Morocco: Financial System Stability Assessment-Update: International Monetary Fund Washington, D.C
Morocco: Financial System Stability Assessment-Update: International Monetary Fund Washington, D.C
Morocco: Financial System Stability Assessment-Update: International Monetary Fund Washington, D.C
This update to the Financial System Stability Assessment on Morocco was prepared by a staff team of
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as background documentation for the periodic
consultation with the member country. It is based on the information available at the time it was
completed on July 8, 2008. The views expressed in this document are those of the staff team and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the government of Morocco or the Executive Board of the IMF.
The policy of publication of staff reports and other documents by the IMF allows for the deletion of
market-sensitive information.
MOROCCO
July 8, 2008
This Financial System Stability Assessment (FSSA) is based on a joint World Bank-IMF Financial Sector
Assessment Update of Morocco, performed in November 2007. The findings were discussed with the authorities
during the May 2008 Article IV mission. The authorities have implemented a large part of the recommendations of
the 2002 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP).
Moroccan banks are stable, profitable, adequately capitalized, and resilient to shocks, but the financial system as a
whole will need to adapt to the inherent risks of changing macroeconomic policies and conditions. Major reforms
have been achieved since the 2002 FSAP within a policy of actively promoting economic and financial sector
opening. The 2002 FSAP recommendations have been largely implemented. Although the financial system is stable
and considerably more robust than in the past, the liberalization of capital flows and increased exchange rate
flexibility present challenges for the monetary authorities, financial regulators, financial institutions and markets.
Purely financial spillovers from the global credit turmoil have so far been very limited because Morocco’s external
debt is low, with long maturities, and macroeconomic policies have been strengthened in recent years. Efforts need
to continue to control and further decrease NPLs, in particular in the former specialized public banks, and build
capital levels.
FSAPs are designed to assess the stability of the financial system as a whole and not that of individual institutions.
They have been developed to help countries identify and remedy weaknesses in their financial sector structure,
thereby enhancing their resilience to macroeconomic shocks and cross-border contagion. FSAPs do not cover risks
that are specific to institutions such as asset quality, operational or legal risks, or fraud.
2
Contents Page
Glossary .....................................................................................................................................4
Executive Summary..................................................................................................................5
V. Stress Tests.......................................................................................................................13
VII. Increased Openness of the Economy: Implications for Liquidity and Macroeconomic
Risk Management ............................................................................................................14
X. Capital Markets................................................................................................................18
XI. Expansion of the Banking System and Access to Financial Services .............................19
Tables
1. Recommendations and Action Plan .....................................................................................7
2. Structure of the Financial System ......................................................................................22
3. Financial Soundness Indicators of the Banking Sector......................................................23
4. Summary Results of the Stress Tests .................................................................................24
5. Summary Results of Liquidity Stress Tests .......................................................................25
6. Summary Compliance with the Basel Core Principles ......................................................34
7. Recommended Action Plan to Improve Compliance with the Basel Core Principles.......36
Figures
1. Macroeconomic Indicators, 2000-2007 .............................................................................26
2. Characteristics of the Banking Sector, 2006......................................................................27
3. Indicators of the Financial Soundness of the Banking Sectors of Emerging and
Industrialized Countries .................................................................................................28
3
Boxes
Operational Framework of Bank Al-Maghrib .........................................................................15
Appendixes
Stress Tests...............................................................................................................................37
Annexes
I . Recommendations and Action Plan...................................................................................29
II. Observance of Financial Sector Standards and Codes—Summary Assessment of
Compliance with the Basel Core Principles...................................................................31
4
GLOSSARY
AICA Association Internationale des Compagnies d’Assurance
ALM Asset and Liability Management
AML-CFT Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism
API Arab Payments and Securities Settlement Initiative
AXA AXA Protection Assurance
BAM Bank Al-Maghrib
BCP Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
CAM Crédit Agricole du Maroc
CAMELS Capital Assets Management Earnings Liquidity Market Sensitivity
CAR Capital Adequacy Ratio
CCG Caisse Centrale de Garantie
CDG Caisse de Dépôts et de Gestion
CDVM Conseil Déontologique pour les Valeurs Mobilières
CEC Comité pour les Etablissements de Crédit
CGF Central Guarantee Fund
CIH Crédit Immobilier et Hôtelier
CNCE Caisse Nationale des Caisses d'Épargne
CNSS Caisse Nationale pour la Sécurité Sociale
DAPS Direction de l'Assurance et Prévoyance Sociale
DH Dirham
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FNAM Fédération Nationale des Associations de Microfinance
FSAP Financial Sector Assessment Program
FX Foreign Exchange
GDP Gross Domestic Product
BAM Bank Al-Maghrib
IMF International Monetary Fund
IAIS International Association of Insurance Companies
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions
LOLR Lender of Last Resort
MADEX Moroccan Most Active Shares Index
MCA Microcredit association
MCI Microcredit institution
MEF Ministry of the Economy and Finance
MENAFATF Middle East and Northern Africa Financial Action Task Force
MREs Moroccan Residents Abroad
NIM Net Interest Margin
NPL Non Performing Loan
OMPIC Office Marocain de la Propriété Industrielle et Commerciale
OPCVM Mutual Fund (Organisme de Placement Collectif en Valeurs Mobilières)
PNB Produit Net Bancaire
ROA Return on Assets
ROE Return on equity
SCR Société Centrale de Réassurance
SME Small and Medium Sized Enterprises
SRBM Système de Règlement Brut Marocain
WB World Bank
5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY1
Financial spill-overs from the global credit turmoil has so far been very limited,
because Moroccan external debt is low, has long maturities, and macroeconomic
policies have been strengthened in recent years. The government, corporates, and banks
have minimal financing from external debt markets. Moroccan stock prices have hardly been
affected by the global financial turmoil.
Banking supervision complies with the majority of the Basel Core Principles for
Effective Banking Supervision (BCP). This is a significant improvement over the 2002
assessment. Since June 2007, the central bank, Bank Al-Maghrib (BAM) applies the
standardized approach to credit risk under Basel II, and tentatively intends to move to the
advanced internal ratings based (IRB) approach around 2010. BAM will need to work closely
with the banks to prepare them for safe and sound implementation of the IRB. The
supervision of insurance companies is also largely compliant with the IAIS principles. In
addition, there have been significant advances in capital market supervision.
1
See Table 1.
6
autonomous monetary policy and effective supervision. The authorities have taken
welcome steps in this context, and promulgated the new articles of incorporation of BAM
confirming its autonomy, a new banking law, a new anti-money laundering law, and a large
number of secondary regulations. BAM has also been equipped with modern surveillance
mechanisms. International practice supports setting a fixed term of office and explicit legal
grounds for dismissal for central bank governors.
The timing of the introduction of a more flexible exchange policy must be chosen
judiciously, and the preconditions for an inflation targeting regime must be in place.
Greater exchange rate flexibility could reinforce incentives for financial intermediaries to
expand risk management capacity. Continued efforts to improve the effectiveness of liquidity
management should facilitate the orderly transition towards increased exchange rate
flexibility. It is also important to ensure that financial intermediaries have adequate tools to
manage the macroeconomic and real sector risks resulting from an increasingly open
economy.
Insurance Sector
Consider review of the by-laws of the insurance supervisor by designating it an MEF Medium-term
independent authority or entity analogous to an independent public entity, in order
to increase its independence.
Access to Finance
Ensure open entry to the financial sector, to deepen financial intermediation and BAM/MEF On-going
stimulate competition.
Include clients of non-bank financial institutions and utilities in Credit Bureau BAM Medium-term
coverage.
Through household and enterprise surveys, identify unserved segments of the BAM / MEF Short- to
population to better target and monitor financial access programs. medium-term
Banking Supervision
Continue to improve knowledge levels of off-site and on-site supervision staff, to BAM On-going
match growing sophistication of the regulatory and operational environment (e.g.,
Basel II, IFRS, market risk).
Issue a new regulation on country and transfer risks and ensure that banks have BAM Ongoing
country and transfer risk management tools
Continue to monitor closely and reduce NPL levels in former public banks BAM Short-term
Monitor banks’ management of exchange risk and interest rate risk BAM Short-term
2
See Annex I for the full set of recommendations.
8
I. MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT3
1. Morocco’s recent economic performance has been favorable. Real GDP growth
averaged 5.4 percent per annum since 2001, against an average of 3.4 percent over the
previous decade. Real per capita income is rising and unemployment has begun to decline.
While the economy continues to be adversely affected by climatic conditions, as shown by
the slowdown in real GDP growth to 2.7 percent in 2007 due to a sharp fall in cereal
production, greater diversification of the economy has made growth less vulnerable to these
types of shocks.
