Chapter 1

Inside the World of a Football Agent
Gennaro Giulio Tedeschi

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Description
In the forward 2021, FIFA (Federation Internationale de Football
Association) will significantly innovate the figure of one of the most
important protagonists of the football world: the football agent.
Inside the World of a Football Agent provides a series of practical cases,
experienced first-hand by the author, that will help the readers to immerse
themselves in the reality of a football agent that interacts with presidents,
CEO, sports directors, supporters, footballers, and their families. In an
ever-increasing need for professionalization, the author, thanks to his
background in representing footballers, presents a clear analysis of the
current international regulation and its latest regulatory innovations.
The audience for the book is represented by all the current or aspiring
professionals involved in the football industry: from football agents who
want to keep up to date with the latest legislation, to aspiring agents,
sports directors or media, who want to understand what is often behind
a yes or no in a complicated transfer negotiation. The book will also be
of interest to graduate schools of business, sports, marketing, and MBA
programs in law.
Keywords
Football agent; intermediary; football; soccer; FIFA; entrepreneurship;
football industry; football transfer market; sports law; football law;
international business; business professionals; sports management
Contents
Introduction��xi
Chapter 1 From the “FIFA regulation on w orking with

intermediaries” to the New FIFA Agents Regulation
Reform of 2021��1
Chapter 2 Comparative Examination of the Figure of the
Football Agent in the European “Big Five Sisters”
and Its Historical Excursus��33
Chapter 3 The Peculiar Regulation of the Football
Agents in the USA��67
Chapter 4 How to Become a Football Agent: Practical Examples��103
Chapter 5 Manage Relationships with the Players’ Families,
Medias, and Colleagues��117
About the Author��131

Index��133
Introduction
The Football Agent: A Hybrid Figure,
a Professional or a Practical One
A dichotomic relationship has characterized this profession since its
genesis precisely due to the very strong personal component in the
performance of the activity itself by the service provider, the agent indeed.
Brokerage activity is certainly a historical phenomenon, but it is con-
stantly growing in professional sport and football in particular. In 2019
alone (the 2020 annuity cannot be considered, considering that has not
ended yet at the time of writing), in football, the fees paid to agents
exceeded 548 million dollars, while in 2013 the value of the fees was less
than a third of this figure.
The aim of this book is to deepen, both through a timely study of the
sector legislation, and following some practical cases put in place by the
author of this text, the figure of the football agent. The regulatory history
of the football agent that will be dealt with in this text, will focus on the
figure and evolution of sports agent, limited to the football players agents,
the so called football agents, as mentioned in several FIFA regulations that
have taken place over thirty years. In particular, in Chapter 1, attention
will first be paid to a critical analysis of the international regulations,
analyzed in a natural chronological order of publication of the acts by
FIFA, passing on a comparative examination of the figure of the football
agent between the five major European football federations, “The Big Five
sisters,” in Chapter 2. Considering the regulatory framework that is mostly
common to each other, as it is straight imposed by FIFA on the individual
national sports federations, through the text, it will become clear how the
analysis will move from an economic and socio-demographic point of
view, rather than a purely legal one.
Chapter 3 will cover a careful analysis of the U.S. Soccer Federation’s
agent regulations, which will be followed by an analysis on the soccer
xii Introduction
phenomenon in the United States and on why the most practiced sport in
the world is still far behind in the American sports hierarchies.
The normative approach of the text that introduces us to the d iscussion
of the matter of the players’ agent on a legal level, already at the end of the
Chapter 3, comes to an end giving space in the Chapter 4, to the treatment
of practical experiential cases personally experienced by the author of the
book, and useful advice on how to deal with all the possible situations in
which you may find yourself being a players’ agent.
Finally, the fifth chapter will at first try to provide a guidance on
how to manage relations with the world of the media and the footballer’s
family. The chapter in question, however, does not have the presumption
of being a holy bible on how to manage the already delicate inter-family
relationships of the player, but simply through lived situations, tries to
build, case by case, a possible series of alternative paths to follow together
with his client, in case the sporting aspect of his career does not go as
planned. Finally, the last chapter will focus on the relationship, very often
underestimated between the various agents, sharks that swim in the same
sea, and therefore, as such, have had to learn to collaborate.
CHAPTER 1
From the “FIFA regulation

on working with
intermediaries” to the New
FIFA Agents Regulation
Reform of 2021
Who is a Football agent?
According to the FIFA Regulation on Players’ agent of October 29,
2007, the football agent is
a natural person who, for a fee, introduces players to clubs with a

view to negotiating or renegotiating an employment contract or
introduces two clubs to one another with a view to concluding a
transfer agreement, in compliance with the provisions set forth in
these regulations.
FIFA has regulated, or tried to regulate, the figure of the football

agents since its first appearance in the football field.
The main stepping stones of the regulation of the football agent’s
figure are:
• The original regulation

• The amended regulation
• The Blatter reform
• New prospectuses of reform
2 Inside the World of a Football Agent
The analysis covered by this work can therefore only start from one
of the regulatory cornerstones of the international federation, namely
the FIFA Statute, focusing in particular on Article 2,1 which perempto-
rily enshrines the objectives of the Fédération Internationale de Football
Association (hereinafter FIFA). FIFA2 aims to:
constantly improve the game of football and spread it throughout

the world taking into account its universal, educational, cultural
and humanitarian impact, putting into practice development pro-
grams aimed in particular at young people; organize their inter-
national competitions; establish rules and ensure that they are
respected; control the game of football in all its forms, taking all
necessary or advisable measures to prevent violation of the Statute,
regulations, decisions of FIFA and the Regulations of the game; to
prevent certain methods and practices from compromising the
integrity of the game or competitions or from involved in abuses
in the context of the game of football.
The Recognition of Football Agents

The recognition of footballers’ agents as a well-established figure in the
world of football, both at national and international level, together with
a regulatory apparatus provided by FIFA statutes and individual national
1
Art. 2 FIFA Regulations on working with Intermediaries 2015:“... in the
s election and engaging process of intermediaries, players and clubs shall act with
due diligence. In this context, due diligence means that platers and clubs shall
use reasonable endeavours to ensure that the intermediaries sign the relevant
Intermediary Declaration and the Representation contract concluded between
the parties.”
2
The Fédération Internationale de Football Association, better known by the
acronym FIFA, is the international federation that governs the sports of football,
five-a-side football and beach soccer. Its headquarters are located in Zurich,
Switzerland. The federation was founded in Paris on May 21, 1904 and is respon-
sible for organizing all intercontinental events. The six different confederations
(officially recognized by the federation), which are responsible for organizing and
supervising football activities in the various continents of the world AFC, CAF,
CONCACAF, CONMEBOL, OFC, UEFA, all belong to FIFA.
From the “FIFA regulation on working with intermediaries” 3
football federations, certainly appear to be the essential elements that

have led FIFA itself to create a set of rules to regulate the activities of
the agents. The International Federation, in fact, has recognized almost
immediately (since their first appearance in the world of football) the
figure of the agents as a professional category, and has remained con-
stant in this approach (until the reform, which will shortly be discussed
in depth, intervened on April 1, 2015), officially recognizing this figure
with the decision of the FIFA Executive Committee of May 20, 1994.
According to FIFA, among the considerations that accompanied the deci-
sion to regulate the activities of footballers’ agents, that there is first and
foremost the need to protect those most directly concerned and therefore
exposed to this activity, namely footballers, in order to guarantee them as
much professional assistance as possible. If we divide the legal evolution
of this profession, we could talk about three phases. In the initial phase,
FIFA was convinced of the certain and necessary professionalism of the
category of football agents, which therefore saw as a logical consequence
its official recognition, sanctioned by the entry into force of the first rules
of procedure dated May 20, 1994, amended on 11 December, 1995,
and entered into force on January 1, 1996 (the initial Regulation). FIFA
regulated, in fact, the access to the profession through the direct issue of
the license conditional on a completely discretionary analysis of the appli-
cant’s profile by its federation and the payment of a bank guarantee of
CHF 200,000 to the international federation. Anyone who had seen their
application accepted could apply next to his name, the qualification of
“FIFA Players’ Agent.”
The Original Regulation and its application problems: The “Piau”

