.

253, B A 9, 1996 509

Republic s. Hernande
*
G.R. No. 117209. Februar 9, 1996.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, . HON.

JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his capacit as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig Cit and
SPOUSES VAN MUNSON NAVARRO and REGINA
MUNSON ANDRADE, respondents.

Ad ; E de ce; Fac a f d g f he e c , he
ff c e b e ed b ega a d e de a , a e
acc ded h gh e ec a d a e b d g a d c c e he
S e e C . It has been said all too often enough that the
factual findings of the lo er court, hen sufficientl buttressed b
legal and evidential support, are accorded high respect and are
binding and conclusive upon this Court. Accordingl , e full
uphold the propriet of that portion of the order of the court belo
granting the petition for adoption.
Sa e; Na e ; Wh e he cha ge f he ad ee a e
f ha f he ad e he a a a d ece a c e e ce
fag a f ad , he g e e a e, a a he
f Ch a a e, f he ad ee e a a a
g a eg e ed he c eg e . Clearl , the la allo s
the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the
surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.
It is the change of the adoptee s a e to follo that of the
adopter hich is the natural and necessar consequence of a
grant of adoption and must specificall be contained in the order
of the court, in fact, even if not pra ed for b petitioner. Ho ever,
the g e or e name, also kno n as the f or Ch a
name, of the adoptee must remain as it as originall registered
in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does
not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee s
registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof,
premised solel upon the adoption thus granted, is be ond the
purvie of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in
nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a pra er
therefor furtivel inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this
case, cannot properl be granted.

* ECOND DI I ION.

10

510 C A A

Republic s. Hernande

Sa e; Sa e; Cha ge f Na e; C Reg e ; The a e f he

ad ee a ec ded he c eg e h d be ed he
ad ceed g de e he c h dc
hea a d de e e he a e. The name of the adoptee as
recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption
proceedings in order to vest the court ith jurisdiction to hear and
determine the same, and shall continue to be so used until the
court orders other ise. Changing the given or proper name of a
person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in
one s official or legal name and cannot be authori ed ithout a
judicial order. The purpose of the statutor procedure authori ing
a change of name is simpl to have, herever possible, a record of
the change, and in keeping ith the object of the statute, a court
to hich the application is made should normall make its decree
recording such change.
Sa e; Sa e; Sa e; Ac ; If a cha ge e a e
de ed, h ca be d e b f ga d c c g h
he b a e a d ced a e e e f a ec a
ceed g f cha ge f a e de R e 103 f he R e f
C . The official name of a person hose birth is registered in
the civil register is the name appearing therein. If a change in
one s name is desired, this can onl be done b filing and strictl
compl ing ith the substantive and procedural requirements for a
special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court, herein the sufficienc of the reasons or grounds
therefor can be threshed out and accordingl determined.
Sa e; Sa e; Sa e; Sa e; A e f cha ge f a e a
de e de a d d c ee ec a ceed g, a d b e f,
g e ed b e f e af , ca be g a ed b
ea f a he ceed g. A petition for change of name
being a proceeding e , strict compliance ith all the
requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court
ith jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and
discrete special proceeding, in and b itself, governed b its o n
set of rules. A f , it cannot be granted b means of an other
proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of
another special proceeding ould be to denigrate its role and
significance as the appropriate remed available under our
remedial la s stem.
Sa e; Sa e; Sa e; Sa e; I d be ced a e e
e a e f ad effec a cha ge f a e he
ab e ce f he c e d g e f he a e e ef a a .
The

11

. 253, B A 9, 1996 511

Republic s. Hernande

Solicitor General correctl points out the glaring defects of the

subject petition insofar as it seeks the change of name of the
adoptee, all of hich taken together cannot but lead to the
conclusion that there as no petition sufficient in form and
substance for change of name as ould rightfull deserve an order
therefor. It ould be procedurall erroneous to emplo a petition
for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the
corresponding petition for the latter relief at la .
Ac ; J de f Ac ; P ead g a d P ac ce; W d
a d Ph a e ; B a de f ac , e e ,a de f
ca e f ac , ea he g f e de a d
gh f ac e ac , he a e e f e ha e ca e
f ac a dec a a . B a joinder of actions, or more
properl , a joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting of t o
or more demands or rights of action in one action; the statement
of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of
t o or more civil causes of action, each of hich could be made the
basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or
petition. A plaintiff ma under certain circumstances join several
distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one
declaration, complaint or petition.
Sa e; Sa e; Sa e; Re e f J de f Ca e f
Ac . While joinder of causes of action is largel left to the
option of a part litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules
allo s causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned
upon the follo ing requisites: (a) it ill not violate the rules on
jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of
action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation
bet een the parties, or are for demands for mone or are of the
same nature and character.
Sa e; Sa e; Sa e; Wh e he ea a a ff a
a e a aeca a he a ha e, he e h d e e he e be
e he be e e ed a d a c e f
a a d fac ed, b ec a a he e c he e
ega d g dc , e e a d de f a e . The
statutor intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of
action is to encourage joinder of actions hich could reasonabl be
said to involve kindred rights and rongs, although the courts
have not succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms
used or in developing a rule of universal application. The
dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or
equitable, here there is some substantial unit bet een them.
While the rule allo s a plaintiff to join as

12

512 C A A

Republic s. Hernande

man separate claims as he ma have, there should nevertheless

be some unit in the problem presented and a common question of
la and fact involved, subject al a s to the restriction thereon
regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited
joinder is not authori ed.
Sa e; Sa e; Sa e; Ad ; Cha ge f Na e; Pe f
ad a d cha ge f a e ha e ea each he ,
a e he f he a e a e cha ac e , ch e d he e e
a c e f fac a h , he d gh
ee he de g e f c ce a de a ded a c
he de de he R e . Turning no to the present
petition, hile it is true that there is no e press prohibition
against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of
name, e do not believe that there is an relation bet een these
t o petitions, nor are the of the same nature or character, much
less do the present an common question of fact or la , hich
conjointl ould arrant their joinder. In short, these petitions do
not rightl meet the underl ing test of conceptual unit
demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.
Sa e; Sa e; Sa e; The c f a d g c f
h ch de c e he e e e de f ca e f
ac add e ed ha a e ae e a ed a d a
e e e e a d de e de e h ch ca be
e ed a d c ehe e e ed b ha g e
 dca ceed g. It furthermore cannot be said that the
proposed joinder in this instance ill make for a complete
determination of all matters pertaining to the coetaneous grant of
adoption and change the name of the adoptee in one petition. As
alread stated, the subject petition as grossl insufficient in
form and substance ith respect to the pra er for change of name
of the adoptee. The polic of avoiding multiplicit of suits hich
underscores the rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is
addressed to suits that are intimatel related and also present
inter oven and dependent issues hich can be most e peditiousl
and comprehensivel settled b having just one judicial
proceeding, but not to suits or actions hose subject matters or
corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that the are
best taken up individuall .
Sa e; Sa e; Sa e; L be a c c f he R e a be
ed a he e he e a be e e c ab e f a
def c e c e a ead g, ded ha he a e d e

