Constitutional and Statutory basis

1. Consti art. 2. secs 9-1, 18 and 20

2. Consti art. 3, secs 10 and 18
3. Consti art 12, sec 3
4. Labor Code Art 112
5. Civil Code Art. 1700

General principles of labor law

1. Definition of Labor Law

1.1 Labor Standards
1.2 Labor Relations
2. Construction of the Labor Code
3. Applicability of the Labor Code
4. Applicabicability of the Labor Code
5. Basic element for application of the Labor law
5.1. Employer- employee Relationship
5.2. Commencement of employer- employee relationship
5.3. Tests to determine the existence of employer- employee relationship
5.4. Elements of employer- employee relationship

Cases

1.Tests to determine existence of employer- employee relationship

Legend Hotel ( Manila) owned by Titanium Corporation, et al vs Hernani S. Realuyo also known as Joey Roam R. No.
153511, 18, July, 2012
Legend Hotel (Manila) vs Realuyo AKA Roa
G.R. No. 153511 July 18, 2012

Facts: Respondent averred that he had worked as a pianist at the Legend Hotel’s Tanglaw Restaurant from September 1992
with an initial rate of P400.00/night that was given to him after each night’s performance; that his rate had increased to
P750.00/night; and that during his employment, he could not choose the time of performance, which had been fixed from 7:00
pm to 10:00 pm for three to six times/week. He added that the Legend Hotel’s restaurant manager had required him to conform
with the venue’s motif; that he had been subjected to the rules on employees’ representation checks and chits, a privilege
granted to other employees; that on July 9, 1999, the management had notified him that as a cost-cutting measure his services
as a pianist would no longer be required effective July 30, 1999; that he disputed the excuse, insisting that Legend Hotel had
been lucratively operating as of the filing of his complaint; and that the loss of his employment made him bring his complaint.

Issues: 1. Whether or not petition for certiorari to the CA is proper.

2. Whether or not there is ER-EE relationship.
3. Whether or not retrenchment as a ground for respondent’s dismissal is valid.

Held: YES. There is no longer any doubt that a petition for certiorari brought to assail the decision of the NLRC may raise
factual issues, and the CA may then review the decision of the NLRC and pass upon such factual issues in the process.8 The
power of the CA to review factual issues in the exercise of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is based on Section 9
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which pertinently provides that the CA “shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings,
receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.”

YES. Petitioner actually wielded the power of selection at the time it entered into the service contract dated September 1,
1992 with respondent. This is true, notwithstanding petitioner’s insistence that respondent had only offered his services to
provide live music at petitioner’s Tanglaw Restaurant, and despite petitioner’s position that what had really transpired was a
negotiation of his rate and time of availability. The power of selection was firmly evidenced by, among others, the express
written recommendation dated January 12, 1998 by Christine Velazco, petitioner’s restaurant manager, for the increase of his
remuneration.

Respondent’s remuneration, albeit denominated as talent fees, was still considered as included in the term wage in the
sense and context of the Labor Code, regardless of how petitioner chose to designate the remuneration. Anent this, Article 97(f)
of the Labor Code clearly states:
xxx wage paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of being expressed
in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the
same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or
to be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered, and includes the fair and reasonable value, as determined by the
Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished by the employer to the employee.

That respondent worked for less than eight hours/day was of no consequence and did not detract from the CA’s finding on
the existence of the employer-employee relationship. In providing that the “normal hours of work of any employee shall not
exceed eight (8) hours a day,” Article 83 of the Labor Code only set a maximum of number of hours as “normal hours of work”
but did not prohibit work of less than eight hours.

The power of the employer to control the work of the employee is considered the most significant determinant of the
existence of an employer-employee relationship. This is the so-called control test, and is premised on whether the person for
whom the services are performed reserves the right to control both the end achieved and the manner and means used to
achieve that end.

A review of the records shows, however, that respondent performed his work as a pianist under petitioner’s supervision
and control. Specifically, petitioner’s control of both the end achieved and the manner and means used to achieve that end was
demonstrated by the following, to wit: a. He could not choose the time of his performance, which petitioners had fixed from
7:00 pm to 10:00 pm, three to six times a week; b. He could not choose the place of his performance; c. The restaurant’s
manager required him at certain times to perform only Tagalog songs or music, or to wear barong Tagalog to conform to the
Filipiniana motif; and d. He was subjected to the rules on employees’ representation check and chits, a privilege granted to other
employees. Relevantly, it is worth remembering that the employer need not actually supervise the performance of duties by the
employee, for it sufficed that the employer has the right to wield that power.

NO. Retrenchment is one of the authorized causes for the dismissal of employees recognized by the Labor Code. It is a
management prerogative resorted to by employers to avoid or to minimize business losses. On this matter, Article 283 of the
Labor Code.

The Court has laid down the following standards that an employer should meet to justify retrenchment and to foil abuse,
namely: (a) The expected losses should be substantial and not merely de minimis in extent; (b) The substantial losses
apprehended must be reasonably imminent; (c) The retrenchment must be reasonably necessary and likely to effectively
prevent the expected losses; and (d) The alleged losses, if already incurred, and the expected imminent losses sought to be
forestalled must be proved by sufficient and convincing evidence.

Anent the last standard of sufficient and convincing evidence, it ought to be pointed out that a less exacting standard of
proof would render too easy the abuse of retrenchment as a ground for termination of services of employees.

In termination cases, the burden of proving that the dismissal was for a valid or authorized cause rests upon the employer.
Here, petitioner did not submit evidence of the losses to its business operations and the economic havoc it would thereby
imminently sustain. It only claimed that respondent’s termination was due to its “present business/financial condition.” This
bare statement fell short of the norm to show a valid retrenchment. Hence, we hold that there was no valid cause for the
retrenchment of respondent.

2.Test to determine existence of employer- employee relationship

Hacienda Leddy, et. Al v Paquito Villegas, Gr. No. 179654, 22 September 2014
 Hacienda Leddy/Ricardo Gambo, Jr. vs Paquito VillegasG.R. No. 179654, September 22, 2014

Regular employeeIn Integrated Contractor and Plumbing Works, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,17 we held
that the test to determine whether employment is regular or not is the reasonable connection between the particular activity
performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. If the employee has been performing the
job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and
continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of that activity to the business.
Clearly, with more than 20 years of service, Villegas, without doubt, passed this test to attain employment regularity.

AbandonmentTo justify a finding of abandonment of work, there must be proof of a deliberate and unjustified refusal on
the part of an employee to resume his employment. The burden of proof is on the employer to show an unequivocal intent on
the part of the employee to discontinue employment. Mere absence is not sufficient. It must be accompanied by manifest acts
unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore.

