REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS.

 G.R. No.
198780; October 16, 2013.

FACTS: On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were
married, as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage. On December 6, 2006, Albios
filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Fringer, alleging that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never
lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering
into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations.

Fringer did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to
set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. After the pre-trial, only
Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule.

The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC opined that the parties
married each other for convenience only. Albios stated that she contracted
Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship
and that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00.
However, she did not pay Fringer $2,000.00 because the latter never processed
her petition for citizenship

The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling which
found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking.

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REPUBLIC V. ALBIOS (G.R. NO. 198780;

OCTOBER 16, 2013)
CASE DIGEST: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY D.
ALBIOS. G.R. No. 198780; October 16, 2013.

FACTS: On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were
married, as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage. On December 6, 2006, Albios
filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Fringer, alleging that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never
lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering
into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations.

Fringer did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to
set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. After the pre-trial, only
Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule.

The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC opined that the parties
married each other for convenience only. Albios stated that she contracted
Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship
and that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00.
However, she did not pay Fringer $2,000.00 because the latter never processed
her petition for citizenship

The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling which
found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking.

ISSUE: Is a marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring

American citizenship void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

HELD: In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization

Service, established the principal test for determining the presence of marriage
fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a arriage is a sham if the bride and
groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were
married.This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to
instead demonstrate that the marriage was not ntered into for the purpose of
evading the immigration laws of the United States.The focus, thus, shifted from
determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the
intention of evading immigration laws. It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not
purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.

In the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, which declared as valid a marriage
entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that
a valid marriage could not be avoided erely because the marriage was entered
into for a limited purpose.The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee, further
recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a
nonsubsisting one.

Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely
given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A reely given consent
requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family
Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also
be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable
consequences of their act.

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact,
there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any
vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they
understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a
real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the
legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal. GRANTED.

 vs Alcantara (case digest)

Alcantara vs Alcantara

G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against

respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and Rosita,
without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the
purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a
person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain priest. They got married
on the same day. They went through another marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo,
Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties
securing a marriage license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. In her
Answer, Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a
marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil
Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She alleged that Restituto has a mistress with whom he has
three children and that Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack
of merit. The CA affirmed the decision.

Restituto appealed. He submitted that at the precise time that his marriage with the
Rosita was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just
went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a “fixer” who arranged everything for them.

He and Rosita did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license.  Assuming
a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the Rosita
was a resident of the place.

The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given
weight because the certification states that “Marriage License number 7054133 was
issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario” but their marriage
contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.
ISSUE:

Was the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio?

HELD:

No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage
license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on
the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local
civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the
marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license
number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified
the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and
Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties
herein. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of
official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to
impugn the validity of his marriage.

Issuance of a marriage license despite the fact that the fact that neither of the parties are
residents of the city or municipality which issued the same is a mere irregularity that
does not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal
requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

As to the discrepancy in the marriage license number, the court held that it is
not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error.  It does not
detract from the conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage
license to the parties.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean
hands, petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage
celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite marriage license.
Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise,
knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from
his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so
when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle
GR No. 183896, January 30, 2013
Abbas vs Abbas
 
Facts: This is a case filed by Syed Azhar Abbas, petitioner, for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Gloria Goo-Abbas on the ground of absence of marriage license, as
provided for in Article 4 of the Family Code.
Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan on August 9, 1992. When they arrived in the
Philippines on December 1992, a ceremony was conducted between them solemnized
by Rev. Mario Dauz and witnessed by Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez and Mary Ann Ceriola.
Present also is Felicitas Goo, mother-in-law of Syed. During the ceremony, he and
Gloria signed a document. Syed claim that he did not know the nature of the ceremony
until Gloria told him that it was a marriage.

In the marriage contract of Syed and Gloria, it is stated that Marriage License No
9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite was proven by the MCR being issued to other
couple.

