JAR25 Change 11
JAR25 Change 11
JAR25 Change 11
Aviation
Requirements
JAR-25
Large Aeroplanes
Change 11
17 March 1986
Printed and distributed by Information Handling Services, 15 Inverness Way East, Englewood,
Colorado, 80112, USA., on behalf of the Joint Aviation Authorities Committee.
The members of the Airworthiness Authorities Steering Committee are
representatives of the Civil Airworthiness Authorities of the countries that
have signed the 'Arrangements Concerning the Development and the
Acceptance of Joint Airworthiness Requirements'. A list of these
countries is kept by Direction Generale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC)
93, Boulevard du Montparnasse, 75270 Paris, Cedex 06, France.
Change 10 ii
JAR–25
CONTENTS
Paragraph Page
Foreword F–1
Preambles P–1
SECTION 1 – REGULATIONS
General 1–O–1
Subpart A – General
Subpart B – Flight
GENERAL
JAR 25X20 Applicability 1–B–1
JAR 25.21 Proof of compliance 1–B–1
JAR 25.23 Load distribution limits 1–B–1
JAR 25.25 Weight limits 1–B–2
JAR 25.27 Centre of gravity limits 1–B–2
JAR 25.29 Empty weight and corresponding centre of gravity 1–B–2
JAR 25.31 Removable ballast 1–B–2
JAR 25.33 Propeller speed and pitch limits 1–B–2
[ PERFORMANCE ]
C–1 Change 11
JAR–25
Paragraph Page
TRIM
STABILITY
STALLS
GENERAL
JAR (BB) 25X20 Applicability 1–BB–1
JAR (BB) 25.21 Proof of compliance 1–BB–1
JAR (BB) 25.23 Load distribution limits 1–BB–2
JAR (BB) 25.25 Weight limits 1–BB–2
Change 11 C–2
JAR–25
Paragraph Page
[ PERFORMANCE ]
TRIM
STABILITY
STALLS
C–3 Change 11
JAR–25
Paragraph Page
Subpart C – Structure
GENERAL
JAR 25.301 Loads 1–C–1
JAR 25.303 Factor of safety 1–C–1
JAR 25.305 Strength and deformation 1–C–1
JAR 25.307 Proof of structure 1–C–1
FLIGHTS LOADS
SUPPLEMENTARY CONDITIONS
Change 11 C–4
JAR–25
Paragraph Page
FATIGUE EVALUATION
LIGHTNING PROTECTION
GENERAL
C–5 Change 10
JAR-25
Paragraph Page
[ JAR 25.605 Fabrication methods 1–D–1
JAR 25.607 Fasteners 1–D–1
JAR 25.609 Protection of structure 1–D–1
JAR 25.611 Accessibility provisions 1–D–1
JAR 25.613 Material strength properties and design values 1–D–1
JAR 25.615 Design properties 1–D–2
JAR 25.619 Special factors 1–D–2
JAR 25.621 Casting factors 1–D–2
JAR 25.623 Bearing factors 1–D–2
JAR 25.625 Fitting factors 1–D–2
JAR 25.629 Flutter, deformation and fail-safe criteria 1–D–3
JAR 25.631 Bird strike damage 1–D–4
CONTROL SURFACES
CONTROL SYSTEMS
LANDING GEAR
Paragraph Page
EMERGENCY PROVISIONS
PRESSURISATION
FIRE PROTECTION
C–7 Change 10
JAR–25
Paragraph Page
MISCELLANEOUS
Subpart E – Powerplant
GENERAL
FUEL SYSTEM
Change 10 C–8
JAR–25
Paragraph Page
OIL SYSTEM
COOLING
INDUCTION SYSTEM
EXHAUST SYSTEM
C–9 Change 8
JAR–25
Paragraph Page
Subpart F — Equipment
GENERAL
INSTRUMENTS: INSTALLATION
Change 8 C–10
JAR-25
Paragraph Page
LIGHTS
SAFETY EQUIPMENT
MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT
C–11 Change 8
JAR–25
Paragraph Page
OPERATING LIMITATIONS
Change 8 C–12
JAR–25
Paragraph Page
GENERAL
FUEL SYSTEM
OIL SYSTEM
COOLING
INDUCTION SYSTEM
EXHAUST SYSTEM
C–13 Change 8
JAR–25
Paragraph Page
EQUIPMENT
OPERATING LIMITATIONS
GENERAL
FUEL SYSTEM
OIL SYSTEM
Change 8 C–14
JAR–25
Paragraph Page
INDUCTION SYSTEM
EQUIPMENT
Appendices
C–15 Change 11
JAR–25 SECTION 1
FOREWORD
1 The Civil Airworthiness Authorities of certain European countries have agreed common comprehensive
and detailed airworthiness requirements (referred to as the Joint Airworthiness Requirements (JAR)) with
a view to minimising Type Certification problems on joint ventures, and also to facilitate the export and
import of aviation products.
2 The JAR are recognised by the Civil Airworthiness Authorities of participating countries as an acceptable
basis for showing compliance with their national airworthiness codes, except in a limited number of cases
where one or more participating countries have declared National Variants. It is also accepted that, except
where National Variants have been declared, there is an interpretation of JAR requirements which provides
equivalence with national codes as currently interpreted.
3
[3] An existing airworthiness code (FAR Part 25 of the Federal Aviation Administration of the United States
of America) has been selected to form the basis of the JAR for Large Aeroplanes*, and is referred to as the
Basic Code.
3
[4] Certain of the requirements of this JAR–25, in particular those in Sub-part F, call for the installation of
equipment and in some cases prescribe requirements for the design and performance of that equipment.
These requirements, in common with the remainder of JAR–25, are intended to be acceptable to all
Participating Authorities as showing compliance with their National Code for type certification purposes,
but it should be borne in mind that an importing country may require equipment additional to those in this
JAR for operational purposes.
3
[5] The performance requirements of Subparts B, BB and G have been developed on the assumption that the
resulting scheduled performance data will be used in conjunction with performance operating rules which
are complementary to these performance requirements.
3
[6 Future development of the requirements of this JAR will be in accordance with the agreed amendment
procedure. Broadly, these procedures are such that amendment of JAR–25 can be proposed by the
Airworthiness Authority of any of the participating countries and by any organisation represented on the
Joint Steering Committee.]
1,3
[7] Amendment to the Basic Code is made by the Federal Aviation Administration of the United States of
[ America. Each amendment to the Basic Code is considered for adoption for JAR in accordance with the
amendment procedure. ]
3
[8] The Airworthiness Authorities have agreed they should not unilaterally initiate amendment of their national
codes without having made a proposal for amendment of the JAR–25 in accordance with the agreed
procedure.
3
[9] The requirements of JAR–25 have been determined to be applicable to the certification of large aeroplanes.
They may be used at the option of the applicant for a certificate, for the certification of small aeroplanes.
NOTE: Some Authorities consider the requirements of JAR–25 are applicable also to those aeroplanes of less than 5700 kg
Maximum Certificated Weight, having 10 or more passenger seats.
3
[ 10 ] Definitions and abbreviations of terms used in this JAR–25 are contained in JAR–1, Definitions and
Abbreviations.
3
[11 ] Amendments to the text in this JAR–25 are issued initially as ’Orange Paper' Amendments. These show an
effective date and have the same status and applicability as JAR–25 from that date. Orange Paper
Amendments are incorporated into the printed text approximately annually. ]
*A large aeroplane is defined as one of more than 5700 kg maximum certificated weight.
