Cases answers Labor

In the case of Gregorio Araneta University Foundation vs. NLRC, 155 SCRA 301, 1987

Facts:

On 1983, the president of Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, (hereinafter called University) Mr.
Cesar A. Mijares wrote the there. Minister of Labor Blas Ople soliciting his opinion on a proposed
retrenchment and reorganization program made necessary by the University's financial difficulties.

Minister Ople found "no serious objection to the program" but advised him that "it should be
implemented without prejudice to whatever benefits that might have accrued to the employees
concerned at the effective date of reorganization."

The private respondents did not submit their courtesy resignations.

Mr. Meneses the acting president served the private petitioners notices of termination, all dated
November 10, 1983, and effective November 11, 1983.

The private respondents responded to Meneses' action by filing cases for illegal dismissal, non-
payment of separation pay, and other benefits and unfair labor practice with damages against the
university and Meneses before the National Labor Relations Commission.

In their position paper, the complainants alleged that they were dismissed without prior notice in
violation of BP 130; that the implementation of the retrenchment program was without any
established criteria for selecting the faculty members to be dismissed, as, in fact, they were replaced
by faculty members with qualifications inferior to the complainants; and that their discharge from
employment was a retaliatory move against them by Meneses for their having been instrumental in
charging him with having committed various anomalies in the university administration.

The university denied the respondents' allegations and stated in its answer that sufficient notice was
given to them prior to their dismissal because as early as May 1983, the then president Mijares had
publicly announced the proposals for a new working structure as a result of which several meetings
were held with the faculty members and other personnel with their respective unions; that the 30-
day notice envisioned in BP 130 was substantially complied with because in their letters of
termination it is stated that " It is understood that your name shall still be included in the payroll for
one month after said date" and that actually the complainants received the terminal 30-day pay
whose operative effect is to put them in estoppel to question their dismissal; that the complainants'
dismissal was due to the non-submission of their resignation letters as directed and their failure to
conform to the new terms and conditions of the reorganized set-up and not as a retaliation move
against the complainants; and that the complainants' appointments as institute deans and
department heads were merely ad hoc or temporary and had expired on October 15, 1983 as
indicated in their appointment papers which they signed resulting in their termination even without
the retrenchment program.

The complainants appealed the decision to the National Labor Relations Commission. In a decision
dated April 10, 1986, the NLRC en banc modified the Labor Arbiter's decision.

Issue: Whether the private respondents were illegally dismissed.

Ruling:

It is clear. therefore, that the respondents' failure to rehire the complainants in their former positions,
which, to repeat, were not abolished as a result of the reorganization, pursuant to their own
reorganization plan, amounted to dismissal which was illegal because it was effected for no valid
reason .

On the proposition that the private respondents are estopped from questioning their dismissal
because they accepted their 30-day termination pay, suffice it to state that the private respondents
cannot waive their rights protected by no less than the Constitution. Section 18, Article 11 of the 1987
Constitution provides that "The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect
the rights of workers and promote their welfare." This constitutional protection to labor has been
carried through all our three (3) constitutions since 1935.

The appeal to the Court about saving a noble institution from collapse has no basis. Retrenchments
are allowed for all unnecessary positions based on the petitioner's own reorganization program.
However, the re-organization cannot be used as a convenient device to get rid of existing personnel in
order to replace them with new ones. For this purpose, the regular rules and procedures on dismissal
of employees will have to be followed.

In the case of Fuentes vs. NLRC, 266 SCRA 24, 1997

Facts:

Petitioners, numbering seventy-five (75) in all were regular employees of private respondent Agusan
Plantations, Inc. Claiming that it was suffering business losses which resulted in the decision of the
head office in Singapore to undertake retrenchment measures, private respondent sent notices of
termination to petitioners and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).

On 31 October 1990 petitioners filed with the DOLE office in Cagayan de Oro City a complaint for
illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement, backwages and damages against private respondent
Agusan Plantation, Inc., and/or Chang Chee Kong. The respondents denied the allegations of
petitioners and contended that upon receipt of instructions from the head office in Singapore to
implement retrenchment, private respondents conducted grievance conferences or meetings with
petitioners' representative labor organization, the Association of Trade Unions through its national
president Jorge Alegarbes, its local president and its board of directors. Private respondents also
contended that the 30-day notices of termination were duly sent to petitioners.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The decision of the Labor Arbiter was
reversed.