13

. 253, B A 9, 1996 513

Republic s. Hernande

b e he e e ce f he ceed g a d c e a ea a
ea ab e a e a c a ce h he R e . The situation
presented in this case does not arrant e ception from the Rules
under the polic of liberal construction thereof in general, and for
change of name in particular, as proposed b private respondents
and adopted b respondent judge. Liberal construction of the
Rules ma be invoked in situations herein there ma be some
e cusable formal deficienc or error in a pleading, provided that
the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and
connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance ith the
Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justl be rationali ed
b harking on the polic of liberal construction.
Sa e; Sa e; Sa e; Ad ec e a a e g
he effec e e f ce e f b a e gh h gh he de
a d eed ad a f ce ca be e e ha ed
ha ced a e ha e he h e e a ae he
de ad a f ce. Procedural rules are not to be
disdained as mere technicalities that ma be ignored at ill to
suit the convenience of a part . Adjective la is important in
ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through
the orderl and speed administration of justice. These rules are
not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but,
indeed to provide for a s stem under hich a suitor ma be heard
in the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a
peaceful confrontation before a judge hose authorit the
ackno ledge. It cannot be overemphasi ed that procedural rules
have their o n holesome rationale in the orderl administration
of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in
order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or himsicalit .
Sa e; Sa e; Sa e; The e a d ced e a d d f
he a c a d he ad d ca f ca e a e a e f b c
c h ch ca e be cha ged eg a ed b ag ee e
be ee a b a e a ac f he g a
c e e ce. The danger rought b non-observance of the
Rules is that the violation of or failure to compl ith the
procedure prescribed b la prevents the proper determination of
the questions raised b the parties ith respect to the merits of
the case and makes it necessar to decide, in the first place, such
questions as relate to the form of the action. The rules and
procedure laid do n for the trial court and the adjudication of
cases are matters of public polic . The are matters of public
order and interest hich can in no ise be changed or

514 C A A

Republic s. Hernande

regulated b agreements bet een or stipulations b parties to an

action for their singular convenience.
Na e ; A e a e a d c b a f d b
h ch he a d de f ed, a d d g hed f he ,
f he c e e ce f he d a a ge add e gh ,
ea g f dea g hh b h f e a a e a
b c e e ha e e e ha e a a e. It is
necessar to reiterate in this discussion that a person s name is a
ord or combination of ords b hich he is kno n and
identified, and distinguished from others, for the convenience of
the orld at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing
ith him. It is both of personal as ell as public interest that
ever person must have a name. The name of an individual has
t o parts: the given or proper name and the surname or famil
name. The given or proper name is that hich is given to the
individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other
individuals. The surname or famil name is that hich identifies
the famil to hich he belongs and is continued from parent to
child. The given name ma be freel selected b the parents for
the child, but the surname to hich the child is entitled is fi ed b
la .
Sa e; C Reg e ; The ff c a a e f a e ha
g e h he c eg e . B Article 408 of the Civil Code, a
person s birth must be entered in the civil register. The official
name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That is his
name in the e es of the la . And once the name of a person is
officiall entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same Code
seals that identit ith its precise mandate: no person can change
his name or surname ithout judicial authorit . This statutor
restriction is premised on the interest of the State in names borne
b individuals and entities for purposes of identification.
Sa e; Sa e; Ac ; Cha ge f Na e; The a ha he
a e fa e ca be cha ged ega h gh a e f
cha ge f a e de R e 103 f he R e f C , a d he
a e ha a be cha ged he e ff c a a e ec ded
he c eg e . B reason thereof, the onl a that the name
of person can be changed legall is through a petition for change
of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. For purposes of an
application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code
and correlativel implemented b Rule 103, the onl name that
ma be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil
register. As earlier

. 253, B A 9, 1996 515

Republic s. Hernande

mentioned, a petition for change of name being a proceeding in

rem, impressed as it is ith public interest, strict compliance ith
all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court ith
jurisdiction is essential, and failure therein renders the
proceedings a nullit .
Sa e; Sa e; Sa e; Sa e; G d Wa a g a Cha ge f
Na e. Jurisprudence has recogni ed, e a a, the follo ing
grounds as being sufficient to arrant a change of name: (a) hen
the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or e tremel difficult to rite
or pronounce; (b) hen the change results as a legal consequence
of legitimation or adoption; (c) hen the change ill avoid
confusion; (d) hen one has continuousl used and been kno n
since childhood b a Filipino name and as una are of alien
parentage; (e) hen the change is based on sincere desire to adopt
a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and ithout prejudice to an bod ; and (f) hen the surname
causes embarrassment and there is no sho ing that the desired
change of name as for a fraudulent purpose or that the change
of name ould prejudice public interest.
Sa e; Sa e; Sa e; Sa e; Ba ;A a eg e a e
he ch ch ec d e e he e b h ch he he
c he a a a ce h ha e e ed he c
eg e ff c a a d ca be ec g ed a h ea a e.
Contraril , a petition for change of name grounded on the fact
that one as bapti ed b another name, under hich he has been
kno n and hich he used, has been denied inasmuch as the use
of baptismal names is not sanctioned. For, in truth, baptism is not
a condition e a to a change of name. Neither does the
fact that the petitioner has been using a different name and has
become kno n b it constitute proper and reasonable cause to
legall authori e a change of name. A name given to a person in
the church records or else here or b hich he is kno n in the
communit hen at variance ith that entered in the civil
register is unofficial and cannot be recogni ed as his real name.
Sa e; Sa e; Sa e; Sa e; Ad ; Pa e a d Ch d; Wh e
he gh f a a a a e a e he ch d ec g ed,
g a a eed a d ec ed de he a , he -ca ed gh f a
ad e a e e- a e a ad ed ch d b e a a
c e e ce f ad , e e f he be e a d
g ca , hea d f a a d c e e
ca be fa ab c - de ed. While the right of a natural
parent to name the child is

516 C A A

Republic s. Hernande

recogni ed, guaranteed and protected under the la , the so-called

right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child b virtue
or as a consequence of adoption, even for the most noble
intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in la and
consequentl cannot be favorabl considered. To repeat, the
change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption
and to follo that of the adopter does not la full e tend to or
include the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities
and legal consequences, rather than sentimentalit and
s mbolisms, are hat are of concern to the Court.

