INDIAN MADHYAMAKA

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
AFTER NAGARJUNA Volume 2
__________
Plain English Translations of the Essential Works
of Chandrakirti and Shantideva and Two Early
Madhyamaka Critiques of God
__________
Translated with Notes and Commentaries by
Richard H. Jones
Jackson Square Books New York 2012

Printed and distributed by www.createspace.com

Printed in the United States of America
Copyright © 2012 Richard H. Jones
All Rights Reserved
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Indian Madhyamaka Buddhism after Nagarjuna, volume 2 / translations

with notes and commentaries by Richard H. Jones
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-147-007-6382
ISBN-10: 147-007-6381
1. M~~
Contents
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. iv Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.....v

I. Translations

Chandrakirti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
..3
Entering the Middle Way (Madhyamaka-avatara) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Clearly-worded Commentary (Prasannda-pada) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Shantideva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
135
Entering the Bodhisattva’s Path (Bodhicharya-avatara) . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Collection of the Teachings(Shiksa-samucchaya) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
Two Early Madhyamaka Critiques of the Existence of God . . . . . . . . . . . .
165
Nagarjuna (?), The Refutation of Vishnu as the One Creator . . . . . . . 166
Bhavaviveka, Verses on the Heart of the Middle Way 3.215-23, 3.247-250,
9.89-113 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

II. Commentaries

Chandrakirti’s Innovations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. 177
Shantideva and the Factual Grounding of Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
192
The Madhyamaka Critiques of the Existence of God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
199

References and Other Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

205 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . 209 iii
Abbreviations
BC — Shantideva’s Entering the Bodhisattva’s Path (Bodhicarya-avatara)
CS — Aryadeva’s The Four Hundred Verses

( Catuh-shataka-shastra-karikanama)
HVNP — Aryadeva’s Hand Treatise (Hasta-vala-nama-prakarana) MA —
Chandrakirti’s Entry the Middle Way (Madhyamaka -avatara) MAS —
Bhavaviveka’s Summary of the Meaning of the Middle Way

(Madhyamaka-artha-samgraha)

MHK — Bhavaviveka’s Verses on the Heart of the Middle Way

(Madhyamaka-hridaya-karikas)
MK — Nagarjuna’s Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way (Mula-
madhyamaka-karikas)
MKV — Buddhapalita’s Commentary on Nagarjuna’s Fundamental Verses
on the Middle Way (Mula-Madhyamaka-karika-vritti)
Pr — Chandrakirti’s Clearly-Worded Commentary (Prasanna-pada)
R — Nagarjuna’s Jewel Garland of Advice (Ratna-vali)
Sk — Shantideva’s Collection of the Teachings (Shiksa-samucchaya)
SS — Aryadeva’s One Hundred Verses (Shataka-shastra)
SSK — Nagarjuna’s Seventy Verses on Emptiness
(Shunyata-saptati-karikas)
VP — Nagarjuna’s Pulverizing the Categories (Vaidalya-prakarana)
VV — Nagarjuna’s Overturning the Objections (Vigraha-vyavartanti)
YS — Nagarjuna’s Sixty Verses on Argument (Yukti-shashtikas)

iv
Preface
This volume completes the presentation of selected texts of the Buddhist
Madhyamaka tradition in India. (This book presumes that the reader is
familiar with Volume 1 [Jones 2011] and Nagarjuna: Buddhism’s Most
Important Philosopher [Jones 2010].) It picks up the history two centuries
after the last works of the first volume, those of Bhavaviveka. Apparently,
very little survives from the period between then and the first author
presented here, Chandrakirti. There are other Madhyamaka texts in Sanskrit
that survive from a later period, but this ends the most creative period of
Indian Madhyamaka thought. Chandrakirti and Shantideva were “the last
two major representatives of the authentic Madhyamika doctrine” (Ricci
1988: 6).

This also was the end of any “pure” Madhyamaka schools in India. In the
generation after Shantideva, hybrids of Madhyamaka and the more
prominent Yogachara tradition developed, beginning with Shantarakshita
and Kamalashila. (See Eckel 1987 and Blumenthal 2004 for studies of two
later Madhyamikas, Jnangarbha and Shantarakshita.) The Yogachara
tradition, also known as the Chitta-matra (“nothing but mind”) and
Vijnana-vada (“the doctrine of consciousness”), took external objects to
have no reality — for them, extramental “objects” are merely projections of
the mind, while the Madhyamikas gave such objects conventional reality
and characteristics. Some later Madhyamikas adopted the Yogachara idea of
an underlying “storehouse-consciousness (alaya-vijnana)” to explain
personal continuity. Like “Prasangika” and “Svatantraka,” there was no
Sanskrit labels for the resulting hybrid Yogachara-Madhyamaka schools; all
the labels were later Tibetan inventions. Moreover, among the Indian
Mahayanists, the divisions were fluid and did not represent “schisms” as
with the major divisions within Christianity.

Nagarjuna and the Madhyamaka tradition as a whole did not have the
influence in Indian Buddhism that it had in Tibet and East Asia, let alone
the prominence it is given in the West today, and so it is not surprising that
in India the tradition was absorbed by the dominant Yogachara tradition.
Basically, “aside from a few commentators on N~g~rjuna’s works, who
identified themselves as M~dhyamikas, Indian intellectual life continued
almost

v vi ~ Indian Madhyamaka Buddhist Philosophy After Nagarjuna ~

as if N ~g~rjuna had never existed” (Hayes 1994: 299). Other schools gave
their own definition to “emptiness (shunyata)” and described themselves as
the “middle way” between total nonexistence and eternal, permanent
realities. Those who noted the Madhyamikas at all only did so to reject
them. Chandrakirti was virtually totally ignored until many centuries after
his death (Vose 2009: 18-20) and only one Indian commentary on his work
is known.

As with the earlier books, the translations from Sanskrit here are attempts to
make the works understandable to those within the general public who are
interested in philosophy. The basic texts, unlike the commentaries, were
pithy because they were designed to be chanted and memorized.
(Chandrakirti’s Entering the Middle Way and Shantideva’s Entering the
Bodhisattva’s Path are still chanted and memorized today.) Sometimes there
is no verb in a Sanskrit line but only nouns and ancillary words. In many
lines, a pronoun is used to refer to a word in a previous verse or to
something that the listeners have been told but that the translator must now
supply — sometimes even a pronoun is omitted. Words thus have often
been added in English to fill out the terse verses — including sometimes a
subject or verb. Material has also been added in parentheses to indicate my
interpretation of what the text means or to offer explanations. The texts
were never meant to be understood independently of a teacher or a
tradition’s commentary — it was understood that there would be a teacher
there explaining the lines more fully. That the listeners would share a
common philosophical background and thus already know the meaning of
many of the technical terms also made it less necessary for the authors to
expand their thoughts.

Also as with the earlier books, the basic works have been reformatted here
from a series of verses into sentences and paragraphs grouped as the
subject-matter dictates. The grammar and syntax (e.g., changing a passive
voice to active) has also been changed when it helps clarify the meaning.
Attempts to modernize the works — e.g., translating a word that means
“unreasonable” or “unacceptable” as “illogical” or “logically contradictory”
or “logically impossible” — have been resisted because of the danger that
they distort the original works and mislead the modern reader. (One
concession has been to change the experiential flavor of verbs denoting “x
is not found’ or “x is not seen” to the ontological claim “x does not exist”or
“there is no x.”) Certainly, overtly reading Western philosophy and
contemporary science into premodern Indian texts has been avoided.

***
I. Translations Chandrakirti
(fl. 600-650)

Chandrakirti probably came from South India. He supposedly used miracles

to convert others to the doctrine of emptiness (e.g., supplying the
community of monks with milk by milking a picture of a cow and passing
his hand through a pillar to show its lack of self-existence). He ended up
abbot of the great Buddhist monastic university at Nalanda located near
Rajgir in Bihar in northeast India. There he clashed with the Sanskrit
grammarian Chandragomin. But he became the most prominent
Madhyamika after Nagarjuna on philosophical matters — indeed, the
modern scholarly understanding of Nagarjuna is tightly shaped by the
understanding of Chandrakirti.

The first text presented here is Chapter 6 of his Entering the Middle Way.
The text is still used today in Tibetan monasteriesas the basic introduction
to the Madhyamaka school. He wrote it before the Clearly-worded
Commentary. It is composed in the same tense style that most of these texts
were. It assumes background knowledge and requires commentary; in fact,
he wrote a commentary to it after composing the Clearly-worded
Commentary whose contents suggests that he did not change his positions
in the interim. The text is no longer extant in Sanskrit, but the Sanskrit for
this chapter has been reconstructed from the Tibetan (Sastri 1929-32); this
means that the new Sanskrit may reflect a particular Tibetan understanding
of the text.

The second text is his Clearly-worded Commentary on Nagarjuna’s

Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way (MK). (Verses from the MK are
indented and in italics; they are sometimes translated differently than in
Jones 2010 to reflect Chandrakirti’s understanding of the text.) The entire
text would be over 600 pages in translation, but the basics of his teachings
can be presented with selections. The first selection — his commentary on
MK 1 — in fact is itself a summary of his teachings. (Some long quotations
from other texts have been omitted or abbreviated.) Also included are his
commentaries on chapters 15, 24, part of 18, and 25. New topic headings
have been added.

***
Entering the Middle Way (Madhyamaka-avatara)
Chapter 6

[1] On the stage of their path called “Directly Facing the Realm of Truth,”
bodhisattvas abide with a concentrated mind. They proceed toward the
qualities of a perfect buddha and perceive the nature of dependent-arising.
They dwell in wisdom and thereby attain the cessation of rebirths. [2] A
single person with sight can easily lead a group of blind people to their
desired destination, and so it is with wisdom here: it takes the sightless
virtues and guides them to victory. [3] The noble Nagarjuna grasped the
profound nature of things through reasoning as well as through scriptural
authority, and the approach to be advanced here is inaccord with his way.

[4] When some ordinary persons merely hear about emptiness, great joy
wells up again and again. Their eyes fill with tears of joy, and the hair on
their body stand on end. [5] They have the seed of a perfect buddha and are
receptive students for the teaching of the true nature of reality. It is to them
that reality from the ultimate point of view should be taught since thereby
they will receive the qualities necessary for enlightenment. [6] They always
embrace the code of proper conduct, give generously, practice compassion,
and cultivate patience. They apply the merit of these practices toward their
awakening for the liberation of all living creatures. [7] They venerate the
perfect bodhisattvas. Those people who are expert inthis profound and vast
way will, step by step, attain the stage called “the Great Joy.” Those alone
who yearn for this stage should listen to this path.

The Non-Arising of Phenomena from Themselves or Others

[8] No entity arises from itself, but how can it arise from another? It does
not arise from both itself and another, but how can it arise without a cause?
It would be entirely pointless for an entity to arise from itself (since it must
already exist to arise). In addition, it is inadmissible to suggest that
something that is already arisen could be arise all over again. [9] If you
think that what is already arisen gives rise to further arisings, then either the
production of, for example, a sprout from a seed cannot occur in everyday
experience (because the effect already exists), or else its seed would
produce sprouts again and again until the end of all existence — for how
could all these sprouts ever do away with the seed?

[10] For you Samkhyas (who maintain that the effect is present but
unmanifested in the cause and so is identical to the cause), there is no
difference in the sprout’s shape, color, taste, efficacy, or ripening as the
effect of the seed as the cause. [11] If for you the seed is not different from
the associated sprout, then either what is termed “the sprout” would, like
the seed, never be perceived, or the seed would look precisely like the
sprout since the two are the same. Thus, this cannot be maintained. [12]
Because the effect is seen only if the cause has ceased, the two are not the
same even on the level of everyday experience. Thus, to suggest that things
are selfproduced is inadmissible from the point of view both of ultimate
truth and conventional truth. [13] If self-production is maintained, then
“product,” “producer,” “effect,” and “agent of production” would be
identical. But they are obviously not identical, and thus the claim of self-
production is not acceptable because of the objectionable consequences that
have been explained extensively in Nagarjuna’sFundamental Verses of the
Middle Way.

[14] Turning to the second option for arising: If one entity were indeed to
come into existence from dependence on something else, thick darkness
would arise from fire. Indeed, if this were the case, then you must agree that
anything could arise from anything, since it is not merely the cause that is
different from its effect but all things unproductive of that effect are
different from that effect.

Objection : [15] What is capable of being produced is for that reason

designated “the effect,” and what is capable of generating it is “the cause,”
even though it is different from the effect. They belong to one continuum of
causes and effects. The effect was produced from what gives rise to it, and
so it is not the case that, for example, a rice sprout is caused by a barley
seed.

Reply : [16] You do not judge that a barley seed or a lotus seed or a
kimshuka flower seed or any other type of seed produces a rice sprout
because they do not possess the capacity to do so, and because they are not
included in a common continuum with the rice sprout, and because they are
differ from a sprout. [17] Seed and sprout do not exist simultaneously, so
how then can the seed be different from the sprout when there is no sprout
existing at the same time for it to contrast with? Thus, the sprout cannot be
produced from the seed (as another thing existing at the same time). Thus,
the proposition “There is production from another” should be given up.

Objection : [18ab] Just as the ends of a scale’s beam can be seen moving
simultaneously — i.e., one goes up as the other goes down — so too the
arising of an effect and the cessation of the cause are simultaneous.

Reply : [18cd] Even though the movement of the beam’s ends are
simultaneous, there is no such simultaneity of the producer and product.
Thus, the example is not apropos.

Objection : [19ab] What is being produced (i.e., the effect) “tends toward”
arising but does not yet exist, while what is ceasing (i.e., the cause) “tends
toward” cessation but still exists.

Reply : [19cd] How then is this similar to the example of the scale? Such
“production” in the absence of a producer makes no sense.
[20] If visual cognition arises at the same time as its causes arise — the
physical eye, the perception, and so forth — it is other than them and is
already existing. Then what need is there for it to come into existence
again? (That is, if the cognition is other then the causes, it is not caused by
them and must already exist.) But if you claim that it does not already exist,
then the flaw in your thesis was already explained above.
[21] If a producer is a cause that produces something other than itself, then
is what is produced real, unreal, both, or neither? If the product is real, then
what need is there for a producer to do? If it does not real, then what has the
producer done? What was accomplished if the product is both real and
unreal or if it is neither?

The Two Types of Truths

Objection : [22] We maintain that “worldly consensus” is a valid means to
knowledge within the conventional realm. Thus, what is to be accomplished
by these demands for a reason here? In addition, the worldly consensus
knows that something arises from something else, and thus that there is
“production from another.” What possible need is there for a reason here?

Reply : [23] All entities, because they can been seen with either an accurate
or erroneous perception, have a dual nature. Whatever is the object revealed
through an accurate perception is “reality as it truly is,” while what is
revealed through an erroneous perception is declared to be a concealing
“conventional truth.” [24] In addition, we maintain that there are two
categories of erroneous perception: one having a healthy sense-faculty, and
one having an impaired sense-faculty. The understanding of those with
impaired sense-faculties is considered false compared to the understanding
from healthy sense-faculties.

[25] From a conventional point of view, anything that is apprehended

through any of the six sense-faculties (the five senses and the mind) when
they are unimpaired is reality for the conventional world. All remaining
mental discriminations are deemed to be false from the conventional point
of view. [26] Things imagined about a “person” by non-Buddhists who are
corrupted by the sleep of the root-ignorance are all nonexistent. They are
imaginary conceptions, phantoms, mirages, and so forth, since even from a
conventional point of view they do not exist. [27] Just as the observations
of an eye afflicted with an eye-defect do not invalidatethe knowledge of an
eye free of any defect, so the intellect of those from whom uncontaminated
wisdom is concealed does not invalidate uncontaminated knowledge.

[28] Delusion is a concealment precisely because its nature is to conceal.

Whatever appears conventionally seems to be real, and the Buddha has
called this “conventional reality,” and any entity that is fabricated is a
concealment. [29] Under the influence of an eye-defect, such falseimages as
a hair in front of the eyes are formed, while an unimpaired eye sees what is
real. The two truths must be understood in an analogous manner. [30] If
everyday experiences were valid means of knowing reality as it truly is,
then ordinary cognition would see reality as it truly is. What need then
would there be for others, i.e., the noble ones (the enlightened and those
advanced on the path)? And what would be accomplished by treading the
noble path? It is unreasonable for such foolish means to be accepted as
valid. [31] Since ordinary experience is not a valid means of knowing
reality as it truly is, the conventional point of view does not contradict
reality from the ultimate point of view. But consensus approves
conventional matters, and consensus negates the denial of them.

[32] The worldly sow the seed and then claim “I created the boy,” or they
imagine “This is like planting a tree.” Thus, even according to the world
production is not from another (i.e., something not on the “common
continuum” of v. 16). [33] Because the sprout is not different from the seed,
the seed is not destroyed at the time when the sprout arises. But because the
seed and sprout are not identical, one cannot say that there is a seed when
there is a sprout.

[34] If entities existed in dependence on their defining self-characteristics,

then by negating of those characteristics through seeing emptiness, entities
would be destroyed, and emptiness would be the cause of this destruction.
But this is not the case since entities are not real. (That is, emptiness does
not cause anything — the entities were not real all along.) [35] If entities
are examined, nothing is found except that they have the characteristic of
reality. (They are empty and have no individual “defining self-
characteristic” of an entity.) Thus, mundane conventional usages should not
be critically examined (since “entities” are real conventionally).

[36] Thus, “self-production” and “production from another” are

inapplicable when dealing with what is truly real (since there are no real
entities to arise). And by the same reasoning, these two options are
inapplicable conventionally (since even conventionally nothing arises from
itself, and to rise from another, that other must self-exist). Howthen could
the “production” you claim occur? [37] It is well-established conventionally
that empty entities such as reflections do not appear except independence
on a nexus of conditions. And an empty reflection and the like can give rise
to a cognition of a form that is also empty. [38] In the same way,all entities
are similarly empty of self-existence, and also are produced out of empty
causes and conditions. According to the doctrine of two truths, entities are
not selfexistent, and thus they are neither eternal nor subject to cessation.
[39] Because there is no self-existent cessation, one must understand that,
even without any “storehouse for consciousness” (i.e., a medium to keep
the seed of action alive), it is possible for an action that has long since
ceased to give rise to an effect somewhere. [40] Even after awakening from
a dream, the naive may remain attached to objects apprehended in the
dream. So too, an action that has ceased and is without self-existence may
still have an effect. [41] And just as the object perceived by someone
affected with an eye-defect is an image of floating hair and not an image of
something else, so one should know that the ripening of an action is not
arbitrary, even though this effect is as unreal as those others. [42] Thus,
while a bad act has unwholesome consequences and a good act has
wholesome consequences, one finds liberation only when his mind is free
from both what is wholesome and is unwholesome. (That is, liberation is
not the result of any action.) In addition, speculation concerning action and
its consequences has been expressly condemned by the Buddha. [43]
Teachings such as “a storehouseconsciousness exists,” “a person exists,”
and “only the bodily aggregates exist” are presented (as teaching devices)
for those who cannot understand the more profound teaching (of
emptiness).

[44] Although the buddhas held no view of a real, self-existent “self,” they
nevertheless used the expressions “I” and “mine” in teaching. So too, even
though entities are without self-existence, nevertheless they taught in a
provisional sense (and not in a final sense) that entities exist.

Refutation of Consciousness as Ultimately Real

[45] Objection from the Yogacharas: Where there is no sense-object, no

subject can be found, and thus the three realms of existence (i.e., the realm
of desire and the “formed” and “unformed” meditative realms) are nothing
but mind. Thus, bodhisattvas, abiding in wisdom, realize that reality as it
truly is “nothing but mind.” [46] Just as the waves on the ocean are stirred
up by the wind, so too nothing but mind arises through its own potencies
within the storehouse-consciousness that is the seed of all things. [47] Thus,
all things are dependent entities. Their dependent nature is the cause of
designating things as (conventionally) real. This nature appears even though
there are no external objects to apprehend. This dependent nature is real. Its
nature is not open to the possibility of conceptualproliferation.

Reply : [48] But when is there such a thing as a thought without an external
object? If you say it is like a dream, thenconsider this: according to you,
even in a dream there is no thought without an object. Thus, your example
is unacceptable. [49] If the existence of the mind during the dream is
established through memory of the dream when awake, then the existence
of the objects in the dream are established in the same way. For just as you
recall “I saw . . .,” so too there is also a memory of the object from the
dream.

Objection : [50] During sleep there is no visual consciousness — there is

only the mind without an object. But the dreamer attributes external
existence to what is dreamed about. And here while awake, the process is
the same.

Reply : [51] But just as according to you no external objects are produced in
the dream, so too the mind is not produced either. The eye, the visual
object, and the visual cognition produced by them are all false. [52] The
three components involved in hearing and those for the other senses
likewise are not produced in a dream. And just as the things perceived in
the dream are false, so too here are those things perceived while awake. The
mind is not self-existent, and neither are the sense-fields or the sense-
faculties. [53] He who awakens from the sleep of root-ignorance is the one
truly awakening from a dream. So long as one is not awake, the three
components remain, but when one awakens they no longer appear.

Objection : [54] Both the hair perceived under the influence of an eye-
defect and the cognition associated with the affected sense-organ are real,
relative to that cognition. But for one who sees clearly, the two are false.

Reply : [55] If there is a cognition in the absence of any object of cognition,

then even those without the eye-defect would see hair when looking at the
place where hair was seen by those with defective eyes. But this does not
happen. Thus, there is no self-existent cognition.
Objection : [56] Cognition of the hair is caused by potentialities in the
mind; if these do not ripen in particular individuals (with healthy eyes),
there is no cognition. In this way, the absence of seeing hair is not because
of the absence of an entity to serve as the object of knowledge.

Reply : There is no such thing as “potentiality,” and so your position is not

established. [57] There is no possibility of potentiality for what has already
been produced or for an unproduced entity. There can be no characteristics
made without something being characterized, for if this were so, it would
follow that there is potentiality for the son of a barren woman.

[58] You may attempt to explain that a future cognition will arise from a
potentiality, but this not occur because there is no “potentiality.” And the
noble ones have declared that things that arise dependently in mutual
dependence are not established. (That is, they do not have self-existence
and thus cannot be real. Thus, if potentiality and future cognition are
interdependent, neither is real.) [59] If a cognition arises from a ripening
potentiality that has ceased, then one thing would indeed arise from the
potentiality of another thing. But then the parts of a continuum of one
cognition would be separated from each other. Thus, if this were possible,
anything could arise from anything else.

Objection : [60] Although the parts of the continuum are distinct, the
continuum itself is continuous, and thus there is no flaw here.
Reply: You still have to demonstrate this since parts of a continuum are not
in fact distinct. [61] Maitreya and Upagupta are different people, and thus
their constitutive factors do not belong to the same continuum. Similarly, it
would not be admissible that things that differ in their own defining
selfcharacteristics could be parts of the same continuum.
Objection: [62] The production of a visual cognition occurs entirely from its
own potentiality and immediately from its own (ripened) potentiality. What
is understood by ordinary people to be the physical organ of the eye is
actually this potentiality that is the source of its own cognition. [63] Here
ordinary people think that a cognition of shape and color arises from the
sense-organ — they do not realize that the appearance of such things as
blueness arises (through the mental visual sense-faculty) from its own seeds
ripening in the storehouse-consciousness without any external object, and it
is on this account that he supposes that such an external object is present.
[64] As in a dream, the image of a discrete form of a object arises from its
own ripened potentiality without any such (external) form, so too also here
in the waking life: there is cognition without there being any external
object.
Reply: [65] In a dream, the mental cognition of such things as blueness
arises without an eye. Why then does such a mental cognition not similarly
arise from its own seeds here in the waking life to a blind person without
any visual sense-organ? [66] If you say that there is the ripening of the
potentiality of the sixth sense (i.e., mental cognition) in a blind person’s
dream, while in the blind person’s waking life there is none, then why is it
impermissible to say that in the same way that for a blind person there is no
ripened potentiality for the sixth sense here in the wakinglife that there is
also no ripened potentiality in the dream state? [67] For just as having no
eyes does not cause the ripening of potentialities in the waking life, so too
sleep does not cause the ripening in a dream. Thus, in a dream as well as in
waking life, (only) the sense-object and the eye can provide causes for the
perception of illusory things.
[68] Whatever answers you give, we see them as the same thesis based on
defective vision. Thus, this argument has been defeated. The buddhas did
not teach that any entity whatsoever is real (i.e., self-existent).
Objection: [69] Following the instructions of his teacher, a yogin in
meditation visualizes the ground as strewn with skeletons. In this case, it is
obvious that all three elements (the eye, the visual object, and the visual
cognition) do not arise since there is only the projection of consciousness.
Reply: [70] If in your example, the visualized skeletons cognized in the
“repulsion meditation” are of the same nature as objects of sense-
perception, then when anyone else look toward the place where the yogin is
looking they too should perceive the skeletons. But the skeletons are
fictitious and are not perceived. [71] So too, the example of “hungry
ghosts” who perceive pus when viewing the water running in a river is no
different from that of the visual sense-faculty affected by an eye-defect. In
sum, our meaning must be understood thus: just as there are no self-existent
objects of cognition, so too there is no self-existent cognition either.
Objection: [72] Now, if dependent entities exist without any external sense-
objects or subjects, then who is aware of them? It is unacceptable to say that
something exists but is not apprehended.
Reply: [73] It has not been established that a cognition is aware of itself. It
cannot be established by using a later memory of the previous event since in
that case the evidence offered to establish what is unestablished is itself
unestablished and thus is no admitted (as proof). [74] Even if self-
awareness is admitted and the memory is a genuine remembrance (of self-
awareness), still it is indeed unacceptable that a memory that remembers
like this establishes self-awareness since the experience of self-awareness
and the memory of that event are different. It would be the same asthe
production of a memory in the mental continuum of someone who never
knew the event. This argument that distinguishes self-awareness and
memory effectively counters any other particular attempt at establishing
cognition of a self. [75] But on the other hand, according to Madhyamikas,
a memory is not distinct from the previous remembered experience of an
object. Thus, one’s memory is in the form “I saw . . . .” This is also the
common convention of the worldly.
[76] Thus, if self-awareness is not real, what will apprehend the dependent
phenomena you accept? The actor, its action, and its object are not identical.
Thus, it is inadmissible that a cognition can apprehend itself.
[77] If there were real things that were of a dependent form and were
unproduced and unknowable, then why not also accept the existence of the
son of a barren woman? What harm could the son of a barren woman inflict
on others?
Objection: [78] Since what is dependent does not exist in any way
whatsoever, what can be the cause of conventional reality?
Reply: Through your attachment to substances, you forsake all the ordered
structure of the everyday world. [79] There is no means of finding peace for
those who are not treading the path taught by Nagarjuna. Such people have
failed to grasp the distinction of conventional and true reality, and thus
liberation lies beyond their reach. [80] Conventional usages are the means,
and seeing reality from the ultimate point of view arises by those means.
Through their misconception, those who do not understand the distinction
between the two truths tread a false path.
[81] Unlike you Yogacharas, who affirm dependent things as ultimately
real, we Madhyamikas do not accept that even for conventional reality.
Concerning the conventional we say “Even though things do not (truly)
exist, they do exist (conventionally).” We do this for a purpose (i.e., to lead
others to liberation). [82] The things of the conventional world do not
(truly) exist for the enlightened disciples, who have abandoned the bodily
aggregates and have found peace. But conventional things do exist for the
worldly in the everyday sense. If they did not so exist, we would not
maintain that they do exist in a qualified sense. [83] If the world does not
contradict your position, then (use it to) refute conventional perceptions.
Debate with the world, and after this we will side with the winner.
[84] Bodhisattvas on this stage of the path called “Directly Facing the
Realm of Truth” perceive the three realms of existence as nothing but
consciousness. They negate any view of an eternal self or creator of the
world. Because of their understanding, they conceive the creator as nothing
but mind (but do not affirm the Yogachara position that external objects are
“nothing but mind”). [85] Like a lighting bolt shattering high mountain
peaks, the omniscient Buddha spoke in the Lankavatara Sutra those
diamond-hard words that crush the teachings of non-Buddhists in order to
increase the wisdom of the wise. [86] In their own texts, non-Buddhists
speak of a “person” or some other eternal entity as the creator. Because he
did not see a creator of things, the Buddha taught the mind alone is the
creator of the (conventional) world. [87] Just as a buddha is explained as
“one whose knowledge of reality as it truly is is expansive,” so the
Lankavatara Sutra taught “nothing but mind” for the teaching “the mind
alone is preeminent in the conventional world.” But it is not the intention of
the scripture to deny material form. [88] If the Buddha intended to deny
material form when he said that the three realms are nothing but mind, then
why did the Great Soul proceed to claim in the same scripture that the mind
itself is produced from delusion and actions with karmic consequences?
[89] The mind itself constructs the vast diversity of sentient and insentient
forms in the world and the nonsentient environment containing them. He
taught that the entire world is created by karmic action and that if the mind
were terminated there would be no karmic actions. [90] Even though there
indeed is material form, it, unlike the mind, does not have the capacity to
create. Thus, in denying that there are any other creator but the mind,
material form is not denied.
[91] For those who reside in mundane reality, the five bodily aggregates do
exist conventionally. But they do not appear to the yogin who is engaged in
the development of the knowledge of reality as it truly is.
[92] If there were no material forms, then one should maintain that the mind
exists. But if there is the mind, one should not maintain that material forms
do not exist. The Buddha unqualifiedly rejected the ultimate reality of both
of them in the Perfection of Wisdom texts, while in the Abhidharma texts
he affirmed the conventional reality of both of them. [93] Even if you
destroy the hierarchy of the two types of truth, the real phenomenon of
consciousness without an object would not be established, for it has already
been refuted. Thus, because of the hierarchy, it should be understood that
from the very beginning things are in reality unarisen, but from the
mundane point of view they do arise.
[94] In the Lankavatara Sutra it is taught that there are no external realities
and that the diversity of the world is nothing but mind. The Buddha denied
there are material forms to those who were very attached to material forms,
but the meaning of such teachings is only provisional (and not final). [95]
The Buddha said provisional things, and it is only admissible to interpret it
that way. In addition, the authority of this passage clearly shows that
scriptures of like kind are also provisional in meaning.
[96] The buddhas have taught that the refutation of an inner knower is
easily accomplished once there are no objects of cognition. If there are no
self-existent objects of cognition, then the negation of consciousness is
established (since it would have nothing to know). Thus, the buddhas start
by negating the objects of cognition. [97] Thus, one must proceed
accordingly when interpreting textual authority. Scriptures whose subjects
are something other than “reality as it truly is” are provisional and must be
understood as such and interpreted accordingly. Those texts that speak of
emptiness are to be understood as final in their meaning.

The Non-Arising of Phenomena from Both Themselves and

Others and Without a Cause

[98] Turning to the third option for arising: production from both something
itself and another thing is not acceptable because of the flaws already
explained (for production from oneself or from another). It cannot be
maintained either from a conventional point of view or from the point of
view of what is truly real because neither type of production can be
maintained individually.

[99] Turning to the fourth option for arising: if there were production
without any cause at all, then things could be produced from anything
whatsoever anywhere at any time. So too, then worldly people would not
even gather seeds by the hundreds in order to grow rice. [100] If the world
itself were without any causes, nothing within it could indeed be
apprehended, just as the color and smell of a (nonexistent) lotus growing in
the sky are not apprehended. But the world is apprehended in all its rich
diversity, and thus it must be accepted that the world, like the mind, arises
from causes. (That is, the perception of things involves causes, and so if
there were no causes in the world, perceptions could not occur. Since
perceptions do in fact occur, there must be causes.)

[101] The primary elements of the material world are not characterized by
self-nature, like what serves as the object of your (alleged) cognition. And
when your mind is obscured by an impenetrable darkness concerning the
nature of this world, how can you accurately comprehend the next? [102]
When you materialists reject the existence of a next world, this is a
distorted belief about the nature of what can be known — forthis belief
holds that possessing a body is the basis of existing. Thus, whenever you
assert selfexistence, it is of the primary material elements.[103] The way in
which the primary material elements are not self-existent has already been
explained, insofar as the preceding constitutes a general refutation of
production from onself, another, both, or without a cause. Even though
these elements were not specifically discussed, how then could they be self-
existent?

Summary of the Refutation of Self-Existence

[104] All entities are without self-existence since nothing arises from itself,
another entity, both, or without a cause. But objects give a false appearance
because the world is shrouded with a dense delusion as though by a mass of
clouds. [105] Because of an eye-defect, one mistakenly perceives hair, two
moons, the color of a peacock’s tail, or a swarm of bees (where there are
none). In a similar manner, because of the influence of delusion, the naive,
while perceiving the diversity of the world, see compound phenomena.
[106] Karmic actions arise in dependence on delusion,and in the absence of
delusion such actions do not arise. Indeed, only those with learning
understand this. The wise, who have burned away the thick clouds of
delusion with the sun of their noble minds, have penetrated emptiness and
are liberated.

Objection : [107] If in reality things do not exist, then they would be like
the son of a barren woman: nonexistent even conventionally. But because
this is not the case (since they do exist conventionally), they must have
selfexistence.

Reply : [108] Your objection should be raised first with those who suffer
from an eye-defect since objects like hair appear to them even though the
objects are unarisen even conventionally. After you have explained this
phenomenon, then raise your objection with those who suffer from the
defect of the root-ignorance. [109] When one perceives unarisen things
such as dreams, the castle of the heavenly musicians, a mirage, a magician’s
trick, or a reflection, the things are equally nonexistent. But how could one
perceive them since you claim they do not differ from what does not exist,
e.g., a son of a barren woman? It is inadmissable. [110] In reality, things are
unarisen — they are not like the son of a barren woman since they are
perceived conventionally. Thus, your argument is not convincing. [111] The
son of a barren woman does not arise from itself either in reality or
conventionally. So too, all things do not arise from themselves either in
reality or conventionally. [112] Thus, the Buddha declared that all
phenomena from the very beginning are at peace, since they lack arising,
and by their nature completely unentangled with suffering. Thus, there is no
arising. [113] For example, a pot does not exist in reality, but it does exist
conventionally. All entities are the same in this way, and thus one cannot
conclude thatthey are the same as the son of a barren woman.

[114] Because entities do not arise from such thingsas Ishvara the creator,
from themselves, from another, from both, or without a cause, they arise
from dependence on other things. [115] And because things arise through
dependence, conceptualizations cannot withstand analysis. Thus, the
reasoning from dependent-arising completely slashes the net of mistaken
views. [116] If entities did really exist through self-existence, then
conceptualizations would be acceptable. But a thorough analysis reveals
that things are not self-existent, and if there are no self-existent things
conceptualizations are unacceptable, just as there can be no fire without
fuel. [117] Ordinary people are bound by their conceptualizations, but
yogins who do not produce conceptualizations attain liberation. The wise
have said that analysis results in the terminations of conceptualization.

[118] The analysis of Nagarjuna’s Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way is

not undertaken out of an attachment to debate — it teaches reality as it truly
is for the purpose of liberation. If while fully explaining reality other
philosophical schools are destroyed, this cannot be construed as a flaw.
[119] Attachment to one’s own views and aversion to the views of another
is itself to conceptualize. If one analyzes without attachment or aversion,
one will swiftly attain liberation.

The Selflessness of a Person

[120] Perceiving that all mental afflictions and delusions without exception
arise from the view of a real, substantive individual, and having identified
the self as the object of this view, yogins undertake a negation of the self.
[121] The self as conceptualized by Samkhya philosophers is eternal,
nonactive, without qualities, a non-creator, and an experiencer (of the
objects of knowledge). The system of these non-Buddhists evolved into
different schools through minor variations on this view of the “self.”

[122] A self like this is utterly unreal because it is unproduced like the son
of a barren woman. In addition, it is also incorrect that this is the basis for
clinging to a sense of “I.” It is considered by us to be nonexistent even
conventionally (i.e., there is no transcendental, Samkhya-like self even
conventionally). [123] Indeed, all the characteristics that are ascribed to the
“self” by non-Buddhists in all their texts are all countered by the argument
that (this self) is unarisen, as they themselves admit. Thus, the self also does
not have any characteristics (and thus is not real). [124] Thus, there is no
self that is different from the bodily aggregates since the apprehension of a
self cannot be established independently of the aggregates. Nor is the self
considered to be the basis for the conventional sense of “I” because the
view is inapplicable (i.e., the everyday sense of a person is not based on a
metaphysical theory). [125] And an eternal, unarisen self is not perceived
even by those who have wandered for eons in rebirths as animals. But they
clearly still cling to a sense of “I.” Thus, there is no self separate from the
aggregates.

[126] Because no self can be established apart from the bodily aggregates,
the self is only the bodily aggregates — material form (i.e., the physical
body), feelings, consciousness, perceptions, and dispositions. But some
Buddhists maintain that the five aggregates themselves are the basis for the
view of a self, while others maintain that nothing but consciousness is the
basis. [127] If the bodily aggregates are the self, then because the
aggregates are many there would also be many selves. The self would also
be a real substance, and cognition of the self would not be erroneous. [128]
At the moment of attaining nirvana, such a self would then indeed be
annihilated, and prior to attaining nirvana, the self would arise and cease
every moment. Thus, since the actor is destroyed (in each moment), there
would be no karmic fruit of his previous actions for him, and thus one self
would experience the karmic fruit of another self’s actions.

Objection: [129] There is no flaw, for in reality there is a continuity of the

selves throughout change.

Reply : The flaws in positing a continuum were previously analyzed (v. 61).
Thus, it is incorrect that the bodily aggregates or the mind alone is the self,
although this is one of the questions such as whether the world comes to an
end or not that the Buddha left unanswered.

[130] Indeed, if the bodily aggregates or the mind were the self, then when
yogins perceive that there is no self, they would also perceive the
nonexistence of all things (i.e., all conventional things would be seen as
totally nonexistent, just like the self). But if they abandon (the concept of) a
permanent self, then the self consequently could not be the mind or the
bodily aggregates. [131] Thus, when yogins perceive that there is no self,
they would not comprehend the physical body and the other aggregates as
they really are. (That is, they would still be thinking in terms of a self.) And
when the yogins direct their attention to physical bodies,they would form
attachments and so forth and thus not comprehend their true nature.

Objection : [132] The bodily aggregates are the self because the Buddha has
taught “The bodily aggregates are the self.”
Reply: This is simply rejects (the thesis) that the self is something other than
the aggregates. For in other scriptures it is taught that the self is not the
physical body (or the other bodily aggregates). [133] In sum, since other
scriptures state that the five bodily aggregates are not the self, the teaching
of this scripture does not proclaim that the bodily aggregates are the self.
Objection: [134] When we maintain that the aggregates are the self, we
mean the combination of the aggregates, not any aggregate individually.
Reply: (The Buddha said the self is a master, subduer, and witness, but) the
collection is not a master, subduer, or witness, and thus the collection is not
the self. [135] A chariot is a collection of parts, and the self is comparable.
The scriptures say that the self is dependent on the aggregates, and thus the
self cannot be equated with the collection of aggregates. [136] If you assert
that the self had the shape of the combination of aggregates, then we reply
that the self would have material form since only form has shape, and thus
for you form alone would be the self. Thus, that collection of the mind and
so forth would not be the self since these aggregates do not have any shape.
[137] It is incorrect to claim that the acquirer (i.e., the self) and what is
acquired (i.e., the collection of aggregates) are the same. If this were so,
then doer and the deed would be the same as well (and so the doer cannot
do the deed). And if you think that there can be a deed without a doer, this
is not so: with no doer, there is no deed.
[138] The Buddha taught that the self is dependent on the six elements —
earth, water, fire, wind, consciousness, and space — and the sense-fields
(i.e., the sense-organ and its object) of vision and so forth. [139] In addition,
he taught that the self depends on the mind and its components. Thus, the
self is not these elements collectively or any one of them separately. Thus,
these cannot be the basis of clinging to (a belief in a) self.
Objection: [140] When one attains selflessness, (only the view of) a
permanent self is abandoned.
Reply: But you do not consider a permanent self to be the basis of the sense
of self. How strange then to claim that the view of a real, substantive self
would be uprooted by realizing selflessness! [141] On seeing a snake coiled
in a recess of your house, your alarm is dispelled by thinking “Well, there is
no elephant here,” and you abandon any fearof the snake. Behold the
credulity of our opponent!
[142] There is no self in the bodily aggregates, and there are no aggregates
in the self. If they were different, such conceptualizations might be
plausible, but since there is no difference (betweenthe self and the
aggregates), there are no such conceptualizations. [143] It cannot be
maintained that the self possesses material form because the self does not
exist. Thus, the notion of “ownership” cannot apply. In addition, the relation
of self and the physical body is not like either someone possessing
something different such as a cow or possessing something identical such as
one’s body. But the self is neither different nor identical to the physical
body.
[144] The self is not the physical body, nor does the self possess the body.
The self is not in the body, nor the body in the self. The other four
aggregates are to be understood according to these four relations. Thus,
altogether, there are twenty views of a self. [145] These views are the
towering peak of a massive mountain chain of views of a real, substantive
self. They and the fundamental view of the self are completely shattered by
the lightning bolt of realizing selflessness.
Objection: [146] The “person” is a real substance. But it cannot be
expressed as either identical to or different from the bodily aggregates, or as
either permanent or impermanent. The person is an object of the cognitions
of the six senses. It is the basis for the sense of “I.”
Reply: [147] That the mind is distinct from the material form is not
“inexpressible” or “incomprehensible” — indeed, no real thing is
inexpressible or incomprehensible. If the self is established as a real entity,
then it would be just as established as the mind is and would not be
inexpressible.
Objection: [148] A pot is not by its nature established as a real entity
because it is inexpressible concerning (its difference from or identity to) its
form.
Reply: So too, the relation of the self to the aggregates is also inexpressible,
and thus one ought not to conceive the self as real.
Objection: [149] Cognition is not different from one’s own self, but it is
distinct from the physical body and the other aggregates.
Reply: You thus see two distinct aspects to any one thing, i.e, identity to the
self and distinction from other things. These aspects of identity and
distinction are perceived for any entity, and since the self does not have
them the self is not real.
[150] Thus, the basis of our clinging to the sense of “I” is not a real entity.
The self is not different form the bodily aggregates.Nor is it the same as the
aggregates themselves, nor is it possess the aggregates. The self is
established (as a conventional reality) in dependence on the aggregates.
[151] The self is like a chariot: it cannot be maintained that a chariot is
different from its constituent parts, or that it is not different fromthem, or
that it possesses them, or that it is in the parts, or that the parts are in it, or
that it is simply the collection of the parts (since it continues asthe parts are
replaced), or that it is the shape of the parts. [152] If the chariot were simply
the collection of its parts, then it would exist when the parts are scattered.
(A pile of chariot parts do not constitute a chariot, which a functioning
whole.) In addition, if there is no possessor of the parts, there are no
“parts.” (The items would exist but not be labeled “parts” unless they were
parts of a chariot.) Furthermore, it is unreasonable that a chariot is the mere
shape of the assemblage of parts (since the parts can be changed and the
chariot remains).
Objection: [153] When included in the chariot, the shape of each part
remains the same.
Reply: But then the chariot no more exists after being assembled then it did
among the unassembled scattered parts. [154] If the shape of the wheels and
other parts within the assembled chariot is different than it was before the
chariot was assembled, then this difference would be perceived, but it is
not. Thus, the chariot is not merely its shape.
Objection: [155] There is no real compound entity, but the shape is not
itself a compound entity.
Reply: How could there be any shape if it depends on something
nonexistent? [156] Although you maintain that, you should know that all
results are produced in dependence on unreal causes and so have an unreal
nature. All things arise in precisely that manner.
[157] Thus, it is inadmissible to assert that a cognition of a pot is a
cognition of its form, which is analogous to the form of the chariot. Because
there is no (real) production, material form and the other aggregates are not
self-existent (and thus are not real). Thus, it is wrong to claim that the
aggregates possess shape (and thus that there is a self that is either different
or identical to what has shape).
[158] The existence of the chariot cannot be established either in reality or
in the conventional sense by any of the seven options (listed in v. 151), but
in the unanalyzed everyday sense, the chariot is imputed to exist in
dependence on its parts. [159] Thus, the chariot has parts and pieces of
parts, and so it is referred to in the world as an “agent.” Forordinary people,
this establishes that there is an acquirer of properties. Do not undermine the
conventions that the world has accepted! [160] How can what is nonexistent
according to the seven-fold analysis nevertheless be said to exist? Yogins do
not find it real, and yet they easily penetrate what is real. Thus, one should
accept what they establish here. [161] If the chariot does not exist, then
there is no “possessor of the parts,” nor are there any “parts.” When the
chariot is burned up, its parts no longer exist. So too, when the fire of
discrimination burns the possessor of the parts, the parts themselves are
consumed.
[162] Because it is supposed in the conventional world, there is a self that is
dependent upon the basic elements and the six sense-fields, and it is an
acquirer. Thereby, there is what is acquired, the act of acquiring, and the
agent of acquiring. [163] But because there is no (real) entity, the self is
neither constant nor varying, neither arisen nor ceasing. It does not have the
property of “permanence” and so forth, nor identity or difference. [164]
Thoughts of clinging to an “I” continuously arise in all sentient beings, and
thoughts of “mine” arise concerning what this “I” possesses — the self is
what is taken to be this “I.” This self arises through delusion and is taken
for granted when not examined. [165] Because there are no actors, there are
no actions. In addition, because there is no self, there is no “mine.” Through
perceiving the emptiness of “I” and “mine,” yogins become completely
liberated.

Return to the Issue of Non-Arising

[166] Pots, woolen cloth, armies, forests, garlands, trees, houses, carts,
guesthouses, and so forth — these things and whatever else is perceived by
ordinary people are to be understood as conventionally real because the
Buddha has no quarrel with the world. [167] Qualities, parts, desires,
defining-characteristics, fuel, and so forth; possessors of qualities or parts, a
base for desire or the defining-characteristics, fire, and so forth — such
objects are nonexistent: as shown by the chariot analysis, they do not exist
in any of the seven ways. But they do indeed exist conventionally.

[168] A cause is a “cause” only if it produces an “effect.” If no effect is

produced, then without that production there is no “cause.” So too, effects
are only produced if there are causes. Thus, (if you want to establish either
as real), please state what comes from what and which of the two comes
first. [169] If as you assert the cause produces the effectthrough contact,
then at the moment of contact they become a single potentiality, and thus
the producer is not different from the effect. Or if thecause and effect are
distinct, then the cause is not different from a non-cause. And once these
two alternatives have been refuted, there is no possibility to consider. [170]
If you claim that a cause cannot produce an effect, then there is nothing to
be referred to as “an effect.” In addition, a cause separated from an effect is
a non-cause, and such a thing is nonexistent. Because we maintain that both
cause and effect are like a magician’s tricks, we thus are subject to no flaw
in our argument, and things experienced in the conventional world remain
existing.

Objection : [171] Does your refutation of cause and effect negate what is to
be refuted by your refutation by contact with it or not? Does not the flaw
you just set forth apply to you? (That is, if they connect then the refutation
and what is refuted are exactly a case of cause and effect; and so if cause
and effect are not real, then the refutation fails. But if they do not connect,
then they do not have contact and there is no refutation.) When you speak
like this, you merely defeat your own position. Thus, your refutation is
incapable of refuting. [172] You deny the real existence of all entities with
your caviling, and the consequences apply equally to your own words. The
noble ones would never agree with you. Because you lack any position of
your own, you make use of any sort of refutation just for the sake of debate.

Reply : [173] Arguments refute without making contact with what is

refuted. Or if you say they do make contact, where is the flaw? The flaw is
only in any position holding self-existence. But this consequence is of no
concern to us since we hold no position (asserting self-existence). [174]
According to you, the orb of the sun is self-existent. But changes in the
shape of the orb also appear in its reflection, as seen during an eclipse and
so forth. But to speak of the sun and its reflection “connecting” or “not
connecting” is obviously unreasonable. Nevertheless, as a mere dependent
conventional reality, the sun’s reflection does arise. [175] So too, even
though an image in a mirror is not real, it is useful for anyone who desires
to make himself attractive, and in this way it does exist conventionally. In
the same way, arguments about what is real are an image by which one has
the ability to clean the face of wisdom. They are not simple, but you should
understand and know what is being established.

[176] If what our arguments show and what is to be understood by them

have indeed been established, and you understood the nature of what has
been established, you would not apply your reasons of “contact” and so
forth because they are futile. [177] It is quite easy to understand what is
meant by the lack of self-existence within all things, but it is much more
difficult to comprehend existing through “self-existence.” So why do you
ensnare the world in a web of your faulty reasoning?

[178] Understand well the above refutation (vv. 168-70)! When we reply
(vv. 173-77) to your position concerning “contact”and so forth (vv. 171-72),
we were not trying to offend. Any additional positions of yours are to be
explained by the same (seven-fold) method given above(in v. 151).

The Sixteen Types of Emptiness

[179] For the liberation of all sentient beings, selflessness was divided by
the Buddha into two types: selflessness of the basic phenomena of the
experienced world, and selflessness of persons. In addition, the Buddha
divided the two types further into many categories since he differentiated
his disciples (according to their specific needs). [180] In this elaborated
version, he explained sixteen types of emptiness. In addition,he condensed
these sixteen into four types, all of which the Mahayana accept.

(1) [181] Because of their nature, the (conventional) eye is empty of a (self-
existent) eye. The ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind are also described in
this manner. [182] Because the six sense-faculties are neither permanent nor
ceasing, they have no self-existence. This is “internal emptiness.”

(2) [183] By their self-nature, material forms are empty of (self-existent)

forms. Sound, smell, taste, touch, and mental phenomena are also the same
in nature. [184] The absence of any self-existence in forms and the others is
called “external emptiness.”
(3) The absence of self-existence in each of the above two types is called
“internal/external emptiness.”

(4) [185] The absence of any self-existent nature within any thing is called
by the wise “emptiness.” This emptiness is also considered to be empty of a
self-nature labeled “emptiness.” [186] The emptiness of what is called
“emptiness” is called “the emptiness of emptiness.” It is explained in this
manner for the purpose of stopping any understanding of emptiness as an
entity. (In short, emptiness is not itself a self-existent reality.)

(5) [187] The directions of space are vast since they pervade without
remainder the worlds as well as sentient beings dwelling therein and since,
by being without bounds, they exemplify the boundlessness (of the four
“sublime attitudes” — friendliness, compassion, sympathetic joy in the
happiness of others, and even-mindedness). [188] The emptiness of the ten
directions (up/down and the eight compass points) is called “the vast
emptiness.” It is explained in this manner for the purpose of stopping any
understanding of the vastness of space as self-existent.

(6) [189] Nirvana is the ultimate because it is thesupreme goal. Its

emptiness is called “the emptiness of the ultimate truth/reality.” [190] The
emptiness of the ultimate was taught by those who know the ultimate for
the purpose of stopping any understanding of nirvana as an entity.

(7) [191] The three worlds (i.e., the realm of desireand the “formed” and
“unformed” meditative realms) are definitely described as “compound”
because they arise from causes and conditions. Their emptiness is called
“the emptiness of compound things.”

(8) [192] Those entities that arise or that endure are impermanent. Those
entities that are not these are uncompounded. Thus, the emptiness of the
latter is “the emptiness of the uncompounded.”

(9) [193] What is without the extremes of being either eternal or totally
nonexistent are categorized as “transcending the extremes.” Their emptiness
is called “the emptiness of what has transcended the boundaries.”
(10) [194-95] The cycle of rebirths is described as being without beginning
or end since it has neither an initial arising nor a final end. It is without
coming or going, like a dream. Its emptiness is referred to in the treatises as
“the emptiness of what is without beginning or end.”

(11) [196] What is rejected is defined as “what is cast aside and

abandoned.” To not reject something is not to cast it aside and abandon it.
[197] The emptiness of what is not rejected is called “the emptiness of what
is not rejected.”

(12) [198] The self-nature of compound entities is not invented by disciples,

self-enlightened buddhas, bodhisattvas, or fully-enlightened buddhas. [199]
Thus, the self-nature of compound entities is called their “own-nature.” The
emptiness of this is called “the emptiness of own-nature.”

(13) [200-201] The eighteen material elements (i.e., the six sensefaculties,
six sense-objects, and six sense-cognitions), the six sense-organs, and the
six sensations that arise from them, material form and the formless, the
compound and the uncompound — the emptiness of all of these basic
phenomena of the experienced world is called “the emptiness of all basic
phenomena.”

(14) Form and the other aggregates are without any self-existent nature.

