Limbona vs. Commission On Elections, 555 SCRA 391

5/7/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 555
G.R. No. 181097. June 25, 2008.*
NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA, petitioner, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MALIK “BOBBY” T.
ALINGAN, respondents.
Election Law; Certificates of Candidacy; The withdrawal of a

certificate of candidacy does not necessarily render the certificate
void ab initio—once filed, the permanent legal effects produced
thereby remain even if the certificate itself be subsequently
withdrawn.—The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not
necessarily render the certificate void ab initio. Once filed, the
permanent legal effects produced thereby remain even if the
certificate itself be subsequently withdrawn. Section 73 of the
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881, as
amended) provides: Sec. 73. Certificate of candidacy.—No
person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files
a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein. A
person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior
to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the
office concerned a written declaration under oath. No
person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the
same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more
than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However,
before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificate of
candidacy, the person who has filed more than one certificate of
candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires
to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other
office or offices. The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of
candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or
administrative liabilities which a candidate may have
incurred. (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; The fact that a person’s certificate of candidacy
as a substitute candidate is given due course by the COMELEC
does not bar the COMELEC from deciding on her qualifications to
run as a candidate.—The fact that petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy as a substitute candidate was given due course by the
Comelec did not bar the Comelec from deciding on her
qualifications to run as mu-
_______________
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001794483a833fd0ff047003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/15
* EN BANC.
392
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Limbona vs. Commission on Elections
nicipal mayor. As correctly found by the Comelec: Said resolution

(Comelec Resolution No. 8255) discloses only the following: a)
movant is given the green lights to be the substitute candidate for
her husband who was disqualified; b) her certificate of candidacy
was duly accomplished in form and substance and c) the
certificate of candidacy will not cause confusion among the voters.
Clearly, no issue of disqualification was passed upon by the
Commission in the said resolution. Movant may have been given
the impression that the Commission’s act of giving due course to
her substitute certificate of candidacy constitutes a
pronouncement that she is not disqualified. It must be pointed
out, however, that the bases for giving due course to a certificate
of candidacy are totally different from those for enunciating that
the candidate is not disqualified. x x x
Same; Same; Residence; Domicile; Words and Phrases; The
term “residence” as used in the election law is synonymous with
“domicile,” which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention; For purposes of election law,
the question of residence is mainly one of intention.—The Comelec
correctly found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year
residency requirement. The term “residence” as used in the
election law is synonymous with “domicile,” which imports not
only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence
in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
The manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification
is to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the
latter, from an elective office to serve that community. For
purposes of election law, the question of residence is mainly one of
intention. There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine
where a person actually resides. Three rules are, however, well
established: first, that a man must have a residence or domicile
somewhere; second, that where once established it remains until a
new one is acquired; and third, a man can have but one domicile
at a time.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile of Choice; Change of
Domicile; Requisites.—In order to acquire a domicile by choice,
there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new

locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile. A person’s “domicile” once established is
considered to
393
VOL. 555, JUNE 25, 2008 393
continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is

established. To successfully effect a change of domicile one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a
bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one, and definite acts which correspond
with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Husband and Wife; Family Code;
Where there is failure to show that a wife maintained a separate
residence from her husband, and where there is no evidence to
prove otherwise, reliance on Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code
is proper and is in consonance with human experience.—We note
the findings of the Comelec that petitioner’s domicile of origin is
Maguing, Lanao del Norte, which is also her place of birth; and
that her domicile by operation of law (by virtue of marriage) is
Rapasun, Marawi City. The Comelec found that Mohammad,
petitioner’s husband, effected the change of his domicile in favor
of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on November 11, 2006. Since it is
presumed that the husband and wife live together in one legal
residence, then it follows that petitioner effected the change of her
domicile also on November 11, 2006. Articles 68 and 69 of the
Family Code provide: Art. 68. The husband and wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Art. 69. The
husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of
disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt
one spouse from living with the other if the latter should
live abroad or there are other valid and compelling
reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not
apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the
family. (Emphasis ours) Considering that petitioner failed to show
that she maintained a separate residence from her husband, and
as there is no evidence to prove otherwise, reliance on these
provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in consonance with

human experience.
Same; Local Government Code; Succession to Office; Where
there is a permanent vacancy arising from the failure of a mayor to
qualify or arising from her removal from office, the Vice-Mayor
shall
393
VOL. 555, JUNE 25, 2008 393
succeed as mayor, not the second placer in the election.—For

