Akhlaqul Azam Sir Notes
Akhlaqul Azam Sir Notes
Approaches to Interpretation
It is well known fact that a statute is intention of legislature. The language employed in the
statute is the determinative factor of the legislative intent and the essence of the law, as said by
Salmond, lies in its spirit, not in letter. The letter is significant only as being the external
manifestation of the intention that underlines it.
The interpretation is usually either ‘legal’ or ‘doctrinal’. It is legal when there is an actual rule of
law which binds the judge to place a certain interpretation on the statute. It is doctrinal when its
purpose is to discover the real or true meaning of the statute. Legal interpretation is again
divided into ‘authentic’ and ‘usual’. It is authentic when the rule of interpretation is derived from
the legislator himself; it is usual when it comes from the other source such as , custom or case
laws.
Since a Statute is the ‘will of the legislature’. The legislature will follow the procedure laid down
or prescribed in the enactment of laws. If there is any procedural defect in the legislative process,
it may be cured immediately by appropriate legislative action i.e., by amendment to the existing
provision or inserting a new one in its place, without canvassing or challenging in the courts.
Courts are under a duty to interpret the Statute irrespective of ambiguity or lack of clarity or
otherwise, in order to discharge its basic duty of doing justice. In this process, the courts have
attempted to find out the intention of the legislature from the words used in the four corners of
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the relevant provisions. The usual rule that is adhered to is nothing to be implied, which is
inconsistent with the words used in expressing the intention of the legislature, as the words used
in the Statute speak for the intention of the legislature.
Balasinor nagrik Co-operative Bank Ltd., Vs. Babubhai shanker Lal Pandya (1987)
In this case the court observed that the object of all interpretation of a Statute is to determine the
intention of the law-maker from the language used to find out whether a particular case falls
within the ambit of the intention so determined.
Certain set of rules have been framed to govern the process of interpretation. If one judge takes
only narrow meaning of the language of a statutory provision and the other judge takes a broad
meaning of the same, then the same law will mean differently yo different persons. Therefore,
the basic principles of interpretation of statute are necessary to be observed though they are not
enacted laws. These rules have been formulated on the basis of the views taken by Supreme
Court and High Courts. Sccording to Salmond, these principles are guide. The Basic Principles
of Interpretation of Statute are as follows:
1. Intention of Legislature
The legislature enacts a law with a definite object. That object of legislature is called ‘intent’.
The legislature expects that the law enacted by it shall be understood by the courts in its true
spirit and shall be administered in accordance with the intention with which the statute has been
framed so as to advance the purpose of the statute.
The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in
the words used by the Legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed to have been
intended but what has been said. The key to the opening of every law is the reason and spirit of
the law. Each word, phrase or sentence, is to be construed in the light of the general purpose of
the Act itself. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context, as they are the bases of
interpretation. If the text is the texture, context gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. A
particular clause or expression is construed by construing the whole instrument and any
dominant purposes that it may express. The Legislative function cannot be usurped under the
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disguise of interpretation, and the danger of an priori determination of the meaning of a provision
based on the preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme should be avoided. Caution
is all the more necessary.
The correct interpretation is one that best harmonizes the words with the object of the statute. A
right construction of the Act can only be attained if its whole scope and object together with an
analysis of its wording and the circumstances in which it is enacted are taken into consideration.
It s all about interpretation and not about interpolation.
The rules of interpretation are not rules of law; they are guides and such of them which serve no
useful purpose, can be rejected and new rules can be evolved in their place. They are aids to
construction, presumptions or pointers.
The shift towards use of plain language has attached with it, a lot of controversy. The language
of our legislation cannot be reduced to baby talk for consumption of the masses, and the
attainment of precision, and accuracy. A good draft contains a clear expression of intent, uses a
consistent terminology throughout, avoids passive voice and aspirational statements The terms
defined are either authoritatively defined in the draft or by judicial interpretation. Sentences are
short. Simple words commonly used in ordinary speech are preferred. Convoluted sub-division is
avoided and so is repetition.
the court held that the law is a pragmatic instrument of social order and an interpretative effort
must be imbued with the statutory purpose. A construction that would promote the purpose or
object of an Act, even if not expressed, is to be preferred. “There is no possibility of mistaking
midnight for noon; but at what precise moment twilight becomes darkness is hard to determine.”
Nelson Motis v Union of India (1992) it was held that when the word of statute are clear, plain or
unambiguous, i.e, they bear only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that
meaning, without looking ino consequences thereof.
J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan (2003), it was held that where the language is clear, the
intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used.
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Union of India v Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. (2008) SC held that all the statutes have to be
considered in light of the object and purport of the Act.
CCE Customs v. Punjab Fibres Ltd. (2008) it was held that the legislative intent must be
determined on comparing other provisions of the same statute.
The meaning of the maxim Ex Visceribus Actus is that every part of the statute must be construed
within the four corners of the Act. No provision should be interpreted in isolation. The statute as
a whole, the previous state of the law, other statutes in pari material (on same subject matter), the
general scope of the statute, and the mischief it is to remedy, is the basic context of any statute.
The elementary rule states that the intention of the Legislature must be found by reading the
statute as a whole. Every clause needs to be construed with reference to the context and other
clauses of the Act, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes
relating to the subject-matter. It is the most natural and genuine exposition of a statute.