Their emptiness is called “the emptiness of any defining self-

characteristic.” [202] Material form has the defining-characteristicof color
and shape;
feeling has the self-nature of experience; perception apprehends
definingcharacteristics; mental dispositions are what buildactions of body,
speech,
and mind. [203] The defining-characteristic of cognition is awareness of
distinct objects. The bodily aggregates have the defining-characteristic of
suffering. The eighteen basic elements are like poisonous snakes in nature.
[204] The Buddha has declared the sense-fields to be the gateway to arising,
and dependent-arising has the defining-characteristic of being compound.
[205] The defining-characteristic of perfected generosity is giving. The
defining-characteristic of proper conduct is not tormenting others. The
defining-characteristic of patience is the lack of anger. The
definingcharacteristic of vigor is lack of sloth. [206] The defining-
characteristic of
concentration-meditation is mental focus. The defining-characteristic of
wisdom is lack of attachment. These are distinguishing characteristics of the
“six perfections.” [207] The Buddha, the perfectly knowing one, has
declared
that the defining-characteristic of concentration-meditation, the four
sublime
attitudes, and other formless meditative absorptions is the lack of
disturbance (by feelings and thoughts).
[208] The thirty-seven factors that lead us toward enlightenment have
the defining-characteristic of contributing to the escape from the cycle of
rebirth.
(The defining-characteristics of the three gateways to liberation are:)
first, “emptiness” has the defining-characteristic of “isolation” (from any
defilements resulting from ideas of real entities) due to correct perception.
[209] Second, the “signless” has the defining-characteristic of serenity.
Third,
the “wishless” has the defining-characteristic of the lack of suffering and
confusion. The full deliverances have the defining-characteristic of
contributing to liberation.
(The defining-characteristics of the fruit of the path are these:) [210] The
ten powers are said to have the nature of certitude. The nature of a buddha’s
fearlessness in rescuing sentient beings from suffering is immutable
steadfastness. [211] The superlative knowledge of a buddha has the
definingcharacteristic of continuous confidence and so forth. What brings
great
benefit to all sentient beings is called “great love.” [212] Great compassion
rescues those immersed in suffering. “Sympathetic joy” is the
definingcharacteristic of “great joy.” “Even-mindedness” has the defining-
characteristic of being unadulterated in its impartiality. [213] The qualities
considered
unique to a fully-enlightened buddha are eighteen in number. Because they
cannot be removed from a buddha, their defining-characteristic is being
undivertable. [214] Direct perception is considered the defining-
characteristic
of the omniscient knowledge of a buddha. Other knowledge is limited in its
scope and is not considered direct perception.
[215] The emptiness of any defining-characteristic of the compound and
the uncompound is also “the emptiness of any defining self-characteristic.”
(See v. 202.)
(15) [216] The present does not endure, and the past and future do not
exist. None of these three times can be observed. They are referred to as
“the
unobservables.” [217] What is unobservable is completely without any
selfnature of its own and is neither eternally enduring nor ever decaying.
This is
called “the emptiness of the unobservable.”
(16) [218] Because entities arise from causes and conditions, they do not
have the self-nature of being compounded. The emptiness of these entities
of being compounded is called “the emptiness of the absence of entities.”
(The condensed list of the types of emptiness is:) (I) [219] In short, the
word “a being” refers to the five bodily aggregates. Their emptiness is
called
“the emptiness of beings.”
(II) [220] Again in short, non-entities are declared to be uncompounded
phenomena. Their emptiness is called “the emptiness of non-entities.” (III)
[221] Self-nature is not invented, and so it is referred to as “selfnature.” The
lack of self-existence in self-nature is called “the emptiness of
self-nature.”
(IV) [222] Whether or not any buddha come in the world, all entities are
empty. This is proclaimed “the emptiness of being other (than
conventionally
real).” [223] In the school of the Perfection of Wisdom texts, “the emptiness
of being other” is called the “reality-limit” and the “such-ness of things.”

Conclusion

[224] Bodhisattvas radiate light through the brilliant ray of wisdom and see
that the three realms of existence from the beginning are unproduced as
clearly as they see a medicinal herb in the palm of their hand. And through
the power of conventional truth, they go to the cessation of rebirths. [225]
Even though their minds rest constantly on cessation, still they cultivate
compassion for all sentient beings who are without a protector. Those born
from the Buddha’s speech and self-enlightened buddhas will later be
outpaced by their wisdom. [226] Like the king of swans, they soar ahead of
the common flock, spreading their broad white wings of conventional and
ultimate truth. Held aloft by the strong wind of virtue, they fly to the
excellence on the far shore of the ocean of the Buddha’s qualities.

***
Notes
[1] Bodhisattvas are beings set on the path to becoming not merely
enlightened but fully-enlightened buddhas. At this stage of their path, they
have attained freedom from the cycle of rebirths controlled by karmic
actions, but they freely accept rebirth to help others and advance toward
buddhahood.

[8] Non-arising ( an-utpada): something that arises is considered produced

from something, either itself or something else or both or from nothing, and
so what does not so arise is unproduced. Hence, the term can also be
translated “not produced.” To Madhyamikas, what is real is in fact non-
arisen.

[10] The Samkhya position — the effect is present but unmanifested in the
cause and so is identical to the cause — may seem strange. One way to
make it seem plausible today is to think of the Samkhya stance as a type of
reductionism: no new substance or structure is created in the emergence of,
for example, cream from milk, and so the effect is really nothing but the
cause and is present in the cause before it is made manifest by some action.

[21] Here Chandrakirti invokes the four options (see Jones 2010: 155-58).
Also note that the dichotomy of “it exists” and “it does not exist”
supposedly logically exhausts all ontological options for the opponent.
[22] On the two truths, see Jones 2010: 147-48. The difference for
Nagarjuna, in a nutshell, is between statements made from the point of view
of ultimate ontological status of things and those made about conventional
divisions within the world of appearances. To Chandrakirti, the ultimate
truths are not statable. (See the Essay.)

[23] The word for “conventional truth (samvriti)” comes from a root (vri)
meaning “to conceal.” It conceals the true ontological nature of things.

[42] Note that Chandrakirti defends that ethics and the path to
enlightenment are possible. For any Buddhist it is important that the
ontology they advance supports soteriology.
[45] The Yogacharas are idealists who take conventional objects to be
nothing but mind. Chandrakirti claims they are different in substance from
the Madhyamikas.

[45] “ Vijnana” usually means cognition, but here it means the mind in
general. “Alaya-vijnana” is a “storehouse-consciousness,” i.e., something
changing but storing the karmic residue of past karmic actions. It is
postulated by the Yogacharas to explain the continuity of a person.

[47] “Prajnaptisad-vastu” means “a thing designated as real.”

[78] The “ordered structure of the everyday world” means the order of the
same causes and conditions producing the same effects. Buddhists do not
question that this order is permanent even if the contents of the phenomenal
world are constantly changing.

[81] Thus, Chandrakirti accepts the conventional reality of entities.

[84] Bodhisattvas at this level reflect Yogachara teachings.
[117] The termination of conceptualizations (kalpanas) is connected to the
end of conceptual projection (prapancha), not the end of words or analysis.

[120] Through meditation, the idea of a self is negated — from the ultimate
point of view, there is no self actually to negate.
[186] The “emptiness of emptiness” is not a new exotic ontological claim or
some obtuse, esoteric mystery. Rather, it is a straightforward corollary of
Madhyamaka metaphysics. (See Jones 2010: 142.) Nagarjuna and
Chandrakirti are simply saying that “emptiness” is like any other concept:
there is no selfexistent, real entity called “emptiness” corresponding to the
term in the world any more than for any other noun. Nagarjuna claims
“Those for whom emptiness is a view are said to be incurable (MK 13.8)”
because they then take emptiness to be an entity existing by self-existence
(since only such an entity is the subject of a view). Commenting on this,
Chandrakirti gives the analogy of a man who, when being told by a
shopkeeper “There is nothing to sell, so I can give you nothing,” asks the
merchant to sellhim the “nothing” (Pr 248). Also see Pr 495-96 below.
Some Buddhists prefer the name “nishsvabhavavada” (the teaching of
“being without self-existence”) for the doctrine of emptiness to “shunytata-
vada” since this avoids the possibility of seeing emptiness as an entity of
some type.

[189] “ Artha” means the “highest purpose, objective, or meaning.” Like

“satya (truth/real),” it has both epistemic and ontological dimensions. Here
Chandrakirti equates nirvana with “parama-artha” — the ultimate truth or
reality. Nagarjuna does not do that.

[199] “Self-nature ( svabhava)” — here “svabhava” is used in its

nontechnical sense, not in the philosophical sense of “self-existence.” That
is, it is the everyday sense of what something is without any grand
metaphysical implications. (See the Essay on “svabhava.”)

***
The Clearly-Worded Commentary (Prasanna-pada)
Chapter 1: Conditions

. . . [12] Nagarjuna now undertakes to explain dependent-arising. It is

characterized as “non-ceasing,” and so forth. First, he advances the
refutation of “arising” since he knows that if it is refuted then “ceasing” and
the other characteristics are easily refuted. When other schools reflect on
“arising,” they conceive it as either arising from one thing itself, from
another, from both itself and another, or without a cause. Nagarjuna claims
that all of these conceptions are, upon examination, unsupportable (MK
1.1):

[1] No entities whatsoever are found anywhere that have arisen from
themselves, from another, from both themselves and another, or from no
cause at all.

Objection : [13] Now, once it has been specified that “nothing arises from
itself,” isn’t it the case that the unwanted consequence must be accepted
that “things arise from other things”?

Reply : This consequence does not follow. For it is intended that the
negation not imply or assume an affirmation — arising from another will be
equally negated. The reason for that negation may be ascertained in the
Entering the Middle Way: “Thus, if something of any kind whatsoever has
arisen, then the re-arising of what has arisen cannot be established (MA
6.8).”

Defending Buddhapalita Against Bhavaviveka

[14] Indeed, Buddhapalita declared “Entities do not arise from themselves

because such arising would be pointless and because it would extend arising
too far — for there is no purpose in things that already exist in themselves
arising again, or if what already exists arises again, there never would be a
time when it is not arising.”
Bhavaviveka advanced the following criticism concerning that: “This
30

claim is unfounded. First, because no reason and example have been

provided (as required in an independent argument to establish a claim). Nor
has a refutation of the flaws alleged by the opponent been provided. [15]
Second, there is an inconsistency within Buddhapalita’s own position: his
claim is in the form of a reductio ad absurdum — so, through the reversal of
the meaning (in the proposition ‘Entities do not arise from themselves’), an
inferred conclusion and its reason having the reverse meaning appears (i.e.,
‘Entities arise from another entity’). Thus, arising would have a purpose
(and thus not be futile) and arising would come to a stop.”

We find Bhavaviveka’s entire criticism to be unfounded. Why? First, it

cannot be claimed that Buddhapalita has failed to supply a reason and an
example. Why? Because the Samkhyas accept that entities arise from
themselves. (This refers to the Samkhyas’ doctrine thatan effect pre-exists
within its cause and so is self-generated.) And thus they claim that what
exists from itself has the attribute of being the cause from which it arises.
But we Madhyamikas see no purpose in repeated arising of what already
exists and no infinite number of arisings. But neither do the Samkhya hold
these doctrines. Thus, the Samkhyas’ argument is indeed without
justification (i.e., their doctrine of an effect existing within its cause does
not support the latter two doctrines), and so Bhavaviveka’s criticism is
inconsistent.

But having been disputed by Bhavaviveka, may Buddhapalita not maintain

his position by admitting a reason and example that could then be of use in
the debate with the Samkhyas? Suppose again that the Samkhyas do not
reject their thesis even because of the above dispute related to its
inconsistency. But then again, the Samkhyas, due to pride, may not reject
their thesis even if Buddhapalita had given them a reason and example. But,
as it is said, there is no debating with the intoxicated.

[16] So too, Bhavaviveka displays his predilection for independent

arguments that introduce inferences even when it is out of place. For a
Madhyamika to formulate an independent argument on his own account is
not acceptable because he does not accept the alternative propositions
(allegedly entailed by the negating a opponent’s proposition). As has also
been stated by Aryadeva: “It is not possible even after a long time to level a
charge against someone who has no proposition positing an entity as real,
unreal, or both real and unreal (CS 16.25).” And as has been stated by
Nagarjuna: “If there were any thesis whatsoever of mine, then this defect
would be mine. However, there is no thesis of mine. Thus, there is no defect
that is mine. If anything whatsoever were apprehended through perception,
then there would be an affirmation or denial. But there is no such thing to
perceive, and so there is no fault in me (VV 29-30).”

Thus, Madhyamikas advance no positive arguments. How then could

Buddhapalita advance a positive thesis such as “The sense-fields are not
produced from internal mental and physical causes” against which the
Samkhyas could raise an objection? [17] What is the sense of a “thesis”?
Does the thesis “There is no arising from itself” have the nature of an effect,
or does it have the nature of a cause? What does this involve? If the former,
then the thesis establishes what is already established (and this is an error in
debates). If the latter, the sense of the thesis in fact is inconsistent with what
Madhyamikas hold [18] since for all that arises there is the arising of
precisely what exists as the cause. How could there be for Madhyamikas the
reason “because an entity already exists” that either establishes what
already exists or is inconsistent with what we hold? We seek to avoid any
argument involving either of those two flaws. Thus, because the
flawsalleged by the opponent do not occur, Buddhapalita does not need to
specify its rebuttal.

Objection : Madhyamikas do not formulate positive arguments. Thus, since

any thesis, reason, and example are not established, the object of the thesis
is also not established, nor is the rejectionof the opponent’s thesis
established (on grounds common to both parties to the debate) for both
parties. Nevertheless, in light of the need for an outcome in the debate
concerning the alleged contradiction with the reason in the opponent’s
account for his thesis, there then is still needed from the Madhyamikas’
account precisely a thesis free from defects in the thesis itself, its reason,
and the example. Thus, there indeed exists this flaw in Buddhapalita not
formulating a reason (for a positive argument) and not having refuted the
flaws that Samkhyas allege the reason has.
[19] Reply: This is not so. Why? Because he who advances as a thesis an
object must demonstrate to the other party the justification upon which he
has perceived that object. This is done out of a desire to create in the other
party the conviction that is like his own conviction of the object. Thus, in
the first place the correct procedure is that the demonstration of the object
of the thesis accepted by yourself should be advanced only by you. And
because no reason or example given by the Samkhya that is acceptable to
Madhyamikas is available, the Samkhya merely advances a demonstration
of the object of his own thesis that consists of basically only reasserting his
own thesis. Thus, because of his acceptance of a proposition that has no
justification and because he contradicts himself, the Samkhya is unable to
generate a conviction in others. Thus, the clearest refutation of the
Samkhya’s thesis lies in his inability to demonstrate the object of his thesis.
In such a situation, what then could be the purpose of pointing out the
appearance of a fallacy by means of a reason as Bhavaviveka requires?

Objection : But still, the flaw of self-contradiction within an argument must

be pointed out.
Reply: [20] This flaw too was in fact pointed out by Buddhapalita. This is
so because he states that “Entities do not arise from themselves because of
the futility of their arising.” Here the word “their” generates the recognition
of what according to the Samkhyas self-exists. Indeed, the statement “There
is no purpose in the arising again of entities that self-exist” is an
explanation of the concise statement of MK 1.1. And by means ofthis
statement there is the perception of an example of the same nature that is
also acknowledged by the Samkhyas, and it is accompanied by what is to be
proved and a reason for it. By stating here “of entities that self-exist,” there
is the recognition of the reason and by stating “because of the futilityof their
arising,” there is the recognition of what is to be proved.
In this connection, consider this argument:
(1) Sound is impermanent (thesis)
(2) Because it is produced (reason)
(3) Like a pot (corroborating example)
(4) Just so is a sound produced (application)
(5) Thus, because it is produced, sound is impermanent (conclusion). Here,
“it is produced” is the reason, as shown in the application. [21] So too here,
an argument has been advanced by Buddhapalita: “Entities do not arise
from themselves, because there is no purpose in the arising again of what is
self-existent. Here the presence of what (Smakhyas believe) self-exists,
such as a pot, is known not to depend on continuous arising. Thus, if the
Samkhyas suppose that, for example, a pot self-exists even in its state as a
lump of clay (i.e., in its cause), then this self-existing thing cannot arise.” In
this way, by means of the reason “because of self-existence” that is revealed
in the application and that succeeds in negating continued arising,
Buddhapalita has indeed pointed out the inconsistency in the Samkhya’s
argument from self-existence. So how can it be argued that Buddhapalita’s
procedure is unfounded because no reason and example were provided?
In addition, not only was there no failure by Buddhapalita to provide a
reason and an example, there was no failure to refute the criticism leveled
against him by the opponent. Why? Because Samkhyas do not posit the
rearising of a pot whose nature has already appeared and thus is already
present — for it is precisely this existing pot that is taken as the
corroborating example because its form is already established, while what is
to be proved by the negation of its arising is the pot that is still only
potential in nature and whose form has not yet appeared. How then could
the flaw in a thesis of establishing what is already established be suspected
of Buddhapalita? And how could it be suspected that the reason is self-
contradictory in substance?
Thus, also given the absence of the above flaw in Buddhapalita’s
demonstration of the invalidation of the Samkhyas’ own argument, a
response to the criticism of the opponent is not in fact lacking. Thus, it must
be understood that Bhavaviveka’s criticism of Buddhapalita’s procedure is
altogether inappropriate.
[22] By the words “and so forth” in the phrase “thepot and so forth,” there
is intended the inclusion of all things that arise. Thus, there is also no
inconclusiveness concerning, for example, a cloth arising from threads.
Alternatively, the following form of argument is also available against the
Samkhyas: for the proponent of the arising of something from itself, things
do not arise from the self, except for the self itself, since the evolutes of
primal matter already self-exist (in primal matter) like the self. This
example of the self is provided as the example for the argument.
Objection: For the proponent of manifestation (of pre-existing evolutes out
of their cause), the negation of arising does not invalidate our doctrine.
Reply: The term “arising” attacked here for “manifestation” does not fail to
invalidate the Samkhya doctrine of manifestation since “manifestation” has
been expressed here by the word “arising” due to the similarity (of the two
concepts) with regard to the nonperception of something in its prior cause
and perception once the thing has been produced or manifested.
Objection: How has such an analysis been achieved without the sense of
“manifestation” being expressed?
Reply: [23] These statements of meaning, which contain great meaning,
have indeed come into a general use that embraces “arising.” And once
explained, they yield the essential meaning mentioned above. So nothing
here should be supposed to have been left uncovered.

Defending the Reductio ad Absurdum Method

In addition, it is only the Madhyamikas’ debating partner who engages in

the opposite of the reductio ad absurdum reasoning (in affirming the
“Entities do not arise from themselves”). But we Madhyamikas are not
involved in this way since there is no thesis of our own (concerning the
arising of entities). And for this reason there is no contradiction with the
established Madhyamaka position (of not affirming the self-existent reality
of entities). And to the extent that there are a multitude of defects that occur
for the opponent due to the occurrence of the opposite of the reductio ad
absurdum reasoning, we recognize that too.

[24] So how then could the noble Buddhapalita, a follower of the flawless
thought of the noble Nagarjuna, have made a (positive) statement
(concerning the arising of entities) that is open to assault, so that his
debating partner may be able to discover an assailable weak point? And
when a reductio argument is advanced by the proponent ofthe absence of
selfexistence against a proponent of self-existence, how could there occur to
Madhyamikas any sense that is the opposite of a reductio ad absurdum
argument? For, like watchmen and policemen, words do not overpower
their own speaker. Rather, effective words conform to their speaker’s intent.

Thus, since the Madhyamikas’ reductio argument results solely in the

negation of an opponent’s thesis (without advancingany positive thesis of
their own), there occurs no sense that the opposite of the sense of the
reductio ad absurdum argument. (That is, Madhyamikas are not committed
to the opposite thesis of the one they negate.) Thus, the noble Nagarjuna has
abundantly demolished the opponent’s proposition by the reductio
argument, declaring: “No space is seen prior to the defining-characteristics
of space — if space existed prior to its characteristics, then it would follow
that it exists without its characteristics (MK 5.1)” and “If there were form
apart from its cause, then the form would be without a cause. But nowhere
is there any effect without a cause (MK 4.2).” Thus, [25] “Nirvana is not an
entity. If it were, it would be characterized by aging and death, for indeed
there is no entity without aging and death (MK 25.4).”

Objection : Assuming that because Nagarjuna’s statements are meaningful,

and given their great meaning, this is a motivating cause for producing
many (positive) supporting arguments. Why then should we not assume that
the noble Buddhapalita’s statements are also (positive arguments)? We
assume that it is the procedure of commentators to formulate in detail
supporting arguments.

Reply : This too is not so. For even when writing a commentary on his own
Overturning the Objections, the noble Nagarjuna did not formulate
supporting arguments. In addition, although Bhavaviveka accepted the
Madhyamaka teaching, if he has formulated a positive argument out of a
desire only to reveal his great expertise in the study of reasoning, then this
is considered grounds for the accumulation by the reasoner of exceedingly
many defects. Why? First, Bhavaviveka himself has stated in this matter
that “[26] From the point of view of what is real, the sense-fields do not
arise from the self, since they already exist like the self does.” But why did
he add here the qualification “from the point of view of what is real”?

Objection : It is so because arising is not negated conventionally — it is

accepted by Madhyamikas as the conventional truth of ordinary worldly
people. In addition, if there were such a negation, what Madhyamikas
accept would be invalidated (since you too accept the world
conventionally).

Reply : This is unfounded because self-arising is not accepted by

Madhyamikas even as a conventional truth. In the Shalistamba Sutra, it has
been declared: “When a sprout, having a seed as its cause,arises, it is not
selfproduced, nor is it produced from another thing, nor is it produced by
both itself and another thing, nor does it arise withouta cause; nor is it
created by the Lord Ishvara, time, bits of matter, primal matter, or its innate
nature.” Also theLalitavistara Sutra states: “If a seed is real, then so is the
sprout. But the sprout is not the seed — it is neither different from the seed
nor identical to it. So too, the seed, is not destroyed, nor is it eternal. This is
the true nature of things.” And Nagarjuna declares: “Whatever arises
dependently upon another thing is not that thing, nor is it different from that
thing. Thus, it is neither annihilated nor eternal (MK 18.10).”

Objection : The qualification “from the point of view of what is real” is

made in light of the opponent’s doctrine.
Reply: This also is unfounded since even on the level of conventional truth
no such doctrine is accepted by Madhyamikas. [27] Those outside the
Madhyamaka tradition, who have indeed diverged from the correct teaching
of the doctrine of the “two types of truth,” are rebutted in both respects (i.e.,
from both the conventional and the ultimate points of view) and not solely
from the latter point of view. To that extent, it is a good quality (i.e., it is
good against both points of view). Thus, it is not correct to introduce this
qualification even with regard to the opponent’s doctrine.
Nor do the ordinary people of the world even understand “self-arising” (i.e.,
they do not understand the very notion of how something could cause itself
or the Samkhya doctrine of “manifestation”), so that the qualification might
prove fruitful (for them). For ordinary people understand only this: that a
result arises from a cause — they do not analyze whether there is arising
from oneself, another, and so forth. This is what Nagarjuna has also
established. In this way, it is ascertained that the qualification “from the
point of view of what is real” is altogether unproductive.
In addition, if the qualification is accepted in a desire to reject the negation
of arising on the conventional level, then by this account alone there would
be the fallacy of a proposition having an unestablished subject (i.e., a reason
without a topic to defend), or the fallacy of having a ungrounded reason
(i.e., the reason does not support the subject of the thesis). For on our
account Madhyamikas do not accept the existence of the field of the eye
and the fields of the other senses from the point of view of what is real.
Objection: There is no fallacy because the eye and so forth have real
existence on the conventional level.
Reply: What then does the qualification “from the point of view of what is
real” qualify?
Objection: Employing the expression “from the point of view of what is
real” qualifies the negation of the arising of the eye, and so forth as
conventionally conceived from the ultimate point of view.
Reply: In that case, one should say [28] “From the ultimate point of view,
there is no arising of the eye and so forth conventionally conceived.” But no
such claim is stated. In addition, even if this were stated, the opponents
accept the eye and so forth as real substances andnot as nominal. Thus,
from the point of view of the opponents, there is the fallacy of a proposition
having an unestablished subject. Thus, Bhavaviveka’s procedure is
unfounded.

Qualifying and What is Qualified

Objection : Be that as it may, in the case of “Sound is impermanent,”

“sound” (in general rather than a particular sound) is what is qualified and
“impermanent” is the qualifying property. Here then it is only the
(unparticularized) generality of a property and something qualified that is
apprehended, not a particular instance. [29] If one holds such distinctions,
there exists no convention of inference and what is inferred. (Thatis, only
when there a generality do we have to make mental constructs and
inferences, not when we directly experience something.) Why? If we hold
that sound arises from the four elements, what is qualified is not established
for the opponent (here, the Hindu Vaisheshikas). On the other hand, if the
opponent holds that sound is a quality of space, then it is not established for
the Buddhists. Likewise, if Vaisheshikas, who assert the impermanence of
sound, hold that sound is an effect of the elements what is qualified is still
not established for the partner in this debate (who hold sound to be
permanent). On the other hand, if sound is apprehended as something to be
manifested (as the Mimamsakas hold), it is still not established for the
Buddhists (since the effect would be in the cause). In the same way, if,
according to this case, the cessation of sound is also produced by a cause
(separate from sound), then again it is not established for the Buddhists (for
whom anything does not need a separate cause to cease). But if, on the
other hand, ceasing is not caused by a separate cause, then it is not
established for the opponent. Thus, here too only the qualified thing will be
held with the rejection of qualification in precisely the same way as the
simple (unparticularized) generality of the property and what is being
qualified.

Reply : This is not so. [30] For if the intended negation here is of “arising as
a qualifying property to be established,” then atthis very point Bhavaviveka
has himself accepted the failure of what is being qualified: the subject of the
negation is an entity that is recognized only through a mistaken awareness.
Now “mistaken awareness” and “the absence of mistaken awareness” are
indeed different. Thus, whenever what does not in fact exist is mistakenly
seen as real — as are such things as (nonexistent) hairs that are seen by
those afflicted with an eye-defect — how atthat time could even a minute
part of a truly real thing be perceived? But when, because of the absence of
mistaking, nothing unreal is superimposed onto what is really there — as
when such things as hairs in space are not superimposed onto the visual
sense-field by one free of any eye-defect — how could even the most
minute vestige of what is unreal then be perceived? If one did so, there
would then be a conventional covering truth. For this reason, Nagarjuna has
declared: “If anything whatsoever were apprehended through perception,
then there would be an affirmation or denial. But there is no such thing to
perceive, and so there is no fault in me (VV 30).” This is so because
“mistaken awareness” and “the absence of mistaken awareness” are
accordingly different. Thus, for those who know in the state that is free of
mistaking, there is no possibility of a mistaken awareness — so how could
the eye of conventional truth perceive the subject (of a positive argument
and thereby provide agreement with the opponent)? For this reason, neither
the fallacy of a proposition having an unestablished subject nor the fallacy
of having an ungrounded reason is eliminated in Bhavaviveka’s argument.
Thus, our objection remains unrefuted.

Nor is the analogy to the eye and its field comparable to the argument
establishing the impermanence of unqualified sound. For here the generality
of sound and the generality of impermanence, where no particular instances
are intended, are accepted by both parties. But in the same way, no
generality of the eye has been admitted by both the advocate of emptiness
and the advocate of non-emptiness (i.e., self-existence) on either the
conventional level or from the point of view of what is in fact real. Thus,
the instances are not similar.
Unestablished Reasons in Bhavaviveka’s Arguments

The rule “Something must exist” used to point out a fallacy in a proposition
having an unestablished object is also used when pointing out the fallacy of
an ungrounded reason. [31] Thus, the sense discussed above was accepted
by the reasoner Bhavaviveka himself. Why? Because his opponent has
advanced this claim: “There are indeed causes and so forth that produce the
sense-fields (thesis), for the Buddha has taught that (reason). What the
Buddha has taught in a particular manner is so (application), e.g., ‘nirvana
is tranquil (example).’” But Bhavaviveka advanced this violation against it:
“How do you understand the reason taught by the Buddha— as a
conventional truth or as a truth from the ultimate point of view? If you think
it is a conventional truth, then the meaning of the reason(i.e., ‘because it is
real’) is not established even for you. On the other hand, if you think it is an
ultimate truth, then consider what Nagarjuna states:‘when no existing,
nonexisting, or existing-and-nonexisting basic phenomena are produced —
because of the elimination of anything existing, nonexisting, or both could
cause a result — how is a cause admitted (MK 1.7)?’ The plain meaning of
this statement is that such a cause is indeed ineffective. Thereby, from the
point of view of what is real, being an effect and being a cause are both
unestablished. Thus, the reason has the quality of being unestablished in its
meaning or being contradictory in its meaning.” By this reasoning,
Bhavaviveka himself has accepted that the reason is not established. Thus,
even on Bhavaviveka’s own account, there is no establishment of any
argument having reasons that are treated as substantively real things.

Consider two examples of Bhavaviveka’s reasoning: “From the point of

view of what is real, there is no arising of the sense-fields from internal
mental and physical causes, since the sense-fields are other than those
causes, as in the case of a pot,” and “[32] From the point of view of what is
real, conditions are not meant as ‘other conditions’ causing the sense-fields
of the eye and so forth, since they do not exist as other than those, as with
cloth and threads.” Thus, here the state of being “other” and so forth is not
established even in Bhavaviveka’s own account.

Bhavaviveka also desires to point out the nonestablishment of the reason

that the opponent stated as “Entities from internal mental and physical
causes are indeed arisen because they are distinct objects according to
conventional usage.” He himself responds: “But if, from the point of view
of what is real, arising, motion, and so forth are established as entities for
yogins with concentrated minds who discern the true nature of things with
their eye of wisdom, then the reason given by the opponent is not
established, precisely because by the negation of arising, motion is also
negated.” Thus, also in the argument formulated by Bhavaviveka himself:
“In the claim ‘From the point of view of what is real, non-motion is not
moving because it has the quality of a completed journey,’ the substance of
the reason (‘because it is like a completed journey’) is not established in the
speaker’s own account.” And that the reason and so forth are notestablished
even for yourself applies in arguments such as the following: “From the
point of view of what is real, the eye that is the same in natureas material
form does not see matter, since it is the eye-faculty (i.e., the non-physical
mental faculty of sight) that is operative.” [33] Likewise from Bhavaviveka:
“The (material) eye does not see (material) form because form is produced
from the elements, like the eye’s own (material) form (MHK 3.41),” and
“The earth has no selfexistent solidity because of its state as a great (non-
self-existent) element, like the air (MHK 3.27).”

The Inconclusiveness of the Reason in Bhavaviveka’s Arguments

For the opponent, the reason “Because it is real” is inconclusive: do the

sense-fields not arise from internal mental and physical causes because they
already exist like the self, or do they arise from themselves like the pot
(selfarising from matter)?

Objection : There is no inconclusiveness because the property is also the

same for the pot and so forth (i.e., the property and the object have the same
nature).

Reply : This is not so since this sameness has not be stated. Objection: [34]
Isn’t it the case that when a criticism is directed against others’ arguments
that it also applies in the same way to one’s own when applicable? Here,
don’t the fallacy of a proposition having an unestablished subject, the
fallacy of having a ungrounded reason, and so forth apply? Thus, since
what is fallacious for both parties is not to be pressed against only one
party, your entire criticism turns out to be unfounded.
Reply: These fallacies arise only for those advocating positive arguments
(i.e., Svatantrika Madhyamikas). But we Prasangika Madhyamikas
formulate no positive arguments — our arguments result only in the
negation of an opponent’s thesis. In this way, having supposed that the
claim “The eye sees form other than itself,” our opponent is confronted with
the argument he himself acknowledges, and those who maintain that the
quality of the eye’s not seeing itself still accept the quality of the eye seeing
another form. To this, Nagarjuna advances this argument: “Whenever
something is not seen by itself, then nothing else can be seen either (thesis),
as with a pot (example). Now, for the eye there is no seeing of itself
(reason); thus, for the material eye, there is no seeing of anything else
material either (conclusion) (see MK 3.2).” Thus, the eye in seeing another
form such as blue, which conflicts with it not being able to see itself, is
opposed by the argument that the opponent acknowledges. Since it
precisely this that is pointed out by our arguments, how would the above
fallacy affect our proposition, so as to incur the same flaw as the
Svatantrikas?

Dignaga’s Requirements for an Argument

Objection : Is an argument also invalid in the case of an argument that is

acknowledged by only one of the two parties to a debate and not both?
Reply: It is, since there then is a reason that has been acknowledged only by
yourself. [35] But this is not due to a reason acknowledged only by one’s
opponent. Indeed, this is what one finds with the views of the ordinary
people: sometimes among the worldly there is a victory or defeat in a
dispute declared by a witness held to be authoritative by both the plaintiff
and defendant, and sometimes there is a victory or defeatdue only to one’s
own assertions. But neither victory nor defeat is due solely to the plaintiff’s
declarations. And just as it is in the worldly practice, so it also is with
philosophical reasoning, since in the study of reasoning, worldly
conventions are considered. And thus some say that an argument isnot
invalidated only by the force of what one’s opponent acknowledges since
there is a desire to reject what the opponent maintains. The Buddhist
logician Dignaga believes that what expresses what is certain for both
parties to a debate serves as a proof or as a refutation, but what is
acknowledged only by one of the two parties or expresses only what is
doubtful cannot.
Thus, following the worldly procedure here, one should accept reasoning
only of the kind just described. Thus, scriptural authority is invalidated not
only by scriptural authority that is in fact acknowledged by both parties but
also by that scriptural authority acknowledged only by yourself. But in an
argument only for yourself, what is acknowledged by yourself is what
completely prevails, and not what is acknowledged by both parties. [36] For
this reason, stating a defining-characteristic of reasoning is without purpose.
Why? Because for worldly students who do not know this, assistance comes
from the buddhas by the establishment of what is acknowledged by
yourself.
But enough of this side point! We will now explain the main topic at hand.
(Chandrakirti then turns to the second line of MK 1.1.)

There is No Arising from Another Entity

Entities also do not arise from another entity since no other entities exist
either. This Nagarjuna explains: “The self-existence of entities is not found
in their conditions (MK 1.3).” Thus, because no other entities exist, neither
do entities arise from another entity. Moreover, if another entity were
indeed to come into existence from dependence on something else, thick
darkness would arise from fire, and you must then agree that everything
would then arise from everything, for “otherness” would also hold in the
same way for all that is unproductive of effects (MA 6.14). Since this is so,
it may be ascertained that arising from other entities is tobe negated.
Buddhapalita in fact explains: “Entities do not arise from other entities
since otherwise there arises the consequence that everything arises
fromeverything.”

Objection : Against this claim Bhavaviveka advances the following

refutation: “[37] Because there is here a reductio ad absurdum, when a
rejection of the property and its reason has been achieved, there is a
contradiction with the previous proposition ‘Entities arise from themselves,
from both, or from no cause, since anything arises from something.’
Otherwise Buddhapalita’s reason ‘Because there arises the consequence that
everything from everything’ comprises neither a proof nor a refutation and
so is irrelevant.”

Reply : This objection is itself irrelevant in substance. It has no value since

Bhavaviveka’s objection in fact was advanced previously (see [14] and
[15]) and was refuted, and since Buddhapalita’s claim is itself a refutation
because the meaning asserted by the opponent was refuted by it.

No further effort thus needs to be expended on this point.

There is No Arising from An Entity and Another

[38] Turning to the third line of MK 1.1.: entities do not arise from both
themselves and other entities. This is so because of the fallacies stated
above for both positions (i.e., that entities arise from themselves or from
others) both apply to this claim as consequences. In addition, it is
impossible for entities to arise individually. As Nagarjuna declares: “If
suffering were created by oneself and another, it would be made by both
(MK 12.9).”

There is No Arising Without a Cause

Turning to the fourth line of MK 1.1: entities also do not arise from no
causes at all. This is so because of this consequence: “If there is no cause,
then an ‘effect’ and its ‘cause’ are not found (MK 8.4).” And there also is
this consequence: “If the world itself were without any causes, nothing
within it could indeed be apprehended, just as the color and smell of a
(nonexistent) lotus growing in the sky are not apprehended (MA 6.100).”
Indeed, Buddhapalita states: “Entities do not arise from no cause, for then
there would occur the consequence that everything always arises from
everything.” (That is, anything in the world would arise from anything else
— e.g., rabbits from acorns. There would be no a fixed causal order.)
Against this, Bhavaviveka has stated this refutation: “Here too there is a
reductio ad absurdum. [39] Thus, if the sense of the statement is maintained
as revealing the opposite property and reason, then this is expressed in the
claim ‘Entities arise from a cause since sometimes something arises
somewhere, and since the effort undertaken to produce an effect yields
fruit.’ Thus, Buddhapalita’s explanation is unfounded because of the fallacy
mentioned above.” But according to others (i.e., the Prasangikas), it is this
claim byBhavaviveka that is unfounded in view of the previously expressed
refutation.

A Creator God and Other Alleged Causes

It is also without foundation to include the god Ishvara as the cause of

arising, for Ishvara and other alleged causes (such as time) are covered in
the propositions of self-arising, arising from another, and arising from both
(oneself and another) as discussed above.

Dependent-Arising and Scriptures of Provisional and Final

Meaning

Thus, no arising has been established because it is impossible to conceive

(of self-existent entities arising). And because the arising (of real entities)
does not exist, “dependent-arising” is established, qualified as itself without
an arising, and so forth.

Objection : You claim that dependent-arising is qualified as itself without an

arising and so forth, but the Buddha has declared: “Dispositions are
conditioned by root-ignorance, and by the stopping of root-ignorance the
mental dispositions are stopped.” Also: “These dispositions are
impermanent, having the properties of arising and ceasing. Having arisen,
they can come to an end, and their pacification is blissful.” Also: “[40]
Whether buddhas arise or not, the true nature of the basic phenomena of the
experienced world is fixed.” Thus, the Buddha taught dependent-arising
qualified by cessation and so forth — how then is there no contradiction
with your claim that dependent-arising is qualified as “without an arising,
and so forth”?

Reply : [41] Thus, since cessation and so forth are perceived for dependent-
arising, it is the case that Nagarjuna composed the Fundamental Verses of
the Middle Way to explicate the proper distinction between a canonical text
of “provisional meaning” and one of “final meaning” (i.e., texts whose
meaning must be explained further versus those whose plain meaning is
accepted as definitive). As applied here: if that arising and so forth of
dependent-arising has been stated, then this is not with respect to the real
nature of the objects of true knowledge, but instead with respect to objects
of knowledge of the eye of understanding impaired by the blindness of
rootignorance.

Concerning seeing reality as it truly it, the Buddhahas stated: “The ultimate
reality/truth is nirvana, which has the property of being free of error.
Dispositions are false and deceptive.” Also: “What has the property of
being deceptive has the property of failing and is false — it is a magical
trick (i.e., deceptive in its appearance and dependent on someone who
creates it) and the babbling of a child. Here there exists no true ‘thus-ness.’”
Also: “Material form is like a ball of foam. Feelings are like a bubble.
Perception is like a mirage. Dispositions are the hollow stem of a banana
tree. Cognition is like a magical trick. So has the sun-like Buddha spoken.
[42] A monk who strives with effort and analyzes these phenomena with
awareness and attention day and night will attain the tranquil place, the
quiet pacification of the conditions of dependent-arising, for phenomena are
selfless.”

By misunderstanding the teaching’s purpose in this way, one may be in

doubt as to which teaching has reality as it goal and is purposeful. And, due
to a weak intelligence, one may misunderstand a teaching of “provisional
meaning” as one of “final meaning.” In order to remove doubt and error
concerning these two kinds of meaning for worldly students, Nagarjuna
undertook through argument and scriptural authority to compose the
Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way. In that treatise, an argument
concerning self-arising and so forth is presented in MK 1.1. Also: “The
blessed one, the Buddha, has said ‘Whatever is characterized by deception
is false.’ All phenomena that are compounded (i.e., assembled from parts)
are characterized by deception and thus they all are false (MK 13.1).” Also:
“The great sage, the Buddha, has stated that a limit to the past is not known.
The cycling of rebirths is without beginning or end. Indeed, there is no
beginning nor end to it (MK 11.1).” Also: “[43] In the Discourse to
Katyayana, both ‘is’ and ‘is not’ (i.e., the extremes of permanent existence
and total nonexistence) are denied by the blessed one who has made known
both ‘being’ and ‘nonbeing’ (MK 15.7).” Nagarjuna also presented other
scriptural authority.

In the Akshayamatinirdesha Sutra, it is stated: “Which texts are of

provisional meaning and which of final meaning? Those taught to introduce
the path to enlightenment are called of ‘provisional meaning.’ Those taught
to introduce the fruits of the path are called of ‘final meaning.’ When
emptiness, the signless, the desireless, the absence of dispositions, the
unborn, the unarisen, the absence of entities, theselfless, the absence of
sentient beings, the absence of embodied beings, the absence of persons, the
masterless, and gates of liberation are taught in texts, these are called of
‘final meaning.’” [44] Similarly, in the Samadhiraja Sutra, it is stated: “The
characteristic of a text of ‘final meaning’ is that one knows emptiness as
taught by the Buddha. And, on the contrary, one in which a person, being,
or self is taught, one knows all of these things as having a ‘provisional
meaning.’”

Thus, Nagarjuna has undertaken the explanation of dependent-arising to

make known that the teaching of “arising” and soforth is false in its aim.

The Question of Ontological Nihilism

Objection : If, in the absence of arising and so forth, Nagarjuna undertook

his treatise to make known the falsity of all phenomena, then since the false
does not exist unwholesome actions do not exist, and thus miserable states
of existence do not exist. Wholesome actions also do not exist, and thus
pleasurable states of existence do not exist. And since pleasurable and
miserable states of existence do not exist, no cycle of rebirths exists. Thus,
all effort toward better rebirths or enlightenment is in fact futile.

Reply : It is only concerning conventional realities that we make known that

the falsity of entities in their substance, since this is a counter-proposition to
ordinary people’s devotion to things as real. It is not the case that the noble
ones who have done what is to be done apprehend anything that might be
either false or true. In addition, do karmic actions and the cycle of rebirths
exist for one who has apprehended the falsity of things? Such an
enlightened one indeed apprehends neither the existence nor nonexistence
of anything whatsoever.

[45] The Buddha declared in the Ratnakuta Sutra: “If one searches fo the
mind, it is not found. What is not found is not perceived. What is not
perceived is neither past, future, or present. What is neither past, future, or
present is not self-existent. What is not self-existent cannot arise. What does
not arise does not cease, and so on.” One who does not understand the
falsity of things because of his misperception devotes himself to the self-
existence of entities that actually exist dependently. Since one is thus
devoted to the idea that entities are real, one acts and is reborn in the cycle
of rebirths; fixed in misperception, one is not destined to attain nirvana.

Objection : But since things are false in nature, can they be a cause for the
purification of mental afflictions?
Reply: For example, a magically-conjured young woman will still cause
negative actions for those who do not know her truenature, and a phantom
of the Buddha will be a cause for purification for those who have planted a
wholesome root. ([46] Chandrakirti then extensivelyquotes texts for this
point:) Thus, entities that are false in nature too are the cause of mental
afflictions and purification of the naive. ([47-50]Chandrakirti quotes an
example from the Ratnakuta Sutra for this point:) Thus, the cause of
purification of five hundred monks was accomplished by two phantom
monks conjured up by the Buddha who were false in nature. ([50-54]
Chandrakirti then quotes texts for this point:) Thus, in this way, these
entities are without self-existence and falsely created by one’s own
misperception, but they are the causes of mental afflictions for the naive.
This is what is established. In Entering the Middle Way, how things that are
false in nature are the cause of mental afflictions and purification can be
ascertained in detail.

Return to the Question of Causation

Objection : If there is no arising of entities from themselves, others, both, or

without a cause, how is it that the Buddha spoke of emotional dispositions
being dependent upon root-ignorance?
Reply : This is the conventional reality, not what is in fact real. How is the
condition of conventional reality to be stated? The determination of the
conventional reality is through nothing but the dependency of things, not by
assenting to any of the four propositions of MK 1.1. Assenting to any of the
four propositions has the consequence of accepting self-existence. In
addition, the propositions are unfounded. [55] If arising solely through the
dependency of things is asserted to, because of the mutual connection of
(the concepts of) “cause” and “effect,” there is no establishment of things
through self-existence. Thus, there is no doctrine of self-existence.

Thus, it is declared in the Lokatitastava Sutra: “It has been declared by

speculative reasoners that suffering is caused by itself, by others, and by
both itself and others, and that it is without a cause, but the Buddha has
stated that it is produced dependently.” Nagarjuna also declares: “An actor
is dependent upon an action, and the action proceeds dependent upon an
actor — we cannot see any other way to establish them (MK 8.12).” The
Buddha declared precisely that in the Madhyamaka-Shalistamba Sutra:
“Accordingly, the agreement concerning phenomena is this: because of the
arising of this, that arises. Dispositions are dependent upon root-ignorance,
cognition is dependent upon dispositions, and so forth.”

The Question of Means of Knowledge

Objection : Does your conviction that entities do not arise proceed from a
“valid means to knowledge” or not? If it does, these questions must be
answered: how many valid means of knowledge are there? What are their
defining-characteristic? What are the objects of the valid means of
knowledge? Do the means arise from themselves, others, both, or without a
cause? But if your conviction does not proceed from a validmeans of
knowledge, it is unfounded, since knowledge of objects of valid knowledge
depends on valid means of knowledge. Indeed, something unknown cannot
become known without a valid means of knowledge — so if something is
unknown because of the absence of a valid means of knowledge,how can
there be a correct conviction? Thus, there is no foundation for saying
“Entities do not arise.”
In addition, my conviction that all entities exist has the same source as your
conviction that all entities do not arise. [56]So too, like your conviction that
all phenomena do not arise, my conviction is that all entities do arise. But if
for you there is no conviction that “No entities arise,” then it is altogether
futile to undertake the composition of a treatise since it is impossible to
communicate to another what one is not convinced of.

Thus, all entities do exist without being negated.

Reply: If a conviction exists, it does indeed proceed either from a valid
means of knowledge or not. But there is no conviction on our part that
entities do not arise. Why? If there were a contrary conviction here in
nonarising, then there would exist a conviction related to it as a
counterproposition. But when there is no contrary conviction, how could
there be a conviction as its opposite? For there is no further dependence on
what is related as with “shortness” and “longness” of a nonexistent
donkey’s horn. (Since there is no such entity, there is nothing to deny.) [57]
Thus, if there is no conviction, of what then can we posit the establishment?
Or, how can there be a number, a defining-characteristic, or object for
nonexistent valid means of knowledge? We cannot speak of all of this by
asserting the arising from oneself, another, or both, or without a cause.
Objection: If thus there is no conviction at all, how do you comprehend this
sentence: “Entities do not exist through themselves, or another, or from
both, or through no cause”?
Reply: For the ordinary people, this sentence is a conviction with a
justification acknowledged solely on their own account, not for the noble
ones.
Objection: But for the noble ones there is then no truly existing
justification.
Reply: By whom could it be said that a justification exists or not? What is in
fact real is a matter of silence for the noble ones. Thus, for that realm, how
can there be any conceptual projection onto what is real so that there might
be either a justification or no justification?
Objection: But how then can they inform ordinary people in the world
about reality from the ultimate point of view if the noble ones present no
justification?
Reply: The noble ones do not present any justification by means of the
conventional usages of the world. Instead, they have recourse to the
justification acknowledged precisely by ordinary people in order to make
the higher type of truth known to others. It is with this conventional-level
justification that they inform the ordinary people of the world. For example,
people who are devoured by passion and are affected by miscomprehension
do not comprehend the impurity in the body, although it is there, and by
superimposing an image of purity that is in fact unreal onto the body they
are entirely polluted. And in order to dispel passions, a phantom or a god
conjured up by the Buddha might reveal the flaws of the body that were
previously concealed by the perception based on a mental discrimination
that the body is pure, saying that “In the body there are hairs and other
impure things.” And by being free from this (erroneous) perception of
purity, these people are able to achieve detachment.
[58] So also here: the ordinary people’s eyes of understanding are afflicted
with the blindness of root-ignorance, having superimposed a mistaken self-
existence onto entities, although self-existence has the nature of being
completely unperceived by the noble ones. Thereby, the worldly are entirely
polluted to the highest degree possible with regard to any particular feature
in any place.
And the noble ones now make this known to ordinary people by means of a
justification acknowledged by these ordinary people themselves in this way:
just as it is accepted by ordinary people that there is no arising from clay
and so forth of an existing pot (i.e., an existing pot does not arise again), so
too it should be accepted by them that there is no arising of anything that
exists prior to its arising since it already exists. Similarly, just as it is
accepted that there is no arising of a sprout from what has a different nature,
as with a flame and coal and so forth, so too it should be understood that
there is no (real) arising even from seeds and so forth as intended by you.
Objection: For us, immediate experience is what provides a justification for
arising.
Reply: This also is unfounded since any such experience is false, like the
experience of a double moon and so forth by someone affected with an
eyedefect. Experience is itself something that requiresto be established by a
justification. Thus, the opponent’s response is unfounded.
Thus, firstly, Nagarjuna undertook to compose chapter 1 of the
Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way, starting with the claim “Entities are
unarisen,” as a counter-proposition to the mistakensuperimposition of
selfexistence onto things. The remaining chapters of the treatise were
undertaken to exclude some particular thing superimposed in some
particular way. This was done for the purpose of conveying that there also is
no particular thing at all that is real by arising dependently — e.g., a mover,
what is moved over, and moving (MK 2) and the other subjects of the
treatise.

Defining-Characteristics

[ Objection from Dignaga’s school]: What if it is only this mundane

conventional usage of “valid means of knowledge” and “valid objects of
knowledge” that is depicted by us in the treatises?

Reply : Then the result of this account has to be stated.

Objection: [59] What has been corrupted by poor speculative reasoners (i.e.,
the Hindu Nyayikas) concerning the defining-characteristic has been
correctly stated by us.
Reply: This is also unfounded. If an erroneous defining-characteristic has
been presented by poor speculative reasoners, then for ordinary people in
the world there is a mistake in what has been defined, and for the purpose
of correcting this, there should be a fruitful effort. But since this is not so,
that effort has in fact been in vain, as has been stated above.
In addition, a flaw has been exposed by Nagarjuna in Overturning the
Objections: if an understanding of the valid objects of knowledge depends
on the valid means of knowledge, then by what are these valid means of
knowledge determined (see VV 31)? (That is, by what valid means can we
know the defining-characteristic?) Since this objection has remained
unanswered, the indication of the correct defining-characteristic is not
found.
In addition, Dignaga has stated that there is a pair of valid means of
knowledge (direct perception and inference) that are in conformity with a
particular self-characteristic (which for him is real) and a general
characteristic (which is constructed by consciousness). (The particular
characteristic is the object of direct perception; the general characteristic is
the object of inference.)
Is there then something characterizable for which there is this pair of
characteristics or not? If there is such a thing, then the two types of valid
objects of knowledge are different from it — so how can there be a pair of
valid means for knowing it? If there is no such thing, the characteristic then
lacks any grounding and so does not exist — so again,how can there be a
pair of valid means of knowledge? As Nagarjuna states: “Where no
characteristics occur, no entity with characteristics occurs. And where there
is no occurrence of an entity with characteristics, no characteristics can
arise (MK 5.4).”
Objection: [60] A “defining-characteristic” does not have something
characterized by it but is itself the object of the defining-characteristic (i.e.,
it is grounded in itself and not in a characterized object).
Reply: Even if that were so, the characterized object is different from the
means of characterization by which that is defined. This is so since here the
defining-characteristic is not defined by the characterized object. That is
exactly the flaw. (That is, there is nothing here to function as the means of
characterization to characterize an object.)
Objection: There is no such flaw in causing knowledge, and knowledge is
included in its self-characteristic.
Reply: Here a self-characteristic is that nature of an entity. Its nature is not
common to any other entity. Thus, for example, there is the solidity of the
earth, the experience of an object of feeling, and the individual awareness
of an object of cognition — i.e, this particular entity is characterized by that
particular defining-characteristic. Thus, having cast aside the generally
accepted derivation of “defining-characteristic,” it is taken to have an
objective support. But then, in apprehending that cognition is an objective
support, one specific defining-characteristic itself has the condition of an
object and another defining-characteristic has the nature of an objective
support. [61] Here the flaw lies precisely in claiming that if the
definingcharacteristic of any cognition is an objective support then there
must be an object of action for it that is separate from it.
Objection: Defining-characteristics such as the solidity present in earth that
are accessible to cognition are in fact the objects of cognition, and they are
not separated from their particular self-characteristics.
Reply: If so, the defining self-characteristic of cognition does not have the
condition of the object of a valid cognition, since it does not have the
condition of “being an object.” This is so because the self-characteristic,
having precisely the nature of an object of action,has the condition of a
valid object of knowledge. Thus, you specify that the object of a valid
cognition is twofold — namely, having both a particular self-characteristic
and a general characteristic. Thus, the following must be stated: one thing
— the selfcharacteristic that is the valid object of cognition — is designated
as what has been given a defining-characteristic, and another thing that is
not the object of a valid cognition is designated as having been
characterized definitionally by the former thing. And if this valid object of
cognition also has an objective support, there still must be a different
means. Butif another knowledge is settled on as the nature of the means,
there is the flaw of an infinite regress of such means.
Objection: There is unmediated self-knowledge. Thus, since there is the
condition of an object of action, due to its being an apprehension through
self-knowledge, this is included in the valid objects of cognition.
Reply: Self-cognition is refuted in detail in our Entry into the Middle Way
(MA 6.72-76). [62] Thus, one particular defining self-characteristic is here
characterized by another particular defining self-characteristic, and doing
this is unfounded (since the first defining-characteristic by itself supposedly
defines an object). In addition, this alleged knowledge does not exist at all:
there can be no knowledge of it because this knowledge is not established
separately from the defining-characteristic, and because when there exists
nothing that is characterized, then the defining-characteristic lacks an
objective ground and so does not become operative. So how could there be
any self-knowledge?
(Also the valid objects of cognition and the valid means to cognition would
collapse into one and thus neither would be established. See VV 30-51.) In
the Ratnachudaparipriccha Sutra, it is said: “One may think this: ‘Since
there is an objective cognitive support, a thought arises.’ Now are the object
and the thought distinct? If so, there is a duality of thought. But if they are
not distinct, how then does thought perceive this thought? Indeed, thought
does not perceive thought. [63] The blade of a sword cannot cut itself, nor
can the tip of a finger touch itself. So too, one thought cannot perceive that
same thought. Thus, for one who has correctly applied himself there is no
fixity of thought, neither ceasing nor nonceasing, nor unchanging, neither
without a cause nor without conditions, neither arising from itself nor from
another, neither identical nor distinct. One who knows and sees the stream
of thought to be like a creeping vine knows and sees the nature of thought,
the nonfixity of thought, the motionlessness of thought (i.e., it is nothing
real that could move), the imperceptibility of thought (i.e., there is nothing
real to see), and the self-characterization of thought. One who knows and
sees in such a way does not come into conflict with the thus-ness of reality.
And thus one knows accurately and sees the isolatedness (from any
defilements resulting from ideas of real entities) of thought. Such mental
seeing of thought is the bodhisattva’s application of mindfulness to
thought.”
Thus, there is no (real entity called) “self-knowledge.” Since it does not
exist, what is characterized definitionally by it?

