Poea Cases: Duty, Without Restrictions." Aside From The Normal Duties of A Chief Cook, Respondent Alleged

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POEA CASES

FALCON MARITIME AND ALLIED SERVICES, INC., YOKOHAMA MARINE AND


MERCHANT CORPORATION, AND/OR FLORIDA Z. JOSE, PETITIONERS, v. ANGELITO B.
PANGASIAN, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

From 2002 to 2012, Falcon Maritime, Yokohama Marine and Merchant Corporation
and Jose hired Angelito B. Pangasian as Chief Cook. After undergoing the requisite pre-
employment medical examination on April 13, 2011 and having been declared "fit for sea
duty, without restrictions.” Aside from the normal duties of a Chief Cook, respondent alleged
that he also helped in the loading and unloading of tons of cargoes. On March 15, 2012,
while the M/V New Hayatsuki was sailing on the Pacific Ocean within the State of Peru in
West South America, respondent noticed swelling and felt pain in his testicles after lifting,
carrying and loading heavy sacks.

April 17, 2012, in yet another course of loading heavy sacks full of skipjack, tuna fish
and big squid into the ship, respondent averred that he accidentally slipped and lost his
balance. Again, respondent alleged that the swelling and the pain in his testicles, and his
back pains became alarming so he reported the same to his ship master. He was surprised
when the ship captain, instead of referring him to a port doctor, told him that he will be
repatriated and that his replacement was already waiting to board the reefer ship.

On May 21, 2012, respondent was examined by Dr. Comising, the company-
designated physician, and was diagnosed with varicocoele, bilateral. On October 1, 2012,
respondent consulted Dr. Cortes for a second opinion. Dr. Cortes interviewed the
respondent and studied the medical records and documents he presented which showed
that he had Varicocele, Bilateral S/P Varicocelectomy, Bilateral.

On October 12, 2012, respondent went to Dr. Pimentel who diagnosed him to be
suffering from herniated nucleus pulposus and recommended that he undergo six sessions
of physical therapy. The respondent was not restored to his previous condition despite
having undergone varicocoele surgery and numerous sessions of physiotherapy, and as
certified by his private physicians that he was already suffering from total and permanent
disability, he filed a claim with the petitioners for the payment of his disability benefits
based on POEA-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). Petitioners, however, refused
to grant his claim on the ground that the respondent had already been declared fit to work
by the company-designated physician.
ISSUES:

1. Is Pangasian entitled to disability benefits?


2. Is he entitled to sick allowance?

RULING:

1. Respondent is not entitled to disability benefits. Section 20(A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC,
which is the rule applicable to this case since respondent was employed in 2011,
governs the procedure for compensation and benefits for a work-related injury or
illness suffered by a seafarer on board sea-going vessels during the term of his
employment contract. “..the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment
medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days
upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a
written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. In the
course of the treatment, the seafarer shall also report regularly to the company-
designated physician specifically on the dates as prescribed by the company-
designated physician and agreed to by the seafarer. Failure of the seafarer to comply
with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right
to claim the above benefits.

There is no denying that respondent submitted himself to post-employment medical


examination within the required period. However, what is peculiar in this case is that
his examination was confined only to the pain and swelling in his testicles as had been
mentioned in the doctor's referral, as well as for abdominal pain that he informed the
doctor he had been experiencing on and off since March 15, 2012. The truth of the
matter was that his back pains was not included in the referral precisely because
his written request only asked for a referral for his testicular pain. If respondent had
truly been experiencing continuing back pains while he was still on board the vessel,
then it stands to reason that respondent's written request for medical referral would
not only be for his testicular pain but would naturally include his back pains.

The High Court has consistently held that that the three-day mandatory reporting
requirement must be strictly observed since within three days from repatriation, it
would be fairly manageable for the company-designated physician to identify whether
the illness or injury was contracted during the term of the seafarer's employment or
that his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment.

2. Respondent is entitled to sickness allowance. While the Court rules that respondent is
not entitled to disability benefits for his back pains, the Court does not lose sight
that when the respondent was repatriated on May 18, 2012, he was already
complaining of pain and swelling in his testicles. His post-employment medical
examination on May 21, 2012 revealed that he was suffering from varicocoele,
bilateral for which he was treated and operated on. After a series of follow-up
check-ups, he was declared fit to work on August 28, 2012. As respondent was
suffering from an illness that required medical attention after he was repatriated, he
is clearly entitled to a sickness allowance pursuant to Section 20(A)(3) of the 2010
POEA-SEC.