 
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Syed and Gloria is valid.
Ruling:          No. As the marriage of Syed and Gloria was solemnized on January 9,
1993, the Family Code is the applicable law, particularly Articles 3, 4 and 35 (3).
Article 3 provides the formal requisites of marriage. Article 4 provides the effects of the
absence of the essential and formal requisites. And Article 35, Paragraph 3 provides
that those marriages which are solemnized without a license are void from the
beginning in exception to those covered by the preceding chapter.

Gloria failed to present actual marriage license or copy relied on the marriage contract
and testimonies to prove the existence of the said license.

Thus, the marriage of Syed and Gloria is void ab initio.

G.R. No. 175581               March 28, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x

G.R. No. 179474

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

Chico-Nazario, J.:

FACTS:   On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City
through the execution of a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the
age of maturity and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years. Then Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on
August 31, 1990. On June 3, 1993 Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.  Then
on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna. He contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between
the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had
lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage
was secured through fraud. The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for
the ground that the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa was valid. Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose assertion that
his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.  Jose filed a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the
proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 34 of the New
Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the legal condition that the
man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least
five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab initio?

RULING: Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for lacking the requirements
of valid marriage in which the sworn affidavit that Felisa executed is merely a scrap of
paper because they started living together five months before the celebration of their
marriage. That according to the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article
34 “No license shall be necessary for the marriage for a man and a woman who have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediments to marry each other… “ it means that a five years period computed back
from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day
of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity, meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the five years and continuity that is unbroken.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and
unwary parties. 

The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision that the marriage between Jose A. Dayot
and Felisa C. Tecson is void ab initio.

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO v. PEOPLE, GR No. 200233, 2015-07-15

Facts:
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage
Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information... for bigamy.
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang
since 2 June 1974,... asked petitioner to marry him.
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in
the crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single
when they got married.
She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second... marriage to her
should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage
was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, “her marriage was celebrated
without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code,
which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their...
marriage.”
Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy
CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy.
Issues:
But in the main, she argues that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second
marriage must be proven by the... prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry
each other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting.
Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the... previous undissolved marriage of the
accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused.
Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of
the following circumstances:
(1) when Santos was... courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they
openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like
petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible
witness compared with petitioner... who had various inconsistent testimonies,
straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the
former was the legal wife of Santos.
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she
was validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts’ imposition of
the principal penalty on her.
Archilla... holds that the second spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as
an accomplice.
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity.
If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a... matter of
defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos
took place without a marriage license.
The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage,
which reveals that their union was celebrated under
Article 34 of the Family Code.
Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would have been exempted from a
marriage license had they cohabited exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years
before their marriage.
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each
other for only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have
cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage.
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the
misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a
license.
We thus face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy
based on her... illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite
knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2)
falsely making claims in no less than her marriage contract.
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner’s illegal acts of feigning a
marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would
only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage.
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case
of bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a
marriage license.
But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of
Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based
on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least
five years prior their marriage.
In violation of our law against illegal marriages,... petitioner married Santos while knowing
fully well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under
Article 34 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago
is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is... hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to
four years of prision correccional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by... law.
RENE RONULO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 182438, 2 July 2014.

BRION, J.:

Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic
Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day of the wedding, the church's officiating priest refused to
solemnize the marriage because of lack of a marriage license.

With the couple and the guests already dressed for the wedding, they headed to an Aglipayan Church.
The Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner Ronulo, conducted a ceremony on the same day where the couple
took each other as husband and wife in front of the guests. This was despite Petitioner's knowledge of the
couple's lack of marriage license.

Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal marriage
ceremony.

The MTC did not believe Petitioner's defense that what he did was an act of blessing and was not
tantamount to solemnization of marriage and was found guilty.

The decision was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioner committed an illegal marriage.

RULING: Yes.

Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any
illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are: 
1. authority of the solemnizing officer; and 
2. his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
The first element is present since Petitioner himself admitted that he has authority to solemnize a
marriage.

The second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by Petitioner is tantamount to the
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.

There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. However, Article 6 of the Family
Code provides that it shall be necessary: 
1. for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and 
2. declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife.
The first requirement is present since petitioner admitted to it. The second requirement is likewise present
since the prosecution, through the testimony of its witnesses, proved that the contracting parties
personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.