Defining-Characteristics in General

In addition, there is no defining-characteristic either distinct from what is

characterized nor not distinct from it. If it were distinct, then since the
defining-characteristic is distinct from what is characterized, it would not be
a defining-characteristic, like everything else that is not a defining-
characteristic. And by being different from the defining-characteristic, what
is characterized would not be characterized, like everything else that is not
characterized (by that defining-characteristic). [64] Thus, because the
defining-characteristic is distinct from what is characterized, there would
exist for the defining-characteristic a characterized object independent of its
defining-characteristic. Thus, because of this independence from any
defining-characteristic, this object is like a (nonexistent) flower in the sky.

But if, on the other hand, what is characterized and its definingcharacteristic
are not distinct, then because of this the condition of what is characterized
as an “object that is characterized” is lost. And in the same way, the nature
of the defining-characteristic is lost. By not being distinct from what is
characterized, a defining-characteristic also does not have the nature of a
“defining-characteristic,” just as with the nature of an “object that is
characterized.” In the Lokatitastava Sutra, it is declared: “If the
definingcharacteristic is distinct from the thing characterized, this thing
would exist without a defining-characteristic. And neither exists in the case
where they are not distinct. The Buddha has explained this very plainly.”

Apart from identity and distinction, there is no other way of existing (for
what is self-existent). Thus, it is declared: “Indeed, how could there be the
establishment of two things, when this establishment does not occur
through either identity or difference?”
Objection : There is an establishment through its inexpressibility. Reply:
This is not so. There is “inexpressibility” only in the absence of any precise
knowledge of mutual otherness. (Where there are no self-existent entities,
entities are not distinct or clearly “other”; thus, the relation of things that
are dependently-arisen is inexpressible.) But where there is no precise
knowledge of mutual otherness, there is lacking a specification of
distinction “this is the defining-characteristic, and this is the thing
characterized” — and where this is lacking, these two indeed do not exist.
Thus, there is no establishment of a defining-characteristic through
inexpressibility.
In addition, if knowledge is a means, who is the agentin discerning an
object? [65] For without an agent, there is no means and so forth, just as in
the case of cutting where there is someone cuttingand a cutting implement.
And it is also unfounded that the mind is deemed the agent here: the
operation of the mind consists in seeing nothing but an intentional object,
and it is the mental factors that see the particularity of the intentional object.
Where there is a single principal activity to be achieved, there is an
instrumentality and so forth of the means and so forth since they serve a
subsidiary role through their subsidiary activity in this process. But here
there is no single principal activity for both knowledge and an act of
cognition. Instead, distinguishing the particularity of nothing but the
intentional object is the principal activity of cognition, while distinguishing
the particularity of the intentional object is the principal activity of
knowledge. (That is, cognition selects an object and knowledge gives it its
“thingness.”) Thus, for knowledge there is no instrumentality, and for
cognition there is no agency. This is precisely the flaw with this position.
Objection: According to scriptural authority, all things are without a self.
Thus, there is no agent whatsoever. But there is indeed found a
conventional usage that relates to an act and so forth even without an agent.
Reply: This too is not so, for no real intentional object has been specified by
the scriptural authority. This has been exactly stated in Entering the Middle
Way (MA 6.76).
Objection: [66] In the case of expressions like “the body of a statue” or “the
head of (the bodyless demon) Rahu,” there is the relation of “distinguishing
mark” and “what is distinguished,” even though there is no mark distinct
from the body and head. So too with the expression “the
definingcharacteristic of the earth” there is also such a relation, even though
there is no earth distinct from its specific defining-characteristic.
Reply: This is not so because of the incompatibility between the case of the
defining-characteristic and your examples. In the case of the words “body”
and “head,” there is dependency on another accompanying thing, such as a
thought (for the case of the “head”), a hand (for the case of the “body”), and
so forth. Since that is the case, there is present the additional production of
a thought having as its object the words “body” and “head” and involving
precisely the expectation of the other accompanyingthing, such as “the body
of what?” or “the head of whom?” and so forth. Since one wishes to
eliminate any connection with a further distinguishing mark, it is
appropriate that still another mark would remove an apprehender’s
expectation through the expressions for the marks “statue” and “Rahu,”
since these expressions conform to mundane conventions. But in the case of
a defining-characteristic and what is characterized, no such relation of
“distinguishing mark” and “what is distinguished” is found. (For example,
there is no possibility of what is characterized existing apart from the
characteristic, e.g., earth apart from solidity.)
Objection: The mention of a “mark” is not fallacious to outsiders, for they
accept a characterized object that is distinct (from a defining-characteristic).
Reply: [67] The situation is not like that, for it is not reasonable to
incorporate into one’s own doctrine things that are theorized by speculative
reasoners that lack a foundation in reason, since then an additional standard
for valid knowledge must be accepted (leading to an infinite regress). In
addition, there is a statue that, as the receiver of denotation, has the
objective support of a body that is part of the mundane conventional usage
of “statue” and has a mark that has been accepted without any analysis of
the situation. So too, there is Rahu who as the receiver of denotation has the
objective support of a head. This being so, the comparison to the situation
of a defining-characteristic and what is characterized is unfounded, just as
with the name of an “individual” and so forth.
Objection: The comparison is indeed established since it shares this much:
in the examples of the statue and Rahu’s head, there is no establishment of a
separate torso or head.
Reply: This is not so, since in mundane conventional usage, there is no such
analytical investigation, and mundane things exist without analysis being
engaged in. When analyzed, there is no “self” that is found to exist
separately from material form and the other four aggregates constituting a
“person.” Yet by the conventional truth of the world, the “self” exists in
dependence upon those factors. So too, there is no establishment in the
examples of the statue and Rahu. Thus, when critically analyzed, there is
found nothing in such things as earth that is characterized definitionally
apart from these things’ defining-characteristics such as “solidity.” And
even though apart from what is characterized a defining-characteristic lacks
a ground, there is this conventional truth. Teachers have declared the
conventional existence of things because of their establishment through
simple interdependence and that this must be accepted in this manner —
otherwise conventional truth would be without a justificationand it would
then be reality as it truly is and not conventional. [68] Nor is there the
nonexistence of such things as a statue that are in fact being analyzed with
respect to whether there is a justification. Instead, because of the reasoning
given below, there is no existence even of the material form, feelings, and
other aggregates of a “person.” Thus, as with the statue, their existence is to
be accepted conventionally. But since it is not real, it is nonexistent (from
the point of view of what is in fact real).
Objection: Even if that is so, what is the point of such subtle investigation?
For indeed we do not claim that the whole of the conventional usage of
“valid knowledge” and “the means of valid knowledge” is real. Rather, we
are setting out in this argument what is acknowledged by the world.
Reply: We also ask, what indeed is the point of introducing this subtle
investigation into the conventional usage of the world? First, there is the
conventional truth of the existence of an entity that is acquired through the
mere misapprehension of how things really are. For those seeking release
from rebirth, this may be the motivating cause for the accumulation of the
wholesome merit that is the carrier to release, while there is no knowledge
of how things really are. [69] However, because your intellect is not refined
in making the distinction between “worldly convention” and “ultimate
meaning,” you ruin it by bad reasoning against worldly convention,
claiming that it does not correspond to true reasoning. As for myself, I take
my stand precisely in worldly propositions through my skill in determining
conventional truth, and by means of one reason I exclude this or that other
reason that is advanced to deny some particular conventional truth, but I do
not reject conventional truth.
Thus, if the claim is a mundane conventional usage, then what is
characterized by a defining-characteristic must exist in the same way as the
defining-characteristic. Because this is so, this is precisely the flaw in your
argument. But if the claim is an ultimate truth, then there is also no pair of
particular and general characteristics, since there is no thing to be
characterized. So how could there be a pair of “means of valid knowledge”?
Objection: Then no derivation of words predicated on the relation between
“an act” and “an actor” is accepted.
Reply: That would be very difficult. You yourself engage in conventional
activity through precisely those words that function because of the relation
of act and actor, yet you do not consider the meaning of words to be
constructed out of this connection of an act and an implement and so forth.
Unfortunately, your procedure thus depends on nothingbut wishes.
In addition, when the pair of valid objects of knowledge is unfixed in this
way, then scriptural authority and so forth will also not fail to be additional
valid means of knowledge since they do not fall within the reach of either a
particular self-characteristic (i.e., the field of direct perception) or a general
characteristic (i.e., the field of inference).
Moreover, this is without foundation since there is nothing that extends to
all circumstances of the defining-characteristic (i.e., the opponent’s
definition is too narrow and misses some mundane instances covered by the
term). This is so because there has been accepted the mundane conventional
usage as with, for example, “The pot is directly perceivable,” and also
because there has been accepted a conventional usage not belonging to the
noble ones.
Objection: [70] The dark color and so forth that are the objective support of
the pot are directly perceptible, and so there is a determination of the
supports by direct perception as a valid means of knowledge. Thus, just as
the Buddha’s birth is designated “bliss” through a figurative reference to the
cause for its effect, so too a pot having as its material cause dark color and
so forth is described as directly perceptible through the figurative reference
of its cause to the effect.
Reply: Such figurative usage is unfounded with respect to an object of this
kind. For in the world, birth is apprehended as different from bliss, and birth
is not in fact bliss because it is the cause of hundreds of hardships since it
has as its nature a compound defining-characteristic. Thus, describing birth
as “bliss” is indeed inappropriate, and thus the figurative usage is
appropriate for such an object. But in the case of “The pot is directly
perceptible,” nothing that is not directly perceptible as a pot is separately
perceived that could become directly perceptible based on the figurative
usage.
Objection: Because of the nonexistence of any pot existing separately from
its dark color and so forth, its direct perceptibility comes from the figure
used.
Reply: Even if this is so, the figurative usage is all the more unfounded
because there is no base (such as dark color) that is open to the usage. For
sharpness is not open to such usage for a nonexistent donkey’s horn.
In addition, a pot is a part of mundane conventional usage because it does
not exist separately from dark color and so forth. This being so, if a pot has
its direct perceptibility theorized through a figurative usage because the
dark color does not exist separately from earth, thenthe direct perceptibility
of the dark earth through such usage must also be theorized. [71] As has
been stated by Aryadeva: “Just as the pot is not seen apart from form, smell,
taste, and touch (i.e., the pot does not exist apart from these), so form and
the others are not seen apart the elements of earth, water, fire, and air (CS
14.15).”
Thus, because the mundane conventional usage of this nature is not
accepted in your definition of the defining-characteristic, your definition of
the defining-characteristic does not extend to all circumstances. Nor indeed
is the direct perceptibility of such things as the pot and of such things as the
dark color accepted by one who knows reality as it truly is. However, the
direct perceptibility of such things as the pot is precisely to be accepted on
the level of the conventional truth of the worldly people. As has been
declared by Aryadeva: “Not everything about a pot is perceived by
perceiving its form. Indeed, what person who knows reality as it truly is
would also say that the pot is perceptible in all respects? With the very same
reasoning, those with supreme intelligence should refute all that is subject
to smell, taste, and touch (CS 13.1-2).”
Objection: [72] In addition, an object that is immediately present is directly
perceptible, for the words “directly perceptible” denote an object not closed
off to perception. Since it is understood that the sense-faculty of vision
bears directly on this dark color, the direct perceptibility of the pot and the
dark color and so forth that are not closed off to perception is established.
And since the knowledge determining this is caused by what is directly
perceptible, its direct perceptibility is indicated, as with a fire whose
objective support is grass or straw.
Reply: But for one who, like Dignaga, explains the words “directly
perceptible” to mean “being present to each sense-faculty separately.”
However, this derivation is unfounded because knowledge is not the object
of any sense-faculty. Rather, it has a sense-object for its object. Thus, let
“sense-perception” be “thing-perception” or “object-perception.”
Objection: We employ the designation “eye-cognition” because of the
sense-organ alone, for a cognition is changeable from changes in that
senseorgan owing to the sharpness or feebleness of the sense-organ, even
though cognition is dependent upon both the sense-organ and the mental
visual faculty. So too, although there is an act of cognition with respect to
each intentional object separately, a cognition that acts separately on each
sensefaculty still gets its name from its sense-organ. Thus, there is the
designation “sense-perception” and not “thing-perception” or “object-
perception,” for a designation is seen because of its specific base, as with “a
drum sound” or “a barley sprout.”
Reply: These examples do not apply to the previous topic since cognition is
designated according to its sense-object. But the differences between the six
cognitions (i.e., cognitions from the five senses and the mind) are not
indicated by expressions such as “cognition of form”since a mental
cognition involves a single object along with visual cognition and so forth
(i.e., mental cognitions involve the same object as a sense-cognition). [73]
In this way, since the six cognitions, such as of dark color, are named
“cognition,” there indeed occurs the idea having precisely this expectation:
“Does a particular cognition arise from one of the five empirical sense-
faculties or from the mind?” But since the designation of a cognition is with
respect to its senseorgan, a difference is established between them even
when a mental cognition occurs in relation to the sense-object of visual
cognition.
But in the present case, because of your desire to state the
definingcharacteristic of the valid means of knowledge, you accept that
only what is free of conceptualizations has the condition of being open to
direct perception. This being so, no purpose whatsoever is seen for the
designation of a valid means of knowledge by its specific cause, for you
suppose that this differs precisely from what is open to conceptualization.
And the number of valid means of knowledge depends on the valid objects
of knowledge, and the existence of their nature is acquired through each
means simply reproducing the feature of their valid objects of knowledge.
Thus, the nature of the two means (direct perception and inference) is fixed.
Thus, a designation by reference to a sense-faculty is of no help whatsoever.
Thus, the designation of a valid means of knowledge by means of only its
object is in every respect proper.
Objection: Because the expression “object-perception” in the sense you
intend is not used by the people of the world — the word “sense-
perception” is used — we rely on the meaning based on “sense-organ.”
Reply: [74] The word “sense-perception” is current among the people of the
world. Indeed, we have expressed this just as it is used in the world. But
when an explanation is advanced that sets aside the ordinary mundane
meaning as fixed by usage, the current word will also then be cast aside.
Thus, the word “sense-perception” would not exist. A single visual
cognition based momentarily on the sense-faculty for its sense-organ then
does not posses the condition of being directly perceptible, for it lacks a
widelydistributed object. And if the condition of being directly perceptible
does not exist in one instance, it cannot exist in many either.
You accept that the condition of being directly perceptible belongs only to
knowledge from which conceptualization has been removed. Also, because
of that, according to you there is no mundane conventional usage (for there
are no conceptualizations in what is directly perceptible). But since it is still
your desire to explain the conventional usages of “the valid means of
knowledge” and “the valid objects of knowledge,” the result of your
conceptualizations of the valid means of “direct perception” is indeed
senseless.
Your position is also without a foundation since according to scriptural
authority there is no direct perceptibility by a cognition that is indeed free
of conceptualization. There is no relevance here of the scriptural authority
that has the sense of expressing the defining-characteristic of direct
perception: “One who is having a visual-perception of a dark color does not
know ‘It is a dark color.’” [75] The scripture is only making known that the
five cognitions belonging to the five sense-faculties are themselves without
senses. Thus, for the people of the world, if you claim “What is subject to
defining-characterization exists” or “Both a ‘defining self-characteristic’
and a ‘general characteristic’ exist,” all in fact will be open to perception
for there is then immediate perception. And the sense-perception is thereby
defined along with the cognition having it as its object. Such things as the
double moon that is seen by someone with an eye-defect do not have the
condition of being directly perceptible by the cognition of people unaffected
with an eyedefect. But according to your position, two moons will indeed
be directly perceptible to those who are affected with an eye-defect and so
forth.
Besides direct perception, there are three other valid means of knowledge.
An “inference” constitutes knowledge that is not open to perception but that
arises from a distinguishing characteristic that follows inevitably from what
is to be inferred. “Scriptural authority” is a statement made by reliable
persons who know matters that transcend the senses. And “comparison” is
understanding through resemblance of something that has not been actually
experienced, such as in “A wild ox is like a domestic ox.”
In this manner, the understanding of things by the worldly is defined by the
fourfold valid means of knowledge. Such “valid means of knowledge” are
established in a mutual dependence with the “valid objects of knowledge”:
there are valid objects of knowledge when there the valid means of
knowledge, and there are valid means of knowledge when there the valid
objects of knowledge. But it is most assuredly not the case that either the
means or objects are established as self-existent. Thus, letonly worldly
matters that conform with what is known by experience be accepted.
But enough of these reductio ad absurdum arguments!We will now explain
the main topic: the blessed buddhas teaching of the doctrine based on the
way people of the world see things (i.e., byconventional truths).

The Conditions for Arising

Hinayana Buddhist objection : [76] We agree with you that entities do not
arise from themselves since the arising of an entity that already exists out of
itself serves no purpose. That entities do not arise out of both themselves
and others is also acceptable since each half of the combination has been
invalidated. And the final option that entities arise without a cause is wholly
absurd and should be dismissed.

But you also maintain that entities do not arise from what is other than
themselves, and this we do not admit. The Buddha taughtthat entities have
causes that are other than themselves. As Nagarjuna states:
[2] There are four conditions: the effective cause, objective support within
the world, continuity with previous states, and overall influence. There is no
fifth condition.

[77] Here the “effective cause” is what brings about a result. What brings
about something else — e.g., a seed producing a sprout — is called by
definition the “effective cause.” When something is intentionally produced,
it arises from a support in the world, and that is its “objective support.” The
destruction of the immediately preceding cause is a condition for the
production of the effect — e.g., the destruction of the seed for the sprout to
arise. This is the condition of “continuity with previous states.” The
“overall influence” is that condition because of which something else will
come to be. These are the four conditions of arising. If there are other
conditions that are prior to, simultaneous with, or subsequent to arising,
they are included in these. A creator god and other such conditions do not
exist. Hence the limit “There is no fifth condition.”

Entities arise under these conditions, and these conditions are not identical
to what is produced. Thus, there is “production from another.”
Reply: Neither do entities arise from what is other than themselves [78]:

[3] The self-existence of entities is not found in their conditions; and if

there is no self-existence, no other-existence (i.e., the self-existence of
something else [MK 15.3]) can be found either.

If the entities that arise as effects were self-existent and were in any way in
their causes and conditions — either in them collectively, or separately, or
both in them collectively and in each one individually, or outside of their
causes and conditions collectively — and if they are other than their
conditions, the effect would arise from them (while still in them). But this is
not so: the effects do not exist prior to their arising. If they did already exist
in the collection of causes and conditions in any way, they would be
perceived there, and their arising from causes and conditions serves no
purpose.

Thus, the conditions for arising do not contain any self-existent entities. But
if there is no self-existence, there is no other-existence (since otherexistence
is simply the self-existence of something else). An entity comes into
existence when it arises. To arise from “what is other” means to exist in
dependence on the “other.” But no real entity is so (i.e., what is real is not
dependent on anything in any way). Thus, it cannot be maintained that
entities arise from what is other than themselves.

Objection : Produced entities, such as sprouts, do not exist in their causes,

such as seeds, until the causes have undergone changes. It is the nature of
causes to change themselves. Otherwise, there would be no causes at all (if
there is no real change).

Reply : But then in what sense can we understand the “otherness” of causes
and conditions? When both a worker and his co-worker are present, they are
two separate entities and their mutual relation is one of “otherness.” But no
such co-existence is found between a seed and a sprout. Thus, when sprouts
and so forth are not separate and self-existent, seeds and so forth cannot
exist as separate and self-existent, and thus there is no (real) “otherness.”
The designation of “otherness” cannot apply, and there is no arising from an
“other.” (That is, there is no real, self-existent cause or effect, and only if
the cause were real could the effect be real or the relation of “otherness” be
real.) The opponent reveals his utter ignorance of the true meaning of the
scriptures. The buddhas never uttered anything contrary to this. The true
intention of the scriptures was explained above.

Causal Energy

[79] Thus, the proponents of cognitions “arising from conditions” are

disposed of. Next are the proponents of arising through “causal energy.”
They argue that the eye, color, and the other conditions do not cause a
visual cognition directly. These are called “conditions” because they give
rise to the causal energy that actually gives rise to a cognition. Thus, the
conditions as distinct entities do no produce cognition. The causal energy
giving rise to the cognition exists already in the conditions, like the causal
action that cooks rice. We respond:

[4a] Causal energy is not in the conditions.

If there were any such a causal energy, it would give rise to a visual
cognition by means of the eye and other conditions, since it is already in the
conditions, but this is not so. We ask: does this supposed causal energy
appear after the cognition already exists, or before, or simultaneously with
it? If the cognition has already arisen, the supposed causal energy has no
purpose — the causal energy is suppose to produce something, but if that
thing is already produced, what need is there of the causal energy? This has
been made clear in Entering the Middle Way: “It is inadmissible to suggest
that something that is already arisen could be arise all over again (MA
6.8).”

Neither should we suppose that the causal energy exists before the
cognition is produced. This we have also stated in Entering the Middle Way:
“Production in the absence of a producer makes no sense (MA 6.19).”

[80] Nor is the existence of the causal energy at the moment of production
possible since the effect is either produced or not produced — there is no
production between these two. It has been said: “What is being produced is
not produced because it is only half produced. Otherwise, all things without
exception are always in a state of being produced.”

Thus, since a causal energy is not found in the past, present, or future, it
does not exist. That is why Nagarjuna says: “Causal energy is not in the
conditions.” In Entering the Middle Way, we commented on this point:
“There can be no characteristics made without something that is
characterized (MA 6.57).” Indeed, the son of a barren woman cannot be
characterized as having a cow.

But then may a causal energy exist without already being in the conditions?
Nagarjuna responds:
[4b] . . . nor is the causal energy outside of the conditions.

If the causal energy is independent of the conditions, how could it exist

outside of the conditions, for then it would be noncausal? How could one
suppose that if the cloth does not exist in the threads that it could exist in
straw?
Objection : If it is impossible to suppose that there is a causal energy, then
the conditions themselves must produce things.
Reply: This is answered:

[4c] Moreover, no conditions exist without the power to act.

If there is no causal energy, then the conditions lack the power to act,
cannot act, and thus are not causes. How then do they produce anything?

Objection : But since they do give rise to things, they do possess causal
energy.
Reply: To this, it is answered [81]:

[4d] . . ., nor do the conditions exist with the power to act.

The meaning is that a causal energy does not exist. How can there be a
causal energy in the conditions. What was stated above concerning a causal
energy producing a visual cognition applies to other types of causes. Thus
the very term “producing” is itself without meaning.

Conditions

Objection : What is the point of your examination of conditions having

causal energy? Things such as visual cognitions still arise in dependence on
other things such as the eye as their conditions. Thus, the eye and so forth
are “conditions” since such things as visual cognitions arise from them.
Reply: This is also wrong. Nagarjuna states:

[5] Conditions are called “conditions” because something arises dependent

upon something else. But as long as that “something” does not arise, why
are the conditions not really non-conditions?

If visual cognitions arise dependent on the eye, color, and so forth as

conditions, then these are said to be their “conditions.” But as long as the
visual cognition, i.e., the effect, has not arisen, aren’tthe eye, color, and so
forth “non-conditions”? This is the meaning of calling them “non-
conditions.” And nothing arises out of non-conditions — e.g., sesame oil
does not arise out of grains of sand.
Objection : [82] What at one time are non-conditions become causes by
combining with some other conditions.
Reply: This is not so. The condition that supposedly becomes a cause when
combined with things that are not yet “conditions” can be a “cause” only
when those things are in fact conditions. In that case, precisely the same
difficulty arises as before. Thus, this explanation cannot be accepted. In our
example, the eye, color, and so forth are accepted as the conditions of a
visual cognition, but are they the conditions of an existing cognition or of a
nonexisting cognition? Nagarjuna states that either way is impossible:

[6] A condition is not admitted for either what is not real or for what is
real: if something is nonexistent, how could it have a condition? And if
something is already existing, how could it have a condition?

If there is no entity, how can there be a condition of what in fact does not
exist? Nor can it be some future entity, i.e., something that will be. You may
attempt to explain that a future cognition will arise from a potentiality, but
this not occur because there is no “potentiality” (MA 6.58). This flaw has
been dealt with above. And if in fact something already exists — i.e., has
already arisen — then the notion of its “condition” is simply useless.

[83] Having shown in this way that conditions in general are not “causes”
since they lack the capacity to produce effects, Nagarjuna now proceeds to
consider the conditions one by one and to show that they are not causes.

Objection : Even if there are no conditions in this way, nevertheless because

the definition of its defining-characteristics can be given the idea of a
“condition” is well-established. The definition of the “effective cause”
condition that is accepted here is that it is what “brings about” something.
But a definition could never be given to something that is entirely the
absence of an entity, like the son of barren woman (and so does not exist).

Reply: There would be a cause if it had a defining-characteristic, but:

[7] So too, when no existing, nonexisting, or existing-and-nonexisting basic

phenomena of the experienced world are produced, how is a cause
admitted?
Here “are produced” means to “created.” If the basic phenomenon that is
produced were in fact created, the cause would produce it. But it is not
created — nothing existing, nonexisting, or both existing and nonexisting is
ever created. Nothing existing can be created since it always has existed.
Nothing nonexisting can be created since it does not exist. Nothing both
existing and nonexisting can be created since no one thing can have the
mutually contradicting characteristics of “existing” and “not existing” and
because, even if they did, of the flaws of each position already given. Thus,
the claim that there must be a cause because of its definition must be given
up as inadmissible.

Nagarjuna now proceeds to refute the second condition — “objective

support within the world” [84]:

[8] Something real is shown to be unsupported by another real thing. When

a thing exists without such objective support, what purpose would an
objective support serve?

What are the basic phenomena that Hinayanists hold to be dependent on an

objective support? According to scripture, all the contents of the mind are
so dependent. Whatever objective cause — e.g., color or another sense-
object — produces the contents of the minds is their objective support.

Is this objective support imagined for mental content that already exists or
for mental content that has not yet arisen? In the first case, there is no need
for an objective support for mental content that already exists — indeed, the
objective support is supposed to explain the arising of mental content, but
the content in fact exists prior to the objective support operating. Indeed,
the mind and its content would be established as existing without any
objective support. Thus, the mind and its content appear as real (i.e., self-
existent and so without causes). Then it would simply be your imagination
that there is an objective support, for there is no connection whatsoever
between the mental content and any objective support.

On the other hand, it is not possible to imagine that mental content that does
not yet exist has an objective support. Existing mental content would not
need an objective support, as Nagarjuna states. [85] But there can be no
connection of nonexistent mental content with an objective support. Our
opponent would have to substitute “with such objective support” for
“without such objective support” in the verse, but it reads “When a thing
exists without such objective support, what purpose would an objective
support serve?” That is why it is expressed in the form of a question. The
meaning then is: if some mental content is thus without an objective
support, it is in fact nonexistent, and so how can it then have an objective
support? If what would need objective support does not exist, neither can
the objective support exist.

Objection : But then do the contents of the mind have objective support?
Reply: There is an objective support if the question is considered from the
conventional point of view, but not from the point of view of what is real.
Thus, there is no error.

Nagarjuna next proceeds to refute the idea of a condition of “continuity

with previous states” [86]:

[9] When basic phenomena have not arisen first, cessation does not occur.
Thus, the condition of “continuity” is not applicable. And how can it indeed
be a “condition” when the reality has ceased?

Here the two halves of the last sentence should be transposed and the word
“indeed” should precede “has ceased.” Thus, the second half of the verse
should be: “When the reality indeed has ceased, how can it be a
‘condition’? Thus, the condition of ‘continuity’ is not applicable.” It was
put the other way only for the purpose of structuring the verse.

The Hinayana definition of “continuity with previous states” is this: the

immediately preceding destruction of the cause is a condition for the arising
of the effect. This must be examined. If the basic phenomena of the
experienced world are effects — e.g., a sprout — that do not in fact arise,
then it is not possible that their cause — e.g., the seed — has ceased to
exist. In this case, there is no cessation of the cause, and so how could there
be a continuity with a previous state? Or, suppose it is maintained that the
seed ceases to exist before the effect arises. If that is so, when the seed has
ceased to exist, it is nonexistent, and so what will then be the cause of the
sprout? And what will be the cause of the destruction of the seed? Both the
cessation of the seed and the arising of the sprout are without causes. As
Nagarjuna states: “how can it indeed be a ‘condition’ when the reality has
ceased?” The word “indeed” refers back to the previous phrase “cessation
does not occur.” Since it is supposed that the sprout does not arise because
the seed and other conditions have ceased, then both the cessation of the
seed and the arising of the sprout are without a cause. Thus, a “continuity
with previous states” is not possible.

Alternatively, there is another explanation of the verse based on the first

verse: “No entities whatsoever are found anywhere that have arisen from
themselves, from another, from both themselves and another, or from no
cause at all (MK 1.1).” This is a general rejection of the whole idea of
“causation.” Then the first three lines of verse 9 refers to this general
rejection, and the last line is to be explained exactly as before.

Nagarjuna now goes on to refute the idea of the condition of “overall

influence”:
[10] Since the existence of entities without self-existence is not found, we
cannot say “This reality existing, that one comes to be.”

[87] The Hinayana definition of “overall influence” is this: something arises

when the condition called an “overall influence” is present. But since
entities arise in dependence on other entities and no entities are self-
existent, how indeed can the phrase “this reality” point to a (real) cause?
And how can the phrase “that one” point to a (real) effect? Thus, although
“overall influence” is defined, it has not been established.

Effects and Conditions

Objection : Having seen that, for example, cloth is made out of threads, it is
said that threads are the condition of the cloth.
Reply: It is from the point of view of what is actually real that production of
such things as cloth is denied. How then can the causal effectiveness of the
conditions be established (when nothing real is involved)? Nagarjuna makes
clear that the production of such effects as cloth is ultimately unreal:

[11] An effect does not exist in conditions that are either separate or
combined. And how can what does not exist in the conditions come from
those conditions?

The cloth does not exist in the threads, nor in any of the other conditions —
the weaver’s brush, his loom, the shuttle, the pins, or any other condition
taken individually — because we do not perceive the cloth in any of them.
In addition, from a plurality of causes, there would be a plurality of effects.
And since the cloth does not exist in the conditions taken individually, it
does not exist in the conditions taken collectively. And since the effect is
not present in any single part, the effect would have to arise part by part.
Thus, since there is no self-existent effect, there can be no self-existent
conditions.

[12ab] If the effect that develops from conditions does not exist in those
conditions, . . .
[88] This is what the Hinayana holds. Nagarjuna replies:
[12cd] . . . why does it not arise without those conditions?

The effect does not pre-exist in what are non-conditions either. Thus, cloth
cannot arise from such non-conditions as straw. Since they do not have their
own existence, no real effect ever arises at all.

Objection : If the effect were one thing and its conditions were something
totally separate, then the question whether the effect exists in the conditions
would be understandable, but an effect is not totally separate from its
conditions. On the contrary, the effect simply is the conditions.

Reply: Nagarjuna states:

[13] The effect is not constituted by its conditions. Conditions are not self-
created. So how can an effect that arises from conditions that are
themselves not self-created be created by those conditions?

It is wrong to maintain that an effect possesses the conditions and that the
effect is a modification of its conditions since the conditions are not real
conditions because they are not self-existent. You assert that the piece of
cloth consists only of threads. [89] The cloth could then be real if it is
established that the threads are self-existent. But the cloth consists of parts
and is the modification of these parts, and thus the cloth is not self-existent.
Thus, the effect named “cloth” arises from parts that have no self-nature
and are not self-existent — how then can it be maintained that the cloth
consists of threads (since these parts are not real)? It has been said: “Cloth
results from its threads, and the threads result from something else — but
how can what is not itself self-existent (i.e., real) be the cause of something
else?”

[14a] Thus, an effect is not made either by conditions . . .

Thus, there is no effect in the conditions. If it is supposed on the contrary
that it is in non-conditions, then:
[14b] . . . nor by non-conditions.
If a cloth does not consist of threads, how can there be one consisting of
straw?

Objection : Even supposing there is no real effect, there is however

regularity among things as to conditions and non-conditions. You yourself
say: “If there is no real effect, why is it that certain effects arise only after
conditions they are associated with and not after conditions they are not
associated with?” If there are no effects, whether a cloth or straw mat, the
condition-ness of their conditions, whether the threads or straw, would not
be possible (i.e., they would not be called “conditions”). Thus, we
Hinayanists maintain that the effect is real.

Reply : There would be a (real) effect, if there were (real) conditions and
non-conditions. If the effect were real, we could say such and such are its
conditions and such and such are not its conditions. But through analysis,
these things are found not to be real.

[14cd] But in the absence of a (real) effect, where are conditions or non-
conditions found?

[90] Thus, there is no (real) association among separate things, since none
have their own existence. As is said in the Ratnakara Sutra: “The adept of
emptiness is not found, like the bird’s path in the sky. What in no way is
selfexistent can never be a cause of something else. How can what lacks
selfexistence, without itself existing, be the cause of anything else? Such is
the nature of a ‘cause’ as taught by the Buddha. All the basic phenomena of
the experienced world are like mountains: by their nature immovable,
firmly planted, unchanging, never suffering, peaceful; they are
imperceivable, like the path of a flight in the sky, and misperceived by the
unenlightened. As mountains can never be shaken, so basic phenomena are
immovable. They never arise nor cease. In this manner, the victorious
Buddha taught the true nature of the basic phenomena of the experienced
world.” [91] And from another source: “The true doctrine of the basic
phenomena has been revealed by the victorious Buddha, a lion among men.
It is not born or arisen. It does not decay or die. In it all sentient beings are
established. If what is empty of self-existence in every sense, how can it
then receive self-existence from another (i.e., “other-existence”)? Thus,
there is nothing real either internally or externally, but the doctrine of the
Buddha is realized everywhere. The condition of being at peace has been
revealed by the Buddha. In it there is no substance at all. There you will
stroll, free from rebirth. Being free from rebirth yourself, there you will
dwell and will free hosts of sentient beings. There is no other path
whatsoever to be discerned.

Chapter 15: Self-Nature and Self-Existence

Objection : [259] Entities in fact have a self-nature, and these natures arise
as products of certain causes and conditions. We do not take entities that do
not exist, such as flowers in the sky, to be the effects of causes and
conditions. But we take, for example, a seed to be a cause that has a sprout
as its effect, or root-ignorance to be the cause that has emotional
dispositions as its effect. Thus, we claim that entities have own natures.

Refuting Self-Nature

Reply : If entities such as dispositions and sprouts have their own natures,
what is the purpose of their arising, since they already exist? Since there
indeed are dispositions (conventionally), we would not have to suppose that
root-ignorance as their cause for a second arising, nor seeds for a second
arising of sprouts. Thus, nothing other than itself is required for the arising
of anything since its self-nature already exists. But as Nagarjuna says:

[1ab] That self-nature arises from causes and conditions is not admissible.
You may agree that before something arises there can be no self-nature of
anything and that when something already exists its arising again would be
pointless. But you may ask: what if a self-nature, which does not exist
before something arises, subsequently arises from causes and conditions. If
you think thus, Nagarjuna continues:

[1cd] If self-nature arose from causes and conditions, it would be

something produced.

Objection : [260] That self-natures are produced — since they arise from
causes and conditions — is exactly what we mean. Thus, the objection that
self-natures are produced does not harm us.

Reply: Nagarjuna says that this claim too is not admissible:

[2ab] But how could there be a “produced self-nature”?

Since the terms “produced” and “self-nature” are mutually incompatible,

the phrase “produced self-nature” has an inconsistent sense. Here the
etymology is that “self-nature” is something’s own nature (and so cannot be
produced by something else). Thus, in conventional usage, something that
is “produced” — e.g., the heat of hot water that is produced by fuel or the
acts of a spirit or a ruby-like quartz (to focus sunlight) — is not commonly
spoken of as “self-nature.” But it is conventionally said that what is
produced has a self-nature — e.g., the heat of a fire or the genuine ruby-
ness of rubies. That is called “self-nature” because it is not produced by a
conjunction with something else.

Thus, the mundane convention is what is non-produced has a “selfnature.”

But we claim further that it should be recognized that heat also is not the
self-nature of fire because of its nature too is produced. In the case here,
one sees that fire arises from the confluence of a focusing gem, fuel, and the
sun or from the friction of two sticks rubbed together, and so forth — thus,
it is purely dependent on causes and conditions. But heat does not occur
apart from fire. Thus, heat too arises from causes and conditions and thus is
produced. And because it is produced, like the heat of hot water, it is clearly
ascertained that heat is not fire’s (self-existent) “self-nature.”
Objection : But that heat is the self-nature of fire is well-known even to
ordinary people, including cowherds and women.
Reply: Did we say that it is not well-known? Rather, we claim that is not
entitled to be called “self-nature” since it does not that have the
characteristics of “self-nature” (and thus is not real). [261] However, by
relying on the errors based on root-ignorance, the unenlightened world
accepts all things that have arisen as endowed with a (self-existent) self-
nature although they are in fact without it. For example, one with cataracts,
because of the condition of having cataracts, is fixed on the self-nature of
illusory hair, even though it is in fact (nonexistent because it is) without
self-existence. So too, because the eye of cognition is afflicted by the eye-
disease of root-ignorance, the naive are fixed on what has arisen as
endowed with a (self-existent) selfnature, although it is in fact (nonexistent
because it is) without self-existence. The naive declare the defining-
characteristics of things according to this fixation — e.g., claiming that heat
is the defining self-characteristic of fire. They claim that heat is its very
own defining-characteristic, since it is unique and not perceived anywhere
else except in fire.
And, according to what is familiar to all who are unenlightened, the Buddha
presented this self-nature as conventionally real in the Abhidharma schools.
A generic property such as impermanence is called a “general defining-
characteristic.” However, when it comes to the understanding of those
whose eye of wisdom is clear, since it is free of the eye-disease of
rootignorance, then it is clearly stated by the noble ones, who do not
apprehend the self-nature imagined by the naive, just as those without
cataracts do not see the illusory hair seen by those with cataracts, that this
self-nature is not the real nature of entities. [262] As it is said inthe
Lankavatara Sutra: “As those with an eye-disease mistakenly grasp after
false hairs, so the naive mistakenly imagine the idea that entities are
real.There is no self-existence, no knowledge, no reality, and no ground to
consciousness — these are all the imaginings of unenlightened, idle
speculative reasoners.” And: “Knowing that self-existence does not arise
within time, I have declared that all the basic phenomena of the experienced
world do not arise withintime.”

What is Self-Nature?
Objection : You indeed say that such things as the heat of fire are without a
(self-existent) self-nature, since they arise from causes and conditions and
thus are produced. In that case, what is the defining-characteristic of the
selfnature of, for example, fire? And what is that “self-nature”? You should
make that clear.

Reply: The reply is from Nagarjuna:

[2cd] Self-nature is non-produced and not dependent upon anything else.

Here the intended meaning is that a self-nature exists only in itself (i.e., it is
self-existent). [263] What is something’s innermost form is called its
“selfnature.” What is uniquely something’s own? Whatever in it that is not
produced. But what is produced, such as the heat of water, is not its own. In
addition, what is under something’s control is its own, such as one’s
servants or wealth. But what is under another’s control is not one’s own,
such as something borrowed for a time, and is not subject to itself.

Thus, what is produced and what is dependent on another thing are not
considered to have a self-nature. For this reason, it is not correct to say that
heat is fire’s self-nature — both because it is dependent on causes and
conditions and because it is produced, since it arises after having previously
been nonexistent. And this being so, it follows that (if there are real
selfnatures) the unborn nature of fire, which is invariable throughout time,
is unproduced — i.e., it cannot arise after previously having been
nonexistent. [264] It is also not dependent on causes and conditions —
unlike hot water, or “this side” and “other side,” or “long” and “short.” That
is what is meant by a self-nature.

Objection : Is there then a “self-nature” of this nature (i.e, unborn and

nondependent) in things such as fire?
Reply: This self-nature of anything, such as fire, neither exists nor does it
not exist by its own nature. Although this is so, in order to avoid frightening
listeners, we nevertheless superimpose conventional reality (onto what is
actually real) and affirm that it exists. As theBuddha said: “Of the teaching
without syllables, what can be heard and what taught? Only by
superimposition can what is without syllables be heard and alsotaught.”
Here also Nagarjuna says: “‘Empty,’ ‘not empty,’ ‘both,’ or ‘neither’ —
these should not be said, but they are said only for the purpose of indication
(MK 22.11).”
Objection: If to allay fear, you indeed say through attribution that selfnature
exists, what then does “self-nature” itself mean?
Reply: What is called “the true nature” of the basic phenomena of the
experienced world is their self-nature.
Objection: What then is “the true nature of the basic phenomena of the
experienced world”?
Reply: The self-nature of the basic phenomena of the experienced world.
Objection: What is “self-nature”?
Reply: Original nature.
Objection: What is this “original nature”?
Reply: What emptiness is.
Objection: What is this “emptiness”?
Reply: Lack of self-existence.
Objection: What is this lack of self-existence?
Reply: [265] The “thus-ness” of things.
Objection: What is this “thus-ness”?
Reply: Being thus — changeless and never-arisen. Whatever it is in such
things as fire that is itself completely nonarisen because it is not dependent
on another thing and is not produced — that is said to be the self-nature of
things.
To summarize: Whatever arises in any way from the eye-defect of
rootignorance is taken to be the conventional world of entities, but by
seeing it free of conventions it becomes the world of the nobles who are
free of the eye-disease of root-ignorance — that has its own nature and it is
named the “self-nature” of these entities. In addition, it should be
understood that Nagarjuna presented this as the definition of “self-nature”:
“Self-nature is non-produced and not dependent upon anything else (MK
15.2cd).” And this self-nature of entities, which is by nature ever nonarisen,
is without selfnature in the conventional sense because it is a nonentity
without any specific nature. Thus, it should be understood that there is no
self-nature of any entity. (That is, there are no real entities and so no real
“self-nature.”)
As the Buddha said: “The wise one who understands that entities are
nonentities is never obsessed with entities. The one who is never obsessed
with entities attains the peace of mind beyond all words.”
Other-Nature and Other-Existence

Objection : Even if entities are not self-existent, there is at least the

conventional existence of “other-nature” (i.e., a self-existent entity having a
nature that is other than another real entity’s self-nature), since this has not
been refuted. And if other-nature exists, then self-nature will also exist
since the existence of other-nature cannot be established apart from self-
nature.

Reply: Nagarjuna replies to this claim [266]:

[3] In the absence of self-nature, how can there be “other-nature”? For the
self-nature of another entity is called “other-nature.”

In this way, any entity whatsoever with its own self-nature can be
designated “other” since it is related to some other entity with its own self-
nature. If heat is the self-nature of fire, it is designated “other” with respect
to fluidity, the self-nature of water. But since nothing whatsoever has a
“self-nature” when examined by those on their way to liberation, how can
there be “othernature”?

Objection : Even if there is no “self-nature” or “other-nature,” nevertheless

there are entities that exist because this has not been excluded. And such
entities will either be self-existent or will exist through other-existence (i.e.,
be self-existent or be produced by another self-existent entity). Thus, it
follows that there is both self-existence and other-existence.

Reply: Nagarjuna also replies to this claim:

[4] Without self-existence and other-existence, how can there be an entity?

When there is self-existence or other-existence, then an entity is established.

If one thinks an entity truly exists, it must be either self-existent or

otherexistent. But as previously explained, there is neither self-nature nor
othernature. And because there are neither of these, it must be accepted that
there cannot be a truly existing entity either (since what is real must have a
selfnature or other-nature).

The Absence of an Entity

Objection : Although you have ruled out the existence of entities,
nevertheless there is the absence of entities since you have not ruled that
out. Thus, entities must exist because the opposite — their absence —
exists.

Reply: Entities would exist if their absence were established. But Nagarjuna
says this is not so [267]:

[5] If an entity is not established, the absence of an entity (i.e., a “non-

entity”) is certainly not established, since it is an entity that has changed
(i.e., “becoming otherwise”) that people call a “nonentity.”

Accordingly, if any entity were established, then the absence of an entity

would be established as its “otherness.” Such entities as pots are
conventionally said to be absent if they cease from their current state and
become otherwise. But if such entities have not been established as truly
existing, how can absent entities be “other” from them (since only what is
real can be either the same or different from another real thing)? It follows
that there is no other-existence either. Thus, self-existence, other-existence,
and the absence of existence are all not admissible. They are misperceptions
by those whose spiritual vision is blinded by the defect of root-ignorance.

The Buddha’s Teaching on Self-Existence

[6] Those who perceive “self-existence,” “other-existence,” “an entity,”

and “the absence of an entity” do not perceive the truth in the Buddha’s
teaching.

Those delude themselves that they are faithfully expounding the teachings
of the perfectly realized one when they declare the self-existence of entities,
saying for example that “solidity” is the self-existent nature of earth, or that
the experience of an entity is the self-existent nature of sensation, or that
reflecting an object is the self-existent nature of cognition. And they explain
other-existence by claiming that cognition is other than the object of
cognition and that sensation is other than both. They explain cognition and
the other bodily aggregates as existing when they are in the present and as
not existing when they are in the past. They do not explain the supremely
profound truth of dependent-arising since the existence of self-existence
and other-existence is, as demonstrated, contrary to what is proper. But the
selfexistence of things is not proclaimed by the perfectly realized ones,
which is contrary to the evidence, because of their independent,
incorrigible, perfected enlightenment concerning the true nature of things.

[268] Now the wise say that the teaching of the revered buddhas is a “valid
means of knowledge” since it is in accord with what is proper and is free of
contradictions. [269] And because it is derived from the realized ones who
are completely free of any flaws, it has authority since it is an authentic
guide for those who are on the way to liberation, and because it comes from
seeing reality as it truly is, the worldly can attain nirvana if it is their
foundation. “Authority” is characterized as the teachings only of those who
are perfectly enlightened. Doctrines that differ from this are not in accord
with what is proper and thus are declared not to be valid means of
knowledge but false doctrines.

Thus, the views of self-existence, other-existence, entities and the absence

of entities are void of acceptability and are not the way things truly are. So
for the guidance of those desiring liberation, Nagarjuna says:

[7] In his Discourse to Katyayana, both “is” and “is not” are denied by the
blessed one who has made known both “being” and “nonbeing.”

The Buddha says in the Discourse to Katyayana: “The unenlightened,

clinging tenaciously to existence or nonexistence, are not liberated. They
are not liberated from the suffering of birth, old age, disease, death, grief,
mourning, and sorrow. They are not freed from the prison of the cycle of
rebirths, based as it is in personal existence. They are not freed from the
painful sorrow of a mother’s death or a father’s death, and so forth. This
text is taught in all Buddhist schools. [270] Thus, on its authority and from
the arguments given above, the intelligent should not reasonably hold the
views of self-existence, other-existence, existence, and nonexistence since
they are totally opposed to the words of the perfectly realized one who
rejected them.

Of precisely what nature is the Buddha himself? He comprehends existence

and nonexistence. One whose nature it is to comprehend existence and
nonexistence is “a comprehender of existence and nonexistence.” From his
complete grasp of self-existence from the point of view of what is actually
real as it relates to existence and nonexistence as explained here, only the
Buddha is said to be a comprehender of existence and nonexistence. Thus,
he rejects both the view that entities exist and the view that they do not
exist. Thus, it is inadmissible to insist that the way things really are can be
seen in terms of “existence” or “nonexistence.”

In the Ratnakuta Sutra, it says: “To say ‘Something is’ is one extreme. To
say ‘Something is not’ is one extreme. What avoids these two extremes is
said to be without a defining nature (since nothing is real), beyond
establishment, unrelated, imperceptible (since there is nothing real to see),
without an abode (in the external world), and not open to conceptualization.
This is designated ‘the middle way.’ It is the correct way toregard the true
nature of things.” In the Samadhiraja Sutra, it says: “‘It is’ and ‘It is not’
are two views. ‘It is pure’ and ‘It is impure’ are two views. The wise
abandon these views without advancing a proposition in the middle. “It is”
and “It is not,” “It is pure” and “It is not pure” — these are disputation.
Suffering is not ended by engaging in disputation — it is brought to an end
by not engaging in disputation.”

Self-Existence and Change

Objection : [271] But if there is the self-existence of such things as fire,

where is the objection?
Reply: The objection has already been given: a self-existent nature that
arises from causes and conditions is something produced, and so forth (and
so is not self-existent). In addition, if anything such as fire were self-
existent, it would already exist and could never change (for what is real is
permanent and cannot change). Nagarjuna says:

[8ab] If existence existed by its own nature, there could be no nonexistence

of it.
If it is the self-nature of such entities as fire to be self-existent, then such a
self-existent entity whose nature it is to exist could not change.
[8cd] For the change in the nature of something self-existent never occurs.
If the nature of such entities as fire were as you suppose, it would be
selfexistent. And then, because of the unchangeability of what is real,
“becoming other” (i.e., any change) could never be possible. For example,
infinite space would never change. So too, there could be no change in such
entities as fire because it is their nature to exist as they are (and not as
something else).

But in fact the disappearance of entities is seen, either through change or

through a disruption of their continuity (i.e., ceases). Thus, because it is
there nature to change, self-existence cannot be the true nature of entities —
rather, it should be clear that their nature is like the heat of hot water (i.e.,
produced).

Objection : If change is impossible for anything that exists by its own

nature and yet change is perceived, you claim that there is no true nature of
such entities. But then Nagarjuna himself says:

[9ab] Since such a self-existent nature does not exist, of what can there be a
change in natures?

[272] That is, how can there be change in something that, like a (totally
nonexistent) lotus in the sky, is not real by its own nature? One does not
perceive change in something that by its nature does not exist. Thus,
because change is experienced there must be things that are self-existent by
their nature.

Reply : If accordingly there is a self-existent nature in entities since there

can be no change in anything that has no essential nature (since nothing
unreal can change) and yet there is the direct experience of change, then:

[9cd] But if such a nature existed, of what would there be such a change?

Following your position, how indeed can there be change in anything that
exists by its own self-existent nature at this time? There can be no change in
anything that exists by its own nature. Thus, change is impossible in any
way. Thus, (since change is perceived) it should be realized that there are no
selfexistent, real entities.
When we said earlier that there could be no self-existence because change
is perceived, that was stated concerning the experience of change as
understood by others. At no time have we agreed that there is in fact change
at all in anything (real). Rather, the self-existence of any entity is totally
nonexistent — all basic phenomena of the experienced world are in fact
nonexistent (from the ultimate point of view) and without self-existence.
Thus, change in such (nonexistent) entities is nonexistent. But for one who
believes in the existence and nonexistence of entities, it follows inevitably
for him, so believing, (that he accepts real change).