PETITION for certiorari to re ie a decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Pasig Cit , Br. 158.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The S lici Ge e al for petitioner.
The La Fi f Pa c al Ge d a d Li for
pri ate respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

I deed, ha i a a e, as the Bard of A on has ritten,

i ce a eb a he a e ld ell a ee ?
This could ell be the theme of the present appeal b
certiorari hich challenges, on pure questions of la , the
order of the Regional Trial1 Court, Branch 158, Pasig Cit ,
dated September 13, 1994 in JDRC Case No. 2964. Said
court is faulted for ha ing appro ed the petition for
adoption of Ke in Earl Bartolome Moran and
simultaneousl granted the pra er therein for the change
of the first name of said adoptee to Aa J e h, to
complement the surname M A d ade hich he
acquired consequent to his adoption.
The facts are undisputed. On March 10, 1994, herein
pri ate respondent spouses, Van Munson 2 Na arro and
Regina Munson Andrade, filed a petition to adopt the
minor Ke in Earl Bartolome Moran, dul alleging therein
the jurisdic-

_______________

1 Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 37-40; per Presiding Judge Jose R.

Hernandez.
2 Annex B, d.; b d., 41-44.

517

. 253, B A 9, 1996 517

Republic s. Hernande

tional facts required b Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for

adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be adopti e
parents, as ell as the circumstances under and b reason
of hich the adoption of the aforenamed minor as sought.
In the er same petition, pri ate respondents pra ed for
the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron
Joseph, the same being the name ith hich he as
bapti ed in keeping ith religious tradition, and b hich
he has been called b his adopti e famil , relati es and
friends since Ma 6, 31993 hen he arri ed at pri ate
respondents residence.
 At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the
inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same
petition
4
for adoption. In its formal opposition dated Ma 3,
1995, petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of
the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of
name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition
should be conducted and pursued as t o separate
proceedings.
After considering the e idence and arguments of the
contending parties, the trial court ruled in fa or of herein
pri ate respondents in this ise:

WHEREFORE, minor child Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran is freed

from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance ith
respect to his natural parents, and for all legal intents and
purposes shall be kno n as Aaron Joseph Munson Andrade, the
legall adopted child of Van Munson and Regina Munson effective
upon the filing of the petition on March 10, 1994. As soon as the
decree of adoption becomes final and e ecutor , it shall be
recorded in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro
Manila pursuant to Section 8, Rule 99 and Section 6, Rule 103,
respectivel , of the Rules of Court, and shall be annotated in the
record of birth of the adopted child, hich in this case is in
Valen uela, Metro Manila, here the child as born. Like ise,
send a cop of this Order to the National Census and Statistics
5
Office, Manila, for its appropriate action consisten(t) here ith.

_______________

3 Id., d; b d,, 44-45.

4 Annex C, d; b d., 47-50.
5 Annex A, d.; b d., 40.

51

518 C A A
Republic s. Hernande

At this juncture, it should be noted that no challenge has

been raised b petitioner regarding the fitness of herein
pri ate respondents to be adopting parents nor the alidit
of the decree of adoption rendered in their fa or. The
records sho that the latter ha e commendabl established
6
their qualifications under the la to be adopters, and ha e
ampl complied ith the procedural requirements for the
petition for adoption, ith the findings of the trial court
being recited thus:
 To compl ith the jurisdictional requirements, the Order of this
Court dated March 16, 1994 setting this petition for hearing (E h.
A ) as published in the March 31, April 6 and 13, 1994 issues of
the Manila Chronicle, a ne spaper of general circulation (E hs.
B to E and submarkings).

Petitioners apart from being financiall able, have no criminal

nor derogator record (E hs. K to V ); and are ph sicall fit to be
the adoptive parents of the minor child Kevin (E h. W ). Their
qualification to become the adoptive parents of Kevin Earl finds
support also in the Social Case Stud Report prepared b the
DSWD through Social Worker Lu Angela Sonido, the pertinent
portion of hich reads:

Mr. and Mrs. M nson are er religio s, responsible, mat re and

friendl indi id als. The are fo nd ph sicall health , mentall fit,
spirit all and financiall capable to adopt Ke in Earl Moran a.k.a.
Aaron Joseph.
Mr. and Mrs. M nson ha e pro ided AJ ith all his needs. The
nselfishl share their time, lo e and attention to him. The are read
and illing to contin o sl pro ide him a happ and sec re home life.
Aaron Joseph, on the other hand, is gro ing normall nder the care
of the M nsons. He had comfortabl settled in his ne en ironment. His
sta ith the M nsons d ring the

6 A . 183 A . 185, F C .
A . 188, F C ;A . 32-38, C C ; .
1-5, 99, C .

51

. 253, B A 9, 1996 519

Republic s. Hernande

si months trial c stod period has res lted to a close bond ith Mr. and
Mrs. M nson and ice- ersa.
We highl recommend to the Honorable Co rt that the adoption of
Ke in Earl Moran a.k.a. Aaron Joseph b Mr. and Mrs. Van M nson be
legali ed.

It has been said all too often enough that the factual
findings of the lo er court, hen sufficientl buttressed b
legal and e idential support, are accorded high respect and
are binding and conclusi e upon this Court. Accordingl ,
e full uphold the propriet of that portion of the order of
the court belo granting the petition for adoption.
 The onl legal issues that need to be resol ed ma then
be s nthesi ed mainl as follo s: (1) hether or not the
court a erred in granting the pra er for the change of
the registered proper or gi en name of the minor adoptee
embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2) hether or
not there as la ful ground for the change of name.
I. It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge
e ceeded his jurisdiction hen he additionall granted the
pra er for the change of the gi en or proper name of the
adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a
petition for change of name are t o special proceedings
hich, in substance and purpose, are different from and
are not related to each other, being respecti el go erned
b distinct sets of la and rules. In order to be entitled to
both reliefs, namel , a decree of adoption and an authorit
to change the gi en or proper name of the adoptee, the
respecti e proceedings for each must be instituted
separatel , and the substanti e and procedural
requirements therefor under Articles 183 to 193 of

_______________

Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 37, 38.

FNCB Finance vs. Estavillo, G.R. No. 93394, December 20, 1990, 192
SCRA 514; Donato, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 102603,
January 18, 1993, 217 SCRA 196; Isabelo, Jr. vs. Perpetual Help College
of Rizal, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 103142, November 8, 1993, 227 SCRA 591.