3. The fiscal situation improved significantly through 2007, but the recent surge in
subsidies related expenditure poses a major challenge to fiscal policy. The budget deficit
(excluding privatization) fell to nearly zero in 2007, mostly reflecting the strong revenue
performance. However, the decision to not pass on increases in world commodity prices has
significantly increased the fiscal cost of consumer subsidies which are expected to reach
5 percent of GDP in 2008, and could lead to a widening of the fiscal deficit to 3.5 percent of
GDP. Over the medium term, curbing the growth of subsidy spending will be key to preserve
the fiscal consolidation of recent years and keep the public debt-to-GDP ratio on its
downward trend.
5. Consumer price inflation was 2 percent in December 2007 but pressures are
rising. Despite an upward trend since early 2008, with prices 3.7 percent higher at end-April
2008 (y-o-y), inflation remains relatively low, in part because administered prices have not
been adjusted since the beginning of 2007. Looking forward, possible adjustments to
administered prices, as well as high credit growth and net capital inflows, are likely to put
further upward pressure on inflation.
3
See Figure 1.
9
8. With bank assets equivalent to 109 percent of GDP in 2007 (81 percent in 2003),
banks play a central role in the Moroccan financial sector. The banking sector comprises
16 banks (11 private and 5 public). Additionally, six offshore banks are active, holding less
than 2 percent of system assets. The system remains dominated by the six largest banks
(Figure 2), which hold 85 percent of system assets. Bank credit to the private sector grew by
18 percent per year since 2005, and was equivalent to 66 percent of GDP at end-2007
(compared to 12 percent in Algeria, 61 percent in Tunisia, and 75 percent in Lebanon).
Furthermore, the financial system comprises 13 microfinance associations, and several
consumer credit financing, leasing, mortgage, factoring, money transfer and guarantee
companies.
9. Six banks are majority domestically privately owned; five are majority foreign
owned; five are majority publicly owned. Majority foreign owned banks hold 14 percent of
financial sector assets and 21 percent of banking system assets at end-2006. The government
continues to directly or indirectly control about 23 percent of the banking sector, down from
40 percent in 2002. Banks’ balance sheets consist mostly of loans (over 50 percent medium-
to-long-term), funded mainly by short-term deposits (82 percent of liabilities), mostly
unremunerated (Figure 2). Moroccans residing abroad hold 21 percent of deposits. In 2007,
government securities accounted for 15 percent of bank assets (25 percent in 2002).
10. As shown below, the former specialized public banks have been restructured
and opened to private capital but are not fully up to the capital and asset quality levels
as the privately held banks. This requires continued monitoring and guidance by BAM,
especially since it is not clear that these banks could receive support from within their groups
should they approach minimum thresholds for capital or liquidity. The former specialized
public banks account for only 7 percent of total bank assets.
11. Capital markets are increasingly contributing to financial deepening, with stock
market capitalization growing to almost 100 percent of GDP in 2007 (up from
85 percent in 2006 and 28 percent in 2002). Trading remains concentrated in a few stocks,
with six stocks accounting for 61 percent of trades in 2007, down from 73 percent in 2006.
Financial intermediation through the stock market still has considerable scope for growth,
nevertheless. The debt market is dominated by public sector bond issues, while private sector
corporate issues remain marginal. Mutual funds hold assets of DH 144 billion (16 percent) of
the financial system.
4
Transactions by nonresidents have already been liberalized.
5
See Table 2; data as available at end-June 2007.
10
12. Although it is the largest market in the Maghreb, Morocco’s insurance sector is
relatively small by emerging country standards. There are 17 insurance and one
reinsurance (SCR) companies, which account for 16 percent of the assets of the financial
system, with about DH 14.7 billion in premiums in 2006 (around 3 percent of GDP). These
institutions are not affiliated with banks.
13. With an average risk weighted capital adequacy ratio (CAR) for banks of
10.6 percent (minimum 8 percent), financial soundness indicators overall show that
banks are mostly adequately capitalized.6 After significant operational and financial
restructuring, the two former specialized public banks have CARs of 7.3 percent and
10.8 percent respectively (Table 3). The overall leverage ratio of the system is over
7 percent.7 Higher capital buffers are needed to ensure banks’ capability to adjust to the
prospect of further liberalization, increased competition, diversification abroad and
prospective capital inflows. In this context, and given the decrease in capital levels since
the update mission in November 2007, BAM decided to raise the minimum CAR to
10 percent by end-2008 and intends to raise it further to 12 percent by end-2009 depending
on the risk profile of banks.
14. Banks remain highly profitable, as a result of: (i) still high interest rate margins,
(ii) moderation of operating expenses (2 percent of assets); and (iii) an increase in fees
and commissions. However, a shift from unremunerated or low yield retail deposits to more
highly remunerated liabilities, and intensified competition of new foreign banks, could
increase the cost of funds. Moreover, while banks’ direct exposure to equity prices at
4 percent of assets may not be excessive, banks’ borrowers could be vulnerable to a
correction of the stock market, which has risen significantly over the past years. In case of a
stock market correction, banks could see fee income decline and some borrowers may not be
able to meet the required margin calls. This is an area that may need to be explored more in
detail by BAM. Data to assess the volume of banks lending to customers for the purchase of
securities was not available to the mission.
15. Banks’ liquidity ratios are tight, with liquid assets only covering 31 percent of
short-term liabilities in 2007. The ratio would be higher if account were taken of the
permanent nature of a part of the short term deposits. Foreign owned banks show even lower
liquidity ratios but may be able to obtain refinancing from their parent banks when needed.
16. Return on equity (ROE) continued to increase to 17.4 percent at end-2006, and
20.6 percent at end-2007. Interest income has been mainly generated by core banking
activities, i.e., loans, primarily to the corporate sector, with a small proportion still generated
by investments in government securities.
6
For one of the former specialized public banks the capital adequacy ratio is still below the minimum.
7
Capital to non-risk weighted assets.
11
17. Overall asset quality in the sector has improved, with declining NPLs
(10.9 percent at end-2006 and 7.9 percent at end-2007) (Table 3). Former specialized
public banks still show a high percentage of 21 percent at end-2007 (27 percent at end-2006),
which needs to decrease further. Private banks showed NPLs of 5.3 percent at end-2007
(7.4 percent end-2006). The authorities report that NPLs still largely consist of old loans.
Provisioning for the sector overall is adequate, with coverage at some 75 percent, but the
former specialized public banks have a coverage percentage of 63 percent.
19. The overall foreign exchange (FX) net-open position of the banking system is
within prudential limits set by BAM, and does not represent a vulnerability. In addition,
FX-denominated loans are provided only to clients with FX-earnings and constitute a
marginal 2.3 percent of total loans.
20. A comparison of financial soundness indicators for the Moroccan banking sector
with emerging countries in Europe shows an adequate level of capitalization and
solvency, an average level of profitability, but a higher ratio of nonperforming loans.
However, on the latter, the Moroccan banking sector compares favorably with other Maghreb
countries (Figure 2).
21. The restructuring of the former specialized state-owned banking sector is now
largely complete. This makes the banking system as a whole more sound and resilient. The
Crédit Agricole du Maroc (CAM) has floated 22 percent of its stock for purchase by private
and public investors.
22. BAM exercises banking supervision on the basis of the provisions of the 2006
banking law. Banking supervision applies equally to all banks, bank groups, formerly
specialized banks, and majority foreign as well as majority domestically owned banks. Also
the CDG is now under supervision of the BAM. Banking system regulation and supervision
is compliant or largely compliant with 21 out of the 25 BCP principles. This represents a
substantial strengthening since the 2002 assessment. BAM’s decision to increase the
minimum capital adequacy levels to 10 percent by end-2008 and its intention to increase it
further to 12 percent by end-2009 is also a welcome development.
23. The authorities have made great progress in their supervisory techniques. The
central bank has an effective tool for rating credit institutions (CAMELS-type). Significant
actions have been undertaken by the authorities to upgrade legislation, regulation and
supervision. New rules and international standards (Basel II, IFRS, market risk) will require
continued effort to train supervisory staff. Morocco is implementing the standardized
approach for credit risk under Basel II starting June 2007, and is tentatively considering to
12
introduce the Advanced Internal Ratings Based Approach to credit risk in 2010. The latter
will require highly skilled staff resources and budget, careful preparation, and extensive
guidance to the banks.