failure to comply with the residency requirement, petitioner is
disqualified to run for the office of mayor of Pantar, Lanao del
Norte. However, petitioner’s disqualification would not result in
Malik’s proclamation who came in second during the special
election. The rules on succession under the Local Government
Code shall apply, to wit: SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in
the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-
Mayor.—If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the x x x
mayor, the x x x vice-mayor concerned shall become the x x x
mayor. x x x x For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy
arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office,
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify or is removed from
office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. x x x x
(Emphasis ours) Considering the disqualification of petitioner to
run as mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, the proclaimed Vice-
Mayor shall then succeed as mayor.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Dimnatang T. Saro for petitioner.
Tingcap T. Mortaba for private respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a

temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction seeks to reverse and nullify the September 4,
2007 Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
in SPA Case No. 07-611 disqualifying petitioner to run as
mayor of the municipality of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, as
well as the
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 30-36; penned by Commissioner Rene V.

Sarmiento and concurred in by Commissioners Florentino
A. Tuason, Jr. and Nicodemo T. Ferrer.
395
VOL. 555, JUNE 25, 2008 395

January 9, 2008 Resolution2 denying the motion for

reconsideration.
Petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona (Norlainie), her
husband, Mohammad G. Limbona (Mohammad), and
respondent Malik “Bobby” T. Alingan (Malik) were
mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao del Norte during
the 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections.
Mohammad and Norlainie filed their certificates of
candidacy with Acting Election Officer, Alauya S. Tago, on
January 22, 2007 and March 29, 2007, respectively; while
Malik filed his certificate of candidacy with the Office of
the Election Officer on March 26, 2007.
On April 2, 2007, Malik filed a petition to disqualify
Mohammad for failure to comply with the residency
requirement. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 07-188.
Subsequently, or on April 12, 2007, Malik filed another
petition to disqualify Norlainie also on the ground of lack of
the one-year residency requirement. The petition was
docketed as SPA No. 07-611.3
On April 21, 2007, Norlainie filed an Affidavit of
Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy.4 Thereafter, or on
May 2, 2007, she filed before the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor a Motion to Dismiss5 the petition for
disqualification in SPA No. 07-611 on the ground that the
petition had become moot in view of the withdrawal of her
certificate of candidacy.
The Comelec en banc granted the withdrawal of
Norlainie’s certificate of candidacy in Resolution No. 79496
dated May 13, 2007, the dispositive portion of which
provides:
_______________
2 Id., at pp. 39-43; signed by Acting Chairman Resurreccion Z. Borra

and Commissioners Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., Romeo A. Brawner, Rene V.
Sarmiento, Nicodemo T. Ferrer, and Moslemen T. Macarambon.
3 Id., at pp. 106-115.
4 Id., at p. 157.
5 Id., at pp. 155-156.
6 Id., at pp. 198-200.
396

“The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to

approve the foregoing recommendations of the Law Department,
as concurred in by Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., as
follows:
1. To GIVE due course to the Affidavits of Withdrawal
of Certificates of Candidacy of the following candidates:
xxxx
Norlaine M. Limbona Mayor Pantar, Lanao del Norte
xxxx
2. To direct the Election Officers concerned to DELETE
the aforementioned names of candidates from the Certified
List of Candidates.
Let the Law Department implement this resolution with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.”
Meanwhile, the First Division of Comelec issued on May

24, 2007 a Resolution7 in SPA No. 07-188 granting the
petition filed by Malik and disqualifying Mohammad from
running as municipal mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte for
failing to satisfy the one year residency requirement and
for not being a registered voter of the said place, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is

GRANTED. Respondent Mohammad “Exchan” G. Limbona is
hereby disqualified. Accordingly, his name is ordered deleted from
the official list of candidates for the position of mayor of the
municipality of Pantar, Lanao del Norte.
SO ORDERED.”
The May 24, 2007 Resolution became final and

executory on June 2, 2007.8
_______________
7 Annex “1” of Comment. Per Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra

and Romeo A. Brawner.
8 Per Order of the COMELEC En Banc dated July 19, 2007. See Annex
“2” to the Comment.
397
VOL. 555, JUNE 25, 2008 397