Effects of illegal dismissalAn illegally dismissed employee should be entitled to either reinstatement if viable, or separation
pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, plus backwages in either instance.24 Considering that reinstatement is no longer
feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the employer, separation pay should be granted. The basis for
computing separation pay is usually the length of the employees past service, while that for backwages is the actual period when
the employee was unlawfully prevented from working.25 It should be emphasized, however, that the finality of the illegal
dismissal decision becomes the reckoning point. In allowing separation pay, the final decision effectively declares that the
employment relationship ended so that separation pay and backwages are to be computed up to that point. The decision also
becomes a judgment for money from which another consequence flows the payment of interest in case of delay.

3.Who has jurisdiction to determine ER-EE relationship

Meteoro et al Vs. Creative Creatures Gr. No. 171275,13, July 2009

VICTOR METEORO v. CREATIVE CREATURES, GR No. 171275, 2009-07-13

Facts:

Respondent is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of producing, providing, or procuring the production of set
designs and set construction services

On the other hand, petitioners were hired by respondent on various dates as artists, carpenters and welders.

petitioners filed their respective complaints for non-payment of night shift differential pay, overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th
month pay, premium pay for Sundays and/or rest days, service incentive leave pay, paternity... leave pay, educational
assistance, rice benefits, and illegal and/or unauthorized deductions from salaries against respondent, before the Department of
Labor and Employment

In its position paper, respondent argued that the DOLE-NCR had no jurisdiction over the complaint of the petitioners
because of the absence of an employer-employee relationship. It added that petitioners were free-lance individuals, performing
special services with skills and... expertise

DOLE Regional Director Maximo Baguyot Lim issued an Order... directing respondent to pay petitioners

The Regional Director sustained petitioners' claim on the existence of an employer-employee relationship using the
determinants set forth by the Labor Code, specifically, the elements of control and supervision, power of dismissal, payment of
wages, and the selection and... engagement of employees. He added that since the petitioners had worked for more than one
year doing the same routine work, they were regular employees with respect to the activity in which they were employed.

respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeal... s... the instant petition is GRANTED. For lack of jurisdiction... the
Orders... issued by respondent Secretary are hereby declared NULL and VOID.

Issues:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error when it ruled that the instant case falls within the exception
clause of Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code... whether or not petitioners were independent contractors/project employees/free
lance workers

Ruling:

We sustain the appellate court's conclusion that the instant case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC.

The DOLE Secretary and her authorized representatives, such as the DOLE-NCR Regional Director, have jurisdiction to
enforce compliance with labor standards laws under the broad visitorial and enforcement powers conferred by Article 128 of
the Labor Code

The last sentence of Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, otherwise known as the "exception clause," provides an instance
when the Regional Director or his... representatives may be divested of jurisdiction over a labor standards case.

Under prevailing jurisprudence, the so-called "exception clause" has the following elements, all of which must concur:

(a) that the employer contests the findings of the labor regulations officer and raises issues thereon;

(b) that in order to resolve such issues, there is a need to examine evidentiary matters; and

(c) that such matters are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection.

In the present case, the CA aptly applied the "exception clause."

To resolve the issue raised by respondent, that is, the existence of an employer-employee relationship, there is need to
examine evidentiary matters.

Some businessmen, however, try to avoid an employer-employee relationship from arising in their enterprises, because
that juridical relation spawns obligations connected with workmen's compensation, social security, medicare, termination pay,
and unionism.

The most important index of an... employer-employee relationship is the so-called "control test," that is, whether the
employer controls or has reserved the right to control the employee, not only as to the result of the work to be done, but also as
to the means and methods by which the same is to be... accomplished.

the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

4.Reasonable casual connection

Indophil textile Mills Vs. Adviento, Gr. No. 171212, 04 August 2014
INDOPHIL TEXTILE MILLS, INC.,v. ENGR. SALVADOR ADVIENTO.
G.R. No. 171212, 20 August 2014, THIRD DIVISION, (Peralta, J.)
Regular courts have jurisdiction over the negligent act of an employerwho failed to provide
a safe and healthy working environment. The Court formulated the “reasonable causal connection
rule,” wherein if there is a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the
employer-employee relations, then the case is within the jurisdiction of the labor courts; and in the
absence thereof, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction.
Engr. Salvador Adviento was hired by Indophil Textile Mills, Inc.
(Indophil) to maintain its thread manufacturing business in Bulacan. Adviento
alleged that there were no adequate safety measures introduced by Indophil when he
conducted a maintenance check on the dye house area.The workplace is very hot
and emits foul chemical odor. According to Adviento, the air washer dampers and
all roof exhaust vests are blown into open air, carrying dust thereto. He
recommended to management to place roof insulation but such was turned down by
management due to high cost. Twelve years later, Adviento experienced weakness
and dizziness, and was thereafter diagnosed with Chronic Poly Sinusitis and Allergic
Rhinitis.
Adviento filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, alleging that he
contracted such occupational disease by reason of the gross negligence of petitioner
to provide him with a safe, healthy and workable environment. Indophil argued that
the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint because the
same falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.RTC
sustained its jurisdiction on the ground that the case is a quasi-delict, that Indophil's
failure to provide its employees with a safe, healthy and workable environment is an
act of negligence.
ISSUE:
Does RTC have jurisdiction over a negligent employer who failed to provide
a safe and healthy working environment?
RULING:
Yes, the jurisdiction rests on the regular courts.According to the Court, not
all claims involving employees can be resolved solely by labor courts, specifically
when the law provides otherwise.
The Court formulated the “reasonable causal connection rule,” wherein if
there is a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the
employer-employee relations, then the case is within the jurisdiction of the labor
courts; and in the absence thereof, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction.
UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015
In the case at bar, Adviento's claim for damages is specifically grounded on
Indophil's gross negligence to provide a safe, healthy and workable environment for
its employees –a case of quasi-delict. The Court ascertained this from reading the
complaint, which enumerated the acts and/or omissions of Indophil relative to the
conditions in the workplace.
It is a basic tenet that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined
upon the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein, which is a matter
resolved only after and as a result of a trial.Neither can jurisdiction of a court be
made to depend upon the defenses made by a defendant in his answer or motion to
dismiss. In this case, a perusal of the complaint would reveal that the subject matter
is one of claim for damages arising from quasi-delict, which is within the ambit of
the regular court's jurisdiction.
Adviento alleges that due to the continued and prolonged exposure to
textile dust seriously inimical to his health, he suffered work-contracted disease
which is now irreversible and incurable, and deprived him of job
opportunities.Clearly, injury and damages were allegedly suffered by respondent, an
element of quasi-delict.
It also bears stressing that respondent is not praying for any relief under the
Labor Code of the Philippines. He neither claims for reinstatement nor backwages
or separation pay resulting from an illegal termination. The cause of action herein
pertains to the consequence of petitioner’s omission which led to a work-related
disease suffered by respondent, causing harm or damage to his person. Such cause
of action is within the realm of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the controversy
belongs to the regular courts.
 Where the resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor
management relations nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions of
employment, but rather in the application of the general civil law, such claim falls
outside the area of competence of expertise ordinarily ascribed to the LA and the
NLRC.The RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondent’s complaint
praying for moral damages, exemplary damages, compensatory damages, anchored
on petitioner’s alleged gross negligence in failing to provide a safe and healthy
working environment for respondent.