1
Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/1, Eff. 30.4.84)
2
Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/1, Eff. 24.5.85)
3
F–1 Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/2, Eff. 18.11.85)
JAR–25
Title Page –
ii Change 10
C–1 Change 11
C–2 Change 11
C–3 Change 11
C–4 Change 11
C–5 Change 10
C–6 Reissued by Change 10
C–7 Change 10
C–8 Change 10
C–9 Change 8
C–10 Change 8
C–11 Change 8
C–12 Change 8
C–13 Change 8
C–14 Change 8
C–15 Change 11
C–16 Reissued by Change 11
[
F–1 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/1, Eff. 30.4.84)
Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/1, Eff. 24.5.85)
Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/2, Eff. 18.11.85)
F–2 Reissued by Change 11
CL–1 Change 11
CL–2 Change 11
CL–3 Change 11
CL–4 Change 11
CL–5 Change 11
CL–6 Change 11
CL–7 Change 11
CL–8 Change 11
CL–9 Change 11
CL–10 Change 11
CL–11 Change 11
CL–12 Change 11
P–1 Change 5
P–2 Change 5
P–3 Reissued by Change 6
CL–1 Change 11
JAR–25
P–4 Change 6
P–5 Change 6
P–6 Change 6
P–7 Change 7
P–8 Change 7
P–9 Change 8
P–10 Change 8
P–11 Change 8
P–12 Change 8
P–13 Change 9
P–14 Change 9
P–15 Change 11
P–16 Reissued by Change 11
P–17 Change 10
P–18 Change 10
P–19 Reissued by Change11
P–20 Change 11
P–21 Change 11
P–22 Change 11
P–23 Change 11
P–24 Change 11
P–25 Change 11
P–26 Change 11
1–0–1 Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/2, Eff. 18.11.85)
1–0–2 Reissued by Change 11
1–A–1 Change 8
1–A–2 Change 8
1–B–1 Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/2, Eff. 18.11.85)
1–B–2 Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/1, Eff. 24.5.85)
1–B–3 Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/1, Eff. 24.5.85)
1–B–3–1 Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/2, Eff. 18.11.85)
1–B–3–2 Change 11
1–B–4 Reissued by Change 11
1–B–5 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/3, Eff. 30.11.84)
1–B–6 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/2, Eff. 12.7.84)
Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/3, Eff. 30.11.84)
1–B–6–1 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/3, Eff. 30.11.84)
1–B–6–2 Reissued by Change 11
1–B–7 Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/1, Eff. 24.5.85)
Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/2, Eff. 18.11.85)
1–B–8 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/3, Eff. 30.11.84)
1–B–9 Reissued by Change 11
1–B–10 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/3, Eff. 30.11.84)
Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/2, Eff. 18.11.85)
1–B–11 Reissued by Change 9
1–B–12 Ch. 9 (Amend. 81/2, Eff. 31.12.81)
Change 11 CL–2
JAR–25
CL–3 Change 11
JAR–25
Change 11 CL–4
JAR–25
CL–5 Change 11
JAR–25
1–E–10 Change 8
1–E–11 Change 8
1–E–12 Change 8
1–E–13 Reissued by Change 11
1–E–14 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/2, Eff. 12.7.84)
1–E–15 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/3, Eff. 30.11.84)
Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/2, Eff. 18.11.85)
1–E–16 Reissued by Change 11
1–E–17 Change 8
1–E–18 Change 8
1–E–19 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/1, Eff. 30.4.84)
1–E–20 Reissued by Change 11
1–F–1 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/2, Eff. 12.7.84)
Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/3, Eff. 30.11.84)
1–F–2 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/1, Eff. 30.4.84)
Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/3, Eff. 30.11.84)
1–F–2–1 Change 11
1–F–2–2 Change 11
1–F–3 Ch. 10 (corrected)
1–F–4 Reissued by Change 10
1–F–5 Reissued by Change 10
1–F–6 Ch. 10 (Amend. 83/3, Eff. 30.9.83)
1–F–7 Change 8
1–F–8 Change 8
1–F–9 Ch. 9 (Amend. 82/1, Eff. 21.6.82)
1–F–10 Reissued by Change 9
1–F–11 Reissued by Change 11
1–F–12 Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/2, Eff. 18.11.85)
1–F–13 Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/2, Eff. 18.11.85)
1–F–14 Reissued by Change 11
1–F–15 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/1, Eff. 30.4.84)
1–F–16 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/1, Eff. 30.4.84)
1–F–17 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/1, Eff. 30.4.84)
1–F–18 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/1, Eff. 30.4.84)
1–F–19 Change 8
1–F–20 Change 8
1–F–21 Reissued by Change 9
1–F–22 Ch. 9 (corrected)
1–F–23 Change 8
1–F–24 Change 8
1–G–1 Reissued by Change 10
1–G–2 Ch. 10 (Amend. 83/1, Eff. 17.3.83)
1–G–3 Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/2, Eff. 18.11.85)
1–G–4 Reissued by Change 11
1–G–5 Reissued by Change 11
1–G–6 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/1, Eff. 30.4.84)
Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/3, Eff. 30.11.84)
Change 11 CL–6
JAR–25
CL–7 Change 11
JAR–25
2–B–2 Change 10
2–B–3 Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/1, Eff. 24.5.85)
2–B–3–1 Change 11
2–B–3–2 Change 11
2–B–4 Reissued by Change 11
2–B–4–1 Ch. 10 (Amend. 83/1, Eff. 17.3.83)
2–B–4–2 Change 10
2–B–5 Reissued by Change 11
2–B–5–1 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/3, Eff. 30.11.84)
2–B–5–2 Ch. 10 (Amend. 83/1, Eff. 17.3.83)
2–B–6 Reissued by Change 10
2–B–7 Ch. 10 (Amend 83/1, Eff. 17.3.83)
2–B–8 Reissued by Change 10
2–B–9 Reissued by Change 11
2–B–9–1 Ch. 11 (corrected)
2–B–9–2 Reissued by Change 10
2–B–10 Ch. 10 (Amend. 83/2, Eff. 30.8.83)
2–B–10–1 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/2, Eff. 12.7.84)
2–B–10–2 Reissued by Change 11
2–B–11 Reissued by Change 10
2–B–12 Ch. 10 (Amend. 83/1, Eff. 17.3.83)
2–B–12–1 Reissued by Change 11
2–B–12–2 Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/1, Eff. 24.5.85)
2–B–13 Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/1, Eff. 24.5.85)
2–B–14 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/1, Eff. 30.4.84)
2–B–14–1 Change 11
2–B–14–2 Change 11
2–B–14–3 Change 11
2–B–14–4 Change 11
2–BB–1 Reissued by Change 10
2–BB–2 Ch. 10 (Amend. 83/1, Eff. 17.3.83)
2–BB–2–1 Change 10
2–BB–2–2 Change 10
2–C–1 Ch. 8 (Amend. 83/1, Eff. 14.4.81)
2–C–2 Reissued by Change 8
2–C–3 Ch. 6 (corrected)
2–C–4 Ch. 6 (corrected)
2–C–5 Ch. 11 (corrected)
2–C–5–1 Ch. 11 (corrected)
2–C–5–2 Ch. 11 (corrected)
2–C–6 Ch. 11 (corrected)
2–C–6–1 Ch. 11 (corrected)
2–C–6–2 Reissued by Change 11
2–C–7 Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/2, Eff. 18.11.85)
2–C–8 Reissued by Change 11
2–C–9 Ch. 7 (Amend. 7, Eff. 24.11.80)
2–C–9–1 Ch. 7 (Amend. 7, Eff. 24.11.80)
Change 11 CL–8
JAR–25
CL–9 Change 11
JAR–25
Change 11 CL–10
JAR—25
2–G–6
[ Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/1, Eff. 30.4.84)
Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/3, Eff. 30.11.84)
Reissued by Change 11
2–J–1 Ch. 7 (Amend. 7, Eff. 24.11.80)
2–J–2 Ch. 7 (Amend. 7, Eff. 24.11.80)
2–J–3 Ch. 7 (Amend. 7, Eff. 24.11.80)
2–J–4 Ch. 7 (Amend. 7, Eff. 24.11.80)
2–J–5 Ch. 7 (Amend. 7, Eff. 24.11.80)
2–J–6 Change 7
App 1–1 Ch. 2 (Amend. 2, Eff. 9.4.76)
App 1–2 Change 2
CL—11 Change 11
JAR—25
Change 11 CL—12
JAR—25
[ PREAMBLES ]
JAR—25 1.8.74
JAR—25 will consist of seven Sub-parts as does the Basic Code FAR—25. The first issue of JAR—25 includes
the material for three of these Sub-parts, i.e. Sub-part C — Structures, Sub-part D — Design & Construction,
and Sub-part E — Power-plant Installations; the other Sub-parts will be issued as they become available.
Because all of JAR—25 is not yet available certain reservations must be made about the material so far approved.
For example, it has not been possible closely to check the appropriateness of cross references to paragraphs in as
yet unpublished Sub-parts, and it may be necessary to review some parts of the material already issued when
inter-related material in other Sub-parts becomes available for publication.
The purpose of this amendment is to take account of the publication of FAA Amendments Nos. 33, 34 and 35
in the Basic Code.
Amendment No. 33 was accepted by the JSC in principle but a CTC to JAR 25.772 is introduced.
Amendment No. 34 was not accepted by the JSC and this has been indicated by an appropriate statement
opposite FAR 25.809(j).
An editorial correction has been made to ACJ 25.901(d), "1000°F" being corrected to read "100°F".
(c) Requirements for bonding and protection against lightning discharge in Sub-parts C, D and E.
(e) An amendment to JAR 25.905(a) and (b) requiring propellers to meet the requirements of JAR—P.
(f) A statement that FAR 25.907 is not required for JAR—25, since the subject matter is already covered by
JAR—P, Chapter C5—4, 3.
Amendment No. 37 was accepted by the JSC without change, and this is indicated on the Contents Page and
on Page 1—0—1.
(c) Icing requirements in Sub-part D, Design and Construction and Sub-part E, Power-plant.
(d) JAR 25X261 and ACJ 25X261, both of which were unintentionally omitted when Sub-part B, Flight, was
published under Amendment 2.
(e) A correction on page 1—O—1 where, in paragraph 1.5, '1—G—11, is changed to 'App D—1'.
(f) A correction on page 1—B—5. where '(G) JAR 25.116' is changed to '(G) JAR 25X116'.
(g) A correction on page 1—B—6, where the cross-reference to '(G) ACJ 25.107(h) (United Kingdom)' is
changed to '(G) ACJ 25X116 (United Kingdom)'.
P—1 Change 5
JAR–25
(h) A correction on page 2—B—5, where '(G) ACJ 25.107(h) (United Kingdom)' has been changed to
'(G) ACJ 25X116 (United Kingdom)'.
(j) Appendix D has been reissued only to revise the page numbers.
The purpose of this amendment is to take into account the publication of FAA Amendments Nos. 36, 38, 39
and 40 in the Basic Code, and to introduce into JAR—25:–
(k) An amendment to JAR 25.1 (a) to indicate that the applicability of JAR–25 is to Large Turbine-engined
Aeroplanes only. This change results in the deletion of paragraph 5 from the Foreword.