520

520 C A A
Republic s. Hernande

the Famil Code in relation to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court

for adoption, and Articles 364 to 380 of the Ci il Code in
relation to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for 10
change of
name, must correspondingl be complied ith.
A perusal of the records, according to petitioner, sho s
that onl the la s and rules on adoption ha e been 11
obser ed, but not those for a petition for change of name.
Petitioner further contends that hat the la allo s is the
change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right,
to conform ith that of the adopter and as a natural
consequence of the adoption thus granted. If hat is sought
is the change of the registered gi en or proper name, and
since this ould in ol e a substantial change of one s legal
name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should
accordingl be instituted, ith the substanti e and 12
adjecti e requisites therefor being conformabl satisfied.
Pri ate respondents, on the contrar , admittedl filed
the petition for adoption ith a pra er for change of name
predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 hich allo s permissi e
joinder of causes of action in order to a oid multiplicit of
suits and in line ith the polic of discouraging protracted
and e atious litigations. It is argued that there is no
prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and
change of name being pleaded as t o separate but related
causes of action in a single petition. Further, the conditions
for permissi e joinder of causes of action, i.e., jurisdiction of
the court,
13
proper enue and joinder of parties, ha e been
met.
Corollaril , petitioner insists on strict adherence to the
rule regarding change of name in ie of the natural
interest of the State in maintaining a s stem of
identification of its citi 14
ens and in the orderl
administration of justice. Pri ate respondents argue
other ise and in oke a liberal construction

_______________

10 Rollo, 18-19.
11 Ib d., 20-23.
12 Ib d., 16.
13 Ib d., 63, 65-66.
14 Ib d., 24-27.

521

. 253, B A 9, 1996 521

Republic s. Hernande

and application of the Rules, the elfare and interest of the

adoptee being the primordial concern 15
that should be
addressed in the instant proceeding.
On this score, the trial court adopted a liberal stance in
holding that

Furthermore, the change of name of the child from Kevin Earl

Bartolome to Aaron Joseph should not be treated strictl , it
appearing that no rights have been prejudiced b said change of
name. The strict and meticulous observation of the requisites set
forth b Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is indubitabl for the
purpose of preventing fraud, ensuring that neither State nor an
third person should be prejudiced b the grant of the petition for
change of name under said rule, to a petitioner of discernment.
 The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant
barel over a ear old. Kevin Earl has not e ercised full civil
rights nor engaged in an contractual obligations. Neither can he
nor petitioners on his behalf, be deemed to have an immoral,
criminal or illicit purpose for seeking said cha(n)ge of name. It
stands to reason that there is no a that the state or an person
ma be so prejudiced b the action for change of Kevin Earl s first
name. In fact, to obviate an possible doubts on the intent of
petitioners, the pra er for change of name as caused to be
16
published together ith the petition for adoption.

Art. 189 of the Famil Code enumerates in no uncertain

terms the legal effects of adoption:

(1) For ci il purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to

be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall
acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising
from the relationship of parent and child, including
the right of the adopted to use the surname of the
adopters;
(2) The parental authorit of the parents b nature
o er the adopted shall terminate and be ested in
the adopters, e cept that if the adopter is the
spouse of the parent b nature of the adopted,
parental authorit o er the adopted shall be
e ercised jointl b both spouses; and

_______________

15 Ib d., 70-71.
16 Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 39.

522

522 C A A
Republic s. Hernande

(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his

parents and other blood relati es.

Clearl , the la allo s the adoptee, as a matter of right

and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the
adoptee s a e to follo that of the adopter hich is the
natural and necessar consequence of a grant of adoption
and must specificall be contained in the order of the court,
in fact, e en if not pra ed for b petitioner.
 Ho e er, the gi e or e name, also kno n as the
fi or Ch i ia name, of the adoptee must remain as it
as originall registered in the ci il register. The creation
of an adopti e relationship does not confer upon the
adopter a license to change the adoptee s registered
Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof,
premised solel upon the adoption thus granted, is be ond
the pur ie of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere
incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such
that a pra er therefor furti el inserted in a petition for
adoption, as in this case, cannot properl be granted.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the ci il register
should be used in the adoption proceedings in order to est
the court
1
ith jurisdiction to hear and determine the
same, and shall continue to be so used until the court
orders other ise. Changing the gi en or proper name of a
person as recorded in the ci il register is a substantial
change in one s official or legal name and cannot be
authori ed ithout a judicial order. The purpose of the
statutor procedure authori ing a change of name is simpl
to ha e, here er possible, a record of the change, and in
keeping ith the object of the statute, a court to hich the
application is made 1should normall make its decree
recording such change.

_______________

1 Cruz vs. Republic, L-20927, July 26, 1966, 17 SCRA 693.

1 See Art. 412, Civil Code; Re Ross. 8 Cal 2d 608, 67 P2d 94, 110 ALR
217.

523

. 253, B A 9, 1996 523

Republic s. Hernande

The official name of a person hose birth is registered in

the ci il register is the name appearing therein. If a change
in one s name is desired, this can onl be done b filing and
strictl compl ing ith the substanti e and procedural
requirements for a special proceeding for change of name
under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, herein the
sufficienc of the reasons or grounds therefor can be
threshed out and accordingl determined.
Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be
filed in the regional trial court of the pro ince here the
person desiring to change his name resides. It shall be
signed and erified b the person desiring the name to be
changed or b some other person in his behalf and shall
state that the petitioner has been a b a fide resident of
the pro ince here the petition is filed for at least three
ears prior to such filing, the cause for hich the change of
name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the
date and place of hearing shall be made and published,
ith the Solicitor General or the proper pro incial or cit
prosecutor appearing for the Go ernment at such hearing.
It is onl upon satisfactor proof of the eracit of the
allegations in the petition and the reasonableness of the
causes for the change of name that the court ma adjudge
that the name be changed as pra ed for in the petition, and
shall furnish a cop of said judgment to the ci il registrar
of the municipalit concerned ho shall forth ith enter the
same in the ci il register.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding i e ,
strict compliance ith all the requirements therefor is
indispensable in1order to est the court ith jurisdiction for
its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special
proceeding, in and b itself, go erned b its o n set of
rules. A f i i, it cannot be granted b means of an other
proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot
of another

_______________

1 Yu Chi Han vs. Republic, L-22040, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 454;
Cruz vs. Republic, a, fn. 17; Republic vs. Ta ada, etc., et al., L-31563,
November 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 419; Secan Kok vs. Republic, L-27621,
August 30, 1973, 52 SCRA 322.

