CaseDig Neypes Vs Ca

CaseDig: Neypes vs.
Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 141524; Sept.14, 2005
Posted by: Pearlie Jane Q. Binahon on July 19, 2018
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land

and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the
RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed
petitioners' complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed.
Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998
and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing
the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five
days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the
appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding
that it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order
dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule
65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the
appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of
appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run
only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the
trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice
of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within
the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the
petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned
from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the
"final order" appealable under the Rules.
ISSUES:
I
Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal, the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the
complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration.
II
Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.
HELD:
I.
The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be
deemed as the final order. In the case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the
trial court declared petitioner non-suited and accordingly dismissed his
complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to
set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to
appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time
dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was
likewise dismissed ― for having been filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that
petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his
complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. The
SC reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the
final order as it was what ended the issues raised there. This pronouncement was
reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where the SC
again considered the order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration as the
final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. Based on the
aforementioned cases, the SC sustained petitioners' view that the order dated
July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order
contemplated in the Rules.
II.
Yes. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply
to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make
the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any
final order or resolution.
The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal
within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt
of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not
inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall
be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from.
The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of
one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the
notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within
15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to
the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129
which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the
disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998)
remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period
of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered
the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the
process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve
cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some
definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within
15 days from receipt of the RTC's decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of
the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either
motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the
lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here
filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order
denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of
appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.
IMPORTANT NOTES:
The "FRESH PERIOD RULE" do not apply to Rule 64 (Review of

Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and
the Commission on Audit) because Rule 64 is derived from the Constitution. It is
likewise doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases.
The Neypes Rule
The "Neypes Rule," otherwise known as the "Fresh Period Rule," states
that "a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from
receipt of the Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days from receipt
of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration."
QUERY:
Is the Neypes Rule applicable in criminal cases? Certiorari cases?

Administrative cases? DARAB case? For full discussion, see Winlawsuite post on
the "Fresh Period Rule" HERE

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CaseDig: Neypes vs.

Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land

The "FRESH PERIOD RULE" do not apply to Rule 64 (Review of

The Neypes Rule

Is the Neypes Rule applicable in criminal cases? Certiorari cases?

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