24. Under the banking law, BAM and its Governor are operationally independent in
making decisions on banking supervision. The Governor serves at the discretion of the
Sovereign. Accepted international practice typically tends to reinforce the autonomy of the
head of the central bank by setting a fixed term of office and establishing limited grounds for
dismissal.
25. BAM has an adequate range of tools for intervention in noncompliant banks or
those engaging in unsafe or unsound practices that put the interests of depositors and
creditors at risk. Since December 2006, BAM has an explicit internal policy on when it may
intervene to address problem banks, although this policy has not been explicitly tested yet.
27. Since 1996, Morocco has had a deposit guarantee fund financed by the banks
(with the exception of the offshore banks) to indemnify depositors should a bank be
unable to repay deposits. The fund is approximately USD 1 billion large, and covers
approximately 1.4 percent of eligible deposits. Banks’ contributions represent a percentage of
total deposits, which, under the banking law may not exceed 0.25 percent (the banks
contributed 0.2 percent in 2006). The banks should be invited to inform the public more
systematically (at the time they open new accounts, for example) of the protection offered by
the deposit insurance fund. This could contribute to broader participation in the financial
system.
28. Under Article 105 of the banking law, the deposit guarantee fund may
compensate depositors for lost funds (up to a maximum amount of DH 80,000,
approximately $11,000 per customer, including corporate customers). If the fund is
insufficient to pay out all eligible deposits, pro rata haircuts are applied to depositors claims,
according to the BAM circular 22G. On a highly exceptional basis and subject to the
Governor’s approval, it may also be used to provide repayable emergency credit to troubled
banks. Decisions on this are taken by the Governor, after consulting the CEC which includes
representatives of the banking sector. The fund has in practice never been used for this
purpose.
29. Nevertheless, in theory, this double use of the guarantee fund could potentially
be a source of conflict between the stability function and the deposit protection function
of BAM. BAM may call on shareholders or partners that directly or indirectly hold interests
equal to or greater than 5 percent of the institution’s capital to provide the financial support it
needs.
13
V. STRESS TESTS
30. Credit risk, foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk and liquidity risk stress
tests, as well as a multi-factor test, were performed by the mission, in close
collaboration with the BAM team. 8,9 Stress test parameters were set in consultation with
the authorities’ stress testing team. The tests were performed on each of the nine largest
banks covering 98 percent of the banking system’s total assets, on the banking sector as a
whole, as well as on four groups of banks: (i) majority domestically-owned, (ii) majority
foreign-owned, (iii) commercial banks, and (iv) former specialized state-owned banks.
31. The stress tests showed that the banking sector as a whole is largely resistant to
credit risk shocks (Table 4); however there are signs of vulnerabilities to concentration
risk and real estate exposures, with differences in impact from bank to bank. The
exchange rate tests had a marginal impact, also because net open FX positions are subject to
prudential limits (total open positions must be less than 20 percent of Tier 1 capital). The
banking sector appears well hedged against interest rate risk. Liquidity stress tests, which
assumed a five-day run on deposits,10 showed that banks could withstand four days of runs,
without interbank or LOLR recourse (Table 5). The multi-factor tests also did not lead to
inadequate CARs for the sector as a whole, although majority foreign owned banks fell
slightly below the required minimum.11
32. BAM staff has made significant strides in its stress testing capabilities although
it may wish to consider more frequent stress tests, also with more severe parameters.
Banks’ compliance with FX open position limits should continue to be watched carefully,
while ensuring proper hedging and monitoring of counterparty risk. Given further capital
account liberalization, interest rate and liquidity risk should be closely monitored.
33. In order to further integrate the Moroccan economy into the global economy,
the authorities are continuing their policies to liberalize the capital account and intend
to adopt a flexible exchange rate regime over the medium term. Accordingly, the
authorities have in recent years taken a number of measures to further open the capital
account.12
34. In August 2007, a number of additional measures were taken to liberalize the
capital account. These include: (i) increasing the share of export receipts that can be
8
Based on BAM data per end-2006. At the time of the mission, 2007 official data were not available, however,
as a robustness check, the team ran a few stress tests based on the then available and comparable mid-2007 data.
The results generally corroborated the conclusions of the stress tests conducted on the submitted end-2006
official financial statements.
9
See Appendix I, the FSI manual and the Technical Note on Stress Tests for more details.
10
Assuming a daily withdrawal of 8 percent of sight deposits and 10 percent of term deposits.
11 The multifactor tests did not include results of a deterioration of the large exposures, and the market risk
components of the multifactor test tended to compensate for the results of the credit risk components.
12
The capital account is already largely open; the restrictions apply mainly to capital flows from Moroccan
residents abroad.
14
Liquidity management
35. To provide an alternative anchor for prices in the context of a more flexible
exchange rate regime, BAM is preparing to move to inflation targeting. In order to
conduct an independent monetary and exchange rate policy, the autonomy of BAM has been
significantly enhanced.13 It has also considerably strengthened the analytical and operational
framework for monetary policy, including its liquidity forecasts.
36. The central bank has also reformed its communications and transparency
strategy to make monetary policy more effective, anchor inflation expectations, and
enable financial institutions to better manage risk. BAM now discloses the schedule of its
board meetings, issues a communiqué after the meetings, and publishes a periodic report on
monetary policy.
38. The surge in banking activity as well as the impact of the application of the BAM
reserve requirements to Crédit Immobilier et Hôtelier (CIH), Crédit Agricole du Maroc
(CAM), and CDG-Capital led to a significant decrease of funds available to the
interbank market since August 2007. Continued adaptation of monetary operations to
market conditions is therefore needed.14 More generally, increased use of indirect monetary
policy instruments, as opposed to reliance on reserve requirements, could help stimulate
market development.
13
Specific measures taken over the past few years to reinforce the authority of BAM include internal reforms at
the central bank, strengthening the analytical framework and monetary policy implementation capacity,
developing BAM’s forecasting ability, and improving the understanding of the functioning of credit markets
and the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
14
In light of liquidity shortages that developed, BAM decided to reduce reserve requirements from 16.5 percent
to 15 percent as of January 1, 2008.
15
39. The government bond market has deepened, and the Treasury has issued
securities with maturities of up to 30 years. Recent fiscal consolidation efforts have
reduced the Treasury’s need to borrow in the market, and thereby diminished the issuance
volume.15 It is nevertheless essential for the further development of the market that the
Treasury maintains a presence at key benchmark points on the yield curve.
40. The creation of a Money Market Committee, which sets the amounts to which
BAM will intervene through its weekly auctions, improved transparency and
forecasting models, as well as improved communication with the Treasury have helped
strengthen liquidity management. More actions can be taken to strengthen forecasting,
including: (i) more accurate forecasts on the Treasury position with the central bank;
(ii) remuneration of the Treasury account at BAM, which would stimulate effective cash
management; and (iii) coordination between Treasury and BAM money market operations.
41. The calm macroeconomic situation of recent years, together with the stability of
exchange and interest rates, mean that the capacity of financial intermediaries to
manage risks in a more challenging environment has yet to be tested.16 However, the
increased openness of the Moroccan economy implies an increase in risk. In particular, an
explicit exchange rate guarantee in the context of a more open capital account can lead to
underestimation of FX risk in investment decisions. Increased capital flows can also put
pressure on the peg and lead to decreased control over monetary conditions. In order to
successfully manage the exchange rate in the context of a further opening of the capital
account, the authorities will need to closely monitor market signals with regard to the rate of
the dirham. Financial intermediaries also must have adequate tools to manage risks
associated with an increasingly open economy.
15
Despite the diminished volume on the primary market in 2007, secondary market activity contimued to
increase driven by an active repo market, whereas outright transactions declined.
16
Banks run daily VaR tests to monitor FX risk. Also, they actively use hedging instruments to mitigate risk
including foreign exchange swaps, forward outright transactions and FX options. Moreover, prudential limits
and restrictions are applied to the FX positions. Interest rate risk is hedged through swaps.
16
42. The introduction of a more flexible exchange policy must be carefully timed also
taking into account the need to put in place the preconditions for an inflation targeting
regime. It is essential that the authorities, markets and institutions prepare carefully, by
continuing efforts towards: (i) ensuring a sound public finance position; (ii) strengthening
liquidity management; (iii) developing the interbank and government bond markets;
(iv) ensuring consistency between monetary policy signals and domestic liquidity conditions,
and (v) ensuring transparency of the authorities’ policy intentions, notably with regard to
inflation control and the capital account liberalization strategy.