Consequently, Norlainie filed a new certificate of

candidacy as substitute candidate for Mohammad which
was given due course by the Comelec en banc in its
Resolution No. 82559 dated July 23, 2007, the dispositive
portion of which states:
“The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to

approve the foregoing recommendations of the Law Department,
as follows:
1. To GIVE due course to the Certificate of Candidacy
and Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance of Norlainie
“Lai-Exchan” Mitmug Limbona as substitute candidate
for Mohammad “Exchan” G. Limbona for Mayor,
Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and
2. To direct the Election Officer of Pantar, Lanao del
Norte to DELETE the name of Mohammad “Exchan” G.
Limbona from the Certified List of Candidates for Mayor,
Pantar, Lanao del Norte and to INCLUDE therein the
name of Norlainie “Lai-Exchan” Mitmug Limbona.
Let the Law Department implement this resolution with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.”
Thus, Malik filed a second petition for disqualification

against Norlainie docketed as SPA No. 07-621.
After the elections, Norlainie emerged as the winning
candidate and accordingly took her oath and assumed
office.
However, on September 4, 2007, the Second Division of
Comelec in SPA No. 07-611 disqualified Norlainie on three
grounds: lack of the one-year residency requirement; not
being a registered voter of the municipality; and, nullity of
her certificate of candidacy for having been filed at a place
other than the Office of the Election Officer.
Norlainie filed an Omnibus Motion to declare the
petition in SPA No. 07-611 moot and/or for reconsideration,
arguing that the Comelec en banc had approved the
withdrawal of her
_______________
9 Rollo, pp. 152-154.
398

first certificate of candidacy and had given due course to

her new certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate
for Mohammad. Malik opposed the omnibus motion.
Meanwhile, the Second Division of Comelec in SPA No.
07-621, promulgated on November 23, 2007 a Resolution10
disqualifying Norlainie from running as mayor of Pantar,
Lanao del Norte. It held thus:
“As regards the residency requirement, We rule for petitioner.

As borne out from the record, respondent’s domicile of origin
was in Maguing, Lanao del Norte, which is her place of birth.
When she got married, she became a resident of Marawi City,
specifically, in Barangay Rapasun where her husband served as
Barangay Chairman until November 2006. This is her domicile by
operation of law pursuant to the Family Code as applied in the
case of Larrazabal v. Comelec, (G.R. No. 100739, September 3,
1991).
What respondent now is trying to impress upon Us is that she
has changed her aforesaid domicile and resided in Pantar, Lanao
del Norte. x x x
In the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent, which
consists merely of self-serving affidavits cannot persuade Us that
she has abandoned her domicile of origin or her domicile in
Marawi City. It is alleged that respondent “has been staying,
sleeping and doing business in her house for more than 20
months” in Lower Kalanganan and yet, there is no independent
and competent evidence that would corroborate such statement.
Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondent’s
intention to stay in Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The
filing of her Certificate of Candidacy in Pantar, standing alone, is
not sufficient to hold that she has chosen Pantar as her new
residence. We also take notice of the fact that in SPA No. 07-611,
this Commission has even found that she is not a registered voter
in the said municipality warranting her disqualification as a
candidate.”11
_______________
10 Annex “4” of Comment.

11 Annex “4-D” to “4-E” of Comment.
399
VOL. 555, JUNE 25, 2008 399

On January 9, 2008, the Comelec en banc in SPA No. 07-

611 denied Norlainie’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition alleging that the Comelec
gravely abused its discretion in proceeding to resolve the
petition in SPA No. 07-611 despite the approval of
petitioner’s withdrawal of certificate of candidacy.12
On January 29, 2008, the Court resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order effective immediately
enjoining respondents from enforcing and implementing
the Comelec Resolutions disqualifying petitioner as a
candidate for mayor in Pantar, Lanao del Norte.13
The petition lacks merit.
The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not
necessarily render the certificate void ab initio. Once filed,
the permanent legal effects produced thereby remain even
if the certificate itself be subsequently withdrawn.14
Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines
(B.P. Blg. 881, as amended) provides:
“Sec. 73. Certificate of candidacy.—No person shall be

eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn
certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein. A person
who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the
election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office
concerned a written declaration under oath. No person shall
be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same
election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than
one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before
the expiration of the period for the filing of certificate of
candidacy, the person who has filed more than one certificate of
candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires
to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other
office or offices. The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of
candidacy shall not affect whatever civil,
_______________
12 Rollo, p. 5.
13 Id., at p. 211.
14 Monroy v. Court of Appeals, 127 Phil. 1, 6; 20 SCRA 620, 625 (1967).
400

criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate

may have incurred.” (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, when petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy

on March 29, 2007, such act produced legal effects, and the
withdrawal of the same, despite the approval of the
Comelec, did not bar or render nugatory the legal
proceedings it had set in motion. As such, the Comelec did
not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled on the
merits of the petition despite the withdrawal of petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy. The Comelec correctly held that a
case only becomes moot when “there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can
be served in passing upon the merits.”15 In the instant
case, although petitioner withdrew her first certificate of
candidacy, the subsequent disqualification of her husband
required that she file a new certificate of candidacy as a
substitute candidate. The second filing of a certificate of
candidacy thus once again put her qualifications in issue.
Hence, a ruling upon the same is necessary.
The fact that petitioner’s certificate of candidacy as a
substitute candidate was given due course by the Comelec
did not bar the Comelec from deciding on her qualifications
to run as municipal mayor. As correctly found by the
Comelec:
“Said resolution (Comelec Resolution No. 8255) discloses only

the following: a) movant is given the green lights to be the
substitute candidate for her husband who was disqualified; b) her
certificate of candidacy was duly accomplished in form and
substance and c) the certificate of candidacy will not cause
confusion among the voters. Clearly, no issue of disqualification
was passed upon by the Commission in the said resolution.
Movant may have been given the impression that the
Commission’s act of giving due course to her substitute certificate
of candidacy constitutes a pronouncement that she is not
disqualified. It must be pointed out, however, that the bases for
giving due course to
_______________
15 Enrile v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 132986, May 19, 2004, 428
SCRA 472, 477.
401
VOL. 555, JUNE 25, 2008 401

a certificate of candidacy are totally different from those for

enunciating that the candidate is not disqualified. x x x”16
Moreover, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No.

6646) “authorizes the Commission (Comelec) to try and
decide petitions for disqualifications even after the
elections,”17 thus:
“SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.—Any candidate who

has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of
the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.” (Emphasis
ours)
As such, the Comelec did not err when it continued with

the trial and hearing of the petition for disqualification.
The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to
satisfy the one-year residency requirement. The term
“residence” as used in the election law is synonymous with
“domicile,” which imports not only intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention.18 The manifest
intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to
exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified
with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community.19
_______________
16 Rollo, p. 41.
17 Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 327 Phil. 521, 568; 257 SCRA
727, 765 (1996).
18 Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453, 456 (1941).
19 Id., at p. 458.
402

For purposes of election law, the question of residence is

mainly one of intention. There is no hard and fast rule by
which to determine where a person actually resides.20
Three rules are, however, well established: first, that a
man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; second,
that where once established it remains until a new one is
acquired; and third, a man can have but one domicile at a
time.21
In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must
concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality,
(2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile.22 A person’s “domicile” once
established is considered to continue and will not be
deemed lost until a new one is established.23
To successfully effect a change of domicile one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite
acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words,
there must basically be animus manendi coupled with
animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time;
the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.24
Petitioner’s claim that she has been physically present
and actually residing in Pantar for almost 20 months prior
to the elections,25 is self-serving and unsubstantiated. As
correctly observed by the Comelec:
_______________
20 Alcantara v. Secretary of Interior, 61 Phil. 459, 465 (1935).

21 Id.
22 Gallego v. Verra, supra.
23 Domino v. Commission on Elections, 369 Phil. 798, 819; 310 SCRA
546, 568 (1999).
24 Id.
25 Rollo, p. 18.
403
VOL. 555, JUNE 25, 2008 403

“In the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent,

which consists merely of self-serving affidavits cannot persuade
Us that she has abandoned her domicile of origin or her domicile
in Marawi City. It is alleged that respondent “has been staying,

sleeping and doing business in her house for more than 20
months” in Lower Kalanganan and yet, there is no independent
and competent evidence that would corroborate such statement.
Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondent’s
intention to stay in Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The
filing of her Certificate of Candidacy in Pantar, standing alone, is
not sufficient to hold that she has chosen Pantar as her new
residence. We also take notice of the fact that in SPA No. 07-611,
this Commission has even found that she is not a registered voter
in the said municipality warranting her disqualification as a
candidate.”26
We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioner’s

domicile of origin is Maguing, Lanao del Norte,27 which is
also her place of birth; and that her domicile by operation
of law (by virtue of marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi City.
The Comelec found that Mohammad, petitioner’s husband,
effected the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar,
Lanao del Norte only on November 11, 2006. Since it is
presumed that the husband and wife live together in one
legal residence,28 then it follows that petitioner effected the
change of her domicile also on November 11, 2006. Articles
68 and 69 of the Family Code provide:
“Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live

together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family
domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The
court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if
the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and
_______________
26 Annex “4-E” of Comment.

