Coming to the issue of the BLA as an organization, it is a Baloch ethno-nationalist organization

that has grown out of the decades-long tense relations between the Baloch people and the

Pakistani government and military over the underdevelopment of Balochistan, exploitation of

Balochistan’s resources, as well as the political suppression of the Baloch people. It was formed

in 2000, and its most recent attack was earlier this week on a ranger’s vehicle in Karachi. The

BLA has historically targeted military personnel, non-Baloch civilians residing in Balochistan,

and foreign nationals, mainly the Chinese to send the message of their discontentment with the

Chinese and Pakistani intervention in Gwadar. As the Gwadar port becomes operational and

open to trade, BLA attacks have increased. the escalating violence in the region is linked with the

growing Chinese presence and intensified activities by the Pakistani armed forces. The group

fears the influx of foreigners in the region, drowning out of Baloch issues and greater economic

exploitation due to the increased trade. They demand greater regional autonomy for Balochistan

as well as greater investment in the region and an immediate halt to the exploitation of

Balochistan’s natural resources. 

Analysing the Baloch insurgency from a historical standpoint provides us with insight to the

political suppression and past conflict that has led to the emergence of BLA. The Baloch

insurgency started in 1947 when the Khan of Kalat declared independence from Pakistan which

led to the Pakistani Army forcibly annexing the region, and hence the struggle over Balochistan's

regional autonomy began. In 1955, with the imposition of the One Unit Scheme, any territorial

identity Balochistan had was eliminated. the Baloch nationalists protested against the Scheme

asking for provincial autonomy. In response, the government launched another military operation

against them. In the 1960s, yet another Baloch separatist movement started gaining momentum

for greater provincial autonomy. The federal government had tasked the Pakistan Army with
building several new bases in key areas of Balochistan. the Baloch nationalists retaliated to this

increasing militarisation in their homeland by carrying out terrorist attacks. In 1970, President

Yahya Khan abolished the "One Unit" policy, and Balochistan was finally granted provincial

status. However, just a few years later in 1973, the Bhutto government dismissed the elected

NAP government in Balochistan on trumped-up charges of terrorism. Hence, the Baloch were

not allowed to run their own affairs for even a year. Baloch response to the action was to launch

an armed struggle that soon turned into a war with the powerful Pakistani military. 80,000

Pakistani troops, helped by combat helicopters and the Air Force, fought against 55,000 poorly

armed Baloch guerrillas.

The 1980s remained a peaceful era for Balochistan as General Zia ul-Haq, declared a ceasefire,

called back the troops, and as a gesture of goodwill released NAP leaders and workers from

prison. Nonetheless, most of the major Baloch leaders did not accept Zia's dictatorship and went

into exile. In 1999, the peace years came to an end as the Musharraf govt infuriated the

nationalists by announcing mega-development projects in Balochistan, which included the

exploration of natural resources, the construction of Gwadar Port, and two army cantonments,

with hardly any representation of or benefit for the Baloch. The Musharraf era led to the 5th

wave of ongoing low-level insurgency, starting in 2003, which has emerged in the form of

organized terrorist groups such as the BLA. 

The Gwadar port is a major issue of contention in the current militant wave. It is one of the

mega-projects in Balochistan with no local participation at all. The port has immense strategic

and economic significance for Pakistan. Due to its location at the cross-junction of international

sea shipping oil trade routes, Gwadar has the potential to become an international trade hub for
Pakistan. However as the pace of construction has increased in Gwadar, so have the incidents of

violence, abduction, and land-grabbing by the Pakistani military. 

Just to briefly shed some light on the socio-economic conditions of Balochistan during these

movements, figures collected by economist Omer Noman for the 1970s present a drastic picture

of deprivation. Balochistan had the highest unemployment rate and the lowest literacy rate, and

47% of the population living below the poverty line. Barely 20% of the population had access to

electricity, and there was little or no supply of infrastructure. And this situation has barely

improved today. At the same time, Pakistan’s poorest province also happens to be the richest in

natural resources such as gas, copper, gold, coal, as well as potential oil reserves. It provides

80% of gas to Pakistan yet receives a mere 12.4% royalty for supplying gas. Gas was discovered

at Sui in 1952, was piped to the rest of the provinces, and became a major revenue earner for the

federal government however, gas was made available to Balochistan’s own capital, Quetta, only

in the 1980s. The Saindak project for copper exploration was also given to China in 2002, which

gets 50% of the profit. Of the remainder, 48% goes to the central government and only 2% to

Balochistan. It is no wonder that the Baloch have come to see the Chinese presence in the region

as a threat to their existence. Locals feel exploited and deprived of the benefits obtained from the

use of their provincial resources, as well as political marginalization by the Pakistani state. Many

Baloch fear that the CPEC will transform Balochistan into a “Chinese Colony”. This fear is

evident in the BLA’s attack on the Pakistani stock exchange building in Karachi in June 2020

which sought to target both Pakistani and Chinese “development” of the region.  