and Multiplayers International Denmark cases (and proceedings)
Toward the end of the last century, competition proceedings were opened
against FIFA by the European Commission on the basis of a complaint
that considered the FIFA regulation to be contrary to the provisions of the
EC Treaty precisely in Article 100a of the Treaty 144 on free competition
because of excessive restrictions on the excess of the profession. The origi-
nal Regulation made the exercise of that profession subject, in fact, to the
possession of a license issued by the competent national federation and
reserved the activity in question for natural persons (Articles 1 and 2).
Prior to obtaining the license, an interview was held to test the c andidate’s
knowledge, particularly legal and sporting knowledge (Articles 6, 7,
and 8). The latter also had to satisfy certain requirements of compatibil-
ity and morality, such as the absence of criminal convictions in criminal
records (Articles 2, 3, and 4). The professional who wanted to be defined
and recognized as football agent also had to deposit, as already mentioned,
a bank guarantee of 200,000 Swiss francs (CHF) (Article 9). The contract
governing the relationship between the agent and the player could last
a maximum of two years but was renewable (Article 12). Agents, play-
ers, and clubs that broke the rules would be variously sanctioned. Staff
could, by a security, censure, or warning, impose an unspecified fine and
withdraw their license (Article 14). Players and clubs, could be fined up
to CHF 50,000 and CHF 100,000, respectively. Players could also be
imposed the disciplinary sanction of suspension from competitive sport
(up to 12 months), clubs could be suspended or prohibited from any
transfer (Articles 16 and 18). A “Footballer’s Status Commission” was
designated as FIFA’s supervisory and decision-making body (Article 20).
On March 23, 1998, an agent of the Federation Francaise de F ootball
(FFF) footballers, Mr. Piau lodged a complaint3 with the Commission
concerning the abovementioned initial Regulation. He complained,
first, that the regulation was contrary to Article 10 of the Directive of
the E uropean Commission that foresees that “It is for the national court
to ensure that, in the light of the provisions of Article 49 and the fol-
lowing articles of the Treaty relating to the freedom to provide services,
the restrictions on the exercise of the profession consisting of the opaque
examination procedures and the obligation to guarantee banking and, on
the other hand, the provision for supervision and penalties.” Secondly,
the complaint considered that the regulation could lead to discrimination
between Member States. Thirdly, it was complained that the R egulation
did not provide for the means of judicial protection or appeal of the
applicable decisions and penalties.
3
See Judgment of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities,
Cause T-193/02, Piau / Commission of the European Communities, in “Rivista
di Legge ed Economia dello Sport,” n. 1, 2005, 127 et seq.
Even before that, on February 20, 1996, the Commission received a

complaint from Multiplayers International Denmark, which questioned
the compatibility of the same Staff Regulations with Articles 25 and 19
of the Treaty. The Commission can also support Amendments Nos 814
EC and 825 EC, which are also related to the freedom of competition
4
Article 81 EC: “Treaty of Rome”: 1. All agreements between companies, all
decisions by associations of companies and all concerted practices which may
affect trade between Member States and which have as their basis are incompatible
with the common market object or effect of preventing, restricting or distort-
ing competition within the common market and in particular those consisting
in: (a) directly or indirectly fixing purchase or sale prices or other transaction
conditions, (b) limiting o control production, outlets, technical development or
investments, (c) share markets or sources of supply, (d) apply, in commercial
relations with other contractors, dissimilar conditions for equivalent services, so
as to determine for the latter a competitive disadvantage, (e) making the conclu-
sion of contracts conditional on the acceptance by the other parties of additional
services, which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no con-
nection with the object of the contracts themselves. 2. Agreements or decisions
prohibited by virtue of this article are automatically void. 3. However, the provi-
sions of paragraph 1 may be declared inapplicable: - to any agreement or category
of agreements between undertakings, - to any decision or category of decisions
of associations of undertakings, and - to any concerted practice or category of
concerted practice which contribute to improving the production or distribution
of products or to promoting technical or economic progress, while reserving users
a fair share of the resulting profit, and avoiding (a) imposing restrictions on the
undertakings concerned that are not indispensable for achieving these objectives
(b) to give such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect
of a substantial part of the products in question.
5
Articolo 82 CE: “Trattato di Roma”: Any abuse by one or more undertakings
of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it
shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar as it may
affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: (a)
directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
trading conditions; (b) limiting production, markets or technical development to
the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent
transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
in professionalization. The Commission has also informed of petitions

introduced before the European Parliament by citizens of German and
French nationality, declared admissible by the European Parliament
on October 29, 1996 and March 9, 1998, respectively, also relating to
the rules under discussion. The Commission thus opened proceedings
in accordance with Council Regulation No 17 of February 6, 1962,
first Regulation implementing Articles (81) and (82) of the Treaty (OJ
1962, No. 13, p. 204), and notified FIFA of a statement of objections on
October 19, 1999. That notice defined the regulation (the so-called initial
regulation) as a decision of the association of undertakings within the
meaning of Article 81 EC and called into question the compatibility with
that provision of the restrictions contained in that Regulation, namely the
mandatory nature of the license, the exclusion of its attribution to legal
persons, the prohibition on clubs and players from using unauthorized
agents, the demand for a bank guarantee, and the provision of sanctions.
On January 4, 2000, in response to the statement of objections, FIFA
contested that the abovementioned regulation could be called an associ-
ation decision instead of a regulation. A decision was more an expression
of a political enclave, it was not as effectively binding as a regulation. In
order to justify the restrictions the decision entailed, FIFA claimed “an
anxiety about the moralization and qualification of the profession” and
argued that it was possible to derogate from it on the basis of Article 100a
of the Treaty. 81, point 3, EC.
The “amended” Regulation of March 1, 2001 and the closing

of the “Piau case”
Following the administrative procedure initiated by the Commission,

FIFA adopted on December 10, 2000 a new regulation for the activi-
ties of the football agents, which entered into force on March 1, 2001
and was again amended on April 3, 2002. The new FIFA Regulation (the
amended regulation) maintains the obligation, necessary to practice the
profession of the player agent (which continues to be reserved to natural
persons) to hold a license issued by the competent national federation for
an unlimited period (Articles 1, 2, and 10). In addition, in the amended
regulation, other than having an impeccable reputation (Article 2), the
candidate must undergo a written examination (Articles 4 and 5), in the

form of a multiple-choice questionnaire, aimed at verifying their legal and
sporting knowledge. The candidate must also provide professional liability
insurance or, in alternative, deposit a bank guarantee amounting to CHF
100,000 (Articles 6 and 7). The relationship between the agents and the
players they wish to represent must be enshrined in a written contract of
up to two years, which is renewable. The contract must provide for the
remuneration of the agent, which is calculated on the basis of the player’s
gross basic remuneration and fixed, unless otherwise agreed by the parties,
to the extent of 5 percent of the same. A copy of the contract must be
sent to the national federation, which keeps a register of the contracts
received and that is always available at FIFA headquarters (Article 12).
Authorized agents must, inter alia, comply with FIFA’s statutes and regula-
tions and cannot approach a player who is under contract with a company
(Article 14). Finally, there is a series of sanctions against clubs, players, and
agents included in this amended version too. All of the above are, in fact,
liable, if they break the mentioned rules, to a security, censure, or warning,
as well as fines (Articles 15, 17, and 19). Agents may be required to sus-
pend or withdraw their license (Article 15); players may risk a suspension
for up to 12 months (Art. 17); clubs may also be suspended and prohib-
ited from moving their players for at least three months (Article 19); fines
can be imposed on everyone, football agents and clubs. The amount of the
fine for the agents is not specified (as it was not in the original regulation),
whereas for players and clubs, it is now at least 10,000 or 20,000 Swiss
francs respectively (Articles 15, 17, and 19 respectively). Penalties may be
imposed jointly (Articles 15, 17, and 19). In the event of disputes, the
national federation concerned or the “Footballer’s Status Commission”
(Article 22) shall have jurisdiction. Transitional measures allow the valida-
tion of licenses granted in accordance with the old legislation (Article 23).
A code of professional conduct and a standard model representative con-
tract (Annexes B and C respectively) are also annexed to the amended
Regulation. The amendments made on April 3, 2002, specify that citizens
of the European Union (EU) or the European Economic Area (EEA) must
refer the license application to the national federation of their country
or country of residence, regardless of the length of their residence, and
will be able to take out the insurance policy prescribed in any country of
the European Union or the EEA. On July 9 and 10, 2001, the European
Parliament declared the files closed.
On August 3, 2001, the Commission sent Mr. Piau a letter pursuant
to Article 6 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2842 of December 22,
1998 on hearings in certain proceedings under Articles (81) and (82) of
the EC Treaty (OJ L 354, p. 18). The Commission stated that its inter-
vention at FIFA had led to the elimination of the most restrictive mea-
sures contained in the “Regulation for the activities of players’ agents” and
that there was no longer any interest on the part of the Community in
following up the proceedings.
On November 12, 2001, the Commission sent a similar letter to
Multiplayers International Denmark, to which the company did not reply.
Mr. Piau informed the Commission that, even considering their lack
of interest in pursuing the proceedings, he was maintaining the com-
plaint. He claimed that infringements of Article 81(1) EC in respect of
examination and professional insurance remained in the amended Reg-
ulation and that new infringements had been introduced in the form
of ethical rules, standard contract models and methods of calculating
remuneration. Those restrictions, in his view, could not be avoided by a
derogation under Article 81(3) EC. The applicant then claimed that the
Commission had not examined the contested regulation in the light of
the wording of Article 82 EC.
By decision of April 15, 2002, the Commission rejected Mr. Piau’s
complaint.
According to the institution, there was insufficient Community inter-
est to follow up the procedure since the more restrictive provisions com-
plained of had been repealed. With regards to the mandatory nature of
the license, it could be justified—and those that remained could have
been derogated on the basis of Article 81(3) EC and Article 82 EC did
not apply in the present case. The European Commission decided to close
the proceedings when FIFA agreed to amend its rules, giving rise to a
second phase, characterized by a massive proliferation of rules regarding
football agents.
The second phase was the result of a long period during which the
legal basis for the figure of the player agent were defined. The new FIFA
regulation, entered into force on March 1, 2001 (revised several times in
the years: 2006, 2009, 2011) with radical regulatory changes, including
the obligation for the aspiring agent to pass an exam in the form of a mul-
tiple choice written questionnaire and the obligation to take out civil lia-
bility insurance in order to obtain the license for an unlimited period by
the competent national federation and no longer FIFA. One of the most
impactful consequences, much more cultural than factual, was the sup-
pression of the term “FIFA Players’ Agent,” the use of which is still wide-
spread today especially among those who obtained the license at the dawn
of the different regulation. Today, the use of the term constitutes a viola-
tion of the protected brand of the World Football Federation. Through
this regulation, once the license had been purchased by the national fed-
eration, the agent is entitled to use the title of “Players’ Agent Licensed
by the X Football Association.” Subsequently, the exponential and, in
some ways, disorderly growth of the profession at international level, and
above all, the increasing number of appeals to the courts of the highest
body in international football (in order to settle disputes between agents,
footballers, and clubs) led FIFA to amend and revise more restrictively its
rules on football agents.
The Blatter Reform