(l) The transfer of paragraph 10 of the Foreword to paragraph 1.5 of Section 1, General.
(m) Deletion of the reference to relatively rigid aeroplanes in JAR 25.341 and JAR 25.473.
(n) Deletion of the UK National Variant for definitions of Fire-resistant, Fire Proof and Standard Flame,
these definitions now being contained in JAR–1.
(p) A paragraph into the Foreword concerning the additional equipment that may be required by an importing
country for operational purposes.
(r) References to auxiliary power units have not been included in Sub-part E, as a separate sub-Section dealing
specifically with APU's is in the course of preparation.
Owing to the number of amendments that have been introduced into Sub-parts C, D and E of Section 1 and
Sub-part E of Section 2, it was found to be impossible to maintain the present page numbering, which, in any
case as a result of past changes, is now somewhat complicated. The page numbering of these sub-parts has
therefore been consolidated in this change.
The purpose of this amendment is to take into account the publication of FAA Amendments Nos. 41, 42 and 43
in the Basic Code and to introduce into JAR—25:–
Section 1
Sub–part B
(a) UK National Variants for JAR 25.105(c)(i), JAR 25.107(d), JAR 25.109(a), JAR 25.113 and JAR 25X133,
together with amendments to UK National Variants for JAR 25.125(a)(12) and JAR 25X116(b)(iv) and (v).
Change 5 P—2
JAR—25
(b) French National Variants for JAR 25X131, JAR 25X133 and JAR 25X135.
(c) JAR 25.145(c) has been deleted since the effective difference from FAR 25.145(c) is purely editorial.
(d) JAR 25.149(e) for the purpose of including a cross-reference to ACJ material.
Sub-part C
(a) Editorial renumbering of the paragraphs in JAR 25.351(b) and a French National Variant for
JAR 25.351(b)(2).
(b) Editorial clarification of JAR 25.473(e).
(c) Editorial clarification of JAR 25.479(c)(4).
Sub-part D
Sub-part E
(a) JAR 25.903(d)(1) for the purpose of including a cross-reference to ACJ material.
(b) Cross-references in JAR 25.1027 to ACJ's 25.1027 and 25.1027(b).
(c) The deletion of the reference to auxiliary power units in JAR 25.1195.
(d) A French National Variant for JAR 25.1197(a).
Sub-part F
(a) The renumbering of JAR 25X1326 as JAR 25X1328 as a result of the introduction of FAR 25.1326.
(b) The renumbering of JAR 25.1435(a) (7), (8) and (9) as (9), (10) and (11) as a result of the introduction
of FAR 25.1435 (a) (7) and (8).
(c) Miscellaneous amendments to JAR 25X1436, Pneumatic Systems–High Pressure.
(d) Detailed wording for JAR 25.1457, Cockpit Voice Recorders.
(e) Detailed wording for JAR 25.1459, Flight Recorders.
Sub-part G
Section 2
Sub-part B
(e) ACJ 25.201(c)(3) has been deleted and a new ACJ 25.201(d) added.
Sub-part D
(d) The deletion of paragraph 3.3 ACJ 25X899 and renumbering of subsequent paragraphs.
Sub-part E
Sub-part F
(h) A new ACJ 25.1438, Pressurisation and Low Pressure Pneumatic Systems.
(i) The deletion of paragraph 5 of ACJ 25.1447(c)(1), paragraph 6 being renumbered accordingly.
Sub-part G
The purpose of this amendment is to take into account the publication of FAA Amendment No. 44 in the
Basic Code and to introduce into JAR–25:–
Section 1
Sub-part B
(a) The deletion of paragraph (c) of JAR 25X20 and renumbering of paragraph (d) to (c), and addition of
an Italian National Variant to paragraph (c).
(b) The deletion of the UK National Variant to JAR 25.105(c) and the addition of French and Italian
National Variants for sub-paragraph (c) (1).
Change 6 P–4
JAR–25
(c) The transfer of the United Kingdom National Variant to JAR 25.107(d) to Section 2, as a United Kingdom
ACJ to JAR 25.107(d).
(d) JAR 25.111(b) for the purpose of cross-referring to an ACJ 25.111(b), arising from NPA 25B-52.
(e) An additional paragraph JAR 25.113(a)(3), together with French and Italian National Variants for that
paragraph.
(f) An additional paragraph JAR 25.113(b)(3), together with French and Italian National Variants for that
paragraph.
(g) An amendment to JAR 25.119(b), arising from NPA 25B-53, and deletion of the cross-reference to
ACJ 25.119.
(i) A new paragraph JAR 25X132, together with French and Italian National Variants.
(n) The deletion of JAR 25.145(c), since the text is identical to the Basic Code text.
(q) The transfer of the United Kingdom National Variant to JAR 25.251(f) to Section 2 as a United Kingdom
ACJ to JAR 25.251(e).
Sub-part C
(b) Paragraph JAR 25.361 (c)(2) and (3) for the purpose of stating that these paragraphs are not required
for JAR–25.
(c) A repositioning of the main heading 'Control Surface and System Loads' from above JAR 25.427 to
above JAR 25.393.
(e) The deletion of the United Kingdom National Variant to JAR 25.561(c).
(f) The deletion of the cross-reference to (G) ACJ 25.571(a) from JAR 25.571(a).
Sub-part D
(a) Paragraph JAR 25.609 for the purpose of referring to ACJ 25.609.
P–5 Change 6
JAR—25
(e) Paragraph JAR 25.803(e) for the purpose of referring to ACJ 25.803(e)(2).
Sub-part E
Sub-part F
(a) The deletion of the United Kingdom National Variant for JAR 25.1327(c).
(C) A correction in JAR 25.1401 to change '0.30 steradians' to read '0.03 steradians'.
(d) A deletion of the text of JAR 25.1443, which is identical to the Basic Code.
(e) To transfer the intent of the United Kingdom National Variant to JAR 25.1459(b) to Section 2 as a
United Kingdom ACJ to JAR 25.1459(b).
Sub-part G
(a) A new paragraph JAR 25.1533(b), together with French and Italian National Variants for that paragraph.
(c) An amendment to JAR 25X1588, together with Italian National Variants to that paragraph.
Section 2
Sub-part B
(a) A deletion of the cross-reference to (G) JAR 25.107(d) in the heading of ACJ 25.107(d).
(b) A new United Kingdom ACJ 25.107(d), the text having been transferred from (G) JAR 25.107(d)(United
Kingdom).
(f) The deletion of ACJ 25.125(b)(5), arising from NPA 25B-54, together with the renumbering of
subsequent paragraphs.
(j) A new United Kingdom ACJ 25.251(e), the text having been transferred from (G) JAR 25.251(f)
(United Kingdom).
Change 6 P–6
JAR—25
(k) A new paragraph to ACJ 25.253(a) (5), arising from NPA 25B-62.
Sub-part C
(a) A correction to the headings of pages 2–C–2, 2–C–3 and 2–C–-4, changing 'ACJ 25.301(d) (continued)’
to read 'ACJ 25.305(d) (continued)'.
Sub-part D
Sub-part E
Sub-part F
(b) A revision of ACJ No. 1 to JAR 25.1309, arising from NPA 25F-44.
(c) A revision of ACJ No. 6 to JAR 25.1309, arising from NPA 2SF-51.
(d) A correction to the heading of page 2–F–28–-1, 'ACJ 25.1451 (continued)' being amended to read
'ACJ 25.1453 (continued)'.
(e) A new United Kingdom ACJ 25.1459(b), based on the now deleted (G) JAR 25.1459(b) (United Kingdom).
Sub-part G
The purpose of this amendment is to take into account the publication of FAA Amendments Nos. 45, 46, 47
and 48 in the Basic Code and to introduce into JAR–25:–
P–7 Change 7
JAR—25
Section 1
Sub-part B
(b) Deletion of the CTC for JAR 25.21(e), arising from NPA 25B-77.
(d) The inclusion of FAR 25.111(e) to show that this paragraph is not required for JAR–25.
Sub-part BB
(a) The introduction of a new Sub-part BB, entitled 'Flight — Emergency Power or Thrust,' arising from
NPA's 25B-71, 25B-72 and 25B-73.
Sub-part C
(a) The inclusion of revised text for FAR 25.331(c) and the deletion of the JAR NOTE to 25.331 (c)(3)
which, in FAR Part 25, is now a reserved number.
(c) An amendment to JAR 25.345(c), the addition of a new paragraph JAR 25.345(d) and the renumbering
of the current paragraph (d) to read (e).
(d) A revision of (G) JAR 25.345(c), the addition of a new paragraph (G) JAR 25.345(d) and the
renumbering of the current paragraphs (d) and (e) to read (e) and (f).
(f) The inclusion of revised text for FAR 25.361(b) and (c).
(i) The inclusion of French and German National Variants for JAR 25.561 (b)(3).
Sub-part D
(e) Amendments to JAR 25.735 arising from FAR 25, Amendment 25–48.
(f) An amendment to JAR 25.772(a) arising from FAR 25, Amendment 25–47.
(h) The inclusion of the text of JAR 25.785(c), arising from NPA 25D-47.