43. The non-bank financial institutions hold broadly one third of the financial
system’s assets, and with 5.3 percent of the financial system’s assets, equivalent to about
10 percent of GDP at end-2006, the Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion (CDG) remains the
largest nonbank financial institution. It continues to be a key instrument of the
government’s financial policy. The CDG has a significant presence in the different financial
markets in 2006. It is currently the most important player on the primary market and is the
second largest on the secondary market for Treasury securities.
44. The CDG’s transparency and market orientation should remain a prime
objective. The CDG’s high profile in the public securities market should not lead to any
distortion of prices in the fixed-income markets. It plays a key role in managing contractual
savings, which could generate hidden costs for the management of pension systems. The
opening of the capital account would allow a share of pension fund assets to be invested
abroad, thus creating competition in a core CDG business activity.
45. Expanded prudential supervision of the CDG represents a major step forward.
The authorities should ensure that the recent trend towards transparency and market
orientation is irreversible.
46. The Poste du Maroc plays a key role as a provider of depository, payments and
other retail banking services for small savers. With over 1600 branches, 850 of which are
authorized to perform financial transactions, the postal service takes demand and time
deposits from about 13 percent of the population (though it still represents only 2 percent of
total financial sector assets) .17 The amounts placed in saving accounts are transferred to the
CDG to be invested in the financial markets. Since the introduction of the new banking law,
and the adoption of the implementation decree in May 2007, the Poste du Maroc is subject to
BAM supervision. The Poste du Maroc submits periodic reports to BAM, which can exercise
on-site and off-site supervision.18 The on-site program should commence. With the assistance
of an international consulting group, Poste du Maroc is considering transforming itself into a
17
This ratio is obtained by adding the number of term and demand accounts and dividing it by the population.
The existence of accounts held by Moroccans resident abroad as well as the possibility that a single individual
may hold several accounts would decrease this ratio.
18
According to the law, BAM must in particular: (i) ensure that the accounting and organizational structures are
adequate and that the internal control systems are in place; and (ii) that the financial statements are of good
quality.
17
more commercially oriented entity, which would require it to obtain a full banking license in
due course.
47. The microcredit sector has developed into a vibrant sector, providing credit to
1.1 million creditors (3.7 percent of the population). The total amount of loans has more
than quintupled since 2003, amounting to DH 5 billion in 2007. The volume of the unmet
demand for credit, coupled with the fact that microcredit associations (MCAs) facilitate
access to bank financing, are the source of this robust growth. Through the microcredit
associations, the MCAs can obtain commercial funding to finance this growth. Driven by
this upswing, the MCAs now represent 0.5 percent of financial sector assets, a sharp increase
since 2003. The MCAs are supervised by BAM, since the introduction of the new banking
law in 2006, and are required to report to BAM on a quarterly basis on compliance with
prudential ratios. A special chart of accounts for MCAs has been adopted.
48. Authorizing the MCAs to take retail deposits from the general public would
eventually require that an appropriate form of prudential supervision be exercised over
their activities. International experience has demonstrated the importance that the
development of MCAs not be hindered by an unduly heavy regulatory and supervisory
burden.
49. The Caisse Centrale de Garantie (CCG: Central Guarantee Fund) currently
operates 14 guarantee and co-financing operations on behalf of, and with the backing of
the government. Its operations, like those of the postal service, are subject to the banking
law. The 14 programs cover a range of sectors from support for young entrepreneurs to
property ownership programs.
50. The insurance market appears to be both concentrated and stable and has
grown steadily over the past years (by 12 percent in 2006 and 20 percent in 2007).
Turnover of the direct insurance market amounted to DH 17.7 billion in 2007. Of the
17 direct insurance companies, ten are significant and the largest three account for 53 percent
of the market. The sector also comprises one domestic re-insurer, the Central Reinsurance
Company (SCR).
51. The Moroccan insurance market is the second largest in Africa, after South
Africa. It is the leading market in the Maghreb and in the Arab world. Nevertheless,
premia amount to only 3 percent of GDP, and insurance consumption amounts to about $65
per capita per year, indicating considerable potential for expansion of the market. Conditions
for new entrants should therefore be clear and transparent.
52. The state-owned Central Reinsurance Company (SCR) is the only Moroccan re-
insurer. It is now largely funded by transfers, guaranteed by the government, of 10 percent
of the premia collected in the Moroccan insurance market. However, these legal transfers are
18
to be phased out by 2013. In 2006, the turnover of SCR acceptances amounted to DH 1.7
billion, and its capital was increased from DH 300 million to DH 1 billion.
53. The sector showed a small deficit in 2002, but returned to overall profitability in
2006, with an overall profit of DH 1.3 billion (9.1 percent of turnover), as a result of
better management. The market’s solvency margin (equity) appears solid over the period
2002-2006, with 5.12 times the minimum requirement in 2006. The representation of
regulated liabilities by assets under the insurance code was maintained at a high level over
the period, in the order of 106 percent in 2006.
54. Much progress has been made since 2002, in terms of both form and content of
insurance sector supervision, exercised by the Insurance and Social Welfare Directorate
of the Ministry of Finance (DAPS). Regulations are complete, and are based on the EU
insurance directives, including advanced provisions on corporate governance and internal
controls. The main deficiencies found were in the licensing procedure and the incomplete
separation in distinct legal entities of life and annuity insurance on the one hand, and non-life
insurance on the other. Further enhancement of the independence of the regulator is needed.
X. CAPITAL MARKETS
55. Capital markets represent a growing share of the financial sector with stock
market capitalization at 73 percent of GDP in 2006 and 98 percent of GDP in 2007.
Nevertheless, a move by corporates from bank credit toward the capital markets is still
limited in scope, and the domestic equity market, notwithstanding its volume in absolute
terms, has yet to play an economic role commensurate with its volume. The number of traded
stocks is still limited (63 in 2006, 73 in 2007) and trades are concentrated in relatively few
stocks (6 stocks accounted for 71 percent of trades in 2007). Banks therefore continue to be
the main source of private sector financing, while in the non-bank debt market, government
securities still dominate.
56. Developing the capital market further would require participation of larger and
more diverse listed firms, improvements in corporate governance of issuers, more
efficient market access and exit, and the presence of investment advice, market making,
and liquidity providing institutions. Moreover, to meet the needs of a developing and
increasingly sophisticated capital market, political will is needed, in order to build a stronger
legal base for the authority, credibility and powers of the regulator.
57. Good progress has been made to achieve these objectives. Since the 2002 FSAP,
Morocco has further strengthened the legal and regulatory framework. It also has undertaken
steps to increase the depth and liquidity of markets. The resulting structure observes
international standards and is consistent with the policies of greater economic and financial
openness, also for institutional investors with a longer term perspective. Generally, the
participation of the latter group of investors provides critical mass to financial markets.
58. Of particular interest are the strengthening of the powers and accountability of
the Conseil Déontologique des Valeurs Mobilières (CDVM; the securities regulatory
authority). This has largely been done through clarification of the powers of the head of the
19
CDVM, by decree of 2004, and the recent adoption of the Règlement Général (general
statute) on the operations of the CDVM. Moreover, the Board of the CDVM has been
expanded to nine members, including three government representatives and one BAM
representative. Powers of inspection and oversight with respect to the Bourse de Casablanca,
Maroclear,19 brokers, and various other market operators have been enhanced and the mission
of the CDVM clarified. Nevertheless, some issues remain outstanding, e.g., achieving the
right balance between accountability and independence of the CDVM. Many of the powers
granted are relatively new or are not fully operational. Hence, more time is needed to observe
whether the new powers are actually being used effectively.
59. Access to banking services has greatly improved since the assessment in 2002.
The percentage of the population holding bank accounts has increased from 15 percent in
2002 to 27 percent in 2007 (40 percent if one includes the accounts opened with the
Moroccan Postal Service)20 and the volume of credit has more than doubled since 2001, This
progress was due to increased competition, the need to diversify risks in the context of
adopting the Basel principles, and the favorable economic environment. The number of bank
branches has increased by 12 percent in 2007 alone, and the number of ATMs has tripled
over the past five years.
60. Despite this progress, access to bank credit is limited to a small segment of the
economy, notably larger enterprises and an estimated 10 percent of the population with
a fixed income or property to give as collateral. The rest of the population has access to
financing mainly through microcredit associations. The penetration rate of banking and
microfinance services remains low in rural areas. Over 75 percent if all bank credits go to
Casablanca and Rabat. Casablanca alone absorbs 62 percent of all private sector credit, with
an increasing trend since 2002, while the five major cities in Morocco account for more than
half of all bank branches.
19
Central registry and depository for securities traded on the Casablanca stock market.
20
This ratio is clearly overestimated. A large portion of these accounts is held by Moroccan residents abroad
(MRAs). The deposits of MRAs represent one fourth of total bank deposits.