The “Blatter reform” named after the former FIFA president, the same
one who had in fact signed the previous regulation of the figure in ques-
tion, evolved the role and legal qualification of the footballers’ agent rad-
ically in April 2015. In fact, the figure in question has been completely
transformed into a sports intermediary. The new regulation, in essence, no
longer restricts access to the profession and, as stated on FIFA’s official
website in April 2015,
is based on principles of transparency, with regard to the a ctivity

of intermediaries, and good administration of federations that
will have the task of creating national registers and adopting
regulations transposing FIFA principles.
This gaunt and imprecise regulation has led to many problems from
the point of view of the application of legislation, which suddenly was
no longer harmonized by any central body of the ball, as it was before

with FIFA, a body which is a homologator of rules par excellence in
the field of football. This gives rise to a series of practical iniquities in the
performance of the profession of football agents, depending on whether
the profession was carried out in a nation that had confined itself only to
incorporating the FIFA regulation into its essential points rather than
to another that had decided to supplement these minimum requirements
dictated by the Zurich body (FIFA). In Italy, Germany, and Portugal, for
example, this has led to the introduction of the double representation rule,
which is typical of brokerage, since it is now the market operator sud-
denly projected into a sector where it should no longer have been in the
interests of either of the two parties involved in a negotiation, but of both.
The new name of intermediary brings with it, on a practical level,
two other important regulatory innovations: the first, to be an intermedi-
ary, comes without distinction among a natural or legal person, who will
have to register with a registration system held by the individual National
Sports Federation, communicating both the activities carried out and the
compensation received; the second (and in some ways symptomatic of
a clear and more general position of indifference or mere tolerance of
the newly formed intermediary figure assumed by FIFA), FIFA implic-
itly states that it no longer wishes to deal, in the event of a violation of
disciplinary rules or rules by the intermediary, with the resolution of all
future disputes between intermediary and footballer, or intermediary and
company. FIFA itself, on the other hand, will, as it has always been, penal-
ize the player or club who have appointed the intermediary for the single
operation in dispute. The profession also changes from the point of view
of the total remuneration due to an intermediary to represent a footballer,
and the way in which he is wound up. In fact, the percentage allocated
to the services rendered by the intermediary may not exceed 3 percent of
the player’s basic gross income for the entire duration of the contract. The
principles that led FIFA to do so are therefore formally inspired by the
transparency of the operations and the containment of costs by the com-
panies. In practice, however, as I have said, the reform has resulted in the
liberalization of the profession and a reduction in the requirements for
access. This decision has caused great alarm in the category of agents of
FIFA-licensed footballers that, according to the most recent census dated
Table 1.1 Number of licensed agents
Nation Number of FIFA licensed Agents

Italy 1,063
Spain 560
England 557
Germany 482
Argentina 225
Brazil 203
Other countries 148
2017, are 6,501 in the world and only in Italy, which holds the record, as
many as 1,063, followed by Spain with 560, England with 557, Germany
with 482, Argentina 225, Brazil 203, and gradually all the other countries
represented that are 148 (Table 1.1).
The FIFA Regulation on Intermediaries 2015, therefore, currently
presents structural and regulatory critical issues that need a more in-depth
analysis in their key points.
The Regulation, in fact, reaffirms the role of the intermediary who is
defined as:
A natural or legal person who for a fee or free of charge, represents

players and/or clubs in negotiations, in order to conclude a
Contract, or represents the clubs in negotiations to conclude a
Transfer Agreement
and the tasks of the Federations, in Article 19 titled as Purpose.

In fact, national bodies are required to consider the provisions of
the regulation as minimum principles on which their federal internal
legislation should be based.
In Article 2, with particular reference to paragraph 2, FIFA, on the
other hand, requires clubs and players to choose intermediaries diligently
and in compliance with the requirements laid down with regard to the
representative contract and the declaration of intermediation. Article 3
states that the intermediary chosen for the individual transaction must
be registered and have an impeccable reputation with the characteristics
prescribed by Article 4 entitled “Requisites for Registration.” The quali-

fication of impeccable has origins from Article 6 paragraph 1 of the pre-
vious FIFA Football agents Regulation approved by the FIFA Executive
Committee on October 29, 2007, and entered into force on January 1,
2008, where the impeccable reputation was even considered as a prereq-
uisite for access to the qualification examination for the profession of
the agent, and therefore, inserted in the wider Article 6 entitled “Pre-
liminary requirements for submitting an application.” According to this
rule, impeccable reputation corresponds to not having received criminal
convictions for financial crimes or violent crimes. Important news com-
pared to the previous regulation, dated 2006, was also introduced with
regard to the right to compensation, here provided for in commission
mode and proportional to gross compensation, but calculated over the
entire duration of the contract concluded by the professional footballer,
as provided for in Article 7 paragraph 314 and no longer commensurate
with the individual annuity. The amount of remuneration due to an
intermediary acting in the interest of a player must be calculated on
the basis of the fixed part of the gross total engagement for the entire
duration of the contract. Clubs that use the services of an intermediary
will have to pay for it with the payment of a lump sum, agreed before
the conclusion of the transaction. With the agreement of all the par-
ties, the payment can also be paid in installment solution. Taking into
account the national regulations and national and international man-
datory rules, Article 7(3)(a)(b)(c) provides an indication of how to pay
compensation to the intermediary, as a recommendation, establishing
that players and clubs may adopt the following benchmarks: the fixed
part of the gross total engagement, calculated for the entire duration of
the sports performance contract; (b) the total amount of remuneration
due to the intermediary who has acted in the interest of a club in the
conclusion of a contract with a player should not exceed three per cent
(3%) the fixed part of the gross total engagement, calculated for the
entire duration of the sports performance contract; (c) the total amount
of remuneration due to the intermediary acting in the interest of the
club for the conclusion of a transfer agreement should not exceed three
per cent (3%) of the amount paid for the player’s transfer. Clubs must
ensure that payments made from one club to another in connection with
the transfer, v ariable part of the engagement, training compensation,6
6
The Training Compensation: Article 20 FIFA Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players, consists in the payment of a sum—defined as a parameter—
to clubs that have trained young players, which accrues upon signing a multi-year
membership. The objective of this regulation is to develop the training of young
players and more generally to reward clubs that deal exclusively with the youth
sector. The FIFA preparation and conception award (the FIFA Player Status and
Transfer Regulations govern the institution, calling it the training allowance),
together with the solidarity mechanism, constitute the forms of “incentive” for the
development of youth football. In order to economically quantify the accruing
prizes, FIFA divides the clubs into 4 categories according to the Championship
and the Confederation to which they belong. The payment of this indemnity
accrues upon signing the first contract as a professional or upon subsequent
transfers within the age of 23. Therefore, the clubs “eligible for compensation”
according to the provisions of Annex 4 to the FIFA Regulations on the Status
and Transfers of Players, are those that have contributed to the training of the
player between 12 and 23 years of age. The same article, also the cases in which
the payment of this indemnity is not due, that is: If the registration of the player
is carried out by an amateur club or by a club belonging to the fourth category in
the national system of categorization of clubs; or if the registration of the player
took place following a termination of the contract for just cause between the
player himself and the previous club, without prejudice to the rights of the previ-
ous clubs that formed the player. The payment of the training allowance must be
made within 30 days from the registration of the player. The club or clubs that
have not received the payment of this award within 18 months of their registra-
tion can lodge a complaint with the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (CRC)
at the first instance and possibly at the second instance at the CAS in Lausanne.
After 18 months without any request for payment of the training allowance, or in
the event of bankruptcy of the club or clubs that contributed to the player’s train-
ing, the prize will be paid to the federation/s of the countries in which the same
player was formed. The National Sports Federation is then obliged to use these
fees for the future training of “young amateur” or “non-professional” young play-
ers of players who in the previous season had been registered as “young” with an
annual bond, are required to pay the cd to the club or clubs for which the player
has previously been registered. “Preparation bonus” on the basis of a parameter,
doubled in the case of club membership of the professional leagues, updated at
the end of each sporting season based on the ISTAT cost of living indexes, except
or solidarity m
echanism,7 are not paid to intermediaries and that such
payments are not made by the intermediaries.8 This prohibition also
in the case where the request concerns clubs belonging to the same league. A key
aspect is that the player’s bond, for at least an entire football season, is an essential
condition for the right to the prize.
7
Solidarity mechanism: Article 21 FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer
of Players, and Annex 6 of the same regulations: According to the two rules in
question, “If a professional football player transfers during a contract, 5 percent of
any remuneration, with the exception of training, paid to the previous club, must
be deducted from the total of these fees and distributed by the destination club as
a solidarity contribution to the club(s) that have provided the player with train-
ing and education over the years. This solidarity contribution takes into account
the number of years (calculated in proportion if less than one year) during which
the player was registered for the club / clubs in question in the seasons between
the 12th and 23rd year of age.” The contribution is equivalent to 5 percent of the
price agreed by the two companies for the transfer according to the established
rates. Therefore, the destination club must pay the solidarity contribution to the
teams that are entitled to the compensation. This percentage must be deducted
from the total transfer, and therefore would be borne by the transferring com-
pany. Therefore, each club for which the player has been registered from 12 to 23
years of age is entitled to a share according to the scheme presented in the table
above. This cost is charged to the income statement, among other charges, by the
company that supports it. The FIFA regulations also indicate the payment terms,
specifying that “The destination club is required to pay the solidarity contribu-
tion to the club(s) that have provided the player with the training in accordance
with the provisions of this Annex no later than 30 days from the player’s registra-
tion or, in the case of installment payments, within 30 days from the date of the
individual payments.” Furthermore, always according to the rules, “If it is not
possible to establish a link between the professional player and some of the clubs
that formed him within 18 months of the transfer, the solidarity contribution
must be paid to the Federation(s) of the country (or countries) in which the
professional received his training. This contribution will be earmarked for youth
football development programs in the Federation (or Federations) in question.”
“Solidarity contribution and training allowance: However, the solidarity contri-
bution mechanism is not to be confused with the training allowance. The training
allowance is paid on the occasion of the first contract as a professional and for
transfers up to 23 years of age. While the solidarity contribution must be paid for
each single transfer for consideration in the manner described above.”
8
Article 7.4 FIFA Regulations on working with Intermediaries 2015: “Clubs
shall ensure that payments to be made by one club to another club in connection
refers, but not only, to any additional rights to the variable part of the
engagement or the future transfer value of a player. The transfer of credit
is also prohibited. According to the provisions of Article 7 paragraph 6,9
any payment due for the services of an intermediary must be made
exclusively by the intermediary’s client to the intermediary himself.
After the conclusion of the transaction and with the consent of the
club, the player may provide his written consent for the club to pay the
intermediary in his name. The payment made by the club on behalf of
the player must comply with the manner previously agreed between the
player and the intermediary. Officers,10 as defined in paragraph 11 of the
Definitions section of the FIFA Statute, are prohibited from receiving
from an intermediary the total sum or part of it, due to that intermedi-
ary for a transaction. The officer who contravenes this provision will be
subject to disciplinary sanctions. Finally, Article 8 states that for
players and/or clubs who use the advice of an intermediary in

