1/29/2021 G.R. No.

L-25375 and 25376

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Republic of the Philippines

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-25375 and 25376 October 8, 1926

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

Modesto Reyes for appellant.

VILLAMOR, J.:

Early in the morning of December 21, 1925, Vicente de Leon y Flora entered the yard of Vicente Magat's house on
Domingo Santiago Street, Manila, and without violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things, took,
with intent to gain, two game roosters which were in the yard, one with colored plumage valued at P8 belonging to
Diego Magat, and the other with white plumage and black spots, valued at P10, belonging to Ignacio Nicolas.

Vicente de Leon y Flora was prosecuted in the municipal court for two crimes of theft, on the theft of Magat's rooster
and the other that of Nicolas'. Upon being arraigned, the accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the
municipal court in each to suffer the penalty of three years, six months and one day presidio correcional, to return
the stolen roosters to their respective owners and to pay the costs in both cases. The accused appealed from this
judgment to the Court of First Instance, and, upon being arraigned upon the same informations, pleaded not guilty in
both cases, which were tried jointly by agreement of the parties approved by the court.

In view of the evidence, the trial court found the accused guilty of one crime of theft, holding that the theft of the two
roosters constituted but one crime, and taking into consideration the circumstance that the accused is an habitual
delinquent sentenced him in said two cases to the penalty of three years, six moths and one day presidio
correccional and to pay the costs in case R. G. No. 25375, declaring the costs in case No. 25376, de oficio without
the obligation to indemnify, as the roosters were returned to their respective owners. The accused appealed to this
court and his counsel alleges that the trial court erred: (a) In holding that the guilt of the accused was proven by his
own admission; (b) in not giving him the benefit of reasonable doubt, and (c) in sentencing instead of acquitting the
accused, with the costs de oficio.

We have reviewed the evidence and find no grounds to support the contention of the appellant. We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that the guilt of the accused in the present case is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The
case falls under the provisions of paragraph 5 of article 518 of the Penal Code, amended by section 1 of Act No.
3244, in connection with paragraph 3 of article 520 of the same Code. The penalty provided in the law is that of
presidio correcional in its full extent, and there having been present the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, the
penalty must be imposed upon the accused in its maximum degree, or four years, two moths and one day presidio
correcional. The accused being an habitual delinquent, under Act No. 3062 an additional penalty must be imposed
upon him consisting of half the penalty provided or the crime committed, or 2 years and 1 month presidio
correcional. (People vs. Aguinaldo, 47 Phil., 728; People vs. Espiritu, R. G. No. 24753 1).

We could stop right here, but the Attorney-General raises a question in his brief which we believe it is necessary for
us to resolve now, due to the fact that it is not only important to our jurisprudence, but also to the due prosecution of
violators of the law. The Attorney-General urges that the penalty for two crimes of theft be imposed upon the
accused for each of the stolen roosters. The question, then, to determine is whether or not the fact that the accused,
with intent to gain, on the same occasion and in the same place, took the two roosters, one belonging to Vicente
Magat and the other to Ignacio Nicolas, constitutes two crimes of theft.

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It will be remembered that article 517 of the Penal Code contains three paragraphs enumerating the acts which
constitute the crime of theft. The first defines theft in general; the second declares a particular act to be theft which
is not included in the description in the first paragraph, and the third also considers theft a series of acts with similar
characteristics to the general type, with the exceptions therein noted.

Article 517 of the Penal Code reads as follows:

ART. 517. The following are guilty of theft: 1awph!l.net

1. Any person who, with intent to gain, but without the use of violence or intimidation against any person or
the use of force upon anything, shall take anything which is the personal property of another without the
latter's consent.

2. Any person who, having found anything which has been lost, shall with knowledge of its ownership
appropriate the same with of gain.

3. Any person guilty of malicious damage who shall remove or make use of the things damaged, subject to
the exceptions established by paragraphs one two, and three of article five hundred and ninety-two paragraph
one of article five hundred and ninety-three; paragraph one of article five hundred and ninety-five, and articles
five hundred and ninety-six, five hundred and ninety-eight, and six hundred and three.