524

524 C A A
Republic s. Hernande

special proceeding ould be to denigrate its role and

significance as the appropriate remed a ailable under our
remedial la s stem.
The Solicitor General correctl points out the glaring
defects of the subject petition
20
insofar as it seeks the change
of name of the adoptee, all of hich taken together cannot
but lead to the conclusion that there as no petition
sufficient in form and substance for change of name as
ould rightfull deser e an order therefor. It ould be
procedurall erroneous to emplo a petition for adoption to
effect a change of name in the absence of the corresponding
petition for the latter relief at la .
 Neither can the allo ance of the subject petition, b an
stretch of imagination and liberalit , be justified under the
rule allo ing permissi e joinder of causes of action.
Moreo er, the reliance b pri ate respondents21
on the
pronouncements22 in B i . B i , e al., and Pe e .
Ma i e , e al. is misplaced. A restatement of the rule
and jurisprudence on joinder of causes of action ould,
therefor, appear to be called for.
B a joinder of actions, or more properl , a joinder of
causes of action, is meant the uniting of t o or more
demands or rights of action in one action; the statement
23
of
more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the
union of t o or more ci il causes of action, each of hich
could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same
complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff ma under
certain circumstances join se eral distinct demands,
contro ersies or rights24
of action in one declaration,
complaint or petition.
As can easil be inferred from the abo e definitions, a
part is generall not required to join in one suit se eral
distinct causes of action. The joinder of separate causes of
action, here allo able, is permissi e and not mandator
in the ab-

_______________

20 Rollo, 21-22.
21 43 Phil. 763 (1922).
22 88 Phil. 72 (1951).
23 1 C.J.S., Actions, Sec. 61, 1181.
24 1 Am Jur 2d, Actions, Sec. 81, 776.

525

. 253, B A 9, 1996 525

Republic s. Hernande

sence of a contrar statutor pro ision, e en though the

causes of action arose from the same factual setting
25
and
might under applicable joinder rules be joined. Modern
statutes and rules go erning joinders are intended to a oid
a multiplicit of suits and to promote the efficient
administration of justice here er this ma be done
ithout prejudice to the rights of the litigants.
26
To achie e
these ends, the are liberall construed.
While joinder of causes of action is largel left to the
option of a part litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present
Rules allo s causes of action to be joined in one complaint
conditioned upon the follo ing requisites: (a) it ill not
iolate the rules on jurisdiction, enue and joinder of
parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same
contract, transaction or relation bet een the parties, or are
for demands for mone or are of the same nature and
character.
The objecti es of the rule or pro ision are to a oid a
multiplicit of suits here the same parties and subject
matter are to be dealt ith b effecting in one action a
complete determination of all matters in contro ers and
litigation bet een the parties in ol ing one subject matter,
and to e pedite the disposition of litigation at minimum
cost. The pro ision should be construed so as to a oid such
multiplicit , here possible, ithout prejudice to the rights
of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the pro ision
should be liberall construed, to the end that related
contro ersies bet een the same parties ma be adjudicated
at one time; 2
and it should be made effectual as far as
practicable, ith the end in 2 ie of promoting the
efficient administration of justice.
The statutor intent behind the pro isions on joinder of
causes of action is to encourage joinder of actions hich
could reasonabl be said to in ol e kindred rights and
rongs, al-

_______________

25 Ib d., d., Sec. 85, 778.

26 Ib d., d., Sec. 86, 779.
2 Francisco, V.J., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. I,
1973 ed., 186.
2 1 Am Jur 2d, Actions, Sec. 86, 779.

526

526 C A A
Republic s. Hernande

though the courts ha e not succeeded in gi ing a standard

definition of the terms used or in de eloping a rule of
uni ersal application. The dominant idea is to permit
joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable,
2
here there is
some substantial unit bet een them. While the rule
allo s a plaintiff to join as man separate claims as he ma
ha e, he e h ld e e hele be e i i he
ble e e ed a d a c e i f la a d fac
i l ed, subject al a s to the restriction thereon
regarding jurisdiction, enue and 30
joinder of parties.
Unlimited joinder is not authori ed.
Our rule on permissi e joinder of causes of action, ith
the pro iso subjecting it to the correlati 31
e rules on
jurisdiction, enue and joinder of parties and requiring a
conceptual unit in the problems
32
presented, effecti el
disallo s unlimited joinder.
Turning no to the present petition, hile it is true that
there is no e press prohibition against the joinder of a
petition for adoption and for change of name, e do not
belie e that there is an relation bet een these t o
petitions, nor are the of the same nature or character,
much less do the present an common question of fact or
la , hich conjointl ould arrant their joinder. In short,
these petitions do not rightl meet the underl ing test of
conceptual unit demanded to sanction their joinder under
our Rules.
As keenl obser ed and correctl pointed out b the
Solicitor General

A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are t o

special proceedings hich, in substance and purpose, are different
from each other. Each action is individuall governed b
particular sets of la s and rules. These t o proceedings involve
dispa-

2 Ibid., id., . 89, 781.

30 F , .J., op. cit., 185-189.
31 G & C C ., . . E
C , ., G. . N . 64013, N 28, 1983, 126 C A 31.
32 F .M - , ., G. . N . 66620, 24, 1986,
144 C A 377.

527

. 253, B A 9, 1996 527

Republic s. Hernande

rate issues. In a petition for adoption, the court is called upon to

evaluate the proposed adopter s fitness and qualifications to bring
up and educate the adoptee properl (Prasnick vs. Republic, 99
Phil. 665). On the other hand, in a petition for change of name, no
famil relations are created or affected for hat is looked into is
the propriet and reasonableness of the grounds supporting the
proposed change of name (Yu vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 253).
 . Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be
separatel assessed and determined for neither action is
33
dependent on the other.
The rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is clear.
Joinder ma be allo ed onl if the actions sho a commonalit of
relationship and conform to the rules on jurisdiction, venue and
joinder of parties (Section 5, Rule 2, Rules of Court).
These conditions are anting in the instant case. As alread
pointed out in our Petition (pp. 9-10), an action for adoption and
an action for change of name are, in nature and purpose, not
related to each other and do not arise out of the same relation
bet een the parties. While hat is cogent in an adoption
proceeding is the proposed adopter s fitness and qualifications to
adopt, a petition for change of first name ma onl prosper upon
proof of reasonable and compelling grounds supporting the change
requested. Fitness to adopt is not determinative of the sufficienc
of reasons justif ing a change of name. And similarl , a change of
first name cannot be justified in vie of a finding that the
proposed adopter as found fit to adopt. There is just no a that
the t o actions can connect and find a common ground, thus the
joinder ould be improper.
In contending that adoption and change of name ma be
similarl sought in one petition, private respondents rel upon
Pe e . Ma e and B .B (p. 4, Comment)
We ho ever submit that these citations are e . In
both cases, the fact of intimac and relatedness of the issues is so
pronounced. In Pe e , an application to pronounce the husband an
absentee is obviousl intert ined ith the action to transfer the
management of conjugal assets to the ife. In B , an action for
declaration of heirship as deemed a clear condition precedent to
an action to recover the land subject of partition and distribution
pro-

33 , 18-19.

52

528 C A A
Republic s. Hernande

ceeding. Ho ever, the commonalit of relationship hich stands

out in both cases does not characteri e the present action for
adoption and change of name. Thus the rulings in Pe e and B
find no place in the case at bar.
Besides, it is interesting to note that although a joinder of the
t o actions as, in B , declared feasible, the Supreme Court did
not indorse an automatic joinder and instead remanded the
matter for further proceedings, granting leave to amend the
pleadings and implead additional parties-defendants for a
complete determination of the controvers (Bri vs. Bri , 43 Phil.
763, 770). Such cautionar stance all the more emphasi es that
although joinders are generall accepted, the are not allo ed
34
here the conditions are not satisfactoril met.