27 Should be Lanao del Sur.
28 Abella v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 100710 & 100739, September
3, 1991, 201 SCRA 259, 264.
404

compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such

exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarity of the family.” (Emphasis ours)
Considering that petitioner failed to show that she

maintained a separate residence from her husband, and as
there is no evidence to prove otherwise, reliance on these
provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in
consonance with human experience.29
Thus, for failure to comply with the residency
requirement, petitioner is disqualified to run for the office
of mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. However, petitioner’s
disqualification would not result in Malik’s proclamation
who came in second during the special election.
The rules on succession under the Local Government
Code shall apply, to wit:
“SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the

Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor.—If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the x x x mayor, the x x
x vice-mayor concerned shall become the x x x mayor.
xxxx
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises
when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses
to assume office, fails to qualify or is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office.
x x x x” (Emphasis ours)
Considering the disqualification of petitioner to run as

mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, the proclaimed Vice-
Mayor shall then succeed as mayor.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED. The September 4, 2007 Resolution of the
Commission on Elections in SPA Case No. 07-611
disqualifying petitioner Nor-
_______________
29 Id., at p. 262.
405
VOL. 555, JUNE 25, 2008 405

lainie Mitmug Limbona from running for office of the

Mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, and the January 9, 2008
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are
AFFIRMED. In view of the permanent vacancy in the
Office of the Mayor, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall
SUCCEED as Mayor. The temporary restraining order

issued on January 29, 2008 is ordered LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J.), Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,

Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-De Castro and
Brion, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed, Comelec resolutions dated September

4, 2007 and January 9, 2008 affirmed.
Notes.—It is immaterial if a candidate personally

received the telegram after the date of promulgation of the
COMELEC’s decision on a petition for disqualification for
as long as the telegram was sent and delivered before the
date of promulgation at the candidate’s residence indicated
in his Certificate of Candidacy. (Cayat vs. Commission on
Elections, 522 SCRA 23 [2007])
While the term “residence” is equated with “domicile” as
far as election law is concerned, for purposes of venue, the
less technical definition of “residence” is adopted—it is
understood to mean as the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode;
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it
one’s domicile. (Ang Kek Chen vs. Calasan, 528 SCRA 124
[2007])
——o0o——
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Limbona vs. Commission On Elections, 555 SCRA 391

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5/7/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 555

G.R. No. 181097. June 25, 2008.*

NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA, petitioner, vs.

Election Law; Certificates of Candidacy; The withdrawal of a

392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Limbona vs. Commission on Elections

nicipal mayor. As correctly found by the Comelec: Said resolution

there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new

VOL. 555, JUNE 25, 2008 393

Limbona vs. Commission on Elections

continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is

provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in consonance with

VOL. 555, JUNE 25, 2008 393

Limbona vs. Commission on Elections

succeed as mayor, not the second placer in the election.—For

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

This petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a

1 Rollo, pp. 30-36; penned by Commissioner Rene V.

VOL. 555, JUNE 25, 2008 395

January 9, 2008 Resolution2 denying the motion for

2 Id., at pp. 39-43; signed by Acting Chairman Resurreccion Z. Borra

396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to

Meanwhile, the First Division of Comelec issued on May

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is

The May 24, 2007 Resolution became final and

7 Annex “1” of Comment. Per Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra

VOL. 555, JUNE 25, 2008 397

Consequently, Norlainie filed a new certificate of

“The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to

Thus, Malik filed a second petition for disqualification

9 Rollo, pp. 152-154.

398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

first certificate of candidacy and had given due course to

“As regards the residency requirement, We rule for petitioner.

10 Annex “4” of Comment.

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On January 9, 2008, the Comelec en banc in SPA No. 07-

“Sec. 73. Certificate of candidacy.—No person shall be

400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate

Thus, when petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy

“Said resolution (Comelec Resolution No. 8255) discloses only

VOL. 555, JUNE 25, 2008 401

a certificate of candidacy are totally different from those for

Moreover, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No.

“SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.—Any candidate who

As such, the Comelec did not err when it continued with

402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

For purposes of election law, the question of residence is

20 Alcantara v. Secretary of Interior, 61 Phil. 459, 465 (1935).

VOL. 555, JUNE 25, 2008 403

“In the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent,

in Marawi City. It is alleged that respondent “has been staying,

We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioner’s

“Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live

26 Annex “4-E” of Comment.

404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such