5.Effect when no employer- employee relationship exists when the main issued does not involve ER-EE relationship

Georg Grotjan GMBH v. Isani Gr. No 109272, 10 August 1994

6. Coorporate officer or employee? -

Malting Industrial and Commercial Corporation, Richard K Spencer, Catherine and Alex Mancilla v. Ricardo R. Coros, Gr.
No. 157802, 13 October 2010

1. MATLING INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL CORPORATION vs. RICARDO COROS

G.R. No. 157802 October 13, 2010
 FACTS:
After respondent Ricardo Coros dismissal by Matling as its Vice President for Finance and Administration, he filed on
August 10, 2000 a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against Matling and some of its corporate officers in the
NLRC, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint, raising the ground,
among others, that the complaint pertained to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission due to the
controversy being intra-corporate inasmuch as the respondent was a member of Matling’s Board of Directors aside from being
its Vice-President for Finance and Administration prior to his termination.
The respondent opposed the petitioners’ motion to dismiss, insisting that his status as a member of Matling’s Board of
Directors was doubtful, considering that he had not been formally elected as such; that he did not own a single share of stock in
Matling, considering that he had been made to sign in blank an undated indorsement of the certificate of stock he had been
given in 1992; that Matling had taken back and retained the certificate of stock in its custody; and that even assuming that he
had been a Director of Matling, he had been removed as the Vice President for Finance and Administration, not as a Director, a
fact that the notice of his termination dated April 10, 2000 showed. On October 16, 2000, the Labor Arbiter granted the
petitioners’ motion to dismiss, ruling that the respondent was a corporate officer. On March 13, 2001, the NLRC set aside the
dismissal, concluding that the respondent’s complaint for illegal dismissal was properly cognizable by the LA, not by the SEC,
because he was not a corporate officer by virtue of his position in Matling, albeit high ranking and managerial, not being among
the positions listed in Matling’s Constitution and By-Laws.
On motion for reconsideration, petitioners submitted a certified machine copies of Matling’s Amended Articles of
Incorporation and By Laws to prove that the President of Matling was thereby granted "full power to create new offices and
appoint the officers thereto” and the minutes of special meeting held on June 7, 1999 by Matling’s Board of Directors to prove
that the respondent was, indeed, a Member of the Board of Directors. Nonetheless, the NLRC denied the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration. The petitioners elevated the issue to the CA by petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari and ruled that for a position to be considered as a corporate office, or, for that matter, for one to be considered as a
corporate officer, the position must, if not listed in the by-laws, have been created by the corporation's board of directors, and
the occupant thereof appointed or elected by the same board of directors or stockholders. Motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent was a corporate officer of Matling Industrial and Commercial Corporation.
HELD:
Conformably with Section 25, a position must be expressly mentioned in the By-Laws in order to be considered as a
corporate office. Thus, the creation of an office pursuant to or under a By-Law enabling provision is not enough to make a
position a corporate office. Guerrea v. Lezama, the first ruling on the matter, held that the only officers of a corporation were
those given that character either by the Corporation Code or by the By-Laws; the rest of the corporate officers could be
considered only as employees or subordinate officials.
It is relevant to state in this connection that the SEC, the primary agency administering the Corporation Code, adopted a
similar interpretation of Section 25 of the Corporation Code in its Opinion dated November 25, 1993, to wit:
Thus, pursuant to Section 25 of the Corporation Code, whoever are the corporate officers enumerated in the by-laws are
the exclusive Officers of the corporation and the Board has no power to create other Offices without amending first the
corporate By-laws. However, the Board may create appointive positions other than the positions of corporate Officers, but the
persons occupying such positions are not considered as corporate officers within the meaning of Section 25 of the Corporation
Code and are not empowered to exercise the functions of the corporate Officers, except those functions lawfully delegated to
them. Their functions and duties are to be determined by the Board of Directors/Trustees.
Moreover, the Board of Directors of Matling could not validly delegate the power to create a corporate office to the
President, in light of Section 25 of the Corporation Code requiring the Board of Directors itself to elect the corporate officers.
Verily, the power to elect the corporate officers was a discretionary power that the law exclusively vested in the Board of
Directors, and could not be delegated to subordinate officers or agents. The office of Vice President for Finance and
Administration created by Matling’s President pursuant to By Law No. V was an ordinary, not a corporate, office.
To emphasize, the power to create new offices and the power to appoint the officers to occupy them vested by By-Law No.
V merely allowed Matling’s President to create non-corporate offices to be occupied by ordinary employees of Matling. Such
powers were incidental to the President’s duties as the executive head of Matling to assist him in the daily operations of the
business.

B. RIGHT TO SELF- ORGANIZATION & UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE

I. Right to self- organization

1. Meaning of the right to self- organization
2. Who are accorded the right to self- organization
3. Implications and limitations on the right to self- organization
4. Who are qualified to form and join a labor organization
 5. Who are disqualified from forming or joining a labor organization

II. Union Security Agreement (USA)

1. definition of Union Security Agreement

1.1. Validity
1.2. Effects
1.3 Limitations
2. Types of Union Security Agreements

III. Unfair Labor Practice (ULP)

1. Definition of Unfair Labor Practice

1.1 Essence of ULP
1.2 Nature of ULP
2. Prosecution of ULP
2.1 Who can commit ULP
2.2 Against whom can ULP be committed
2.3 Who has jurisdiction over ULP complaints
2.4 Criminal Prosecution of ULP
2.4.1 Who are criminally liable
2.5 Prescriptive period
2.5.1 Administrative aspect
2.5.2 Criminal Aspect
3. ULP practices of Employers
4. ULP practices of Labor Organizations

C. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

1. Labor Organizations

1. Definition of Labor Organizations

2. Kinds of Labor Organizations
3. Who are qualified to form or join labor organizations
4. Who are disqualified from forming or joining labor organizations
5. Registration of Labor Organization
5.1 Purpose of registration
5.2 Constitutionality of registration requirement
5.3 Registration requirement for independent union
5.4 Registration requirements for Federation
5.5 Denial of registration
5.6 Remedies when registration is denied
6. Definition of Legitimate Labor Organization
7. Definition of Local Chapter
7.1 who can create a local chapter
7.2 when does a local chapter acquire legitimacy and legal personality
8. Affiliation
8.1 Can an independent union affiliate with a federation; requirements; effect
8.2 Nature of relationship between federation and local union
9. Disaffiliation
9.1 Definition
9.2 Procedure
9.3 Effects
10. Cancellation of Registration
10.1 Manner of cancellation
10.2 Grounds for cancellation
10.3 Proper party to file petition for cancellation
10.4 Where to file petition for cancellation
10.5 Effect of cancellation proceedings
10.6 Remedy from order of cancellation
10.7 Voluntary cancellation of registration
11. Merger and consolidation of Labor Organizations
12. Change of name of union
 II. Rights and conditions of membership