Issue: Whethe the NLRC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
ruling that petitioners were legally terminated from their employment.

Ruling: The ruling of the Labor Arbiter that there was no valid retrenchment is correct. Article 283 of
the Labor Code clearly states:

Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. — The employer may also terminate
the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of the title, by
serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1)
month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving
devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to
at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in case of closure or cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation
pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole
year.

Under Art. 283 therefore retrenchment may be valid only when the following requisites are met: (a) it
is to prevent losses; (b) written notices were served on the workers and the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) at least one (1) month before the effective date of retrenchment; and, (c)
separation pay is paid to the affected workers.

There is no question that an employer may reduce its work force to prevent losses. However, these
losses must be serious, actual and real.3 Otherwise, this ground for termination of employment would
be susceptible to abuse by scheming employers who might be merely feigning losses in their business
ventures in order to ease out employees.4

Indeed, private respondents failed to prove their claim of business losses. What they submitted to the
Labor Arbiter were mere self-serving documents and allegations. Private respondents never adduced
evidence which would show clearly the extent of losses they suffered as a result of lack of capital
funding, which failure is fatal to their cause.

As regards the requirement of notices of termination to the employees, it is undisputed that the
Notice of Retrenchment was submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment on 12
September 19905 The findings of both the Labor Arbiter and NLRC show that petitioners were
terminated on the following dates in 1990 after they received their notices of termination, to wit:

Name of Employee Date of Notice of Effectivity of

Termination Termination

1. Noquera, Vilma 22 Sept. 25 Sept.

2. Dumalagan, Margarito 22 Sept. 30 Sept.
3. Osok, Marciano 20 Sept. 30 Sept.
4. Abaa, Leopoldo 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
5. Aboylo, Amancio 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
6. Allado, Nestor Jr. 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
7. Bandera, Verginia 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
8. Basanez, Lily 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
9. Baumbad, Alejo 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
10. Blanco, Myrna 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
11. Blanco, Reynaldo 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
12. Canal, Marieto 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
13. Fabon, Madilyn01 Sept. 30 Sept.
14. Ferrer, Elpidio 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
15. Meniano, Rodolfo 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
16. Nunez, Angelico 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
17. Osok, Bebiano 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
18. Penaloga, Jose Jr. 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
19. Taglocop, Hermogena 01 Sept. 30 Sept.
20. Allado, Lydio 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
21. Baya, Maria 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
22. Carlon, Flaviana 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
23. Carlon, Cresencio 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
24. Culaba, Rogelio22 Aug. 30 Sept.
25. Cabriades, Carmelito 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
26. Dellomes, Elma22 Aug. 30 Sept.
27. Fabon, Arcadio 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
28. Gordo, Francisco 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
29. Inocencio, Virgilio 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
30. Inocencio, Ruel 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
31. Luna, Blandina 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
32. Luna, Avelino 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
33. Lubrico, Celia 22 Aug. 30 Sept.
34. Monteclar, Violeta 22 Aug. 25 Sept.
35. Macabecha, Aquino 22 Aug. 25 Sept.
36. Melloria, Ananian 22 Aug. 25 Sept.
37. Malinao, Rogelio 22 Aug. 25 Sept.
38. Leonarda, Notarte 22 Aug. 25 Sept.
39. Parejas, Jerry 22 Aug. 25 Sept.
40. Parejas, Alfonso 22 Aug. 25 Sept.
41. Sardinola, Alfonso 22 Aug. 25 Sept.
42. Solaterio, Bonifacio 22 Aug. 25 Sept.

Culled from the above data, the termination of petitioners could not have validly taken effect either
on 25 or 30 September 1990. The one-month notice of retrenchment filed with the DOLE and served
on the workers before the intended date thereof is mandatory. Private respondents failed to comply
with this requisite. The earliest possible date of termination should be 12 October 1990 or one (1)
month after notice was sent to DOLE unless the notice of termination was sent to the workers later
than the notice to DOLE on 12 September 1990, in which case, the date of termination should be at
least one (1) month from the date of notice to the workers. Petitioners were terminated less than a
month after notice was sent to DOLE and to each of the workers.

We agree with the conclusion of the Labor Arbiter that the termination of the services of petitioners
was illegal as there was no valid retrenchment. Respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in reversing the findings of the Labor Arbiter and ruling that there was substantial
compliance with the law. This Court firmly holds that measures should be strictly implemented to
ensure that such constitutional mandate on protection to labor is not rendered meaningless by an
erroneous interpretation of applicable laws.