Permanence and Annihilation

[10ab] To say “It is” is to grasp for permanence. To say “It is not” is to
grasp for complete annihilation.
[273] It is implied here that the views of “permanence” and “annihilation”
are obstacles on the path to the final peace and that they cause great
suffering.
[10cd] Thus, the clear-sighted should not adhere to either “It is” or “It is
not.”
Supposing the views of real existence and real nonexistence, there are the
views of permanence and annihilation. Why? Because:

[11] For the claim “Whatever exists through self-existence does not not
exist” entails the view of eternal permanence. The claim “It does not now
exist, but did exist before” entails the view of complete annihilation.

What is said to exist by self-existence can at no time not exist because

selfexistence is constantly in the same state (and so the entity is
permanent/eternal). Thus, if one agrees that entities currently exist, then one
holds the eternalist view. And if one agrees that something really existed in
the past but now has ceased, one says “It does not exist” and is caught in the
annihilationist view. But for whom “a self-existent entity” is not
understandable — since the self-existence of anything is never directly
perceived — there is no involvement with the eternalist and annihilationist
views.
Objection : Those who suppose there is no self-existence of entities but do
not hold the eternalist view, since they reject the reality of entities, are
inevitably caught up in the annihilationist view. (Thus, Madhyamikas are in
fact ontological nihilists.)

Reply : The annihilationist view does not arise in this manner. Those who
suppose that at one time something existed by self-existence and who
perceive at a later time that this something has disappeared hold that entities
are not real because they reject what they previously perceived as
“selfexistent.” [274] But when one is free of that eye-defect, one no longer
perceives things as the do those who with an eye-defect see hair in front of
them. When such a one then says “Entities do not really exist (from the
point of view of what is truly real),” he is not claiming “Everything is
nonexistent,” for then there would be nothing to be negated. (Thus, there is
something real there, although there is no self-existence and so no self-
existent entities.) In order to remove the persisting illusions of the deluded,
we, like those freed from the eye-defect, declare “Entities in themselves do
not truly exist.” In saying this, we have not become caught up in the
annihilationist view — rather, we are attempting to help others. As one text
says: “One who supposes the real existence of desire, hatred, and delusion
and later claims that they have ceased is indeed an annihilationist,” and so
forth.

Objection : Yogacharas and others who suppose that the mind and its
objects are real only in mutual dependence avoid the view of eternalism
since there is no self-existence in the dependence they conceive, [275] and
they avoid the view of annihilationism because dependent mental states,
which are responsible for the removal of mental afflictions, really do exist.

Reply : How can such people avoid the twin views? What is projected by
the mind is nonexistent, but what depends on the mind exists — thus, both
views operate here. Further, your exposition is unacceptable since it has
been shown that the self-existence of what is dependent is inadmissible.
Thus, the Madhyamaka position alone is free of the twin views of
eternalism and annihilationism, not the positions of the Yogacharas and
others. As Nagarjuna says in the Ratnavali: “Ask the ordinary people, along
with the Samkhyas, the Vaisheshikas, Jainas, and Pudgalavadins (Buddhists
who hold there is a “person”) who maintain the doctrine of a (real) person
and (real) bodily aggregates whether they proclaim to the world what passes
beyond real existence and total nonexistence. Thereby know that our
doctrine that passes beyond the doctrines of real existence and total
nonexistence is called “the ambrosia of the profound teaching of the
buddhas.”

[276] Our objective is the enlightenment of those people who need

guidance. As a useful means to understanding the ultimate truth, the
Buddha in his unlimited compassion taught the doctrines of the Yogacharas
and the Sammitiyas who believe in the existence of an individual “person.”
But their texts are only texts of provisional meaning, not final meaning. As
it is said in the Samadhiraja Sutra: “One who can distinguish the ultimate
truth in the texts knows that the Buddha taught the absence of self-existence
in entities. He knows that all mention of ‘persons,’ ‘beings,’ and ‘selves’
are only of provisional meaning.” This point is repeatedly found in the
teachings of the Akshamati Sutra and other texts. The cycle of death and
rebirth endures as long as the entanglement of the twin views that entities
are real or unreal endures. When those who genuinely strive for liberation
realize this, they are freed from the twin views and they correctly embrace
the middle way.

As the Buddha said in the Samadhiraja Sutra: “Let there be an end to the
knowledge of existence and nonexistence — all is unreal and thus
inaccessible to thought (since there is no real entity to know). Those who
follow their inclination to conceptual projection will suffer countless
rebirths. [277] Those who are wise understand that entities are nonentities
are never obsessed with entities. [278] Those who are never obsessed with
entities attain the peace of mind beyond all words.” “When the Buddha, the
sage, the king of truth, the revealer of all truth, appears, the refrain is
sounded from the grass, bushes, trees, plants, rocks, and mountains: all
basic phenomena of the experienced world are without self-existence!”
“However far mere words reach in the realms of the world, all are without
self-existence,none are real, and the call of the Buddha, the guide and
teacher of all beings, resounds that far!”
To claim “Something exists” is to say that it has being-ness. But eternal
being is not itself the self-existent nature of any particular entity. All basic
phenomena of the experienced world are not real but empty of being since
as particulars they are not self-existent by their nature. This is found in the
Perfection of Wisdom texts. The self-existence of particular entities is
contrary to cognition. “The refrain is sounded that all basic phenomena of
the experienced world are without self-existence!” — the meaning of
similar texts is to be understood in this sense. [279] “However far mere
words reach in the realms of the world, (it is proclaimed) ‘All are without
self-existence, none are real!’”

In sum, the intention is to renounce the reality of entities. Saying that

entities are not real is precisely the same as saying that they have no
selfexistence.

Chapter 18: The Self

Conceptual Projection

Objection: [350] By the ceasing of what do mental afflictions and karmic

actions cease?
Reply: Nagarjuna says:

[5] From the destruction of the mental afflictions resulting from karmic
actions, there is the liberation from rebirth. The afflictions arise from
conceptualizations that make distinctions between entities. These
conceptualizations come from projecting distinctions onto reality. But such
conceptual projections cease through emptiness.

. . . Karmic actions and mental afflictions result from conceptualizations

that make distinctions between entities. Such conceptualizations are the
product of projecting distinctions (onto reality) that has occurred throughout
the cycle of rebirths that is without a beginning. Such projections consist of
knowledge, the objects of knowledge, words, what is expressed, those who
act, acts, means of action, actions, pots, cloth, diadems, chariots, objects,
feelings, women, men, gain, loss, happiness, sorrow, fame, infamy, blame,
praise, and so forth.
The world resulting from conceptual projection is ended in its entity by
(seeing) emptiness — i.e., when one sees that emptiness is the self-nature of
everything. How is this to be understood? When things are seen as existing,
there is the world of conceptual projection. If those filled with desire do not
perceive the daughter of a barren woman to be a (real) fair young woman,
they do not enter the territory of conceptual projection. And by not entering
the territory of conceptual projection, they do not generate
conceptualizations that make distinctions between entities. [351] By not
entering the world of conceptualizations, founded on the view of a “self”
arising from an attachment to “I” (the self) and “mine” (what pertains to the
self), mental afflictions do not arise. And by the non-arising of the mental
afflictions based on a sense of “I” grounded in the view of a real being,
karmic actions that are good, bad, and neutral are not committed. Because
these acts are not committed, there is no experience of the jungle of the
cycle of rebirths that is a multitude of births, aging, dying, suffering,
lamentation, pain, sadness, and torment.

Thus, yogins, steadfastly seeing emptiness, do not take the bodily

aggregates, sense-fields, or the bases of cognition as self-existent. By not
taking the nature of things as self-existent, they do not enter the territory of
conceptual projection. By not entering the territory of conceptual
projection, they do not form conceptualizations that make distinctions
between entities. By not forming such conceptualizations, mental afflictions
founded on the view of a “self” arising from an attachment to “I” and
“mine” do not arise. By the nonarising of the mental afflictions founded on
the view of a “self,” karmic acts are not committed. Because the yogins do
not commit karmic acts, they do not experience the cycle of rebirths that is
birth, aging, and death. Thus, by attaining the emptiness that has the
characteristic of the peace coming from stilling all conceptual projection,
conceptualizations based in conceptual projection that make distinctions
between entities cease. By such conceptualization ceasing, all karmic
actions and mental afflictions cease. By the ceasing of karmic actions and
mental afflictions, a new birth does not occur.

For these reasons, emptiness is called “nirvana” because it has the

characteristic of extinguishing all conceptual projection. As it is stated in
Aryadeva’s Four Hundred Verses: “The buddhas have explained that the
doctrine in brief is this: nonviolence in action andthat emptiness is nirvana.
Here in our tradition there are only these two (teachings) (CS 12.23).”

But Bhavaviveka, not understanding the direct knowledgeof emptiness of

the disciples and solitary buddhas as explained, gives this account: [352]
the disciples see all that is caused by others and that ceases each moment as
devoid of “I” and “mine”; so too, they see “I” and “mine” as having
selfexistence; they see only the basic phenomena of theexperienced world
as arising and ceasing. Thus, the self is the object of the sense of “self.” But
in the absence of this sense there is no self. This sense being nonexistent, in
no way is there any such internal or external reality. Without the sense of
“mine,” one is free of “I” and “mine” and the sense of a self-existent “I.” It
is only a conventional usage. How much more is this so for the great
bodhisattvas who reside in the wisdom without conceptualizations that
make distinctions between entities and who see that all compound things
(including persons) do not arise. Thus, it is said: “What is without a sense
of “I” and “mine” does not exist.”

Thus, Bhavaviveka does not follow Nagarjuna in this regard, as

demonstrated in Entering the Middle Way: [353] “The seventh stage of the
bodhisattva’s path named ‘Traveling Far’ (in which bodhisattvas surpass the
knowledge of the disciples) is the domain of cognition.” In the Perfection of
Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines: “One who longs for the enlightenment of
the disciples can learn so from this Perfection of Wisdom scripture; one
who longs to attain the enlightenment of the solitary buddhas can also learn
so from this scripture. One who longs for the supreme and perfect
enlightenment of the great beings (i.e., the fully-enlightened buddhas) can
learn so in this Perfection of Wisdom scripture.” It states further: [354]
“Whoever desires to become a disciple, a solitary buddha, or a king of the
doctrine will attain nothing without recourse to patience. Without patience,
like a man who cannot see the banks of a river, he will not arrive at one
bank or the other.”

The Buddha on the Self

Objection : If it is argued that reality as it truly is is free of the

conceptualizations of “I” and “mine” regarding the interior or exterior of
anything by not perceiving anything internal or external, then aren’t the
following words of the Buddha in contradiction: “The self is the protector
of the self. What else could be the protector? The learned attain heaven by
controlling the self. The self is the witness of the self in both good and bad
acts.” So too the Samadhiraja Sutrastates: “Neither a bad act nor a good act
perishes. The self bears the karmic fruit of each. The act and the fruit are
not reborn. Nothing is established without a cause.”

Reply : [355] Didn’t the illustrious Buddha also say: “In this world, there is
neither a being nor a self. But beings and the basic phenomena of the
experienced world all have causes.” Also: “Physical form is not the self, nor
does the self possess physical form, nor is the selfin physical form, nor is
physical form in the self. So too, consciousness is not the self, nor does the
self possess consciousness, nor is the self in consciousness, nor is
consciousness in the self.” And again: “All the basic phenomena of the
experienced world are without a self.”

Texts of Final Meaning and of Provisional Meaning

Objection : Why are the scriptures you quote not in contradiction with the
scriptures we quote?
Reply: Because to understand the scriptures, the intention of the illustrious
ones’ teachings in the former scriptures must be understood. It is generally
accepted that there is a distinction between canonical texts of “final
meaning” (whose plain meaning is accepted as definitive) and canonical
texts of “provisional meaning” (whose meaning must be explained further)
in the teaching of the illustrious buddhas who are devoted to awakening the
lotuslike mind of all beings who are to be guided by the teachings and who
are like a sun that never sets and whose great rays are great compassion,
skill means, and knowledge. Thus, this:

[6] That “There is a self” has been disclosed. That “There is no self” has
been taught. But by the Buddha it has been taught that “There is neither the
self nor indeed what is not the self whatsoever.”

[356] The meaning is this: there are some in the world (i.e., materialists)
whose eye of their mind is completely covered by the cataract of the error
arising from the false belief that there is no self. They do not see that
objects are only what the worldly with normal vision see. They accept as
true only conventional truths and find as real only the elements earth, water,
fire, and air. They claim that the mind arises only from the great elements,
like a fetus gestating. It is like the intoxicating drinks, flatulence, and so
forth that result from the gestation of various materials like roots, boiled
rice, and water. Thus, they deny a past and future life, the self, and another
world, saying “This world is not real (i.e., eternal), and another world is not
real; there is no karmic maturation of good and bad acts; no being is born
(again)” and so forth. By denying all this, they turn their backs on pursuing
such superb and desirable goals as heaven and the ultimate happiness. They
constantly engage in bad acts and are headed for a great fall into the hells
and so forth.

To end the erroneous views of these people, the buddhas have sometimes
spoken of a self. [357] The illustrious buddhas — being devoted to
fulfilling their vow to save all sentient beings and equipped with great
compassion, skillful means, and wisdom, without equal, remaining in the
world for its relief, physicians for the great disease of the mental afflictions,
great kings of the needed medicine, and always willing to show kindness to
those of the lowest, middle, or highest classes needing guidance —
formulate their teaching in terms of the conventional truths of the world,
with its 8,400 different states of sentient beings, with the aim of ending the
bad acts of those of the lowest class. (To the lowest class, he taught “There
is a self.”)

The reason refuting the teaching of arising without a cause is that there is
nothing without a cause. This was presented in detail in the chapter
examining “action” and “actor” (MK 8) and in Entering the Middle Way. It
is not necessary to refute this teaching again.

There are some, who like birds, are leashed by very long and strong bonds
of attachment to “I” and “mine” that are produced by holding that the self is
real. Even if such people go far and perform wholesome acts, they will not
go beyond the three realms (the world created by desire, and the formed and
formless realms created through meditation) and cannot attain the blissful
city of nirvana where there is no aging and death. [358] Such people are the
middle group of those in need of guidance. To them, the illustrious buddhas,
in their desire to show favor to those who need guidance, have taught
“There is no self” to weaken their attachment to a “self” and to awaken the
desire for nirvana.

And there are some who have perfected their potential by success in their
earlier practice through adherence to the profound doctrine. These in the
highest class are free of attachment to a “self” and are capable of
penetrating the supreme and profound true meaning of the excellent
teachings of the silent one. To them, nirvana is near, and the Buddha,
having seen their worthiness, thus taught “No self whatsoever either exists
or does not exist.” Even as seeing “There is a self” does not reflect reality
as it truly is, so too seeing “There is no self” does not reflect reality as it
truly is (since then one is still seeing reality through a conceptual prism).
Thus, it is taught: “There is neither the self nor indeed what is not the self
whatsoever.”

As stated in the Ratnakuta Sutra: “‘There is a self’ is one extreme; ‘There is

no self’ is the second extreme. What is betweenthese two extremes is said
to be without form, beyond establishing, without objective support,
invisible, without an abode, and not known to conceptualizing
consciousness. That is named ‘the middle way.’ That is the true
discrimination of the basic phenomena of the experienced world.” [359] As
Nagarjuna states in the Jewel Garland of Advice: “Indeed, grasping ‘There
is a self’ or ‘There is no self’ is not how things really are. The great silent
one eradicated the views of a sense of ‘self’ and ‘non-self.’ What is seen
and heard and so forth is declared by the silent one to be not real and not
nonexistent. Fromone proposition the counter-proposition arises, but neither
is true (R 103-104).”

Thus, the teaching of the doctrine of the illustrious buddhas, in refuting that
there is a self, that there is no self, and that there is both, takes into account
the diverse dispositions of those to be guided of the lowest, middle, and
highest classes. Thus, the scriptures cited by the opponent do not contradict
Madhyamikas. This is why Aryadeva states: “First, turn away from
unwholesome acts. Next, turn away from the notion of a ‘self.’ Finally, turn
away from seeing all things as self-existent. Anyone who knows this is wise
(CS 8.15).” And Nagarjuna states: “Just as a grammarian first teaches the
alphabet to his students, so the Buddha first taught the doctrine in a way
accessible to those to be converted. To some, the Buddha taught the
doctrine to end clinging to demeritous deeds. To some, he taught it for the
sake of achieving merit. To some, he taught the doctrine based on duality.
To some, he taught doctrines not based on duality — [360] a doctrine that is
profound and terrifying to those who are afraid. To some, he taught the
inner core of and terrifying to those who are afraid. To some, he taught the
inner core of 96).”

There is another interpretation of verse 6. The Samkhyas and others accept

the teaching that there is an absence of a connection of a karmic act and its
fruit in compound things that cease in each moment, but they still speak of a
“self.” And there are materialists who did not see a self in the cycle of
rebirths, but they still accept the teaching of “no self.” They say “There is
no person outside the field of the senses. Oh blessed one, the talk of the
learned is the prattle of an animal.” But just as those people who do not
suffer from an eye-defect do not see such things as (illusory) hair and
mosquitos that those people who do suffer from an eye-defect see, so do the
buddhas in no way whatsoever see “self” and “non-self” as self-existent
realities as the naive imagine. Thus, then: “‘There is no ‘self’ or ‘non-self’
— that is the teaching of the buddhas.”

(Then follows a long quotation from the Tathagataguhya Sutra that was
probably added later on stilling conceptualizations and views of “self.”)

Language and Reality as it Truly is

Objection : [364] If the illustrious buddhas did not teach “There is a self” or
“There is no self,” then what did they teach?
Reply: Nagarjuna answers:

[7] When the object of thought has ceased, then what can be named has
ceased. The nature of all things is unarisen and unceasing, like nirvana.

If there is a something real to be designated, it would be taught. But when

there is no object to designate and words are not applicable, there is nothing
to be taught by the buddhas. Why is there nothing open to being
designated? Because the object of thought has ceased. The “object of
thought” means what thought has as its object. “Object” refers to an object
that is graspable in thought. When thought has such an object, one can use
words to attribute characteristics to it. But when thought does not have an
object, to what can characteristics be attributed and how can words be used?

Why there is no object of thought is explained by Nagarjuna when he says:

“Like nirvana, the nature of things neither arises nor ceases.” As to the
nature of things, it is said that the nature of phenomena — their self-nature,
their fundamental nature — is like nirvana: unarisen and unceasing. Thus,
thought cannot act in this regard. And when thought cannot act, how can
characteristics be attributed? Without characteristics, how can words be
used? Thus, it is now established that nothing at all is taught by the
illustrious buddhas. Thus, Nagarjuna will later say: “The stilling of all
conceptual support and the stilling of the projection of concepts onto reality
is peace — no doctrine was taught by the Buddha in any place to anyone
(MK 25.24).”

Objection : It may be so. [365] But what of the previous proposition: “The
projection of concepts onto reality is ended by emptiness.” How is that
ended by emptiness?

Rely : Because the object open to being designated has ceased. The
explanation is as before.
Objection: But it is also said: “It is by the nonperception of all things, both
internal and external concerning, all ideas of an internal or external ‘I’ and
‘mine’ that the cessation is complete. This cessation is reality as it truly is.”
Could you state more precisely the way “reality as it is truly is” is?
Reply: To the first line of the verse “When the object of thought has ceased,
then what can be named has ceased . . . ” add“ . . . from the point of view of
reality as it truly is.”
Objection: Why in “reality as it truly is” have the object that can be
designated and the object of thought ceased?
Reply: It is said: “The nature of things neither arises nor ceases, as with
nirvana.” [366] The explanation given above applies here.
In the Tathagataguhya Sutra, it is stated: “On the night when the Buddha
became enlightened and attained complete and unsurpassable illumination
and entered the nirvana without residue,during that time not a single
syllable was uttered or expressed by the Buddha, nor did he address anyone,
nor will he. Nevertheless, the doctrine is taught in different ways by the
Buddha to all sentient beings who are to be helped — the gods, the demons,
ordinary human beings, the accomplished human beings, legendary
creatures, and so forth. By emitting one sound during one moment he taught
the doctrine whose glare banishes darkness from people’s minds, awakens
the great lotus of enlightenment in its many forms, dries up the ocean of old
age and death, and confounds the many rays of the seven suns at the end of
the cosmic age.”
[367] Thus, it is stated in the Samadhiraja Sutra: “When a buddha, the
silent sage, the king of the doctrine, who proclaims all of the doctrine,
appears, the words of the nonexistence of all entities resounds from the
grass, bushes, trees, rocks, and mountains. Of the many sounds in the
world, ‘No entities exist, none are real’ — all these sounds are the voice of
a buddha, the guide of the world.”

The Question of Ontological Nihilism

Objection : [368] Madhyamikas are no different from nihilists who hold

that nothing exists, since they claim that wholesome and unwholesome acts,
actors, the fruit of action, and all entities in the world are empty of
selfexistence. Indeed, nihilists hold “There is nothing.” Thus, Madhyamikas
are not different from nihilists.

Reply : That is not so. Why? Because Madhyamikas propound the doctrine
of arising dependently, and they hold that everything in this world and the
next are without self-existence because all things arise dependently through
the confluence of causes and conditions. As for nihilists who accept in self-
existent natures, it is not because of entities’ emptiness of selfexistence that
they affirm the nonexistence of another world and so forth. On the contrary,
while accepting the reality of the present world because of its existence,
they do not accept that one is born into this life from another or that one is
born into another life from this one. Thus, they end up denying that things
that are similar to what is perceived in this world exist elsewhere.
Objection : They hold the nonexistence of anything believed to be real in
itself, and that is the same doctrine as yours.
Reply: This is not so. Why? Because Madhyamikas accept the existence of
things in the conventional sense, the two doctrines are not in agreement.
Objection: But the doctrines are identical in substance.
Reply: Although they are similar in content in denying self-existence, they
are not similar because they differ in how thedenial is applied. Consider a
man who is accused of being a thief. Suppose one person who does not
recognize the man clearly but, being urged by the man’s enemy, falsely
gives testimony that he committed the crime. [369] And another person
who witnessed the crime also accuses the man of the crime. Now, even
though in content their accusations are identical, there is nevertheless a
difference between the two accusers: the first is said to speak falsely and the
second to speak the truth. When considered, the first committed an act of
disgrace and demerit; the second did not.
And here it is the same case. Although there is no difference in content, the
knowledge and claim of Madhyamikas do not correspond to those of the
nihilists. For the former have correctly grasped the true self-nature of
things, and the latter have not. There is a great difference in their
discrimination between the worldly and the noble ones who practice even-
mindedness, even though the former achieve an even-mindedness. So too,
there is a great difference between those who are blind from birth and those
who can see when they encounter the same precipice that is hard to cross.
Just as that is so, so too there is a difference between Madhyamikas and
nihilists. That is the teaching of the earlier masters.
But enough of these arguments! Let us return to explaining our topic.

The Graduated Teaching

Objection : If the nature of all things is “unarisen and unceased, like

nirvana,” and if there is no use of speech or thought concerning the true
nature of things, then it is incommunicable and there is nothing for people
to know concerning it.

Reply : Thus, to bring this teaching to people who need guidance, it is

necessary to have recourse to a graduated teaching based on conventional
truths. That is how the teaching can be communicated. This is that
graduated teaching of the illustrious buddhas that introduces the ambrosia
of reality as it truly is:

[8] The buddhas’ teaching is this: everything is real or everything is not

real; everything is both real and not real; everything is neither real nor not
real.

[370] Concerning this it has been said: “What is most familiar to someone
is naturally the most effective for him — for one who is bewildered cannot
be a vessel for the teaching of the doctrine. Just as it is not possible to make
a foreigner understand by means of a language other than his own, so the
worldly cannot be made to comprehend except by worldly means.” The
same has been said by the illustrious Buddha: “The world quarrels with me.
I do not I quarrel with the world. What is accepted by the worldly as
existing is also accepted by me; what is not accepted by the worldly as
existing is not accepted by me.” That has been said in the scriptures.

The Buddha always taught as real the bodily aggregates, the elements, and
the bases of cognition as they are known and perceived as real by those who
wish to be guided — i.e., by those who suffer from the eye-defect of root-
ignorance but in whom the desire has arisen to be taught the true nature of
the diverse things that are generally accepted as real. His intention was to
arouse the faith of the worldly in himself — this omniscient buddha who
sees all and is aware of all that happens in the world. [371] For he has truly
taught the origin, duration, and cessation of sentient beings, the outer limits
of the world of the living, along with its causes and fruits, and pleasures and
pains. And he has truly taught the physical world, beginning with the
coursing of the winds and ending with the element space, with its many
divisions.

Later, after those who are being guided have realized that the Buddha is
omniscient, it is explained that all of this is not real. What is real does not
change. But all that is compounded indeed changes because they are
constantly ceasing. Thus, because of these changes, it is said that they are
not real.

The words “or” and “and” in the verse are to be understood as joining the
two views. The meaning is this: “All is real or not real.” To some it is taught
that “Everything in the world is real and not real.” For the worldly,
everything in the world is real, but it is unreal for the noble ones since it is
not perceived (i.e., the everyday objects are not seen as real). To those who
through following the practice for a long time see reality as it truly is and
have eradicated almost completely the obstructions named “the roots of
trees,” it is taught “Everything in the world is neither real nor unreal.” It is
for severing the remaining residue of the obstructions that the two
alternatives are rejected, as with a son of a barren woman one rejects the
ideathat he is white or black.

That is the graduated teaching of the illustrious buddhas. The teaching sets
people on the right path after they had detoured on the bad path. The
teaching is flexible because it is graduated and is adapted to the needs of the
people being guided.

[372] All of the teachings of the illustrious buddhas, who possess great
compassion, knowledge of the means of helping others, are the means for
attaining the ambrosia of reality as it truly is. The perfectly realized ones
have not uttered a single word that is not for attainingthe ambrosia of reality
as it truly is. Just as doctors administer the medicines that are appropriate
for each sickness, so do the perfectly realized ones, wishing to aid those
who need guidance, teach the doctrine adapted to their needs. The same is
stated in Aryadeva’s Four Hundred Verses: “It is declared by the buddhas
‘It is real,’ ‘It is not real,’ ‘It is both real and not real,’ and ‘It is neither real
nor not real.’ Indeed, does not everything called “medicine” depend on the
illnesses being treated? (CS 8.20).”

Reality as it Truly is

Objection : The teachings of the buddhas is to introduce reality as it truly is.

What then is the meaning of “reality as it truly is”?
Reply: This was stated above in verse 7: “When the object of thought has
ceased, then what can be named has ceased.” This being so, what further
objection can there be?
Objection: This may be so, nevertheless you must conform to the
conventional truths of the worldly and speak by superimposing
characteristics onto what is truly real.
Reply: Nagarjuna responds:

[9] The characteristic of what is actually real is this: not dependent upon
another, peaceful, free of being projected upon by conceptual projections,
free of thoughts that make distinctions, and without multiplicity.

[373] “Not dependent upon another” means that the nature of what is is not
dependent upon anything else. It is said that this is not attained by the
teaching by another but is attained on one’s own. Thus, it is those suffering
from an eye-defect who see nonexistent things such as hair, mosquitos, and
flies. When taught by those with sound vision, they still do not comprehend
because they do not comprehend the true nature of the (illusory) hair since
they cannot not see it as those with sound vision donot. Rather, the teaching
of those with sound vision leads them only to the conviction that what they
see is illusory. (However, when those suffering from the eye-defect are
cured, they see clearly and see that there are no hair and so forth.) So too,
when those suffering from the defect (of root-ignorance)are treated with the
ointment of seeing the reality of emptiness, they are cured of the defect and
then attained the knowledge of reality as it truly is. They then comprehend
reality as those who see. Thus, now they see that the true nature of entities
is not dependent on anything. That is reality as it truly is.

“Peaceful” means to be completely without self-existence, just as the

illusory hairs are without self-existence.
“Conceptual projections” means giving words substance (i.e., seeing things
corresponding to words as real). “Free of being projected upon by
conceptual projections” means that reality as it truly is cannot support
speech.
[374] “Thoughts that make distinctions” are the wandering customs of
thought. By the abandonment of that, “free of thoughts that make
distinctions” means the way reality as it truly is without thoughts that make
distinctions. As the scripture says: “What is the ultimate truth? There
knowledge does not occur (since there are no entities corresponding to
words to know). Of what use again is there in pouring forth words? That is
the meaning of ‘free of thoughts that make distinctions.’”
What has diverse objects is said to have multiplicity. This means that what
is “without multiplicity” does not have diverse objects. As it is said in the
Satyadvayavatara Sutra: “From the point of view of ultimate truth, the
nature of all the basic phenomena of the experienced world is the same. . . .
What is the sameness of all basic phenomena from the point of view of the
ultimate truth? It is the sameness of not being produced and not arising of
any basic phenomenon from the ultimate point of view. Why? [375]
Because from the ultimate point of view, in nirvana all basic phenomena are
indeed without multiplicity because of the complete lack of arising of basic
phenomena. Just as the space in a clay pot and the space in a bejewelled pot
are both the element ‘space,’ and thus there is no multiplicity from the
ultimate point of view, so too from the ultimate point of view neither
suffering nor purification arises in any manner. So too, the cycle of rebirths
and also nirvana are identical to complete non-arising. From the ultimate
point of view, there are no multiple factors in them. Why? Because from the
ultimate point of view, there is no arising of any basic phenomenon of the
experienced world.”
Thus, one should understand that non-multiplicity is the characteristic of
reality as it truly is because of the reality ofthe oneness of emptiness.

Conventional Reality

That is how the noble ones who have vanquished the cycle of birth, old age,
and death speak of the characteristics of reality as it truly is. Concerning the
characteristics of the way reality is in the conventional world, Nagarjuna
says thus:

[10] Whatever arises dependently upon another thing is not that thing, nor
is it different from that thing. Therefore, it is neither annihilated nor eternal.

[376] An effect arises dependent upon a cause, like a sprout of rice is born
in dependence on a rice seed and a confluence of the conditions of the soil
and so forth. It is not possible to say that the sprout is identical to the seed.
If the seed were identical to the sprout, the cause and the effect would one
and the same thing — a father and son would be identical. The two being
identical, the seed would be taken as existing when there is a sprout, and the
sprout would be taken as existing when there is a seed, and the seed would
thus be eternal since it does not perish. One succumbs to the doctrine of
eternalism, with its many severe faults. Actions and their effects would not
be connected. Thus, it is not permissible to say that the seed is identical to
the sprout. But it is not different from it either: the sprout is not different
from the seed since then the sprout would be produced without the seed. As
Nagarjuna says: “If one thing is other than another thing, it would also exist
without that other thing (MK 14.6).”

Thus, if the seed is found in the sprout, it does not perish. One falls into the
Samkhya doctrine of “the effect pre-existing in the cause.”
Because the effect arises in dependence on the cause, it is not identical to
the cause nor different from it. Thus, it is not permissible to say that the
cause is annihilated or is eternal. As Aryadeva says: “Since entities arise
and continue, they are not annihilated. And since they cease, permanence is
not found (CS 10.25).” And it is stated in the Lalitavistara Sutra: “There is
a sprout if there is a seed. The seed is not identical to the sprout. It is not
different from the sprout nor identical to it. Thus, the nature of things is
neither annihilated nor eternal.”

Chapter 24: The Four Noble Truths

Buddhist Objections to “Emptiness”

Objection: [475] Some may now object:

[1] If all this is empty, there is neither arising nor ceasing. And then for
you, it follows that the four “noble truths” — the truth of suffering, its
cause, the prescription of its cure, and the path to ending it — do not exist.

If you Madhyamikas establish that “all this” — the collection of all external
and internal entities that there are — is empty, and thereby establish your
teaching that all this does not arise, then many great faults befall you. Why?
Because if you suppose that all this is empty of self-existence, then what is
empty does not exist, and what cannot be said to exist cannot, like a son of
a barren woman, either come to be or cease to be precisely because it does
not exist (i.e., ontological nihilism). Thus, there is no arising or ceasing of
any entity whatsoever. Because there is no arising or ceasing, it follows that
for you, the advocates of emptiness, the four noble truths do not exist.
Reply : This is not so. Why? In our doctrine, the five bodily aggregates,
which arise from a prior cause and are the product of conditions, are called
“suffering” because of the anguish and suffering inherent in existing,
because all change is suffering, and because of the suffering in anything
compounded. [476] Only the noble ones, whose misperceptions have been
eliminated, fully recognize this suffering — not those who are not noble, for
they are victims of misperceptions and, in conformity with how they
perceive, they define entities as having self-existence. Those with impaired
sense-faculties due to illness or another affliction perceive sugar and the
like as bitter, even though their true nature is sweetness. Just as in this
cognition bitterness, not sweetness, is taken as real because the true nature
of sugar is not perceived, so it is here. Even though the five bodily
aggregates are by their self-nature suffering, still it is only those who clearly
perceive the aggregates to have the nature of suffering truly understand the
world to be suffering — not those who perceive things as otherwise than
they really are, since they are victims of misperceptions. That the
aggregates are suffering by their nature is true only for the noble ones. That
is way the truth of suffering is said to be a “noble truth.”

Objection : But are not painful feelings defined as “suffering” by those who
are not noble? In that case, how is it that suffering is a truth only for the
noble ones?

Reply : Because the truth of suffering is not limited to only feelings of pain
(as the unwise believe) but encompasses (the suffering of) all five bodily
aggregates. Thus, only for the noble ones is this truth called a “noble truth.”

It is said: “An eye-lash in the palm of the hand is not felt, but if it gets into
one’s eye it causes discomfort and torment. So too, the naive, like the hand,
do not know that the compounded is suffering, but the noble ones, like the
eye, alone tremble at the torments.” Thus, since the truth of suffering exists
only the noble ones, it is known as a “nobletruth.”

Objection : But for there to be a noble truth of suffering, there must be

arisings and ceasings-to-be. But if nothing comes to be or ceases because all
entities are empty of self-existence, then there can be no suffering. And if
there is no suffering, how can there be a truth concerning its cause? For the
cause from which suffering arises and grows is called its “cause,” and this is
understood as the mental afflictions arising from actions that in turn arise
from the thirst for existence and desires. But if there is no effect of mental
afflictions, then there is no cause of suffering since there is no “cause”
without an “effect.”

[477] When suffering disappears and is never to arise again, this is called
“cessation.” But if there is no suffering, of what is there a “cessation”?
Thus, there is no “cessation of suffering.” And if there is no suffering, there
is no noble truth of the “cessation of suffering.” And if there is no cessation
of suffering, how can there be the way of the “eightfold path” that leads to
the cessation of suffering? Thus, there is no noble truth of the way either.

Thus, if one affirms “All entities are empty of self-existence,” then it

follows that there are no four noble truths. And what harm results from
that? Nagarjuna states it:

[2] And since the four noble truths do not exist, then the recognition of
suffering, the elimination of its cause, the cultivation of ending it through
meditation, and the realization of the end of suffering cannot occur.

If there are no four noble truths, then there is (1) no perfect knowledge of
the truth of suffering in what is impermanent, selfless, and open to
suffering, (2) no destruction of the cause of suffering, (3) no acceptance of
the way leading to the cessation of suffering, and (4) no final realization of
its cessation. Because there are no four noble truths, there is no perfect
knowledge of the truth of suffering and so forth. And what is the harm of
that? Nagarjuna again states it:

[3] If these four things do not exist, then the four noble fruits of the
Buddhist way of life — “entering the stream” leading to nirvana, “once
returning” for a final rebirth, “never returning,” and “attaining nirvana in
this life” — are not found. [478] [4] If the eight types of practitioners
connected to the four fruits (i.e., those who aspire for one of the four fruits
and those who have attained one) do not exist, so too the community of
monks and nuns does not exist. In addition, because the four noble truths do
not exist, there is no true doctrine. [5ab] With no true doctrine and no
religious community, how can there be the Buddha?
When in this manner there is no perfect knowledge of suffering, no
destroying its cause, and so forth, then none of the four fruits of the
Buddhist way of life — “entering the stream,” “once returning,” “never
returning,” and “attaining nirvana in this life” — are possible because they
do not exist. Why? [479] In our school, the complete elimination of the
desires receives the name “fruit.” (The correlations of the progressive
elimination of mental afflictions with different stages of the fruits then
follows. The point is that the different moments of realization require the
possibility of the four achievements beginning with the perfect knowledge
of suffering.)

[487] If there are no four noble truths and no four achievements beginning
with the perfection of the knowledge of suffering, then there are no persons
who would be progressing through these stages and realizing them, since
there are no attainments by which, by inner acceptance and direct
experience, these noble truths are grasped. Thus, there would be no
community of Buddhist monks. For, if there are no eight categories of holy
persons (i.e., those persons aspiring to the four noble fruits and those who
have attained any of them), there would be no community of monks and
nuns since it exists by people having attained the clarity acquired by
comprehending and directly experiencing the doctrine that is inseparable
from the illustrious Buddha despite the efforts of demons.

In addition, if there are no four noble truths, there is no true doctrine. For
what is true for the noble ones is the Buddhist doctrine. [488] The truth of
the cessation of suffering is the fruit of the doctrine, and the truth of the
path is the fruit of being introduced to the doctrine. That is the doctrine of
final release. The teachings that clarify it fully are the doctrine of the
Buddhist tradition. If there are no four noble truths, all of this is nothing. As
it is said, “If there are no noble truths, the doctrine is not found. If there is
no doctrine and no community, how could there be an enlightened one?”

If the (non-Madhyamaka) doctrine expounded here (in this objection) is

true, then without contradiction there could be a buddha who is fully
enlightened concerning all aspects of every basic phenomenon of the
experienced world because he could realize both the basic truth and its
applications. So too, if there is a community of monks and nuns, then there
is a reservoir of knowledge that is increased by its teachings, and a reservoir
of merit is increased by taking refuge in the community, by revering it, and
by making donations to it, and thus one gradually can become enlightened.

In addition, if there were no community of monks and nuns, there can be no

aspirants for the attainments of stream-enterer, once-returner, and so forth.
Now, if no one progresses through the various attainments, no one can
achieve enlightenment, for a blessed one invariably must abide in these
fruits and must be a member of the community itself. Thus, if there is no
community, there is no blessed buddhas.

Moreover, the blessed ones themselves are included in the community

because they are no longer learners. Some claim that the buddhas are
members of the community because of the saying “the community of
monks and nuns with a buddha at its head.” In their opinion, it is self-
evident that “If there is no Buddhist doctrine and community, how can there
be an enlightened one?”

[489] Madhyadeshikas, based on the series of ten stages of a bodhisattva’s

career set forth in the Mahavastu, maintain that a bodhisattva, as one firmly
set in the first stage of the bodhisattva’s path, having attained the way of
insight, is also included in the community. Thus, if there is no community,
there are no bodhisattvas either. How then could there be an enlightened
one? That is self-evident. So:

[5cd] Thus, speaking in this way you indeed reject the three jewels of
Buddhism.

By proclaiming that the emptiness of entities, you reject the Buddha, the
Buddhist doctrine, and the Buddhist community of monks and nuns. These
are called the “three jewels” of the Buddhist tradition because they are
difficult to attain, they arise only rarely, they are inaccessible to those of
little merit, and they are of great value.

In addition:

[6] Speaking in this way about “emptiness,” you reject the true existence of
the fruits, of true and untrue doctrines, and of all mundane conventions.
[490] The word “emptiness” is the object of “speaking in this way.” If all
entities are empty of self-existence, then nothing exists. If so, wholesome
and unwholesome actions, along with their desired and undesired fruits, do
not exist since they are among “all entities.” So too, all these mundane
orders “Do,” “Cook,” “Eat,” “Stand,” “Go,” “Come,” and so forth are
among “all entities,” and so do not make sense. So too, all the basic
phenomena of the experienced world do not exist.

Thus, your argument, which was meticulously described above, is not the
superior one.

The Madhyamaka Interpretation of “Emptiness”

Reply : [7] We say here that you do not comprehend the purpose of
emptiness. Therefore, emptiness and the significance of emptiness distress
you.

By way of your discriminations, you superimpose onto the word

“emptiness” the false meaning of “nonexistence.” You slander us with such
arguments as “If all things are empty of self-existence, there is no arising or
ceasing (Pr 223).” You fall into great distress and torment yourself badly by
various false discriminations.

However, the meaning of “emptiness,” which is carefully described here in

this treatise, is different from the meaning you suppose. Not understanding
the meaning of “emptiness,” you do not understand emptiness itself. Nor do
you discern the purpose of “emptiness.” And because you do not
understand the nature of things as they really are, your account is erroneous
and is unrelated to our own understanding.

Now then, what is the purpose of “emptiness of self-existence”? It is given

in by Nagarjuna: “From the destruction of the afflictions resulting from
karmic actions, there is the liberation from rebirth. The afflictions arise
from thoughts that make distinctions between entities. These thoughts come
from projecting distinctions onto reality. But such conceptual projections
cease through (seeing) emptiness (MK 18.5).” [491] This means that
emptiness is taught for the purpose of stilling all conceptual projection
without exception. Thus, the purpose of emptiness is to completely pacify
the entire complex of named entities. However, by erroneously
discriminating the meaning of “emptiness” as “nonexistence,” you actually
strengthen your entanglement in the net of conceptual projection. You
simply do not understand the purpose of “emptiness”!

And now, what is the “emptiness of self-existence” itself? This too was
defined by Nagarjuna: “The characteristic of what isactually real is this: not
dependent upon another, peaceful, free of being projected upon by
conceptual projections, free of thoughts that make distinctions, and without
multiplicity (MK 18.9).” How can emptiness, whose nature is the end of
conceptual projection, be described as having the nature of “nonexistence”?
You indeed do not know emptiness either. We explain below how the term
developed: “Whatever is dependently arisen, we call that ‘emptiness.’ This
indicator, once comprehended, is in fact itself the ‘middle way’ (MK
24.18).” As the blessed one has said: “Whatever arises from conditions, that
is not arisen because it does not arise through self-existence. (That is,
because it is not self-existent, it is not real and thus cannot arise.) Whatever
depends on conditions is said to be empty of self-existence. Whoever
understands emptiness is wise.”

Thus, the meaning of “dependent-arising” is the same as the meaning of

“emptiness.” But the meaning of the term “nonexistence” is not the same as
the meaning of “emptiness.” By attributing the meaning of “nonexistence”
to “emptiness,” you slander us. Thus, you do not know the meaning of
“emptiness” at all. By this baseless criticism, you only torment yourself.

The Two Types of Truth

Now, who is it who criticizes us in this manner? [492] It is one who follows
the words of the texts literally but does not know the indisputable
distinction between the two types of truth as taught in the sayings of the
Buddha. That is why Nagarjuna, out of compassion for his opponents, states
the following to clarify the indisputable distinction of two types of truth as
taught in the sayings of the Buddha in order to cast out the
misunderstanding of the doctrine by others:
[8] The buddhas’ teaching of the doctrine rests upon two categories of
truths: truth based on mundane conventions, and truth from the ultimate
point of view.

Now, the teaching of the doctrine by the blessed Buddha in the world is
indeed developed based on the two types of truth. What are these? The
conventional truth of the mundane world and the truth from ultimate
(ontological) point of view. It is said of them: “The world is said to have a
permanent self among the bodily aggregates. Indeed, it is upon these that it
is based.” Here, the everyday (conventional) “person” is called “the world”
because the idea of a “person” is dependent on the five bodily aggregates.

“The conventional” means “being completely obscured.” Indeed, the

ignorance (of ultimate ontological matters) is called “the conventional”
because it completely obscures the nature of things as they really are.
Alternatively, “the conventional” means that “entities are mutually
dependent” (e.g., the concepts of “cause” and “effect” are interdependent
and thus not independently real). Or, “the conventional” means “agreement
with worldly practices,” which itself is the characteristic of “what
designates” and “what is designated,” “knowing” and “what is known,” and
so forth.

[493] The “conventional world” refers to conventions of the world. What

would be a non-mundane convention from which we distinct the mundane?
Here “mundane” refers to the categories as they are constituted in the
everyday world — thus, there is no room for such a question here. But
those who persistently perceive entities erroneously because of their
impaired senses — e.g., an eye-defect or jaundice — are “non-mundane.”
What they take the world to be is non-conventional. Conventional truths are
distinct from that. This is explained fully in Entering the Middle Way, from
which this can be understood.

What is true in the everyday world is the conventional truths of the world.
The totality without exception of words and practices based on the
distinction between “naming” and “what is named” and between “knowing”
and “what is known,” and so forth, is what is meant by “the conventional
truths of the world.” Such a world does not exist from the point of view of
what is actually real. Thus, it has been said: “When the domain of thought
has ceased, then what can be named has ceased. The nature of all things is,
like nirvana, unarisen and unceased (MK 18.7).”

This being so, how could words or discursive knowledge be valid from the
point of view of what is truly real? For what is real is not dependent on
anything but itself, tranquil (due to the absence of distinct entities), and
accessible to the noble ones. It is beyond all conceptual projection and
cannot be pointed to or known (as an object). As stated earlier: “Not
dependent on anything but itself, tranquil, not differentiated by conceptual
projection, not of a varying form — this is how ‘reality as it truly is’ is
spoken of.”

[494] What has a surpassing objective is the ultimate truth. That alone is
truth/reality from the ultimate point of view. The distinction between the
two types of truths can be studied in detail in Entering the Middle Way (MA
6.22-44).

The teaching of the Buddhist doctrine by the illustrious Buddha is based on

this twofold nature of truth. With the structureof the teaching thus
established, Nagarjuna states:

[9] Those who do not discern the distinction of these two categories of
truths do not discern the profound truth in the teachings of the buddhas.

Objection : If reality as it truly is has the nature of being free of conceptual

projection, let it be so. But why then is there the teaching of what has
nothing to do with the ultimate truth — the bodily aggregates, the basic
phenomena of the experienced world, the sense-faculties, the sense-fields,
Buddhist truths, dependent-arising, and so forth? For what is not real should
be rejected, and why teach something that is to be rejected?

Reply : This is true indeed. But the ultimate truth cannot be pointed out or
taught without accepting as a base the mundane conventions of naming and
what is the named, knowing and what is known, and so forth. And if the
ultimate truth cannot be pointed out, it cannot be comprehended, and if the
ultimate truth is not comprehended, nirvana cannot be attained. Thus,
Nagarjuna, pointing this out, states:
[10] Without relying upon mundane convention, the truth from the ultimate
point of view cannot be taught. And without reaching the truth from the
ultimate point of view, nirvana cannot be achieved.

Thus, mundane truths, as defined above, must first be admitted since they
are the means to attaining nirvana. They are like receptacles for one who
wants water.

Misperceiving Emptiness

Thus, whoever rejects in this way the establishment of the twofold nature of
truth indicated by “conventional truth” and “truth from the ultimate point of
view” is a person of little intelligence, and [495]:

[11] Seeing emptiness incorrectly destroys a person of little intelligence,

just as does a snake incorrectly grasped or a spell incorrectly cast.

The yogin, having realized that conventional truth arises only from
ignorance and is empty of self-existence, perceives that “emptiness of self-
existence” is a higher truth than the mundane and does not fall into the
dualism of “it is” and “it is not” (i.e., eternalism and annihilationism). He
does not afterward dismiss the self-existence of entities since he has found
no self-existence in them (and so there is nothing to dismiss). Thus, he does
not ask, as some may, “How is what was once real now no more?” (since he
sees that entities were never real to begin with and have not changed). Nor
does he reject altogether the everyday worldly conventions, which are like a
reflection (i.e., not self-existent or totally nonexistent but dependent on
something else). Thus, he does not reject karmic action and its fruit, the
distinction between wholesome and unwholesome actions, and so forth. On
the other hand, he, from the point of view of what is actually real, does not
impute self-existence to everyday entities since he experiences such entities
as karmic action and its fruit as not self-existent and does not experience
them as self-existent.

But one eager for liberation who grasps at emptiness in all compound
entities and dwells on it without seeing the distinction between the two
types of truth in this way would either imagine that all compound entities
are nonexistent or that the emptiness of entities itself exists like an entity —
i.e., he imagines “emptiness” to be a self-existent reality. Either way, the
doctrine of emptiness, wrongly understood, inevitably destroys such a one.
Why? Because if one imagines that “All the world is empty” means
“Everything does not exist in any way,” then a serious heresy has befallen
him. [496] It is said: “This doctrine, wrongly understood, causes the ruin of
the unintelligent, since they sink into the impurity of the doctrine of total
nonexistence (R 119).” On the other hand, if he does not take the position of
denying all entities, then he must reject their emptiness, thinking “How can
entities be empty of self-existence when they are perceived by the worlds of
gods, demons, and humans?” Thus, having rejected the idea that being
empty of self-existence only means that worldly entities are not self-
existent, he proceeds to an evil destiny that results from unwholesome acts
that destroy the true doctrine. It is said in Nagarjuna’s Jewel Garland of
Advice: “Some foolish ones who think themselves learned, do not
understand the doctrine properly and thereby fall into a terrible hell, having
ruined themselves by their criticism (R 120).”

Thus, the absence of self-existence destroys one who comprehends it to

mean the nonexistence of entities. But one may erroneously conceive
emptiness itself to be an existent entity and imagines it to be the substance
of everyday entities. If so, then confusion would break out on the path
leading to nirvana in the very teaching of the doctrine of emptiness because
of this mistake. This is why the absence of self-existence destroys one
comprehending emptiness to be by nature an entity.

Objection : [497] If something useful is grasped badly, it does not provide

any service at all, but how does it do harm? An improperly sown seed does
not harm the farmer.

Reply : Nagarjuna gives an example here that clarifies his meaning: “just as
does a snake incorrectly grasped or a spell incorrectly cast.” A snake
properly caught according to the prescriptions of herbs and spells produces
a great treasure of riches because one obtains the price on its head and the
snake catcher can thus make a living. But the snakedestroys the catcher if
the prescriptions are put aside. Spells too, when cast according to the
instructions, favor a magician, but they destroy him if they are cast when
the instructions are lost. So too with our magical doctrine of emptiness:
when it is realized in practice and fully comprehended according to the
instructions, it leads to enlightenment. As the middle way between the
extremes of “it is” and “it is not,” it extinguishes the fire of suffering —
birth, old age, death, and so forth — and baths those who comprehend in
the bliss of the flowing ocean of the unconditioned nirvana without residue.
[498] But for the reasons stated, emptiness will surely destroy one who
conceives it contrary to the special instructions given here.

That is why emptiness destroys one who grasps it incorrectly and why those
of weak intelligence are incapable of grasping it correctly.

[12] Thus, when the Buddha considered how difficult it would be for those
of little intelligence to comprehend the doctrine, his mind turned away from
teaching.

Thus, the doctrine of emptiness destroys one of weak intelligence and a

small mind because they grasp it incorrectly. Since this is so, the blessed
Buddha, after fully awakening to the supreme and perfect enlightenment
and beholding the realms of all sentient beings and the profundity of the
doctrine and realizing how difficult it would be for those of weak
intelligence to fathom the doctrine, abstained at first from teaching the
doctrine, although he was gifted with the special knowledge of the great
means to do so. As it is stated in a discourse: “The Buddha in the moment
he attained perfect enlightenment, thought: ‘The doctrine that I have
attained is profound, deep in its splendor, beyond reasoning and the domain
of reasoning, subtle, and to be known only by the discernment of the wise
and learned. Even if I were to reveal its radiance to others, they would not
understand it. That would be fruitless, and it would be injurious to myself
causing fatigue and a sinking heart. [499] Now I myself have achieved the
joy ofperceiving the sweet doctrine and shall move to a remote forest alone,
and so forth.’”

Emptiness Versus Self-Existence in the World

Thus, in this manner lacking discernment into the indisputable doctrine of

the twofold truth:
[13] In addition, the error accompanying the objections to emptiness that
you make is not ours — it is not applicable to what is empty.

Objection : This has a faulty consequence: if the entire world is empty of

self-existence, there is no arising or ceasing-to-be, and so forth.
Reply: Such a refutation, cast against us because of a lack of insight into the
twofold nature of truth and because of ignorance of the nature of emptiness
and its meaning and its purpose, does not apply to our understanding of
emptiness. Thus, it is not applicable. In alleging a refutation of emptiness,
you charge, slander, attack, and reject emptiness, but your accusation does
not apply to us. Your accusation is made by superimposing “nonexistence”
onto the idea of “emptiness.” But we do not maintain that the meaning of
“nonexistence” is that of “emptiness.” What is it then? It is
“dependentarising.” Thus, it is not acceptable to attack the very doctrine of
“emptiness.”
[500] Not only are these stated refutations not applicable to our position,
but in addition the entire system of Buddhist doctrines becomes more
intelligible (by accepting emptiness as it is properly understood). Thus,
Nagarjuna explains:

[14] For whom emptiness is admissible, everything is admissible. For

whom emptiness is inadmissible, everything is inadmissible.