1. Rights of a legitimate labor organization

2. Authority of unions to collect assessments and fees and extraordinary fees
3. Check- offs
4. Union funds
5. Remedy if there is violation of rights and conditions of membership
6. Consequences of violation of the rights of union membership

III. Election of Union Officers

1. Who are qualified to run for union officers

2. Who are qualified to vote in an election of union officers
3. How should election of union officers be conducted
4. Expulsion or implementation of union officers

Cases

1. Who cannot unionize for purposes of collective bargaining-

Benguet Electric Cooperative v Caleja, GR. No. 79025, December 29, 1989

BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
and BENECO EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION, respondents.

Facts: Beneco Worker's Labor Union-Association of Democratic Labor Organizations (BWLU- ADLO) filed a petition for direct
certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of Benguet Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (BENECO) alleging that BENECO has in its employ 214 rank and file employees; that 198 or 92.5% of these
employees have supported the filing of the petition; that no certification election has been conducted for the last 12 months;
that there is no existing collective bargaining representative of the rank and file employees sought to represented by BWLU-
ADLO; and, that there is no collective bargaining agreement in the cooperative. An opposition to the petition was filed by the
Beneco Employees Labor Union (BELU) contending that it was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the
subject workers pursuant to an order issued by the med-arbiter; that pending resolution by the NLRC are two cases it filed
against BENECO involving bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice; and, that the pendency of these cases bars any
representation question. BENECO, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the petition claiming that it is a non-profit
electric cooperative engaged in providing electric services to its members and patron-consumers; and, that the employees
sought to be represented by BWLU-ADLO are not eligible to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing
because they are members and joint owners of the cooperative. The med-arbiter issued an order giving due course to the
petition for certification election. However, the med-arbiter limited the election among the rank and file employees of BENECO
who are non-members thereof and without any involvement in the actual ownership of the cooperative. The med-arbiter found
that there are 37 employees who are not members and without any involvement in the actual ownership of the cooperative.
BELU and BENECO appealed but the same was dismissed for lack of merit. So BENECO filed with the SC a petition for certiorari
which the SC dismissed for lack of merit in a minute resolution dated April 1986. The ordered certification election was held in
October 1986. Prior to the conduct thereof BENECO's counsel verbally manifested that "the cooperative is protesting that
employees who are members-consumers are being allowed to vote when they are not eligible to be members of any labor union
for purposes of collective bargaining; much less, to vote in this certification election." BENECO submitted a certification showing
that only 4 employees are not members of BENECO and insisted that only these employees are eligible to vote in the
certification election. Canvass of the votes showed that BELU garnered 49 of the 83 "valid" votes cast. Thereafter BENECO
formalized its verbal manifestation by filing a Protest. The med-arbiter dismissed the protest. BLR director Calleja affirmed the
med-arbiter's order and certified BELU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees of BENECO.

Issue: W/N employees of a cooperative are qualified to form or join a labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining.

NO

Ratio: Under Article 256 LC, to have a valid certification election, "at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have
cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent
of all workers in the unit." BENECO asserts that the certification election held was null and void since members-employees who
are not eligible to form and join a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining were allowed to vote therein. The issue has
already been resolved and clarified in the case of Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. vs. Ferrer Calleja, et al. and
reiterated in the cases of Batangas-Electric Cooperative Labor Union v. Young, et al. and San Jose City Electric Service
Cooperative, Inc. v. Ministry of Labor and Employment, et al. wherein the Court had stated that the right to collective bargaining
is not available to an employee of a cooperative who at the same time is a member and co-owner thereof. With respect,
however, to employees who are neither members nor co- owners of the cooperative they are entitled to exercise the rights to
self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiation as mandated by the Constitution and applicable statutes.

Calleja argues that to deny the members of petitioner cooperative the right to form, assist or join a labor union of their own
choice for purposes of collective bargaining would amount to a patent violation of their right to self-organization.

The above contention is untenable. Contrary to respondents' claim, the fact that the members-employees of BENECO do not
participate in the actual management of the cooperative does not make them eligible to form, assist or join a labor organization
for the purpose of collective bargaining with petitioner. The Court's ruling in the Davao City case that members of cooperative
cannot join a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining was based on the fact that as members of the cooperative they
are co-owners thereof. As such, they cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for "certainly an owner cannot bargain with
himself or his co-owners." It is the fact of ownership of the cooperative, and not involvement in the management thereof, which
disqualifies a member from joining any labor organization within the cooperative. Thus, irrespective of the degree of their
participation in the actual management of the cooperative, all members thereof cannot form, assist or join a labor organization
for the purpose of collective bargaining.

Respondent union further claims that if nominal ownership in a cooperative is "enough to take away the constitutional
protections afforded to labor, then there would be no hindrance for employers to grant, on a scheme of generous profit sharing,
stock bonuses to their employees and thereafter claim that since their employees are stockholders, albeit in a minimal and
involuntary manner, they are now also co-owners and thus disqualified to form unions."

The above contention is based on the erroneous presumption that membership in a cooperative is the same as ownership of
stocks in ordinary corporations. While cooperatives may exercise some of the rights and privileges given to ordinary
corporations provided under existing laws, such cooperatives enjoy other privileges not granted to the latter. Similarly, members
of cooperatives have rights and obligations different from those of stockholders of ordinary corporations. It was precisely
because of the special nature of cooperatives, that the Court held in the Davao City case that members-employees thereof
cannot form or join a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining.

The Court held that: A cooperative is by its nature different from an ordinary business concern being run either by persons,
partnerships, or corporations. Its owners and/or members are the ones who run and operate the business while the others are
its employees. As above stated, irrespective of the number of shares owned by each member they are entitled to cast one vote
each in deciding upon the affairs of the cooperative. An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a member and co-
owner thereof cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-
owners.

Article 256 of the Labor Code provides, among others, that: To have a valid, election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in
the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the
exclusive bargaining agent of all workers in the unit.

In this case it cannot be determined whether or not respondent union was duly elected by the eligible voters of the bargaining
unit since even employees who are ineligible to join a labor union within the cooperative because of their membership therein
were allowed to vote in the certification election. Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent director committed
grave abuse of discretion in certifying respondent union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file
employees of petitioner cooperative.