We uphold the monetary award of the Labor Arbiter for: (a) the balance of the separation pay
benefits of petitioners equivalent to fifteen (15) days for every year of service after finding that
reinstatement is no longer feasible under the circumstances, and (b) the salary differentials for
complainants who were relieved during the pendency of the case before the Labor Arbiter and full
back wages for the rest of the complainants. This is in accord with Art. 279 of the Labor Code as
amended by R.A. 6715 under which petitioners who were unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to full back wages inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time their compensation was withheld up to the date of this decision.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Labor Arbiter of 27 March 1992 granting
petitioners their claim for the balance of their separation pay benefits equivalent to fifteen (15) days
for every year of service, and salary differentials for complainants who were relieved during the
pendency of the case before the Labor Arbiter, and full back wages for the rest of the complainants is
REINSTATED. Consequently, the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 27
September 1992 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

In the case of Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co.,
Inc., 51 SCRA 1989, 1973

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO,

PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA,
BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, Petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.
and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Respondents.

L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.

Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO)
is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills
Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon,
Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members
of the petitioner Union.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang
on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the
workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts
(from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the
respondent Company of their proposed demonstration
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the
respondent Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties - parties -

3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass demonstration at
Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be participated by the
first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00
PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;chanrobles virtual law library

4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the
Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de
Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino
Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin
Pagcu.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration
at Malacañang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union
panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be
cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with
Management;chanrobles virtual law library

6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that
the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned
the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without
previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4,
1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would
be amounting to an illegal strike;chanrobles virtual law library

7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked Company
represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo
Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969,
Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers may join the
Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be
excused from joining the demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize the workers in
the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO
LOCKOUT - NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be dismiss; De
Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers
of the mass demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to change their
plans inasmuch as the Malacañang demonstration will be held the following morning; andchanrobles
virtual law library

8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which
was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST
EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp.
42-43, rec.)

Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration
despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to
participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized
for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of
the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners
and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6
in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA
providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied
by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter,
a corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T.
Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)chanrobles virtual law library

In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA
because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4,
1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech
against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34,
rec.)chanrobles virtual law library

After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M.
Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining
in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion
Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly
responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to
have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56,
rec.)chanrobles virtual law library

Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.);
and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a
motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary
to law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments
pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )
chanrobles virtual law library

In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company
averred that herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17
(should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September
27, 1969, within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that because their motion for
reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo,
1which held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period for the filing of a motion
for reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64,
rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated October 11,
1969, in support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73,
rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion for
reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary
period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on
October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October 24,
1969 and addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of
Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for
reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an
appeal from the decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from the
order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration
on time was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the president of the
petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said
president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969,
herein petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L",
pp. 88-89, rec.).

There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by the
case at bar.

(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human
personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable
character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts
and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person." 2chanrobles virtual law library

(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the
assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and
the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general principles." 3chanrobles virtual
law library

In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw
"certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's
rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly,
and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections." 4Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State,
was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits
to the authority it was entitled to exercise." 5chanrobles virtual law library

(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among
the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to
protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated,
not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to
listen. 6And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the
liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected.

(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political
rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete
fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment
of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in
the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to
the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the
imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees

(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property
rights is recognized. 8Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as
the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government
regulation only "with narrow specificity." 9chanrobles virtual law library

Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If
human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to
limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials,
of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs - political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred
position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions;
10and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions."

The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere
reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose -
that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive - would suffice to validate a law
which restricts or impairs property rights. 12On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement
of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate
danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the
main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the
opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec,
supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 14believes that the
freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our
right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed," 15even as Mr. Justice Castro
relies on the balancing-of-interests test. 16Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger
rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. - whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger.
17chanrobles virtual law library