All that is described here is admissible for the one to whom the emptiness
of self-existence in all entities is admissible. For such a one everything in
the way we have explained is admissible. Why? Because we explain
“dependentarising” as “emptiness of self-existence.” As stated in one text:
“What arises from conditions is not arisen (since it is not real), and there is
no arising from self-existence (since the real is eternal). Whatever depends
on conditions is said to be empty of self-existence. Whoever comprehends
emptiness is free of delusion.” Also from the Perfection of Wisdom texts:
“All basic phenomena of the experienced world are empty because they
lack self-existence.”

Thus, dependent-arising is admissible to one for whom emptiness is

admissible, agreeable, and acceptable. In addition, the four noble truths are
admissible to one for whom dependent-arising is admissible. Why? Because
it is precisely what arises dependently that is suffering, not what does not
arise dependently. What arises dependently also is empty because it is not
self-existent. When there is suffering, then the arising of suffering, the
cessation of suffering, and the way to cessation of suffering are possible.
Thus, a clear grasp of suffering, the elimination of its arising, the realization
of its cessation, and the practice of the way are all possible.

[501] If there are the truths of suffering and thegrasping of them and so
forth, then their spiritual fruit is possible. When the fruits are possible,
recipients of the fruits are possible. When recipients are possible, aspirants
are possible. When aspirants are possible, the community of monks and
nuns is possible. When there are Buddhist truths, then there is the Buddhist
doctrine. If the Buddhist doctrine and the community are possible, then
buddhas are possible. Thus, there are the three “jewels” — the community,
the doctrine, and the Buddha. All things whatsoever, whether of this realm
or of the realms beyond that are realized by the Buddhist discipline, are
then possible. Correct and incorrect conduct, their fruits, auspicious and
inauspicious destinations, and all mundane practices are possible.

Thus it is that “Everything is admissible for one for whom emptiness is

admissible.” Thus, for such a one for whom the absence of self-existence in
all entities is admissible everything in the world as we have described it
above is admissible and can be effected. But the entire world is not
admissible for one for whom emptiness as we have explained it is not
admissible — because they do not understand the dependent-arising of all
entities. This is demonstrated in detail below.

Thus, our proposition is without flaw and is established without any

contradictions. But your proposition is full of errors — it is exceedingly
simplistic, very shortsighted, and contradicts others. You are too obtuse to
find the merits and the faults [502]:

[15] In attributing your errors to us, you have forgotten the horse you
yourself are mounted upon.

Just as one who forgets that he is mounted on a horse falsely accuses others
of the crime of stealing the horse, so do you, although mounted on the horse
of the position of emptiness understood as the dependent-arising of all
entities, not perceive this because of your confusion, and so you revile us.
What are the opponent’s flaws that he does not perceive and so reproaches
the advocate of emptiness? In order to expound them, Nagarjuna states:

[16] If you perceive entities as having true being because of their

selfexistence, then you will perceive entities as being without causes and
conditions.

If you see entities as existent through their own self-existence, then you
ignore their causes and conditions. You see entities, whether internal or
external, as having no causes and conditions, as existing without causes and
conditions, and as having no cause since what is self-existent is not
dependent on causes and conditions. Also, by supposing the absence of
causes [503]:

[17] You will also reject effect, cause, actor, the means of acting, action,
arising, ceasing, and fruit.

Why? If you suppose here that a pot exists through its own self-existence,
what need would this self-existent entity have for causes and conditions of
clay and so forth? Thus, there would be no causes and conditions. And it is
not acceptable that there is an effect named “a pot” when there is no cause.
Without such causes as the potter’s wheel, the potter as the maker, and the
activity of making the pot are nonexistent, and also arising and ceasing-to-
be are nonexistent. But if nothing arises or ceases, how can there be any
spiritual fruits? Thus, by accepting that entities are self-existent, you
discard all the effects in question and others besides, so that if you accept
self-existence, all that occurs is impossible for you. On the other hand, for
us who declare that all entities are empty of self-existence, all that occurs is
possible. Why? Because:

[18] Whatever is dependently arisen, we call that “emptiness.” This

indicator, once comprehended, is in fact itself the “middle way.”

This dependent-arising, which is manifest in such cases as seeds and

consciousness that depend on causes and conditions, means that entities do
not arise through self-existence. And the non-arising of entities through
selfexistence is the emptiness of entities. [504] It is stated by the Buddha:
“Whatever arises from conditions is not really arisen — it does not arise as
selfexistent. Whatever depends on conditions is said to be empty of
selfexistence. Whoever comprehends emptiness is free of delusion.” And it
is described in detail in the Lankavatara Sutra: “It is accepted that there is
no arising through self-existence. It is my teaching that basic phenomena of
the experienced world are empty,” and so forth. In the Dyvadhashatika
Sutra, it is said: “All basic phenomena are empty because they have no self-
existence.”

In addition, this emptiness of self-existence is a dependent designation. This

“emptiness of self-existence” is established as a “dependent designation.” A
“chariot” is designated as derived from the wheelsand its other parts. Thus,
whatever is designated by its parts does not arise self-existently, and such
non-arising through self-existence is emptiness. Indeed, this emptiness is
indicated by non-arising through self-existence, and is known as the
“middle way.” What does not arise self-existently surely does not have the
definingcharacteristic of what exists. But since what does not arise through
selfexistence does not cease to exist, it does not have the defining-
characteristic of what does not exist either. Thus, because it is free from the
extremes of eternalism and annihilationism, the emptiness of entities that is
understood as the non-arising through self-existence of all entities without
exception is designated “the middle way” or “the middle path.” Thus,
“emptiness” as a dependent designation and “the middle way” are
identifying terms for “dependent-arising.”

The Emptiness of Things

[505] Consider this in all its aspects:

[19] Any basic phenomenon of the experienced world that is not

dependently arisen is not seen. Thus, a thing that is not empty is not seen.

Indeed, a basic phenomenon that does not arise through conditions is not
found. As Aryadeva states in his One Hundred Verses: “There is no state of
unconditionedness anywhere at any time in any respect. Thus, eternal
existence is not found anywhere at any time in any respect. The naive think
that non-compounded things such as space are eternal. The clear-sighted do
not see existent objects in it corresponding to worldly conventions.” And
the Buddha said: “The wise comprehend the basic phenomena as
conditioned. They do not take refuge in the views of eternalism and
annihilationism. They know the basic phenomena have causes and
conditions and that it is not the nature of the basic phenomena to be without
causes and conditions.” Thus it is said: “There is no basic phenomenon that
does not arise dependently.”

Since what arises dependently is empty, there is no basic phenomenon that

is not empty of self-existence. Thus, for us,all basic phenomena are empty,
and the refutation alleged by our opponent is not applicable to us, but it is
applicable to our opponent, the advocate of self-existence.

[20ab] If, as you say, everything were not empty, then there would be
neither arising nor ceasing, . . .
And if there is not arising nor ceasing, then [506]:
[20cd] . . . and the nonexistence of the four noble truths follows.
Why? Because:

[21] How could suffering come to be if it is not dependently arisen? It is

said that suffering is impermanent — indeed, it is not seen in what is self-
existent.

Indeed, what is by nature self-existent is not arisen through conditions, and

what is not arisen through conditions is not impermanent — a flower in the
sky is unarisen and is not impermanent. But the Buddha has stated that what
is impermanent is suffering: “Impermanence is suffering.” And from
Aryadeva’s One Hundred Verses: “Suffering indeed arises from the
impermanent, and there is no happiness in it. Thus, the impermanent is
know as ‘suffering.’”

If entities are by nature self-existent or arise through self-existence, there is

no impermanence. Thus, supposing there are self-existent entities, suffering
is not admitted. Not only is suffering not admitted: if entities are by nature
self-existent, the arising of suffering also cannot be admitted. As Nagarjuna
explains:

[22] In addition, if something exists by self-existence, how could it come to

be? For one who rejects emptiness, there can be no “comingto-be.”
[507] If suffering does arise and thus there is suffering, then it is said
“There is a cause of suffering.” Thus, if one rejects the emptiness of
suffering and accepts it to be self-existent, the idea of a cause of suffering is
not admitted, since there would be no purpose in it arising again. Thus, an
arising of suffering is not admitted for you who rejects emptiness.

So too, the ceasing of suffering is not possible for one who accepts that
suffering is self-existent. Nagarjuna explains:

[23] Thus, there can be no cessation of suffering that exists though self-
existence. You deny cessation by being obsessed with selfexistence.

If suffering in fact exists by self-existence, how can it cease since the

selfexistent is indestructible? Thus, because of your obsession with
selfexistence, having seized the idea and being attached to it, you reject the
cessation of suffering.

So too, the Buddhist path is also inadmissible for the advocate of

selfexistence. Nagarjuna explains with these words:

[24] If the path were self-existent, the cultivation of the path could not
occur. But since the path is in fact cultivated, self-existence is not seen in it.

[508] If entities have self-existence, then the Buddhist path is also

selfexistent. But then the path cannot be followed through meditative
development (because development involves change and the self-existent
does not change). What then is the purpose of meditative development?
Thus, as Nagarjuna says, “the cultivation of the path could not occur.”

But if it is admitted that a path is to be followed, then indeed the Buddhist

path cannot by nature be self-existent. Then the path has the nature of being
an effect of causes and conditions. In addition, meditative development on
the path is commended for the purpose of realizing the cessation of
suffering and eliminating its cause. But the above argument establishes that
for you, the advocate of self-existent entities:

[25] If no suffering, arising, and ceasing are seen, what path for the
cessation of suffering could there be?
For the advocate of self-existence, there is no cessation at all of suffering by
completing a path that is self-existent (since nothing real can change). Thus,
the Buddhist path in this way is not possible. Thus, from the advocacy of
selfexistent entities, there are no four noble truths.

Emptiness and Enlightenment

Nagarjuna now explains how for the opponent there can be no clear
understanding of suffering, no ending of its cause, no meditative
development, and no final realization of the Buddhist truths.

[26] If non-understanding exists by self-existence, how will understanding

ever arise? Is not self-existence fixed?

[509] If at first there is a self-existent non-understanding of suffering, then

perfect understanding cannot arise later. Why? Because it is said that the
selfexistent is unchanging. Indeed, in the world what is self-existent is
immutable — it never undergoes any change, as with the heat (as the self-
existent nature) of fire. Since there is no change in what is self-existent,
there can be no understanding of suffering when there already is a self-
existent misunder- standing first.

Thus, there can be no perfect understanding of suffering either. When there

is no perfect understanding of suffering, then:

[27] Like understanding, elimination, realization, and meditative

development are not possible if you accept self-existence, nor are their four
noble fruits.

“Elimination and realization” mean both the elimination of the cause of

suffering and the final realization of its cessation. “Meditative
development” is the following of the Buddhist path. Thus, these are not
possible for you since there is no perfect understanding of suffering. There
can be no elimination of a cause that is indestructible because of its self-
existence. The same applies to “realization” and “meditative development.”

In addition, not only is there no perfect understanding and so forth because

of the view of self-existence, but, like perfect understanding, there are no
four fruits (discussed above). Just as there is no perfect understanding of a
suffering that is not already perfectly understood since it is self-existent, so
too there can be no later attainment of “stream-entering,” as it did not
already exist earlier (since there is no arising of what is self-existent). That
there is no “once-returning,” “non-returning,” and “attainment in this life”
should be recognized in the same way as with “stream-entering.” And it is
not only that these fruits are not possible, like perfect understanding, but
attaining these fruits is also not possible. Nagarjuna explains [510]:

[28] For one who accepts self-existence, how is it possible to obtain a fruit
that is not already obtained through its self-existence?

For those who hold the view of the self-existence of entities, there can be no
later realization of entities that by their nature were earlier unrealized, since
self-existence is by its nature indestructible.

[29] In the absence of the fruits, there are none who have attained the
fruits, nor any who have entered the way to attaining them. If these eight
types of people do not exist, there is no community of monks and nuns. [30]
Because of the nonexistence of the four noble truths, the true doctrine also
is not seen. And if there is no doctrine or religious community, how could a
buddha arise?

The meaning of these two verses is to be understood as before. In addition,

once self-existence is accepted:

[31] It also follows for you that an enlightened one is not dependent upon
enlightenment. It also follows for you that enlightenment is not dependent
upon the enlightened.

[511] If there were a self-existent entity at all named “the enlightened,” then
it is without dependence on, or relation to, the omniscient awareness of
enlightenment in any way. For it is said: “The self-existent is not made and
is independent of everything but itself.” In this way, there would be
enlightenment without there being the enlightened. There would be
enlightenment without resort to anything because it is self-existent.

In addition:
[32] One who by his self-existent nature is unenlightened would not attain
enlightenment even while striving toward enlightenment by leading the way
of life of a bodhisattva.

Because “being enlightened” is self-existent, there can be no enlightenment

for one who is unenlightened by his self-existent nature, even though there
is the career of a bodhisattva and he strives for enlightenment in that career.
This is so because an unenlightened self-existent nature cannot cease.

Moreover:

[33] And no one will ever perform correct or incorrect actions — what can
be done to what is not empty since what is self-existent cannot be affected
by action?

Indeed, when the view of self-existence is accepted, it is not possible to

perform correct and incorrect actions. What can be accomplished in a
nonempty, self-existent world? For one cannot bring about anything that is
not without self-existence in nature since the non-empty already exists.

In addition [512]:

[34] Indeed, for you karmic fruit is found without any correct or incorrect
action. Conversely, the fruit of correct and incorrect actions is not found.

If a desirable or undesirable karmic fruit caused by correct or incorrect

action is self-existent, then the fruit exists without correct or incorrect
action. When for you there is karmic fruit without correct or incorrect
action, then for you there is no karmic fruit arising from correct or incorrect
action. Thus, there cannot be any accumulation of wholesome or
unwholesome merit. Thus, it is said: “for you karmic fruit is found without
any correct or incorrect action.”

But if it is imagined that there is fruit caused by (real) correct or incorrect

action, then this fruit is not empty of self-existence. As Nagarjuna explains:

[35] Or, if for you there is the fruit of correct and incorrect actions, how
can this fruit be non-empty since it has arisen from correct and incorrect
actions?

This means that the karmic fruit is in fact empty of self-existence because it
is produced through conditions, like a reflection is. In addition, all mundane
practices such as going, doing, cooking, reading, or standing arise
dependently. If you regard these as self-existent, then the dependent-arising
of entities is rejected by you. From this rejection, all mundane practices are
also rejected. Thus, Nagarjuna explains [513]:

[36] You reject all mundane conventions since you reject the emptiness of
“dependent-arising.” [37] For one who rejects emptiness, there would be
nothing whatsoever that could be done; there would be uninitiated actions;
there would be an actor with no action.

If entities are not at all empty of an inherent nature, they are self-existent. If
that is so, nothing can be accomplished by anyone in any way concerning
the self-existent because it already exists, just as the openness of space is
not made by anyone. There would be “an action” without being acted, and
there would be “an actor” who does not bring about an action. But this is
not the way things are — thus, entities are not non-empty of self-existence.

Moreover:

[38] The world would then be unarisen, unceasing, and immutable since it
would be devoid of varying conditions in its self-existent state.

[514] If entities exist self-existently, then the totality of the world would be
unarisen and unceasing since the self-existent is uncreated and
imperishable. Since what is self-existent is uncreated and unchanging, all
entities would be unchanging. For the advocates of non-emptiness, all
entities do not arise dependently, since they are independent of causes and
conditions, and they do not vary in their state.

In the Pitaputrasamagama Sutra, it is said: “If anything were non-empty,

the Buddha would not have spoken of emptiness. For it is certain that what
exists is immutable and unvarying in its nature and neither grows nor
diminishes.” And in the Hastikakshya Sutra, it is said: “If any basic
phenomenon of the experienced world were self-existent at all, the Buddha,
along with his disciples, would assuredly know. There would be no
cessation of an immutable basic phenomenon, and the Buddha would never
stop making distinctions (between real entities).”

[515] When the view of self-existence is accepted, it is not only mundane

practices that fall but also ethical and religious striving. Nagarjuna explains:

[39] If the world is not empty, there is no attaining what has not already
been attained — the act of ending suffering and eliminating of the
afflictions would not be found.

If all in the world is not empty and thus self-existent, then what is not yet
attained surely cannot be attained later, and thus no karmic fruit that is as
yet unattained can ever be attained. Any action to end suffering that did not
exist previously cannot exist now. And the elimination of mental afflictions
that do not as yet exist cannot exist later. Thus, all the world becomes
impossible when the view of self-existence is accepted. Thus:

[40] But whoever sees dependent-arising sees this and also sees suffering,
its arising, its cessation, and the path leading to its cessation.

Indeed, one who sees with complete clarity the lack of self-existence as the
characteristic of the dependent-arising of all basic elements of the
experienced world sees the four Buddhist noble truths as they really are.
[516] As it is said in the Perfection of Wisdom texts: “Suffering is perfectly
known by one who sees the non-arising of all the basic phenomena of the
experienced world. The cause of suffering is eliminated by one who sees
the non-selfexistence of all basic phenomena of the experienced world. The
cessation of suffering is realized by one who sees that all basic phenomena
are in a state of complete annihilation and without any restrictions. The way
of meditative development is followed by one who sees that the basic
phenomena are without self-existence,” and so forth.

(Chandrakirti then quotes the Dhyayitamushti Sutra to the effect that

sentient beings are trapped in the cycle of rebirths because the idea of a
substantive self leads to the defilements that keep them being reborn and
that this is ended by no longer discriminating the basic phenomena, which
are unarisen, as self-existent, distinct entities. This leads to seeing the four
noble truths are they really are. The quotation concludes:) “[517] Suffering
is known perfectly by one who sees that all the basic phenomena are
unarisen. The cause of suffering is eliminated for one who sees that all basic
phenomena are unarisen. The cessation of suffering is realized by one who
sees that all basic phenomena are in a state of complete annihilation and are
without any restrictions. The way of meditative development is followed by
one who sees that the basic phenomena are empty without any restrictions.
One who sees the four noble truths in this manner does not have the idea
‘These basic phenomena are wholesome while those basic phenomena are
not. These basic phenomena are to be eliminated, while those are to be
realized. Suffering is to be known perfectly, the cause is to be eliminated,
the cessation is to be realized, and the way of meditative development is to
be carried out.’ Why? Because such a one does not recognize or conceive
any basic phenomena as a self-existent entity, and so forth. The naive, who
discriminate basic phenomena as self-existent entities, become disturbed,
angry, and confused. But the wise neither accepts nor rejects any basic
phenomena. As such a one neither accepts nor rejects any basic phenomena
in this manner, his mind is not disturbed by the three realms of existence.
He understands that all of the three realms are unarisen and are comparable
to a phantom, a dream, and an echo. [518] Seeing that the nature of all the
basicphenomena is like that, he is detached of attraction and repulsion
toward all sentient beings. Why? Because he does not conceive the basic
phenomena and so forth that he would be attracted to or repulsed by as real.
With a mind like clear space, he does not see the Buddha, the Buddhist
doctrine, or the community of monks and nuns as real. As he realizes that
all basic phenomena are empty of selfexistence, he has no doubts about any
such phenomenon. Having no doubts, he is free from grasping. Not having
any grasping, he is liberated, attaining the nirvana without residue.”

Chapter 25: Nirvana

The Hinayana View of Nirvana

[519] Some object:

Objection : [1] If all this is empty, then there is neither the arising nor the
ceasing of things. So, by the removal or cessation of what is nirvana
sought?
The Buddha has taught that persons who live a chaste life and practice the
discipline leading to perfect realization and have acquired a knowledge of
the nature of the basic phenomena of the experienced world can attain a
twofold nirvana: the nirvana in this life with a residual base and the nirvana
after death without any residual base.

In the first case, “nirvana with a residual base” is attained with the complete
destruction of the mental afflictions — i.e., root-ignorance, desire, and so
forth. What is called “the base” is grounded in adherence to the concept of a
“self.” Thus, the word “base” refers to the aggregates that give rise to the
concept of a “self.” The “base” is the residue of past karmic actions. Only a
base with residue is a “residual base.” “Nirvana with a residual base” means
the state of nirvana in which one continues to exist connected to the residual
base. What sort of thing is this type of nirvana? It consists of nothing but
the bare bodily aggregates freed from the delusional afflictions such as the
belief in a substantive “self” — it is like town in which all criminal gangs
have been purged. This is “nirvana with a residual base.”

[520] In the second case, “nirvana without a residual base” is the nirvana in
which even the purified bare bodily aggregates are absent. The idea of a
“base” is absent. With the residual base destroyed, itis like a town in which
all criminal gangs have been purged and the town itself has been
annihilated. About this nirvana, it has been said: “The body hascollapsed.
Perceptions are gone. Sensations and mental dispositions are pacified.
Cognition itself is nonnexistent.” And: “Through the body, even though one
does not cling to it, one still has some sensations. But in nirvana cognition
has ceases, just as a light that has gone out.” Such “nirvana without
aresidual base” is attained by the cessation of the bodily aggregates.

The Madhyamaka Position

Objection : How can this twofold nirvana be made understandable? Nirvana

is possible only when both the mental afflictions and the bodily aggregates
have ceased. But if everything is empty of self-existence, nothing
whatsoever can either arise or cease — so how can mental afflictions and
bodily aggregates arise, the ceasing of which is nirvana? Thus, it is found
that entities must be self-existent.
[521] Reply: If we suppose that entities are self-existent, then:

Reply : [2] If everything is not empty, then there is neither the arising nor
the ceasing of things. So, by the removal or cessation of what is nirvana
sought?

In order to attain nirvana, there must be a cessation of mental afflictions and

bodily aggregates, but since self-existence cannot disappear, if mental
afflictions and bodily aggregates are self-existent, how can they ever cease?
Thus, for the proponents of the self-existence of things, nirvana is not
possible. But the proponents of the absence of things’ self-existence do not
admit nirvana is characterized as the cessation of (self-existent) mental
afflictions and bodily aggregates, and thus they are not guilty of this flaw,
and this does not constitute an accusation against them.

Objection : But if proponents of the absence of self-existence do not accept

nirvana as the cessation of mental afflictions and bodily aggregates, how do
they conceive the nature of nirvana?

Reply: Nagarjuna says:

[3] Unrelinquished, unattained, unannihilated, non-eternal, unarisen, and
unceased — this describes nirvana.

Nirvana is not something that can be extinguished like desire, nor

something that can be gained through action like a karmic reward. Nor is it
something that ends like the bodily aggregates and so forth, nor is it
something everlasting like something not empty of self-existence. Nirvana
is said to be something that by its self-nature neither arises nor ceases. It is
the stilling all conceptual projection.

Objection : Now if nirvana is free of conceptual projection, what then of the

concept of “mental afflictions” whose cessation is supposed to constitute
nirvana with residue? [522] What too of the conceptof “bodily aggregates”
whose cessation is supposed to constitute nirvana without residue?

Reply : So long as these conceptualizations remain, nirvana is not attained.

Nirvana is only attained through the dissipation of conceptual projection.
Objection : If that is so, then there are no mental afflictions or bodily
aggregates in nirvana — but then they did exist prior to attaining nirvana,
and it is from their dissipation that there is nirvana.

Reply : Let go of the conception you grasp! Entities that are self-existent
prior to nirvana cannot later become nonexistent. For this reason, this
conception must be abandoned by those seeking to attain nirvana. Indeed,
Nagarjuna will state this later: “The full extent of nirvana is the full extent
of cyclical existence. There is not slightest interval between them (MK
25.20).” Thus, it should be realized that in the state of nirvana there is no
extinction of anything whatsoever, nor any cessation of anything
whatsoever (since nothing real — i.e., self-existent — ever really existed to
begin with). Nirvana consists of the complete dissipation of
conceptualizations (of real entities).

This has been stated by the Buddha himself: “There is no annihilation of the
basic phenomena of the experienced world, and basic phenomena that do
not exist now never existed. If one projects conceptualizations, thinking
‘This is self-existent’ and ‘This is not self-existent,’ if one courses so,
rebirth will never come to rest.” The meaning of this verse is this: In the
perfected state of nirvana without a residual base, there are no basic
phenomena of the experienced world since all of them — whether they are
afflictions, actions, an individual being, or the bodily aggregates — have
totally vanished. Proponents of all Buddhist schools accept this.

[523] Now those basic phenomena that do not exist in the perfected state do
not exist at all (since if they were real they would exist forever). They are
like the fear caused by mistaking a rope in the dark to be a snake that
vanishes in the light — they do not exist. Nor do the basic phenomena of
the experienced world — whether they are afflictions, actions, an individual
being, or the bodily aggregates — have no true reality at any time
whatsoever in the realm of rebirth. Indeed, the rope in the darkness is not by
its nature a snake since no snake in reality is perceived by sight and touch
either in the darkness or in the light.

Objection : How then can there be an everyday world of rebirths? Reply:

Entities that do not really exist indeed appear to do so to the naive people in
the world who are in the grip of illusory notions of “I” and “mine,” just as
nonexisting hair, flies, and so forth appear to those with an eye-defect.
Thus, the Buddha stated: “If one projects conceptualizations, thinking ‘This
is self-existent’ and ‘This is not self-existent,’ if one courses so, the realm
of suffering will never come to rest.”
Those who advocate self-existence — the idea that true reality is found in
individual entities — are the followers of Jaimini, Kanada, Kapila, and
others up to the Buddhist Vaibhashikas. Those who advocate nonexistence
are the materialists who are rooted in the path leading to calamitous
rebirths. There are others (the Buddhist Sautranikas) who deny that the past
and the future exist, and dispositions related to thought and form, but who
admit there are other phenomena. And there are others (the Yogacharas)
who deny the existence of individual external entities as only constructions
of thought, but who admit such entities’ contingent reality and also admit a
true reality. For those affirming either self-existence or nonexistence, the
realm of suffering and the cycle of rebirths will never come to rest.
[524] Indeed, there is this verse: “A man, who suspects he has taken poison,
faints even when there is no poison in his stomach. Swayed by the care of
‘I’ and ‘mine,’ one eternally comes and goes (i.e., dies and is reborn)
without real knowledge of the (true nature of the) ‘self.’” Thus, it is
understood that in nirvana there is no cessation or extinction of anything
whatsoever — nirvana is nothing but the ending of all conceptualizations.
According to Nagarjuna’s Ratnavali: “Nirvana is not in fact the absence of
an entity — how then could that be demonstrated? Nirvana is said to be the
destruction of the notion of entities and the absence of entities (R 42).”
To those who are not able to understand that nirvana is the attainment of
ending all conceptualization and falsely imagine nirvana to be something
that exists, or does not exist, or both, or neither, the following verses are
directed:

Nirvana is Not an Entity

[4] To begin with, nirvana is not an entity. If it were, it would be

characterized by aging and death, for indeed there is no entity without
aging and death.

[525] In this matter, there are indeed some who are committed to the idea
that nirvana is an existent entity. Their argument is as follows.
Objection : There is something real (in nirvana) that by its nature is
cessation. It is the definite termination to a continuum of a personal
existence that arose from karmic actions based on mental afflictions. It is
like a dam stopping a stream of water. This termination is nirvana. Basic
phenomena of the experienced world that are withoutself-existence are
never observed to be a potent agent in this way.

Sautrantika objection : But there is total dispassion — the ending of the

desires associated with a joyous worldly life — and this cessation is called
“nirvana.” What is a mere termination is not capable of being an entity. It
has been rightly declared: “In nirvana, cognition itself is gone, just as a light
has gone out.” It is not admissible to regard the extinction of a light as an
“entity.”

Vaibhashika objection : It should not be thought that “termination of desire”

means “an extinct desire.” Rather, the end ofdesire occurs in something
called “nirvana” that is a really existing basic phenomenon of the
experienced world. It is this that is the proper termination of desire. (That
is, there is no entity “desire” and so no absence of that entity.) The
extinction of the light is a mere simile, and this simile must still be
understood to mean that the release from cognitions takes place in
something that is real.

Madhyamaka reply : Nagarjuna now examines the view that determines that
nirvana is an entity. He finds that nirvana is not an entity. Why? Because if
it were, it would follow that it would be subject to aging and death, since
“aging” and “death” are the inevitable characteristics of an entity. He means
that this would not then be nirvana since it would then be subject to aging
and death, like cognition and the other bodily aggregates.

To explain further the inapplicability of the qualities of aging and death,

Nagarjuna says: “There is no entity without aging and death.” Indeed,
anything that is without aging and death is not an entity at all. It is like a
flower in the sky: it never ages or dies (since it does not exist).

In addition [526]:
[5] If nirvana were an entity, nirvana would be compounded, for an
uncompounded entity is not seen anywhere.
If nirvana were an entity, it would be compounded, just like cognition and
the other bodily aggregates, because these are entities. Whatever is not
compounded, like the horns of a donkey, is not an entity (because it does
not exist). Formulating the contrary proposition, Nagarjuna states: “An
uncompounded entity is not seen anywhere.” The word “anywhere” refers
to any place or time or its use in a philosophical argument. The expression
“an uncompounded entity” refers to the thing located, whether it is external
or mental. This is his meaning.

In addition:
[6] If nirvana were an entity, how could it be non-dependent? A
nondependent entity is not seen anywhere.

If, as you think, nirvana were an entity, then it would be dependent, i.e., it
would be based in the totality of its own causes (and conditions). But such a
dependent nirvana is not accepted by anyone — rather, nirvana is
considered to be without any dependence. Thus, if nirvana were an entity,
how could it be without any dependence? Indeed, nirvana could not be
without any dependence because it is an entity, just as cognition and the
other bodily aggregates cannot be non-dependent. Nagarjuna added a
further reason for the contrary proposition: “A non-dependent entity is not
seen anywhere.”

Nirvana is Not the Absence of an Entity

Sautrantika objection : [527] If nirvana indeed is not an entity because of

the fault exposed by the reductio ad absurdum argument, then nirvana must
be the absence of an entity since it is merely the end of the individual being
who arises from mental afflictions.

Reply: That too is inadmissible:

[7] If nirvana were not an entity, how could it become the absence of an
entity? Where nirvana is not an entity, no absence of an entity is seen.

If nirvana is not accepted as an entity — i.e., if the claim “Nirvana is an

entity” is rejected — then does nirvana become the absence of an entity?
Nagarjuna’s meaning is that nirvana cannot be the absence of an entity.
If nirvana is the absence of mental afflictions and the individual being born
of them, then nirvana is merely the ceasing of these afflictions and the
individual being. Indeed, the cessation of these defilements and individual
being has nothing but the characteristic of “ceasing” — thus, nirvana would
be nothing but ceasing. But this cannot be admitted, since in that case
liberation would be attained without effort. That is quite inadmissible.

In addition:
[8] And if nirvana were a non-entity, how can it be non-dependent? No non-
dependent absence of an entity that could be nirvana is seen.

Here “the absence of an entity,” like “ceasing,” conveys meaning only by its
dependence on an entity, since such things as a nonexistent donkey’s horn
are not perceived as ceasing. [528] What has a characteristic has meaning
only in dependence on its defining-characteristic, and defining-
characteristics have meaning only in dependence on what they characterize.
Thus, defining-characteristics and what is characterized are mutually
dependent. How could there be ceasing without an entity characterized by
it? Thus, “the absence of an entity” too conveys meaning only in
dependence on “an entity.” This being so, if nirvana is the absence of an
entity, in that case how could it be without any dependence? Nirvana would
indeed be dependent if it is the absence of an entity, just as in the case of
cessation. To make the point clearly, Nagarjuna states: “No non-dependent
absence of an entity that could be nirvana is seen.”

Objection : But if the absence of an entity is not without any dependence,

then mustn’t “the absence of the son of a barren woman” be dependent on a
real son of a barren woman?

Reply : Who has established that such things as the “son of a barren
woman” are the absence of an entity? It was stated above: “If something is
not established as an entity, its absence cannot be established. What people
call ‘the absence of an entity’ is nothing but a change in an entity (Pr 158).”

Thus, the “son of a barren woman” is not the absence of an entity. Indeed, it
has been declared: “Empty space, the horns of rabbits, and sons of barren
women are all spoken of as the absence of entities, as illusions concerning
existing entities.” Here too it is to be understood that these are nothing but
imagined contradictions of entities — they are not conceptions of the
absence of entities since nothing real corresponds to them. The phrase “son
of a barren woman” is nothing but words. The object of this phrase is never
perceived as something that could be either an entity or its absence. How
can one think in terms of “an entity” or “the absence of an entity” for
something that by its own nature cannot be experienced? (That is, there is
nothing real in the absence of an entity to experience.)

Thus, the “son of a barren woman” must not be thought of as an entity. And
it has also been established that there is no absence of an entity that exists
without dependence on an entity.

Summary of Last Sections

Objection : If nirvana is neither an entity nor the absence of an entity, then

what is it?
Reply: The reply of the noble ones is this [529]:

[9] An entity that comes and goes is conditioned and dependent. What is
without conditions and is non-dependent is taught to be nirvana.

Here “comes and goes” means either arising and ceasing in general or the
cycle of birth and death. The cycle of being born and dying can be
understood as dependent on a complex of causes and conditions, as “long”
and “short” are. Or it can be under as entities that are dependent on
something external, as light from a lamp or a sprout from a seed are. In
either case, whether the process is understood as dependent on something
external or as arising from causes and conditions, it is the ceasing of this
continuous cycle of births and deaths, due to (the error) of taking them to be
uncaused and non-dependent, that is called “nirvana.” But what is nothing
but a ceasing-to-be cannot be conceived as either an entity or the absence of
an entity. Thus, nirvana is neither an entity nor the absence of one.

Vaibhashika objection : Mental dispositions continue through successive

lives. Arising and cessation are rigidly dependent on causes, and the
absence of any mental dispositions as the cause is nirvana.
Pudgalavada objection : It is the “person” that persists through successive
lives. The “person” is indefinable as either “impermanent” or “permanent.”
[530] This “being born” and “dying” is based on the person as a changing
substratum. In the moment the person no longer continues, it is no longer
dependent, and that is called “nirvana.”

Reply : Since the mere ceasing-to-continue of either the person or the

mental dispositions cannot be conceived of as either an “entity” or “the
absence of an entity,” it then is unacceptable to conceive of nirvana as an
entity or the absence of an entity.

In addition:

[10] The Buddha has spoken of relinquishing both becoming and ceasing.
Thus, it is admissible to say that nirvana is neither an entity nor an
absence.

On this point, the Udana says: “All those who long for liberation from this
personal existence into something that either ‘exists’ or ‘does not exist’ lack
perfect insight. Both a longing for an eternal life and for mere nonexistence
must be renounced.” But it is not nirvana that the Buddha urged should be
rejected — on the contrary, it is not to be rejected. If nirvana were either
eternal life or annihilation, it too would be rejected. Thus, Nagarjuna states:
“Thus, it is admissible to say that nirvana is neither an entity nor an
absence.”

Nirvana is Both an Entity and the Absence of an Entity

Vaibhashika objection : Nirvana is of a double nature. It is the absence of an

entity since an individual being and the mental defilements are not present
in nirvana. But nirvana is itself an entity by its nature. Thus, nirvana is both
an entity and the absence of (another) entity.

Reply: This is inadmissible. In response, Nagarjuna states [531]:

[11] If nirvana were both an entity and the absence of an entity, then
liberation would be both an entity and the absence of an entity, and this is
not admissible.
If nirvana were of the nature of both an entity and the absence of an entity,
liberation would be both an entity and the absence of an entity. Thus, the
reality of dispositions in an individual and their extinction together
constitute liberation. But it cannot be accepted that liberation and the
dispositions can exist together. Thus, Nagarjuna states: “This is not
admissible.”

In addition:

[12] If nirvana were both an entity and the absence of an entity, nirvana
would not be non-dependent for it would dependent upon both of these.

If nirvana were both an entity and the absence of an entity, then it would be
dependent on a complex of causes and conditions — i.e., it would not be
nondependent. Why? Because both an entity and the absence of an entity
are dependent. If it is agreed that the absence of an entity is dependent on
an entity and an entity is dependent on the absence of an entity for its
meaning, then both the entity and the absence are obviously dependent and
not nondependent. This is so if nirvana were in nature both an entity and the
absence of an entity, but this is not the case and is not admissible.

In addition:

[13] How could nirvana be both an entity and the absence of an entity?
Nirvana is uncompounded, but what is an entity and the absence of an
entity is compounded.

[532] An entity is compounded since it arises from the totality of its causes
and conditions. The absence of an entity is compounded since it arises in
dependence on an entity and since it has been declared in scripture that old
age and death are dependent upon birth. Thus, if nirvana were in its true
nature both an entity and the absence of an entity, then it would not be
uncompounded but instead would be compounded. And since it is not
admitted that nirvana can be thought of as compounded, nirvana is not in its
own nature both an entity and the absence of an entity.

Objection : Even if this is so, perhaps nirvana is the place where an entity
and the absence of an entity can be found together.
Reply: This is not acceptable either. Why? Because:

[14] How could nirvana be both an entity and the absence of an entity?
There can be no existence of these in one place, just as in the case of light
and darkness.

Since an entity and the absence of an entity are mutually incompatible, they
cannot possibly exist together in one place, i.e., in nirvana. Thus, the
question: “How could nirvana be both an entity and the absence of an
entity?” This question means it is absolutely impossible.

Nirvana is Not Both an Entity and the Absence of an Entity

How it could be that nirvana is “neither an entity nor the absence of an

entity”? Nagarjuna expounds this next:

[15] If the proposition “Nirvana is both an entity and not an entity” were
established, the proposition “Nirvana is neither an entity nor the absence of
an entity” could be established.

[533] If there were such an entity (named “nirvana”), then by its negation
there would be the conceptualization “Nirvana is not an entity.” If there
were the absence of an entity, then by its negation nirvana would not be the
absence of an entity. But when there is neither an entity nor the absence of
an entity, there cannot be the negation of either. Thus, the claim “Nirvana is
both an entity and the absence of an entity” clearly is not admissible. (And
so its negation also cannot be established.)

In addition:

[16] If nirvana is neither an entity nor the absence of an entity, by what

means is it asserted that it is “neither an entity nor the absence of an
entity”?

If it is imagined that there is this nirvana that has the nature “neither an
entity nor the absence of an entity,” what shows this? Who perceives this?
Who proclaims the doctrine that nirvana has “ being neither an entity nor
the absence of an entity” as its nature? In this case, is there a knower of
such a nirvana or not? If there is no one here, is there perhaps someone in
nirvana that can realize it, or is there not? If there is, then a self would
indeed exist in nirvana. But this is not admitted because of the absence of
the existence of a self apart from the arisen bodily substratum (i.e., the
aggregates). But if there is no one in nirvana, by whom will it then be
determined that nirvana really is of this nature? If it is answered that one
still within the realm of rebirth determines this, then does he do so by either
everyday cognition or knowledge of reality as it truly is? If you suppose
that he does this by everyday cognition, this is unacceptable. Why? Because
cognition has its object the mark of an object (i.e., marks indicating
defining-characteristics and thus providing support for conceptions), but in
nirvana there are no object-marks at all. Thus, nirvana cannot be
apprehended through cognition. Nor can nirvana be known by knowledge
of reality as it truly is. Why? Because “knowledge of reality as it truly is”
only has the emptiness of entities as its object. (Thus, there is no entity
called “nirvana” to apprehend.) And it is precisely the nature of such
knowledge that it never arises. How then can such knowledge, whose own
nature is nonexistent, grasp that nirvana is “neither an entity nor the absence
of an entity”? [534] Indeed, the nature of knowledge of reality as it truly is
beyond all conceptual projection.

Thus, nothing shows that nirvana is “neither an entity nor the absence of an
entity.” And so it is not permissible to claim that what is unseen,
unrevealed, and unperceived exists in these terms.

Conclusion

Just as the four conceptualizations that nirvana is an entity, the absence of

an entity, both, or neither are not possible, so too these conceptualizations
are not possible when applied to the Buddha, who has attained nirvana:

[17] It is not to be inferred that the blessed one exists after ceasing (i.e.,
after the Buddha’s death after he attained enlightenment), nor that he does
not exist, nor both, nor neither.

As was stated earlier: “One who holds the crude notion that the Buddha
exists in this life must be convinced that after enlightenment he does not
exist (Pr 203).” In this regard, one cannot imagine what happens after the
cessation of the Buddha — does he exist or does he not? Since each of these
alternatives is unimaginable alone, one cannot imagine that both hold, and
because one cannot imagine both holding, one cannot imagine that neither
holds.

It is not only concerning the Buddha after his death that one cannot imagine
in the fourfold manner, but in addition:
[18] It is not to be inferred even that a currently living blessed one exists,
nor that he does not exist, nor both, nor neither.
[535] This is beyond our understanding and our conceptions. This was
shown in Chapter 22 devoted to the Buddha. It is so for precisely this
reason:

[19] There is not the slightest difference of cyclical existence from nirvana.
There is not the slightest difference of nirvana from cyclical existence.

It is impossible to imagine a (truly existent) Buddha living in this realm nor

to deny (that a conventional Buddha does exist here), and it is equally
impossible to imagine a (truly existing or conventional) Buddha existing or
not existing in the nirvana after death. And this being so, there is no
difference at all between the everyday world of rebirth and nirvana: upon
analysis, they reveal themselves to be of the same nature (i.e., empty of
self-existence).

And by this reason, the words of the Buddha should be understood: “The
world of rebirth, consisting of birth, decay, and death, has no limits (i.e., the
concepts of arising and ceasing do not apply).” This is so because there is
no difference between the world of rebirth and nirvana. Indeed:

[20] The full extent of nirvana is the full extent of cyclical existence. There
is not slightest interval between them.

Since the world of rebirth is the same in nature as nirvana, it is impossible

to imagine either its beginning or end. (That is, thecycle of rebirth is not a
reality that comes to an end and then the reality of nirvana then begins.
Both have the same nature: being free of self-existence.) But not only that
[536]:
[21] The views “After cessation, there is an end” and the other three
options, and “It is eternal” and the other three options, all depend on the
ideas of “nirvana,” a “past limit,” and a “future limit.”

None of these views can be held since the world of rebirth and nirvana are
one in nature, i.e., by nature they are tranquil (i.e., free of multiple real
entities).

The four views proceed based on the notion of “after he ceased” in this
manner: “The Buddha exists after his death,” “The Buddha does not exist
after his death,” “The Buddha both exists and does not exist after his
death,” and “The Buddha neither exists nor does not exist after his death.”
These four views are based on “ceasing” and “nirvana” being analogous.

And there are also these views regarding the end of the world: “The world
has an end,” “The world does not have an end,” “The world both has an end
and has no end,” “The world neither has an end nor does it not have an
end.” These are based on the assumption that there is an entity “the end.”
The view that the world has an end arises from not knowing anything about
a future life or future world. This view establishes an end to the world.
Similarly, the view that the world has no end arises from the expectation of
a future life. Those who both expect and do not expect a future life proclaim
the dual view of both an end to the world and no end. Those who deny both
proclaim the view that the world neither has nor does not have an end.

There likewise are four options regarding the beginning of the world: “The
world is without a beginning,” “The world has a beginning,” “The world
both has and does not have a beginning,” and “The world neither has nor
does not have a beginning.” The first view is based on the belief that we
ourselves or the world itself previously existed, and the second view is
based on rejecting that belief. The third view is based on believing both that
we ourselves or the world itself previously existed and that we did not, and
the fourth view is based on rejecting both. These views are based on the
idea of “a beginning.”

[537] How are these views to be understood? If any of these things were
self-existent in any respect, then we could understand conceptualizations
about entities and the absence of entities. But we have established that there
is no difference between the world of rebirth and nirvana. Thus:

[22] If all basic phenomena are empty, what is without a limit? What has a
limit? What has both no limit and a limit? What has neither a limit nor no
limit? [23] Indeed, what is the same? What is different? What is eternal?
And what is not? What is both eternal and not? What is neither eternal nor
not eternal?

It should be noted that these fourteen unanswered questions (i.e., these ten
questions plus the four about a buddha after his final death) are not
resolvable because the nature of entities is not real. But those who
superimpose this idea of self-existence onto entities affirm or deny self-
existence, and having fabricated these views they hold to them stubbornly.
This hinders them on the path leading to the city of nirvana and binds them
to the troubles of cyclic existence.

Objection : If this is so, nirvana is denied. To what purpose then did the
Buddha propound a doctrine for attaining liberation by all sentient beings?
The doctrine, which has antidotes to every walk of life, was formulated by
the Buddha who, because of his infinite compassion, watches and cherishes
all sentient beings of the three realms as one cherishes a beloved only child,
and who unmistakably knows the intentions of all the living world as they
truly are, and who follows the mass of sentient beings in all their
wanderings.

Reply : [538] This would be so if there were any doctrine that by its own
nature were self-existent, and if there were self-existent bearers of this
doctrine, and if there were some self-existent being called “the Buddha.”
However:

[24] The stilling of all conceptual support and the stilling of the projection
of concepts onto reality is peace — no doctrine was taught by the Buddha in
any place to anyone.

How can the objection made above affect us? Here the meaning is that the
very stilling of all conceptual projection and all support for the
conceptualizations of all named entities is itself nirvana. This stilling, which
by its nature is a peace, is the highest good. When all words cease, named
entities are at peace. The ceasing of discursive knowledge is the highest
good. That is, the stilling of conceptual projection by putting all mental
afflictions to an end, thereby ending (the rebirth of) an individual being, is
the highest good. The stilling of conceptual projection by abandoning all
mental afflictions, and thus ridding oneself of unconscious mental habits
without residue, is the highest good. Again, the stilling of conceptual
projection — by all objects of discursive knowledge and even discursive
knowledge itself dying away — is the highest good.

[539] When the illustrious buddhas are in nirvana, the highest good, which
is the stilling of all conceptual projection, they are like royal swans soaring
through the sky without any support. They soar through the sky or hover
there on the twin wings of accumulated merit and knowledge of reality as it
truly is. It should be known that from there,because they do not perceive
any objects supported by signs, the buddhas teach no (real, selfexistent)
doctrine whatsoever concerning afflictionsor purification in the divine or
human worlds to any gods or human beings whatsoever.

As stated in the Tathagataguhya Sutra: “(The Buddha has never uttered a

syllable, but) all sentient beings according to their religious development
imagine the voice of the Buddha as it issues forth discourses in various
dialects of various lands on different occasions. For them, they hear ‘This
revered one is teaching this doctrine for our benefit,’ or ‘We are hearing the
doctrine of the Buddha.’ But the Buddha never engages in
conceptualizations or talk of real entities, since the Buddha is freed from
unconscious habits, from all entanglements with conceptualizations, and
from all mental discriminations of discrete entities.” To quote again:
“Inexpressible, beyond all language, are the basic phenomena of the
experienced world, empty of self-existence, tranquil, pure. Those who know
the basic phenomena as they really are are called ‘buddhas’ and
‘bodhisattvas.’”

Objection : But if the Buddha has taught no doctrine at all to anyone

whomsoever at any time, why is it that we hear of his various discourses
that constitute the scriptures?
Reply : This arises only from the conceptualizations of people who are
dreaming and are deep in the slumber of root-ignorance. According to
them: “The Buddha, the lord of gods, demons, and human beings in all
three realms, taught this doctrine for our sakes.” And the Buddha said: “The
Buddha’s being is but a reflection of the pure, passionless truth — [540] he
is not real in himself, nor is he perfected. He is beheld in all the realms as a
being only as a reflection.” This is explained in details in a treatise on the
secret meaning of the Buddha’s words.

Since there is no (real) doctrine about (real) basic phenomena for the
purpose of attaining nirvana, how can it be maintained that nirvana exists
based on a real doctrine existing? Thus, it is established that there even is
no (real) nirvana. Accordingly, it was said by the Buddha: “The ruler of the
world has taught that nirvana is no (real) nirvana. A knot tied by an empty
space has been unraveled by that space itself!”

In addition: “An enlightened one cannot appear for those who believe that
the basic phenomena of the experienced world can arise and can cease.
There is no victory over the realm of rebirth for those who persist in
seeking for a nirvana that a is real entity. Why? Nirvana is the cessation of
all perceptions of marks of real entities, the quieting of all inner and outer
activity. [541] Thus, they are deluded who, although having taken up the
religious life of well-taught doctrine and discipline, have fallen into a false,
non-Buddhist doctrine and persist in seeking nirvana as a real entity. They
believe nirvana can be obtained as sesame oil is pressed from sesameseeds
and butter is churned from milk. I declare that they are self-deluded
nonbelievers who strain after nirvana as an eternal extinction of all the basic
phenomena of the experienced world. A master of meditation, one who is
fully realized, does not produce the coming-to-be or the ceasing-to-be of
any basic phenomenon whatsoever, nor does he claim that some real basic
phenomenon can be attained or grasped by clear understanding,” and so
forth.

***
Notes
[1.34] In Buddhist psychology, the physical eye does not see: the eye is a
material object, and one material object cannot see another. Rather, the
visual faculty (indriya) is an inner mental visual capacity that actually sees.

[1.40] The idea of texts of final meaning ( nitartha) and those of provisional
meaning (neyartha) has roots in the earlier Buddhist texts. It is the grounds
for the later idea of “two types of truth.” (See Jones 2010: 147-48.)

[1.44] “” Prati-paksha” is literally “counter-proposition,” but it can also

mean a more generally “corrective” or “remedy” or “cure.”
[1.57] The word translated here as “contrary conviction (a-
nishayasambhava) is simply the negative of the word for “conviction” (i.e.,
doubt). But the Madhyamaka idea behind this is that to deny a conviction is
in fact to affirm a conviction in the opposite of a particular proposition —
here, the anticonviction would be “There is no arising.” Of course, one can
have doubts only about a proposition that exists in some sense, but in the
Madhyamaka epistemology to deny, reject, or negate a proposition is to
affirm its opposite. Madhyamikas hold that one can only deny a proposition
if a proposition exists to deny — i.e., by denying the proposition “Arising is
real,” one affirms there is that proposition. Thus, Madhyamikas neither
affirm nor deny anything since this would implicitly affirm self-existent
entities.

[1.64] For Chandrakirti, only if there are discrete, real entities can anything
be expressed — i.e., only then can words truly reflect the makeup of reality.
Thus, since there is no self-existence, from the ultimate point of view there
are no discrete entities, and so nothing about reality as it truly is (tattva) is
expressible. Therefore, the true ontic nature of reality is “inexpressible
(avachyata).” So too, ultimate truths are inexpressible.

[1.75] Thus, Chandrakirti does not reject “valid means of knowledge” and
“valid objects of knowledge” as conventional truths, but he does reject them
as self-existent and thereby real.
[1.75] Note that Chandrakirti will use the conventional truths of the world
to explain the Buddhist doctrine and how to attain nirvana, not the higher
metaphysical truths of the ultimate ontic status of things.

[1.78] What arises dependently is not dependent upon anything real, and
thus there is no real (self-existent) dependent-arising.
[1.79] “Causal energy (kriya)” is an alleged power or activity inherent in
something (in additions to its conditions) that produces an effect.
[1.82] There are no real conditions because nothing real arises. What is real
is eternal and so exists prior to conditions or any combining of conditions.

[1.86] “Continuity with previous states ( samanantara-pratyaya)” means

that two distinct things (cause and effect) must have immediate contact. For
the Hinayana, all of reality is a chain of discrete arising and ceasing
moments, and a cause must cease for the effect to arise. But then there is
discontinuity and no contact of cause and effect.

[Chapter 15] Chandrakirti uses “svabhava” in different senses. (See the

essay.)

[15.265] Chandrakirti denies self-nature since only what is real (self-

existent) can have a real self-nature, but everything in fact is dependent on
causes and conditions, and so from the ultimate point of view there are no
self-natures.

[15.265-66] Chandrakirti treats verses 15.3-4 in terms of “self-nature” and

“selfexistence” — the objection presented after verse 3 only makes sense if
both concepts are involved. The claim seems to be that only what is real has
a true self-nature, and what is real is either self-existent or produced by
something that is self-existent (i.e., produced through “other-existence”) —
so without self-existence, there can be no self-nature; and conversely, if
there is no true self-nature, then there is no self-existent entities.

[15.267] “Perfect” means “complete” or “thorough.” Thus, perfected

knowledge is the complete or thorough knowledge of a subject — there is
nothing else to know about a subject.
[15.267] The first half of the last sentence may also be translated: “But
selfnature of things as proclaimed by the perfectly realized ones is not
contrary to the evidence. . . .” That is, if svabhava here means “self-
existence,” then the translation given above is appropriate; but if svabhava
means “self-nature,” then this translation is better. The location of the word
“not (na)” suggests this reading, but the prior sentence suggests the reading
given above.