20
such as other NBFIs (particularly, leasing and consumer finance companies), utilities, social
security, and tax authorities.
63. In recent years, the interest rates on lending to SMEs have considerably declined
(from over 12 percent in 2003 to less than 10 percent today). Thus, interest rates are
probably not a major obstacle to access to credit by SMEs. However, transaction costs for
current bank operations remain high despite progress in the payments system. The legal
regime remains complex and has gaps that could hinder the process of credit collection.
64. Implementation of the authorities’ 2004-2006 strategic plan for the payment
system has led to substantial modernization of the payment system.21 Since end-2007, all
payment instruments—including checks, drafts, and bills of exchange—are paperless.
Dematerialization has reduced the settlement periods for checks by 15 to 30 days nationwide.
BAM exercises oversight over the payment system.
65. A new law on the payment system and means of payment is being drafted.
Following the recommendations of donors and the Arab Payment s and Settlement Initiative
(API), a National Payments Council has been created. The platform for on-line payments has
also been established. In close cooperation with the local market, a large value settlement
system in real time (Morocco Gross Settlements System, SRBM) has come on stream. BAM
has also conducted a training program for payment system operators, attended by 160 local
specialists.
21
The team did not conduct an assessment of the compliance of payments and settlement systems with the
Basel principles, since Morocco was recently the subject of an evaluation by the Arab Payments and Securities
Settlements Initiative (API), whose report was completed in March 2007 and broadly concluded that the system
still relied heavily on cash transactions, and required a more complete legal framework. A second evaluation on
the basis of the Basel principles is scheduled for 2008.
22
The team did not assess compliance with FATF principles since Morocco had been subject to an AML/CFT
evaluation by the Middle East and North Africa FATF (MENAFATF) in 2007. The evaluation identified a
number of areas where the authorities could strengthen their efforts. After the discussions at the MENAFATF
meeting in Damascus in early November 2007, the evaluation report has been amended to take into account
comments of the Moroccan authorities.
21
67. For some years now, the Moroccan authorities have embarked on an ambitious
project to complete the AML/CFT system. More recently, efforts have focused on the
establishment of the FIU, and a decree to create an FIU has been adopted. A new law against
money laundering was promulgated on April 17, 2007, and its implementing regulations are
in the process of being adopted. As a testimony to their determination to combat potential
money-laundering and terrorism financing operations, the authorities recently launched a
broad public education and awareness campaign in 2007, with participation of the judiciary,
various involved professions and the financial sector.
Table 2. Morocco: Structure of the Financial System, 2004-2007
II. Non Bank Financial Institutions 254 350,382 46 70 254 395,115 46 76 270 474,960 46 83 311 537,340 44 87
Insurance Companies 18 79,134 10 16 18 84,945 10 16 18 91,518 9 16 18 109,501 9 18
Pension funds 4 84,243 11 17 4 101,836 12 19 4 112,209 11 20 4 129,045 11 21
Leasing 8 14,415 2 3 7 16,962 2 3 7 21,227 2 4 7 26,497 2 4
Factoring 2 789 0 0 2 980 0 0 2 1,125 0 0 2 1,494 0 0
Consumer finance companies 22 21,118 3 4 19 23,293 3 4 19 26,620 3 5 20 33,473 3 5
Brokerage companies 13 3,871 1 1 13 6,062 1 1 14 15,554 2 3 16 21,689 2 4
Mutual funds 181 81,040 11 16 185 86,470 10 17 200 129,090 13 22 238 132,138 11 21
22
Mortgage lending institutions 2 629 0 0 2 727 0 0 2 758 0 0 2 853 0 0
Caisse d'épargne (Savings)* 1 9,348 1 2 1 10,721 1 2 1 11,699 1 2 1 13,163 1 2
Chèques postaux* 1 9,038 1 2 1 11,891 1 2 1 10,113 1 2 1 9,934 1 2
Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion 1 46,162 6 9 1 50,798 6 10 1 54,717 5 10 1 59,224 5 10
Caisse Centrale de Garantie 1 595 0 0 1 430 0 0 1 330 0 0 1 329 0 0
IV. Total Financial System Assets (I+II+II 289 769,802 100 154 288 860,288 100 165 305 1,029,148 100 179 346 1,211,634 100 197
(*) Caisse d'épargne and chèques postaux constitute the financial services provided by Barid Al-Maghrib (post office). The amounts in total assets correspond to total deposits.
23
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Regulatory Capital 1/
Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets 2/ 13.0 13.9 14.2 13.2 10.1 9.6 10.5 11.5 12.3 10.6
Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets 12.5 13.1 12.5 11.8 8.8 11.1 11.5 10.0 11.0 9.2
Capital to assets 8.5 8.8 8.7 7.8 7.4 7.6 7.6 7.7 7.4 6.9
Asset Quality
Sectoral distribution of loans to total loans
Industry 25.9 23.6 24.2 21.9 21.0 21.1 19.8 21.9 19.9 19.6
of which: agro-business 6.4 5.7 7.1 6.2 4.8 5.8 5.3 6.6 5.9 4.9
of which: textile 4.8 4.1 3.2 2.3 2.6 4.0 3.5 2.7 2.0 2.3
of which: gas and electricity 2.6 3.0 2.6 3.2 3.6 2.0 2.1 3.0 3.3 3.7
Agriculture 4.8 2.8 2.3 1.9 2.5 9.0 8.2 5.4 4.8 4.8
Commerce 10.1 9.2 8.6 7.6 7.2 8.3 7.7 7.5 6.7 6.4
Construction 6.2 5.9 5.7 7.3 9.7 6.9 7.0 6.2 7.4 10.1
Tourism 3.8 2.4 2.3 1.7 2.2 4.8 3.7 2.9 2.3 2.5
Finance 11.0 13.5 12.6 13.5 16.1 8.3 10.7 10.2 11.4 14.0
Public administration 1.4 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.5 3.5 3.9 3.4 3.1 2.8
Transportation and communication 4.0 4.0 5.6 6.3 5.9 3.2 3.3 5.4 5.9 5.2
Households 25.9 27.2 25.4 27.8 27.3 24.9 26.7 26.0 28.6 28.4
Other 6.9 9.3 11.5 10.3 6.6 10.0 9.0 11.1 9.9 6.2
FX-loans to total loans 2.1 3.1 2.5 3.2 2.6 1.5 2.4 1.9 2.7 2.3
Credit to the private sector to total loans 97.4 97.4 93.9 94.7 95.2 95.6 95.4 92.7 93.1 94.0
Non Performing Loans (NPLs) to total loans 12.3 12.4 9.6 7.4 5.3 18.7 19.4 15.7 10.9 7.9
Specific provisions to NPLs 71.5 72.2 74.0 77.7 84.3 54.9 59.3 67.1 71.2 75.2
NPLs, net of provisions, to Tier 1 capital 27.5 26.8 21.0 14.4 8.3 81.8 75.3 57.2 30.3 20.1
Large exposures to Tier 1 capital ... ... 317.0 356.0 … ... ... 388.0 381.0 363.0
Loans to subsidiaries to total loans … … … 7.3 … … … … 6.5 …
Loans to shareholders to total loans … … … 1.1 … … … … 1.3 …
Interest rate average spread (b/w loans and deposits) 5.5 5.3 4.9 4.6 4.3 5.4 5.0 4.8 4.7 4.4
Specific provisions to total loans 8.8 8.9 7.1 5.8 4.5 10.3 11.5 10.5 7.8 5.9
General provisions to total loans 1.9 1.4 1.3 0.9 0.8 1.7 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.9
Profitability
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.5 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.3 -0.2 0.8 0.5 1.3 1.5
Return on Equity (ROE) 6.4 10.8 14.1 16.2 17.4 -2.0 10.9 6.3 17.4 20.6
Net interest margin to net banking product (PNB) 3/ 81.4 78.6 78.8 74.9 74.1 82.4 79.8 80.1 75.8 75.9
Operating expenses to PNB 51.8 50.4 49.8 48.8 46.8 53.4 94.7 50.0 48.4 46.5
Operating expenses to total assets 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 1.9 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.0
Personnel expenses to non-interest expenses 52.9 51.7 52.2 49.9 52.2 53.7 52.5 53.1 50.7 52.3
Trading and other non-interest income to PNB 19.3 22.1 21.0 24.8 25.9 18.2 20.8 19.6 23.9 24.1
Liquidity
Liquid assets to total assets 31.2 32.9 32.0 29.0 21.8 28.1 29.6 29.0 27.0 23.6
Liquid assets to short-term liabilities 40.0 42.3 39.5 36.2 29.3 42.6 42.4 40.2 36.8 30.7
Deposits to loans 172.0 173.2 169.1 160.5 147.2 138.5 142.9 144.9 146.0 135.2