Change 7 P—8
JAR—25
(j) The deletion of the United Kingdom National Variant for JAR 25.841(b)(5).
Subpart E
(a) A statement that FAR 25.901(d) is not required for JAR–25, the current JAR 25.901(d) being
renumbered to read (e).
(e) The inclusion of the text for JAR 25.1121(a) and (b), arising from NPA 25E-20.
(g) The inclusion of text for JAR 25.1143(f) and (g), together with a French and Italian National Variant
for JAR 25.1143(g).
(h) The inclusion of text for JAR 25.1145(c), arising from NPA 25E-57.
Subpart F
Subpart G
Subpart J
(a) The inclusion of a new Subpart J, entitled 'Gas Turbine Auxiliary Power Unit Installations'.
Section 2
Introduction
Subpart B
P—9 Change 8
JAR—25
(c) Revised text for ACJ 25.253(a)(3), arising from NPA 25B-80.
Subpart BB
(a) A new 'ACJ Subpart BB', arising from NPA's 25B-71, 25B-72 and 25B-73.
Subpart C
(a) Revised text for ACJ 25.571(a), arising from NPA 25C-81.
Subpart D
(b) ACJ 25.773(a) corrected to read ACJ 25.733(a) and repositioned accordingly.
Subpart E
(d) New ACJ 25.1121(a) and ACJ 25.1121(b), arising from NPA 25E-20 and NPA 25E-34.
Subpart G
Subpart J
(i) to take into account the publication of FAA Amendment Nos. 49, 50, 51, 52 and 53;
(ii) to introduce the complete text of Section 1 (with the exception of Subpart J which was published in
Change 7) and the Appendices to Section 1;
(iii) to incorporate the contents of the Errata for JAR—25, dated 24.11.80; and
Change 8 P—10
JAR—25
(iv) to introduce the following amendments to the text, as detailed in Amendment 81/1,hereby cancelled.
Section 1
A revision of the introductory page to take account of the introduction of the full text and to extend
paragraph 1.1 to show that requirements for reciprocating engined aeroplanes, seaplanes, skiplanes and
credit for standby power are not included in JAR—25.
Subpart B
(a) A cross-reference to ACJ material added to JAR 25.101, arising from NPA 25B-98.
(d) A cross-reference to ACJ material added to JAR 25.181, arising from NPA 25B-86.
(e) The inclusion of text for JAR 25.255, arising from NPA 25B-87.
Subpart BB
(b) A cross-reference to ACJ material added to JAR(BB) 25.101, arising from NPA 25B-98.
(f) A cross-reference to ACJ material added to JAR 25.181, arising from NPA 25B-86.
(g) The inclusion of text for JAR(BB) 25.255, arising from NPA 25B-87.
Subpart C
(a) Cross-references to ACJ material added to JAR 25.341(b) and (c), arising from NPA 25C-101; the deletion
of paragraph (d) and a UK National Variant added.
(b) A cross-reference to ACJ material added to JAR 25.351(b), arising from NPA 25C-101 and a UK National
Variant added.
(c) The title of JAR 25.361 and JAR 25.361(b) amended to take account of APU installations.
(d) The title of JAR 25.363 and JAR 25.363(a) amended to take account of APU installations.
Subpart D
(a) The text of JAR 25.607(a) amended to correct a printing error which occurred when the paragraph was
introduced into Change 7.
(c) A cross-reference to ACJ material added to JAR 25.723(a), arising from NPA 25C-102.
P—11 Change 8
JAR—25
(f) A cross-reference to ACJ material added to JAR 25.785(g), arising from NPA 25D-48.
(i) A statement that JAR 25.832 is not required at present. (This relates to cabin ozone concentration
introduced by Amendment 25—50).
(j) A cross-reference to ACJ material added to JAR 25.851(a), arising from NPA 25D-74.
Subpart E
(a) The cross-reference to ACJ material in JAR 25.903(d)(1) changed in accordance with NPA 25E-11.
(b) A cross-reference to ACJ material added to JAR 25.939(a), arising from NPA 25E-95.
Subpart F
(a) A cross-reference to ACJ material added to JAR 25.1303(c)(1) and to the French National Variant,
arising from NPA 25F-50.
Section 2
Subpart B
Subpart BB
Subpart C
(a) The amendment of paragraph 1 of ACJ 25.305(d), arising from NPA 25C-101.
(b) The introduction of ACJ's 25.341(b) and (c), arising from NPA 25C-101, together with UK National
Variants for JAR 25.341 (b)(c) and (d).
Change 8 P–12
JAR—25
(c) The introduction of ACJ 25.351 (b)(1), arising from NPA 25C-101, together with a UK National Variant.
Subpart D
(a) The amendment of ACJ 25.703 (b)(4), arising from NPA 25D-59.
(b) The introduction of ACJ 25.723 (a), arising from NPA 25C-102.
(c) Deletion of knob shapes for mixture and supercharger controls from ACJ 25.777 (g).
Subpart E
(a) The amendment of ACJ 25.903 (d) (1), arising from NPA 25E-11.
Subpart F
(a) The introduction of ACJ 25.1303 (c)(1), arising from NPA 25F-50.
Effective Dates:
Change 9 Amendment 81/2 31.12.81
Amendment 82/1 21.6.82
Amendment 82/2 25.8.82
The purpose of this Change, published on 30th November, 1982, is to introduce the amendments detailed in
Amendments 81/2, 82/1 and 82/2 (which are hereby cancelled) and to incorporate other miscellaneous changes
listed below.
Section 1
Subpart B
(d) An amendment to JAR 25.149(f), (g) and (h) and the introduction of paragraph (i), arising from NPA 25B-94.
(f) The deletion of two dashes in the United Kingdom National Variant for JAR 25.253(a)(2) to clarify the text.
Subpart BB
(c) The addition of JAR(BB) 25.111 (b)(5) arising from NPA 25B-97.
P—13 Change 9
JAR—25
(d) The deletion of JAR(BB) 25.111 (c)(5) arising from NPA 25B-97.
(g) An amendment to JAR (BB) 25.149(f), (g) and (h) and the introduction of paragraph (i), arising from NPA 25B-94.
(i) The deletion of two dashes in the United Kingdom National Variant for JAR(BB) 25.253(a)(2) to clarify the text.
Subpart D
(b) The addition of JAR 25.851 (a)(5) and (a)(6) arising from NPA 25D-74.
Subpart E
(a) The addition of JAR 25.952 (c) arising from NPA 25E-21.
Subpart F
Subpart G
Section 2
Subpart B
Subpart D
(a) The addition of ACJ 25.851 (a) arising from NPA 25D-74.
(b) The addition of ACJ 25.851 (a)(5) arising from NPA 25D-74.
(c) The addition of ACJ 25.851 (a)(6) arising from NPA 25D-74.
Subpart E
(a) Correction of a cross reference in UK/Netherlands National Variant in ACJ 25.903(d)(1), paragraph 2.2.
Change 9 P—14
JAR—25
Subpart F
(a) The transfer of ACJ 25.1303(c)(1) from page 2–F–1–1 to page 2–F–2.
Subpart G
(a) An amendment to ACJ 25.1585(a) (3) (c) arising from NPA 25E-25.
(b) The addition of ACJ 25.1585(a) (6) arising from NPA 25G-40.
The purpose of this Change, published on 19th December 1983, is to introduce the amendments detailed in
Amendments 83/1, 83/2 and 83/3 (which are hereby cancelled) and to incorporate other miscellaneous changes
listed below.
Foreword
A new paragraph added concerning performance requirements, arising from NPA 25B-104, and a new paragraph
added, cross-referring to JAR–1.
Section 1
[ Page 1–0–1 amended to show which FAR Part 25 Amendment JAR–25 agrees (ie Amendment No. 55). ]
Subpart B
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.101 (c) added to JAR 25.101(c)(2), arising from NPA 25B-109.
Cross-references to ACJ No. 1 to JAR 25.107(e)(4) and ACJ No. 2 to JAR 25.107(e)(4) added to JAR 25.107(e)(4),
arising from NPA 25B-109.
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.109(a) added to JAR 25.109(a), arising from NPA 25B-109.
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.109(a) added to (G) JAR 25.109(a) (United Kingdom), arising from NPA 25B-109.
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.111 added to JAR 25.111, arising from NPA 25B-109.
An amendment to JAR 25.111 (c)(4) arising from FAR Part 25 Amendment 25–54.
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.119(a) added to JAR 25.119(a), arising from NPA 25B-109.
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.121 added to JAR 25.121, arising from NPA 25B-103.
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.121(a)(1) added to JAR 25.121(a)(1), arising from NPA 25B-109.
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.121(b)(1) added to JAR 25.121(b)(1), arising from NPA 25B-109.
P–15 Change 11
JAR—25
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.123 added to JAR 25.123, arising from NPA 25B-109.
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.125(a)(6) added to JAR 25.125(a)(6), arising from NPA 25B-103.
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.125(a)(6)(ii) added to JAR 25.125(a)(6)(ii), arising from NPA 25B-109.
The UK National Variant for JAR 25.125(a)(9)(ii) withdrawn by NPA 25B, BB, D & G-140.
The UK National Variant for JAR 25X133 withdrawn by NPA 25B, BB, D & G-140.
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.149 added to JAR 25.149, arising from NPA 25B-109.
