The Netherlands and Denmark agreed on using the equidistance principle to delimit the boundary between their continental shelves. However, Germany argued this principle would disadvantage it given its concave coastline. The International Court of Justice was asked to determine the applicable legal principles for such delimitation. The Court held that the equidistance principle had not attained customary international law status, as it did not meet the requirements of widespread and representative participation and uniform state practice. As such, Germany was not legally obligated to accept the equidistance principle for delimiting its continental shelf boundaries in the North Sea.
The Netherlands and Denmark agreed on using the equidistance principle to delimit the boundary between their continental shelves. However, Germany argued this principle would disadvantage it given its concave coastline. The International Court of Justice was asked to determine the applicable legal principles for such delimitation. The Court held that the equidistance principle had not attained customary international law status, as it did not meet the requirements of widespread and representative participation and uniform state practice. As such, Germany was not legally obligated to accept the equidistance principle for delimiting its continental shelf boundaries in the North Sea.
The Netherlands and Denmark agreed on using the equidistance principle to delimit the boundary between their continental shelves. However, Germany argued this principle would disadvantage it given its concave coastline. The International Court of Justice was asked to determine the applicable legal principles for such delimitation. The Court held that the equidistance principle had not attained customary international law status, as it did not meet the requirements of widespread and representative participation and uniform state practice. As such, Germany was not legally obligated to accept the equidistance principle for delimiting its continental shelf boundaries in the North Sea.
The Netherlands and Denmark agreed on using the equidistance principle to delimit the boundary between their continental shelves. However, Germany argued this principle would disadvantage it given its concave coastline. The International Court of Justice was asked to determine the applicable legal principles for such delimitation. The Court held that the equidistance principle had not attained customary international law status, as it did not meet the requirements of widespread and representative participation and uniform state practice. As such, Germany was not legally obligated to accept the equidistance principle for delimiting its continental shelf boundaries in the North Sea.
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NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASES (1969)
FACTS:
Countries Netherlands and Denmark made an agreement on the prolongation of the boundary line based on the equidistance principle. However, Germany stated that due to its concave coastline, such boundary line would be disadvantage on her part as to the share of the continental shelf that is based on proportionality to the length of its North Sea coastline. The parties thereby requested the Court to decide the principles and rules of international law that are applicable to the above delimitation, since the parties failed to agree on the applicable principles or rules of delimitation- whether the principle of equidistant as claimed by Netherlands and Denmark or through the principle of just and equitable method. Germany argued that the principle of equidistance was neither a mandatory rule in delimitation of the continental shelf nor a rule of customary international law that was binding on Germany. The Court was not asked to delimit as the parties had already agreed to delimit the continental shelf but rather, the Court had to decide the principles and rules of international law applicable to this delimitation and whether these principles were binding on the parties either through treaty law or customary international law.
ISSUE/S:
A. Whether or not Germany has the legal obligation to accept the equidistance-special circumstances principle contained in Art. 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958 either as a customary international law rule or on the basis of the Genneva Convention? B. Whether or not the equidistance method shall be used for the delimitation of the concerned areas? C. Whether or not the Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention is binding on Germany in so far as they reflect customary international law? D. Whether or not the Article 6 on the equidistance principle attain the customary law status after the Convention came into force?
HELD/RULING:
No. The equidistance method has not attained its customary law status; therefore, it is not obligatory to be used in the delimitation of the concerned areas in the North Sea. The Court held that for a customary rule to emerge, it needed (1) very widespread and representative participation in the Convention, including States whose interests were specially affected and (2) uniformity in practice like consistent and uniform usage in a manner that shows (3) general recognition of the rule of law or legal opinion such as opinion juries. In this case of North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the court further held that the passage of a considerable period of time was unnecessary for the formation of a customary law. The first criteria was not met as the number of ratifications and accessions to the Convention were not adequately represented or widespread.
Although some States favour the practice of the equidistance principle, the Court could not deduct the necessary opinion juris from the State practice. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases confirmed that both State practice (objective element) and opinio juris (subject element) are essential pre-requisites for the formation of a customary law rule.
The Court concluded that the equidistance principle was not binding on Germany by way of treaty or customary international law. Since the principle of equidistance had not attained a customary international law status, then the use of such principle is not obligatory for the delimitation of the concerned areas.