[15.268] In Madhyamaka metaphysics, the extremes of “It exists” and “It

does not exist” do not exhaust all ontological possibilities. These are the
extremes of being eternal and being totally nonexistent — realities that are
dependently arisen do not fall into either category. Thus, from the ultimate
point of view, “is” and “exist” do not apply to anything dependently arisen.

[18.370] The idea of a “graduated ( anupurvi)” teaching fits well with the
Mahayana ideas of two types of truth and skillful means (upaya) in leading
listeners to enlightenment.

[18.375] Rather than treating nirvana only as a state of a person,

Chandrakirti ontologizes it into “reality as it truly is (tattva).” (See also MA
6.189).

[24.490] “Nonexistence ( na-asti, na-astitva)” means literally “there is not.”

It is denying the reality of any entity (bhava) in the sense that any entity is
selfexistent — i.e., no entity exists by its own power (svabhava)
independently of other entities. Notice the connection of emptiness to
countering “conceptual projection (prapancha).” (See Jones 2010: 169.)

[24.492] “Ignorance ( a-jnana)” is not merely the lack of knowledge but an

active error of seeing the world in the everyday way of consisting of
independent, self-existent entities rather than as empty of self-existence.

[24.493] “Discursive knowledge ( jnana)” is related to worldly

discriminations and is related to cognition (vijnana). It is different from the
wisdom (prajna) connected to seeing reality as it truly is (tattva), i.e.,
empty of self-existence. When Buddhists also use “jnana” to refer to the
resulting knowledge, as for example in Pr 533, it is knowledge without
mental discriminations (nirvikalpa-jnana), i.e., conceptualized “entities.”
Chandrakirti argues that discursive knowledge and words cannot be valid
from the point of view of what is truly real (parama-artha-tas) since reality
as it truly is has no permanent distinctions. (He then proceeds to speak of
the nature of reality as it truly is.)

[24.504] On “dependent designation (prajnapti-upadayaprajnapti-upadaya

89. Buddhapalita, not Nagarjuna, made it a major point.

[24.518] By seeing all phenomena as free of self-existence, one becomes

evenminded and detached — neither attracted to, nor repulsed by, any
phenomena. This may seem incompatible with the bodhisattva’s
compassion: if you take nothing more seriously than anything else, how can
you care about others? But the even-mindedness of detachment permits
bodhisattvas to implement the normative value they have chosen —
concern for others’ soteriological welfare — evenly and without any
concern for personal repercussions. (See Jones 2004: 184-87.)

[25.521-22] On the importance of the concept of “conceptual projection

(prapancha)” in the thought of Nagarjuna, see Jones 2010: 169.
Conceptualizations (kaplanas) are connected to this: they are the actual
imaginings of our mind resulting from the sense of discrete entities that we
project onto what is actually real.
[25.533] Discursive or conceptualized cognition (vijnana) is part of the
everyday world, versus meditative knowledge of reality as it truly is
(jnana).

[25.536] On MK 25.19, see Jones 2010: 118-19, 142-43. Here the world of
rebirths (samsara) and nirvana are said to have the same nature, but not that
they are the identical realities — they share the same nature with everything
else (being empty of any self-existence), but they are not identical any more
than a brick and a tree are identical, although they too are empty of self-
existence and so are the same in nature. Ontologically, everything is
selfless, including nirvana, but this is not to say that everyone is already in a
state of nirvana. Saying that samsara and nirvana are not different rather
than the same is simply a direct consequence of Madhyamaka metaphysics:
only entities that exist by self-existenceare the type of thing that can be the
same or different, and thus things empty of self-existence cannot be related
that way. There simply are no real (self-existent), distinct entities to be
different. Thus, samsara and nirvana are not different, but they also are not
the same thing either. (See also BC 9.150. There was no need to point out
that nirvana and samsara are not the same since that is known even
conventionally.) The only way to express their ontic status is to say that
they are both empty of selfexistence. There is no reason to point out that
they are different since they obviously are different — indeed, it is their
contrast on the conventional level that makes it worthwhile to
Madhyamikas to mention that they are the same in nature.

[25.538-40] To Nagarjuna, the Buddha, his teaching, and his listeners are
not real simply because they are empty of self-existence. That is, they are
no more self-existent than anything else — they are empty, and thus not
“real.” Thus, ultimately, the Buddha spoke no “real” words — he was the
“silent one.” But Chandrakirti changes this and makes the Buddha and his
discourses literally imaginary, only dreamed by the unenlightened. This has
more in keeping with the Mahayanist doctrines of the “three bodies” of the
Buddha.

[25.540] “ Nirvana is the cessation of all perceptions of marks of real

entities, the quieting of all inner and outer activity.” Note the importance of
perception, misperception, nonperception (of “entities”), and mistaken
views throughout the work. Whether something “exists” is a matter of
whether it is “seen” or “found.” Enlightenment is not a matter of
intellectual knowledge but seeing things correctly as they really are and
interacting with the world accordingly.
Shantideva
(fl. 700-750)

Shantideva lived after Chandrakirti, although their exact dates are not
known. According to the legend, he was a prince named Achaleasena who
as a child had a dream-vision of the bodhisattva Manjushri. He had another
vision of him the night before his coronation in which Manjushri told him
to find a spiritual teacher and he renounced the throne. The bodhisattva Tara
led him to a cave where he met a yogin, who was in fact Manjushri. Like
Chandrakirti, he ended up at the great monastic university in Nalanda,
where he was known for his spiritual practice. There he acquired the name
“Shanti-deva (lord of peace)” because of the high level of tranquility he
attained. He is said to have finally renounced monkhood and lived as a
naked ascetic.

Shantideva is not as original and strong a philosophical figure as

Chandrakirti. His strength lies on the practical “religious” side, focusing on
the “mind of awakening” and the bodhisattva’s perfections, not on the
philosophical analysis of points of Buddhist doctrine that made the
bodhisattva’s career possible. But Chapter 9 of his Entering the
Bodhisattva’s Path (Bodhicarya-avatara) covering “wisdom (prajna),” i.e.,
insight into the true ontological nature of things, has been included here.
Chapter 8 is also included: it concerns the concentration (dhyana) of the
mind connected to “calming” meditative practices (shamatha), but it also
introduces some of the basic problems of applying the no-self doctrine to
morality. (See Crosby & Skilton 1995: 75-76 on the difference between
meditative concentration and the mindfulness type of meditation connected
to wisdom [prajna].)

Entering the Bodhisattva’s Path is, from a literary point of view, the best of
the works translated in this series, but no attempt has been to capture the
flavor in Sanskrit. The text has also grown over the years: the earliest
known manuscripts have 600 verses, but the standard version today has
913. Chapter 9 may have ended with the dramatic declaration of verse 9.34.
Also included here are Shantideva’s verses that introduce sections of his
Collection of the Teachings (Shiksha-sumucchaya), the body of which
consists of selections from other Mahayana texts. Even these verses are not
particularly original since they contain some stock quotes (Clayton 2006:
38), but

135
they do give an overview of the text’s teachings, which are mainly in the
area of a bodhisattva’s practice and discipline.
***
Entering the Bodhisattva’s Path (Bodhicharaya-
avatara)
Chapter 8: Meditative Concentration

[1] Having thus developed perseverance, one should focus one’s mind in
meditative concentration since those whose mind wanders are stuck in the
grasp of the fangs of the mental afflictions. [2] Through the discernment of
mind and body, one (gives up attachments and desires and) is not troubled
by distractions. Thus, forsake the worldly life and discard distracting
thoughts. [3] But because of an attachment to people and a desire for
material gain, the worldly life is not forsaken. Thus, one should forsake
these things, since this is the way that the wise reflect.

Renouncing the World

[4] Meditative insight coupled with meditative calming of the mind

destroys the mental afflictions. Realizing this, one should seek to calm
one’s mind first. This is achieved through the genuine joy of renouncing the
world. [5] For whom among transient beings is the desire of attachment
appropriate? For one will not be able to see loved ones again for thousands
of lives. [6] Not seeing them, one becomes unhappy and cannot focus one’s
mind in meditation. Even if one does see them, there is no satisfaction and,
as before, one is tormented by longing. [7] One does not see things as they
really are. The desire for liberation is struck down. Desiring the contact of
loved ones, one is constantly consumed by grief. [8] By thinking only of
them, this life ebbs away without purpose. For fleeting friends and relatives,
the eternal Buddhist doctrine (leading to enlightenment) is destroyed.

[9] One who behaves like a child certainly falls into the lower realms (in
future rebirths). Since associating with the childish leads thus, why keep
company with the childish? [10] In one moment they are friends, and in the
next they are enemies. They become angry even on happy occasions.
Worldly people are difficult to please! [11] When anything is said for their
benefit, they resent it. All they do turns me away from what is beneficial. If
they are not listened to, they get angry and fall into the lower realms. [12]
They are jealous of superiors, contend with equals, and are arrogant toward
inferiors. They are conceited when praised, and they become enraged when
criticized. What benefit could there be in such childish people? [13] So
from association with the childish, what is untoward accrues, such as self-
praise, faulting others, and talking about the joys of the cycle of rebirth.
[14] In this way, association with the childish harms oneself. I should live
apart in solitude, with my mind undisturbed. [15] One should flee far away
from the childish. But when you encounter them, be courteous with the
social amenities, but maintain the detachment of a noble one. [16] After
taking only what is necessary for the practice of the Buddhist doctrine, like
a bee taking nectar from flowers, I shall dwell unknown in all places, as if I
had not been there before.

[17] “I have many possessions, I am honored by people, and many adore

me” — one who thinks thus still fears death when confronted by it. [18]
Wherever the mind, confused about happiness, becomes attached (to
anything), a thousand-fold suffering will accrue to it. [19] Thus, the wise do
not crave (such pleasures) because fear arises from desires. With this firmly
fixed in the mind, these desires dissipate by theirown nature. [20] Many
people have made fortunes and also acquired fame. But it is not known
where they have gone (after death) with their wealth and renown.

[21] Some despise me, so why should I feel pleased when praised by
others? Some praise me, so why should I feel displeasure when criticized?
[22] Even the buddhas could not please all people with their various
inclinations — why then even mention an ignorant person such as myself?
So why bother about the world? [23] People scorn the poor and think little
of the rich. How can there be any pleasure being among those who by their
nature dwell in suffering? [24] The buddhas have taught that the childish
are nobody’s friend since happiness arises for the childish only with regard
to their own interest. [25] Happiness born of self-interest alone is a
happiness for the interests of the “self” alone, just as the distress over a the
loss of material wealth is caused only by the loss of pleasure.

[26] Trees do not speak harsh words, nor are they pleased by efforts (of
praise).When may I dwell with such pleasant companions? [27] When shall
I, with complete detachment and never looking back, stay in empty temples
or at the foot of trees or caves? [28] When shall I dwell, without
attachments and following my own inclinations, in vast ownerless places
that are in their natural state? [29] When shall I live free of fear and without
the need to cover my body, having just a begging bowl as my wealth and
clothes that no thief would have a need for?

[30] When shall I go to a cremation yard and realize my decaying body and
the dry bones there are the same? [31] For this body of mine will turn so
putrid in that way that not even jackals will approach near to it because of
its stench. [32] Even the bits of bone that belong together in this single body
will be scattered apart. Why will the bodies of those one holds dear not
similarly be scattered? [33] Indeed, beings are born alone and die alone.
None share their pain. Of what use then are beloved ones who merely make
obstacles (to enlightenment)? [34] Like a wayfarer on the road taking
temporary lodging along the way, one on the road of rebirths leaves the
lodging of one birth for the next.

[35] One should renounce the world and retreat to the forest before the four
pallbearers arrive for this body amid the laments of the worldly. [36]
Befriending no one and reviling no one, without attachments and dwelling
alone, one does not grieve at the time of death because he is already dead
(to the world) while alive. [37] Nor can such a one’s beloved ones cause
him any grief through their laments. Nor can they distract him from his
recollection of the Buddha and the doctrine.

[38] Thus, I should follow the solitary life, which is happy and free from
strife and which leads to the auspicious and calms all disturbances. [39]
Freed from all thoughts of other things and with my mind focused one-
pointedly, I shall endeavor to tame and to increase the meditative
concentration of my mind. [40] Indeed, desires produce all misfortune in
this world and the next — in this life, imprisonment, torture and murder; in
the next, hells and other inauspicious rebirths.

The Body
[41] For the sake of whom you desire (i.e., women), respectful greetings are
made many times to intermediaries and messengers. For their sake, the cost
of misdeeds and disgrace is never counted. [42] And one commits fearful
deeds and wastes one’s wealth. But these whom one desires to embrace for
the highest bliss are [43] nothing but bones, devoid of a self, and without
selfexistence. Rather than being obsessed with them, why not seek refuge in
detachment? [44] That face, whether it was seen or unseen, was covered
with a veil, and when the veil was finally lifted only with effort, that face
was lowered in modesty. [45] That face that you so longed for, producing
great mental afflictions, is now exposed by vultures. Behold it now! Why
do you run away? [46] Now that it is being devoured, why do not jealously
protect the body you protected from the glancing eyes of others? [47] Look
at this pile of meat being devoured by vultures and other scavengers — why
did you worship with garlands, sandalwood, and jewelry what is now food
for others? [48] You are scared merely by the sight of this immobile pile of
bones. Why are you not also afraid of it when it walks as if animated by a
demon?

[49] Saliva and excrement are produced from the same source — food. So
why do you hate the excrement and yet find joy in drinking saliva (in a
kiss)? [50] The lustful are not satisfied touching pillows stuffed with a soft
material — they do not think that the human body emits a foul smell. Oh
lustful one, you do not know what is unclean! [51] If there is so much
infatuation for (the unclean body) that is covered(by skin), why do you
dislike it when it is uncovered? If you have no use for the covering, why do
you caress it passionately? [52] If you have no passion for what is unclean,
why do you embrace another who is merely a cage of bones tied together by
muscles and plastered over with the mud of flesh? [53] You yourself
contain many unclean things — be content with that. Thus, oh eater of
excrement, forget about other bundles of filth!

[54] But you say “It is the flesh I love to see and touch!” How can you
desire flesh when it is by its own nature without consciousness? [55] In
addition, that consciousness that you desire cannot be seen or touched. And
what can be seen and touched is not conscious, so why do you try
pointlessly to embrace it? [56] It is not surprising that you do not see that
the bodies of others are by nature unclean, but it is indeed strange that you
do not understand that your very own body is by nature unclean.

[57] Forsaking the delicate lotus, blossoming under the rays of sunlight in a
cloudless sky, why do I, whose mind is absorbed with the unclean, desire
this cage of excrement? [58] Since you do not wish to touch the earth and
other things covered with excrement, why do you wish to touch the body
from which that excrement is cast out? [59] If you have no passion for what
is unclean, why do you embrace others who are born from a filthy seed in a
field of filth and nourished by filth? [60] You do not like even the smallest
of dirty worms because it is born in filth — yet you desire a body that is
likewise born of filth but is born from a great amount of filth! [61] You, oh
glutton for excrement, despise your own excrement, yet you desire other
bags of filth! [62] Even such clean things as camphor, cooked rice, and
savory vegetables make the earth filthy after being taken into the mouth and
spat or vomited out.

[63] If you cannot admit the excrement in your body, although it is before
your eyes, go to the cremation yard and look at other horrible bodies
discarded there. [64] Great is the fear when the skin is rent open. Knowing
this, how then can joy ever arise in such an object again? [65] The perfume
applied to the body comes from sandalwood and not from another (body).
Why then are you attracted to others’ bodies when the scents come from
something else? [66] It is indeed good if a body whose natural smell is foul
does not produce passion. Why do people, desiring what is worthless,
anoint the body with pleasant scents? [67] If the scent is in fact sandalwood,
how can it come from the body? Why are you attracted elsewhere by the
scent belonging to something else?

[68] The naked body in its nature state looks horrible — long hair and nails,
stained and yellow teeth, filth covering all. [69] This being so, why do you
make such an effort to polish it like a weapon for your own destruction?
The world is filled with the insane laboring to deceive themselves!

[70] You are horrified to see the corpses in a cremation yard. Yet you take
delight in your town, which is merely a cremation yard full of walking
corpses.
The Cost of Desire

[71] And these filthy bodies (of women) are not acquired without a price. In
order to earn enough money for one, one exhausts oneself in this life and
endues the torments of hells or other lower rebirths in the next. [72] In
childhood, there is no opportunity to amass wealth, and as a youth how can
one be happy with it? Thus, one’s youth is wasted earning money. Once one
has grown old, of what use is passion? [73] Some lustful people with
unwholesome desires are thoroughly exhausted after a day’s work. Coming
home in the evening, they lie down like the dead. [74] Others,obliged to
travel abroad, suffer the torments of staying away from their homes — they
long to see their wives and children but do not see them foryears. [75] The
purpose for which they sell themselves also goes unfulfilled. Rather, their
lives are wasted uselessly in the service of others. [76] Some have sold
themselves and are employed by others, while their wives give birth at the
feet of trees in wild forests. [77] Others in order to live become soldiers and
enter wars at the risk of their lives. Other foolish ones, confused by their
passions, even enter slavery because of their pride. [78] Others who are
victims of passion have limbs severed or are impaled on stakes, while
others are burned alive or killed with swords.

[79] Wealth causes endless misfortune in amassing and protecting it and in

losing it. Because of their distraction, those who are fixed on wealth have
no opportunity of release from the misery of the chain of rebirths.

[80] Thus, because of their abundant miseries, those subject to passion have
little comfort. They are like beasts who when pulling a cart can grab only
bits of grass. [81] For the sake of that piddling happiness that even animals
can easily obtain, the good fortune (of having a human life) that is so hard
to come by is destroyed by their misdeeds. [82] All that we desire will
certainly perish and will hurl us into the hells and other lower realms. The
immense work expended all the time for the sake of the body is wasted.
[83] Yet with even a millionth part of that effort buddhahood is obtained.
But there is no enlightened wisdom for those subject to passion, and their
suffering is greater than that of those following the bodhisattva’s path.
[84] When one remembers the torments of the hells,no sword, poison, fire,
precipice, or enemy can compare with the (fruit of) passions. [85] Having
thus become disillusioned with passion, let joy arise in solitude in places
empty of strife and distractions: the peace and stillness of the forest. [86]
The fortunate ones, contemplating the welfare of others, roam in vast places
on rock surfaces cooled by sandal trees under moonbeams and as broad as
palaces, fanned by silent and gentle forest breezes. [87] There they live, free
from care, as long as they wish — in empty dwellings, at the foot of a tree,
or in caves, free of the misery of clinging to and protecting a household.
[88] Living as they choose, free of desires, having no ties to anyone, they
enjoy a happiness and contentment that even Lord Indra has difficulty
finding.

Seeing Oneself in Others

[89] Contemplating the qualities of solitude in ways such as these and

calming distractions, one should cultivate the mind of awakening. [90] First
one should strive to meditate upon the equality of oneself and others in this
way: “In joy and suffering all are equal, and so I should look after all
sentient beings as I protect myself.” [91] The hand and other parts are many
and different, but as one body they are all to be nurtured. So too, all
different beings in their joys and suffering are all one in wanting, like me,
happiness.

[92] Even though the suffering in me does not afflict or distress other
beings, that suffering becomes unbearable to myself because of my
attachment to a sense of “self” (i.e., I see it as mine). [93] Similarly, even
though the suffering of others does not afflict me, that suffering too
becomes unbearable to me when I conceive others’ sense of self. (That is,
others’ suffering becomes unbearable to me when I put myself in their
shoes.) [94] Thus, others’ suffering should be dispelled by me because it is
suffering like my own. Other sentient beings should also be benefitted by
me since they are sentient beings like myself. [95] Since both I and others
are equal in our wish to be happy, what is special about me that I strive for
only my happiness? [96] And since both I and others are equal in our not
desiring fear and suffering, what is special about me that I protect only
myself and not others?
Objection : [97] But why should I protect others when their suffering does
not cause me any harm?
Reply: But then why should I protect my body against suffering in a future
life if it causes me no harm at present? [98] It is a false conception to think
“I will experience the suffering (of the next life).” For it is one person who
dies and a different person who is reborn.
Objection: [99] Each person is to guard himself from suffering.
Reply: But suffering in my foot is not in the suffering of my hand — so why
does the hand protect the foot? [100] Even if the suffering is unrelated (to
me), it arises from the sense of “self.” But whatever is unrelated to myself
and others is to be destroyed as completely as possible.
[101] The continuum of consciousness, like a series, and an aggregate, like
an army, is a fiction. There is no one who “has” suffering. Thus, to whom
does this suffering belong? [102] Without exception,all sufferings are
without an owner. They are to be prevented precisely because of their
nature as suffering. What distinction (of one’s suffering and another’s) can
be put on that? [103] If one asks why suffering is to be prevented, we
respond that this is accepted by all without dispute. If suffering is to be
prevented, then all suffering must be prevented — not merely in my case,
but for everyone.
Objection: [104] But this compassion (for others) will bring me misery. So
why should I exert myself to cultivate it?
Reply: But seeing all that sentient beings have to suffer, how great is the
suffering caused (to myself) by compassion? [105] If the suffering of a
single one can destroy the suffering of many, that suffering should be
produced by the kind-hearted for the sake of oneself and others. [106] Thus,
the bodhisattva Supushachandra, although knowing the harm that King
Shuradatta would cause him (for teaching the Buddhist doctrine), accepted
his own suffering in order to alleviate the suffering of many. [107] So too,
bodhisattvas who have cultivated their continuum of consciousness in this
way and who delight in stilling the suffering of others (freely) enter the
lowest hell like wild geese landing in a lotus pool (to help those there).
[108] The ocean of happiness that will exist when all sentient beings are
released — will that not be enough? What would be the point of wishing for
(only one’s own) liberation? [109] Thus, although working for the benefit
of others, I should not be conceited or consider myself wonderful. And
since the only desire is for others’ welfare, there is no desire for any karmic
fruit of one’s actions. [110] Thus, just as I protect myself from all
unpleasant occurrences, however small, so should I, with a compassionate
and caring mind, act in the same way for the sake of others.
[111] Through habit, there can be the understanding of a “self” located in
the drops of sperm, blood, or things of others, even though in fact there is
no such entity. [112] So why can’t I regard the bodies of others as my own?
It also is not difficult to regard my own body as that of others. (These may
be meditative exercises; see verse 8.120 below.) [113] Having realized that
there is a mistake in cherishing oneself and that loving others produces
oceans of virtue (i.e., merit), one should reject all love toward one’s “self”
and practice the acceptance of others. [114] Just as hands and other limbs
are regarded as members of the one body, why aren’t all embodied beings
regarded as members of the same world? [115] Just as through habit, the
idea of a “self” in the body arose, although the body is without a self, why
can’t a sense of “self” in others be conceived through habit?
[116] Working for the sake of others in this way, there should be neither
conceit nor wonder, just as when one feeds oneself there is no expectation
of reward. [117] Thus, just as you wish to protect yourself from grief, pain,
and so forth, in the same way you should cultivate a compassionate and
protective mind for the world. [118] It is for this reason that the bodhisattva
Avalokiteshvara blessed his name to protect even those who were afraid of
being timid in working among others. [119] One should not turn away from
what is difficult, since by the power of practice one may not become happy
even in the absence of someone whose very name was once frightening.
[120] Whoever wishes quickly to be a refuge for both himself and others
should practice this supreme mystery: exchanging oneself for others. [121]
Because of excessive attachment to oneself, one becomes frightened even
by the smallest danger. This “self” is the source of fear — who would not
revile it as an enemy? [122] Whoever with the wish to remove hunger,
thirst, and so forth kills birds, fish, deer, and so forth and lies in wait along
the roads (as a robber), and [123] who for the sake of gain and honor kills
even his own parents and steals offerings to the three jewels of Buddhism
(the community of monks and nuns, the doctrine, and the Buddha) will
undoubtably burn in the lowest hell. [124] Thus, what wise person would
wish to protect and venerate this “self”? Who would honor it and not regard
it as an enemy?
[125] “If I give this, what will be left for me to enjoy?” Such selfish
thinking is the way of the hungry ghosts. “If I enjoy this, what will be left to
give to others?” Such concern for others is the quality of the gods. [126] If
one harms others for one’s own sake, one will be delivered to the tortures of
the hells and so forth. If one harms oneself for the sake of others, one
acquires all that is excellent. [127] From wishing for one’s own
advancement, condemnation, stupidity, and bad rebirths result. By
transferring this wish to others, respect, intelligence, and joyful rebirths
result. [128] Ordering others for one’s own purposes, one experiences
servitude oneself. Ordering oneself for the sake of others, one experiences
lordship. [129] All who are unhappy in this world are so because of their
desire for their own happiness. All who are happy are so because of their
desire for the happiness of others. [130] But why so much talk! Just look at
the difference between the naive who work only for their own benefit and
the buddhas who work for the benefit of others. [131] There is no attaining
buddhahood or even happiness inthis world without exchanging my
happiness for the suffering of others.
[132] In this life, let alone the next, the needs oflife are not fulfilled when
servants do not do their work and when masters do not pay wages that are
earned. [133] Casting aside the promotion of others’ happiness that creates
happiness now and in the future, the deluded bring unbearable pain upon
themselves by inflicting suffering on others. [134]The harms of this world,
the sufferings and fears, all result from attachment to the sense of “self.” So
of what good is this attachment of mine? [135] If this “self” is not
completely forsaken, one cannot forsake suffering, just as it is not possible
to avoid being burned if one does not give up fire.
[136] Thus, for the sake of ending my own suffering and others’, I shall
devote myself to others and accept them as I do myself. [137] Oh mind, be
certain of this: “I am linked to others.” Now, nothing should be considered
by you except the benefit of all sentient beings. [138] (Having dedicated
oneself to others’ welfare,) it is not proper to use sight and the other sense-
faculties for one’s own benefit since the eyes and other senses are now
others’. It is not proper to use the hands and other limbs for one’s own
benefit since they are now others’. [139] Thus, sentient beings now being
my main concern, seize whatever you see in your body and use it for the
benefit of others.
[140] Taking inferiors and others as oneself and oneself as others, consider
“envy” and “pride” with a mind free of distorted conceptions: [141] “He is
honored, but I am not. I do not have the wealth as he does. He is praised,
but I am despised. I suffer. He is happy.” [142] I have to remain at work,
while he remains at ease. He is respected as great in this world, while I am
an inferior possessing no good qualities. [143] What can be done by one
without good qualities? Yet I do have some good qualities. There are those
to whom I am inferior and those to whom I am superior.

The Self Personified

[144] The failings in my conduct and views and so forth result from the
mental afflictions, not from my “self.” I should be cured of this, if possible,
and I also have accepted (the resulting) suffering. (At this point, Shantideva
addresses the self as if it were a person.) [145] If I cannot be cured by
another, why belittle me? Of what use are his good qualities to me, when he
is the one possessing them? [146] This other one, having no compassion for
beings who dwell in the vicious jaws of rebirth in the lower realms, is proud
of his external good qualities and wishes to belittle the wise. [147] Having
seen another as his equal, he strives to increase his own superiority by gifts
and honors for himself, even if it is achieved only through contention.

[148] May my good gifts be made known to the world by every means, but
may whatever gifts such a person has not be heard of anywhere. [149] May
my faults be hidden that I, and certainly not him, be venerated. May I now
gain wealth easily. May I be honored, and not him. [150] I shall take delight
in seeing him denigrated, the object of scornand derision to all.

[151] It is said that this wretched one is trying to compete with me. But
what are his knowledge, insight, form, pedigree, or wealth? [152] Hearing
of my good qualities being made well-known to all in this way, I thoroughly
enjoy elation, with my hair tingling with delight. [153] If he has any
possessions and he works for me, I shall give him only enough to live on
and forcibly take the rest. [154] He is to be shaken from his happiness and
yoked to continual suffering. Because of him, we have all endured the
anguish of hundreds of rebirths.

Addressing the Mind

[155] (Shantideva now addresses his mind.) Innumerable ages have passed
while you pursued your own ends, but all this gigantic effort of yours has
led only to suffering. [156] Thus, I entreat you, engage yourself in this task
(of working for the welfare of others by exchanging yourself for others) at
once. Later you will realize the benefits of such conduct, because the
Buddha’s word is true. [157] If in the past you made this your practice, this
current condition of life — devoid of a buddha’s great joy — would not
have come about. [158] Thus, just as you have come to hold these drops of
sperm and blood of others as your own, so should you also develop a sense
of “I” with regard to other beings. [159] Having become devoted to others,
take whatever your body possesses and use it for the benefit of others.

[160] Practice jealousy toward yourself in this manner: “This one is happy
while another is not. This is one is exalted, while another is not. The other
works, but this one does not.” [161] Pull yourself down from happiness and
yoke yourself to the suffering of others. Examine your faults, asking “Why
am I doing this now?” [162] Take any fault committed by another as your
own, but even the slightest fault of your own should be announced to the
great sages. [163] Spread the reputation of others that it might outshine your
own. Set yourself to tasks for others as if you were the lowest servant. [164]
Do not praise yourself for your trifling share of temporary good qualities,
for you are full of faults. Act so that no one becomes aware of these
qualities. [165] In sum, may whatever harm you have inflicted on others to
benefit yourself fall on you for the benefit of sentient beings.

[166] Nor should you be so encouraged that you become too talkative.
Rather, like a new bride, you should be demure, timid, and restrained. [167]
Thus, oh mind, be like this and abide in it and do notact as before (i.e.,
selfishly). In this way you are to be controlled and punished if you
transgress. [168] If you do not act accordingly after being so instructed, I
shall punish you, for all faults reside in you alone. [169] Where will you
go? I now see you and will destroy your insolence. The time when you
ruined me is past.

[170] Now give up any hope that today you work for yourself. I have sold
you to others without any worries about your service. [171] If out of
inattention I do not give you away (for service for others), it is certain that
you will hand me over to the guardians of the hells. [172] Handed over by
you in that way, I have been tormented for a long time by you.
Remembering your hostile actions, I shall destroy you, oh slave to your
own wishes.

The Body

[173] If I wish to be happy, I should not be happy with myself. If I wish for
protection, I should protect others. [174] The more that is done to protect
this body, the more it disintegrates and the more it is sensitive (to suffering).
[175] With (the mind) having fallen so far that even everything on the earth
is not able to satisfy its longings, who could satisfy its wish? [176] Mental
afflictions and frustrated hopes are born from unsatisfied wishes, while for
one who is free of hope there is unexhaustible good fortune. [177] Thus,
never give the desires of the body the opportunity to increase. The best of
all possessions are those things that do not grasp you as attractive.

[178] The final destiny of this body is ashes. (Being only matter,) it is
without motion and is moved by another. Why do I cling to this unbearable
and unclean form? [179] Of what use is this contraption to me, whether I
am alive or dead? How is it different from any clod of earth? Oh, why can’t
I dispel this sense of “self”! [180] Through favoring this body, suffering for
no purpose accrues. Of what use is anger or pleading for something that is
similar to a piece of wood? [181] Whether I am caring for it in this manner
or it is being devoured by vultures, this body feels neither attraction or
aversion. Why then am I so attached to it? [182] This body does not feel
anger when derided nor pleasure when praised. For whom then do I make
such an effort? [183] Those who appreciate this body (of mine) are said to
be my friends. All people love their bodies — why then are they not as dear
to me as my own?

[184] Thus, free of any attachment, I shall give up this body for the benefit
of beings. Thus, despite its many faults, I shall carry it as a tool for that
activity.

Conclusion
[185] Enough then of these worldly matters! I shall follow the wise, and
remembering the instructions given by them on vigilance, I shall turn away
from sloth and mental dullness. [186] Thus, in order to rend the veil of
illusion, I shall turn my mind from the false paths and rest it in
evenmindedness on the perfect path.

Chapter 9: Wisdom

[1] It was for the sake of wisdom that the Buddha taught this entire set of
perfections. Thus, from a desire for the cessation of suffering, one should
generate wisdom.

The Two Types of Truth

[2] This is to be understood: truth is twofold — the conventional and the

ultimate. Reality as it truly is is not within the range of the intellect (i.e.,
within the power of the mind that makes distinctions). Thus, the intellect is
said to be conventional. [3] The world is seen in two ways: by the yogin
and by the ordinary people. The world according to the ordinary person is
driven away by the world according to the yogin. [4] And there are even
differences by degree of understanding among the yogins: those with lesser
understanding are contradicted by those with greater understanding.

It is claimed by us that both yogins and ordinary people employ the same
examples because of a failure to examine the purpose of the examples
accepted by both. [5] Entities are seen by the world, but they are seen (by
yogins) in fact as constructions from the point of view of what is real.
Ordinary people never think “This is like an illusion.” Therein is the
disagreement between the worldly and the yogins. [6] When there is direct
perception, there is form and so forth by popular consensus, but not by the
valid means of knowledge (of reality as it is). The consensus is wrong, like
the general acceptance of purity in what is impure, and so forth. (Even
direct perception may be contaminated by the notion of self-existent
entities.)

[7] For the sake of making the world understand, entities were referred to
by the Buddha.
Hinayana objection: Since (according to you) in reality entities are not even
momentary, isn’t it a contradiction to say that they are even conventionally
real?
Reply: [8] There is no fault in the yogins’ use of conventional truth. They
see the true reality in the world. Otherwise (if ordinary people saw reality as
it really is), conventional wisdom would contradict the yogins’
understanding of a woman as impure.
Objection: [9] How in reality does merit spring (from revering the Buddha)
if the Buddha is like an illusion? If a sentient being is like an illusion, how,
once one has died, can one be reborn?
Reply: [10] As long as there is an aggregation of conditions, then indeed
illusions occurs. Why is a sentient being considered real simply because it
has a longer continuity of conditions?

Yogachara View of Consciousness

Yogachara objection : [11] When there is no consciousness (of a real being)

in the event of killing an illusory being, there is no demerit (for the actor).

Reply : But when one is equipped with illusory consciousness (i.e., seeing
nonexistent beings as real), demerit and merit arise as fruits of one’s
actions.
Objection: [12] Because spells and so forth do not have the ability (to
produce minds), the illusion of consciousness itself cannot arise.
Reply: Since illusions in fact arise from different conditions, the kinds of
illusions are also varied. [13] Nowhere is there the power to produce
anything whatsoever from one condition.
Objection: If one attains nirvana by means of ultimate truth, then one
proceeds in the cycle of rebirths by conventional truth. [14] In that case,
even the Buddha would proceed in the cycle of rebirths (since he utilized
conventional truths). What then the use of practices leading to
enlightenment?
Reply: If there is no interruption of the continuity of conditions, then even
illusion is not interrupted. [15] But from the cutting off of conditions, there
is no arising even according to conventional truths.
Question: Since false perceptions do not even exist, by whom is illusion
apprehended?
Reply: [16] If for you Yogacharas even illusions do not exist, then what is
there to apprehend?
Objection: It is merely the appearance of the mind (i.e., nothing external), if
it is anything at all from the point of view of what is real.
Reply: [17] If illusions are only mind, what is seen by what? The Buddha
himself proclaimed that the mind does not see the mind. [18] Just as the
blade of a sword cannot cut itself, so too the mind cannot see itself. If you
think thus “It is like a lamp illuminating itself,” we respond that [19] the
lamp is not illuminated since it is not concealed by darkness.
Objection: (An illusion in the mind) is not like the blueness of a clear
crystal that depends on another object for its blueness. [20] This shows that
some (perceptions) are seen to be dependent on otherthings and some are
not dependent.
Reply: Nothing that previously was not blue can make itself blue (and so
your example does not help to understand how consciousness can have an
illusion). [21] Indeed, what blue can make itself blue by itself? It cannot
make itself blue in the absence of blueness already. (Alternative verse: [21]
When one knows “The lamp shines,” it is told by one who knows it. When
one knows “The mind shines,” by whom, knowing that is so, is it told?)
[22] Whether the mind shines or not is not known since the mind is not seen
by anyone. It would be as pointless to discuss as the beauty of the daughter
of a barren woman.
Objection: [23] If there is no self-knowledge, how is a cognition
remembered?
Reply: There is memory from the association with other experiences, like a
rat-poison (whose effects are known by observing effects on other animals
but not by one’s own introspection).
Objection: [24] It reveals itself from seeing other connected conditions (i.e.,
by yogic powers one can see into other minds).
Reply: By the application of magical ointment, a jar is seen, but the
ointment itself cannot be seen (or, the ointment itself does not become the
jar). [25] Thus, seeing, hearing, and knowing are indeed not denied here.
But from the point of view of reality, conceptualizations, which are the
cause of suffering, are denied here.
Objection: [26] Illusions are not different from the mind, even though they
cannot be said to be identical.
Reply: How could a thing be neither “not different” from the mind nor
“identical”? There could be no such thing (since anything real real must be
one or the other). [27] Just as an illusion may be seen, even though it is
unreal, so too the mind that (conventionally) is the seer is unreal.
Objection: The cycle of rebirths must have a material basis. Otherwise, it
would be like space.
Reply: [28] But how could the absence of an entity be endowed to function
by recourse to a material basis? (That is, how can what is unreal become the
basis of anything else?) Indeed, the mind, which according to you has only
nonexistent companions, would be alone. [29] If consciousness is freed
from what can be perceived, then everyone is an enlightened buddha. And
in that case, what advantage is achieved when just “nothing but mind” is
supposed?
Objection: [30] How are mental afflictions stopped even when we recognize
that everything is like an illusion?
Reply: Even lust for an illusory woman arises in the man who created the
illusion. [31] When the habits arising from mentalafflictions toward the
illusory woman have not abated for the creator who knows she is an
illusion, at the moment of seeing her his aptitude for “emptiness” is then
weak. [32] From the presence of an aptitude toward emptiness, the aptitude
to see entities as real abates. And from repeatedly thinking “There is
nothing whatsoever,” even this is given up later (when one is no longer
thinking in terms of real, distinct entities).
Objection: [33] If an entity is not apprehended for which the claim “It does
not exist” is appropriate, then how could its absence, which is unsupported
(by anything), stand before the mind?
Reply: [34] When neither an entity nor its absence stands before the mind,
then because there are no other possible states, the mind, having no support
(in anything real or unreal), becomes tranquil.
[35] Just as a wish-granting jewel or a wishing-tree fulfills wishes, so the
image of the Buddha is seen by the disciple because of the Buddha’s vow to
help others. [36] After a herbalist who made a pillar with healing power has
long since died, the pillar protects one who consumes poison. [37] So also
the Buddha’s “pillar” continues to accomplish all to be done for those who
adhere to the bodhisattva’s path, even though the Bodhisattva has been
released (from rebirths).

Abhidharmists on Liberation and Emptiness

Hinayana objection : [38] (If there is no mind, then the Buddha has no
mind, so) how can merit accrue from offerings made to what has no mind
(since he then cannot be aware of the offerings)?

Reply : It has been taught that offerings made to one who is present or has
passed into the extinction of enlightenment are the same. [39] And it is
established on scriptural authority that there is meritorious fruit, whether
from the conventional or ultimate point of view. Otherwise, how could it
thus be taught “Offerings made to the true Buddha are fruitful”?

Objection : [40] Liberation comes from seeing truth/reality. What is the

point of seeing “emptiness”?
Reply: The reason is that the scriptures say “There is no enlightenment
without this path.”
Objection: [41] The Mahayana tradition is not established.
Reply: How is your tradition established?
Objection: Because it is established for both of us.
Reply: But in the beginning, your tradition too was not established. [42]
And the confidence (you have) in the conditions thereapply also to the
Mahayana (e.g., an unbroken line of teachers). In addition, if something
were true because it is accepted by two parties, then there would be truth in
the Vedas and so forth. [43] If you reject the Mahayana because it is a
matter of dispute, then you have to abandon your own tradition because it
contends with non-Buddhists and because your own tradition is disputed by
other Buddhist schools.
[44] The Buddhist doctrine has its root in the life of a monk, and indeed the
life of a monk is difficult. Also, the release of minds that depend on objects
is difficult. [45] If liberation is the elimination of mental afflictions, it
should occur immediately after that elimination. But the power of karmic
fruit is seen in those who are without mental afflictions. (That is, karmic
consequences of past actions still occur after enlightenment.)
Objection: [46] At first, the fruit is fixed, but those who have eliminated
mental afflictions have no cravings that lead to grasping (i.e., rebirth).
Reply: Even if there is no afflicted craving, why is there no craving
associated with delusion? [47] Craving is dependent on the condition of
sensation (or “feeling”), and it is seen that yogins have sensations. When
there is a consciousness with objects, the mind has places (for sensations to
occur and thus for craving). [48] Without emptiness, the mind is fettered
and will arise again, even after having attained a meditative state lacking
ideas. Thus, one should cultivate emptiness (through meditation).
[49] One accepts whatever is said in a scripture, if one believes it is what
was taught by the Buddha. In general, nothing accepted in your texts is
equal to the Mahayana. [50] If all is found flawed by one transgression,
(why not also the reverse:) if one thing in a text is agreeable, why isn’t
everything in it accepted as declared by the Buddha? [51] Even the great
Kashyapa and others did not plumb the profound depths of the doctrine —
who will pronounce a doctrine “unacceptable” simply because it cannot be
comprehended by you?
[52] This is the fruit of emptiness: (the bodhisattva’s) abiding in the cycle of
rebirths, even though freed from fear and clinging, for the sake of the ones
who suffer by reason of delusion. [53] So, it is not proper to object to the
wing of emptiness (the other wing being compassion). Thus, having no
doubts, emptiness is to be cultivated. [54] Indeed, emptiness is the opposite
of the darkness of the mental afflictions and of thehindrance of the
knowable (conventional entities). Why then wouldn’t one who desires
omniscience not quickly cultivate emptiness?

Views of the Self

[55] Fear arises from whatever thing arouses suffering. But emptiness is the
calming of suffering. Thus, how is fear born? [56] If the “I” (i.e., a self)
existed at all, then fear may come from any direction whatsoever. But if
there is no “I,” for whom will there be any fear? [57] I am not teeth, hair,
bone, blood, snot, phlegm, pus, or lymph. [58] I am not fat, sweat, lungs,
liver, or other inner organs, nor excrement or urine. [59] I am not flesh or
muscle, not body heat or breath. I am not the openings of the body or in any
way the six cognitions (of the mind and the five sense-faculties).

[60] If the knowledge of sound were permanent, then sound would be

grasped at all times. But without a (real) object to know, what does one
know by which one could speak of “knowledge”? [61] If notknowing
something is knowledge, it would reduce to the absurdity that even a stick
is knowledge. Thus, it is certain that in the absence of something knowable
nearby, there is no knowledge.
[62] (If consciousness is one as the Samkhyas say,) why at the time one
knows precisely a visual form doesn’t one also hear?
Samkhya objection: Because when sound is not near, there is no knowledge
of that.
Reply: [63] When something has the nature to apprehend sound, how could
it apprehend visual form (which is a different type of sense-object)?
Objection: It is like one person who can be both a father and a son.
Reply: But there is no “father” or “son” from the point of view of what is
truly real. [64] There is no “light,” “passion,” or “darkness” (the three
“qualities” that make up things according to the Samkhyas). So too, there
are no “father” or “son” (made of those nonexistent qualities).
In addition, the self-nature (of visual form) is not apprehended when sound
is apprehended.
Objection: [65] (Consciousness) remains the same — it is merely taking on
different roles (when we apprehend different objects), as with an actor. (Its
roles) are impermanent, (but its nature remains the same).
Reply: If that one thing has other natures, it is an unprecedented type of
“oneness.” [66] If a different nature is the real one, please state that true
nature. If it is the state of knowledge that is the same in all people, then all
people are one. [67] And what has intentions (i.e.,a mind) and what does
not are also one because the two are both equal in their existence. And if the
apparent differences are in fact erroneous, how could you speak of
“sameness” (i.e., only two distinct things can share one nature)? [68]
Indeed, there is no “I” (i.e., a self) without thinking, since it would lack
sentience, like a cloth and so forth do.
Nyaya objection: The self is not by nature conscious, but it possesses
consciousness.
Reply: If that were so, it reduces to the absurdity that the nonconscious self
is destroyed (once consciousness appears).
[69] If the self is unchanging, what is to be done with sentience? If the state
of the self is believed to be without the capacity to know or act (i.e, the
Samkhya “self”), then space has a self.
Objection: [70] Without one self, there is no connection of an action and its
karmic consequences. When an action is completed and then completely
perishes, of whose action will there then be fruit? (That is, the one who
experiences the fruit will then be different from the one who produced it.)
Reply: [71] It is agreed by both of us that the action and the fruit have
separate supports (i.e., they do not occur to the same physical thing). In this
case, isn’t it a pointless discussion to claim “The self is inactive”? [72] It is
never seen that what possesses the cause possesses the fruit. Because there
is a oneness to the stream of consciousness, it is taught that the actor is the
enjoyer (of the fruit of the action).
[73] The past mind and the future mind is not the self since that self is in
not present now. Thus, the present mind is the self, and when it has ceased
the self too no longer exists. [74] Just as nothing is found when the (hollow)
trunk of a banana tree is split open, so too the self is found to be unreal
when sought through analysis.
Objection: [75] If there are no sentient beings, for whom can there be
compassion?
Reply: For the sake of the fruit (i.e., enlightenment), it is imagined by a
convention of delusion that there are “sentient beings.”
Objection: [76] If there are no sentient beings, who gains the fruit of
enlightenment?
Reply: Since that is true (i.e., there are no real sentient beings), the effort (to
attain enlightenment) is from a deluded idea. But for the sake of ending
suffering, the delusion of the fruit of “enlightenment” is not removed. [77]
However, the delusion of a sense of “I,” which is the cause of suffering,
only increases from the delusion that there is a self. And if that is the
unavoidable result, then the contemplation of selflessness is best.
[78] The body is not the feet, the calves, the thighs, or the hips. Nor is it the
belly, the back, the chest, or the arms. [79] It is not the hands, the sides, the
armpits, or the area of the shoulders. The bodyis not the neck or the head. In
which of these many parts is the body? [80] If the body abides in all the
parts, it is not present in one single spot. The parts do abide in the parts (and
if the body had parts, it could reside in each part) — so where does the
(partless) body itself reside? [81] If the entire body is present in each part,
then the body abides in the hands, and so forth. Then there would be
precisely as many bodies as there are hands and other parts. [82] If the body
is neither inside nor outside the parts, how could the body be in the parts?
And since the body is not separate from the body parts, how then could a
separate body be found? [83] Thus, there is no body. (That is, there is no
separate, real entity called “a body” in addition to the parts.) But from
delusion there is still the idea of a “body” in the hands and so forth. It is like
imagining a person in a post because of the shape. [84] As long as there is a
completeness of conditions, so long is the body seen as a person. In the
same way, as long as there is a completeness of conditions in the hands and
so forth, so long is a body seen here.
[85] In the same way (as the body is not a real entity), how can there be a
(real) foot from the assemblage of toes? (The toes in turn are not real)
because they are an assemblage of joints, which also (are not real) because
of their division into their parts. [86] The parts can be divided minutely into
particles. The particles too can be divided according to the six directions
(the four compass directions and up and down). The six directions are
empty space. Thus, there are no (real) particles. [87] In this way, form being
like a dream, who could be excited about the body after this analysis? And
when likewise there is no body, then what is a man and what is a woman?

Feelings

[88] If suffering is real, why does it not assail joyous people? (If suffering is
real, it would be permanent and so always present.) If pleasure is pure, why
doesn’t it shine for one fallen into distress?

Objection : [89] When pleasure is not perceived, it is because it is overcome

by something stronger.
Reply: How can there be a feeling that is yours when, by its nature, it is not
experienced by you?
Objection: [90] (There is a feeling because) even when the gross form of
suffering has been removed, suffering in a subtle state remains.
Reply: If the other state is one of satisfaction, still it is only a subtle state of
satisfaction. [91] If suffering does not arise when conditions do not permit
it, then to consider the result to be a “feeling” is nothing but a mental
construction (i.e., imaginary and not real). [92] Thus, the analysis that is the
antidote of that (feeling) is to be cultivated. Indeed, yogins have the food of
meditation that is produced from the field of the imaginary.
[93] If there is a space between the senses and objects, how could there be a
meeting of those two? If there is no distance between senses and objects,
there is a oneness of the two, and so what would meet with what? [94]
There is no penetration of one particle by others becauseeach is the same —
being free of space (i.e., there is no space “inside” to penetrate). In the
absence of penetration, there is no mingling. If there is no mingling, there is
no contact. [95] And how is it reasonable to speak of the meeting of what is
without parts? (That is, there is no meeting of the “sides” of partless
particles.) And if what is without parts is seen in combination, please show
it to us. [96] In addition, it certainly is invalid that a meeting is possible for
the formless cognition (since the immaterial has no parts to meet). Nor can
it be part of an assemblage since an assemblage is unreal, as seen by the
pervious analysis.
[97] Accordingly, when there is no contact, how can feeling (i.e., a
sensesensation) arise? What is the purpose of vexing yourself over this?
From what, and to whom, could harm occur? [98] Since there is no (real)
person who “feels” and no “feeling,” why when you realize this, oh
Craving, do you not split asunder? [99] Seeing or touching by the “self” is
seen to be like a dream or illusion. Feeling is not seen by thought because it
arises simultaneously with it. [100] Feelings born earlier are remembered
by one born later. They can be remembered, but they cannot be
experienced. So too, one does not experience one’s “own self,” nor is it
experienced by another. [101] And there is no one who feels since, from the
point of view of reality, there is no “feeling.” Since this totality is without a
“self,” who is there to be troubled by “feeling”?

Knowledge

[102] The mind does not dwell in the sense-faculties, nor in visual form and
the other sense-objects, nor in between. Nor can the mind be grasped inside
or outside the body or elsewhere. [103] What is not in the body or mingling
or separate anywhere — that is nothing whatsoever. Thus, sentient beings
by their nature are (already) completely liberated.

[104] If knowledge precedes the existence of a known object, on what does

its occurrence depend? If knowledge arises along with the object that is
known, what is the origin of its objective support? [105] However, if
knowledge arises after the known object, then from what does the
knowledge arise? Thus, the arising of any basic phenomenon of the
experienced world cannot be ascertained.

Objection : [106] If in this way there can be nothing conventional, how can
there be “two truths”? If it is by means of another conventional truth that
we attained liberation, how may a sentient being become liberated?

Reply : [107] The “one who is liberated” is something imagined in another’s

thought. But it is not a conventional truth of one who is liberated. If
thoughts occur later in the liberated state, then they are still conventional
truths. But since the thought “one who is liberated” (i.e., a real person) is
not imagined, it does not exist as a conventional truth for him.

[108] “Conceptualization” and “what is conceptualized” are mutually

dependent. Thus, all analysis is said to be based on what is conventionally
accepted.

Objection : [109] If what has been analyzed must be analyzed by further

analysis, then that analysis would also have to be analyzed. Thus, there
would never be an end (to the regress of analyses).

Reply : [110] If an object of analysis has been fully analyzed, the analysis
finds no (real) object as its basis. Because there is no basis, analysis does
not arise, and this is called “nirvana.” [111] However, one for whom both
the analysis and its basis are real is in a very difficult position. But if an
object of knowledge is established based on knowledge, what will establish
the knowledge? [112] On the other hand, if knowledge is established by an
object of knowledge, how could the existence of the object be established?
If the two mutually establish each other, then neither of them can be truly
existing (since they are then both dependent). [113] If there cannot be a
“father” without a “son,” how can there be a son? If there is no “son,” then
there is no “father.” So too, neither the object of knowledge nor knowledge
truly exists.

Causation

Objection : [114] A sprout arises from a seed. The seed is indicated by the
existence of that sprout. So too, why is the existence of the object of
knowledge not indicated by the knowledge that results from it?

Reply : [115] It is an act of knowledge that is different from (seeing) the

sprout that tells of the existence of the seed. (It is inferred, not directly
perceived, as with seeing the sprout.) But what will indicate the existence of
the knowledge that arises from an object of knowledge? [116] The worldly
people observe directly that all phenomena have a cause. For example, the
variety of lotus parts — its stem and so forth — arise from a variety of
causes.

Objection : [117] What causes the variety of causes?

Reply: It results from a variety of previous causes.
Objection: How is a particular cause able to produce a particular result?
Reply: By the force of the preceding causes.
Objection: [118] The creator god Ishvara is the cause of the world. Reply:
Then please explain who Ishvara is. If the answer is “He is the

great elements (earth, water, fire, air, space, and consciousness),” then why
is there such a fuss over a mere name? [119] In addition, earth and the other
elements are multiple, impermanent, without activity, not divine (i.e., not of
the nature of a deva), trampled under foot, and impure — thus, they are not
Ishvara. [120] Space also cannot be Ishvara because it is without activity.
Nor is it the self since that (self) has been already refuted. And if he is
beyond conception, what can be said of his inconceivable creativity?

