The Court of Appeals' decision is sustained. The petitioner carrier failed to prove that the 349.65 metric ton shortage of fertilizer cargo was due to a peril of the sea or storm. Bad weather must reach a certain threshold of severity to exempt carriers from liability, and petitioner did not show the winds exceeded this threshold or were unexpected. Petitioner also did not prove the weather was the sole proximate cause of damage or that it exercised extraordinary diligence. Additionally, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied as it was filed late based on proof of receipt of the decision.
The Court of Appeals' decision is sustained. The petitioner carrier failed to prove that the 349.65 metric ton shortage of fertilizer cargo was due to a peril of the sea or storm. Bad weather must reach a certain threshold of severity to exempt carriers from liability, and petitioner did not show the winds exceeded this threshold or were unexpected. Petitioner also did not prove the weather was the sole proximate cause of damage or that it exercised extraordinary diligence. Additionally, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied as it was filed late based on proof of receipt of the decision.
The Court of Appeals' decision is sustained. The petitioner carrier failed to prove that the 349.65 metric ton shortage of fertilizer cargo was due to a peril of the sea or storm. Bad weather must reach a certain threshold of severity to exempt carriers from liability, and petitioner did not show the winds exceeded this threshold or were unexpected. Petitioner also did not prove the weather was the sole proximate cause of damage or that it exercised extraordinary diligence. Additionally, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied as it was filed late based on proof of receipt of the decision.
The Court of Appeals' decision is sustained. The petitioner carrier failed to prove that the 349.65 metric ton shortage of fertilizer cargo was due to a peril of the sea or storm. Bad weather must reach a certain threshold of severity to exempt carriers from liability, and petitioner did not show the winds exceeded this threshold or were unexpected. Petitioner also did not prove the weather was the sole proximate cause of damage or that it exercised extraordinary diligence. Additionally, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied as it was filed late based on proof of receipt of the decision.
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The case involved a shipment of fertilizer by sea from Ukraine to ports in the Philippines. There was a shortage discovered upon delivery to one of the ports. The insurer paid the claim and then sought reimbursement from the carrier.
The shipment consisted of 21,857 metric tons of prilled urea fertilizer transported from Ukraine to ports in La Union and Albay in the Philippines. Upon delivery to Albay, there was a shortage of 349.65 metric tons discovered.
The carrier claimed that the loss was due to a fortuitous event (bad weather) encountered during the voyage, which constituted a 'peril of the sea' exempting them from liability under commercial law.
G.R. No.
190271 : September 14, 2016
TRANSIMEX CO., Petitioner, v. MAFRE ASIAN INSURANCE CORP., Respondent.
SERENO, C.J.:
FACTS:
On 21 May 1996, M/V Meryem Ana received a shipment consisting of 21,857 metric tons of Prilled Urea Fertilizer from Helm Duengemittel GMBH at Odessa, Ukraine. The shipment was covered by two separate bills of lading and consigned to Fertiphil for delivery to two ports, one in Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union; and the other in Tabaco, Albay. Fertiphil insured the cargo against all risks under a marine risk note issued by respondent Mafre Asian Insurance Corporation.
On 20 June 1996, M/V Meryem Ana arrived at Poro Point, La Union, and discharged 14,339.507 metric tons of fertilizer under the first bill of lading. The ship sailed on to Tabaco, Albay, to unload the remainder of the cargo. The fertilizer unloaded at Albay appeared to have a gross weight of 7,700 metric tons. The present controversy involves only this second delivery.
When the cargo was subsequently weighed, it was discovered that only 7,350.35 metric tons of fertilizer had been delivered. Because of the alleged shortage of 349.65 metric tons, Fertiphil filed a claim with respondent for P1,617,527.37,15 which was found compensable.
After paying the claim of Fertiphil, respondent demanded reimbursement from petitioner on the basis of the right of subrogation. The claim was denied, prompting respondent to file a complaint with the RTC for recovery of sum of money.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner to pay the claim of P1,617,527.37. The RTC found that there was indeed a shortage in the cargo delivered, for which the common carrier must be held responsible under Article 1734 of the Civil Code. On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and denied petitioner's appeal. Petitioner claims that the loss was due to a fortuitous event as during its voyage, the vessel encountered bad weather.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable for the loss or damage sustained by the cargo because of bad weather?
HELD: Court of Appeals’ decision is sustained.
COMMERCIAL LAW: peril of the sea
Petitioner asserts that it is exempt from loss or damage sustained as a result of a peril of the sea. However, petitioner failed to prove the existence of a storm or a peril of the sea within the context of Article 1734 of the Civil Code or of COGSA. Not all instances of bad weather may be categorized as storms or perils of the sea within the meaning of the provisions of the Civil Code and COGSA on common carriers. To be considered absolutory causes under either statute, bad weather conditions must reach a certain threshold of severity.
Although the term “peril of the sea” has not been definitively defined in Philippine jurisprudence, courts in the United States of America generally limit the application of the phrase to weather that is "so unusual, unexpected and catastrophic as to be beyond reasonable expectation." Accordingly, strong winds and waves are not automatically deemed perils of the sea, if these conditions are not unusual for that particular sea area at that specific time, or if they could have been reasonably anticipated or foreseen. While cases decided by U.S. courts are not binding precedents in this jurisdiction, the Court considers these pronouncements persuasive60 in light of the fact that COGSA was originally an American statute that was merely adopted by the Philippine Legislature in 1936.
In this case, M/V Meryem Ana faced winds of only up to 40 knots while at sea. This wind force clearly fell short of the 48 to 55 knots required for "storms" under Article 1734(1) of the Civil Code based on the threshold established by PAGASA. Petitioner also failed to prove that the inclement weather encountered by the vessel was unusual, unexpected, or catastrophic. In particular, the strong winds and waves, which allegedly assaulted the ship, were not shown to be worse than what should have been expected in that particular location during that time of the year. Consequently, these weather conditions cannot be considered as "perils of the sea" that would absolve the carrier from liability.
Even assuming that the inclement weather encountered by the vessel amounted to a "storm" under Article 1734(1) of the Civil Code, still petitioner cannot be absolved from liability as there is no proof that the bad weather encountered by M/V Meryem Ana was the proximate and only cause of damage to the shipment. Further, petitioner failed to establish that it had exercised the diligence required from common carriers to prevent loss or damage to the cargo. Petitioner limited itself to the defense of denial. No other evidence was presented to demonstrate either the proximate and exclusive cause of the loss or the extraordinary diligence of the carrier.
REMEDIAL LAW: motion for reconsideration
The decision of the CA has become final because of the failure of petitioner to timely file a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the CA’s decision dated August 7, 2009 was filed out of time, as based on the reply letter dated October 13, 2009 of the Chief, Administrative Unit, Office of the Postmaster, Makati City, copy of said decision was received by petitioner's counsel on September 4, 2009, not September 14, 2009 as alleged in the motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the subject decision dated August 27, 2009 had become final and executory considering that the motion for reconsideration was filed only on September 29, 2009, beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period which lasted until September 19, 2009.
The Certification issued by the Office of the Postmaster of Makati, which states that the decision was received by petitioner’s counsel on 4 September 2009, is entitled to full faith and credence. In the absence of contradictory evidence, the presumption is that the postmaster has regularly performed his duty. In this case, there is no reason to doubt his statement as to the date petitioner received the decision of the CA.