2. Exception:
Republic of the Philippines represented by SSS vs AsiaPro Cooperative; GR no. 172101 , 23 Nov 2007
Facts:

Respondent Asiapro Cooperative is composed of owners-members with primary objectives of providing them savings and credit
facilities and livelihood services. In discharge of said objectives, Asiapro entered into several service contracts with Stanfilco.
Sometime later, the cooperative owners-members requested Stanfilco’s help in registering them with SSS and remitting their
contributions. Petitioner SSS informed Asiapro that being actually a manpower contractor supplying employees to Stanfilco, it
must be the one to register itself with SSS as an employer and remit the contributions. Respondent continuously ignoring the
demand of SSS the latter filed before the SSC. Asiapro alleges that there exists no employer-employee relationship between it
and its owners-members. SSC ruled in favor of SSS. On appeal, CA reversed the decision.

Issue:

Whether or not there is employer-employee relationship between Asiapro and its owners-members.
Ruling: YES.

In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following elements are considered: (1) the selection and
engagement of the workers; (2) the payment of wages by whatever means; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to
control the worker‘s conduct, with the latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration. All the aforesaid elements are
present in this case.

3. Supervisory employees-
Atlas Lithographic v. Usec Laguesma- GR. No96566, January 6, 1992

4. Security guards-
Philips Industrial Development vs. NLRC Gr. No. 88957, June 25, 1992

Petitioner Philips Industrial Development, Inc. (PIDI) seeks to set aside the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC on the ground
that it committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding that service engineers, sales
representatives and confidential employees of PIDI are qualified to be included in the existing bargaining unit. PIDI had a total of
six (6) collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with private respondent Philips Employees Organization-FFW (PEO-FFW), a
registered labor union and the certified bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees of PIDI. In the sixth CBA covering the
years 1987 to 1989, it was agreed upon, among others, that the subject of inclusion or exclusion of service engineers, sales
personnel and confidential employees in the coverage of the bargaining unit would be submitted for arbitration. As the parties
failed to agree on a voluntary arbitrator, the BLR endorsed the petition to the Executive Labor Arbiter of the National Capital
Region for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 228 of the Labor Code. It ordered the respondent to conduct a referendum
to determine the will of the service engineers, sales representatives as to their inclusion or exclusion in the bargaining unit.
Furthermore, it declared that the Division Secretaries and all Staff of general management, personnel and industrial relations
department, secretaries of audit, EDP, financial system are confidential employees and as such are hereby deemed excluded in
the bargaining unit. PEO-FFW appealed from the decision to the NLRC in which the NLRC set aside the Executive
Labor Arbiter’s decision.

ISSUE
WON service engineers, sales engineers and confidential employees are qualified to be part of the existing bargaining unit of
the rank-and-file employees of PIDI.
RULING

In holding that they are included in the bargaining unit for the rank and file employees of PIDI, the NLRC practically forced them
to become members of PEO-FFW or to be subject to its sphere of influence, it being the certified bargaining agent for the subject
bargaining unit. This violates, obstructs, impairs and impedes the service engineers' and the sales representatives' constitutional
right to form unions or associations and to self-organization. The decision then of the Executive Labor Arbiter in merely
directing the holding of a referendum "to determine the will of the service engineers, sales representatives as to their inclusion
or exclusion in (sic) the bargaining unit" is the most appropriate procedure that conforms with their right to form, assist or join
in labor union or organization. However, since this decision was rendered before the effectivity of R.A. No. 6715, it must now be
stressed that its future application to the private parties in this case should, insofar as service engineers and sales
representatives holding supervisory positions or functions are concerned, take into account the present Article 245

of the Labor Code which, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, now reads:
ARTICLE 245.
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees
.

—
Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization.
Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank- and-file employees but may join,
assist or form separate labor organizations of their own

5. Test to determine ULP-

De Leon v NLRC Gr. No. 112661, May 30, 2001
De Leon et al. v. NLRC

2001 May 30

Facts: Petitioners are security guards assigned in the premises of Fortune Tobacco Services, Inc. (FTC) pursuant to a contract for
security services with Fortune Integrated Services Inc. (FISI). Sometime after, FISI stockholders executed a “Deed of Sale of
Shares of Stock” in favor of a group of new stockholders, it also amended its Articles of Incorporation changing its name to
Magnum Integrated Services, Inc. (MISI). FTC terminated the contract with FISI which resulted in the displacement of some 582
security guards assigned to FTC, including petitioners herein.

FTC Labor Union which is an affiliate of NAFLU, sent a Notice of Strike which resulted in the picketing of the premises of FTC,
however, RTC of Pasig, issued a writ of injunction to enjoin the picket. Petitioners then filed the instant case to the Arbitration
branch of the NLRC.

Petitioners that they were regular employees of FTC which was also using the corporate names FISI and MISI, averring that they
work under the control and supervision of FTC’s security supervisors, and that, they were dismissed without just cause and due
process. They also claimed that their dismissal was the design of their employer to bust their newly organized union.
Respondent FTC, on the other hand, maintained that there was no EE-ER relationship, that petitioners were employee of MISI a
separate and distinct corporation from FTC.

LA ruled for respondents. NLRC reversed.

Issue: WON respondents are guilty of ULP.

Held: Yes, respondents are guilty of ULP.

Ratio: Respondents were guilty of interfering with the right of petitioners to self-organization which constitutes unfair
labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code. Petitioners have been employed with FISI since the 1980s and have since
been posted at the premises of FTC (main factory plant, tobacco re-drying plant and warehouse). FISI, while having its own
corporate identity, was a mere instrumentality of FTC, tasked to provide protection and security in the company
premises. The 2 corporations had identical stockholders and the same business address. FISI also had no other clients except
FTC and other companies belonging to the Lucio Tan group of companies. Moreover, the early payslips of petitioners show that
their salaries were initially paid by FTC. To enforce their rightful benefits under the laws on Labor Standards, petitioners formed
a union which was later certified as bargaining agent of all the security guards. On February 1, 1991, the stockholders of
FISI sold all their participations in the corporation to a new set of stockholders which renamed the corporation Magnum
Integrated Services, Inc. On October 15, 1991, FTC, without any reason, pre-terminated its contract of security services with MISI
and contracted 2 other agencies to provide security services for its premises. This resulted in the displacement of petitioners. As
MISI had no other clients, it failed to give new assignments to petitioners. Petitioners have remained unemployed since
then. All these facts indicate a concerted effort on the part of respondents to remove petitioners from the company and thus
abate the growth of the union and block its actions to enforce their demands in accordance with the Labor Standards
laws.

The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees within the meaning of section (a) (1) is
whether the employer has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free
exercise of employees’ rights under section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee
was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union
conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining.”

A corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its stockholders and from other corporations to which it is connected.
However, when the concept of separate legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend
crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons, or in case of two corporations, merge them into one.
The separate juridical personality of a corporation may also be disregarded when such corporation is a mere alter ego
or business conduit of another person. FISI was a mere adjunct of FTC. FISI, by virtue of a contract for security services,
provided FTC with security guards to safeguard its premises. However, records show that FISI and FTC have the same owners
and business address, and FISI provided security services only to FTC and other companies belonging to the Lucio Tan group
of companies. The purported sale of the shares of the former stockholders to a new set of stockholders who changed the
name of the corporation to Magnum Integrated Services, Inc. appears to be part of a scheme to terminate the services of
FISI’s security guards posted at the premises of FTC and bust their newly-organized union which was then beginning to
become active in demanding the company’s compliance with Labor Standards laws. Under these circumstances, the
Court cannot allow FTC to use its separate corporate personality to shield itself from liability for illegal acts committed
against its employees.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution

6. ULP of employers-
Hacienda Fatima vs. National Federation of Sugarcane Workers Food and General trade, Gr. No. 149440, 28, January 2003

Search Cases Here

Friday, December 14, 2012
HACIENDA FATIMA vs NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE WORKERS-FOOD AND GENERAL TRADE Case Digest
[G.R. No. 149440. January 28, 2003]

HACIENDA FATIMA and/or PATRICIO VILLEGAS, ALFONSO VILLEGAS and CRISTINE SEGURA, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE WORKERS-FOOD AND GENERAL TRADE, respondents.

FACTS: In the course of a labor dispute between the petitioner and respondent union, the union members were not given work
for more than one month. In protest, complainants staged a strike which was however settled upon the signing of a
Memorandum of Agreement. A conciliation meeting was conducted wherein Luisa Rombo, Ramona Rombo, Bobong Abrega, and
Boboy Silva were not considered by the company as employees, and thus may not be members of the union. It was also agreed
that a number of other employees will be reinstated. When respondents again reneged on its commitment, complainants filed
the present complaint. It is alleged by the petitioners that the above employees are mere seasonal employees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the seasonal employees have become regular employees.

HELD: The SC held that for respondents to be excluded from those classified as regular employees, it is not enough that they
perform work or services that are seasonal in nature. They must have also been employed only for the duration of one season.
The evidence proves the existence of the first, but not of the second, condition. The fact that respondents -- with the exception
of Luisa Rombo, Ramona Rombo, Bobong Abriga and Boboy Silva -- repeatedly worked as sugarcane workers for petitioners for
several years is not denied by the latter. Evidently, petitioners employed respondents for more than one season. Therefore, the
general rule of regular employment is applicable.

The primary standard of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity
performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually
necessary or desirable in the usual trade or business of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the
nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the
employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent,
the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of
that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity and while such
activity exists.

Petition is denied.

7. ULP of Labor organizations-

Salunga v CIR; G.R. No. L- 22456, 27, September 1097

Labor Law Review |Sobreviñas | August –December 2014|PageSalunga v. CIRDate: September 27, 1967Ponente: Concepcion,
J.Digest Maker: John Michael VidaSUMMARY: Salunga resigned from the Union but was advised by SMB that Section 3of the CBA
with NBAILUP-PAFLU (a closed shop agreement) existed.Salunga revoked his resignation in order to keep his job but the Union
didnot allow his membership to be reinstated, hence his termination from hisjob which was regretfully made by SMB. The Court
held for Salunga,stating that the Union was guilty of ULP as unions are not entitled toarbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for
membership, and a closed-shopprovision would not justify the employer in discharging, or a union ininsisting upon the discharge
of, an employee whom the union thus refusesto admit to membership, without any reasonable ground therefor.DOCTRINE:ULP
- a closed-shop provision would not justify the employer indischarging, or a union in insisting upon the discharge of, an
employeewhom the union thus refuses to admit to membership, without anyreasonable ground therefor.FACTS:
[NOTE: taken and derived from earlier Labor 2 digests from last year’s pool]San Miguel Brewery (SMB) entered into a CBA with
the National Brewery andAllied Industries Labor Union of the Philippines (NBAILUP-PAFLU, otherwiseknown as the Union).
Section 3 of the CBA (a Closed Shop Agreement) reads:“The company agrees to require as a condition of employment of those
workers covered by thisagreement who either are members of the UNION on the date of the signing of this agreement, or
mayjoin the UNION during the effectivity of this agreement, that they shall not voluntarily resign from theUNION earlier than
thirty (30) days before the expiry date of this agreement as provided in ArticleXIII hereof, provided, however, that nothing
herein contained shall be construed to require thecompany to enforce any sanction whatsoever against any employee or
worker who fails to retain hismembership in the UNION as hereinbefore stated, for any cause other than voluntary resignation
ornon-payment of regular union dues on the part of said employee or worker.”Petitioner Francisco Salunga was a member of
the Union since 1953. Due to afalling out with the Union, he tendered his resignation from the Union, whichaccepted it and
transmitted it to the Company with a request for the immediateimplementation of said section 3. SMB informed Salunga that his
aforementionedresignation would result in the termination of his employment, and in view of saidsection, Salunga wrote a
letter to the Union withdrawing or revoking hisresignation and advising the Union to continue deducting his monthly
union dues.He, moreover, furnished a copy of this communication to SMB. The latter, in turn,notified the Union of the receipt of
said copy and that "in view thereof, we shallnot take any action on this case and shall consider Mr. Francisco Salunga still
amember of your union and continue deducting his union dues." However, on September 8, 1961, the Union told SMB that
Salunga’s membershipcould not be reinstated and insisted on his separation from the service,conformably with the
stipulation above-quoted. SMB sent a reply clarifying theinstructions of the Union to terminate the employment of Salunga. The
Unionreiterated its request for implementation of said section 3, for which reason, SMBnotified Salunga that, in view of said
letter and the aforementioned section, theyhave to terminate his employment, although with regret. Meanwhile, Salunga
sought the intervention of PAFLU's National President,Cipriano Cid, to which the Union was affiliated, for a review of the
latter's action.PAFLU gave due course to petitioner's request for review. On October 6, 1961, Cid advised Salunga that PAFLU
had found no ground toreview the action taken by the Union and that, on the expiration of the 15-daygrace granted to him by
the Company, the decision thereof to terminate hisservices would take effect.Salunga then notified the PAFLU that he was
appealing to its supreme authority— the PAFLU National Convention — and requested that action on his case bedeferred until
such time as the Convention shall have acted on his appeal.Furthermore, he asked SMB to maintain the status quo, in
the meantime. Thisnotwithstanding, at the close of the business hours, on October 15, 1961, Salunga1