[121] And what does he seek to create? A “self” and the elements? But are
they not, like a creator, eternal (and thus cannot be created)? And
knowledge (or consciousness) arises from the object of knowledge (and not
from a creator). [122] Suffering and happiness result from karmic action —
so what has he created? And if the cause has no beginning, how can there
be any effect? (That is, the creator would never become active and so no
effect occurs.)

[123] Since he does not depend on any causes or conditions, why doesn’t he
create continuously? There is nothing whatsoever that he has not made —
so what could he depend on? [124] If he does depend on other things, then
it is those things that are the cause, not he. When the relevant conditions are
present, he is compelled to act, and when they are absent, he cannot act.
[125] If he acts even though he has no desire to act, then he is dependent.
And even if he created out of a desire, then he is likewise dependent on his
desire. What then becomes of the quality of being “the Lord”?
[126] Those who claim that this world is created out of partless particles
that are eternal (i.e., the Vaisheshikas) have already been refuted. The
Samkhyas hold that primal matter is the permanent cause of the world.
[127] According to them, the three qualities of “light,” “passion,” and
“darkness” in equilibrium are “primal matter.” The universe exists when
they are not in equilibrium. [128] But it is not possible that what is one has
a three-fold nature. Thus, there is no one “primal matter.” So too, the three
qualities do not exist since they too are said to have three aspects each.
[129] And in the absence of the three qualities, then for you thingssuch as
sound are not possible. In addition, it is impossible for things without
consciousness, such as cloth, to have feelings such as pleasure.

Objection : [130] It is the nature of entities to cause such feelings. Reply:

But truly existent “entities” have already be refuted by analysis. In addition,
for you the cause of such things as cloth is (the three qualities of) pleasure
and so forth. Moreover, pleasure and so forth do not exist because primal
matter does not exist. [131] (Conventionally,) pleasure and so forth arise
from things such as cloth, (but upon analysis) such things do not exist, and
so pleasure likewise does not truly exist. In addition, no permanence of
pleasure and so forth is ever seen. [132] If feelings such as pleasure are
truly real, (they are permanent and so) why aren’t they constantly
perceived?
Samkhya objection: (When suffering is present,) pleasure becomes subtle.
(It is the states of coarseness and subtlety that are impermanent.)
Reply: How can something be both subtle and coarse? [133] Since it
becomes subtle upon ceasing to be coarse, this (alternation of) subtle and
coarse is impermanent. Why then do you not accept this impermanence of
all other things? [134] If the coarse manifestation of pleasure is not different
from the feeling of pleasure, then clearly pleasure is impermanent. If you
accept that “Something that does not exist cannot come into existence, since
it does not exist,” then [135] you must accept, however reluctantly, the
arising of something manifest that does not exist (i.e., the appearance of a
previously nonmanifest effect from a cause). If you accept that the effect
exists unmanifested in the cause, then one who is eating food is eating
excrement. [136] So too, having bought cotton seeds with the money that
you would spend on finished clothing, you should clothe yourself with the
seeds.
Objection: Due to delusion, ordinary people do not see (the clothes in the
cotton seeds).
Reply: But one who knows reality as it truly is is also in the same position
(of not seeing the clothes in the cotton seeds). [137] (And if the effect is in
the cause,) then this knowledge must be present in ordinary people. Why do
they not see (the clothes in the seeds)? And if you claim that the knowledge
of ordinary people is not a valid means to knowledge, then even the direct
perception of something manifest is untrue.

Emptiness

Objection : [138] If any valid means of knowledge is not in fact a valid

means of knowledge, then knowledge is false. Even emptiness is not reality
as it truly is, and meditation does not lead (to such knowledge).

Reply : [139] If there is no apprehending something falsely imagined as

real, then there is no grasping of its nonexistence (since nothing is grasped
to begin with). For if no entity is real, the negation of them indeed is also
not real (since there is nothing to negate). [140] Thus, when one’s child dies
in a dream, imagining “He does not exist” overwhelms imagining “He
exists,” but both imaginings are equally false (since there is no real being).

[141] Thus, by means of this analysis, there is nothing without a cause, and
nothing exists in its causes taken individuallyor collectively. [142] Nor has
anything come from another, nor does it persist or cease. What then is the
difference between an illusion and what is takenby the naive out of
confusion to be real? [143] Whatever is created by a magician or by causes
should be examined: where do they come from? and where do they go
(when they cease)? [144] What is seen only as the result of a cause and is
not seen without that cause is like a reflection — how can such an artifice
be real? [145] What would be the purpose of a cause for something that
truly exists? And what need is there for a cause if something doesnot exist
at all? [146] Even by a hundred million causes, an entity that does not truly
exist cannot be transmuted (into a real entity). For how could an entity in
the state of nonexistence be changed into a real entity? And what else is
there that could become an entity? [147] If an entity is not real at the time it
is nonexistent, how could it become a real entity? For unless the absence of
an entity is itself a real entity, (nonexistence) cannot disappear. [148] And
unless the absence of an entity cannot be removed from the state of
nonexistence, an entity cannot arise. But a real entity cannot also become
the “absence of an entity,” since one thing cannot have a dual self-nature.
[149] Thus, there is no existence or cessation of a real entity. All things in
the world are unarisen and without cessation. [150] All beings are like a
dream. When analyzed, they are like the (hollow) trunk of a banana tree.
There is no difference in substance between those who have attained
nirvana and those who have not (since both are empty of self-existence).

[151] Thus, when all the basic phenomena of the experienced world are
empty in this way, what is there to gain and what is there to lose? Who can
be honored or insulted by whom and how? [152] From what do pleasure
and suffering result? What is pleasing or repulsive? In this quest for the true
nature of things, what can be craved, and who can crave? [153] When
analyzed, who is there who lives or dies? Who will arise, and who has
ceased? Who is a relative, and who is whose friend?

[154] May the naive, who get angry in quarrels and elated in celebrations,
accept that everything is like (empty) space. [155]Seeking happiness
through demeritorious actions, they lead miserable lives — they grieve,
strive, dispute with each other, and despair; slashing and stabbing,they
injure each other. [156] Attaining auspicious rebirths (as gods and human
beings) again and again and enjoying their pleasures again and again,they
die and fall into the hells to suffer unbearable torments for exceedingly long
periods (when their merit is exhausted). [157] There are many abysses inthe
world, and reality as it truly is is not found there. There is a mutual
contradiction (between the ordinary view of the world and ultimate truth, or
alternatively between different views), and there is no (attaining) reality as
it truly is.

[158] In the world, there are shoreless oceans of unbearable suffering

exceeding all accounts. Here one’s strength diminishes, and life is short.
[159] Here all activities are for life and health, concerned with hunger,
fatigue, exhaustion, sleep, misfortunes, and the fruitless association with the
naive. [160] Thus, this life passes quickly and pointlessly. The discernment
of reality is hard to come by. In such circumstances, where are the means to
prevent our habitual distractions? [161] Here too, Mara (the Lord of Death
who tempts with prospects of pleasure) works hard to cast us into realms of
misfortune.

Here too, there are a proliferation of wrong paths, and in such

circumstances it is hard to resolve our doubts (about the correct path). [162]
The opportune time (to begin the quest for enlightenment) is also hard to
find, as is finding the presence of an enlightened buddha. Hard too is
avoiding the torrent of mental afflictions. Alas! What a continuous flow of
suffering! [163] Indeed, how grievous are those adrift in the flood of
suffering who, even though they experience great misery, are unaware of
their own plight! [164] They are like those (ascetics) who repeatedly pour
water on themselves and re-enter a fire and yet, while suffering greatly,
think this is pleasurable. [165] So too, those who live as if there were no
aging or death are the first taken by the Lord of Death and then have to
suffer great miseries (in the hells).

[166] When shall I be able to relieve those tormented by the fires of

suffering with the rain of my accumulated happiness arising from the clouds
of my merit? [167] After sufficiently accumulating merit by perceiving
conventional truth, when shall I respectfully teach (the ultimate truth of)
emptiness to those brought to ruin by the view of perceiving self-existence?

***
The Introductory Verses from The Collection of the
Teachings (Shiksha-samucchaya-karikas)
Introduction

[1] Since fear and suffering are not dear to either myself or others, what
distinguishes myself that I should protect myself and not others?
[2] With the desire to end one’s suffering and the wish to climb to the peak
of happiness, and having firmly planted the root of faith, the mind should be
fixed on enlightenment.
[3] From the Mahayana come the vows of the bodhisattva. From these, one
should learn the essential points by which one becomes free of misfortune.
[4] For the sake of all beings, one should dedicate oneself, one’s objects of
enjoyment, and one’s merit from the past, present, and future. Cultivate,
purify, and protect each of these.

Protection

[5] Oneself, one’s objects of enjoyment, and one’s merit are given for the
enjoyment of all beings. If beings are unprotected, how can these things be
enjoyed? What gift is actually given if it cannot be enjoyed? [6] Thus,
oneself, one’s objects of enjoyment, and one’s merit should be protected for
the enjoyment of all beings by not abandoning a spiritual friend (who
guides you on the path) and by constantly studying the religious texts.

[7] How should oneself be protected? By abandoning what is without value

(for attaining the goal of enlightenment). How is this achieved? By
avoiding any fruitless activity. [8] This is accomplished by constant
meditative mindfulness. Mindfulness arises through intense devotion (to the
goal). Such devotion arises from ascetic practice and from knowing great
inner tranquility. [9] “One whose mind is focused knows reality as it truly
is,” said

162
~Shantideva: The Collectionof Verses ~ 163 the Buddha. By turning away
from actions, the mind does not move from tranquility.

[10] One who is steadfast in all things wins over worthy people by speaking
sweetly and gently and will be acceptable to all. [11] But those worldly
people who dislike the sons of the Buddha and reject them burn in the hells
like a (smoldering) fire covered with ash.

[12] In the Cloud of Jewels Sutra, the Buddha summarized the bodhisattva’s
forbearance: “With diligence, one should avoid anything that causes beings’
impurity (or ‘their lack of tranquility’).”

[13] By clothes, medicine, and so forth, one protects oneself. But indulging
in the enjoyments of one’s desires leads toan afflicted error.
[14] The protection of the objects of enjoyment is not difficult for one who
observes this precept: “In all matters, begin meritorious acts and know their
limits.”
[15] Merit is protected by detachment from the fruits of one’s own affairs
(i.e., actions). One should not regret (what one has not done), or, having
done something, not boast. [16] Beware of gain and honors. Always shun
arrogance. A bodhisattva should be pure, and let all doubt about the
Buddhist doctrine be laid aside.

Purification

[17] The enjoyment of one who is purified will become proper for beings,
like well-cooked clean rice.
[18] Just as a grain choked by weeds becomes diseased and does not
flourish, so too a son of the Buddha who is choked with mental afflictions
does not advance.
[19] What is “purifying oneself”? It is purging all mental afflictions and
demeritorious actions by following the meaning of the words of the
fullyenlightened Buddha. When this can be done without effort, there is no
longer any bad rebirths.
[20] Have patience. Seek to hear the teaching (of the Buddha). And then
take refuge in a forest abode. There be intent on focusing your mind.
Meditate on what is impure and so forth.
[21] The purification of karmic merit is from purifying “right livelihood,”
from understanding the purification of the objects of enjoyment, and from
actions whose womb is compassion and emptiness (the twin “wings” of a
bodhisattva).

164 ~ Indian Madhyamaka Buddhist Philosophy After Nagarjuna~

Meditative Cultivation

[22] Those who may receive (from a bodhisattva) are many, and this (i.e.,
what a bodhisattva has to offer) is little. What can be done about that? It
does not give rise to satisfaction. Thus, cultivate (the perfections to increase
what can be given).

[23] What is cultivation of oneself? It is the cultivation of strength and

energy. The cultivation of the objects of enjoyment is from the giving that
arises from the womb of compassion and emptiness.

[24] With effort, first make the firm resolve (to become a fullyenlightened
buddha to help others). Then, making compassion primary, cultivate the
auspicious (i.e., what produces merit). [25] Always devoutly keep the
course of the bodhisattva, praising (the buddhas)and so forth. Always
practice faith and so forth, and cherish the loving-kindness of the buddhas
and so forth.

[26] In sum, the cause of the increase in merit is the “mind of awakening
(i.e., the aspiration to become a fully-enlightenedbuddha),” the detached
gift of the Buddhist doctrine, and benefitting all beings in all circumstances.

[27] The attainment of the “right efforts” is fromstriving to maintain

vigilance, and the attainment of mindfulness is through full awareness and
deep thought.

***
Two Early Madhyamaka Critiques of the
Existence of God
The Vedic gods were initially a pantheon of diverse sources and forces
behind what we observe. But a form of theism (henotheism) also arose in
India early on: the various gods were seen merely as different
manifestations of one supreme god who was personal in nature. The most
prominent theistic group among the Hindus in the early period was
probably the Bhagavatins, who worshiped Vishnu in his incarnation as
Krishna. The Bhagavad-gita was also composed in this period. The
philosophical Hindu Nyaya-Vaisheshika school, which is a favorite target of
Nagarjuna’s, also defended theism. Madhyamikas were not the only
Buddhists in India to take issue with the idea of any cosmic creator of all
that exists. (Buddhists do accept the existence of “gods [devas]” — divine,
long-enduring but mortal beings residing invarious heavens — but none is
the creator of all that exists.) Yogacharins also composed critiques of none
is the creator of all that exists.) Yogacharins also composed critiques of 100;
also see his pp. 85-86 note 4 for earlier Buddhist criticisms.)

Presented here are two early Madhyamaka critiques ofthe possibility of any
creator god. The first text — The Refutation of (Ishvara and) Vishnu as the
One Creator— is attributed to Nagarjuna himself, and it may be written by
him. It is directed to a general audience and is not as sophisticated as his
texts intended for monks and nuns. If it is not composed by him, it probably
is by one of his early followers. (The colophon to the text says it is
composed by Nagarjuna and written down by one of his students.) It is
definitely written before the refinements in Buddhist logic initiated by
Dignaga in the early 6thcentury. (The salutation to Vajrasattva in the text’s
present version may have been added later by Buddhist Tantrikas.) It is not
composed in four-line verses, which suggests it was not to be memorized by
disciples. Verse numbers have been added here for reference. (The Sanskrit
is in Stcherbatsky 1969, as modified in Chemparathy 1968/1969.)

The second text consists of two brief passages from Bhavaviveka’s Verses
on the Heart of the Middle Way (Madhyamaka-hridaya-karikas) not
included in Volume 1. (The Sanskrit is in Lindtner 2001a and 2001b.)
The Refutation of Vishnu as the One Creator
(Vishnor-eka-kartritva-nirakaranam) by Nagarjuna
(?)
Opponent : [1] Indeed, the lord Ishvara is the creator. Let him be critically
examined. [2] He who creates is a creator. He who performs an action is
designated “a creator.”

Reply : [3] In this regard, we answer as follows. Does he create something

that exists or something that does not exist? [4] On the one hand, he cannot
create what already exists, just as when a person exists there is no creation a
second time by a creator who would effect the creation since the individual
already exists. [5] On the other hand, if you then say that he creates what is
not already existing, we reply that oil created from sand does not exist, the
hairs of a turtle do not exist — let Ishvara create those. [6] But he does not
have the power to create these things. Why? Becausethey have the nature of
not existing. The lord too has that nature.

[7] Now it may be claimed that Ishvara creates whatis now both existing
and nonexisting. But this is impossible because of a mutual contradiction:
what is existent is in this way existent, and whatis nonexistent is in this way
nonexistent. [8] Thus, between these two there is an inevitable
contradiction, just as there is between light and dark and between life and
death. [9] For where there is light, there is no darkness; and where there is
darkness, there is no light (i.e., the two cannot exist together at the same
time). [10] So too, one who is alive is indeed alive (and not dead), and one
who is dead is indeed dead (and not alive). [11] In the same way, there can
be no oneness of the existent and nonexistent, and so Ishvara cannot be a
creator (of such a compound) at all.

[12] In addition, there is another objection: does Ishvara create other beings
after he himself has arisen or without having arisen? [13] On the one
~ Early Madhyamaka Critiques of the Existence of God~ 167
hand, he cannot create other beings if he has not himself yet arisen. Why?
Because he himself has a nature that is not arisen. [14] Like the son of a
barren woman who, being unborn, cannot perform any action such as
digging the earth, so is the case also with Ishvara (i.e., what does not exist
cannot do anything including create anything).

[15] On the other hand, if Ishvara creates other beings after he has arisen,
(then he exists but) from what is he born? Did he arise from himself, from
another, or from both? [16] With regard to the first of these options: he
cannot have arisen from himself since such action toward oneself is a
contradiction. [17] For the blade of sword, no matter how sharp it is, cannot
cut itself. Nor can a dancer, no matter how well trained he is, climb onto his
own shoulders and dance. [18] How can the same person be both the
produced and the producer? That a person is himself his own father and
himself his own son — such a saying is not known in the world.

[19] Or assume that Ishvara arises from another being. [20] Even this
cannot be the answer since in the absence of Ishvara (as the creator) there
would be the nonexistence of anything else. [21] Norcan we assume that he
arose (from other things) in succession. If he arose from another in this
fashion, an infinite regress would result since thecreator by its nature has no
beginning. [22] Where there is the nonexistence of an origin, this
nonexistence refutes any end (i.e., refutes any further production). [23]
When there is no seed, any sprout, trunk, branches, leaves, fruits, and so
forth are nonexistent. Why? Because of the absence of the seed.

[24] Nor can Ishvara arise from both (himself and other beings) since that
would suffer from both of the defects (discussed above).
[25] Thus, a creator (of the world) is shown not to exist.

***
Notes
Title . “Nirakarana” means “refutation,” or more literally, “expelling” or
“driving away” or “repudiating.” (Sometimes “The Refutation of Ishvara as
the Creator” is added at the beginning of the text.) Referring to Vishnu as
“one (eka) creator” means that he is allegedly the “one and only creator,”
not “one creator” among many.

Verse 1. The name “Ishvara” is used as the lord, not Vishnu or Shiva. It is a
more generic name. (See also Chandrakirti’s MA 6.84-86; Pr 1.26, 1.40.)

Verse 1 . Note that the author begins by asking whether what is created is
real or not, not whether the creator is, as we would in the West. The
question in the West is how a timeless god could create what is temporal or
intervene in the temporal realm. (See, e.g., Helm 2011.) Some Christian
theologians deny the classical claim that God is timeless or claim
paradoxically that he is both timeless and temporal or leave the question as
a mystery.

Verse 2 . Note that the opponent’s claim is that anyone who performs any
action (kriyam karoti) is designated “a creator.” This is not limited to the
creation of the world. The Madhyamika also responds to the notion of
“creation” in terms more broad than an initial creation of the world alone.

Verse 3 . “Siddha/asiddha” has been modernized here as “exists/does not

exist.” More literally, it is something “established.” That is, something
shown or proven to exist or to not exist. “Asiddha” thus is stronger here
than merely saying that “a claim may be true but cannot be established.”
Rather, the opposite of one claim is established. Thus, in verse25 the author
is saying that the nonexistence of a creator god is established — not merely
that such a god might exist but his existence is not established by the
opponent.

Verse 5 . If the creator in fact had the power to create, he could create oil
from sand or hairs on a turtle miraculously, but weonly see causal order.
Verses 7-11, 15. Here the author covers only the first three of the famous
“four options” — omitting something that is “neither existent nor
nonexistent.” (See Jones 2010: 155-57.) Nagarjuna often does this (MK 1.7,
2.24-25, 5.6, 8.9-11, 21.13, 23.20; R 37; SS 4, 44; VP 4, 51, 56, 73), as does
Chandrakirti (Pr 39).
Verses 16-18. Creation is an action, and the action (kriya) that is
contradictory is arising from oneself (svatmani kriya), not all actions.
Nothing can be its own origin or create itself, i.e., be “self-creating.” This
leads to a basic problem for claiming anything can be the source of
everything including itself: where did that thing, whatever it is, come from?
(Jones 2009: 130-47.)
Verse 21. If Ishvara needed another god to create him, then that god either
now stands in the original place of Ishvara as uncreated (as with the prior
alternative), or that god too would need another creator and so on and so on
since there is no beginning to the eternal universe. That is, either way there
is no origin to the universe, not an origin in an infinite past.
Verses 22-23. “Abhava” means “absence of an entity” or “nonexistence.”
(See Jones 2010: 167-68.) The “nonexistence of an origin” means the
absence of any “real” (self-existent) thing that is an origin or beginning: if
there is nothing real begins, then nothing real follows.
Verses on the Heart of the Middle Way
(Madhyamaka-hridaya-karikas) by Bhavaviveka
From Chapter 3

[215] The creator god Ishvara does not create the world from any motive of
pleasure whatsoever. Even for those bereft of knowledge, the lord Ishvara is
not the creator of pleasure. (Rather, our actions are the cause of all our
feelings.) [216] The creation of everything is not by a lord or without a
cause (i.e., random chance) or without an origin. The creation of everything
is like an undesired flower in appearance. [217] The lord isnot a prior cause
of this world in its entirety. The prior cause of the world is not Krishna nor
consciousness. [218] Nor is the lord the subtle cause of the development of
everything. Nor is the sole cause in any way only Shiva. [219] Yet because
of the multitude (of what can be sensed), the senses ofthe lord make him
like a slave. Thus, the one eternal lord is not established (as the creator). In
fact, it may be the opposite of that. [220] A creator isindeed beloved for all
that is produced, the effort, and so forth (and yet Ishvara did not create
anything). And a distinction without an observable difference proves only
what has already been proven. [221] In addition, a proof does not follow
when the distinctiveness is being eternal, one, subtle, and so forth. Nor is
the fault cured by being embodied into an impermanent (noneternal) form.

[222] Karmic action is the “lord,” the cause of the diversity in the
incalculable worlds that are the receptacles of beings. If so, the existence of
the lord is established conventionally (but only conventionally). [223]
Because of this, time, the self, unevolved matter, the first human being, or
Vishnu is not the cause of this world. Indeed, the claim of a creator is
defeated.

. . . [247] From the point of view of ultimate truth, nothing (real) exists by
reason of itself or another. Nor does anything (real) arise in any manner
from itself, from something else, or from both, [248] nor from Vishnu,
Shiva,
169

the self, unevolved matter, or anything else. [249] All ideas of

dependentarising also are not real. Such ideas are based on the oneness and
diversity, and the defilement and purity of actions. [250] Just as the pain
from a whipping, a multicolored painting, or a sprout do not spring up in
the sky, so all such constructs do not exist (i.e., are not real from the point
of view of what in the final analysis is true).

From Chapter 9

[89] Each of the gods claim separately that he alone is the cause of the
creation of the world. So whose word here is true and whose is false? This
doubt is to be resolved here.

[90] If one claims there is no error because all gods are one, then how
indeed can Brahma be the killer of Brahma (rather than of other gods)? But
if one denies oneness, then such oneness of all thegods cannot be asserted.
[91a] Even if we accept that there is no real (self-existent) differences, how
can the lord be three — Brahma, Vishnu (Krishna), and Shiva?

[91b] And because the gods do not know the cause of suffering, how can
they instruct us on how to gain relief from it? [92] Since the teachings of
the Vedas, the Yoga school, and so forth are deficient in discussing
suffering, they cannot be considered to have the power to protect the
Buddhist teaching. [93] In addition, since their own understanding is
deficient, they are incapable of leading others to peace (i.e., freedom from
suffering). It is as if the guide who has fallen into an abyss were to lead
others along the same path.

[94] One must carefully examine the mass of faultyreasoning in the three
Vedas that is constructed by faulty arguments and a net of mental
constructs. By so examining, the three Vedas are tobe rejected.

[95] I have already shown that the entire world does not have a lord or
anything else as its cause (see 3.215-23 above). Even assuming there is
such a cause, what exactly has he accomplished? [96] To begin with, it
cannot be maintained that the “self” was created by him because it cannot
be created at all (since the self is eternal). Nor can it be maintained that he
is responsible for proper conduct or misconduct for they have always been
his qualities, just as they are today (and so these qualities have existed as
long as he has). [97] In addition, the body that perceives pleasure and
suffering is produced (through our own actions) by proper conduct and
misconduct. Thus, how could the body that living beings possess have
possibly been created by the lord? [98] The body that embodied beings
possess at the beginning of a new cosmic cycle of time is made by previous
but now unseen proper conduct and misconduct. This is so because it is a
body that was the cause of the arising of pleasure and suffering, just as with
a current body.

[99] If one claims that the lordship of the lord is created by merit, then the
lord is not the lord since he depends on merit. [100] If one claims that the
lord gains his lordship without a why (i.e., for no reason), then he still has
this in common with all other beings. Thus, again the lord is not the lord.

[101] If the lord has the nature of knowledge, then the world created by him
must also have the same nature. For an effect must conform to the cause.
Thus, the whole world is of the same nature as the lord (but the world
clearly does not have the character of knowledge). [102] If the lord is the
cause of the world, then the world would have to be subtle and all the other
qualities of the lord. Thus, if the world does not possess subtlety and so
forth, then God cannot be its cause.

[103] If the lord is the maker of karma (i.e., is responsible for karmic
actions having their effects), then he himself would also have to burn in the
hells. However, if it is beings other than himselfwho have to burn in the
hells, then completed actions are lost and no effects follow. [104] In
addition, if the cause of suffering is permanent, then how can suffering be
pacified (i.e., ended permanently)? Obviously, as long as a fire is burning,
its heat is not exhausted.

[105] Moreover, if the lord is one and not diverse, how can he be the cause
of a diversity of effects? (From verse 101: an effect must have the same
nature as its cause.) Nor can the diversity possibly be the result of diverse
desires and so forth if the lord is one. [106] Assuredly, if the cause of the
world is permanent (eternal), without parts, and subtle, how can it be “one”
and “existing throughout everything (i.e., omnipresent)”?

[107] If his purpose for creating is allegedly play, then assuredly its fruit is
pleasure. But since pleasure depends only on itself, the lord is not lord
(since he is not its cause). [108-109] But instead, homage to Rudra (the
“terrible one”) whose name denotes his nature — for he delights in luckless
animals that live in fear of being eaten by other animals, in those who dwell
in the hells and are tortured by being beaten, cut, burned, and so forth, and
in human beings who are plagued by rebirth, disease, old age, fear,
suffering, and exhaustion. [110] It is perceived that it is the doing of the
lord that some wretched people are rich, that it is the condition of some
virtuous people that they must live off others, and that unvirtuous people
are reborn in heaven. [111] It is perceived that it is the doing of the lord that
some people rich in the qualities of proper conduct live short lives, that the
unvirtuous live long lives, and that the generous have little wealth. [112]
Some Buddhists indeed are happy, but why do some devotees suffer? Why
do some people partaking in merit and acting with the knowledge of the
lord not produce demerit? [113a] To those who do not understand diversity
and action (karma), it is declared that karma itself is the cause.

[113b] Thus, the claim that Brahma or Krishna is the creator of the world is
answered.
Opponent: [114] Having closed the door of the mind [to the external world],
the yogin focuses his mind on Shiva. He then meditates on the syllable
“Om” while fixing his concentration in hisheart. [115] When one has
thereby concentrated one’s mind by diligently keeping it concentrated on
the earth and so forth, one becomes free of suffering when the Lord is
clearly seen.
Reply: [116] As long as there is the arising of mental cognitions (of
objects), liberation cannot be attained. Nor can liberation be attained before
a mental cogniton arises. [117] It is not possiblefor devotees of the Lord to
become liberated by seeing Shiva, since then their mind is fixed on an
object just as when they see an image (and thus their mindis not empty of
content, as is necessary for liberation).
[118] In addition, if the Lord is the cause of suffering, then suffering could
not be eradicated because it would be permanent (because it would be real
and thus unendable since it would be created by a real entity). Thus, it is not
possible for any devotee of the Lord to attain the end of suffering by seeing
the Lord.
[119] Thus, the remaining advocates of Brahma, Vishnu, and the self are
refuted. And thus it is not acceptable to take any mental pleasure in the
Lord and so forth.

***
Notes
Verses 3.194-214 . The passage translated here is preceded by a discussion
of karma (i.e., action and its consequences). Bhavaviveka argues there that
everything in this world is determined by cause and effect, and thus the
passage here begins by asserting that there is no place for a god as the
creator of the world.

Verse 3.216. Dependent-arising is the cause of creation, not a god.

Verse 3.217 . “Karanam param” means a “prior” or “distant” or “ultimate”

cause, or simply “another” cause.
Verse 3.220. “Karta” means “distinction.” It can also mean “creator.” This
may be an attempt at humor.
Verse 3.223, 248. “Purusha” is either the self or the primal person of Rig
Veda 10.90. “Pradhana”is unevolved matter; it is usually translated as the
“primal atom.” “Para-manava” is the “most distant” or “first” man.
Verse 3.247. “Paramartha” is what is ultimately real or ultimately true, i.e.,
what from the correct metaphysical point of view is real/true. Notice that
Bhavaviveka refers to the three options here, as did the author of The
Refutation of Vishnu as the One Creator, verses 7-11 and 15.
Verse 9.91. “Ishana” is the “ruler, lord, master.” This is an old title
principally for Shiva. In verse 99, the name “Isvara” is used for the lord, as
in The Refutation of Vishnu as the One Creator.
Verse 9.91b. Bhavaviveka is asserting that the alleged lord of the universe
does not know the cause of suffering — thus, the lord is not omniscient. Nor
is he the creator of suffering: if the god were thecause of suffering, he
would know it. The gods are as trapped in the cycle of rebirth and are no
more creators than any other beings. And since the concern of suffering is
the central Buddhist concern, the god is irrelevant to the quest for
enlightenment (as continued in verses 92-94).
Verse 9.94. “Kalpanas” refers to the false constructs created by
discriminating (vikalpa) discrete entities and thus is connected to
conceptual projection (prapancha).
Verse 9.95. “Vishva” means “the entire world, all that is, everything.”
Verse 9.96. “Dharma” means “proper conduct” (i.e., following the
prescribed social roles of conduct), and “adharma” means “misconduct.”
Verse 9.97. “Kalpa”means the cosmic time-periods of the “rolling” in and
out of Brahman.
Verse 9.101a. “Jna” means “knowledge, intelligence, the capacity to know.”
Verse 9.101b. “Cetana” can mean “consciousness, sentience or thought” or
it can mean “excellent.” Here it means whatever is the nature of Ishvara.
Verse 9.106. “An-avayana” (“without parts”) more literally means to be
without members or limbs.
Verse 9.107. “Krida” is “playing, sport, amusement.” That is, the alleged
purpose of creation is nothing other than recreation, not concern for the
beings to be created or anything more serious than play. This is also alleged
in Advaita Vedanta where it is claimed that Brahman creates because that is
simply what it does, like we breathe.
Verses 9.114-17. That is, even if a creator god does exist, meditating on him
(referring to here as Shiva and the Lord) cannot bring an end to suffering.
As long as the mind is fixed on an image (e.g., Shiva or om), the mind is
fixed and cannot be liberated.
Verse 9.118. In Madhyamaka metaphysics, a product of something
selfexistent would share its nature and be real, but nothing produced is real,
and so anything produced by something self-existent cannot be in fact be
real (i.e., self-existent, eternal, and permanent).

***
II. Commentaries Chandrakirti’s Innovations
Is Chandrakirti a Reliable Guide to Nagarjuna?

The first point to note about Chandrakirti is that he was an innovator and
represents one interpretation of Nagarjuna’s thought. Since Chandrakirti so
influenced Tibetan thought and Tibetan thought today is so influential in
understanding Indian Buddhism, in the modern West Nagarjuna ends up
being understood through the lens of Chandrakirti’s thought. But
Chandrakirti significantly alters Nagarjuna’s thought on some important
points including emptiness and Madhyamaka reasoning (see, e.g., Shulman
2010.) Consider motion in MK 2: Nagarjuna presents problems in terms of
the person in motion(Jones 2010: 4-6), but Chandrakirti in his commentary
changes this to the space moved across — something that obviously does
not move at all and alters the problems Nagarjuna points out. Other
examples are noted below and in the Notes.

Douglas Berger describes Chandrakirti’s commentary as“idiosyncratic”

(2010: 40). At a minimum, it should be remembered that Chandrakirti
appeared four or five centuries after Nagarjuna and that there had been
epistemic developments in Buddhism in the interim. Overall, Chandrakirti
must be seen as one interpreter of Nagarjuna in disputes with other
interpreters, not as uncovering the obviously “true” meaning of Nagarjuna.

Chandrakirti and Bhavaviveka

A major portion of Chandrakirti’s main work, the Clearly-worded

Commentary, is a defense of Buddhapalita’s positions against the objections
raised by Bhavaviveka. However, this does not mean that he saw himself as
creating a new branch of the Madhyamaka tradition — the “Prasangikas” in
opposition to Bhava-viveka’s “Svatantrikas.” There was no schism at least
in India. (See Dreyfus & McClintock 2003 for discussions of the
philosophical and historical questions concerning the distinction.) The term
“Prasangika” was only introduced in Tibet in the eleventh century and
translated into Sanskrit from the Tibetan. Shantideva probably did not think
of himself as a

177

“Prasangika” either — he does not indicate in any way that he thought that
the Madhyamikas were divided into two branches. Nor does he quote
Chandrakirti as an authority or even mention him. Indeed, Bhavaviveka had
more influence in Indian Buddhism than Chandrakirti. Even the great
fourteenth century Tibetan Buddhist Tsong kha pa adopted much of
Bhavaviveka’s logical “modernization” of Madhyamaka Buddhism that he
had developed by importing the logical refinement of the Buddhist logician
Dignaga (fl. ca. 500 CE).

But Chandrakirti rejects Bhavaviveka’s new approach. Bhavaviveka thinks

that the only way to defeat non-Madhyamikas is to advance independent
supportive arguments (svatantrika-anumana) for emptiness providing a
reason and example, and not merely expose alleged problems with the
opponent’s beliefs (see Jones 2011: 199-203). In debates with non-
Madhyamikas to whom the self-existence of entities is imputed,
Bhavaviveka advances positive claims to make explicit what Madhyamikas
believe that opponents may accept or refute. He also adopts the form of
argument that other schools accept in order to show on their own terms that
positive arguments can be made for the ultimate truth of emptiness. One of
Dignaga’s stipulations is that only if both parties agree tothe premises can
the debate proceed (see Pr 34-35) — if a premise is admitted by only one
party, it is inherently open to doubt. Agreement also avoids any need to
analyze the presuppositions of one party’s approach.

Chandrakirti rejects Bhavaviveka’s approach because it makes the

Madhyamaka ontological claim that all “basic phenomena of the
experienced world (dharmas)” are empty of self-existence into a thesis
(pratijna) and thus a target of refutation that must be positively defended.
(But Chandrakirti, unlike Nagarjuna, does use the word proposition
[paksha][e.g., Pr 501] for Madhyamaka claims.) So too, the stipulation of
agreement is not acceptable for the reasons in the arguments when it comes
to the ultimate ontological status of things: the opponents would
misunderstand any Madhyamaka reasons as indicating self-existent entities.
In effect, using “emptiness” as a reason makes it a conventional entity.
Bhavaviveka’s approach also explicitly goes against Nagarjuna’s approach
that he advances no thesis (VV 29-30), as Bhavaviveka himself
acknowledges, even though he thinks positive arguments are entailed by
Nagarjuna’s claims and that as a commentator he can provide them.
Chandrakirti obviously argues extensively, and he does not reject inferences
and syllogisms per se — he employs both three-member and five-member
syllogisms himself to establish, for example, the existence of fire from the
existence of smoke (e.g., Pr 20, 34; see Pr 34 on MK 3.2). (Nagarjuna
employs neither.) But he argues that this form of argument should be used
only for “conventional truths” while Bhavaviveka thinks it can be used to
establish the “ultimate truth” that ontologically all phenomena are empty of
anything that would give them an independent existence — i.e., positive
arguments can be made “from the ultimate point of view” or “in ultimate
matters (parama-artha-tas).”

Chandrakirti thinks first that Bhavaviveka gives conventional entities too

much reality. Not all Buddhists and non-Buddhists accept the doctrine of
two types of truth, and thus by Bhavaviveka accepting entities
conventionally opponents may be led to claim that Madhyamikasaccept
entities as real. At a minimum, Bhavaviveka must accept the opponents’
premise in some sense for an argument to proceed, and accepting
theopponent’s premises at least gives the impression that Madhyamikas
accept conventional entities as being something real (i.e., self-existent) to
be negated. Whether Chandrakirti accepts entities even conventionally is
not always clear since according to him, as noted below, the enlightened do
not see conventional entities. For example, he denies a transcendental self
such as the Samkhya accept as even conventionally real (MA 6.122) but
seems to accept a conventional self connected to the bodily aggregates (MA
6.124). However, he treats the idea of a “conventional self” as at most a
convenient label for a stream of connected parts with the “self’s” parts
doing the causal work, while Bhavaviveka treats the “self” as an
impermanent but conventionally real entity (as does Shantideva). Thus, for
the latter, there is a “conventional self” to negate but none for the former.
Thus, according to Chandrakirti, the qualification “from the ultimate point
of view” is not needed even for negating conventional entities (Pr 26).
Second, for Chandrakirti the ontological truth of emptiness cannot be
described in any positive way or supported by reasons since claims and
reasons must be stated in conventional terms. Indeed, as discussed below,
Chandrakirti does not think any ultimate truths can be stated. So too, any
conventional valid means to knowledge (pramana) cannot establish the
truth of emptiness (although scriptural authority is a valid means of
knowledge for leading the unenlightened to nirvana [Pr 268]). Nor can there
be any agreement on premises with the Madhyamikas’ opponents because
of their acceptance of self-existent subjects and objects. Rather, for him the
only way to establish emptiness is to take the opponents’ premises and rules
of reasoning and show how they lead to contradictions as their
consequences (prasanga) and thus are not acceptable — in short, every
attempt to comprehend anything in the world that presupposes self-
existence ends up being self-contradictory. Emptiness is thereby established
by default. (On this reductio method in Nagarjuna’s thought, see Jones
2010: 157-59.) This approach also avoids the problem that negating the
premise suggests it is real — i.e., only something real can be negated. It
also circumvents the problem that if debaters do not share a common
understanding of the premises and reasons then each side means different
things by the key terms, and so they are talking past each other and thus
neither side can really be refuted.

Third, according to Chandrakirti, Madhyamikas should have no positive

thesis about emptiness but only negate the opponents’ theses in a way that
does not affirm any counterclaim (see Pr 24-25). Bhavaviveka believes that
in the reductio ad absurdum method, the negation of a proposition
implicitly affirms the opposite proposition. (On the two types of negation,
see Jones 2011: 203-205 and Harris 1991: 36-38.) (Whether Chandrakirti
ascribes questionable beliefs to his opponents or whether in general he
reasons validly to his conclusions from those premises will not be addressed
here.)

The problem here then is over the ontological nature of the entities in the
premises and reasons, not the process of inference. The basic rules of logic
are upheld (e.g., the laws of the excluded middle and non-contradiction).
Nor do Nagarjuna or Chandrakirti ever attack the reductio ad absurdum
method itself as ultimately false. Nor do they accept logical contradictions
as ever being capable of stating truths (contra Garfield & Priest 2003). If
they did accept contradictions in general as possibly true, then the reductio
method for destroying their opponents’ claims is rendered groundless since
then the mere fact that a contradiction results would not invalidate the
opponent’s position; and if they accept some contradictions as stating truths,
they would have had to explain at some point why the contradictions
brought out by the reductio method do not fall into that class, but they never
do.

Chandrakirti and Dignaga

In addition to rejecting Bhavaviveka’s approach, Chandrakirti argues in the

Clearly-worded Commentary against the epistemic foundationalism of the
logician Dignaga (Pr 59-75). (But the logicians ended up having more
influence within Indian Buddhism.) For establishing claims about the
everyday world, Dignaga advances two valid means of knowledge: direct
perception (pratyaksha) for seeing the own-characteristics (sva-lakshanas)
unique to an entity, and inference (anumana) for establishing an entity’s
general characteristics (samanya-lakshanas). Direct perception provides a
foundation for valid knowledge because it is unaffected by any
conceptualizations (kalpana-apodha) and sees the bare characteristics of
things directly without any possibility of error. Bhavaviveka follows him on
these points.

Chandrakirti accepts these two valid means of knowledge and adds two
more: scriptural authority (agama) and analogy (upamana). (That he
accepts scriptural authority as a valid means of knowledge [Pr 268-69; e.g.,
MA 6.135] should be noted since many see the Madhyamikas as relying
solely on the reductio method. Even Nagarjuna relies on scriptural authority
for support in his most important work [e.g., MK 15.7; see Pr 42-43].) But
he accepts all these means only conventionally (Pr 55-75; MA 6.25):
ultimately, like everything else, they are empty of anything giving themself-
existence and thus none are ultimately real. If nothing else, the valid means
of knowledge are interdependent with the valid objects of knowledge
(prameyas) and so are not independently real. Chandrakirti also rejected the
claim that direct perception in general is free of error: the sense-perception
of the unenlightened is still conceptualized through the idea of self-
existence and thus flawed; only the sense-perception of the enlightenedis
truly seeing the world as it really is (see MA 6.28-31). The same applies to
mental objects. This led to the charge that since direct perception is not
accepted as ultimately real that it cannot be used at all — even merely to
verify change — and thus that Madhyamikas have no empirical means to
refute their opponents’ claims to self-existence. Nagarjuna’s Overturning
the Objections attempts to refute this objection, and Chandrakirti follows
him here.

Self-Nature Versus Self-Existence

“ Svabhava” in Madhyamaka thought means “self-existence.” That is, the

power of a phenomenon to exist comes only from the phenomenon itself
and thus it exists without dependence on anything else. Only what is self-
existent is real in the final analysis. Unlike for the Abhidharmists, to
Madhyamikas the basic phenomena of the experienced world (dharmas) are
not “real” (i.e., self-existent) but are dependent upon causes and conditions.
And unlike for the Yogacharins, there is something external, not merely the
projections of the mind, and the mind is as impermanent and “unreal” as the
components of the external world. Even what is unconditioned (e.g., space)
is subject to the “four options” that show that the concepts “existent (real)”
and “nonexistent (unreal)” do not apply (see Jones 2010: 155-58).
Madhyamaka arguments attempt to show that any view that involves self-
existence leads to a world of distinct, permanent entities in which nothing
can change or interact — only if phenomena are empty of self-existence can
anything change or can causation or anything else work. So too, nothing
real ceases in nirvana, and nirvana itself is not a real (self-existent) state.
The same applies to emptiness (see the Note on MA 6.186). Basically,
Madhyamikas see their opponents trapped in a Catch-22-type dilemma:
only what is real can arise (or change or cease), but what exists by self-
existence cannot arise (or change or cease) — in short, to exist something
must arise, but what exists by self-existence cannot arise.

Chapter 15 of the Clearly-worded Commentary is about svabhava. Usually

the term is used in its technical, philosophical sense of “self-existence.”
However, Chandrakirti sometimes uses the term to mean simply
“ownnature” in the everyday sense of “the nature of something” without
any metaphysical implications. In those instances, it is translated here as
“selfnature” (see also MA 6.221). (Also see Huntington 1983 and
Westerhoff 2007: 33-34.) For example, it would make no sense to say that
heat is the selfexistence of fire (Pr 241), but heat is its self-nature — i.e.,
fire could not exist without heat. Nagarjuna rarely usessvabhava to mean
self-nature, and never says as Chandrakirti does that, for example, to argue
that heat is the “selfnature” of fire while the heat in water is contingent
upon other conditions (Pr 241). Chandrakirti says the true nature
(dharmata) of the basic phenomena of the experienced world is svabhava
(Pr 264). If “svabhava” here means “selfexistence” rather than “self-
nature,” then Chandrakirti is ultimately advocating the view of self-
existence. William Ames (1982) asserts that Chandrakirti in fact does so in
a third usage for “svabhava”: what is truly real (tattva) is “true self-
existence.” If Chandrakirti does this, he would again be going beyond
Nagarjuna. However, this would involve seeing what is real in terms of self-
existence — something that Madhyamikas resist.

Also what Chandrakirti says about tattva can be explained with only two
senses of svabhava. If Sanskrit had capitals, the philosophical use would be
“Svabhava” and the everyday use as “self-nature” would be “svabhava.”
Chandrakirti apparently uses “own-form (sva-rupa)” as a synonym of either
sense of “svabhava.” A “self-nature” is not dependent upon anything else
(Pr 241), but it is not self-existent since all entities arise dependently (Pr
87). Thus, each type of entity has a conventional self-nature that is distinct
from that of other entities, but entities and their self-nature nevertheless are
not ontologically self-existent. The unenlightened superimpose self-
existence onto entities that are actually selfless (Pr 58). But Chandrakirti
says that the enlightened also see a self-nature to what is truly real (tattva):
the self-nature (svabhava) of what is in fact real is to be free of self-
existence (Svabhava). This does not equate self-existence (Svabhava) with
reality as it truly is (tattva) or reality from the ultimate point of view
(paramartha). Rather, reality as it truly is indeed has a self-nature
(svabhava) — being free of any self-existence (Svabhava). In short,
selflessness is the ultimate self-nature of what is actually real. That is the
true nature (dharmata) of reality. But we should not confuse Chandrakirti’s
two uses and refer to what is real (tattva) as self-existent simply because
reality has a self-nature.
To Chandrakirti, entities ( bhavas) are not even conventionally real since
they are devoid of self-existence and self-existent self-natures, and so there
is nothing to negate. That is, even the self-nature of anything is itself
dependent upon causes and conditions, and so there is no self-nature
(svabhava) or self-existence (Svabhava) either conventionally or from the
ultimate point of view. The true self-nature of things is the never changing,
always-abiding “thus-ness” or “such-ness” (tathata) of being free of
selfexistence and thus dependent and impermanent (Pr 265). (That the
nature of reality [dharmata] never changes and thus is eternal does not
conflict with the claim that what is real is itself constantly changing; so too,
the fixed order of karmic causes and effects or of acorns leading to oak trees
and not palm trees may be permanent even though what is subject to such
lawful order constantly changes.) Svabhava in the sense of “self-nature” is
closely related to “defining-characteristics (sva-lakshanas),” the “marks”
that separate one thing from another. Defining-characteristics and what is
characterized are mutually dependent and thus not independently real (Pr
527). Here Chandrakirti sees his position as significantly different from
Bhavaviveka’s: Bhavaviveka accepts self-characteristics as conventionally
real and as directly seen by nondefective consciousness. Chandrakirti,
however, as noted above, declares that all nonenlightened sense-experience
does not see reality as it truly is.

It should also be pointed out that Chandrakirti’s uses of “ svabhava” in two

senses leads to an ambiguity in his argument against real entities in Chapter
15 of the Clearly-worded Commentary. For example, he shifts from “self-
nature” to “self-existence” in Pr 261, leading to the idea of “self-existent
natures.” The conclusion cannot be logically reached because this switch in
meaning in the middle of the argument (the fallacy of equivocation).
Richard Hayes (1994) ascribes this illegitimate move to Nagarjuna and in
fact makes it central to what Richard Robinson (1968) calls Nagarjuna’s
“shell game.” But Nagarjuna focuses only on self-existence, not self-nature,
and Chandrakirti changes the sense of MK 15 here. (However, whether
Nagarjuna’s arguments have other problems is another issue. See Jones
2010: 160-64.)

Language and the Ultimate Point of View

Madhyamikas make the doctrine of “two types of truth” a cornerstone for
understanding the Buddha’s teachings, and Chandrakirti utilizes the
distinction throughout his works. Conventional truths (samvriti) “cover” the
true ontological status of things: ultimately, there are no entities. But
Chandrakirti accepts the customary truths of the world because the world
accepts them (e.g., Pr 69), although he denies the self-existence that the
worldly mistakenly accept. Since there is no self-existence, conventional
truths about “entities” have an element that will mislead the unenlightened.
Nevertheless, conventional truths remain truths even though they do not
convey ultimate ontological matters. That is, conventional notions can still
convey some true information about the world even though there are no
“real” distinct entities — calling a tree a “tree” and not a “car” conveys
accurate information even though both share the same nature of being
empty of self-existence. All entities bear this dual nature of being empty of
selfexistence and having conventional distinctions, eventhough ordinary
senseperception is flawed (MA 6.23) by the notion of self-existence.

However, Chandrakirti differs from Nagarjuna and Bhavaviveka on the

nature of the “ultimate truth (parama-artha-satya),” i.e., the truths of the
highest meaning on ontological matters. Argument and statements cannot
take the place of an experience of seeing the ultimate truth of things, and
realizing ultimate truths is a nonlinguistic event, but Nagarjuna accepts that
realizing ultimate truths is a nonlinguistic event, but Nagarjuna accepts that
53). There is nothing in his works that suggests that, for example, “All
entities are empty of self-existence” would not be an ultimate truth.
“Reality as it truly is (tattva)” is described in MK 18 negatively as not
dependent, empty of selfexistence, unarisen, unceasing, and free of multiple
entities and thus free of the possibility of conceptual projection; but it is
also described positively: all its content is dependently arisen. Nagarjuna
says: “Without relying upon worldly convention, the truth from the highest
point of view cannot be taught. And without reaching the truth from the
highest point of view, nirvana cannot be achieved (MK 24.10).” Granted,
this does not explicitly say that ultimate truths can be stated, but it does say
that ultimate truths can be taught and it does distinguish the teaching of
ultimate truths from the realization of nirvana — how could an ultimate
truth be taught or even understood without being statable in language, and
what would be the difference between learning the truth and realizing
nirvana? And even if becoming enlightened is an extralinguistic event,
nothing in what Nagarjuna states suggests that the enlightened are incapable
of stating ultimate truths.

Bhavaviveka accepts some ultimate truths as statable and some as not

(MAS 4-6; see Jones 2011: 196). But Chandrakirti goes further and accepts
that no ultimate truth is statable. It is not merely that there are no real
entities, no nuggets of reality, for words to refer to — thus, since reality as
it truly is has no distinct entities while all words are discrete,Madhyamikas
reject “linguistic realism” (i.e., that language mirrors the true content of
reality). Rather, for Chandrakirti, just as unenlightened sense-perception is
always flawed because the notion of self-existent entities operates within it,
so too language is also always flawed and cannot reflect thenondual nature
of reality as it truly is (tattva). Any object of thought is rejected as
nonexistent. (Of course, the laws of logic are also potential objects of
thought, and if they are rejected then the Madhyamaka reductio method is
destroyed.) The defining-characteristic of consciousness (vijnana) is an
awareness of distinct objects (MA 6.203). Thus, reality as it truly is — free
of distinct entities — cannot be presented to dualizing consciousness, and
language operates only in dualizing consciousness. Indeed, any language by
its very nature makes distinctions. That the enlightened still directly realize
“reality as it truly is” in some sense leads to Chandrakirti having to say that
the enlightened are not conscious at all — consciousness (vijnana) is not
any aware mental state but “conceptualizing awareness,” i.e., awareness of
differentiated phenomena guided by our conceptions. So too, when the
enlightened speak they cannot be in an enlightened state. In sum, reality as
it truly is is ineffable because it has no distinctions to be captured in
language.

Thus, Chandrakirti changes the situation: even the enlightened cannot speak
ultimate truths. The conventional is inherently incapable of stating ultimate
truths, and all language is inherently conventional. All that the Buddha
spoke is relegated to only conventional truths — the Buddha never said
anything that is ultimately true. Texts that speak of emptiness are final, not
provisional, in their meaning (MA 6.97), but their truths are still only
conventional. Dependent-arising and “All things arise dependently and are
empty of self-existence” are only conventional truths. The very idea of
“emptiness” is simply another part of conventionality. But again, these are
truths: that things are connected as dependent-arising depicts and are empty
is true and not false — Chandrakirti does still distinguish truth and falsity
on the conventional level and what leads to enlightenment and what does
not (e.g., MA 6.24). So too, the dichotomy of two types of truth is a
conventional truth; ultimately, there are no dichotomies in reality. Nothing
spoken can reflect reality as its really is: anything spoken will inherently
involve distinctions and dualities and cannot reflect the nondual nature of
reality as it really is since it is free of distinctions. But even that is only a
conventional truth. Even speaking “the true status of things” is only a
conventional matter.

Silence

Thus, for Chandrakirti only silence reflects the ultimate truth (Pr 57).
Ultimate truth is beyond words and not an object of consciousness (vijnana)
(Pr 109). Bhavaviveka agrees that when wisdom (prajna) arises words stop:
“Words stop here. This is not the domain of thought. Conceptualizing turns
back, and the silence of wisdom arises (MHK 3.277).” But Bhavaviveka
still believes that there are statable ultimate truths (MAS 4-6) — it is the
projection of concepts (prapancha) onto what is actually real that is ended
in ultimate truth (MAS 5), not language. So too, nothing in Nagarjuna’s
works suggests that the enlightened are reduced to silence: there may be no
selfexistent referents to language, but the enlightened can employ language
in the conventional world to teach ultimate truths (see Jones 2010: 150).
Nor does Nagarjuna suggest, contra Chandrakirti, that thedistinction of the
two truths is only a conventional distinction.