The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage
of work," herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective
bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and
tested by foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such conclusion cannot be sustained.
The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang was against alleged abuses
of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said
demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general and of
their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate
governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They
exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were
police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein
petitioner Union and its members fro the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest
herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees,
so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform
more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent
employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace
for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage
the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more
weakened the position of its laborers the alleged oppressive police who might have been all the more
emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to further
indignities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition
against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private
respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the
Constitution - the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their
employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock
in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property
rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of
the firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality -
abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the
municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis
the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as
that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of
the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary
terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in
anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised
tissues.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights - freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and
of petition for redress of grievances - over property rights has been sustained. 18Emphatic reiteration
of this basic tenet as a coveted boon - at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the
human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization - becomes Our duty, if
freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce
economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police
officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of
the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement,
is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the
constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19chanrobles
virtual law library

The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the
respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe
regular working hours." The strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated
working shifts deny the workers the right to stage mass demonstration against police abuses during
working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and deserves severe
condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender
ground.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally
enjoined by any court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the
workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike. 20The respondent Court of Industrial
Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike
"as the same not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is concerted act and the occurrence
of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the
demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M.
to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand
failed appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely
the complete unity of the Union members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in
order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediately action
on the part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised
against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. 21If demonstrators
are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration
is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the
rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial
indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged
police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two days in advance of their
projected demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent
whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this
case when the Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the
demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the
company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43,
rec.). There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the
request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the
Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as
unchristian as it is unconstitutional.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

IIIchanrobles virtual law library

The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of
the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against
alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service
constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and
freedom petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice
defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the
Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage
in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor
practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights
guaranteed in Section Three."chanrobles virtual law library

We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the
respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police
abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in
such common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence
on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shift should not
participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent
means of inhibiting speech." 22chanrobles virtual law library

Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal protection as the
concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank president with
immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in the appointment and promotion of ban
employees. 23We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to
come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875,
"it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated," as
long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24chanrobles virtual law library

As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court
dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is
an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company"
and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who
without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who
are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning
(March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and,
therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of
dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass demonstration. However, the issues
that the employees raised against the local police, were more important to them because they had
the courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could
happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the
demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support.
Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring
about the desired relief from police abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize
the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for
redress.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers
proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that
the evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities having
jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the
Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to disciplining the local police officers
involved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration
"paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This
significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not
present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to comply with purchase orders on
that day; or that penalties were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that
day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of its
failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were
damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a
sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric
consumption that day. Such savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages
it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for only one day.

Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to
petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the
workers for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work,
constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly
employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is
emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall
afford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is
under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in
favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of
"meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is
enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging
and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of
collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most
unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very governmental
agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed
mission - its raison d'etre - as ordained and directed by the
Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Vchanrobles virtual law library

It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of
jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a
criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through
habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the
remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced
confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25or who is denied the
right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law,
26even after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years. 27chanrobles virtual law
library

Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these
constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and
aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the
municipal police. Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial
Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a
nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public offices including the
courts 28as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must not
be nullified by mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a purely
delegate legislative power, when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled
enjoyment of these human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to
enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of
one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and
expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be
condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure
prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a
contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ
the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft
as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent legal services. 28-a

VIchanrobles virtual law library

The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its order or writ
should filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion
shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16).
As above intimated, these rules of procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations
pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29chanrobles virtual law library

The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on
September 22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim
that they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a
Sunday.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of
the petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply
with a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration or appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail
over constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To
accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights
sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional
government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but
also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional
right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed.
Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or
strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying
the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule,
promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is
beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which
to file a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do
not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re
hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court).
The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if September
28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are
concerned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based on
the ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and
facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which
to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations
(Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by the herein petitioners on
October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period required for the filing of
such supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Herein
petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the
motion for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary period
(Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)chanrobles virtual law library

It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or
where the arguments in suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided
for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision subject of 29-a reconsideration
becomes final and unappealable. But in all these cases, the constitutional rights of free expression,
free assembly and petition were not involved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must be
specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such
pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first
time on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a
decision of the case, the very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which no final and
complete determination of the dispute can be made. 30It is thus seen that a procedural rule of
Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the
procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the
constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor
practice charged against them and in their defense to the said
charge.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a
most compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on
such human rights. 30-a

It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own rules
or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr.
Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-c reiterated this principle and
added that

Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without concerning itself about
procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case, without further loss of
time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus,
this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words, when all the material
facts are spread in the records before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it matters little
that the error of the court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then and there render the
appropriate judgment. Is within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and
within the power of this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or
committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the admit of its authority, in
appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in any error of judgment of a court a quo which
cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not
entertain, on whether or not the errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of Appeals
are short of being jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal grounds
should it choose to reverse said decision here and now even if such errors can be considered as mere
mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary
return of this case to the lower court for the sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an
appeal. (Emphasis supplied). 30-d

Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this particular case at
bar would an unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the herein
laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the right to survive, must be according supremacy
over the property rights of their employer firm which has been given a full hearing on this case,
especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual material damage has be demonstrated as having been
inflicted on its property rights.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders
more imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human
rights sanctioned and shielded with resolution concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the
organic law. It should be stressed that the application in the instant case Section 15 of the Court of
Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore such
application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of petitioning labor union and
workers in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the
record.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with
reference to the case at is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R.
charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."chanrobles virtual law
library

On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo,
speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:

As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new trial is not
"newly discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for the ordinary courts, We
hold that such criterion is not binding upon the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure and
shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided, however, That in the
hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any duties
and power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of
the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules
of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By this
provision the industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to
ordinary courts. Said court is not even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties but
may issue such orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No.
46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We
believe that this provision is ample enough to have enabled the respondent court to consider whether
or not its previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority was founded on fact, without regard to
the technical meaning of newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v.
Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578). (emphasis supplied.)

To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case
is to rule in effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer
seek the sanctuary of human freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because their
counsel - erroneously believing that he received a copy of the decision on September 23, 1969,
instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion for reconsideration September 29, 1969, which
practically is only one day late considering that September 28, 1969 was a
Sunday.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be instruments
of justice, for the attainment of which such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence
on this score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:

As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The Villamor
decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949];
Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.),
decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. when it deserts its proper-office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." (Ibid., p,
322.) To that norm, this Court has remained committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe,
(63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the interpretation of procedural rule should never
"sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural laws are no other than technicalities" view them in
their entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends themselves for the compliance with which courts have
organized and function, but as means conducive to the realization the administration of the law and
of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have remained steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical language
Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in altar of sophisticated technicalities with
impairment of the sacred principles of justice." (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161
[1958]). As succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities of the situation."
(Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point
promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27,
1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that rules
of procedure "are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense"; but are intended "to help secure
substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g

Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect, the
dismissal or termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh
for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court itself recognized the severity of such a
sanction when it did not include the dismissal of the other 393 employees who are members of the
same Union and who participated in the demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact,
upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not officers, were not
dismissed and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as
respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's
Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that not all
the 400 or so employee participated in the demonstration, for which reason only the Union and its
thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's
brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the morning and regular shifts reported for work on
March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the firm continued in operation that day and did not
sustain any damage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The appropriate penalty - if it deserves any penalty at all - should have been simply to charge said
one-day absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the
petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their
wages for their daily sustenance as well as that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is
a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty
tyrants in the localities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:

The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to destroy our
system of Government, but from men of goodwill - good men who allow their proper concerns to
blind them to the fact that what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment of
liberty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, however, is that
preservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the same effect
whether the suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is a
constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each
surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another, larger surrender. The
battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.

... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.

... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.

... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure because we
belong to a group that is important and respected, we must recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code
of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all honor and good conscience must be observe.
31chanrobles virtual law library

The case at bar is worse.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of
sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to
indignities by the local police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits
than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty
tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency
resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It was
pure and implement selfishness, if not greed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32where the petitioner Bank
dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to the
Bank president demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the
appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein,
thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:

It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that the latter
acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless
protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self
organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial
Peace Act ...) This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly stated, the joining
in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as
such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union
activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416
[1949]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their
grievances.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel in
giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of self-organization of employees is
not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to
discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29,
1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the
employer to select his employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that
right by interfering with the countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313
U.S. 177 [1941])...chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as an
interference with the employees' right of self-organization or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a
refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and
intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis supplied.) 33chanrobles virtual law
library

If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic
Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no
less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered
all the more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was
not against the company nor any of its officers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:chanrobles virtual law library

(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated
September 15 and October 9, 1969; andchanrobles virtual law library

(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date
of their separation from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they
might have realized from other sources during their separation from the
service.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.

Calalang vs Williams

In the case of Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Santos, Jr., 218 SCRA 415 (1993),

In Cuadra V NLRC