Labor Law Review |Sobreviñas | August –December 2014|Pagewas discharged from the employment of the Company, through
its assistant-secretary and vice-president, herein respondent Miguel Noel. Hence, thecomplaint in the CIR.CIR decided
in favor of Salunga. Defendants (including SMB) all guilty of ULP.Ordered Union to readmit petitioner as member, and Company
to reinstate himwith backwages.ON Motion for Reconsideration, CIR reversed its earlier decision. Hence, thisappeal by the
petitioner.ISSUES/HELD: 1. WON the Union is guilty of ULP. YES.2. WON SMB (the employer) is guilty of ULP. NO.RATIO:1. In the
case of the Union, it was found that NBAILUP-PAFLU acted arbitrarily.Although Salunga had resigned from the Union and the
latter had accepted theresignation, Salunga had, soon later — upon learning that his withdrawal from theUnion would result in
his separation from the Company, owing to the closed-shopprovision above referred to — revoked or withdrawn said
resignation, and theUnion refused to consent thereto without any just cause therefor. The Union hadnot only acted arbitrarily in
not allowing petitioner to continue his membershipbut the trial Judge also found said refusal of the Union officers to be due to
hiscritical attitude towards certain measures taken or sanctioned by them. The record is clear that, feeling dejected by the
inaction of the union officials onhis grievances and objections to what he believed were illegal disbursements ofunion funds,
coupled with the fact that he was later removed from his position as aunion steward without his knowledge, as well as the fact
that the union did nothonor the power of attorney executed in his favor by Alejandro Miranda, a co-worker, for the collection
of Miranda's indebtedness of P60.00 to him, hesubmitted his letter of resignation from the union on August 18, 1961.
Indeed said officers tried to justify themselves by characterizing said criticisms asacts of disloyalty to the Union, which, of course,
is not true, not only because thecriticism assailed, not the Union, but certain acts of its officers, and, indirectly, theofficers
themselves, but also because the constitution and by-laws of the Unionexplicitly recognize the right of its members to
give their views on "alltransactions made by the Union." As a consequence, the resolution appealed fromcannot be affirmed
without, in effect, nullifying said right which, independently ofthe constitution and by-laws of the Union, is part and parcel of the
freedom ofspeech guaranteed in the Constitution of our Republic, as a condition sine quanon to the sound growth and
development of labor organizations and democraticinstitutions. Although, generally, a state may not compel ordinary voluntary
associations toadmit thereto any given individual, because membership therein may be accordedor withheld as a matter of
privilege, the rule is qualified in respect of labor unionsholding a monopoly in the supply of labor, either in a given locality, or as
regardsa particular employer with which it has a closed-shop agreement. The reason isthat: “…The closed shop and the
union shop cause the admission requirements of trade union tobecome affected with the public interest. Likewise, a
closed shop, a union shop, or maintenance ofmembership clauses cause the administration of discipline by unions to be affected
with the publicinterest.”Consequently, it is well settled that such unions are not entitled to arbitrarilyexclude qualified applicants
for membership, and a closed-shop provision wouldnot justify the employer in discharging, or a union in insisting upon the
dischargeof, an employee whom the union thus refuses to admit to membership, withoutany reasonable ground therefor.
Needless to say, if said unions may be compelled to admit new members, whohave the requisite qualifications, with more
reason may the law and the courtsexercise the coercive power when the employee involved is a long standing unionmember,
who, owing to provocations of union officers, was impelled to tender hisresignation, which he forthwith withdrew or revoked.
Surely, he may, at least,invoke the rights of those who seek admission for the first time, and cannotarbitrarily be denied
readmission.2. For SMB, however, it was held that it did not engage in ULP. It was shown thatSMB itself was even reluctant — if
not unwilling — to discharge the petitioner.2 When the Union first informed SMB of Salunga’s resignation and
urgedimplementation of section 3 of the bargaining contract, SMB advised Salunga ofthe provision, thereby intimating that he
had to withdraw his resignation in orderto keep his employment. Besides, SMB notified the Union that it (SMB) wouldnot take
any action on the case and would consider Salunga "still a member" ofthe Union. When the latter, thereafter, insisted on
petitioner's discharge, SMB stilldemurred and explained it was not taking sides and that its stand was promptedmerely by
"humane" considerations, springing from the belief that petitioner hadresigned from the Union without realizing its effect upon
his employment. And, asthe Union reiterated its demand, SMB notified petitioner that it had no otheralternative but to
terminate his employment, and dismissed him from the service,although with "regret".Under these circumstances, SMB was
not "unfair" to the petitioner. On thecontrary, it did not merely show a commendable understanding of and sympathyfor his
plight. It even tried to help him, although to such extent only as wasconsistent with its obligation to refrain from interfering in
purely internal affairsof the Union. At the same time, SMB could not safely inquire into the motives ofthe Union officers, in
refusing to allow Salunga to withdraw his resignation. Inasmuch as the true motives were not manifest, without such
inquiry, andSalunga had concededly tendered his resignation of his own free will, the arbitrarynature of the decision of said
officers was not such as to be apparent and to justifythe company in regarding said decision unreasonable. Upon the other hand,
SMBcannot be blamed for assuming the contrary, for Salunga had appealed to theNational Officers of the PAFLU and the latter
had sustained the Union. SMB wastherefore justified in presuming that the PAFLU had inquired into all relevantcircumstances,
including the motives of the Union Officers.In finding the company guilty of ULP, the trial Judge felt that San Miguel shouldhave
waited for the action of the national convention before issuing the notice ofdismissal. However, the record does not show that
petitioner was prejudiced bySan Miguel’s failure to maintain the status quo, after the Union had beensustained by
said officers. In fact, petitioner did not even try to establish that hehad submitted to San Miguel — as he has not introduced in
the lower court —satisfactory proof that an appeal had really been taken by him to theaforementioned
Convention.