the negotiation of a sports performance contract and/or a transfer
agreement, it is forbidden to pay any payment to the interme-
diary, if the player concerned is a minor, as defined in point 11
of the Definitions section of the FIFA Regulation on status and
transfers of the players.
with a transfer, such as transfer compensation, training compensation or solidar-

ity contributions, are not paid to intermediaries and that the payment is not
made by intermediaries. This includes, but is not limited to, owning any interest
in any transfer compensation or future transfer value of a player. The assignment
of claims is also prohibited.”
9
Article 7.6 FIFA Regulations on working with Intermediaries 2015: “After
the conclusion of the relevant transaction and subject to the club’s agreement, the
player may give his written consent for the club to pay the intermediary on his
behalf. The payment made on behalf of the player shall be in accordance with the
terms of payment agreed between the player and the intermediary.”
10
Article 7.7 FIFA Regulations on working with Intermediaries 2015: “Officials,
as defined in point 11 of the Definitions section of the FIFA Statutes, are prohib-
ited from receiving any payment from an intermediary of all or part of the fees
paid to that intermediary in a transaction. Any official who contravenes the above
shall be subject to disciplinary sanctions.”
Analyzing FIFA’s reform of football agents, so-called deregulation, is a

difficult task because, in the opinion of the writer, there is no reading that
leads the interpreter to identify an acceptable rationale.
The Blatter reform has its roots in an industry study wanted by the
Zurich Federation itself, which revealed that the agents’ fees reached
254 million dollars in the period 2011 through 2013, only 14.6 percent
of the value of the 865 deals in which prosecutors were present (worth
1.7 billion dollars11). The same study also shows that 83 percent of these
commissions were produced by operations within UEFA. Such a low per-
centage is a clear sign that the intention to professionalize a figure such as
that covered by this work, by FIFA and individual national sports feder-
ations, has failed. However, perhaps the quickest path was pursued, that
of implementing a free all policy, through this centralized deregulation
which, in fact, proved to be the wrong choice. In fact, in the period since
April 1, 2015, the day on which the new regulation “FIFA regulations on
working with intermediaries” became effective, not only has there been
an exponential increase in the number of intermediaries, but the lack of
addition by the majority of the individual sports federations, the so-called
“Minimum Standards,” has provoked a proliferation of judicial appeals
against figures without competence, preparation and, above all, guaran-
tees, provided for in the previous FIFA regulations, such as the obligation
to take out insurance policies, leaving the world of football, the third
sector of the world economy, as often non-stick characters, and therefore,
toward whom nothing was appropriate in a vain attempt to counter ille-
gal actions or against any federal regulation. Furthermore, “deregulation”
has had the effect to act as a diaspora of regulations, in an increasingly
global and multicultural market, which goes beyond national borders
(and lives and is intertwined with international rights) lacking any refer-
ence whatsoever to regulatory harmonization between the relevant rules
in individual States.
In a time when all sectors of public life, the labor market in particular,
choose to sectorize skills in order to increase professionalism and quality
11
Il Sole 24 ore, Marco Bellinazzo, 4th March 2013,—calciomercato UEFA
“solidale”: In the period between 2011\2013, turnover of 5.1 billion euros, more
than half towards smaller clubs.
standards of performance, the world of football decided to backtrack and

clear, with ad hoc regulation, improvisation, and self-certified compe-
tence on a pre-printed form.
We have paradoxically moved from an internationally and nationally
regulated activity, that while presenting completely fillable gaps guaran-
teed a minimum common level of professional preparation certified by
passing an enabling exam, to a free square where, paying the secretarial
rights equal to €500.00 for registration in the Register and €150.00 for
each representation contract deposited, it is legitimate to claim the right
to qualify themselves as Intermediary and represent players and clubs
without guaranteeing knowledge of the basic regulations and the related
technical aspects provided with regard to the memberships, transfers, and
contracts of footballers with related protections. In this international reg-
ulatory chaos, it has certainly played an important and harmonizing role
within the Community, the European Commission. As above mentioned,
the Commission’s discussions with FIFA in 2001 led to the amendment
of FIFA’s rules on player status and transfer. The 2009 study on sports
agents in the European Union analyzed the activities of agents and their
wider role, in the context of the internationalization of professional sport.
An EU conference on sports agents focusing on the main team sports
in Europe took place in 2011 and identified the standardization of the
profession as an option for further consultation and an opportunity to
develop and test the quality requirements of the profession. In 2013,
the Commission published a study on the economic and legal aspects of
player transfers, which shows that transfer systems adopted by clubs can
help ensure fairer competition.
Future Reform Prospectuses

On September 26, 2018, FIFA announced the decision of the FIFA
Football Stakeholders Committee12 meeting in London, to carry out
a reform, as a result of a series of meetings between the FIFA Football
12
Football Stakeholders Committee: advises and assists the Council on all
football-related matters, in particular on the structure of the game, as well as on
all technical matters. The committee will also address the relationship between
Stakeholders Committee with ECA,13 the Leagues (in particular the