Deposits of state-owned enterprises to total deposits 2.5 2.2 2.6 3.4 2.6 2.6 2.2 3.7 4.6 3.9
B. Single Factor
Credit Risk
Deterioration of collateral value (20%) 1 1 -3.5 60.2 12.2 -1.0 2.5 -4.2 11.3 -1.6 9.4 -1.2 10.8 -1.5 4,369 0.8
Step-wise migration of loan portfolio (20% and 50%) 1 5 -3.5 54.0 9.6 -3.6 2.6 -4.1 9.2 -3.7 6.8 -3.8 8.6 -3.7 6,485 1.1
Deterioration of loans to agriculture sector (20%) 1 1 -4.6 61.0 12.5 -0.7 4.2 -2.6 11.8 -1.0 10.0 -0.7 11.3 -0.9 3,603 0.6
Deterioration of loans to real estate sector (20%) 2 2 -4.2 61.0 10.9 -2.3 3.0 -3.8 10.1 -2.7 8.6 -2.1 9.7 -2.5 4,982 0.9
deterioration of loans to textile sector (20%) 1 1 -0.3 61.0 13.0 -0.2 6.7 -0.1 12.7 -0.2 10.5 -0.2 12.1 -0.2 2,394 0.4
Default of large exposures 6 1 -13.6 13.3 6.6 -6.6 6.3 -0.5 7.2 -5.6 4.7 -6.0 6.5 -5.7 25,148 4.4
24
Interest Rate Risk 4/
Net Interest Margin
Parallel shift of yield curve (+), 200 b.p.s 0 0 9.4 21.1 13.4 0.2 … … 13.0 0.1 10.8 0.1 12.4 0.1 0 0.0
Parallel shift of yield curve (-), 200 b.p.s 0 0 9.2 21.7 13.0 -0.2 … … 12.7 -0.1 10.5 -0.1 12.1 -0.1 0 0.0
Economic Value 0 2 7.3 9.7 11.5 -1.7 … … 7.7 -5.1 9.1 -1.5 11.5 -0.8 n.a n.a
C. Multi-factors scenarios
Scenario 1 5/ 0 4 6.5 19.0 10.5 -2.7 … … 10.0 -2.8 7.5 -3.2 9.4 -2.9 1,253 0.2
Scenario 2 6/ 0 3 5.9 20.2 9.7 -3.5 … … 8.6 -4.2 7.4 -3.3 8.3 -4.0 2,523 0.4
1/ Worst/Best correspond to the highest/lowest CAR of individual banks before and after the shocks.
2/ Former specialized state-owned banks.
3/ Total Recapitalization need to restore the CAR of the banks covered by the stress tests to 8 percent.
4/ Interest rate stress tests include only the 6 largest private commercial banks for which the data are available (former specialized banks not included). Economic value was performed by BAM.
5/ and 6/ Scenarios do not include former specialized banks given lack of data on interest rate risk. Results of market risk in some cases compensate for losses from credit risk.
5/ Deterioration of the loan portfolio, depreciation of Dhs versus Euro, and increase in interest rates. This scenario does not include the default of the large exposures in credit risk above.
6/ Deterioration of loans to key sectors, appreciation of Dhs versus Euro, and decrease in interest rates.
25
Illiquid banks
After day 1 0 0.0
After day 2 0 0.0
After day 3 0 0.0
After day 4 3 20.7
After day 5 5 38.3
The six largest banks dominate the banking sector's …which are mainly composed of loans on the asset side
assets... ...
Other assets
other banks 11% Cash and reserves
15% at BAM
9%
government bonds
2 largest banks and other
51% securities
16%
...and deposits, mainly unremunerated …this has contributed to banks' large margins which maintained
sight,deposits on the liability side... banks' capital adequacy and profitability...
25.0
Other liabilities loans
5%
20.0
debt securities
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
2003 2004 2005 2006 Jun-07
-5.0
Deposits
82% ROE CAR
…thanks to increasing net banking product which …these still register high levels of NPLs, concentrated
remains essentially composed of net interest margins on mainly in public banks.
loans...
50.0
Composition of Net Banking Product 45.0
100% 40.0
90% 35.0
80% 30.0
70%
60% 25.0
50% 20.0
40% 15.0
30%
10.0
20%
10% 5.0
0% 0.0
2003 2004 2005 2006 Jun-07 2003 2004 2005 2006 Jun-07
Net Interest Margin Commissions Trading Commercial banks Specialized banks
Total banks
UAE
Tunisia Turkey
ROA
Czech
CAR
Czech Peru
NPL Ratio
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
28
0.0
50.0
100.0
150.0
200.0
250.0
300.0
Mexico UAE
Spain
Czech Mexico
Mexico
Peru Turkey
Peru
Bulgaria Bulgaria
UAE
Greece Jordan
Turkey
Poland Peru
Jordan
Jordan Poland
Morocco
UAE Tunisia
ROE Egypt
Emerging and Industrialized Countries (2005-2006)
Spain Morocco
Czech
Egypt Spain
Capital to Assets
Provisions to NPLs
Greece
Morocco France
France
Turkey Czech
Government Suggested
Recommendation Counterparts Timing
Banking Sector Soundness and Vulnerability
Carry out more regular multi-factor, and more extreme stress tests; base risk BAM Short-term
hypotheses on macroeconomic conditions, in consultation with relevant
departments at BAM.
Continue to closely monitor banks’ on and off balance sheet FX risk, as well as Short-term
counterparty risk, as well as compliance with exposure limits, hedging and other
risk management techniques.
Commence preparation of program of on-site inspections of the Poste du Maroc BAM Short-term
Continue to closely monitor interest rate and liquidity risk, e.g. monitoring of the BAM Short-term
stability of short-term deposits; adjust accordingly the hypotheses of interest rate
sensitivity (in particular as regards the allocation of short-term liabilities to
maturity buckets).
Validate banks’ risk management practices, to ensure banks’ preparedness for BAM Short-term
further capital account liberalization, greater flexibility of the exchange rate, and
adoption of advanced variants of Basel II.
Capital Account Liberalization, Monetary Policy, and Liquidity Management
Maintain transparency and disclosure of capital account liberalization, exchange BAM Medium-term
rate and interest rate policy reforms and sequencing of change, to enable financial
institutions to prepare adequately.
Improve information on Treasury’s operations with a view to strengthen central MEF/BAM Medium-term
bank liquidity management
Ensure consistency between monetary policy signals and domestic liquidity BAM On-going
conditions.
Increase recourse to indirect monetary policy instruments BAM Medium-term
Ensure Treasury presence at key benchmark points on the yield curve. MEF On-going
Insurance Sector
Amend the Insurance Code to set a time limit to respond to licensing applications, MEF Short-term
notifying the applicant of the decision, and to mention the possibility of appeals.
Consider review of the by-laws of DAPS to increase its independence by MEF Medium-term
designating it an independent authority or entity analogous to an independent
public entity.
Capital Markets
Set fixed term of appointment of the Director of the CDVM, reconsider the level MEF/CDVM Short-term
of government participation, in particular limiting representation by the MEF
with respect to sanctions; provide more clarity as to the terms for awarding and
withdrawing licenses, and conform budget practice to new law
Make managers of intermediaries accountable for compliance and assure that all CDVM Short-term
entities/persons who deal with the retail public through sales or provision of
advice are appropriately authorized.
Assure that the CDVM coordinator actually shares information among national CDVM; IFIs Ongoing
authorities for effective surveillance over financial conglomerates; observe and
test effectiveness of implementation of new oversight powers and authorities, to
enforce CDVM guidance.
Continue to improve protection of minority shareholders; transparency of large CDVM with As soon as
shareholdings, and the protection of customer funds; and assure that the intra- Maroclear and practicable
settlement period trading of securities does not diminish the strength of protection La Bourse de
accorded to the settlement process Casablanca
30
Formulate policies to support market efficiency and stimulate longer term CDVM Short- to
investments; obtain necessary expertise to assure that the development of listed Medium-term
derivatives, short sales and other expansions of permitted transactions on the
market are subject to appropriate and sufficiently rigorous risk management and
that the prices obtained in the market have integrity.
