The document discusses a land dispute case between Cruz and Malolos. It details the facts of the case regarding shared land ownership and a partition agreement. It examines whether the court erred in finding the Cruz petitioners were estopped from claiming co-ownership of the disputed lands based on their prior actions regarding other lands covered by the same agreement.
The document discusses a land dispute case between Cruz and Malolos. It details the facts of the case regarding shared land ownership and a partition agreement. It examines whether the court erred in finding the Cruz petitioners were estopped from claiming co-ownership of the disputed lands based on their prior actions regarding other lands covered by the same agreement.
The document discusses a land dispute case between Cruz and Malolos. It details the facts of the case regarding shared land ownership and a partition agreement. It examines whether the court erred in finding the Cruz petitioners were estopped from claiming co-ownership of the disputed lands based on their prior actions regarding other lands covered by the same agreement.
The document discusses a land dispute case between Cruz and Malolos. It details the facts of the case regarding shared land ownership and a partition agreement. It examines whether the court erred in finding the Cruz petitioners were estopped from claiming co-ownership of the disputed lands based on their prior actions regarding other lands covered by the same agreement.
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CRUZ VS CA
FACTS:
Essentially, the petitioners, upon the death of their father, acquire shares in several parcels land. Thereafter, they executed a memorandum agreement, which state:
that they shall have equal sharing;
that they initiated a deed of partial partition, which in effect, the properties affected were actually partitioned and the respective shares of each party, adjudicated to him/her; and That despite the execution of this Deed of Partial Partition and the eventual disposal or sale of their respective shares, they agreed among themselves bind themselves to one another that they shall share alike and receive equal shares from the proceeds of the sale of there share.
This agreement was annotated in the titles of the lands covered by the deed of partial partition.
Meanwhile, the court, in a case for the collection of sums of money, issued a writ of execution and ordered Nerissa cruz, one of the co-owners of the lands, to pay spouses Malolos. Enforcing said writ, the sheriff of the court levied upon the lands in question and thereafter, these properties were sold in an execution sale to the highest bidders.
Nerissa failed to exercise her right of redemption and so the final deed of sale was executed, conveying the lands in question to spouses Malolos. The Malolos couple asked Nerissa Cruz Tamayo to give them the owner's duplicate copy of the seven (7) titles of the lands in question but she refused. The couple moved the court to compel her to surrender said titles to the Register of Deeds of Rizal for cancellation. But Nerissa was adamant. She did not comply with the Order of the court and so the Malolos couple asked the court to declare said titles as null and void.
At this point, Adoracion Cruz, Thelma Cruz, Gerry Cruz and Arnel Cruz entered the picture by filing in said lower court a motion for leave to intervene and oppose [the] Maloloses' motion. The Cruzes alleged that they were co-owners of Nerissa Cruz Tamayo over the lands in question.
Court issued an Order modifying the Order of September 7, 1984 by directing the surrender of the owner's duplicate copies of the titles of the lands in question to the Register of Deeds not for cancellation but for the annotation of the rights, and interest acquired by the Maloloses over said lands.
Petitioners Adoracion, Thelma Debbie, Gerry and Arnel (all surnamed Cruz) filed an action for partition against the private respondents, Spouses Eliseo and Virginia Malolos. The trial court rendered a Decision in favor of the plaintiffs. On appeal, however, Respondent Court reversed the trial court decision, stating that:
First, the Deed of Partial Partition was not materially and substantially incompatible with the MOA. The DPP conferred absolute ownership of the parcels of land in issue on Nerissa Cruz Tamayo, while the MOA merely created an obligation on her part to share with the petitioners the proceeds of the sale of said properties.
Second, the fact that private respondents registered the DPP was inconsistent with the allegation that they intended to abandon it. Indeed, had they meant to abandon it, they would have simply gathered the copies of said document and then torn or burned them.
Third, petitioners were estopped from claiming co-ownership over the disputed properties because, as absolute owners, they either mortgaged or sold the other properties adjudicated to them by virtue of the DPP.
Hence, this petition. 9
ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent Court erred in ruling that petitioners are in estoppel by deed.
HELD:
NO. Under the principle Res inter alios acta, as a general rule, prohibits the admission of evidence that tends to show that what a person has done at one time is probative of the contention that he has done a similar acts at another time. 24 Evidence of similar acts or occurrences compels the defendant to meet allegations that are not mentioned in the complaint, confuses him in his defense, raises a variety of irrelevant issues, and diverts the attention of the court from the issues immediately before it. Hence, this evidentiary rule guards against the practical inconvenience of trying collateral issues and protracting the trial and prevents surprise or other mischief prejudicial to litigants. 25
The rule, however, is not without exception. While in admissible in general, collateral facts may be received as evidence under exceptional circumstances, as when there is a rational similarity or resemblance between the conditions giving rise to the fact offered and the circumstances surrounding the issue or fact to be proved. 26 Evidence of similar acts may frequently become relevant, especially in actions based on fraud and deceit, because it sheds light on the state of mind or knowledge of a person; it provides insight into such person's motive or intent; it uncovers a scheme, design or plan; or it reveals a mistake. 27
In this case, petitioners argue that transactions relating to the other parcels of land they entered into, in the concept of absolute owners, are inadmissible as evidence to show that the parcels in issue are not co-owned. The Court is not persuaded. Evidence of such transactions falls under the exception to the rule on res inter alios acta. Such evidence is admissible because it is relevant to an issue in the case and corroborative of evidence already received. 28 The relevancy of such transactions is readily apparent. The nature of ownership of said property should be the same as that of the lots in question since they are all subject to the MOA. If the parcels of land were held and disposed by petitioners in fee simple, in the concept of absolute owners, then the lots in question should similarly be treated as absolutely owned in fee simple by the Tamayo spouses. Unmistakably, the evidence in dispute manifests petitioners' common purpose and design to treat all the parcels of land covered by the DPP as absolutely owned and not subject to co-ownership. 29
Under the principle of estoppel, petitioners are barred from claiming co-ownership of the lands in issue. In estoppel, a person, who by his deed or conduct has induced another to act in a particular manner, is barred from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct that thereby causes loss or injury to another. 30 It further bars him from denying the truth of a fact which has, in the contemplation of law, become settled by the acts and proceeding of judicial or legislative officers or by the act of the party himself, either by conventional writing or by representations, express or implied or in pais. 31
In their transactions with others, petitioners have declared that the other lands covered by the same MOA are absolutely owned, without indicating the existence of a co-ownership over such properties. Thus, they are estopped from claiming otherwise because, by their very own acts and representations as evidenced by the deeds of mortgage and of sale, they have denied such co-ownership. 32
Capitol Motors Corporations, Plaintiff-Appellee, V. Nemesio I. YABUT, Defendant-Appellant. Jose A. David, Jr. For Plaintiff-Appellee. R. Correa, For Defendant-Appellant. Syllabus