World Leagues Forum), the Players’ Association (FIFpro) and numerous
Federations and Confederations. The aim of this reform is to improve
the transparency of the system of transfers of footballers and, to this end,
it has identified prosecutors as the focus of this system. One of the most
interesting parts of the transfer reform concerns intermediaries, which
will see a significant new change after those of 2010 and 2015. Since
2015, FIFA (FIFA Circular No. 1417), has implemented deregulation,
which has liberalized access to the profession of agent/intermediary, abol-
ishing licenses and the possibility for intermediaries to represent multi-
ple parties. In addition, it excluded the competence of the International
Sports Organization (Player Status Committee) and the state law of each
individual FIFA member state in matters of disputes concerning inter-
mediaries. The implementation of this scheme devised by FIFA has been
delegated to the national federations that have implemented it differently;
for example, Italy first accepted deregulation and then provided, by a
law of the State, the creation of the figure of the sports agent (Article 1
paragraph 373 of law 27 December 2017 n. 205) and of the d.p.c.m. of
March 23, 2018. Italy, in freeing the sporting system from the exclusivity
of competence, took its cue from the FFF (France Football Federation),
which pioneered the activity of football agents first with a state law. The
2015 system appeared incomplete and, since last April, has led FIFA to
clubs, players, leagues, affiliated associations, confederations, and FIFA, as well as

matters relating to the interests of football clubs around the world.
13
ECA (European Club Association) is a body that represents football clubs at
European level. The purpose of the ECA is to protect and promote football in
Europe. Article 2 letter a of the 2017 ECA Statute, available on www.ecaeurope.
com, states that “The objectives of ECA are: To safeguard and promote the inter-
ests of European club football, in particular, and club football in general.” The
ECA was created to replace the G-14, an organization that dissolved in January
2008 as well as the UEFA European Clubs Forum and is chaired by Karl-Heinze
Rumenigge. Its official establishment is with the signing of the Memorandum of
Understanding between UEFA and the ECA on January 21, 2008. The Associa-
tion of European Clubs has adopted an organizational structure and selection
process similar to those on which the Forum of the European Clubs was based,
made up of 102 members with a two-year term of office.
open a confrontation with the top representatives of the category, reach-

ing a draft agreement that by March 2021 will become official and will
enter into force in view of the summer session of the 2021 football market
(Covid-19 permitting).
Throughout 2018, there were several meetings in Zurich and other
European locations between the heads of the FIFA committee and rep-
resentatives of the European Football Agents Association (Efaa), chaired
by the Dutchman Rob Jansen. For more than 10 years, this body has
represented almost all the national associations of agents in Europe as
well as some of the most important in the world such as Argentina,
Brazil, and Japan. In Dubai, on January 2 and 3, 2019, a major panel
was held as part of Globe Soccer14 with the participation of Zvone Boban
(FIFA vice-secretary), Fabio Paratici (head of the technical area of Juven-
tus FC), and Giovanni Branchini (Efaa vice-president). On this occasion,
the importance of the role of agents was reaffirmed not only for the foot-
ball market, but also for the training of athletes itself. This will result in a
new Agents Regulation, which, according to FIFA’s15 official website, will
enter into force in the summer of 2020 and will reintroduce the licensing
system, centrally administered by FIFA with an enabling examination.
In addition, the mandatory liability insurance will be reintroduced, and
it will be necessary to update itself through professional courses on an
annual basis in order to maintain the license, which can only be granted
to natural persons and not to legal entities. Another important innova-
tion that has emerged from the FIFA Executive Board is the inclusion of
agents within FIFA TMS16 (Transfer matching system), the international
14
Ed. “Globe Soccer” is an annual meeting dedicated to the main players in
the transfer market, considered as one of the most exclusive events in the sector,
where the operators of the transfer market, together with the clubs, leagues, fed-
erations, and football institutions can meet and debate. Starting with the second
edition of Globe Soccer, the Globe Soccer Awards have been launched, special
awards dedicated to the best manager and the best football player’s agent of the
year.
15
Also look at www.fifa.com/governance/
16
What is the TMS, then? The FIFA regulation speaks of an “information and
data system on the Internet whose main objective is to simplify the process of
international transfer of footballers (male professionals in the field of football for
transfer management system, in which the agent will have to enter each
transaction and communicate the information regarding the individ-
ual transfer operations concluded. FIFA will pay particular attention to
the possibility of conflict of interest; in particular, the prosecutor may
be involved in the same transaction only on behalf of the player and the
transferee or the transferee club but not all three. In addition, the reform
also includes a contribution to the Solidarity Fund by the prosecutors:
5 percent of the sums collected for the sale of footballers to the clubs that
raised them will not only be paid by the clubs but also by the agents of
the players concerned. Finally, with regard to the dispute settlement sys-
tem, the agent may alternately use two solutions: resolution through the
FIFA and CAS17 systems and the establishment of the so-called Clearing
House, or a transaction settlement system operated by FIFA, which will
facilitate the payment of fees. In addition, the system of sanctions, already
present in the previous sports system, will be reinserted. The last reform
that is to be implemented is the inclusion of a salary cap on salaries paid
to prosecutors, but this novelty will have to go beyond the scrutiny of
European regulations and consequently of other international confedera-
tions. A major problem which, despite the reform, remains to be resolved,
concerns the membership of the players’ agent. At present, even if the
intermediary is not a member, he must be subject to a number of duties
placed by the international sporting order without being able to benefit
from the rights, such as a more rapid settlement of disputes arising from
the non-payment of the fees due to him.
In short, therefore, the reforms that FIFA intends to introduce at the
end of 2020 can be summarized as follows:
• RETURN TO THE REGISTER—With the return of the

FIFA register, all representatives of the players will have to
take an examination and submit to the rules for the category
eleven, ed), to improve optimization of information flow.” This is a mandatory

procedure for transfers: “without the use of the TMS, a purchase is considered
null and void.”
17
CAS: Court of arbitration for sport, è il Tribunale arbitrale internazionale
dello sport, organismo giudiziario con sede a Losanna, Svizzera.
and periodically attend refresher courses. So, even relatives

(such as Wanda Nara, Icardi’s wife and de facto agent) will
have to adapt to these rules in order to have a role.
• PUBLIC COMPENSATION—In the future, compensation
for agents will become public, indicating the figures for each
individual transaction. On the contrary, clubs now only
provide aggregated data that does not allow you to know
specifically the extent of relationships with each consultant.
• PAY CAP—The agents have given the willingness to set a
ceiling on their compensation if this criterion were also to be
applied to other professional figures in football.
• SOLIDARITY FUND—If the compensation ceiling system
is introduced, prosecutors will also contribute to the FIFA
solidarity fund with which clubs donate 5 percent of the sums
collected for the sale of footballers to the companies that
raised them.
• CLEARING HOUSE—FIFA will set up a clearing house,
which will record all operations and thus be able to monitor
relations between clubs, athletes, and agents. This is a
fundamental prerequisite for possible measures.
• YOUTH PROSECUTORS—Reformers have also
photographed the phenomenon of paying abnormal sums to
the families of young footballers. In this respect, it is intended
to carry out controls to prevent unscrupulous individuals
from “buying” prosecutors at a young age, jeopardizing
the careers of grass talents, and exposing them to excessive
pressure.
This empirical reconstruction therefore leads to a return to the past, that

is, to the regulatory regime prior to the FIFA regime of 2015. With this
latest reform, there was complete consistency between supranational—
the so-called FIFA regulation—and national rules.
The regulatory regime of 2015 had led operators and authors to
talk, as mentioned, about deregulation, where conditional access to the
profession through enabling examination had been replaced by the mere
possession of minimum standards/requirements.
In this regulatory system, in fact, access to the profession of sports

agent, or rather intermediary, was not conditional on passing an enabling
examination, as has historically happened, but became in fact free
to anyone, subject to requirements of good repute or, in any case, of
independence.
On the other hand, the situation that occurs, for example, in Italy, the
second nation in the world by volume of commissions paid to sports pros-
ecutors by companies, to date is in close continuity with the previous one,
where professionals involved in the negotiation of contracts must, in order
to operate, be registered in the appropriate register (or Register) at the
Federation, which is accessed following the issue of a license/enabling title.
The same operate within the Sports Order, are required to comply
with the relevant regulations and are subject to Sports Justice, but this is
not by virtue of an associative bond—the so-called membership—as pro-
vided for players, clubs, managers, and so on, but on a voluntarist basis
with registration in the Register, a prodromic to which there is precisely
the acceptance of this systematic-normative corpus.
In the current Italian national football system, therefore, the
sports agent could be considered a work provider—a natural or legal
person— registered in a professional register with conditional access,
which acts under a mandate by assuming a result obligation. A varied
figure, as m entioned, not only in terms of domestic law, but also at
international-private level, where the hermeneutic effort could lead to
the solution (of reasonable compromise) to bring the case back within
the scope of the mandate more than other types such as the agency of
common law or the provision of services.
In the opinion of the writer, these interpretative considerations,
although laudable and, in some ways, essential perhaps take second
place if we consider the following assumptions. In the legal transaction
concerned, the differences between the elements of one, rather than the
other cases of common law, fade, giving rise to a contractual type which
is consistent in its practical and consolidated application. Although not
typical, the legal transaction in question is known in its elements binding
on the subjects of the same operating in the sports system.
Secondly, the mandate of a sports agency and the activity of the
football agents—although not typical in the state system, although