The UK National Variant for JAR 25.253(a) (2) withdrawn by NPA 25B, BB, D & G-140.
Subpart BB
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.101(c) added to JAR(BB) 25.101(c)(2), arising from NPA 25B-109.
Cross-references to ACJ No. 1 to JAR 25.107(e)(4) and ACJ No. 2 to JAR 25.107(e)(4) added to
JAR(BB) 25.107(e)(4), arising from NPA 25B-109.
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.109(a) added to JAR(BB) 25.109(a), arising from NPA 25B-109.
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.109(a) added to (G) JAR(BB) 25.109(a) (United Kingdom), arising from
NPA 25B-109.
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.111 added to JAR(BB) 25.111 arising from NPA 25B-109.
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.119(a) added to JAR(BB) 25.119(a), arising from NPA 25B-109.
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.121 added to JAR(BB) 25.121, arising from NPA 25B-109.
A cross-reference to ACJ(BB) 25.123 added to JAR(BB) 25.123, arising from NPA 25B-109.
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.125(a)(6) added to JAR(BB) 25.125(a)(6), arising from NPA 25B-109.
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.125(a)(6)(ii) added to JAR(BB) 25.125(a)(6)(ii), arising from NPA 25B-109.
The UK National Variant for JAR(BB) 25.125(a)(9)(ii) withdrawn by NPA 25B, BB, D & G-140.
The UK National Variant for JAR(BB) 25X133 withdrawn by NPA 25B, BB, D & G-140.
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.149 added to JAR(BB) 25.149, arising from NPA 25B-109.
The UK National Variant for JAR(BB) 25.253(a)(2) withdrawn by NPA 25B, BB, D & G-140.
Subpart C
Subpart D
The inclusion of a new paragraph JAR 25.858, arising from FAR Part 25 Amendment 25–54.
Subpart E
The inclusion of a new paragraph JAR 25.905(c), arising from FAR Part 25 Amendment 25–54.
Subpart F
A correction to JAR 25.1309(b)(1), where the word 'could' is changed to read 'would'.
Subpart G
An amended paragraph JAR 25.1529 arising from FAR Part 25 Amendment 25–54.
The UK National Variant for JAR 25.1553 withdrawn by NPA 25B, BB, D & G-140.
A cross-reference to ACJ 25.1587(b)(1) added to JAR 25.1587(b)(1), arising from NPA 25B-103.
The UK National Variant for JAR 25.1587(b) (4) withdrawn by NPA 25B, BB, D & G-140.
The UK National Variant for JAR 25X1588(c) withdrawn by NPA 25B, BB, D & G-140.
Appendix F
Appendix G
A statement that the Appendix G introduced into FAR Part 25 by Amendment 25–54 is not required for
JAR–25.
P—17 Change 10
JAR–25
Appendix H
The inclusion of a new Appendix H, arising from FAR Part 25 Amendment 25–54.
SECTION 2
Subpart B
An amendment to ACJ 25.107(e)(1)(iv), paragraph 2 and the addition of a cross-reference to JAR(BB) 25.107
(e)(1 )(iv), arising from NPA 25B-103.
An amendment to ACJ 25.107(e)(3) and the addition of a cross-reference to JAR(BB) 25.107(e)(3), arising
from NPA 25B-103.
The inclusion of a new ACJ No. 2 to JAR 25.107(e)(4), arising from NPA 25B-109.
The inclusion of a new ACJ 25.121, arising from NPA's 25B-103 and 25B-109.
The inclusion of a new ACJ 25.121 (a)(1), arising from NPA 25B-109.
The inclusion of a new ACJ 25.121 (b)(1), arising from NPA 25B-109.
The inclusion of a new ACJ 25.125(a)(6) (ii), arising from NPA 25B-109.
(G) ACJ 25X133 (United Kingdom) withdrawn by NPA 25B, BB, D & G-140.
(G) ACJ 25.251(e) (United Kingdom) withdrawn by NPA 25B, BB, D & G-140.
Subpart BB
Change 10 P–18
JAR–25
Subpart D
The transfer of ACJ 25.729(e) and (f) from page 2—D—2—1 to page 2—D—3.
(G) ACJ 25X799 (United Kingdom) withdrawn by NPA 25B, BB, D & G-140.
Subpart E
Deletion of Netherlands National Variant for paragraphs 2.2 and 4.5 in ACJ No. 2 to JAR 25.903(d)(1).
Subpart F
Deletion of Netherlands National Variant to paragraph 2.9.2(iii) of ACJ No. 1 to JAR 25.1309.
The addition of a new paragraph 5 to ACJ No. 1 to JAR 25.1309, arising from NPA 25F-122.
A correction in the positioning of ACJ 25.1435(a)(4) so that it appears after Table 4 of ACJ 25.1435(a)(1).
Subpart G
The purpose of this Change, published on 17th March 1986, is to introduce the amendments detailed in Orange
Paper Amendments 84/1, 84/2, 84/3, 85/1 and 85/2 (which are hereby cancelled) and to incorporate other
miscellaneous revisions also listed below.
JAR—25 is based on Part 25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations up to and including Amendment No. 55
(Amendment No. 56 was not adopted for JAR).
Contents
Page C–15 amended to delete reference to Section 3 because there is no such section in JAR–25. Also amended
to delete reference to Section 4 because JAR–25 (as from Change 8) has contained the text of the basic code
(FAR Part 25) where it is accepted for JAR.
Foreword
Page F–1 amended to show deletion in original paragraph 8 (now 7) removing the statement that an amendment
to the Basic Code is automatically accepted for JAR–25, because this is not now correct. Revised sentence added.
Introduction of a new paragraph 11, explaining the principle of Orange Paper Amendments.
SECTION 1
Page 1–0–1
Subpart B
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR 25X20(c) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Amendment to JAR 25.103, introducing revised text, arising from NPA 25B-.108.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR 25.105(c) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of UK National Variant for JAR 25.107(g) by NPA 25B, BB, F, G-169.
Correction to the underlining in the title of JAR 25.111 and to the cross-reference in JAR 25.111(a)(1).
Deletion of JAR 25.111 (c)(2)(ii), (c)(3)(ii), (c)(4)(ii) and withdrawal of French National Variants to these
paragraphs, arising from NPA 25B-145.
Amendment to JAR 25.111(c)(4), inserting a word to clarify text, arising from NPA 25B-144.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR 25.113(a)(3) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR 25.113(b)(3) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of UK National Variant for JAR 25X116 by NPA 25B, BB, F, G-169.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR 25.125 by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of UK National Variant for JAR 25.125(a)(9) by NPA 25B, BB, F, G-169.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR 25X131 by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR 25X132 by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR 25X135 by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Amendments to JAR 25.143(c) and the table, revising the text and forces, arising from NPA 25B-124.
Change 11 P—20
JAR–25
Withdrawal of French National Variant for JAR 25.143(f)(2) by NPA 25B, C, D, E, F-147.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR 25.149(f) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR 25.149(g) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR 25.149(i) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Amendment to JAR 25.201, introducing revised text, arising from NPA 25B-108.
Amendment to JAR 25.207(a), introducing revised text, arising from NPA 25B-108.
Amendment to JAR 25.207(c), introducing revised text, arising from NPA 25B-108.
Withdrawal of French National Variant for JAR 25.253(a)(6) by NPA 25B, C, D, E, F-147.
Subpart BB
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR(BB) 25X20 by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR(BB) 25-101(l) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR(BB) 25.101(m) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Amendment to JAR (BB) 25.103, introducing revised text, arising from NPA 25B-108.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR(BB) 25.105(c) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of UK National Variant for JAR(BB) 25.107(g) by NPA 25B, BB, F, G-169.
Deletion of JAR(BB) 25.111(a)(4)(ii), (a)(5)(ii) and (a)(6)(ii) arising from NPA 25B-145.
Amendment to JAR (BB) 25.111(a)(6), inserting a word to clarify the text, arising from NPA 25B-144.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR(BB) 25.111(b)(4) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR(BB) 25.113(a)(3) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR(BB) 25.113(b)(3) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of UK National Variant for JAR(BB) 25X116 by NPA 25B, BB, F, G-169.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR(BB) 25.119(b) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR(BB) 25.121(e) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR(BB) 25.125 by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of UK National Variant for JAR(BB) 25.125(a)(9) by NPA 25B, BB, F, G-169.
P–21 Change 11
JAR–25
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR(BB) 25X131 by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR(BB) 25X132 by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR(BB) 25X135 by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Amendments to JAR(BB) 25.143(c) and the table, revising text and forces, arising from NPA 25B-124.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR(BB) 25.149(c)(1) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR(BB) 25.149(e)(2) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR(BB) 25.149(f) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR(BB) 25.149(g) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR(BB) 25.149(i) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Amendment to JAR(BB) 25.201, introducing revised text, arising from NPA 25B-108.
Amendment to JAR(BB) 25.207(a), introducing revised text, arising from NPA 25B-108.
Amendment to JAR(BB) 25.207(c), introducing revised text, arising from NPA 25B-108.
Subpart C
Amendment to JAR 25.345(c)(1), introducing revised load factor, arising from NPA 25C-133.
Amendment to French National Variant for JAR 25X519 to make it applicable to JAR 25X519(a) only, arising
from NPA 25B, C, D, E, F-147.