Access to Finance
Ensure open entry to the financial sector, to deepen financial intermediation and BAM On-going
stimulate competition
Include clients of non-bank financial institutions and utilities in Credit Bureau BAM Short- to medium-
coverage. term
Through household and enterprise surveys, identify unserved segments of the BAM / MEF Short- to medium-
population to better target and monitor financial access programs. term
Consolidate government SME and housing development programs to highlight MEF Short- to medium-
their transitory nature; improve baseline information and reporting on outreach term
indicators. Monitor regularly costs and risks of programs.
Shift government focus from direct intervention in the form of guarantees or co- MEF Long-term
financing, to support development of enabling technologies and joint platforms,
such as i.e. reverse factoring, mobile banking, etc. Also, consider government
support for sharing of outreach models such as branchless banking models, to
stimulate innovation.
Continue to adapt supervision of microfinance institutions to latest developments BAM On-going
without unduly slowing their growth
Banking Supervision
Continue to improve knowledge levels of off-site and on-site supervision staff, to BAM On-going
match growing sophistication of the regulatory and operational environment
(Basel II, IFRS, market risk).
Issue a new regulation on country and transfer risks and ensure that banks have BAM Ongoing
country and transfer risk management tools
Modify the banking act so that BAM can engage with host countries in MoUs BAM Short- to medium-
without requiring that all cross border on site examinations be conducted jointly. term
Consider further measures to mitigate concentration risk. BAM Short- to medium-
term
Continue to monitor closely NPL levels in former public banks BAM Short-term
Continue to monitor closely banks’ management of exchange risk and interest BAM Short-term
rate risk
Payment systems
Promulgate a legal framework governing payments and supervision of the BAM Short-term
payment system, including the establishment of a National Payment Council.
Actively continue the campaign to recruit and train specialists in payment system BAM Short-term
supervision.
Anti-Money Laundering
Continue work within the Interministerial Group to implement the MENAFATF MEF, Ministry Short-term
action plan. of Justice,
BAM
31
68. Since the 2002 FSAP the authorities have made great progress in upgrading
their banking regulation and supervision system. Morocco is now compliant or largely
compliant with 21 of the 25 Basel Core Principles (BCPs) and materially non-compliant with
four. Points for material improvement include supervisory approval of major acquisitions by
banks, country and transfer risk, prevention of abuse of the financial system and relations
between home and host supervisors. In the coming time banking supervision will need to
consolidate past gains, and continue to adapt to a more sophisticated regulatory and
operational environment (Basel II, IFRS, Market risk supervision). It will also need to closely
monitor banks’ risk management responses, in particular to the opening of the capital account
and the introduction of a more flexible exchange rate regime.
69. The 2002 BCP assessment was updated in November 2007, based on the 2006
revised Basle Core Principles and methodology. The assessment was performed by
Juergen Dreymann, (Director, International Policy Affairs of Bafin), IMF, and Laurent
Gonnet (Financial Sector Specialist), World Bank.
71. Morocco’s economic performance is strong and growth is now more stable.
Annual GDP growth averaged 5.4 percent since 2001 (average 3.4 percent over the past
decade). The external position is comfortable, with a current account deficit of less than
1 percent of GDP (the current account recorded a surplus in the six preceding years).
Reserves stand at US$24 billion (6.5 months of imports) in 2007. The fiscal deficit fell to
nearly zero percent of GDP in 2007, and is expected to stay well below 3 percent in the
medium term. The stock of public debt is once again trending downward. After rising to
3.3 percent year-on-year in December 2006, CPI inflation fell to 2 percent by end-2007
(twelve month rate). However, recent developments, i.e., increases in oil and food prices as
well as high credit growth and net capital inflows can put pressure on inflation levels.
residents, and increased the scope for financial institutions, banks and enterprises to invest
abroad.23
73. With bank assets equivalent to 109 percent of GDP in 2007 (81 percent in 2003),
banks play a central role in the Moroccan financial sector. The banking sector comprises
16 banks (of which 11 private, and 5 public). The system remains dominated by the six
largest banks (85 percent of system assets; Figure 2). Credit to the private sector accounts for
66 percent of GDP. Capital markets are increasingly contributing to financial deepening, with
stock market capitalization at 98 percent of GDP in 2007 (73 percent in 2006). Morocco’s
insurance sector is the largest in the Maghreb, but is still relatively small by emerging
country standards, with about DH 17.7 billion in premiums in 2007 (around 3 percent of
GDP.
74. With an average risk weighted capital adequacy ratio of 12.3 percent (8 percent
minimum), banks are adequately capitalized, notwithstanding some remaining
vulnerabilities in the former specialized public banks. The leverage ratio has also reached a
comfortable level of 7.4 percent.
75. BAM exercises banking regulation and supervision, and has operational
autonomy. It has broad powers, in particular to issue licenses, exercise on-site and off-site
supervision, impose remedial measures, including fines against managers and license
withdrawal.
77. A well developed public infrastructure: Loan collection and collateral enforcement
have improved. Specialized courts have been established to settle business disputes. A
centralized registration under the Bankers’ Association will permit banks to check borrower
information. The Bankers’ Association is also setting up a mediation system between banks
and borrowers. A Credit Bureau will be created, providing negative and positive information
on banks’ borrowers.
78. Effective market discipline: financial statements are prepared and audited in
accordance with international standards. The IFRS format will be implemented in the coming
months.
79. Systemic protection: A deposit guarantee fund financed by the banks protects
depositors, and may compensate depositors to a maximum of DH 80,000 per customer. In
highly exceptional cases it can also be authorized to provide emergency credit to banks,
subject to acceptance of a rehabilitation plan.
23
Transactions by nonresidents have already been liberalized.
33
Main Findings
80. Objectives, independence, powers, transparency, and cooperation (CP 1). With a
clear mandate, reinforced independence and an adequate budget and staff, BAM is well
placed to exercise its supervisory mandate. An adequate budget provides the means to recruit
and retain good staff. Training accounts for about 6 percent of the institution’s human
resources budget.
81. Licensing and structure (CP 2-5). The existing regulatory framework is appropriate
for ensuring firm control over the operations of the sector from the capital point of view. It
could, however, be considered to require banks to obtain approval before acquiring shares in
nonfinancial institutions.
82. Prudential regulations and requirements (CP 6-18). Morocco has made very
substantial progress in the prudential area. However, shortcomings were noted with respect to
anti-money laundering activities (the FIU was not yet in operation at the time of the mission),
country and transfer risk, and cooperation with foreign supervisors.
83. Supervisory techniques for continuous supervision of banks (CP 19-21). In this
area, the authorities have made much progress. The central bank has an effective system for
rating the safety and soundness of credit institutions (CAMELS type). Moreover, close
collaboration has been established between the on-site examination and off-site supervision
functions. Contacts of banking supervision staff with banks are more “risk”-oriented, by
contrast with the earlier “compliance” approach.
84. Corrective and remedial powers of supervisors (CP 23). BAM has an adequate set
of powers to require banks to take corrective and to impose disciplinary measures. An
internal BAM memorandum provides guidance on the prerequisites for BAM interventions
against credit institutions.
11. Exposure to related Related party lending is limited to 20 percent. Banks’ Boards are informed
parties about related exposures. However, write-offs of related exposures do not
need to be notified, nor is Board approval required. Board approval of such
write-offs should be required.
12. Country and transfer At the time of the assessment no rules were in place to regulate country and
risks transfer risk, though progress is ongoing.
13. Market risks Banks are required to have market risk policies, approved by the Board of
the bank. Banks must perform stress tests and back-testing, although BAM
does not verify whether banks actually use the outcomes. A methodology
for on-site review of market risk would also be useful.
14. Liquidity risk Banks are required to calculate liquidity on a daily basis, using a maturity
bucket system. Liquidity risk management systems must be approved by
the Boards of the banks. Banks are recommended to have liquidity
contingency plans.
15. Operational risk Banks’ operational risk systems are monitored by BAM. Banks’ Boards
and management must oversee compliance. Banks must have a business
continuity plan.
16. Interest rate risk in the Governance bodies must approve interest rate policies and exercise
banking book oversight. Limits must be in place. The large banks conduct interest rate
stress tests.
17. Internal control and Laws and regulations lay down the responsibilities of the governance
audit bodies for internal supervision and risk management. The regulation on
internal control should give more detailed guidance.
18. Abuse of financial The FATF for Northern Africa and the Middle East has given a number of
services recommendations for strengthening the AML/CFT framework. At the time
of the update mission, an operational Financial Intelligence Unit had not
yet become operational. Banks are not required to vet relations with high-
risk customers at management level.
19. Supervisory approach BAM’s reporting framework requires that banks provide information on
prudential ratios, balance sheet and P&L statements, and statistical data.