indirectly recognitions of this kind there are—are certainly typical,

known—also by the related bodies of justice—in the system in which

they express themselves, the federal one, affecting only residually the state
procedural system (physiologically civil or tax).
Finally, since the general and peaceful principle of the protection of
the autonomy of the parties referred to in Article 10 of the Directive still
applies, it is clear from the case-law of the Court of Justice that, in the
present case, it is for the National Court to determine whether, in the
light of the circumstances of the case, it is necessary to, according to 1322
of the Civil Code, “the parties may also conclude contracts which do not
belong to types having special rules, provided that they are dedicated to
the rate of interests worthy of protection under the legal system.”
Without reaching the hyperbole that the practical and economic
application of the case is the driver for legal interpretation, it is still true
that in this case, the type of negotiation is ontologically dynamic and
susceptible to continuous changes on the basis of concrete experience.
Sports prosecutors in recent years have become crucial in the f ootball
market negotiations to say the least. All this because now the various
football clubs are called upon to deal not only with the will of the players,
but also with multiple and often salty economic commissions.
Consequently, as mentioned above, FIFA is considering introducing
a new regulation in order to try to curb the freedom of negotiation of the
agents. This is a set of rules that would impose a ceiling on the sums to be
paid to managers, among other reforms.
The International Football Federation (FIFA) led by Gianni Infantino
aims to impose precise limits. There is talk of the limit between 5 percent
and 10 percent of the transfer fees from the company it sells. To this,
3 percent would be added for those who buy and another 3 percent for
the player interested in changing jerseys.
Faced with this squeeze, however, the sports prosecutors declared
themselves open to dialogue with the institutions of the football field even
if still ready to fight in the event of unbalanced contradiction between the
parties.
On Monday, January 20, 2019, an important dinner was held in
London among the main managers of the football world in which the
author of this book also took part with honor.
On this occasion, FIFA’s imminent decision to officially limit
the commissions relating to player transfers was discussed. The agents
have already decided to join, appealing to the freedom of enterprise,

endangered by a feared regulatory intervention by FIFA, excessively

stringent for an activity, that of the football agents, which in 2020 is
decidedly multifaceted, therefore not includable in predetermined
hetero-imposed hinges.
Football clubs, federations, and national leagues, on the other hand,
are still waiting to decide what to do. On the one hand, they would
welcome the new regulation with a sigh of relief.
On the other hand, however, they would not want to get to the
head-on confrontation with sports prosecutors. In fact, in the market,
they will still be called upon to deal with them. It would therefore not
be convenient for relations to be strained and to get to a mutual closure.
In fact, under any circumstances, it is now essential for the clubs
to find an agreement with the football agents. Even in the case of zero
parameters, if you do not pay the cost of the card to another team, the
money must still be paid to the representatives or mediators of the ath-
letes. Always through commissions.
This situation has arisen precisely and especially since 2015, when the
so-called deregulation desired by the then FIFA President Joseph Blatter
was introduced: that is, the removal of any kind of license or mandate
constraint.
In other words, a prosecutor in the course of a negotiation can repre-
sent not only the player, but also the company that buys and the one that
sells. So, full power and relevant commissions.
And it is no coincidence that in 2019, just considering international
affairs, the category has pocketed a total of about 654 million dollars in
commissions. That figure has tripled in just five years. And if you look at
purchases nationwide, you get to almost a billion dollars.
Relations between agents, on the one hand, and sports clubs and
athletes, on the other
Having highlighted the prodromal aspects of access to the profession, we

can focus on the concrete contents of this activity.
A subordinate condition for carrying it out is having obtained
an assignment in the form of a mandate from the client, sports club
or player, as will be seen, sports clubs and/or football players). Formal

contract, with mandatory written form, with the additional burden
of depositing—by the agent in charge—the mandate with the Federal
Agents Commission.
Contract, moreover, subject to nullity in case it is not integrated with
the summary model (executive summary) available on the Federation web-
site and reporting the essential elements of the store.
Physiologically, the assignment is conferred by one of the parties
involved (the company that intends to acquire the federative and eco-
nomic rights related to the sporting performance of a player; the one that
intends to transfer these rights; the club that intends to register an athlete
or sign/renew a sports employment contract with a player; a player who
must negotiate the first signing or renewal of his employment contract
with the employer company).
However, there is no express prohibition of the hypothesis of a joint
mandate, even if in clear conflict of interest. The assumption is in fact
undisputed: in a multi-party negotiation, the interest of one necessarily
affects that of the others. And then, a club that intends to acquire a player,
if required to pay a higher sum as remuneration to the latter, will probably
negotiate a reduction in the consideration to be paid to the transferring
company for said transfer.
Nonetheless, the cases are expressly legitimized and governed by the
provision of mechanisms for the prior acceptance of the conflict of inter-
est by the parties in charge, to protect them on the assumption they are
informed.
The mandate, then, in the event that it has been conferred by a club
for the registration of a player, a different hypothesis, therefore, from
the transfer of the same from one company to another, automatically
ceases to produce effects when the player in question is no longer
registered for the sending club.
In regards to the content, the mandate may provide for an exclusivity
in favor of the agent and must expressly provide for the payment dead-
lines (while the method, by bank transfer, is bound by regulation) and
the subjects required to pay the obligation, it may be the case that, for
example, the obligation to grant the consideration in favor of the player’s
agent is not the latter but conventionally the sports club.
Consideration that can be determined in a lump sum or in a percent-

age calculated on the player’s total gross income or the economic values
of the transaction.
The so-called temporary football agents. Possible doubts from the

point of view of European labor law
As can be easily learned from both national and international r egulations,

both the state and federal legislators have provided for a transitional regime
operating until the end of 2019 (when the new regulation of sports agents
in the individual federations came into force national sports), temporarily
legitimizing agents in possession of a post March 31, 2015, qualification
to operate.
In particular, for this purpose in Italy, Germany, and Portugal, for
example, the national sports federation has established the Provisional
Federal Register of the so-called Temporary Agents.
The latter, in substance, are subject to the same rules provided for by
the discipline of the reform extensively examined in the previous pages.
It then becomes interesting—with ideas that, as will be seen, embrace
the principles of EU labor law—to define the Temporary Agent.
In particular, in Italy, the specific Federal Regulation allows the
registration in the relevant register to persons who are in possession
of a qualification issued by the FIGC between March 31, 2015 and
December 31, 2017.
In this regard, there is first of all a question of regulatory consistency:
why not allow the exercise of activity in the transitional regime by
professionals with a federal qualification after December 31, 2017 (and
before the entry into force of the new discipline)?
Secondly and more interestingly, the distance between the trenchant
provision for temporary staff—whose qualification was issued, during the
relevant period, (exclusively) by the National Sports Federation—and
that of the ordinary post-reform discipline, which, as seen, provides for
wide dissertation on the possibilities of access to the profession granted to
Community agents, is immediately a source of attention.
Taking a concrete example, a Spanish agent, authorized by his
National Federation after March 31, 2015 and before December 31,
2017, could not operate in Italy, even until December 31, 2019 (except
in the case of passing the examination of the new regime), with all the
consequent findings in terms of Euro-unitary labor law regarding possi-
ble contrasts with the cardinal principles of supranational fundamental
freedoms, including, first of all, the freedom to provide services. As it
is known, the rules of the European Treaties provide—and indeed it is
the pillar of the common market—for the right to exercise freely, on a
temporary and occasional basis, its service activities in the Member State
where the service is provided, under the same conditions as those imposed
by that State on its own nationals, with the consequent prohibition of
restrictions on that freedom to provide services.
If the rationale of the ordinary scheme is considered reasonable,
which, moreover, applies to both Italian and Community agents, which
only saves the qualifications issued before March 31, 2015 (before the
so-called deregulation), the basis of a derogation from the requirement
that applies only to professionals, for example, Italian and not to
Community professionals are not easily understood.
In this respect, it should be pointed out that the prohibited restrictions
are not only direct restrictions—for example, based on the mere fact of
the nationality of the provider—but also indirect restrictions, such as
those that could be found in state and FIGC regulations.
Restrictions which, moreover, in the economic sector concerned,
that of professional football, are all the more striking when we consider
that social dumping18 is ontologically absent because of the inherent
characteristics of the activity and its market-driven profitability.
It is a system of rules that have been positive on the basis of the
guidelines formed and consolidated by the case law of the Court of
Justice of the European Union in a process of integration of the ser-
vices market and in the wake of the 10-year pro-labor policies. From
this point of view, there is also the question of possible restrictions on
the access to the profession, which, as we have seen, are the most inci-
sive elements of the legislative and endo-federal reform that has just been
18
Social dumping: An expression used to indicate the practice of some c ompanies
(especially multinationals) of locating their business in areas where they can
benefit from less restrictive labor provisions or where labor costs are lower. In this
way, the lower costs for the company can be transferred to the final price of the
asset that is more competitive.
examined. Are national provisions that make the pursuit of a professional