INTERCREW SHIPPING AGENCY, INC., STAR EMIRATES MARINE SERVICES AND/OR


GREGORIO ORTEGA, PETITIONERS, VS. OFRECINO B. CALANTOC, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

Intercrew Philippines Agency, Inc. hired Ofrecino B. Calantoc as fourth engineer for
a period of 12 months. As such, he underwent a pre-employment medical examination and
was declared "fit for sea duty," despite his high blood pressure. Four months into his
contract, respondent already experienced a slurring of speech, weakness on his right side,
and was diagnosed with a mild stroke. However, he still continued his work on board the
vessel, but he later on requested to be repatriated when his condition worsened.

He immediately reported to Intercrew Shipping, Star Emirates and Gregorio Ortega,


as the President/General Manager of Intercrew Shipping and requested for medical
assistance, but to no avail. Respondent made several requests, but were repeatedly refused.
He was then constrained to consult a doctor at his own expense. Respondent then
underwent a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) examination which revealed a large
convexity meningioma.

Respondent now claimed that because of his illness he was unable to return to his
customary work as a seafarer for more than 120 days. Petitioners repeatedly refused to
grant him disability benefits. Thus, he filed a complaint claiming disability compensation,
payment of medical expenses, damages, and attorney's fees.

ISSUE:

Is Calantoc entitled to disability benefits?

RULING:
Yes. In this case, respondent executed his employment contract with petitioners on
March 14, 2008. Thus, the provisions of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC)30 are applicable and should
govern the parties' relations. Given the foregoing provision, there are two elements that
must concur before an injury or illness is considered compensable: first, that the injury or
illness must be work-related; and second, that the work-related injury or illness must have
existed during the term of the seafarers' employment contract.

In this case, it is undisputed that in the Pre-Employment Medical Examination


(PEME)33 of respondent, under his medical history, he suffered from or had been told that
he has a high blood pressure. It is likewise beyond dispute that respondent's mild cerebro-
vascular accident or stroke is a compensable disease under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-
SEC. Despite knowing that respondent has a high blood pressure, gave the latter a clean bill
of health, through the former's accredited clinic, before deployment which leads to a
conclusion that whatever illness respondent suffers on board the vessel is work-related. It
goes without saying, too, that respondent's work as a seafarer could have attributed to the
development of his meningioma.

APOLINARIO Z. ZONIO, JR. v. 88 ACES MARITIME SERVICES, INC., KHALIFA A.


ALGOSAIBI DIVING AND MARINE SERVICES CO., AND JANET A. JOCSON

FACTS:
88 Aces Maritime Services, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the
recruitment of Filipino seafarers for and on behalf of its foreign principal Khalifa Algosaibi
Diving & Marine Services Co. Janet A. Jocson is the president/owner/manager of 88 Aces.

On February 4, 2010, Apolinario was hired as an "ordinary seaman" by 88 Aces to


board the vessel MV Algosaibi 42. His contract was for a duration of six months with a basic
monthly salary of US$506.15. Apolinario left Manila on February 26, 2010 and embarked
MV Algosaibi 42 in Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia. After completing his six-month contract with
88 Aces in August 2010, Apolinario however was not repatriated as he directly entered into
a new contract with 88 Aces' foreign principal, Khalifa Algosaibi.

In April 2012, Apolinario was repatriated in Manila. On May 8, 2015, he filed a


complaint before the Labor Arbiter against 88 Aces, Jocson and Khalifa Algosaibi
(respondents) for the payment of disability benefits, attorney's fees, medical fees, sickness
allowance and moral, exemplary and compensatory damages.

Apolinario alleged that while on board MV Algosaibi 42 in December 2010, he


suddenly experienced dizziness. As his condition did not improve, he was sent to As Salama
Hospital in Al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia where he was found to have high glucose and
cholesterol. However, after two years, particularly in January 2012, Apolinario alleged that
his dizziness recurred, accompanied by the blurring of his vision. On April 2, 2012, he
stated that he returned to As Salama Hospital where he was diagnosed to have diabetes
mellitus and dislipedemia.