Lastly, the issue of the Baloch unrest and the violence against the Baloch is heavily censored by

the state as pointed out by Human Rights Watch. The lack of access to media or politics to air

out their grievances is definitely a factor in Baloch nationalists resorting to terrorist tactics.
In essence, following the example of the British colonizers, the Pakistani state and military have

extensively exploited Balochistan, its people, and its resources. “When the British annexed

Balochistan in 1884, their only interest in the region was creating a buffer zone between their

Indian colony and the Russian empire, and establishing a safe passage from Sindh to Afghanistan

through Balochistan.” (Khan 1073). This claim falls in line with Ayesha Jalal’s, who says that

the root of the problems in Balochistan is the fact that the Pakistani state and military never

really considered Balochistan a part of Pakistan politically, it was merely a tactical asset to them

(Consortium for Development Policy Research 27:40–27:54) .This, to a large extent, explains

why Balochis increasingly felt alienated. As time progressed, this colonial mindset of the state

did not diminish, if anything, it became more severe. Any qualms or objections that Baloch

citizens raised, instead of addressing them in a constitutional and democratic manner, the state

suppressed them, labeling them trouble-makers and separatists, which only fueled the fire that

was Baloch insurgency. Pakistani military’s habit of involving itself whenever it came to the

affairs of Balochistan has resulted in repeated human rights violations ever since the partition of

1947. In December 2020, Karima Baloch, an activist from Balochistan who advocated for the

independence of the province was found dead in Toronto, Canada. This is widely believed to be

an assassination carried out by Pakistan’s military. If this is in fact the case, it should come as no

surprise. Pakistan’s central leadership, especially under military dictatorships (particularly

Pervaiz Musharaf), has carried out acts of constitutional violations, illegal arrests and even

down-right murders, and they have carried them out very publicly and unapologetically so. And

yet, ironically, most Pakistani, non-Baloch children grow up hearing that Balochis are

treacherous people who harbor separatist sentiments. Well, no wonder they harbor separatist
sentiments. In August 2006, Akbar Bugti, a Baloch nationalist leader, along with 37 of his

tribesmen was killed when helicopter gunships dropped bombs at his hideout as part of the

military operation. (Khan 1082) In addition to this, with the escalation of violence all over the

province, according to some, an alarming 8000-12000 Baloch have simply disappeared. This too

has been linked to discrete, illegal arrests carried out by Pakistan’s military agencies, again, an

extreme constitutional violation of Balochistan’s citizens with no satisfactory response from the

state. It will not be a stretch to say that Balochis have been degraded to second or even third-

class citizens in their own country. There have been sporadic instances of propositions by

civilian governments that may pay possible reparations to Baloch citizens. However, these

initiatives are claimed to have been quashed by individuals in the upper echelons of the military.

Possible solutions should include an immediate stop to any activities by the army in the province,

a greater and adequate fraction of the revenue from Balochistan’s natural resources to be put into

the socio-economic development of the province. Extra effort and attention should be put into

Balochistan’s education sector, with schools and colleges established widely in the province. The

state needs to empower Balochis and give them a sense of belonging. Most importantly, there

needs to be a proper representation of Balochis at a federal level. The failure of the Congress in

agreeing to the Muslim representation at a federal level proposed by Jinnah resulted in the

partition of India, and again in 1971, the failure of West Pakistan’s government in providing

adequate representation to Bengalis at a federal level resulted in the devastating separation of

Bengal from Pakistan. The state needs to learn from these events and take actions to ensure that

history does not repeat itself. Of course, there is always the fear that it may be the case of too

little too late, as was the case with East Pakistan. According to Ayesha Jalal in “The Struggle for

Pakistan”, the advocacy for separation and autonomy started taking real route just as economic
imbalances between the east and west wings of Pakistan were being somewhat leveled out. Ayub

Khan was putting money into development funds in the province and opportunities were being

provided to Bengalis to be integrated into the senior ranks of Pakistan’s civil service (101).

However, the damage done by the war of 1965 proved to be too great. The state must do

everything in its power to make sure that is not the case with Balochistan.

To sum up, if one is to look towards a better Pakistan in the future, the state must compel

the military to extract the roots it has spread in several of Pakistan’s civil institutions. The

military must not interfere with matters of the state. The state must also acknowledge and

welcome individually, and allow for different ethnic identities to flourish within Pakistan. The

practices of discrimination, alienation, and marginalization must be left behind in order to

progress. Lastly, education of each and every citizen should be a top priority. Be it a Baloch, a

Sindhi, or a Pakhtun. On top of that, the education system needs to undergo a drastic change in

terms of efficiency and the syllabus that is taught. The state propaganda that is the syllabus of

every government schools needs to experience a change, different writers should be introduced

into the curriculum. And most importantly, provincial languages should be taught in schools in-

order to bring individuality and originality into the new generation’s ideas and thoughts.

 Consortium for Development Policy Research. “Understanding Contemporary Pakistan

through History: A Conversation with Ayesha Jalal.” YouTube, uploaded by Consortium for
Development Policy Research, 19 Apr. 2017, www.youtube.com/watch?
v=PdIDxHQPRr4&ab_channel=ConsortiumforDevelopmentPolicyResearch
 Jalal, Ayesha. The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics.

Bilingual, Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press, 2017.

 Khan, Adeel. “Renewed Ethnonationalist Insurgency in Balochistan, Pakistan: The

Militarized State and Continuing Economic Deprivation.” Asian Survey, vol. 49, no.

6, 2009, pp. 1071–91. Crossref, doi:10.1525/as.2009.49.6.1071.