The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law,
specifically Article 44, which states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically penalized, or
of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more
than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the
court.
As such, Petitioner was held guilty of violating Article 352 and was fined P200 as penalty.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
G.R. No. 154380           October 5, 2005
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24, 1981. They were blessed with a with a son and
a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. Lady Myros left
for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer in 1986. After few years, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree sometime in 2000 and
then married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived in California.

He then filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari
on the Decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

Held:
Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code be
interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

The article should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,one of them became naturalized as
a foreign citizen and obtained a divorce decree.

The instant case was one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two
Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently
obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed, she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the US. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if
the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

However, since Orbecido was not able to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization, he was still
barred from remarrying.

 
Republic v. Manalo
G.R. No. 221029
April 24, 2018

Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro.
Manalo filed a case for divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce
decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to cancel
the entry of marriage between her and Minoro from the Civil Registry and to
be allowed to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law

Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse
initiate the divorce instead of the foreign spouse?

2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the
Philippines?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken
into consideration. According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the
Civil Code Revision Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid the
absurd situation of having the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign spouse
even though the latter is no longer married to the former. According to the
Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code
requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not
discriminate as to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino
spouse or the foreign spouse. Also, even if assuming arguendo that the
provision should be interpreted that the divorce proceeding should be initiated
by the foreign spouse, the Court will not follow such interpretation since doing
so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.
In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the
Court ruled that even if Manalo should be bound by the nationality principle,
blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it will cause unjust discrimination
and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally
protected by the law.

The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the
equal protection clause. They said that the limitation provided by Article 26 is
based on a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The violation of
the equal protection clause in this case is shown by the discrimination against
Filipino spouses who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos who
obtained a divorce decree because the foreign spouse had initiated the
divorce proceedings. Their circumstances are alike, and making a distinction
between them as regards to the validity of the divorce decree obtained would
give one undue favor and unjustly discriminate against the other.

The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the
solidarity of the Filipino family but also to defend, among others, the right of
children to special protection from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development. The State cannot do this if
the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is limited to
only those foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.

2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types
of divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the
marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and
leaves the bond in full force.

The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court
to believe that the decree is valid or constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of
divorce must still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce must still
be proved.

In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on
divorce.
Marlyn Monton Nullada vs. The Hon. Civil Registrar of Manila, Akira Ito, Shin Ito and all
persons who have claim or claim any interest.

[G.R. No. 224548, January 23, 2019]

FACTS:        

In 1997, Marlyn and Akira (a Japanese national) got married in Japan. The document was
registered with both the Office of the Local Civil Registry of Manila and the then National
Statistics Office, Civil Registry Division.

The union of Marlyn and Akira resulted in the birth of a child, Shin Ito. Their relationship,
however, eventually turned sour and so they later decided to obtain a divorce by mutual
agreement. In 2009, Akira and Marlyn secured a divorce decree in Japan. The Divorce
Certificate that was issued by the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines.

Marlyn and Akira’s acceptance of the notification of divorce by agreement was supported by an
Acceptance Certificatethat was issued by the Head of Katsushika-ku in Japan.

Hence, Marlyn sought a recognition of the divorce decree in the Philippines by filing a
Petitionfor registration and/or recognition of foreign divorce decree and cancellation of entry of
marriage that was filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 26 of the
Family Code.

Akira did not file an Answer to the petition, notwithstanding summons by publication. The
Republic also did not offer any evidence to rebut the case of Marlyn.

The RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition. According to the RTC, the fact that Marlyn
also agreed to the divorce and jointly filed for it with Akira barred the application of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, which would have otherwise allowed a Filipino
spouse to remarry after the alien spouse had validly obtained a divorce. While the intent of the
law is to equalize Filipinos with their foreigner spouses who are free to marry again after the
divorce, the Filipino spouse cannot invoke the intention of equity behind the law when he or she
is an initiator or active participant in procuring the divorce.