BAM intends to strengthen its use of macro-prudential indicators. BAM
rates the banks using a CAMELS based system , as an input into its
supervisory programs and risk based bank soundness analysis.
20. Supervisory Banks are inspected on-site every one to five years, depending on size and
techniques risk profile of the bank. BAM intends to increase this frequency. After an
on-site visit BAM sends a letter to the bank. BAM’s bank rating system
ensures a systematic review of activities and condition of banks. BAM
meets regularly with bank management and the Board chairmen, as well as
with the external auditors.
21. Supervisory reporting Banks are required to submit periodic prudential reports, both on a solo and
consolidated basis. BAM can also require ad hoc information. External
auditors must report unusual developments in the banks’ financial
condition.
22. Accounting and Banks must prepare annual audited financial statements and a management
disclosure report. An external auditor must certify compliance, accuracy, and
reliability of the statements, and of the bank’s publicly disclosed
information.
23. Corrective and BAM may take remedial action against banks. Fines can be levied against
remedial powers of the bank or its managers or Board members in person.
supervisors
36
24. Consolidated Banks must report to BAM on a solo as well as consolidated basis. On site
supervision examination of overseas operations is possible but is required to be
undertaken by joint home-host teams. A commission has been created for
coordination among the financial supervisors.
25. Home-host BAM may conclude agreements with foreign supervisors. The requirement
relationships that on-site inspections abroad must be conducted in joint home-host teams
could be an impediment to effective cross border supervision.
Table 7. Morocco: Recommended Action Plan to Improve Compliance with the Basel
Core Principles
24
If no such response is provided within a reasonable time frame, the assessors should note this explicitly and
provide a brief summary of the authorities’ initial response provided during the discussion between the
authorities and the assessors at the end of the assessment mission (“wrap-up meeting”).
37
86. Stress tests were performed on each of the nine largest banks covering
98 percent of the banking system’s total assets, the banking sector as a whole, as well as
on four groups of banks: (i) majority domestically-owned; (ii) majority foreign-owned;
(iii) commercial banks, and former specialized state-owned banks.26 The stress tests were
conducted in close collaboration with the BAM stress test teams. The shocks were calibrated
based on historical time series when relevant, and expert judgment of the authorities and the
team. Stress tests were also run by the authorities separately using their own in-house
models. The results obtained by the FSAP team were largely consistent with those of BAM.
88. The banking sector as a whole is largely resistant to credit risk shocks; however
there are signs of vulnerabilities to concentration risk and real estate exposures, with
differences in impact from bank to bank. The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of some banks
falls below the minimum required following a deterioration of their large exposures and real
estate credit, but the capital injection needed to restore capital adequacy in the worst-case
25
Based on BAM data per end 2006; See Tables 3, 4, and 5. At the time of the mission, 2007 official data was
not available, however, as a robustness check, the team run a few stress tests based on the then available and
comparable mid 2007 data. The results generally corroborated the conclusions of the stress tests conducted on
the submitted end-2006 official financial statements.
26
More details on the stress testing methodology can be found in the financial soundness and stress testing
technical note (Volume II of FSAP report).
27
The calibration of credit risk stress tests was discussed and agreed on with the authorities, and based on
hypothetical scenarios mirroring previous macro-recessions based on discussions with the authorities, and
expert judgment based on discussions with on-site supervisors. Historical data series on bank by bank NPLs
were not available.
28
Data on collateral are not available. An increase in provisions was used as a proxy for a deterioration in the
value of collateral.
29
A higher migration percentage from doubtful loans to loan losses is assumed, given the higher probability of
doubtful loans becoming losses, according to the experience of the authorities.
30
Test 3 includes three sub-tests.
38
scenario does not exceed 4.4 percent of GDP. As in other countries with similar income
levels, credit risk appears to be the most important risk, followed by liquidity risk. The two
former specialized public banks are vulnerable to all shocks. Two of the three largest banks,
however, weather all credit risk shocks. The majority domestically-owned banks remain
solvent, but the former specialized banks show signs of vulnerability given their continued
high levels of nonperforming loans and their equity levels as explained in the FSIs section.
As of June 2007, the former specialized public banks reinforced their capital base.
89. The banks most vulnerable to the loss of value of loan collateral test are the
former specialized public banks. Also, some majority foreign-owned banks fall below the
minimum CAR after credit risk shocks (Table 2). Tests on the migration analysis of NPLs
affects mainly the former specialized public banks, the majority foreign-owned banks, and
one major domestic bank; however the latter is affected mainly because its capital is barely
above the minimum CAR before the shock.
90. The majority domestically-owned banks and the banking sector as a whole
withstand test 2). The results of test 3) reflect the vulnerability of one former specialized
bank to the agricultural sector, and the vulnerability of one major domestic bank, one foreign
bank and one former specialized bank to the real estate sector. Textile and tourism sector
shocks appear to have minor impact. The total sector is resistant to all shocks stemming from
a deterioration in loans to key economic sectors. Under the test for the effect of concentration
risk, all but two of the largest banks fall below the minimum CAR after the shock, and some
lose their capital.
91. In light of the authorities’ intention to move toward greater exchange rate
flexibility, four exchange rate stress tests were carried out. Net open foreign exchange
(FX) positions are subject to prudential limits (restricting total open positions to less than
20 percent of Tier 1 capital). As of end 2006, net open FX-positions stood at 8 percent of
Tier 1 capital.31 The shocks assumed both an appreciation and depreciation of the dirham
against euro and USD of 20 percent. The direct impact of these shocks was minimal. The
indirect impact of FX credit exposure to unhedged borrowers is also limited, as FX lending
stands at only 2.3 percent of loans (Table 1). Given their long euro and USD positions, banks
gain slightly from a depreciation, and lose slightly from an appreciation.
92. The interest rate risk tests assumed a parallel shift of the yield curve of 200
basis32 points and estimated the impact on net interest margins (NIM) and on the
economic value of banks’ balance sheets, using duration analysis. Despite a structural
maturity mismatch, Moroccan banks appear well hedged against NIM risk. This is mainly a
result of the predominance of (i) relatively elastic unremunerated deposits,33 and (ii) floating
rates for most medium- and long-term loans. Banks’ cumulative short-term maturity gap is
long; therefore, interest rate risk lies more in the downside, mitigated by the fact that interest
rates are already low in Morocco. The impact on economic value was relatively high for two
large domestic banks which lost 21 and 24 percent of their shareholder equity with a drop in
31
The dirham is pegged to a currency basket (80/20 euro/USD).
32
Based on historical time series (tails of distribution).
33
Hence classified in longer-term maturity buckets by authorities given their historical stability.
39
interest rates, and on another major domestic bank which lost 16 percent with an increase in
interest rates. However, the banking sector as a whole loses only 6 percent of shareholder
equity in the case of a 2 percent drop in interest rates.34 The impact on foreign banks was less
apparent possibly due to better asset-liability management tools from parent banks.
93. Liquidity stress tests35 assumed a deposit run (mainly Moroccan residents
abroad and large depositors) for five consecutive days. The test also assumed that
10 percent of otherwise liquid assets could in fact not be liquidated. Such circumstances
could be triggered by a loss of confidence and/or a flight to more attractive investments
abroad. All banks appear to withstand this shock during the first four days without interbank
or LOLR recourse. However, at the end of the fourth day, some medium-sized foreign banks
become illiquid. At the end of the fifth day, five banks become illiquid. Foreign banks appear
more vulnerable, but are considered to have access to liquidity from their parent-institutions.
95. BAM staff has made significant strides in its stress testing ability, although it
may want to consider carrying out all stress tests more regularly and with more severe
shocks.36 Banks’ compliance with FX-limits should continue to be watched carefully, while
ensuring proper hedging and monitoring of counter party risk. Given further capital account
liberalization, interest rate and liquidity risks should be closely monitored. In particular, the
stability of short-term deposits should continue to be watched and interest rate sensitivity
assumptions adjusted accordingly. In addition, banks’ risk management practices should
continue to be supervised to ensure their preparedness for further capital account
liberalization, greater flexibility of the exchange rate, and adoption of more advanced
approaches of Basel II. BAM could also consider incorporating macroeconomic risk factors
into the stress tests.
34
The results of interest rate stress tests are based on the maturity buckets of interest sensitive assets and
liabilities provided by the authorities. Part of the short-term deposits are considered by the authorities as long
term resources and are allocated to longer maturity buckets given their stability. This is reportedly based on
periodic studies conducted by BAM and as permitted by the Basel Committee.
35
See Table 5.
36
Currently, stress tests are conducted by BAM only occasionally.