After his repatriation to the Philippines on April 11, 2012, Apolinario posited that he
immediately reported to the office of 88 Aces to get his unpaid wages and for him to be
referred to the company physician. However, since his repatriation was due to the
completion of his six-month Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-
approved employment contract, he was allegedly told by President Janet Jocson that 88
Aces could not shoulder his medical expenses. Apolinario did not insist anymore and just
continued taking the medicine given by the doctor in Saudi Arabia.

Subsequently, Apolinario felt well and thought that his illness was already cured.
However, it recurred on August 2, 2013. Apolinario consulted Dr. Joseph Glenn Dimatatac,
an internal medicine physician, and was informed that his illness was indeed diabetes
mellitus. On March 17, 2015, Apolinario consulted Dr. Rufo Luna, the Municipal Health
Officer of the Municipality of San Jose, who declared him to be physically unfit to continue
work due to his hyperglycemia. Consequently, Apolinario demanded from respondents the
payment of his disability benefits, but to no avail.

Apolinario argued that his illness is presumed as work-related. Moreover,


Apolinario contended that his disability is permanent and total because he was already
incapacitated to resume his sea duties for more than 240 days. Apolinario maintained that
his cause of action to file a claim against respondents did not prescribe yet since his action
was instituted within three years from his disembarkation from the vessel.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Apolinatio’s illness is work-related and is compensable.
2. Whether Apolinario’s cause of action already prescribed.

RULING:
The petition is meritorious.

While the illness is not listed as one of the occupational diseases under Section
32(A) of the POEA-SEC, the ailment is presumed work-related under Section 20(B)(4) of
the contract. Respondents are duty-bound to overcome this presumption. However, other
than their bare allegation, respondents did not present a scintilla of proof to establish the
lack of casual connection between Apolinario's disease and his employment as a seafarer.
Had respondents granted Apolinario's request to undergo a post-employment medical
check-up, they could have presented a medical finding to contradict the presumption of
work-relatedness of Apolinario's illness. The post-employment medical check-up could
have been the proper basis to determine the seafarer's illness, whether it was work-
related, or its specific grading of disability. Having failed to present any evidence to defeat
the presumption of work-relatedness of Apolinario's diabetes mellitus, the prima facie case
that it is work-related prevails.
Nonetheless, the presumption provided under Section 20(B)(4) is only limited to
the "work-relatedness" of an illness. It does not cover and extend to compensability. In this
sense, there exists a fine line between the work-relatedness of an illness and the matter of
compensability. The former concept merely relates to the assumption that the seafarer's
illness, albeit not listed as an occupational disease, may have been contracted during and in
connection with one's work, whereas compensability pertains to the entitlement to receive
compensation and benefits upon a showing that a seafarer's work conditions caused or at
least increased the risk of contracting the disease

It is well-settled that a seafarer's cause of action arises upon his disembarkation


from the vessel. As Apolinario's disembarkation from Algosaibi was on April 11, 2012, he
had three years from the date, or until April 11, 2015, to make a claim for disability
benefits. Records show that Apolinario had requested for a SENA before the NLRC as early
as March 25, 2015. To elucidate, SENA is an administrative approach to provide an
accessible, speedy, and inexpensive settlement of complaints arising from employer-
employee relationship to prevent cases from ripening into full blown disputes. All labor
and employment disputes undergo this 30-day mandatory conciliation-mediation process.

Notwithstanding, that Apolinario filed his Complaint before the Labor Arbiter only
on May 8, 2015 is of no moment. SENA being a pre-requisite to the filing of a Complaint
before the Labor Arbiter, the date when Apolinario should be deemed to have instituted his
claim was when he instituted his Request for SENA on March 25, 2015. Considering that the
expiration of Apolinario's cause of action was on April 11, 2015, his claim was filed well
within the 3-year prescriptive period.

Under Section 20(A)(3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, the amount of sickness allowance
that the seafarer shall receive from his employer shall be in an amount equivalent to his
basic wage computed at the time he signed off until he is declared fit to work, or the degree
of disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but shall in no case
exceed 120 days.

Considering that no assessment was made at bar by the company designated


physician, Apolinario is entitled to a sickness allowance equivalent to 120 days. His basic
pay being US$506.00 per month or US$16.866 per day, he should be awarded US$2,024.00
as sickness allowance, or its equivalent amount in Philippine currency.