It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed joinder in

this instance ill make for a complete determination of all
matters pertaining to the coetaneous grant of adoption and
change the name of the adoptee in one petition. As alread
stated, the subject petition as grossl insufficient in form
and substance ith respect to the pra er for change of
name of the adoptee. The polic of a oiding multiplicit of
suits hich underscores the rule on permissi e joinder of
causes of action is addressed to suits that are intimatel
related and also present inter o en and dependent issues
hich can be most e peditiousl and comprehensi el
settled b ha ing just one judicial proceeding, but not to
suits or actions hose subject matters or corresponding
reliefs are unrelated or di erse such that the are best
taken up indi iduall . 35
In Nab .C f A eal , e al., the Court clarified
the rule on permissi e joinder of causes of action:

The rule is clearl permissive. It does not constitute an

obligator rule, as there is no positive provision of la or an rule
of jurisprudence hich compels a part to join all his causes of
action

34 Ibid., 86-88.
35 G. . N . 91670, F 7, 1991, 193 C A 732; B . , 36 .
550 (1917). Cf. H . H , ., 40 . 576 (1919) I
C N A . L C ., ., L-21839, A 30,
1968, 23 C A 438.

52

. 253, B A 9, 1996 529

Republic s. Hernande

and bring them at one and the same time. Under the present
rules, the provision is still that he a ff a , a d ha he
, e e e a ca e f ac although the ma be included
in one of the classes specified. This, therefore, leaves it to the
plaintiff s option hether the causes of action shall be joined in
the same action, and fa ab e fe e ce a be d a f
h fa e ef a d . He ma al a s file another action
based on the remaining cause or causes of action ithin the
prescriptive period therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)

The situation presented in this case does not arrant

e ception from the Rules under the polic of liberal
construction thereof in general, and for change of name in
particular, as proposed b pri ate respondents and adopted
b respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules ma
be in oked in situations herein there ma be some
e cusable formal deficienc or error in a pleading, pro ided
that the same does not sub ert the essence of the
proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at
compliance ith the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules
cannot justl be rationali ed b harking on the polic of
liberal construction.
The Court is not imper ious to the frustration that
litigants and la ers alike ould at times encounter in
procedural bureaucrac but imperati e justice requires
correct obser ance of indispensable technicalities
36
precisel
designed to ensure its proper dispensation. It has long
been recogni ed that strict compliance ith the Rules of
Court is indispensable for the pre ention of needless dela s
and for the
3
orderl and e peditious dispatch of judicial
business.
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere
technicalities that ma be ignored at ill to suit the
con enience of a part . Adjecti e la is important in
ensuring the effecti e enforcement of substanti e rights
through the orderl and speed administration of justice.
These rules are not intended

_______________

36 Young vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 110736, December 27, 1993, 228
SCRA 718.
3 Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 99357, January 27,
1992, 205 SCRA 537.

530

530 C A A
Republic s. Hernande

to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to

pro ide for a s stem under hich a suitor ma be heard in
the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in
a peaceful confrontation
3
before a judge hose authorit
the ackno ledge.
It cannot be o eremphasi ed that procedural rules ha e
their o n holesome rationale in the orderl
administration of justice. Justice has to be administered
according to the Rules in 3
order to ob iate arbitrariness,
caprice, or himsicalit . We ha e been 40
cautioned and
reminded in Li . CA, e al., that:

Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderl

administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights
in judicial and e trajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to
propose that substantive la and adjective la are contradictor
to each other or, as has often been suggested, that enforcement of
procedural rules should never be permitted if it ill result in
prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not
e actl true; the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of
fact, the polic of the courts is to give both kinds of la , as
complementing each other, in the just and speed resolution of
the dispute bet een the parties. Observance of both substantive
rights is equall guaranteed b due process, hatever the source
of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or onl a statute or a
rule of court.

(T)he are required to be follo ed e cept onl hen for

the most persuasive of reasons the ma be rela ed to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate ith the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not compl ing ith the procedure prescribed.

_______________

3 Santos vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92862, July 4, 1991, 198
SCRA 806; Philippine National Construction Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104437, December 17, 1993, 228 SCRA 565.
3 Vasco vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-46763, February 28, 1978, 81
SCRA 762.
40 L-44642, February 20, 1989, 170 SCRA 367. See also Edra vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 75041, November 13, 1989,
179 SCRA 344.

531

. 253, B A 9, 1996 531

Republic s. Hernande

. While it is true that a litigation is not a game of

technicalities, this does not mean that the Rules of Court ma be
ignored at ill and at random to the prejudice of the orderl
presentation and assessment of the issues and their just
resolution. Justice esche s anarch .

Onl e ceptionall in er e treme circumstances, hen a

rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief enem such that
rigid application thereof frustrates rather than promotes
substantial justice, ill technicalities deser e scant
consideration from the court. In such situations, the courts
are empo 41 ered, e en obligated, to suspend the operation of
the rules.
We do not percei e an injustice that can possibl be
isited upon pri ate respondents b follo ing the
reglementar procedure for the change in the proper or
gi en name that the seek for their adopted child. We are
hard put to descr the indispensabilit of a change of the
first name of the adoptee to his elfare and benefit. Nor is
the said change of such urgenc that ould justif an
e emption from or a rela ation of the Rules. It is the State
that stands to be prejudiced b a anton disregard of Rule
103 in this case, considering its natural interest in the
methodical administration of justice and in the efficacious
maintenance of a s stem of identification of its citi ens.
The danger rought b non-obser ance of the Rules is
that the iolation of or failure to compl ith the procedure
prescribed b la pre ents the proper determination of the
questions raised b the parties ith respect to the merits of
the case and makes it necessar to decide, in the first place,
such questions as relate to the form of the action. The rules
and

_______________

41 Alonso vs. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 (1910); Republic vs. Court of

Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 56077, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 165; Yong
Chan Kim vs. People, et al., G.R. No. 84719, January 25, 1991, 193 SCRA
344; Bank of America, NT & SA vs. Gerochi, Jr., etc., et al., G.R. 73210,
February 10, 1994, 230 SCRA 9; Buan, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 101614, August 17, 1994, 235 SCRA 424.

532

532 C A A
Republic s. Hernande

procedure laid do n for the trial court

42
and the adjudiation
of cases are matters of public polic . The are matters of
public order and interest hich can in no ise be changed
or regulated b agreements bet een or stipulations 43
b
parties to an action for their singular
44
con enience.
In Ga cia . Re blic, e are reminded of the
definiteness in the application of the Rules and the
importance of seeking relief under the appropriate
proceeding:

The procedure set b la should be delimited. One should

not confuse or misappl one procedure for another lest e create
confusion in the application of the proper remed .