Deletion of JAR 25.561(d) (and repositioning it as new JAR 25.963(d)) arising from NPA 25D-70.
Subpart D
Amendment to JAR 25.677(a), deleting the underlined words, arising from NPA 25D-88.
Correction to the shoulder heading at the head of the left hand column on page 1–D–9.
Amendment to JAR 25.787(a), introducing revised text, arising from NPA 25D-70.
Withdrawal of French National Variant for JAR 25.851(a)(2) by NPA 25B, C, D, E, F-147.
Withdrawal of French National Variant for JAR 25.851(b)(3) by NPA 25B, C, D, E, F-147.
Change 11 P–22
JAR–25
Subpart E
Inclusion of new sub-paragraph JAR 25.963(d) and renumbering of original sub-paragraph (d) as (e), arising from
NPA 25D-70.
Correction to JAR 25.1127, deleting the three sub-paragraphs and inserting ‘Not Required for JAR–25'.
Inclusion of new French National Variant for JAR 25.1143(f) arising from NPA 25E-148.
Inclusion of new French National Variant for JAR 25.1143(g) arising from NPA 25E-148.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR 25.1143(g) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of French National Variant for JAR 25.1197(a) by NPA 25B, C, D, E, F-147.
Subpart F
Withdrawal of UK National Variant for JAR 25.1303(b) (2) by NPA 25B, BB, F, G-169.
Amendment to JAR 25.1303(c)(1) and French National Variant to clarify the text, arising from NPA 25F-150.
Inclusion of new French National Variant for JAR 25.1305(c)(9) arising from NPA 25E-148.
Inclusion of new French National Variant for JAR 25.1305(c)(10) arising from NPA 25E-148.
Amendment to JAR 25.1305(d)(1), adding a cross-reference to ACJ 25.1305(d)(1), arising from NPA 25F-139.
Amendment to JAR 25.1401(b), revising angle of coverage, arising from NPA 25F-146.
Amendment to JAR 25.1401(d), adding another colour, arising from NPA 25F-146.
Withdrawal of German and Netherlands National Variant for JAR 25.1401(d) by NPA 25F-146.
Amendment to JAR 25.1401(f), adding revised angle and intensity, arising from NPA 25F-146.
Withdrawal of German and Netherlands National Variant for JAR 25.1401(f) by NPA 25F-146.
Amendment to JAR 25.1435(a)(1)(ii),deleting the cross-reference to the French National Variant, arising from
NPA 25B, C, D, E, F-147.
Withdrawal of French National Variant for JAR 25.1435(a)(10) by NPA 25B, C, D, E, F-147.
Amendment to JAR 25X1436(b)(1)(ii),deleting the cross-reference to the French National Variant, arising from
NPA 25B, C, D, E, F-147.
Withdrawal of French National Variant for JAR 25X1436(b)(7) by NPA 25B, C, D, E, F-147.
P–23 Change 11
JAR–25
Subpart G
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR 25.1533(b) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Amendment to JAR 25.1585(c), adding a cross-reference to ACJ 25.1585(c), arising from NPA 25B-92.
Withdrawal of UK National Variant for JAR 25.1587(b)(7) by NPA 25B, BB, F, G-169.
Withdrawal of UK National Variant for JAR 25.1587(b)(8) by NPA 25B, BB, F, G-169.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR 25X1588(a) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR 25X1588(b) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR 25X1588(d) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of Italian National Variant for JAR 25X1588(e) by NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Withdrawal of UK National Variant for JAR 25X1588(f) by NPA 25B, BB, F, G-169.
Subpart J
Withdrawal of French National Variant for JAR 25A1197 by NPA 25B, C, D, E, F-147.
SECTION 2
Page 2–0–1
Subpart B
Amendment to ACJ 25.101(c) paragraph 1.1.3(d), introducing revised text, arising from NPA 25B-135.
Withdrawal of UK National Variant for ACJ 25X116 by NPA 25B, BB, F, G-169.
Amendment to ACJ 25.143(c), introducing revised text, arising from NPA 25B-124.
Amendment to ACJ 25.201(d), introducing new paragraph 2, arising from NPA 25B-108.
Amendment to ACJ 25.203, introducing revised text, arising from NPA 25B-108.
Change 11 P–24
JAR–25
Amendment to ACJ 25.207(b) paragraph 1, introducing revised text, arising from NPA 25B-108.
Amendment to ACJ 25.251(e), introducing revised text, arising from NPA 25B-92.
Subpart C
Editorial correction (repositioning of brackets) in (G) ACJ 25.341(b) and (c) (United Kingdom)
Correction to (G) ACJ 25.351(b) (United Kingdom), so that third line of heading reads 'See JAR 25.351(b)'.
Deletion of ACJ 25.561(d) (and repositioning it as new ACJ 25.963(d)) arising from NPA 25D-70.
Deletion of (G) ACJ 25.561(d) (United Kingdom) (and repositioning it as new (G) ACJ 25.963(d) (United
Kingdom)) arising from NPA 25D-70.
Subpart D
Subpart E
Inclusion of new (G) ACJ 25.963(d)(United Kingdom), arising from NPA 25D-70.
Amendment to ACJ 25.1143(g), deleting the cross-references to the French and Italian National Variants
in the heading, arising from NPA 25E-148 and NPA 25B, BB, E, G-175.
Subpart F
Amendment to ACJ 25.1303(b)(5), introducing new text, arising from NPA 25F-123, and renumbering of
subsequent paragraphs.
Addition of box round the UK National Variant for paragraph 3 of ACJ 25.1329.
Addition of box round the UK National Variant for paragraph 5.5.2(c) of ACJ 25.1329.
Addition of box round the UK National Variant for paragraph 8 of ACJ 25.1329.
Addition of box round the French National Variant for ACJ 25.1333(b) and editorial corrections
(repositioning of brackets).
Withdrawal of French National Variant for ACJ 25.1435(a)(1) and Table 4 by NPA 25B, C, D, E, F-147.
P–25 Change 11
JAR–25
Withdrawal of French National Variant for ACJ 25.1436(b)(1) by NPA 25B, C, D, E, F-147.
Addition of box round the French National Variant for ACJ 25.1453.
Addition of box round the UK National Variant for ACJ 25.1459(b) and editorial correction (repositioning
of brackets).
Withdrawal of UK National Variant for ACJ 25.1587(b)(8) by NPA 25B, BB, F, G-169.
Change 11 P–26
JAR–25
[ SECTION 1 — REQUIREMENTS ]
1 GENERAL
[ 1.1 JAR–25 is based on Part 25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations and is termed 'Joint Airworthiness
Requirements for Large Aeroplanes' or 'JAR–25'. JAR–25 does not contain requirements for reciprocating
engined aeroplanes, seaplanes, skiplanes or credit for standby power (e.g. rockets). ]
1.2 There are, however, a number of areas in which variations and additions to FAR Part 25 have been
considered necessary in order to reach agreement to a code acceptable to the participating countries, and these
differences (Complementary Technical Conditions) are indicated in this Section 1 by underlining. Where an
[ FAR Part 25 regulation is not required for JAR–25, this is so stated. (See paragraph 2.3.) ]
2 PRESENTATION
2.1 The requirements of JAR–25 are presented in two columns on loose pages, each page being identified
by the date of issue or the Change number under which it is amended or reissued.
2.2 In general, the JAR paragraphs carry the same number as the corresponding FAR Section. In cases
where new JAR material is introduced on a subject already dealt with in FAR, this is included within the
numbering system of the relevant FAR Section. In cases where new JAR material is introduced, and there is no
corresponding section in FAR, a number is chosen for it which attempts to place the new material in the right
context within the FAR numbering system; in such cases, the number is prefaced by the letter 'X' (e.g. JAR 25X799)
to indicate that it is a European number rather than one corresponding to an FAR number.
2.3 Explanatory notes not forming part of the JAR text appear in an italic typeface. These are used, for
[ example, to show where FAR text has not been accepted for JAR. Also, sub-headings are in italic typeface. ]
2.4 National Variants (those requirements stated to be applicable by individual countries) are prefaced by
a letter indicating the country which has stated the National Variant. National Variants are contained within
[ boxes and appear immediately below the paragraphs to which they relate and are printed in italic typeface. ]
2.5 New, amended and corrected text is enclosed within heavy brackets.
Subpart A – General
1–A–1 Change 8
JAR–25 SECTION 1
Change 8 1–A–2
SECTION 1 JAR–25
Subpart B – Flight
(1) Automatic landings. Wind (take-off and landing tests). As low as possible but
not to exceed approx-
(2) Approaches and landings with decision imately 12% Vs1 or
heights of less than 200 ft.
10 knots, whichever is
(3) Operations on unprepared runway lower, along the run-
surfaces. way surface.
(1) The highest weight selected by the JAR 25.31 Removable ballast
applicant for the particular conditions; or
Removable ballast may be used in showing
(2) The highest weight at which compliance compliance with the flight requirements of this Sub-
with each applicable structural loading and flight part.
requirement is shown.
