Lucero v. Loot, G.R. No. L-16995, October 26, 1968
Lucero v. Loot, G.R. No. L-16995, October 26, 1968
Lucero v. Loot, G.R. No. L-16995, October 26, 1968
LOOT
G.R. NO. L-16995 OCTOBER 26, 1968
FACTS:
The Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered a decision in a land registration case favor
of the Julio Lucero. With regard to the writ of possession, the CFI ruled that “once the final
decree has been issued the issuance of a writ of possession is only a matter of course if nothing
in the past has been issued in favor of the registered owner.” In addition, it is also ruled that
there is no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of possession, and inasmuch as the
final decree has already been entered, it follows that a writ of possession should be issued in
favor of the registered owner.
Accordingly, the writ of possession was granted in favor of Julio Lucero. However, herein
oppositors (all surnamed Loot), who are affected by the writ, filed an urgent motion to quash
the writ of possession interposing that that there were defects in the reconstitution of the
records and that the motion was not under oath. The the motions to quash as trivial arguments
were dismissed, and the two motions for reconsideration were also denied. Thus, the writ of
possession prayed for was issued in favor of Lucero. The oppositors (Loots) went straight to the
Supreme Court and filed for an appeal for certiorari.
The court dismissed these as trivial arguments. Two motions for reconsideration were
also denied. The writ of possession prayed for was issued in favor of Lucero. The Loots went
directly to the Supreme Court for an appeal.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE GRANTING OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION WAS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
RULING:
The Court of First Instance is correct in granting the writ of possession in favor with
Julio Lucero.
No other view would be compatible with the pertinent provision of the Land
Registration Act, as uniformly interpreted by this Court. As was noted in the order of September
21, 1959, there was a final decree in a land registration case which arose from a decision
promulgated in 1938, the final decree being issued on October 29, 1941.
It was not incorrect for the lower court to state, therefore, that "the issuance of a writ
of possession is only a matter of course if nothing in the past has been issued in favor of the
registered owner." It is equally true, as likewise mentioned therein, that there is "no period of
prescription as to the issuance of a writ of possession."
Based on restatement of the principle, the court held in the case of Demorar v. Ibanez,
that a writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a
registration case but also against anyone adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof
during the land registration proceedings.
The issuance of the decree of registration is part of the registration proceedings. In fact,
it is supposed to end the said proceedings. Consequently, any person unlawfully and adversely
occupying said lot at any time up to the issuance of the final decree, may be subject to judicial
ejectment by means of a writ of possession and it is the duty of the registration court to issue
said writ when asked for by the successful claimant.
The fact that the petitioners have instituted, more than one year after the decree of
registration had been issued, an ordinary action with the Court of First Instance attacking the
validity of the decree on the ground of fraud, is not a bar to the issuance of the writ of
possession applied for by the registered owners.
It is clear, that on the facts as found, the validity of the challenged order cannot be
impugned. It is equally clear that this being a direct appeal to us, no questions of fact may be
raised. "Nothing is better settled than that where the correctness of the findings of fact of the
lower court is assailed, the Court of Appeals is the proper forum. If resort be bad directly to us,
then appellant must be deemed to have waived the opportunity otherwise his to inquire into
such findings and to limit himself to disputing the correctness of the law applied.”
There was also no denial in the brief for movant-appellee that such a case was then
pending at the time the respective briefs were filed. What is decided here cannot affect
whatever final decision might possibly have been rendered by this time in the reconveyance
action. Nonetheless, the mere fact that such a suit was then pending did not oust the lower
court of its jurisdiction to issue the writ of possession.