Respondent judge s unmindful disregard of procedural

tenets aimed at achie ing stabilit of procedure is to be
deplored. He e ceeded his prerogati es b granting the
pra er for change of name, his order being unsupported b
both statutor and case la . The no el but un arranted
manner in hich he adjudicated this case ma be
characteri ed as a regrettable abdication of the dut to
uphold the teachings of remedial la and jurisprudence.
II. Petitioner a ers that it as error for the lo er court
to grant the petition for change of name ithout citing or
pro ing an la ful ground. Indeed, the onl justification
ad anced for the change of name as the fact of the
adoptee s baptism under the name Aaron Joseph and b
hich he has45been kno n since he came to li e ith pri ate
respondents.
Pri ate respondents, through a rather stilted
ratiocination, assert that upon the grant of adoption, the
subject minor adoptee i fac assumed a ne
identification and designation, that is, Aaron Joseph hich
as the name gi en to him during the baptismal rites.
Allo ing the change of his first name as pra ed for in the
petition, so the claim, merel

_______________

42 Sanidad vs. Cabotaje, 5 Phil. 204 (1905).

43 Arzadon vs. Arzadon, 15 Phil. 77 (1910).
44 L-16085, November 29, 1961, 3 SCRA 519.
45 Rollo, 28.

533

. 253, B A 9, 1996 533

Republic s. Hernande

confirms the designation b hich he is kno n and called

in the communit in hich he li es. This largel echoes the
opinion of the lo er court that naming the child Aaron
Joseph as s mbolic of naming him at birth, and that the ,
as adopti e parents, ha e as much right as the natural
parents46
to freel select the first name of their adopted
child.
The lo er court as s mpathetic to herein pri ate
respondents and ruled on this point in this manner:

As adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents ma freel

select the first name given to his/her child as it is onl the
surname to hich the child is entitled that is fi ed b la . .

The given name of the minor as Kevin Earl, a name given for
no other purpose than for identification purposes in a birth
certificate b a oman ho had all intentions of giving him a a .
The naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph b petitioners upon the
grant of their petition for adoption is s mbolic of naming the
4
minor at birth.

We cannot fathom an legal or jurisprudential basis for

this attenuated ruling of respondent judge and must thus
set it aside.
It is necessar to reiterate in this discussion that a
person s name is a ord or combination of ords b hich
he is kno n and identified, and distinguished from others,
for the con enience of the orld at large in addressing him,
or in speaking of or dealing ith him. It is both of personal
as ell as public interest that e er person must ha e a
name. The name of an indi idual has t o parts: the gi en
or proper name and the surname or famil name. The
gi en or proper name is that hich is gi en to the
indi idual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from
other indi iduals. The surname or famil name is that
hich identifies the famil to hich he belongs and is
continued from parent to child. The gi en name ma be
freel selected b the parents for the

_______________

46 Ib d., 67-68.
4 Ib d., 39.

534

534 C A A
Republic s. Hernande
child, but
4
the surname to hich the child is entitled is fi ed
b la .
B Article 408 of the Ci il Code, a person s birth must be
entered in the ci il register. The official name of a person is
that gi en him 4in the ci il register. That is his name in the
e es of the la . And once the name of a person is officiall
entered in the ci il register, Article 376 of the same Code
seals that identit ith its precise mandate: no person can
change his name or surname ithout judicial authorit .
This statutor restriction is premised on the interest of the
State in names borne b 50
indi iduals and entities for
purposes of identification.
B reason thereof, the onl a that the name of person
can be changed legall is through a petition51 for change of
name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. For purposes
of an application for change of name under Article 376 of
the Ci il Code and correlati el implemented b Rule 103,
the onl name that ma be changed is the true or official
name recorded in the ci il register. As earlier mentioned, a
petition for change of name being a proceeding i e ,
impressed as it is ith public interest, strict compliance
ith all the requisites therefor in order to est the court
ith jurisdiction is essential,
52
and failure therein renders
the proceedings a nullit .
It must like ise be stressed once again that a change of
name is a pri ilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the

_______________

4 Tolentino, A.M., Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and

Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 1993 ed., 672.
4 Chomi vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, 99 Phil. 1004 (1956); Ng
Yao Siong vs. Republic, L-20306, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 483.
50 Chiu Hap Chiu vs. Republic, L-20018, April 30, 1966, 16 SCRA 864.
51 Chomi vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, a, fn. 49.
52 Ng Yao Siong vs. Republic, a, fn. 49; Republic vs. Ta ada, etc., et
al., a, fn. 19; Secan Kok vs. Republic, a, fn. 19. See Tan vs.
Republic, L-16384, April 26, 1962, 4 SCRA 1128.

535

. 253, B A 9, 1996 535

Republic s. Hernande

sound discretion of the court hich has the dut to consider

carefull the consequences of a change of name and to den
the same unless eight reasons are sho n. Before a
person can be authori ed to change his name, that is, his
true or official name or that hich appears in his birth
certificate or is entered in the ci il register, he must sho
proper and reasonable cause 53or an con incing reason
hich ma justif such change.
Jurisprudence has recogni ed, i e alia, the follo ing
grounds as being sufficient to arrant a change of name:
(a) hen the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or e tremel
difficult to rite or pronounce; (b) hen the change results
as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) hen
the change ill a oid confusion; (d) hen one has
continuousl used and been kno n since childhood b a
Filipino name and as una are of alien parentage; (e)
hen the change is based on sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and ithout prejudice to an bod ; and (f) hen the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no sho ing
that the desired change of name as for a fraudulent
purpose 54or that the change of name ould prejudice public
interest.
Contraril , a petition for change of name grounded on
the fact that one as bapti ed b another name, under
hich he has been kno n and hich he used, has been
denied inasmuch
55
as the use of baptismal names is not
sanctioned. For, in truth, baptism
56
is not a condition i e
a to a change of name. Neither does the fact that
the petitioner has been using a different name and has
become kno n b it constitute

_______________

53 Ong Pen Oan vs. Republic, 102 Phil. 460 (1957); Nacionale vs.
Republic, L-18067, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 636; Yu vs. Republic, L-20874,
May 25, 1966, 17 SCRA 253; Calderon vs. Republic, L-18127, April 5,
1967, 19 SCRA 721.
54 Republic vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992,
209 SCRA 189, 199 and cases therein cited. See also Republic vs. Avila,
etc., et al., L-33131, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 483.
55 Chomi vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, a, fn. 49.
56 Ong Te vs. Republic, L-15549, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 484.