8. ULP of Labor organizations-

Manila mandarin Employees Union vs NLRC GR. No. 76989, September 29. 1987

MANILA MANDARIN EMPLOYEES UNION v. NLRC and MELBA C.BELONCIO G.R. No. 76989, 1987 Sep 29GUTIERREZ, JR., J.FACTS:
Private respondent, Melba C. Beloncio, assistant head waitress at thehotel's coffee shop, was expelled from the Manila
Mandarin Employees Unionfor acts allegedly inimical to the interests of the union. The charge of disloyaltyagainst Beloncio
arose from her emotional remark to a waitress who happenedto be a union steward, "Wala akong tiwala sa Union ninyo." The
remark wasmade in the course of a heated discussion regarding Beloncio's efforts to makea lazy and recalcitrant waiter adopt a
better attitude towards his work. Theunion demanded the dismissal from employment of Beloncio on the basis of the union
security clause of their collective bargaining agreement and theHotel acceded by placing Beloncio on forced leave. the Labor
Arbiter held thatthe union was guilty of unfair labor practice when it demanded the separationof Beloncio and the employer was
ordered to reinstate her.
ISSUES:
Is petitioner union is guilty of ULP by reason of the arbitrary use of the union security clause in the CBA?
HELD:
Yes. The Hotel would not have compelled Beloncio to go on forcedleave were it not for the union's insistence and demand to
the extent thatbecause of the failure of the hotel to dismiss Beloncio as requested, the unionfiled a notice of strike with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment on the issueof unfair labor practice. Although the CBA contained a union security clause
orclosed-shop agreement, it is, however, stressed that such are also governedby law and by principles of justice, fair play, and
legality. Union securityclauses cannot be used by union officials against an employer, much less theirown members, except with
a high sense of responsibility, fairness, prudence,and judiciousness.A union member may not be expelled from her union, and
consequently fromher job, for personal or impetuous reasons or for causes foreign to the closed-shop agreement and in a
manner characterized by arbitrariness andwhimsicality. Beloncio was merely trying her best to make a hotel bus boy dohis work
promptly and courteously so as to serve hotel customers in the coffeeshop expeditiously and cheerfully. Union membership
does not entitle waiters, janitors, and other workers to be sloppy in their work, inattentive tocustomers, and disrespectful to
supervisors. The Union should have disciplinedits erring and troublesome members instead of causing so much hardship to
amember who was only doing her work for the best interests of the employer,all its employees, and the general public whom
they serve.

9. When not ULP -

General Santos Coca- cola Plant Free workers Union- TUPAS vs Coca Cola Bottlers et. Al Gr. No. 178647, February 13, 2009
Question of Law / Fact

FACTS:

Sometime in the late 1990s, CCBPI experienced a significant decline in profitabilitd!e to the "sian economic crisis, decrease in
sales, and to!gher competition. #o c!rb thenegative effects on the compan, it implemented three $%& 'aves of an (arl
Retirement Programand also there 'as an inter)office memorand!m mandating to p!t on hold all re*!ests for hiringto fill in
vacancies in both reg!lar and temporar positions in +ead ffice and in the Plants. #his prompted petitioner to negotiate 'ith the
-abor anagement Committee for filling !p thevacancies 'ith permanent emploees. /o resol!tion 'as reached on the matter.
aced 'ith thefree2e hiring directive, CCBPI 3en San engaged the services of 4-BP Services Corporation, acompan in the b!
siness of providing labor and manpo'er services, incl!ding 5anitorial services,messengers, and office 'or6ers to vario!s private and
government offices. Petitioner then filed 'ith the /ational Conciliation and ediation Board a /otice of Stri6e onthe gro!nd of
alleged !nfair labor practice committed b CCBPI 3en San for contracting)o!tservices reg!larl performed b !nion members. #he
Secretar of -abor iss!ed an rder en5oining the threatened stri6e and certifing the disp!te to the /-RC for comp!
lsorarbitration. #he /-RC r!led that CCBPI 'as not g!ilt of !nfair labor practice for contractingo!t 5obs to 4-BP. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration 'hich the /-RC denied. #he C"also denied the petition for certiorari as 'ell as the motion for
reconsideration. +ence, this petition.
ISSUE:

7hether or not the act of contracting)o!t services from 4-BP constit!tes !nfair labor practices8
HELD:

nder R!le :; of the Revised R!les on Civil Proced!re, onl *!estions of la' ma beraised in a Petition for Revie' on Certiorari. #here
is a *!estion of la' if the iss!e raised iscapable of being resolved 'itho!t need of revie'ing the probative val!e of the evidence.
"nexamination of the iss!es raised b petitioner reveals that the are *!estions of fact. #he iss!esraised, i.e., 'hether 4-BP is an
independent contractor, 'hether CCBPI<s contracting)o!t of 5obsto 4-BP amo!nted to !nfair labor practice, and 'hether s!ch
action 'as a valid exercise of

There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of beingresolved without need of reviewing the probative value of
theevidence. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the lawprovides on a given set of circumstances. Once it is
clear that theissue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed isone of fact. If the query requires a re-
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstancesand their relation to one
another, the issue in that query is factual.
50

(GENERAL SANTOS COCA-COLA PLANT FREE WORKERS UNION-TUPASvs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. (GENERAL SANTOS
CITY), THECOURT OF APPEALS and THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONSCOMMISSION, G.R. No. 178647)

10. Suspension of CBA due to financial losses not ULP-

Manila Mining Corp. Employees Association- Federation of Free Workers Chapter Vs. Manila Mining Corp. GR. Nos 178222-23
September 20, 2010

FACTS:

Manila Mining Corporation (MMC) is a publicly-listed corporation engaged in large-scale mining for gold and copper ore. MMC
constructed several tailings dams, as mandated by law, to treat and store its waste materials. One of these dams was Tailings
Pond No. 7 (TP No. 7), which was was operated under a permit issued by the DENR.

When MMC-Makati Employees Association-Federation of Free Workers Chapter acquired its legitimate registration status, it
submitted letters to MMC relating its intention to bargain collectively. Then, CBA proposal to MMC.

Upon expiration of the tailings permit, DENR-EMB did not issue a permanent permit due to the inability of MMC to secure an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC). Due to this, it was compelled to temporarily shut down its mining operations,
resulting in the temporary lay-off of more than 400 employees in the mine site. MMC called for the suspension of negotiations
on the CBA with the Union until resumption of mining operations.

The Union insists that MMC is guilty of unfair labor practice when it unilaterally suspended the negotiation for a CBA. They
alleged that MMC did not want to bargain collectively with the Union, so that instead of submitting their counterproposal to the
CBA, MMC decided to terminate all union officers and active members.

ISSUE: Whether or not suspension of the CBA negotiations due to the temporary shutdown of operation is tantamount to refusal
to bargain, hence, an unfair labor practice.

RULING:

No. Unfair labor practice cannot be imputed to MMC since, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, the call of MMC for a suspension of
the CBA negotiations cannot be equated to “refusal to bargain.”

The Union based its contention on the letter request by MMC for the suspension of the collective bargaining negotiations until it
resumes operations. Verily, it cannot be said that MMC deliberately avoided the negotiation. It merely sought a suspension and
in fact, even expressed its willingness to negotiate once the mining operations resume. There was valid reliance on the
suspension of mining operations for the suspension, in turn, of the CBA negotiation. The Union failed to prove bad faith in
MMC’s actuations.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court agreed with the CA that MMC’s suspension of its mining operations was bonafide and the
reason for such suspension was supported by substantial evidence. MMC cannot conduct mining operations without a tailings
disposal system. When the renewal permit was not immediately released by the DENR-EMB, MMC was compelled to
temporarily shutdown its milling and mining operations. Here, it is once apparent that the suspension of MMC’s mining
operations was not due to its fault nor was it necessitated by financial reasons. Such suspension was brought about by the non-
issuance of a permit for the continued operation of TP No. 7 without which MMC cannot resume its milling and mining
operations.