Dissatisfied, Marlyn moved for reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial
court. This prompted Marlyn to file the present petition for review on certiorari directly to the
Supreme Court (this Court).

ISSUES:
A.       Whether Marlyn’s direct recourse to the Supreme Court from the decision of RTC is
proper.
B.       Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code has a restrictive application so
as to apply only in cases where it is the alien spouse who sought the divorce, and not where the
divorce was mutually agreed upon by the spouses.

C.       Whether there is a need to prove the foreign divorce decree despite the lack of opposition
from the OSG.

RULING:
A.      
The direct recourse is proper. This Court explains that it allows the direct recourse from the
decision of the RTC on the ground that the petition raises a pure question of law on the proper
application of Article 26 of the Family Code. “Direct recourse to this Court from the decisions
and final orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or
involved” [Rep. of the Phils. v. Olaybar, 726 Phil. 378, 384 (2014)]. In this case, the RTC’s
resolve to dismiss the petition filed before it delved solely on its application of the statutory
provision to the facts undisputed before it.

B.      
The legal provision that is pertinent to the case is Article 26 of the Family Code, which states:

Art. 26.  All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), [36, 37] and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

The facts in Rep. of the Phils. v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo [G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018], are
similar to the circumstances in this case. It was held that Article 26 of the Family Code should
apply even if it was Manalo (a Filipino) who filed for divorce. The decree made the Japanese
spouse no longer married to Manalo; he then had the capacity to remarry. It would be unjust to
still deem Manalo married to the Japanese who, in turn, was no longer married to her. The fact
that it was Manalo who filed the divorce was inconsequential.

Applying the same legal considerations and considering the similar factual milieu that attended
in Manalo, the present case warrants a reversal of the RTC’s decision that refused to recognize
the divorce decree that was mutually obtained by Marlyn and her foreigner spouse in Japan
solely on the ground that the divorce was jointly initiated by the spouses.

When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the
Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property
relation, it should not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary
consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual
obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to
exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are
freed from the marital bond.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien

capacitating him or her to remarry.” Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce
decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. “The legislature is presumed to know
that meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the
use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words
of a statute there should be no departure.”

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether
the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving
the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result:
the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at
the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not
make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of
the foreing divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operation of the latter’s national law.

C.       While Marlyn and Akira’s divorce decree was not disputed by the OSG, a recognition of
the divorce, however, could not extend as a matter of course. Under prevailing rules and
jurisprudence, the submission of the decree should come with adequate proof of the foreign law
that allows it. The Japanese law on divorce must then be sufficiently proved. “Because our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven x x x like any
other fact” [Ando v. Department of Foreign Affairs, 742 Phil. 37, 48 (2014)].

In ATCI Overseas Corp., et al. v. Echin, 647 Phil. 43 (2010), the Court reiterated the following
rules on proof of foreign laws:

To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which read:
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by his seal of office.

Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is
a correct copy of the original, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of court having a seal, under
the seal of such court.

Marlyn failed to satisfy the foregoing requirements. The records only include a photocopy of
excerpts of The Civil Code of Japan, merely stamped “LIBRARY, Japan Information and
Culture Center, Embassy of Japan, 2627 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City 1300”.This clearly does
not constitute sufficient compliance with the rules on proof of Japan’s law on divorce. In any
case, similar to the remedy that was allowed by the Court in Manalo to resolve such failure, a
remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings and reception of evidence on the laws of
Japan on divorce is allowed, as it is hereby ordered by the Court.

The fallo:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated

January 21, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43 of Manila in Special Proceedings Case
No. 14-132832 is  REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED  to the court of
origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on
divorce.

SO ORDERED.

THINGS DECIDED:

A.       This Court explains that it allows the direct recourse from the decision of the RTC on the
ground that the petition raises a pure question of law on the proper application of Article 26 of
the Family Code. “Direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and final orders of the RTC
may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved” [Rep. of the Phils. v. Olaybar,
726 Phil. 378, 384 (2014)]. 

B.       When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by
the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property
relation, it should not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary
consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual
obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to
exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are
freed from the marital bond.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien

capacitating him or her to remarry.” Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce
decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.