G.R. No. 239055, March 11, 2020

RICHIE P. CHAN, PETITIONER, v. MAGSAYSAY CORPORATION, MARITIME


CORPORATION, CSCS INTERNATIONAL NV AND/OR MS. DORIS HO, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
On November 19, 2012, Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, on behalf of Magsaysay
Maritime Corporation principal, CSCS International NV engaged the services of Richie P.
Chan as fireman on board Costa Voyager-D/E and boarded the vessel on November 25,
2012. Chan sustained knee injury after he slipped and hit his right knee on the deck during
a regular boat drill. He was medically repatriated for treatment on May 13, 2013. On May
14, 2013, he got referred to the company-designated physician at Marine Medical Center.
The company-designated physician diagnosed him with gouty arthritis with meniscal tear
(right knee) and advised him for surgery. On June 24, 2013, Chan requested for more time
to decide whether to undergo surgery. On August 16, 2013, the company-designated
physician noted that Chan had already attained maximum medical cure and was given a
disability assessment of Grade 10. On August 17, 2013 or after ninety-six (96) days since
his repatriation, Chan finally manifested his decision to undergo surgery. Thus, the surgery
on his affected knee was done on August 27, 2013. But the surgery did not relieve him of
the pain. Even subsequent therapy and medical treatments did not help. Consequently,
respondents discontinued to finance Chan's therapy and medical treatment starting on the
last week of October 2013. On October 29, 2013, the company-designated physician issued
his alleged final assessment.
Chan was declared unfit for sea duty due to persistent pain on the knee, swelling,
and limited movement. Thereafter, he asked respondents for total permanent disability
benefits but to no avail. The respondents countered that Chan had no cause of action since
he failed to follow the procedure in contesting the findings of the company-designated
physician. Chan had prematurely filed the complaint without seeking a second opinion
from the physician of his own choice. Respondents also contended that Chan's delayed
treatment which exceeded 120 days should be attributed to him because he requested
more time to decide whether to undergo surgery. Assuming Chan was entitled to disability
benefits, it should be limited to Grade 10 disability as assessed by the company-designated
physician. Chan is not entitled to damages and attorney's fees as respondents were never in
bad faith in dealing with him.
The Labor Arbiter's Ruling
Labor arbiter (LA), Arbiter Vivian H. Magsino-Gonzales, ruled in Chan's favor. The
LA knew that Chan was not informed of the final assessment of the respondent’s company-
designated physician even after the lapse of two hundred forty (240) days from medical
repatriation, so Chan has no left no alternative but to consult an independent physician to
evaluate his medical condition. The LA awarded total permanent disability benefit based on
the POEA Contract but denied the other claims for lack of basis.
The NLRC's Ruling
The NLRC affirmed with modification awarding attorney's fees to Chan. The NLRC
subsequently denied respondents' motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
The Court of Appeals reduced the award to Grade 10 and denied Chan’s motion for
reconsideration. It held that Chan disregarded the conflict resolution procedure under the
POEA-SEC when he did not refer the conflicting findings on the extent of his disability to a
third doctor. Because of this, the findings of the company designated physician must
prevail.
The CA also held that the seafarer's incapacity to work after the lapse of more than
120 days from the time he suffered an injury and/or illness is not a magical incantation that
automatically warrants the grant of total and permanent disability benefits in his favor
since jurisprudence has extended this period to two hundred forty 240 days. Only 169 days
passed from Chan's repatriation for medical treatment on May 13, 2013 until the company-
designated physician gave him a Grade 10 rating on October 29, 2013.
ISSUE:
Whether Chan is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.
RULING:
Yes. Chan is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.
In disability compensation cases, it is not the injury which is compensated, but
rather, the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity. Total
disability refers to an employee's inability to perform his or her usual work. It does not
require total paralysis or complete helplessness. Permanent disability, on the other hand, is
a worker's inability to perform his or her job for more than one hundred twenty (120)
days, or two hundred forty (240) days if the seafarer required further medical attention
justifying the extension of the temporary total disability period, regardless of whether he
loses the use of any part of his body.
Here, while respondents' medical report dated 29 October 2013 claims that
complainant reached maximum care and that he was assessed by company doctors to be
suffering from a disability grade 10, there is no concrete proof that said final assessment
was actually relayed to complainant within the 240 day period.

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