However, Chandrakirti’s position on the lack of differentiated perception in

the enlightened state and on the lack of conventional differentiated entities
forces him to the extreme position that the enlightened are silent: the
enlightened do not see differentiations in the phenomenal world (e.g., MA
6.53, 91) and thus have nothing to speak. The more usual Buddhist position
is that the enlightened still have sense-perceptions but that they do not see
the panorama presented to them as divided into discrete entities and that the
enlightened can use conventions (vyavaharas) without being deceived
about the ontological status of the entities referred to. Rather, the
experienced differentiations are simply no longer taken as indicating
distinct self-existent entities. And thereby speech remains possible. The
enlightened no longer project conceptual distinctions (prapancha) onto
what is really there (see Pr 521-22), which would create a world of discrete
self-existent objects, and they no longer have the dichotomizing
conceptualizations (kalpana) that supports this projection (Pr 522), but they
are still capable of utilizing those distinctions. In short, they can use the
words without seeing or conceiving independent entities. The title of the
Buddha as “the silent one of the Shakya clan (shakya-muni)” is taken to
mean that the Buddha did not speak any real (self-existent) truths or
teachings, not that he was literally silent. But for Chandrakirti, the Buddha
is “mindless” and can say nothing because he sees no differentiations in the
phenomenal world to speak about since all objects and change are reduced
to illusions (Pr 538). (The enlightened do see phenomenal reality as it really
is, but not with conceptualizing consciousness [vijnana], and so to
Chandrakirti, they do not see.) Thus, Chandrakirti has the problem of
explaining how the Buddha spoke at all, or had such copious sermons, even
if he conveyed only conventional truths.

Most Madhyamikas would agree that realizing emptiness involves more

than philosophical analysis — another state of consciousness than
conceptualizing awareness is required. Simply understanding the claim that
all of the phenomenal world is empty of any self-existence isnot enough to
end the root-ignorance (avidya) underlying the desires that propel the cycle
of rebirths — a meditation-supported mindfulness experience of the true
nature of reality is needed. (See Jones 2010: 143-45.) The yogin’s
knowledge of reality (jnana) is perfected by wisdom (prajna, “insight” or
“discernment”).

But for Chandrakirti reality as it truly is ( tattva) cannot be apprehended by

ordinary cognition since there are no features to grasp. Wisdom is not based
on conceptualized discursive perceptions or inferences: there are no
differentiated objects to know. Thus, there are no “valid objects of
knowledge” for wisdom to distinguish, and the accepted conventional
“valid means of knowledge” do not apply to realizing reality as it truly is.
Again, the Buddha was silent: since reality as it truly is is free of distinct
real entities, there is nothing to express. Thus, it is inexpressible
(avachyataavachyata 48; Pr 64, 539) since there are no distinct realities to
be reflected in words. So too, how the enlightened exist in this life is
beyond our understanding and conception (Pr 535). This also means
questions about the limits of the universe are unanswerable (Pr 537) since
there are no real limits, and so on.

Any metaphysical views ( drishtis) or theses (pratijnas) involving

selfexistence are ended by seeing the emptiness of things. Thereby, we see
reality free of such preconceptions. (But Chandrakirti uses another word
from the same root as “drishti” — “darshana, ‘seeing,’ ‘doctrine’” —
positively in connection with emptiness.) Thus, to be enlightened is to be
free of all views since any view involves accepting the reality of
independent, self-existent entities in some form. This involves relinquishing
all conceptual frameworks for enlightenment, although there is nothing in
Chandrakirti’s work to suggest that he sees all language creating a view. To
see reality as “empty” or as “real” or as “midway between the categories of
‘is’ and ‘is not’” or as “selfexistent” in some new sense still involves seeing
reality through the concepts of “exist” and “not exist.”

However, even if there are no differentiations in the “thus-ness” of “reality

as it truly is” and so language cannot reflect anything about the true status
of things, Chandrakirti can still affirm a reality external to our mental
constructions open to the direct experience by the enlightened. For
example, he utilizes the snake/rope analogy (MA 6.141, Pr 523), and this
makes sense only if there is some actual reality that is being misperceived.
Similarly, the analogies to illusions, mirages, reflections, and dreams (e.g.,
MA 6.26) are used only to show thedeceptiveness and dependence of
something false upon some real causes and conditions (MA 6.37) — the
analogies would make no sense if there were no underlying reality. Reality
as it truly is (tattva) — the “rope” beneath all illusions — is phenomenal
reality perceived correctly. (Note that in Madhyamaka metaphysics tattva is
not an “Ultimate Reality” transcending the phenomenal world.) And the
appearances remain even for the enlightened, although the enlightened
would not be deceived. That is, the content of an illusion does not exist
even conventionally, but a mirage or dream itself does exist conventionally
— although it too is dependent upon terms and conditions. But why even
these appearances should remain for the enlightened is not clear in
Chandrakirti’s account of the enlightened state. So too, things are empty of
self-existence but not totally nonexistent (asat), like the son of a barren
woman or a rabbit’s horns — saying what is dependently arisen is
nonexistent is the view of annihilationism (ucchedavada), and all
Madhyamikas reject that as connected to the notion of self-existence. This
applies to anything in the phenomenal world: anything capable of
performing a function is not nonexistent. Thus, water and a mirage are both
“unreal (non-self-existent)” in the technical, Madhyamaka sense, but water
is “real” in an everyday sense in a way that a mirage is not — in short, real
water is not a mirage. Such a stance is sufficiently objective to counter the
claim that Madhyamikas are ontological nihilists, despite Chandrakirti’s
problem of denying conventional “selves” and other “entities.”
Conventional truths are “covering truths,” but they are covering an
extralinguistic, objective reality.

Dependent Designation

Also with regard to language, Chandrakirti changes Nagarjuna’s original

use of “dependent designation (upadaya-prajnapti).” Buddhapalita, who
Chandrakirti defends, began this change. (See Jones 2011: 188-89.)
Nagarjuna equates “emptiness” with “dependent-arising (pratitya-
samutpada)” and says that this indicator (prajnapti) is dependent (upadaya)
and that comprehending this is the “middle way” (MK 24.18). He also says:
“‘Empty,’ ‘not empty,’ ‘both (empty and not empty),’ or ‘neither (empty nor
not empty)’ — these should not be said, but they are said only as indicators
(MK 22.11).” However, Nagarjuna does not use “dependent designation”to
suggest that dependent-arising is a name only — “emptiness” indicates
dependent-arising, and there is no suggestion that dependent-arising is only
a customary conceptual construct rather than a reflection of reality as it
truly works. In effect, “emptiness” is simply a synonym for another word.
So too, for example, the “end of the cycle of rebirths” must be real in some
sense or there is no point to the Buddhist way of life or teachings.But
Chandrakirti alters the notion of “dependent designation” to mean that
designations for all “entities” are no more than convenient labels (e.g., MA
6.158) — e.g., there is no “person” but only the aggregates or no “chariot”
but only its parts and its parts’ parts. The term “dependent-arising” has
nothing to refer to in reality.
Only with Chandrakirti did the idea of “dependent designation” come to
mean that words do not refer to any reality but are merely social
conventions. Most people would agree that any word is arbitrary in one
sense (there is no inherent connection between the sign “car” and a car), but
they accept that these help us navigate the world because they refer to the
world in some way. Chandrakirti, however, removes anything to refer to:
the moon is not an impermanent entity — there is no moon to point to with
words. All form and so forth are only products of our conceptual
consciousness. In sum, the switch is from Nagarjuna’s semantic claim to an
ontological one.

This ties up to Chandrakirti’s emphasis on silence. His interpretation of

“dependent designation” means that language only leads us to social
conventions, not to reality. Words do not refer to anything in the world, and
we are reduced to silence once we see the world correctly. Even on a
conventional level, Chandrakirti has the problem of explaining why some
sentences rather than others can say something that is more accurate about
the world or are “better” or “more effective” in any sense or how any verbal
“skillful means (upaya)” can help lead the unenlightened to nirvana.

Chandrakirti’s “Paradoxes”

Chandrakirti enjoys speaking in one type of paradox: x is not x.

(Technically, this is simply a contradiction — paradoxes involve statements
that are true if false. But the label “paradox” has been expanded today in
common parlance to encompass more.) For example, “The eye is empty of
an eye (MA 6.181),” “The self-nature of what is truly real is to have no
selfnature,” “The defining-characteristic of reality as it truly is is that it has
no defining-characteristic,” “The Buddha taught that nirvana is no nirvana
(Pr 540),” or “Seeing is non-seeing (Pr 351).” They are on the order of the
proper paradox “The ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth.”
However, this literary device makes the claims sound more confusing than
they really are. Thus, the above claims can all be restated clearly:“The
conventional eye is empty of a self-existent eye,” “The nature (dharmata)
of reality as is truly is is to be free of self-existence (Svabhava) and any
self-existent self-nature (svabhava),” “Reality as it truly is has no distinct
attributes and so has no defining-characteristic,” “The Buddha taught that
nirvana is not a real entity,” “The correct seeing of reality in the mindful
state involves no conceptualized awareness,” and “The ultimate truth is that
there are no self-existent truths.”

Misunderstandings by translators may cause paradoxes to appear where

there are none. For example, Jay Garfield and Graham Priest (2003) make
this paradox: ultimate truths are about ultimate reality; but since everything
is empty, there is no ultimate reality; thus, the ultimate truth is that there are
no ultimate truths. However, there is an “ultimate reality”: reality as it truly
is — tattva, the “that-ness” of things. Reality as it truly is is not an “entity”
and does not “exist” in the technical Madhyamaka sense since it is not
selfexistent, but it is the “rope” underneath our misperceptions, and to
Nagarjuna and Bhavaviveka some ultimate truths are statable about it: it is
free of self-existence, all its content is dependently arisen, and so on. There
is no paradox in this account.

Nor is the literary device of paradox necessary to Madhyamaka discourse

since Nagarjuna and the others do not engage in it. (If Chandrakirti does
ascribe self-existence to what is in fact real [tattva] in Pr 108, then this is a
more substantial variation from Nagarjuna than merely a new literary
device.) And even Chandrakirti gives non-contradictory explanations of
Nagarjuna’s verses that may seem paradoxical. For example, the “real” and
“unreal” of MK 18.8 is explained in terms of different teachings being
given to different followers according to their development.

The important philosophical point for understanding these “paradoxical”

claims remains that their content can be restated free of contradictions. The
paradoxical way of putting matters makes reality as it truly is sound
paradoxical, even though nothing in Madhymaka metaphysics suggests that.
It also makes the listeners focus on the form of the statement. This may
have soteriological advantages as with the Zen koans, but it may also cause
the listener to focus on the statement and not the point that is being made,
thereby making another mental barrier.

Madhyamaka Soteriology
It is important to remember that the Madhyamaka ontological analysis is
not meant as a disinterested attempt to understand the world but is meant to
lead people to the end of suffering by ending our cycle of rebirths since
lives are inherently open to pains and dissatisfaction — in short, to end
suffering (duhkha) — by transforming a person’s outlook through
meditative experiences. That is the context of all Buddhist praxis. It does
not make Buddhism any less philosophical, but Buddhism should never be
treated as simply a form of philosophy. Here the dispute between
Bhavaviveka and Chandrakirti should be seen as two Buddhist analogs
oftheologians battling out the best way to lead others to enlightenment. To
Chandrakirti, Bhavaviveka’s way of arguing makes emptiness into a mental
object to which one may become attached, thereby hindering the quest to
uproot illusion. The same with a fixation on forms of argument. Thus, itcan
be objected to on soteriological grounds. Chandrakirti’s claims to silence
concerning ultimate truths may also result from the same concern: we will
end up seeing the world through a conceptual screen that cannot reflect its
real nature.

Chandrakirti did prevail within Central and East Asian Buddhism in the
long run, but his radical undercutting of all claims also has problems from a
soteriological point of view. With all emphasis onthe ultimate ontological
status of things, accepting entities even conventionally is problematic for
him. His approach does supposedly lead to a positive, if ineffable,
experience revealing reality as it truly is (tattva), but his negative approach
leaves nothing positive to say about that reality. Nagarjuna’s ideas were
certainly not that negative. By itself, Chandrakirti’s approach is too
negative to produce any positive result. Its negativity can only work as a
response to some more positive ontological system, such as other Mahayana
Buddhist beliefs. In isolation, his via negativa cannot lead anyone to
enlightenment.
Shantideva and the Factual Foundations of
Morality
The question of philosophical ethics has not figured prominently in this
book or in Volume 1. But Shantideva may be “the greatest of all Buddhist
ethicists” (Goodman 2009: 89). Of special interest, his discussions of how
the bodhisattva’s life works in Entering the Bodhisattva’s Path raise a key
factual issue for mystical morality. To be moral, when deciding how to act
one must take into consideration the welfare of those impacted from their
point of view (see Jones 2004: 33-35). Morality has factual presuppositions
(i.e., factual circumstances that must obtain for a moral concern to be
operative). One is these is that there is someone distinct from yourself that
can be the subject of moral concern; otherwise, we may be only concerned
with our own welfare. (See ibid.: 27, 151-52, 189-92, 307-308.) Thus, if
there are no sentient beings who suffer, why be compassionate — who is
there to be compassion toward? In addition, if one argues that there is
nothing in me to be selfish about, then there also is nothing in others for me
to morally concerned about either: if selfishness cannot be grounded in
reality since there is no self, then there are no others to be compassion
toward either. So too, if I should not hate anyone because there are no real
selves to hate — what doI hate? their hair? their bones? — then so too I
cannot be compassionate toward anyone — what I am being compassionate
toward? their hair? their bones? If there is no way to ground hatred or anger
in what is real, then there is no way to ground love or moral concern either
— that is simply the other side of the same coin.

Consider Entering the Bodhisattva’s Path 9.75-76. The opponent asks, as

we would: “If there are no sentient beings, for whom can there be
compassion?” Shantideva replies: “For the sake of the fruit (i.e.,
enlightenment), it is imagined by a convention of delusion that there are
‘sentient beings.’” The opponent then asks: “If there are no sentient beings,
who gains the fruit of enlightenment?” And Shantideva answers: “Since it is
true that there are no real sentient beings, the effort is from a deluded idea.
But for the sake of ending suffering, the delusion of the fruit of
‘enlightenment’ is not removed.”
192

But Shantideva’s responses in terms of “conventional beings” are not

adequate unless there is still some reality there from the ultimate point of
view that can be directed to enlightenment and can achieve enlightenment.
However, he begins the chapter on wisdom by adopting the Madhyamaka
doctrine of “two types of truths” (BC 9.2-4) and by claiming that yogins see
entities in the world and use conventional truths (BC 9.5, 8). By that
distinction, he can accept the necessary conventional and ultimate realities.

Under the most common Buddhist ontology, there is no “person” but only a
connected stream of components of the experienced world (dharmas) of a
“person” — the conditioned bodily aggregates (skandhas). Thus, there are
“selfless persons.” Mahayanists and Abhidharmists disagree over whether
these dharmas are real or selfless. There is still the defining subjective
experience and intentionality even if there is no “real” person. (On the
general philosophical problems surrounding reducing a person to the
impersonal and the mental to the nonmental, see Jones forthcoming: chapter
4.) There is suffering, but no “person” who suffers. Abhidharmists hold that
suffering is a basic phenomena of the experienced world; Madhymikas
accept such phenomena but hold them to be selfless and not eternal and thus
not ultimately real. Earlier Madhyamikas would say that“person” is a
dependent designation (prajnapti) for the continua of karmic related events,
but all would agree it is a fiction. There are intentions (chetanas), but no
“person” who has intentions. There is a conventional “person,” but “it” is a
constantly changing process. There is no permanent consciousness — no
inner light scanning all inner states — but there are still the states. Thus,
there is all the internal psychological phenomena associated conventionally
with a “person” but no unchanging extra core that “has” them. (See Jones
2004: 189-92.) In particular, when Shantideva denies the self, he never
explicitly denies the conventional self — in fact, in most of the text, he
makes liberal use of the conventional self (Harris 2011: 99).

But the Buddhologist Paul Williams (1998; also see 1999: 145-46) argues
that Shantideva denies a “sentient being” even conventionally and thus that
there is no person whose welfare we should be morally concerned about
and no person to remove suffering from. Williams realizes that this would
destroy the bodhisattva’s path. Indeed, under his interpretation, the
Mahayana Buddhist way of life is blatantly inconsistent since “the heart of
Buddhist insight is the mystery of experience without a subject” (Clayton
2001: 86). And the alleged inconsistency is not revealed by some obtuse
logical deduction but lies on the surface of Shantideva’s claims. Thus, the
very rationality of accepting the Mahayana way of life is radically undercut.

However, a more straightforward understanding of Shantideva’s work

preserves his rationality in advocating the bodhisattva’s life. And nothing
else in his texts suggests that Shantideva was inconsistent in his thought.
Nor can we assume that he was unaware of contradictions since the basic
“Western” logical principles of noncontradiction and the excluded middle
are implicit to his method (e.g., BC 9.26, 34), as with the other
Madhyamikas. (Nor can we assume that mystics in general have ignored, or
feel unconstrained by, such basic logical principles or had “their own
logic.” [See Jones 1993a.])

Williams focuses on one passage: Entering the Bodhisattva’s Path Entering

the Bodhisattva’s Path 103. Here Shantideva says that the continua of
consciousness are fictions. There is no one who has suffering or to whom
sufferings belong (since there is no real beings). Thus, all sufferings are to
be removed without any distinction between one’s own and another’s. If
one asks why suffering is to be prevented, Madhyamikas respond that there
is no disagreement by anyone on that point. And if suffering is to be
prevented, then all suffering must be prevented: if there are no owners of
suffering, there is no ultimate distinction between one’s own and anyone
else’s suffering. However, nothing in this passage suggests that Shantideva
is denying a “person” in any conventional sense. He only denies an ultimate
reality that is self-existent or that a future conventional self is in the
ultimate sense identical to the present conventional self. Similarly, when
Shantideva says one person dies and a different one is reborn (BC 8.94-98),
this does not suggest anything other than a conventional truth since there
are no “persons” to be identical or different. Granted, most Madhyamakins
would say that the reborn “person” is neither the same nor different than the
“person” who died, just as butter and milk are not the same or different —
there is no reincarnation of the same person nor total discontinuity. But
Shantideva is focusing on how to lead the religious way of life, not on such
philosophical issues, and thus we cannot expect the same level of
philosophical analysis as in Nagarjuna’s philosophical work.

Nevertheless, Shantideva’s rationality in advocating a bodhisattva’s way of

life can be shown. First, no one should be confused by the analogies of
conventional persons to dreams and illusions. Obviously we could not feel
compassion toward what does not exist in any way, such as a nonexistent
delusion. And persons are fictions (mrisha) (BC 8.101). But an illusion is
not totally nonexistent. An aggregate of conditions is needed for an illusion
to appear (BC 9.10), and thus there is something there. The Madhyamaka
analogy to dreams, reflections, illusions, and so forth is only to emphasize
that appearances are deceiving and that our conceptions are dependent upon
other things, just as a magical trick or a dream is dependent upon other
things. The point is that things are not as they seem, not that there is nothing
“real” there (i.e., no stream of conditioned components). In sum, it is not
the strong sense of totally nonexistent delusions but the sense of
dependency that an analogy is used for. When bodhisattvas see “no
persons” it means that they see no distinct, self-existent entities, not the
absence of conventional beings. If the enlightened thinks of “one who is
liberated,” this is only a conventional truth (BC 9.107) since ultimately
there are no selves. So too, saying that “suffering is not real” means only
that there is no self-existent entity to eliminate or negate, not that there is
nothing causing us discomfort.

Williams believes that suffering must be deemed “free floating” and

“disembodied” (1998: 165) if there no conventional “self” — i.e., suffering
is not tied to mental states of particular subjects. But nothing in
Shantideva’s work suggests that suffering is not tied to the subjective
experience of a “person” (i.e., a psychological component to the stream of
aggregates). If I stick my hand in a fire, I will feel pain; you maycringe in
sympathy, but you do not feel that pain. And restating this more accurately
in terms of “streams of becoming” does not change this. There is the
opportunity to remove suffering even if there is no independently existing
center of experience that would be a “self,” and even if suffering is not a
discrete, self-existent entity itself. There is a subjective state of suffering
even if there is no discrete “person” to experience it — no metaphysical
claim of distinct “persons” is in any way required. Even without
conventional “persons,” there still are pains (contra Williams 1998: 174) in
the streams of becoming, and thus there is a reality to experience them. In
sum, there is a subjective component of a “person” that experiences
suffering, even if there is no “owner of pain,” and that is all the reality
needed for suffering to be a problem. There is no danger of an ontological
nihilism (see Jones 2009: 139-140): the streams of becoming are real
enough and distinct enough to ground morality. Even if there is no
unchanging core conventionally (as Shantideva argues), there is no reason
to conclude that suffering floats free from our subjective states. In no way is
Shantideva being rationally inconsistent (contra Williams 1998: 174).

Williams must downplay the Buddhist claim of the causal continuity of

persons over time, including between one life and the next, that results from
karmic actions. Karma provides a continuity and coherence. Williams has to
disallow that there are connected series of causes and effects constituting
different impermanent but continuous “streams of becoming”
conventionally conceived in terms of distinct entities as “persons.” The
conventional “self” has a continuity that the interactions between different
streams do not have that keeps its stream distinct. He rightly points out that
there are interactions between different streams (e.g., your sneeze causing
my cold). The world is an interplay of such causal events. But he cannot
successfully argue from this that there is no stronger continuity in different
streams of becoming than between them. He must ignore memories and in
particular the classic Indian paranormal claim that the spiritually advanced
can remember their past lives: such memories reveal a coherence to
different lines of rebirths — the Buddha may have been able to remember
his own past lives (including his lives as an animal) and others’, but he
could not remember anyother “person’s” stream of becoming as “his” own.
Different streams remain distinct, and it is these streams that a bodhisattva
can guide toward enlightenment, as described by Shantideva. Like most
people in the West today, Williams may not accept rebirth, but Shantideva’s
acceptance of its realitygives a rational factual basis for his claims and his
advocacy of the bodhisattva’s way of life.

On a related point, if there is no such causal continuity, we have no control

over what happens through causal predictions, and then there is no point in
even trying to end any suffering, either one’s own or another’s — all
suffering is random. We may try haphazardly to stop some suffering, but
that would not be rational because we could not predict the outcome of our
actions. And even if some suffering were ended, it would not help anyone
in the long run since personal events would still remain random. In fact, all
morality would be out: why bother to try to help others if our acts would at
most only have a random effect on them and not assist anyone’s future?

But the important point is that selfless “streams of becoming” are sufficient
to ground morality: there is some reality other than yourself whose interests
you can take into account. No particular metaphysical conception of the
“other” beyond that is needed — there need not be an eternal, permanent
“self,” but only some reality other than yourself that needs help and can be
affected by your actions. The Buddhist conception of a “selfless person” fits
this: there is still something “real” there even if there is no core “self.” (See
Jones 2004: 189-92.) Moreover, it is not rational to remain only aloof and
uncaring as long as there is a reality that can experience suffering and can
be helped by being directed to enlightenment. So too, a bodhisattva can take
into account the uniqueness of each personal stream of becoming and adjust
the Buddhist teachings and his actions to help in the most effective way. For
example, he would not give up his life for a “person” whose disposition to
compassion is not pure (BC 5.87). (Also note that Shantideva’s idea of the
“equality of oneself and others” or of “exchanging others for oneself” [BC
8.120-24; Sk 1] is at most a conventional truth, since there are no real
selves, and thus this claim is not the ultimate ontological basis for
grounding morality. But the practice does tend to overcome the tendency to
differentiate one’s own suffering and happiness from that of others [Clayton
2001: 92]. However, his analogy in BC 9.91, 99, and 114 that all persons
are connected like the hand and foot in the body does not fit well with the
general Buddhist metaphysics that denies wholes as real, nor is it needed to
support his point.)

However, it should be noted that a metaphysics of selflessness does not

entailthe moral value of being concerned for others — “ought” does not
follow from “is” here. (See Jones 2004: 192-93. David Hume first raised
the problem. Most classical thinkers would not see a distinction between
“is” and “ought”: they may well see their descriptive concepts as having a
normative component too. But that does not mean that we cannotsee the
issue in their concepts once the issue has been raised.) From the
metaphysics of “all things are empty of self-existence,” three options are
possible: compassion for others, a selfish regard for one’s own stream of
becoming, or simple indifference to others. Seeing things as they reallyare
(yathabhutam, tathata) does not automatically compel any of these value
options. So too, we may well accept that all suffering is inherently bad
(despite some pains being warning signs, as when we stick our hand in fire).
Nevertheless, since all suffering is the same, one can concentrate on
removing the suffering in one’s own stream of becoming — it is the equal
of anyone’s, and none have an inherent priority over the suffering we
immediate experience. We need to add a moral concern for others to decide
to focus on other’s suffering.

Thus, Buddhists can be “selfish” even while rejecting the idea of a

“permanent self” and hence not be moral. The Theravada tradition
exemplifies this (see Jones 2004: 149-79). It is the Mahayanists who made
the value of moral concern for others for their own sake central (ibid.: 181-
213). But it is not the case that their metaphysics entails morality. For
example, texts of the Perfection of Wisdom tradition also warn against
developing wisdom (prajna) without equally developing compassion
(karuna), which would not be necessary if wisdom automatically
engendered compassion.

One may argue that people have an “innate nature” to be compassionate or

“other-regarding” — so that removing a sense of self (or any other duality)
leads naturally to a compassionate concern for others (see Harris 2011: 116
n. 23). Still, the basic factual metaphysics of interconnectedness does not
per se entail this moral valuation. Rather, there would have to be included
an additional belief of a built-in value (compassion) in our nature. That is,
our factual nature would then not be itself value-neutral.

More generally, one can adopt a metaphysics of complete impermanence

and interconnection without adopting a moral regard for other parts of the
interconnected whole: one may still try to maximize the comfort of the
impermanent parts connected to your experience at the expense of the other
parts — one need not have a sense of permanence and independent to
differentiate segments of the whole. Even Williams admits that as a logical
matter, the doctrine of “no selfishness” does not follow from the absence of
belief in an eternal individual self: “I can quite consistently accept that I
have

no metaphysical ~tman — say, an independent unchanging

Cartesian self —

and be perfectly selfish” (1999: 145-46). If we see all of reality as

interconnected, it is easier to see that we are not independent of others and
ought to care equally about others’ welfare. But such a value is not logically
necessitated: we can still favor those parts that affect our subjective
experiences most directly and immediately to the detriment of whathas less
of an affect on us. That is, it is logically consistent to care about one’s “self”
and one’s “family” over what is happening to “families” on other continents
even if we accept that everything is ultimately interconnected.

In sum, morality requires adding a value that the metaphysics of emptiness

and interconnectedness does not require. Mysticism’s important innovation
here is not the metaphysics of impermanence and interconnection — such a
metaphysics can readily be accepted for nonmystical reasons, as some
naturalists do today. (But mystics add the experiential dimension of not
merely accepting the metaphysics but internalizing it by making it the
framework through which one experiences the world.)Rather, mysticism’s
contribution is the evaluation that all parts are equal in value. When mystics
adopt morality, this leads to an even-handed concern for all sentient beings,
expressed appropriately to each being’s needs. Only with this evaluation is
even-mindedness possible. Without it, there is no reason why we cannot
focus on enhancing our niche within the interconnected world and also
maintain the same varying tumultuous emotions toward what occurs to us
that we had toward events before we adopted a metaphysics of
impermanence and interconnection. That is, “seeing things as they really
are” is not the cause of even-mindedness but its result: a metaphysics of
complete impermanence and interconnection grounds this way of being.
The Madhyamaka Critiques of the Existence of
God
The first thing to notice about the arguments in the two critiques presented
here is that they rely on ordinary experience and simple rules of reasoning,
not textual authorities or special meditative experiences. Nor do the authors
employ emptiness (shunyata) as a premise (indeed they do not mention it at
all here) or any other specifically Buddhist premise. The author of The
Refutation of Vishnu as the One Creator follows the basic Madhyamaka
method of setting up either/or dichotomies of x and notx that they believe
exhaust all the logical possibilities and showing that both branches lead to
impossible results (either contradictions or conflicts with everyday
experiences), thereby refuting here the very idea of a creator.

The Madhyamikas’ opponent’s position is based on theworld being an

effect: the universe, like a pot, has an intelligent instrumental cause. Its
presupposition is this: if anything exists, it mustbe created, and any chain of
creations must stop with an uncreated creator. (This is a version of the
Cosmological Argument based on a creator being necessary for our
existence: if there were no uncreated, self-existent reality, no other reality
could exist.) Thus, the creator is known by inference from the observation
of cause and effect, not a religious experience. (On whether a god could be
known through an inference, see Aryadeva’sOne Hundred Verses, chapter
2.) With their focus on causation, it is the only type of argument for the
existence of God that Nagarjunians would address. For example, they
would not address the moral problem of natural suffering or the possibility
of experiencing God.

Notice that the texts do not directly attack self-existence ( svabhava) —

they do not mention the concept at all. (That The Refutation of Vishnu as the
One Creator is directed to a popular audience would explain why it does
not invoke technical terms, including “emptiness.”) In fact, the
Madhyamikas’ argument against the existence of a creator is a simple
application of their general argument against what is real (self-existent)
since what is real is eternal/permanent and cannot change. What is
nonexistent cannot produce

199

anything real — only what is real could produce something real. That is,
what lacks self-existence cannot be related in any way to anything real or
unreal since it is not “real.” But in addition something real does not produce
another thing that is real: an effect could not be real if it is produced. And
something real also could not produce (and thus could not be a creator)
since any act of creation involves change. Thus, if x does not change, it
cannot create; but if x creates, it changes, and so it could not be real. So too,
anything that creates must have a cause for that act and so is not the
ultimate cause. Thus, either way, x is not the creator. This applies as much
to an alleged creator creating a universe as to ordinary beings creating any
simple action.

The general Madhyamaka position can be summarized formally as a short

sutra with commentary:

[1] All things are dependently arisen. Nothing existing by self-existence is

found.
Commentary: To “self-exist” means to “self-arise.” But to self-arise,
something must already exist — i.e., it must already exist to do
anything including arise. To self-originate, a reality must already
exist; thus, arising again would be without a purpose and would
also be futile; and, if arising occurs, it would go on ad infinitum,
but we see that that does not occur to phenomena (MKV 1.3, 8).
Thus, whatever exists needs no origination. Also see Nagarjuna’s
SSK 5, 40, 41 on infinite regress. In addition, nothing arises from
itself. See Nagarjuna’s MK 1.1 on the first of the four options.

[2] If God is real, then what he creates is also real. But nothing real is
found. If God is unreal, then he cannot create anything real or unreal.
Commentary: If the effects are real, then they are eternal and
permanent (since that is the definition of being “real”), and so they
cannot change. But we only see changing phenomena, and so there
is no real effect. And without a real effect, there is no real cause
since there is no “cause” without an “effect.” Nor is our universe as
a whole a permanent creation: it will come to an end and be
followed by another universe. On the other hand, what is unreal
cannot create anything real (since the real cannot be caused by
what is itself not real) nor unreal (since the unreal does not exist). Aryadeva
also argues against the claim that because Madhyamikas do not deny the
reality of “cause and effect,” then “birth” and “what is born” are established
(SS 8.10): something real does not produce another thing that is real, nor
can what is nonexistent produce anything real — real things do not give
birth to real things; unreal things do not give birth to unreal things. No real
thing gives birth to another real thing. Nor does something unreal give birth
to another unreal thing. Nor does a real thing produce an unreal thing — a
barren woman does not give birth to a child. Nor does an unreal thing
produce a real thing — the hair of a tortoise does not give birth to a cloth.
Thus, there is no phenomenon “birth.” In addition, if something could give
birth to another thing, there would be the birth of two types of phenomena
(the thing and “giving birth”).

[3] If God is unchanging, no creation is possible. If God changes, no

creation is possible.
Commentary: Creation necessarily involves a change. Thus, if God
cannot change, he cannot form the thought to creation or do any
creating actions. Rather, he is fixed and unchangeable. But if God
in fact changes, then he is not self-existent and thus is not real and
thus cannot create since what is unreal cannot create anything
either real or unreal. Either way, there is no creation of anything
real and thus no creation.

[4] Thus, there can be no act of creation. And therefore, there is no creator
or anything created.
Commentary: The concepts are interconnected: if there is no
creation, then there is no one who “creates” and nothing “created.”
If one term cannot denote anything real, then none can. In sum, if
nothing is real (self-existent), then there is real “creator” and hence
no real “act of creating” and nothing real that is “created.”
In short, to Madhyamikas the idea of “creation” presents an instance of the
Catch-22 dilemma mentioned earlier: to have the capacity to create,
something must be permanent and unchanging, and thus it cannot create
since an act of creation would involve a change. That is, to be able to
create, something must be real, but what is real is permanent, unchanging,
and unmoving, and so the possibility of any change, let alone an act of
creation, is ruled out. And if “creating” is impossible, the related concepts
of “creator” and “a creation” are in turn ruled out.

One can also see in the Madhyamaka arguments the importance of

causation in Madhyamaka thought. The causal force of karma takes the
place of a creator god. (Karma regulates what appears, but Buddhists make
no claim that karma is the ultimate ontological source of what exists.) But
the question of origins figures prominently for any phenomenon. Indeed,
the Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way can be seen as simply different
applications of Nagarjuna’s idea that what is real (eternal, permanent)
cannot produce or be produced to various types of phenomena. The more
ususal issue in Indian philosophy is not a creator god but this: does an effect
preexist in its cause or not? Madhyamikas answer “no” becausean effect is
not found preexisting among its causes and conditions. So too, if the cause
and effect are the same, the creator and what is created would bethe same.

Notice that the Madhyamikas’ arguments apply to any creator god. The
argument assumes only as little as is necessary (asis common in Indian
philosophy), and so there is no specification of the creator’s attributes
beyond being a creator. (But the Naiyayikas argue that thecreator must be
immaterial since he creates all material.) Arguing that God is “ineffable” —
i.e., beyond conceptions — does not help as long as God istaken to be a
creator since at least the concept “creator” would apply in some sense. We
can fill in the concept any way we like, e.g., with classical or any
contemporary Western theistic ideas about the nature of a god that creates.
Either a concerned theistic personal god or an impersonal deistic reality that
is closer to the Advaitic Brahman will do. This would include the Vedic
gods or their avatars acting in history. It would also apply to other alleged
creators advanced in classical India — e.g., time, necessity, chance,
necessity (e.g., Shvetashvatara Upanishad 1.2, 6.1). (Here “necessity
[svabhava]” means a sort of innate tendency of things to exist, as with
“self-existence.”) The same argument applies (with the appropriate
necessary changes) to all other types of alleged transcendental realities —
see Bhavaviveka’s MHK chapter 8, translated in Volume 1 on the Advaitic
self. Indeed, the argument applies more broadly to any worldly act of
creation: the usual term in these arguments for a creator is “kartri” — a
term applied to any maker or agent of action. (Also see MA 6.84-86 where
God is treated as simply another possible cause that falls under the
Madhyamikas’ general analysis of “causes.” The entire phenomenal world
is created by karmic actions that depend on the mind [MA 6.89].)

The arguments also apply to creation ex nihilo or any other way of creating
we can imagine. “Ishvara” is basically a blank that can be filled however
one wants. But it should be noted that in many schools of Indian thought
there are uncreated realities — e.g., space, time, matter, karma, or selves.
Thus, for them no god is omnipotent. (Most Indian schools would argue that
the creator must be omniscient, knowing the material he creates with, in
order to know how to create. But to the Buddhists no god knows the source
of suffering [e.g., MHK 9.118].) A “creator” does not create these but is
responsible for the “unrolling” of the universe at the beginning of each
cosmic cycle. (One tale is that Brahma deludes himself in thinking he is a
creator: he simply is the first entity to “unroll” in a new creation and
mistakenly thinks he creates all that follows him.) To Buddhists, Ishvara
and the other gods are sentient beings in the cycle of rebirth who become
gods by their past wholesome karmic actions. The creation of the universe,
like the realms formed from meditative achievements, resultsfrom
consciousness — it is a collective product of past karmic acts. The universe
is not eternal forward in time and will disappear if all sentient beings
become enlightened.

Shantideva in Entering the Bodhisattva’s Path 9.118-25 makes some

standard points. He first asks if “Ishvara” is merely another name for the
impersonal great elements (dhatus) and then shows why they cannot be the
creator: they are multiple while a creator must beone, inactive while a
creator must be active, impermanent while a creator must be real and thus
permanent/eternal, and so forth. Also the elements do not have the nature of
gods (deva-tas). And if the creator is beyond conception (achitta,
“inconceivable,” or “not of the mind”), what can be said of his
inconceivable creativity? Shantideva also raises objections to what is
supposedly created by a creator — the alleged “creations” are either eternal
(and thus uncreated) or created by our karmic actions. And if the cause has
no beginning, it is never active, and so how can there be any effect? Nor
can a creator be contingent upon any causes or conditions — even if he acts
on his own desires, he is subject to those desires and thus is not the “lord.”

A later Madhyamaka text, the Tattvasamgraha, adds more objections. First,

everything is produced successively, but a real creator would create
everything simultaneously since there are no obstacles that could prevent
anything from being created; if it is objected that some other cause is
needed to make things appear, then the creator is not the lord but dependent
on those causes for action (and this would lead to an infinite regress of
causes); so too, why would his desires that are related to what is created not
arise simultaneously in what is real (permanent/eternal)? Since the creator
would be omnipresent, nothing could inhibit his actions. The creator must
be one and undifferentiated, and what he creates must reflect their cause
and thus also be one and undifferentiated, but we see that things are not that
way. So too, for the same reason the creator could not first create some
cosmic principle that then created diverse things since such a principle
would have to undifferentiated to reflect its cause. So too, anything created
would have to reflect its permanent/eternal creator and so be
permanent/eternal. So too, being eternal (timeless) prevents any creation
since creation requires acts and relations between things over time — i.e.,
the creator would be outside the realm of time and could not spread his acts
over a period of time.

A point made in Volume 1 is worth reiterating here: emptiness (shunyata)

itself should not be seen as a creator god. Aryadeva’s refutes the idea that
emptiness is itself a real (self-existent) phenomenon (SS chapter 10). Many
Westerners today take emptiness to be an analog to God and refer to it as
“the Void” with a capital “V.” But Nagarjuna and those following him make
clear that emptiness is not anentity of any type or the source of the reality of
anything (see MK 13.8). It is not anything that transcends the world but is
merely a description of the true state of all phenomena of the world:
phenomenal reality as it truly is (tattva) is empty of self-existence
(svabhava), i.e., empty of anything that would make phenomena into
substantive, discrete, permanent “real” realities. (On the “emptiness of
emptiness,” see the Note on MA 6.186.) Madhyamikas claim nothing
beyond the impermanence and conditionality of the phenomena of the
world except denying any transcendent creator. Such matters are, like the
matters that the Buddha left unanswered (avyakrita, e.g., Majjhima Nikaya,
1.426-32; see Pr 535-37), irrelevant to the soteriological goal of ending
suffering.

More generally, these critiques of God had a soteriological objective and

were not made out of a disinterested philosophical interest: to remove any
possible mental idols that we may become attached to and thus to facilitate
the end of suffering. This soteriological perspective may have affected the
Madhyamikas’ judgment on the issue, but it consistent with the rest of their
program. And since there is no creator god, there is no God to experience
and thus, unlike in the West, there is no argument for the existence of God
based on religious experience. But most important from the Buddhist point
of view, even if there were a creator god, an experience of him would not
end the problem of suffering, as Bhavaviveka points out (MHK 9.118) —
experiencers would still have an image in their mind, and the mind must be
emptied of all conceptual content for liberation to occur.
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Index
Abhidharma, 14, 60, 65-70, 72, 115-16, cognition (vijnanavijnana 148,
151-52, 181, 193 148, 151-52, 181, 193
Advaita Vedanta, 174 59, 62-64, 76, 81, 82, 90, 116, 119,
aggregates, bodily, 8, 13, 17-21, 26, 55, 125, 132, 133, 149, 152, 156, 172,
187 94-95, 100, 115-20, 142, 179, 189, 193, Collection of the Teachings,
162-164 195 compassion (karuna), 4, 24, 26, 27, 80,
Akshamati Sutra, 81 84, 85, 86, 91, 99, 128, 133, 142, 143,
Akshayamatinirdesha Sutra, 45 , 45
Ames, William, 182 98
annihilationism, 79-80, 102, 107-108, conceptual projection (prapancha),
28, 188 48, 81-84, 91-92, 99, 101, 117, 125,
argumentation, 22-23, 30-35, 39, 40-41, 128-29, 132, 133, 186-87 55, 98,
178-80 conceptualization (kalpana), 16, 19, 28,
Aryadeva, 31, 57, 83, 86, 93, 107, 108, 199 58-59, 77, 82-83, 87, 117-18,
125, 126, 128-29, 133, 150, 157, 173, 182, 184,
Berger, Daniel, 177 186-87
Bhagavad-gita, 165 , 165
Bhavaviveka (Bhavya), 30-34, 35-36, 37, Bhavaviveka (Bhavya), 30-34,
35-36, 37, 39-41, 42, 43, 83, 169-174, 177-80, 108, 113, 122, 123, 124,
131, 148, 149, 181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 190, 191, 202, 150, 151, 158, 171,
181, 182, 183, 188, 204 194, 195, 202, 203, 204
bodhisattva, 4, 9, 13,24, 27, 28, 52, 83, consciousness, 8, 9, 11, 14, 17, 19,
28, 72, 111-12, 129, 133, 135, 136, 141, 142, 143, 111-12, 129, 133, 135,
136, 141, 142, 143, 151, 152, 162-64, 192-96 54, 157, 169, 185, 186, 187,
189, 193,
body, 19,116, 146-47, 154-55 194, 203
Buddha, 8 et passim conventional truth (samvriti), 5, 6-7,
Buddhapalita, 30-34, 35, 42, 43,177, 189 15, 21, 23, 27, 28, 36-37, 38-39,
45, 46, 55-56, 66, 72, 73-74, 85, 89, 90,
causation, 6-7, 14-16, 22, 46-47, 60-63, 93-94, 100, 102, 126, 131, 134,
147-48, 131, 157-59, 179, 182, 195-96, 199, 149, 151, 156-57, 161, 179,
184-86, 187, 202 188, 193, 194, 195, 197
Chandrakirti, v, 3, 4- 134, 177-91 creator god, 16, 36, 43, 157-58, 165-74,
Clearly-worded Commentary, 30-133 199-204
Cloud of Jewels Sutra, 163 cycle of rebirths (samsara), 4, 17, 25,

209 27, 45-46, 55, 70,76, 81-83, 86, 93, 96, 99, 114, 117, 125, 126-27, 128,
130 133-34, 137, 149, 150, 152, 173, 187, 189, 191, 203

defining-characteristic ( lakshanalakshana
26, 49-60, 64-65, 71-72, 107, 121,
183, 185, 190
dependent-arising, 4, 16, 25, 30, 43-45,
76, 99, 104-106,112-14, 131, 172, 185,
186, 189
dependent designation, 107, 133, 189,
193
Dignaga, 41-42, 49, 57,165, 178, 180-181 Dhyayitamushti Sutra, 114
Discourse to Katyayana, 45, 76 Dyadhashatika Sutra, 107
exchanging oneself for others, 141-45, 197
existence (sat) and nonexistence, 15, 17, 18, 21-22, 24, 39, 45, 55, 57, 64-
66, 73, 76-79, 80-81, 83, 86, 88, 98-99, 73, 76-79, 80-81, 83, 86, 88, 98-99,
60, 166, 167, 168, 182, 185, 188, 194, 195, 199, 201
eye-defect analogy, 6-7, 10, 11, 15, 38-39, 49, 59, 71, 72, 73-74, 80, 87, 90,
92, 118, 183

feelings, 17, 25, 44, 50, 55, 82, 95, 152, 155-56, 158, 159
four options, 6, 27, 127, 166, 167, 168, 182, 197, 200

effects, 22, 27, 31, 43 60-62, 67-70, 93, 95, 106, 131, 200
elements, 15, 19, 21, 37, 57, 85, 90, 93, 157-58, 203
157-58, 203
83, 86, 87, 88-89, 92, 93, 94, 94-99, 101-115, 116, 117, 121, 125, 129, 133,
134, 150, 151-52, 159-61, 163, 164, 165, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 185-86,
187-88, 191, 198, 199, 204
emptiness, types of, 23-27
emptiness of emptiness, 24, 29
enlightenment (bodhi), 4, 24, 27, 28, 45, 76, 80, 83, 86, 88, 97, 110-112,
126, 141, 149, 151, 154, 162, 165, 173, 181, 183, 185, 186, 188, 192-93,
195
Entering the Bodhisattva’s Path, 136-161, 192-98
Entering the Middle Way, 4-29, 30, 46, 51, 53, 62, 83, 85, 100, 101
entities (bhavas) and nonentities, 26, 64-65, 75-76, 80, 118, 119-125, 148,
150, 158, 178, 179-80, 182-87, 188, 189, 191, 193, 195-96
eternalism, 79-80, 93, 102, 107-108 Garfield, Jay, 190
God. See creator god.
graduated teaching, 89-91, 132

Hastikakshya Sutra , 113 Hayes, Richard, 183 Hume, David, 197

illusions (mirages, phantasms, etc.), 7,

16,22, 44, 46, 80, 121, 148-50, 156,
160, 187, 188, 194-95
inexpressibility, 19-20, 53, 129, 131, 187,
202
Ishvara. See creator god.

Jains, 80

karmic action and effects, 13, 15, 17, 27,

28, 45, 81-83, 84, 85, 86, 99, 102,
112, 114, 115, 117, 119, 143, 152, 154,
158, 163, 165, 169, 171, 172, 183, 193,
195, 202, 203
knowledge, 6-7, 10, 13, 26, 44, 47-51, 54,
55-56, 58-60, 72, 76, 81, 82, 83, 84,
89, 91, 92, 96, 100, 104, 115, 118, 125,
128-29, 131, 132, 133, 156-57

~Index ~ 211

knowledge, means and objects of, 6-7,

47-51, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59-60, 76, 131,
148, 159, 179-81, 187

language, 87-88,90, 129, 184-86, 188, 189

Lalitavistara Sutra, 36, 94
Lankavatara Sutra, 13, 14
liberation (moksha), 4, 8, 12, 15, 16, 21, 23, 25, 45, 74, 76, 81, 82, 99, 102,
23, 25, 45, 74, 76, 81, 82, 99, 102, 57, 172, 174, 195, 204
Lokatitastva Sutra, 46, 52

Madhyadeshikas, 97
Madhyamaka-Shalistamba Sutra, 47 Mahavastu, 97
Majjhima Nikaya, 204
Mara, 161
meditation, 9, 11, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 40,

52, 85, 89, 95, 109-10, 114, 115, 131,

133, 135, 136-47, 152, 155, 159, 162,
163, 164, 172, 174, 187, 191, 199, 203 memory, 9, 12, 150, 196
mental afflictions (kleshas), 17, 46, 80,
81-83, 85, 95-96, 114, 115-17, 119, 120,
121, 129, 136, 138, 145, 146-47, 150,
151, 152, 161, 163
mental discriminations (vikalpa), See conceptualization.
merit and demerit, 4, 55, 86, 89, 97, 98,
105, 11, 129, 143, 148, 151, 160, 161,
162, 163, 164, 171, 172
Mimamsaka, 37-38
mind (manas),4, 8, 9, 10, 13-14, 15, 18,
19, 23, 25, 53, 58, 65-66, 74, 80, 84,
85, 136, 144, 145-46, 149-51, 152, 156,
172, 174, 181, 187, 202
morality, foundations of, 192, 197-98

Nagarjuna, 3 et passim
negation, 125, 130-31, 159, 179, 180, 183, 195
195

89, 188, 195

nirvana, 24, 29, 35, 44, 83, 85, 87, 88,92,
93, 96, 100, 103, 115-30, 133-34, 149,
157, 160, 179, 182, 184, 185, 190 Nyaya, 49, 153, 165

oneness and difference, 133-34

oneness and difference, 133-34
75

paradox, 190-91

paradox, 190-91
80, 106, 119, 134, 148, 149, 159, 160,
180-81, 184, 185, 186, 187, 190 Perfection of Wisdom, 14, 26, 81, 83,
105, 114, 197
person, 11, 13, 17-21, 55, 80, 100, 122, 189,
193-95, 196-97
phenomena (dharmas), basic, 23, 25,
39, 44, 65-66, 69, 72, 73, 81, 83, 84,
92-93, 97, 98, 105, 107, 107-108, 113,
114-15, 117-18, 128, 129, 130
Pitaputrasamagama Sutra, 113
Prasangika, v, 177, 178
Priest, Graham, 190
proposition (paksha), 6, 31-32, 35, 37,
38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47,
49,55, 77, 86, 87, 105, 120, 124, 130,
131, 178, 180
protection, 162-63
Pudgalavada, 80, 122
purification, 163-64

qualifying, 37-39

Ratnachudaparipriccha Sutra , 51 Ratnakara Sutra, 69

Ratnakuta Sutra, 45, 46, 77, 86 reality (tattva, yathabhutam, tathata),

4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 21, 24,

26, 29, 44, 48, 52, 55, 57, 72, 76, 82,
84, 86, 87-88, 90, 91-93, 99, 101, 125, 128, 129, 131, 133, 147, 148, 150,
125, 128, 129, 131, 133, 147, 148, 150, 86, 187-88, 189, 190-92, 193, 194,
196, 198, 199, 200, 204
rebirth. See cycle of rebirths.
rebirth. See cycle of rebirths.
37, 42, 43, 60, 120, 180, 181, 185 refutation, nature of, 22-23, 33, 104, 167
Refutation of Vishnu as the One Creator, 165-68, 199
release (mukti). See liberation. renouncing the world, 136-41
Robinson, Richard, 184
Svatantrika, v, 177

Tathagataguhya Sutra , 88, 129

Tattvasamgraha Sutra, 203-204 texts, final and provisional meaning of,

43-45, 84-87, 130

thesis (pratijna), 6, 11, 31-34, 35, 37, 39,
41, 187
translation, vi
truths, the four noble, 94-115
Tsong kha pa, 178
two truths, doctrine of, 6-9, 12, 14, 28,
36, 99-101, 102, 130, 132, 147-48

Samadhiraja Sutra, 45, 77, 80, 81, 88 Samkhya, 5, 17, 27, 31, 32-34, 36,
80,86,

93, 153, 158, 159, 179

Satyadvayavatara Sutra, 92
Sautranikas, 118, 119
self, 17, 55, 82, 84, 85, 87, 116, 145, 152-55 self-existence (svabhava), 15-
16, 70-79,

), 15-16, 70-79,

84, 184, 186-88, 190, 194, 195, 199,

200, 201, 202, 204
self-nature (svabhava), 25, 29, 70-74,
132, 181-84, 191
132, 181-84, 191

58, 59, 101, 130, 144, 155, 156, 169,

181, 183, 184, 185, 186
Shalistamba Sutra, 36
Shantideva, v, 135-36, 136-64, 178, 179,
192-98, 203
Shvetashvatara Upanishad, 202 , 202
30, 134, 186-88, 189, 191
snake/rope analogy, 118, 188
soteriology, 133, 191
storehouse-consciousness, v, 8, 9, 11, 28 suffering (duhkha), 16, 25, 26, 42,
47,
69, 76, 77, 79, 82, 92-93, 94, 97,103,
105, 108-109, 110, 113-114, 118, 191, 195

Udana , 123
ultimate truth and the ultimate point of view (paramarthatas), 4, 5, 7,
12, 13, 24, 27, 28, 29, 37, 39, 44, 48,
55, 80, 92-93, 100-102, 131, 132, 184

Vaibhashika Buddhists, 80, 118, 119, 122, 123

Vaisheshika, 37, 158, 165
Vajrasattva, 165
Verses on the Heart of the Middle Way, 169-74
view (drishti), 8, 13, 16, 17, 19, 29, 76, 77, 79-81, 82, 85, 86, 108, 110, 111,
112, 113, 114, 119, 127-28, 1334, 187

Williams, Paul, 193-96, 198

wisdom (prajna), 4, 7, 9, 13, 23, 25, 27,

40, 72, 83, 85, 133, 187

worldly conventions (vyavahara), 8, 9,
12-13, 14, 15-16, 17, 21, 22-23, 28, 40,
48, 53, 54, 55-57, 59, 71, 83, 93-94,
100, 179, 186

Yogachara, v, 9-13, 28, 80, 118, 148-51, 181 yogins, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 21,
40, 82, 83, 102, 152, 187