The conclusion that the language is plain or ambiguous can only be truly arrived at by studying
the statute as a whole. How far and to what extent each component influences the meaning of the
other , would be different in each given case. Each word, must however, be allowed to play its
role, however significant or insignificant it may be. in achieving the legislative intent. Each
section must be construed as a whole, whether or not one of the parts is a saving clause or a
proviso. They may be interdependent, each portion throwing light, if need be on the rest.
According to Lord Davey, every clause of the statute must be construed with reference to context
and other clauses of the Act, so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series
of statutes relating to the subject matter.
According to Lord Greene, to ascertain the meaning of a clause in a statute, the court must look
at the whole statute, at what precedes and at what succeeds and not merely at the clause itself.
Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. V. Suresh Chand (1978) the SC observed that to construe one part of
a statute by another part of the same statute is most genuine and natural exposition of statute.
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State of Maharashtra v. Marwanjee (2002) the SC held that the statute have to be considered in
its entirety and picking up of one word from one particular provision and thereby analyzing it in
a manner contrary to the statement of objects and reasons is neither permissible not warranted.
The office Memorandum dated 14.12.1983 provided officer who will serve in North Eastern
region for a fixed tenure he considered for further posting at n station of his choice. Under this
provision, the respondent named his posting at Agartala on his choice posting, but he was
transferred to Dimapur. Respondent challenged the said before Central Administrative Tribunal
who quashed the impugned transfer order, hence this Appeal. When the provision relating to
choice after completion of fixed tenure in North Eastern region was studied in light of the policy
as a whole, it was observed that this provision was made applicable only for those persons who
belonged to the region other North Eastern region. It was admitted position that the respondent
belonged to North East region, his home town was Agartala in the State of Tripura, he was
originally appointed and posted in that region and for most of his service, he was posted at
Agartala. In view of these facts, the Supreme Court observed that respondent had no right to
claim his posting at Agartala.
The meaning of this maxim is that a provision should not be construed in such a manner so as to
reduce any other provision or the statute to futility. In other words, the language of the provision
must be so interpreted that the law does not become a dead letter. To explain it further, whenever
the words used in a provision are uncertain and imprecise and are capable of bearing more than
one meaning, thereby leading to ambiguity in the language and possibility of alternative
construction, then such a construction should be preferred by which none of the provisions is
turned inoperative. The spirit behind this principle is that the courts are not encouraged to scratch
a law for sheer vagueness. The law is enacted by the Legislature with a definite object and
specific purpose. For achieving such purpose, the law is to be administered in its true sense. i.e.,
in accordance with the intention of Legislature. The intention of Legislature cannot be otherwise
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than to give effect to all the provisions of the statute for attainment of the object for which the
law was enacted. In view of this, if the courts shall uphold such an interpretation by which any
provision of law or the law itself is invalidated, then it will be adverse to the legislative intent.
Moreover, making the law, amending it or repealing it, is the exclusive domain of Legislature
and if by arriving at a particular interpretation, any law or its provision is turned ineffective or
futile, it amounts to rejection of law which is outside the jurisdiction of courts. True, that an
enacted law can be abrogated by the court, but only on the ground of unconstitutionality.
However, courts cannot be allowed to create any vagueness or unconstitutionality in a provision
by construing it in a particular manner.
FAREWELL, J., has observed that unless the words are so absolutely senseless that nothing could
be done with them, it will be binding to find some meaning and not to declare them void for
uncertainty.
LORD DENNING states that when a statute has some meaning or several meanings, the courts
have to say what meaning the statute has to bear rather than reject it as a nullity. In the words of
Lord Dunedin, it is our duty to make what we can of statutes, knowing that they are meant to be
operative and nothing short of impossibility should allow a judge to declare a statute
unworkable.
The Apex Court held that principle that a provision le that a provision must be construed in such
a manner so a: it workable.
Section 39 of Electricity Act, 1910 provided that an accused found guilty under this section must
be punished under Section 379 of Indian Penal Code. Section 50 of this Act provided the
procedure. The appellant was convicted for theft of electricity under Section 99 and the
respondent proceeded against him under Section 379 of IPC. The appellant contended that he
could not be convicted under Section 39 as the procedure for conviction as required by Section
50 was not followed. The Respondent contended that punishment under Section 379 of IPC has
to be imposed in accordance with the provisions of Section 39. The Supreme Court, applying this
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principle, held that the offence is against the Electricity Act and not against IPC, hence Section
50 must have been followed.
It may be noted that had the Supreme Court held otherwise, the consequence would have been
that the accused convicted under Section 39 of Electricity Act would have been punished under
Section 379 of IPC without following the procedure for conviction laid down in Section 50 of
Electricity Act and in result, Section 50 would have become ineffective, inoperative and futile.
4. Statute to be construed to make it effective and workable: However plain the meaning
be
The interpretation should be construed to make the statute workable, which secures the object,
unless crucial omissions or clear direction makes that end unattainable. The doctrine of
purposive reconstruction may be taken recourse to for the purpose of giving it full effect to the
statutory provisions. The meaning of the statute must be considered rather then the rendering the
statute a nullity.
Plain words require no construction. This starts with the premise that the words are plain and that
the conclusion can be arrived at after construing the words. This also means that once the
conclusion has been arrived at, that the words/ sentence can bear only one meaning, the effect to
that meaning is to be given.
It was held “Statutory enactment must ordinarily be construed according to its plain meaning and
no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a
provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable
with the test of the statute.”