536

536 C A A
Republic s. Hernande

proper and
5
reasonable cause to legall authori e a change
of name. A name gi en to a person in the church records
or else here or b hich he is kno n in the communit
 hen at ariance ith that entered in the ci il register
5
is
unofficial and cannot be recogni ed as his real name.
The instant petition does not sufficientl persuade us to
depart from such rulings of long accepted isdom and
applicabilit . The onl grounds offered to justif the change
of name pra ed for as that the adopted child had been
bapti ed as Aaron Joseph in keeping ith the religious
faith of pri ate respondents and that it as the name b
hich he had been called and kno n b his famil ,
relati es and friends5 from the time he came to li e ith
pri ate respondents. Apart from suffusing their pleadings
ith sanctimonious entreaties for compassion, none of the
justified grounds for a change of name has been alleged or
established b pri ate respondents. The legal bases chosen
b them to bolster their cause ha e long been struck do n
as una ailing for their present purposes. For, to allo the
adoptee herein to use his baptismal name, instead of his
name registered in the ci il register, ould be to
countenance
60
or permit that hich has al a s been fro ned
upon.
The earlier quoted posturing of respondent judge, as
e pressed in his assailed order that

(a)s adoptive parents, petitioners like other parents ma freel

select the first name given to his/her child as it is onl the
surname to hich the child is entitled that is fi ed b la . .
The given name of the minor as Kevin Earl, a name given for
no other purpose than for identification purposes in a birth
certificate b a oman ho had all the intentions of giving him
a a . The naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph b petitioners
upon grant

5 O O . , s pra, . 53; G . , L-23609, M

31, 1966, 16 C A 517.
5 N . , s pra, . 49.
5 A B, ; , 44, 67.
60 C . , s pra, . 17.

537

. 253, B A 9, 1996 537

Republic s. Hernande

of their petition for adoption is s mbolic of naming the minor at

birth.
and supposedl based on the authorit of Re blic .
C f A eal a d Ma i W g, a, painfull
misapplies the ruling therein enunciated.
The factual backdrop of said case is not at all analogous
to that of the case at bar. In the W g case, therein
petitioner Ma imo Wong sought the change of his surname
hich he acquired b irtue of the decree of adoption
granted in fa or of spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion T
Wong. Upon reaching the age of majorit , he filed a
petition in court to change his surname from Wong to
Alcala, hich as his surname prior to the adoption. He
adduced proof that the use of the surname Wong caused
him embarrassment and isolation from friends and
relati es in ie of a suggested Chinese ancestr hen in
realit he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
communit , thereb hampering his business and social life,
and that his sur i ing adopti e mother consented to the
change of name sought. This Court granted the petition
and regarded the change of the surname as a mere incident
in, rather than the object of, the adoption.
It should be noted that in said case the change of
surname, not the gi en name, and the legal consequences
thereof in ie of the adoption ere at issue. That it as
sought in a petition dul and precisel filed for that
purpose ith ample proof of the la ful grounds therefor
onl ser es to reinforce the imperati e necessit of seeking
relief under and through the legall prescribed procedures.
Here, the Solicitor General meritoriousl e plained that:

Respondent Judge failed to distinguish bet een a situation

herein a child is being named for the first time b his natural
parent, as against one herein, a child is previousl conferred a
first name b his natural parent, and such name is subsequentl
sought to be disregarded and changed b the adoptive parents. In
the first case, there is no dispute that natural parents have the
right to freel select and give the child s first name for ever
person, including juridical persons, must have a name (Tolentino,
A., Commentaries and

53

538 C A A
Republic s. Hernande

Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. I, 1987 edition, page 721).

In the second case, ho ever, as in the case at bar, private
respondents, in their capacities as adopters, cannot claim a right
to name the minor adoptee after such right to name the child had
alread been e ercised b the natural parent. Adopting parents
have not been conferred such right b la , hence, the right
asserted b private respondents herein remains but illusor .
Renaming the adoptee cannot be claimed as a right. It is merel a
privilege necessitating judicial consent upon compelling
61
grounds.

The liberalit ith hich this Court treats matters leading

up to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent
purposes of adoption and ensures to the adopted child the
rights and pri ileges arising therefrom, e er mindful that
the paramount consideration62 is the o erall benefit and
interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its
proper conte t. It should not be misconstrued or
misinterpreted to e tend to inferences be ond the
contemplation of la and jurisprudence.
The practicall unrestricted freedom of the natural
parent to select the proper or gi en name of the child
presupposes that no other name for it has theretofore been
entered in the ci il register. Once such name is registered,
regardless of the reasons for such choice and e en if it be
solel for the purpose of identification, the same constitutes
the official name. This effecti el authenticates the identit
of the person and must remain unaltered sa e hen, for
the most compelling reasons sho n in an appropriate
proceeding, its change ma merit judicial appro al.
While the right of a natural parent to name the child is
recogni ed, guaranteed and protected under the la , the
socalled right of an adopti e parent to re-name an adopted
child b irtue or as a consequence of adoption, e en for the
most noble intentions and mo ing supplications, is unheard
of in la and consequentl cannot be fa orabl considered.
To re-

_______________

61 Rollo, 31-32.
62 Republic vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92326, January 24,
1992, 205 SCRA 356.

53

. 253, B A 9, 1996 539

Republic s. Hernande

peat, the change of the a e of the adoptee as a result

of the adoption and to follo that of the adopter does not
la full e tend to or include the e gi e a e.
 Furthermore, factual realities and legal consequences,
rather than sentimentalit and s mbolisms, are hat are
of concern to the Court.
Finall , it is understood that this decision does not
entirel foreclose and is ithout prejudice to, pri ate
respondents pri ilege to legall change the proper or gi en
name of their adopted child, pro ided that the same is
e ercised, this time, ia a proper petition for change of
name. Of course, the grant thereof is conditioned on strict
compliance ith all jurisdictional requirements and
satisfactor proof of the compelling reasons ad anced
therefor.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed
order of respondent judge is hereb MODIFIED. The
legall adopted child of pri ate respondents shall
henceforth be officiall kno n as Ke in Earl Munson
Andrade unless a change thereof is hereafter effected in
accordance ith la . In all other respects, the order is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

R e ,P and Me d a, JJ., concur.

O de affi ed ih difica i .

No e . A itness ho has t o names and adopts the

name of his ife is not credible. (Pe le . B e dia, 210
SCRA 531 [1992])
A petition to resume the use of maiden name filed b
petitioner before the respondent Court is a superfluit and
unnecessar proceeding since the la requires her to do so
hen her former husband gets married to another oman
after obtaining a decree of di orce from her in accordance
ith Muslim la s. (Ya i . J dge, Sha i a Di ic C ,
241 SCRA 606 [1995])

o0o

540

C g 2021 Ce a B S , I c. A g e e ed.