activity in a Member State subordinate the pursuit of certain require-
ments, the passing of particular examinations, or a minimum period of
experience compatible with the libertarian principles of European law?
These forecasts, although justified by an objective rationale, could intro-
duce obstacles to the free movement of professionals and could therefore
be anti-competitive. An answer to this question is not possible here. The
institute’s well-established historicity—before the aforementioned dereg-
ulation, both the FIFA regulation and those of the national federations,
provided for the enabling examination for the exercise of the activity of
sports prosecutor—never called into question by the European Justice
System, and the probable proportionality of the examination test with
respect to the relevant interests and with a view to the general balance of
the same, would in any case lead to an affirmative solution regarding the
lawfulness of such rules.
Conclusions
Adhering to metaphors on the subject of treatment, the chronicle set out
in the previous pages tells of a competition played by the team of opera-
tors in the sector—clubs, footballers, agents, and professionals—away on
the field of the national and sports legislator, which ended drawing up
an initial assessment after the first concrete application of the legislative
reform, with an honorable tie.
As seen, I do not take into account the difficulties encountered by the
interested parties in comparing with the new regulatory system, between
new obligations and vetoes on access to the profession of not immediate
solution.
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that any new discipline, all the more
so within the perimeter of the sporting order, in which rules of different
levels, state, and internal, live with each other, bring with it physiological
transitional difficulties.
There is no doubt that the principles that inspired the reform seem
to be acceptable. A return to professionalization of the activity, allowed
only to qualified subjects, is legitimate given the well-known position
rents that permeate the intermediates related to the transfers of players
between clubs.
The complexities (and the above doubts in point of law) have arisen
with regard to certain choices—it can be said, for excludendum—made by
the legislator tracing regime dystonia between certain subjects and others.
In particular, between the agents qualified before March 31, 2015, and
those in possession of a license issued subsequently; and again, between
those Italian agents and those on other Community agents authorized or
not to operate temporarily under transitional regime until the end of the
year 2019.
As mentioned above, here is what FIFA posted on its website19 on
January 22, 2020, regarding the figure of the new sports agents.
The Football Stakeholders Committee and the FIFA Council unani-
mously endorsed last year a series of reform proposals concerning football
agents with the aim to protect the integrity of football and prevent abuses.
These measures were the result of an extensive consultation process with
stakeholders (players, clubs, leagues, and member associations), as well as
agents who were invited to several consultation meetings.
The overarching objective here is to improve transparency, protect
player welfare, enhance contractual stability, and also raise professional
and ethical standards. In other words, to eliminate or at least reduce
the abusive and excessive practices, which unfortunately have existed in
football.
FIFA, as football’s governing body, has the responsibility to address
and regulate these matters. We are aiming for a system of balanced and
reasonable regulation, instead of the law of the jungle currently in place,
with conflicts of interests rife and exorbitant commissions being earned
left and right.
In the last year alone, football agents earned USD 653.9 million in
fees, four times more than in 2015.
The reform package therefore includes several measures concerning
agents:
• Establishment of a cap on commissions to avoid excessive and

abusive practices
Please refer to the official FIFA website for the full text: https://fifa.com/who-
19
we-are/news/reform-proposals-concerning-football-agents-regulations
• Limitation of multiple representation to avoid conflicts of

interest
• Reintroduction of a mandatory licensing system for agents to
raise professional standards
• Creation of a FIFA Clearing House to guarantee better
financial transparency
• Establishment of an effective FIFA dispute resolution system
to address disputes between agents, players, and clubs
• Disclosing and publishing all agent-related work in transfers,
to increase transparency, improve the credibility of the transfer
system, and support the implementation of new regulations
All these proposals from FIFA on agent regulation are sensible, rea-
sonable, rational, proportionate, and necessary to protect the interests of
players and the wider interests of football. They are also in line with senti-
ment repeatedly expressed by institutions such as the European Commis-
sion and European Parliament.
FIFA is currently developing these proposals to be turned into regu-
lations. Once again, this work is done in consultation with the football
stakeholders, including agents’ representatives.
If we asked people in the street what they thought of intermedi-

aries I’m sure critics would label them money grabbers or blame
them for the hyper-inflation of transfer prices. By contrast, sup-
porters might argue that intermediaries constitute an essential
part of the football ecosystem. What neither would really discuss
is whether FIFA should regulate this group or not, but it’s a key
consideration for FIFA at the moment
says Santiago Barroso Torres in his article.20

In order to understand the context of the oncoming reform in the
way intermediaries are regulated, we have to cast our minds back to the
20
See: https://lexsportiva.blog/tag/dual-representation/
FIFA Players Agents Regulations issued in 2008. FIFA Players Agents

Regulations were a complex system of regulations based on the concept
of an agent as a person who, for a fee, negotiates employment contracts to
conclude transfer agreements.
Under the Agents Regulations system, it was actually very difficult
to become an agent; you had to be licensed by the relevant association.
When qualified, you could only represent one party in a negotiation and
any international disputes where agents were involved would be settled by
the FIFA Players Status Committee.
After a few years of the complex regulations, FIFA realized that their
system was not up to par and did not meet their expectations. Some defi-
cits that FIFA identified were that:
1. Only 25 to 30 percent of acting agents actually had a license.

2. Agents and clubs preferred not to report transactions in which
they participated.
3. There were many discrepancies between national regulations
regarding the activities of agents.
Due to these failings, FIFA issued the Regulations on Working with

Intermediaries in April 2015 and this is the regulatory system that oper-
ates today.
Unlike the previous regime, this system is based in the concept of an
intermediary as a natural or legal person who, for a fee or free of charge,
represents players and/or clubs in order to conclude an employment con-
tract or represents clubs in negotiations to conclude transfer agreements.
In contravention with the FIFA Players Agents Regulations 2008, FIFA
decided to deregulate Agents. This meant that the intermediaries no
longer needed a license in order to provide services. In fact, any person
regardless of their expertise could be involved in a player’s transfer, for
example. Other relevant changes were that intermediaries were able to
represent a player and a club. This meant that dual representation was
permitted as long as both the club and the player consented in writing
and prior to the start of the negotiations and established which party shall
remunerate the intermediary. Furthermore, since intermediaries were out
of the football ecosystem, the Player’s Status Committee (or any other
FIFA dispute resolution body) no longer had jurisdiction on matters
relating to intermediaries.
Yet again, FIFA found that such a system of regulations didn’t achieve
the desired objectives that they were looking for. During a conference by
Emilio García Silvero (Chief Legal Officer, FIFA) entitled “Towards a new
Regulatory Framework for the Transfers of Football Players: Evolution
or Revolution?” held at the “Instituto Superior de Derecho y Economía
(ISDE),” he mentioned:
“It was a mistake to de-regulate agents in 2015.”
Today, it seems as if regulation is back in fashion and he hinted
that important changes will be introduced including a licensing system
administered centrally by FIFA through a web-based examination, which
an aspiring intermediary will be required to pass in order to practice.
The aim of this was to ensure integrity and regain trust in the profession.
Bringing intermediaries back into the fold also affords them access to
the effective and efficient dispute resolution systems of FIFA/CAS. FIFA
also intended to create a “clearing house” through which all payments to
intermediaries will be registered in order to better understand and reg-
ulate the way intermediaries are paid. There will also be guidelines that
prohibit conflicts of interest in dual representation cases. For example,
representing:
• Player + Engaging Club = allowed

• Player + Releasing Club = prohibited
• Releasing Club + Engaging club = prohibited
In relation to the famous recommended pay cap for services, it is

important to mention that apparently such remuneration would not be
limited, as long as all the parties are aware of the payments made to the
intermediaries. This increases transparency as all parties must be aware of
all different steps undertaken within negotiations, including the agent’s
fees and any payments directly or indirectly related to the player. Finally,
there will be a sanctioning system in place to deal with non-compliant
clubs, players, and intermediaries.
Index
Agent market and intermediaries compensation, 12
England, 54 double representation rule, 10
clearing house system, 39 impeccable reputation, 12
English Premier League, 38 licensed agents, 11
Football Association, 39 requisites for registration, 12
football authorities, 38 sports intermediary, 9, 10
Premier League, 39–40 Training Compensation, 13
UK legislation, 41–42 Zurich Federation, 16
France, 51–52 Blatter reform of 2015, 35
Germany, 52–54 Bribery Act, 41–42
Italy
AGCM report, 45–46 Canadian Premier League, 96
Beckham Law, 47 College Draft, 90
controls, 46 Common law, 42
gallant transfer market match, 44 Competitive imbalance, 72
Italian Football Federation, CONCACAF Champions League, 89
43–44 Court of arbitration (CAS), 20
neroazzurro coach statement, 45
PDP agency, 46 Double representation rule, 10
repatriated workers, 47
spectacularized market, 44 English Premier League (EPL), 38
transfer market, 43 European Club Association (ECA), 18
Spain European Economic Area (EEA), 7
DSI’s investment strategy, 50 European Football Agents Association
general economic conditions, 50 (EFAA), 19, 128–129
Spanish league, 48 European labor law, 26–28
Spanish legislator, 49
Amended regulation, 6–9 Federation Francaise de Football
American Bar Association’s Model (FFF), 4
Rule of Professional Fédération Internationale de Football
Conduct, 72 Association (FIFA), 1
American Civil War, 58–59 amended regulation, 6–9
Antitrust, 45 association decision, 6
Antitrust legislation, 71 Clearing House, 21
Article 81 EC, 5, 6, 8 clubs, 13
Articolo 82 CE, 5 deregulation, 16, 24
Association decision, 6 Dispute Resolution Chamber
(CRC), 13
Bankruptcy law, 50 intermediarie, 43
Beckham Law, 47–49 licensed footballers, 10–11
Blatter reform limits, 23
clubs and players, 11 pay cap, 21
134 Index
Players Agents Regulations, 31 CIES institute, 56