(b) Minimum weight. The minimum weight JAR 25.23 Propeller speed and pitch limits
(the lowest weight at which compliance with each
applicable requirement of this JAR–25 is shown) (a) The propeller speed and pitch must be
must be established so that it is not less than – limited to values that will ensure -
(1) The lowest weight selected by the (1) Safe operation under normal oper-
applicant; ating conditions; and
(2) The design minimum weight (the (2) Compliance with the performance
lowest weight at which compliance with each requirements in JAR 25.101 to 25.125 for turbo-
structural loading condition of this JAR–25 is propeller powered aeroplanes.
shown); or
(b) There must be a propeller speed limiting
(3) The lowest weight at which compliance means at the governor. It must limit the maximum
with each applicable flight requirement is shown. possible governed engine speed to a value not exceed-
ing the maximum allowable rpm.
JAR 25.27 Centre of gravity limits (c) The low pitch blade stop, or other means
used to limit the low pitch position of the propeller
The extreme forward and the extreme aft centre blades, must be set so that the engine speed does not
of gravity limitations must be established for each exceed 103% of the maximum allowable engine rpm
practicably separable operating condition. No such with the propeller blades at the low pitch limit and
limit may lie beyond - governor inoperative.
(c) The extremes within which compliance with JAR 25.101 General (See ACJ 25.101)
each applicable flight requirement is shown.
(a) Unless otherwise prescribed, aeroplanes
must meet the applicable performance requirements
JAR 25.29 Empty weight and corresponding of this Subpart for ambient atmospheric conditions
centre of gravity and still air.
(a) The empty weight and corresponding centre (b) The performance, as affected by engine
of gravity must be determined by weighing the aero- power or thrust, must be based on the following
plane with - relative humidities:
(c) The performance must correspond to the (2) Propeller pitch controls (if applicable)
propulsive thrust available under the particular in the position necessary for compliance with sub-
ambient atmospheric conditions, the particular flight paragraph (1) of this paragraph and the aeroplane
condition, and the relative humidity specified in in other respects (such as flaps and landing gear)
sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph. The available in the condition existing in the test in which VS is
propulsive thrust must correspond to engine power or being used;
thrust, not exceeding the approved power or thrust,
less – (3) The weight used when VS is being
used as a factor to determine compliance with a
(1) Installation losses; and required performance standard; and
(2) The power or equivalent thrust (4) The most unfavourable centre of
absorbed by the accessories and services appropriate gravity allowable; and
to the particular ambient atmospheric conditions
and the particular flight condition. (See ACJ 25.101 [ (5) The aeroplane trimmed for straight
(c).) flight at a speed selected by the applicant, but not
less than 1.2 VS and not greater than 1.4 VS.
(d) Unless otherwise prescribed, the applicant
must select the take-off, en-route, approach, and (b) The stall speed VS is the greater of —
landing configuration for the aeroplane.
(1) The minimum calibrated airspeed
(e) The aeroplane configurations may vary with obtained when the aeroplane is stalled (or the
weight, altitude, and temperature, to the extent they minimum steady flight speed at which the aeroplane
are compatible with the operating procedures required is controllable with the longitudinal control on its
by sub-paragraph (f) of this paragraph. stop) as determined when the manoeuvre prescribed
in JAR 25.201 and 25.203 is carried out with an
(f) Unless otherwise prescribed, in determining entry rate not exceeding 1 knot per second (see
the accelerate-stop distances, take-off flight paths, ACJ 25.103(b)(l)); and
take-off distances, and landing distances, changes in
the aeroplane's configuration, speed, power, and (2) A calibrated airspeed equal to 94% of
thrust, must be made in accordance with procedures the one-g stall speed, VS1g, determined in the same
established by the applicant for operation in service. conditions.
(g) Procedures for the execution of balked (c) The one-g stall speed, Vs1g, is the minimum
landings and missed approaches associated with the calibrated airspeed at which the aeroplane can
conditions prescribed in JAR 25.119 and 25.121(d) develop a lift force (normal to the flight path)
must be established. equal to its weight, whilst at an angle of attack not
greater than that at which the stall is identified.
(h) The procedures established under sub- (See ACJ 25.103(c).) ]
paragraphs (f) and (g) of this paragraph must –
(a) The stall speed VS must be determined with — (c) The take-off data must be based on a
(1) Zero thrust at the stall speed, or, if the smooth, dry, hard-surfaced runway, except where
resultant thrust has no appreciable effect on the otherwise specified in this Subpart.
stall speed, with engines idling and throttles closed; ]
1—B—3—2 Change 11
JAR–25 SECTION 1
(d) The take-off data must include, within the (2) VR plus the speed increment attained
established operational limits of the aeroplane, the (in accordance with JAR 25.111(c) (2)) before
following operational correction factors: reaching a height of 35 ft above the take-off
surface.
(1) Not more than 50% of nominal wind
components along the take-off path opposite to (d) VMU is the calibrated airspeed at and above
the direction of take-off, and not less than 150% which the aeroplane can safely lift off the ground,
of nominal wind components along the take-off and continue the take-off. VMU speeds must be
path in the direction of take-off. selected by the applicant throughout the range of
thrust-to-weight ratios to be certificated. These
(2) Effective runway gradients. speeds may be established from free air data if these
data are verified by ground take-off tests. (See
ACJ 25.107 (d) and (G) ACJ 25.107 (d) (United
JAR 25.107 Take-off speeds Kingdom).)
(a) V1 must be established in relation to VEF as (e) VR, in terms of calibrated air speed, must be
follows: selected in accordance with the conditions of sub-
paragraphs (1) to (4) of this paragraph:
(1) VEF is the calibrated airspeed at which
the critical engine is assumed to fail. VEF must be (1) VR may not be less than:—
selected by the applicant, but may not be less than
VMCG determined under JAR 25 .149 (e). (i) V1 ;
(ii) 105% of VMC;
(2) V1, in terms of calibrated airspeed, is
the take-off decision speed selected by the (iii) The speed (determined in accord-
applicant; however, V1 may not be less than VEF ance with JAR 25.111(c) (2)) that allows
plus the speed gained with the critical engine reaching V2 before reaching a height of
inoperative during the time interval between the 35 ft above the take-off surface; or
instant at which the critical engine is failed, and
the instant at which the pilot recognises and reacts (iv) A speed that, if the aeroplane is
to the engine failure, as indicated by the pilot's rotated at its maximum practicable rate, will
application of the first retarding means during result in a VLOF of not less than 110% of
accelerate-stop tests. VMU in the all-engines-operating condition
and not less than 105% of VMU determined
(b) V2min, in terms of calibrated airspeed, may at the thrust-to-weight ratio corresponding
not be less than – to the one-engine-inoperative condition,
except that in the particular case that lift-
(1) 1.2VS for— off is limited by the geometry of the aero-
(i) Two-engined and three-engined
turbo-propeller powered aeroplanes; and plane, or by elevator power, the above
margins may be reduced to 108% in the all-
(ii) Turbo-jet powered aeroplanes engines-operating case and 104% in the one-
without provisions for obtaining a signficant engine-inoperative condition. (See ACJ
reduction in the one-engine-inoperative 25.107 (e) (1) (iv).)
power-on stalling speed;
(2) For any given set of conditions (such
(2) l.l5 VS for— as weight, configuration, and temperature), a
(i) Turbo-propeller powered aero- single value of VR, obtained in accordance with
planes with more than three engines; and this paragraph, must be used to show compliance
with both the one-engine-inoperative and the all-
(ii) Turbo-jet powered aeroplanes engines-operating take-off provisions.
with provisions for obtaining a significant
reduction in the one-engine-inoperative
(3) It must be shown that the one-engine-
power-on stalling speed; and inoperative take-off distance, using a rotation
speed of 5 knots less than VR established in
(3) 1.10 times VMC established under
accordance with sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of this
JAR 25.149. paragraph, does not exceed the corresponding one-
engine-inoperative take-off distance using the
(c) V2, in terms of calibrated airspeed, must be
established VR. The take-off distances must be
selected by the applicant to provide at least the determined in accordance with JAR 25.113(a)(1).
gradient of climb required by JAR 25.121 (b) but (See ACJ 25.107 (e) (3).)
may not be less than –
(1) V2min;and (4) Reasonably expected variations in
service from the established take-off procedures
for the operation of the aeroplane (such as over-
rotation of the aeroplane and out-of-trim (ii) Accelerate the aeroplane from VEF
conditions) may not result in unsafe flight to V1 for a dry runway and continue the
characteristics or in marked increases in the acceleration for 2.0 seconds after V1 for a dry
scheduled take-off distance established in accord- runway is reached, assuming the critical engine
ance with JAR 25.113(a). (See ACJ No. 1 to fails at VEF; and
JAR 25.107(e)(4) and ACJ No. 2 to JAR 25.107
(e)(4).) (iii) Come to a full stop on a dry hard
runway from the point reached at the end of
(f) VLOF is the calibrated airspeed at which the the acceleration period prescribed in sub-
aeroplane first becomes airborne. paragraph(a) (1) (ii), assuming that the pilot does
not apply any means of retarding the aeroplane
until that point is reached and that the critical
engine is still inoperative.