As may be seen, the act taking another's property without violence or intimidation against persons, not force upon
things, with intent to gain and without the consent of its owner, is what constitutes the crime of theft, as described in
the first paragraph of article 517.

The crime of theft is an offense against personal property and what is punished is the alarm caused in the
community by the perpetration of the act which is violative of the individual rights guaranteed by the law, as well as
the damage that said act may occasion to the members of the community. Under sound principles, the act of taking
the two roosters, in response to the unity of thought in the criminal purpose on one occasion, is not susceptible of
being modified by the accidental circumstance that the article unlawfully belonged to two distinct persons. There is
no series of acts here for the accomplishment of different purposes, but only one of which was consummated, and
which determines the existence of only one crime. The act of taking the roosters in the same place and on the same
occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their own, because there are not two
distinct appropriations nor two intentions that characterize two separate crimes.

The Supreme Court of Spain, in its decision of July 13, 1894, said:

The act of unlawfully taking two colts, two cows and two calves on one night, belonging to four owners, which
livestock was found in various adjacent and open meadows, constitutes only one crime of theft, because the
fact that the persons injured by the taking of the cattle by the accused were several, said accused knowing
that the meadows in which this livestock was found were open and adjacent, it being easy to pass from one to
the other, does not authorize the legal conception that the said accused committed four thefts on said night,
but only one as found by the lower court, which did not commit an error of law by holding that the acts were
committed on a single occasion.

It is not an element of the crime of theft that the culprit know the owner of the thing stolen, the crime being
consummated provided that being stolen belongs to another and the same is taken with intent to gain. (Decision of
the supreme Court of Spain of November 22, 1898.) Neither is it necessary for the existence of the crime of theft
that it should appear in a specific manner who the owner is of the thing stolen, because the law does not require it
nor does it affect the criminal liability, but only the restitution or indemnification of damages, which are merely of a
civil nature. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, October 4, 1905.) What constitutes the crime of theft is the
taking of another's property with intent to gain, without the consent of the owner, so that after the unlawful act of
taking another's property is proven, it is evident that all the elements mentioned in the first paragraph of article 517
of the Penal Code exist. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the unity of the intention to take a thing belonging to
another on one occasion and in the same place, constitutes the commission of only one crime of theft; and fact that
the things taken belong to different persons does not produce a multiplicity of crimes, which must be punished
separately.

In arriving at this conclusion, we have not lost sight of the doctrine laid down in United States vs. Balaba (37 Phil.,
260), according to which, where the accused made no objection to the information on the ground that it charged
more than one offense, the prosecution properly submitted evidence as to the commission of each and all of the
offenses charged; and the trial court also properly entered judgment of conviction of each and all of these offenses
which were established by the introduction of competent evidence at the trial and should, therefore, have imposed
the prescribed penalties for each and all of the offenses of which the accused was convicted in accordance with the
provisions of article 87 of the Penal Code. This doctrine, however, is not applicable to the present case as two
separate complaints have been filed herein against the accused, but the trial court convicted the accused in the two
cases, considering the facts alleged in the said complaints as constituting but one crime.

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In American cases the same doctrine is maintained as in Spanish decisions in regard to the question which is here
debated:

In Corpus Juris, vol. 36, page 799, it is said in regard to the taking of articles belonging to two different owners at the
same time and place: "In a few jurisdictions the rule obtains that if two or more articles belonging to different are
stolen at the same time and place, the theft of the property of each owner is a separate crime and may be
prosecuted as such." (U. S. vs. Beerman, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,560; 5 Cranch C. C., 412; State vs. Thurston 27 S.
C. L., 382; Morton vs. State, 1 Lea [Tenn.], 498.) In other jurisdiction it is held that such a theft may be prosecuted,
at the pleasure of the State, either as one offense or as several distinct offenses. (Bushman vs. Com., 138 Mass.,
507; Com. vs. Sullivan, 104 Mass., 552; State vs. Douglas, 26 Nev., 196; 65 Pac., 802; 99 Am. St., 688; State vs.
Lambert, 9 Nev., 321.) But the prevailing rule is that if several articles, stored in the same place, are taken by a
single larcenous act, the mere fact that some of them belonged to one person and some to another does not
dissolve the act into separate crimes. (Ala.-Clemm vs. State, 154 Ala., 12; 45 So., 212; Am. St., 17; D. C.-Chanock
vs. U. S., 50 App., 54; 267 Fed., 612; Holies vs. U. S., 10 D. C., 370; 36 Am. Rep., 106; Ga.-Lowe vs. State, 57 Ga.,
171; Dean vs. State, 9 Ga. A., 571; 71 South East, 932; III.-Peo. vs. Israel, 269 III., 284; 109 North East, 969; Ind.-
Furnace vs. State, 153 Ind.-93; 54 North East, 441; Bell vs. State 42 Ins., 335; Iowa-State vs. Sampson, 157 Iowa,
257; 138 North West, 473; 42 Law. Rep. An. [N. S.], 967; State vs. Congrove, 109 Iowa., 66; 80 North West, 227;
State vs. Larson, 85 Iowa, 659; 52 North West, 539; Ky.-Nichols vs. Com., 78 Ky., 180; Md.-State vs. Warren, 77
Md., 121; 26 Atl. Rep., 500; 39 Am. St., 401; Mich.-Peo. vs. Johnson, 81 Mich., 573; 45 North West, 1119; Miss.-
State vs. Quintini, 51 So., 276; Dalton vs. State, 91 Miss., 162; 44 So., 802; 124 Am. St., 637; Ward vs. State, 90
Miss., 249; 43 So., 466; Mo.-State vs. Morphin, 37 Mo., 373; Lorton vs. State, 7 Mo., 55; 37 Am. Dec., 179; Mont.-
State vs. Mjelde, 29 Mont., 490; 75 Pac., 87; N. H.-State vs. Merril, 44 N. H., 624; N. M.-State vs. Klasner, 19 N. M.,
474; 145 Pac., 679; Ann. Cas. 1917-D, 824; N. C.-State vs. Simons, 70 N. C., 336; Oh-State vs. Hennessey, 23 Oh.
St., 339, 13 Am. Rep., 253; State vs. Smith, 10 Oh. Dec. (Reprint), 682; 23 Cinc- LBul., 85; Or.-State vs. Clark, 46
Or., 140; 80 Pac., 101; Pa.-Fulmer vs. Com., 97 Pa., 503; Com. vs. Lent, 15 Pa. Dist., 884; S. D.-State vs. Kieffer,
17 S. D., 67; 95 North West, 289; Tex.-Wilson vs. State, 45 Tex., 76; 23 Am. Rep., 602; Hudson vs. State, 9 Tex. A.,
151, 35 Am. Rep., 732; Addison vs. State, 3 Tex. A., Utah-State vs. Mickel, 23 Utah, 507; 65 Pac., 484; Vt.-State vs.
Blay, 77 Vt., 56; 58 Atl. Rep., 794; State vs. Emery, 68 Vt., 109; 34 Atl. Rep., 432; 54 Am. St., 878; State vs.
Newton, 42 Vt., 537; Va.-Alexander vs. Com., 90 Va., 809; 20 South East, 782; Wash.-State vs. Laws, 61 Wash.,
533; 112 Pac., 488; State vs. Butts, 42 Wash., 455; 85 Pac., 33; Terr. vs. Heywood, 2 Wash., 180; 2 Pac., 189;
Wyo.-Ackerman vs. State, 7 Wyo., 504; 54 Pac., 228; Eng.-Reg. vs. Bleasdale, 2 C. & K., 765; 61 Eng. C. L., 765.)

For the foregoing, the judgment appealed from must be, as is hereby, modified and the accused Vicente de Leon y
Flora is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six years and three months presidio mayor, with the accessories of the
law, and to pay the costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real., JJ., concur.
Johns, J., concurs in the result.

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