preparation bonus, 13 England, 64
public compensation, 21 entrepreneurial category, 55
radical regulatory changes, 9 football observer, 60
regulation, 2 France, 61–62
Regulations on working with German federation, 61
Intermediaries 2015, 15 Gigi Peronace, 63
return to the register, 20–21 intermediaries, 57–58
solidarity fund, 21 UEFA match agent, 63
solidarity mechanism, 14 UEFA system, 64–65
Status and Transfers of Players, 13 UNFP, 64
Statute, 2 International Federation, 3
transfer compensation, 15 legal evolution, 3
transfer matching system, 19 media world, 124–126
youth prosecutors, 21 Multiplayers International
FIFA Regulation on Intermediaries Denmark, 5
2015, 11 networking, 114–116
Football agent original regulation, 3–6
amended regulation, 6–9 Piau’s complaint, 4
colleagues professional qualification, 107–108
EFAA, 128–129 recognition, 2–9
England, 129 regulation, stepping stone, 1
EU sectoral social dialogue for supporters, 122
professional football, 129–130 trust building, 104–107
Italy, 127–128 Football Association (FA), 39
solidarity, 126 Footballer’s Status Commission, 4, 7
consequences, 9 Football Stakeholders Committee,
contacts/connections, 103 17–18, 29, 30
diversification and associations, Football training system, 95
108–113 France Football Federation (FFF), 18
European Big Five sisters Free all policy, 16
agent licenses, 33–34 Future Reform Prospectuses
agent market, 35 Clearing House, 20
bad reputation, 35 European Football Agents
business structure, 34 Association (EFAA), 19
Covid-19 pandemic, 35 FIFA TMS, 19
English Premier League’s Football Stakeholders Committee,
decision, 36 17–18
Global Transfer Report, 37 France Football Federation, 18
TMS FIFA, 37 Italian national football system, 22
UEFA comparison report, 35 mandatory liability insurance, 19
family, 117–122 new Agents Regulation, 19
health problems, 122–124 relations, 24–26
Historical Excursus Sports Order, 22
American Civil War, 58–59 temporary football agents, 26–28
Calciomercato, 63
“Cash & Carry” Pyle, 59 Gallant transfer market match, 44
Christy Wals, 59–60 GEA World Agency, 45
Index 135
Globe Soccer meeting, 19 Professional qualification, 107–108
Hamburger Sport-Verein, 53 Regulations on the Status and Transfer

Harmonized European approach, 130 of Players (RSTP), 40
Health problems, 122–124
School training system, 95
Impeccable reputation, 6, 12 Social dumping, 27
Insolvency law, 50 Solidarity contribution mechanism,
Instituto Superior de Derecho y 14
Economía (ISDE), 32 Solidarity fund, 21
Intermediary concept, 31 Spanish tax reform, 48
International Center for Sports Spectacularized market, 44
Studies, 56 Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust
Italian Association of Football Agents Act (SPARTA), 70
(IAFA), 127–128 Sports intermediary, 9
Italian Football Federation, 43–44 Sports Justice, 22
Italian national football system, 22 Summary model, 25
Licensed agents, 11 Temporary football agents, 26–28

Third-party ownership (TPO)
Major League Soccer (MLS), 89 agreement, 39
Media world, 124–126 Transfer matching system, 19, 37
Minimum Standards, 16, 69 Trattato di Roma, 5
Minimum standards, 69 Treaty of Rome, 5
Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
71 UEFA European Clubs Forum, 18
Multiplayers International Denmark, UEFA system, 64–65
5 UK legislation, 41–42
Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA),
National Collegiate Athletic 68, 69
Association (NCAA), 68 Union of Professional Football Clubs
National Conference of (UCPF), 52
Commissioners on Uniform United Premier Soccer League
State Laws (NCCUSL), 68 (UPSL), 88
National Premier Soccer League United Soccer League (USL), 89
(NPSL), 90 United States Soccer Federation
National Sports Federation, 10, 13 (USSF), 75
National Union of Professional United States Sports Agent
Footballers (UNFP), 52 antitrust legislation, 71
National Women Soccer League competitive imbalance, 72
(NWSL), 90 figure, 67
Networking, 114–116 football “problem”
Alex Morgan, 93–94
Player Allocation, 90 all-American mentality, 93
Players and clubs, 4 brand football marketing, 97
Player welfare, 121 football training system, 95
Premier League, 39–40 Italian Serie A 2019/2020,
Professional liability insurance, 7 97–100
136 Index
Klinsmann’s comment, 92 state-based regulation, 74

Ottawa team, 96 UEFA confederation, 73
school training system, 95 Uniform Athlete Agents Act, 68, 70
self-play and street football, 93 U.S. Soccer Federation
Intermediary Declaration, 75–76 Intermediary Registration
legal persons, 82–84 Form, 85–87
memorandum, 77–78 U.S. Football Federation (USSF), 88
natural persons first name, 79–81 U.S. Soccer Federation Intermediary
requirements for, 76 Registration Form, 85–87
licensed soccer agent, 88–91
minimum standards, 69 Women Premier Soccer League
model, 69 (WPSL), 90
NCCUSL, 68 World Football Federation, 9
North American perspective, 71
SPARTA, 70, 72 Youth prosecutors, 21

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Inside the World of a Football Agent

Inside the World of a Football Agent

Gennaro Giulio Tedeschi

Copyright © Business Expert Press, LLC, 2021.

Cover design by Charlene Kronstedt

Interior design by Exeter Premedia Services Private Ltd., Chennai, India

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

First published in 2021 by

ISBN-13: 978-1-63742-036-2 (paperback)

Business Expert Press Sports and Entertainment Management Collection

Collection ISSN: 2333-8644 (print)

First edition: 2021

Chapter 1 From the “FIFA regulation on w ­ orking with

About the Author��������������������������������������������������������������������������������131

From the “FIFA regulation

a natural person who, for a fee, introduces players to clubs with a

FIFA has regulated, or tried to regulate, the figure of the football

• The original regulation

constantly improve the game of football and spread it throughout

The Recognition of Football Agents

football federations, certainly appear to be the essential elements that

The Original Regulation and its application problems: The “Piau”

Even before that, on February 20, 1996, the Commission received a

in ­professionalization. The Commission has also informed of petitions

The “amended” Regulation of March 1, 2001 and the closing

Following the administrative procedure initiated by the Commission,

candidate must undergo a written examination (Articles 4 and 5), in the

The Blatter Reform

is based on principles of transparency, with regard to the a­ ctivity

no longer harmonized by any central body of the ball, as it was before

Table 1.1 Number of licensed agents

Nation Number of FIFA licensed Agents

A natural or legal person who for a fee or free of charge, ­represents

and the tasks of the Federations, in Article 19 titled as Purpose.

prescribed by Article 4 entitled “Requisites for Registration.” The quali-

players and/or clubs who use the advice of an intermediary in

with a transfer, such as transfer compensation, training compensation or solidar-

Analyzing FIFA’s reform of football agents, so-called deregulation, is a

standards of performance, the world of football decided to backtrack and

Future Reform Prospectuses

Stakeholders Committee with ECA,13 the Leagues (in particular the

clubs, players, leagues, affiliated associations, confederations, and FIFA, as well as

open a confrontation with the top representatives of the category, reach-

• RETURN TO THE REGISTER—With the return of the

eleven, ed), to improve optimization of information flow.” This is a mandatory

and periodically attend refresher courses. So, even relatives

This empirical reconstruction therefore leads to a return to the past, that

In this regulatory system, in fact, access to the profession of sports

known—also by the related bodies of justice—in the system in which

have already decided to join, appealing to the freedom of enterprise,

Having highlighted the prodromal aspects of access to the profession, we

or player, as will be seen, sports clubs and/or football players). Formal

Consideration that can be determined in a lump sum or in a percent-

The so-called temporary football agents. Possible doubts from the

As can be easily learned from both national and international r­ egulations,

examined. Are national provisions that make the pursuit of a professional

• Establishment of a cap on commissions to avoid excessive and

• Limitation of multiple representation to avoid conflicts of

If we asked people in the street what they thought of intermedi-

says Santiago Barroso Torres in his article.20

Chapter 1 From the “FIFA regulation on w orking with

About the Author��131

in professionalization. The Commission has also informed of petitions

is based on principles of transparency, with regard to the a ctivity

A natural or legal person who for a fee or free of charge, represents

As can be easily learned from both national and international r egulations,