C.       The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether
the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving
the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result:
the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at
the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not
make a distinction.

D.       Under prevailing rules and jurisprudence, the submission of the decree should come with
adequate proof of the foreign law that allows it. The Japanese law on divorce must then be
sufficiently proved. “Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the
alien must be alleged and proven x x x like any other fact” [Ando v. Department of Foreign
Affairs, 742 Phil. 37, 48 (2014)].
Case Digest: Fujiki vs. Marinay
GR No. 196049, June 26, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married

respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines. The
marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not
bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact
with each other.

Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without

the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara got married in
Quezon City. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to re-establish their
relationship. Fujiki then helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family
court in Japan declaring her marriage in Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy.

Later, back in the Philippines, Fujiki filed a petition for a Judicial

Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the RTC. However, the trial
court dismissed the petition maintaining that Fujiki lacks personality file
the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to

recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.

RULING:
Yes, a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or
her spouse and a foreign citizen.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of

the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Section 1 of the said rule provides for who may file such petition,
to wit:

Sec. 1: Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located.

In this case, there is no doubt that the prior spouse, Fujiki, has a
personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations arising from it. Thus, he has the
legal personality to file the petition. PETITION GRANTED.

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR.

G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013

Facts:

In 1973, respondent Benjamin Bangayan married Azucena Alegre and had three children. Azucena left for the
USA in 1981 while Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with petitioner Sally Go-Bangayan and
eventually lived together as husband and wife in 1982.

Since Sally’s father was against the relationship, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Pasig City where they
signed a purported marriage contract in order to appease her father. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status,
assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.

During their cohabitation, they produced two children and acquired several properties. Their relationship ended
in 1994 when Sally and the children left for Canada. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification
of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn,
filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin
also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally. A total of 44 registered
properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court.
Issue: Whether the marriage is null and void ab initio and non-existent.

Ruling:
Yes. Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena in 1973 was duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a
certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage
in 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.

The registration officer of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City testified that there was no valid marriage
license issued to Benjamin and Sally. She confirmed that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue
Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate
to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification
enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license. Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the
marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.

It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by the
Local Civil Registrar, National Commission for Culture and the Arts, and the National Statistics Office. The
documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As
pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest" and "a
simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming
from relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives." In short, it
was a fictitious marriage.

The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally.

On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void.
The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to
the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if
the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as
lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not
bigamous because there was no marriage license.

For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity
except for the existence of a prior marriage. In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin
and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was
not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage.

Since Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage, the property relations of Benjamin and
Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply
to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is
not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of
the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Hence, the 37 properties
being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance was
correctly excluded.

@@@@@@@@

CASE DIGEST: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MERLINDA L.

OLAYBAR. G.R. No. 189538; February 10, 2014.

FACTS: Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a

Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her
marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered
that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National. She
denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the
alleged husband; She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the
Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.
During trial, She completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she
revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met
them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadel's Pension House. She
believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel
agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a
passport. A document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the
marriage contract was forged. The RTC decided in favor of the petitioner,
Merlinda L. Olaybar.

Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on

the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries
in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the
marriage void ab initio.
Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding
required. Considering that respondents identity was used by an unknown person
to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for
respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is
not one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: May the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract
which, in effect, nullifies the marriage, be undertaken in a Rule 108
proceeding?

HELD: Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary
or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is
summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a
party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia 225 Phil. 408 the Court has
repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected
through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the
parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding."An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial
court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly
weighed and considered.
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be
dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion.
However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down
in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the
petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim
interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires
the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it
states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is
after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are
followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial
corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is
necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards
of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for
the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children,
the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the
investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts
Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the
corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot
dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in
the civil registry. Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara,
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General of the National Statistics Office G.R.No. 196049, June 26, 2013.
While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of
marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the
parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent;
the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been
admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of
marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of
such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated,
in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the
wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void
as there was no marriage to speak of. DENIED.