JAR 25.109 Accelerate-stop distance (2) The sum of the distances necessary to –
(a) The accelerate-stop distance (see ACJ 25.109 (i) Accelerate the aeroplane from a
(a)) is the greater of the following distances: standing start to VEF corresponding to V1 for
a wet runway with all engines operating;
(1) The sum of the distances necessary
to – (ii) Accelerate the aeroplane from VEF
(i) Accelerate the aeroplane from a to V1 for a wet runway and continue the
standing start to VEF with all engines acceleration for 2.0 seconds after V1 for a wet
operating; runway is reached, assuming the critical engine
fails at VEF; and
(ii) Accelerate the aeroplane from
VEF to V1 and continue the acceleration for (iii) Come to a full stop on the Reference
2.0 seconds after V1 is reached, assuming Wet Hard Surface from the point reached at the
the critical engine fails at VEF; and end of the acceleration period prescribed in
sub-paragraph (a) (2) (ii), assuming that the
(iii) Come to a full stop from the pilot does not apply any means of retarding
point reached at the end of the acceleration the aeroplane until that point is reached and
period prescribed in sub-paragraph (a) (1) (ii) that the critical engine is still inoperative.
of this paragraph, assuming that the pilot
does not apply any means of retarding the (3) The sum of the distances necessary to —
aeroplane until that point is reached and
that the critical engine is still inoperative. (i) Accelerate the aeroplane from a
standing start to V1 for a dry runway and con-
(2) The sum of the distances necessary tinue the acceleration for 2.0 seconds after V1
to – for a dry runway is reached with all engines
operating; and
(i) Accelerate the aeroplane from a
standing start to V1 and continue the (ii) Come to a full stop on a dry hard
acceleration for 2.0 seconds after V1 is runway from the point reached at the end of
reached with all engines operating; and the acceleration period prescribed in sub-
paragraph (a) (3) (i), assuming that the pilot
(ii) Come to a full stop from the does not apply any means of retarding the
point reached at the end of the acceleration aeroplane until that point is reached and that all
period prescribed in sub-paragraph (a) (2) (i) engines are still operating.
of this paragraph, assuming that the pilot
does not apply any means of retarding the (4) The sum of the distances necessary to —
aeroplane until that point is reached and
that all engines are still operating. (i) Accelerate the aeroplane from a
standing start to V1 for a wet runway and con-
tinue the acceleration for 2.0 seconds after V1
(G) (a) (United Kingdom) The accelerate-stop for a wet runway is reached with all engines
distance (see ACJ 25.109(a)) is the greatest of the operating; and
following distances:
(ii) Come to a full stop on the Reference
(1) The sum of the distances necessary to — Wet Hard Surface from the point reached at the
(i) Accelerate the aeroplane from a end of the acceleration period prescribed in sub-
standing start to VEF corresponding to V1 for paragraph (a) (4) (i), assuming that the pilot does
a dry runway will all engines operating; not apply any means of retarding the aeroplane
until that point is reached and that all engines (2) The aeroplane must reach V2 before
are still operating. it is 35 ft above the take-off surface and must
continue at a speed as close as practical to, but not
2
[ less than V2 until it is 400 ft above the take-off
(b) Means other than wheel brakes may be used surface; ]
to determine the accelerate-stop distance if that
means – (3) At each point along the take-off path,
2
[ starting at the point at which the aeroplane reaches
(1) Is safe and reliable; 400 ft above the take-off surface, the available
gradient of climb may not be less than —
(2) Is used so that consistent results can
be expected under normal operating conditions; (i) 1.2% for two-engined aeroplanes;
and
(ii) 1.5% for three-engined aero-
(3) Is such that exceptional skill is not planes; and
required to control the aeroplane.
(iii) 1.7% for four-engined aero-
(c) The landing gear must remain extended planes, and ]
throughout the accelerate-stop distance.
2
[(4) Except for gear retraction and
(d) If the accelerate-stop distance includes a automatic propeller feathering, the aeroplane ]
stopway with surface characteristics substantially configuration may not be changed, and no change
different from those of a smooth hard-surfaced run- in power or thrust that requires action by the pilot
way, the take-off data must include operational [ may be made, until the aeroplane is 400 ft above
correction factors for the accelerate-stop distance. the take-off surface. ]
The correction factors must account for the particular
surface characteristics of the stopway and the vari-
ations in these characterics with seasonal weather
conditions (such as temperature, rain, snow, and ice)
within the established operational limits.
1
[JAR 25.111 Take-off path (See ACJ 25.111) ]
1
Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/2, Eff. 12.7.84)
2
Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/3, Eff. 30.11.84) 1–B–6
SECTION 1 JAR–25
aeroplane is 35 ft above the take-off surface, as (2) The horizontal distance along the
determined by a procedure consistent with take-off path from the start of the take-off to
JAR 25.111 (see ACJ 25.113 (a)(2));or the point at which the aeroplane is 15 ft above
the take-off surface, achieved in a manner con-
(3) For operations on runways covered sistent with the achievement of V2 before reaching
with a significant depth of precipitation, where 35 ft above the take-off surface, determined
approval for such operations is sought by the under JAR 25.111 corresponding to V1
applicant, the distance prescribed in sub-paragraph appropriate to a wet runway;
(a) (2) of this paragraph, but assuming the ground
acceleration of the aeroplane to take place in (3) 115% of the horizontal distance
precipitation having a depth equal to 150% of the along the take-off path, with all engines operating
nominal average depth. (See ACJ 25.113 (a) (3).) from the start of the take-off to the point at
which the aeroplane is 35 ft above the take-off
surface, as determined by a procedure which is
[ (F) (3) (France) Not required for French
consistent with JAR 25.111 and such that V3
certification. ] (see (G) JAR 25.107 (g) Steady initial climb
speed (United Kingdom)) is achieved before
(b) If the take-off distance includes a clearway, reaching 400 ft above the take-off surface.
the take-off run is the greater of – (See ACJ 25.113 (a) (2)), and
(1) The horizontal distance along the take- (4) For operations on runways covered
off path from the start of the take-off to a point with a significant depth of precipitation, where
equidistant between the point at which VLOF is approval for such operations is sought by the
reached and the point at which the aeroplane is applicant, the distance prescribed in sub-para-
35 ft above the take-off surface, as determined graph (a) (3) of this paragraph, but assuming
under JAR 25.111; or the ground acceleration of the aeroplane to
take place in precipitation having a depth equal
(2) 115% of the horizontal distance along to 150% of the nominal average depth. (See
the take-off path, with all engines operating, from ACJ 25.113 (a) (3)..)
the start of the take-off to a point equidistant
1
[ between the point at which VLOF is reached and the (b) If the take-off distance includes a clear-
point at which the aeroplane is 35 ft above the take- way, the take-off run is the greatest of-
off surface, determined by a procedure consistent]
with JAR 25.111 (see ACJ 25.113 (a) (2)); or (1) The horizontal distance along the
take-off path from the start of the take-off to a
(3) For operation on runways covered point equidistant between the point at which
with a significant depth of precipitation, where VLOF is reached and the point at which the
approval for such operation is sought by the aeroplane is 35 ft above the take-off surface,
applicant, the distance prescribed in sub-paragraph determined under JAR 25.111 corresponding
(b) (2) of this paragraph, but assuming the ground to V1 appropriate to a dry runway;
acceleration of the aeroplane to take place in
precipitation having a depth equal to 150% of the (2) The horizontal distance along the
nominal average depth. (See ACJ 25.113 (a) (3).) take-off path from the start of the take-off to the
point at which VLOF is reached, determined
under JAR 25.111 corresponding to V1 appro-
[ (F) (3) (France) Not required for French priate to a wet runway, and
certification. ]
(3) 115% of the horizontal distance
along the take-off path, with all engines operating,
from the start of the take -off to a point equidistant
(G) JAR 25.113 Take-off distance and take-off between the point at which VLOF is reached and
run (United Kingdom) the point at which the aeroplane is 35 ft above the
take-off surface, as determined by a procedure
(a) Take-off distance is the greatest of – which is consistent with JAR 25.111 and such
that V3 (see) (G) JAR 25.107 (g) Steady initial
(1) The horizontal distance along the climb speed (United Kingdom)) is achieved before
take-off path from the start of the take-off to reaching 400 ft above the take-off surface.
the point at which the aeroplane is 35 ft above (See ACJ 25.113 (a) (2).)
the take-off surface, determined under JAR
25.111 corresponding to V1 appropriate to a (4) For operations on runways covered
dry runway; with a significant depth of precipitation, where
approval for such operations is sought by the
1
1–B–7 Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/1, Eff. 24.5.85)
2
Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/2, Eff. 18.11.85)
JAR–25 SECTION 1
(i) 1.15 VS for aeroplanes with four (c) Final take-off. In the en-route configuration
engines on which the application of power at the end of the take-off path determined in accord-
results in a significant reduction in stalling ance with JAR 25.111, the steady gradient of climb
speed; or may not be less than 1.2% for two-engined aeroplanes,
1.5% for three-engined aeroplanes, and 1.7% for four-
(ii) 1.2 VS for all other aeroplanes; engined aeroplanes, at not less than 1.25 Vs and
with –
(2) Not less than VMCL; and
(1) The critical engine inoperative and the
(3) Not more than the greater of 1.3 VS remaining engines at the available maximum
and VMCL. continuous power or thrust; and
(a) Take-off; landing gear extended. In the (d) Discontinued Approach. In a configuration
critical take-off configuration existing along the in which VS does not exceed 110% of the VS for the
flight path (between the points at which the aero- related all-engines-operating landing configuration,
plane reaches VLOF and at which the landing gear the steady gradient may not be less than 2.1% for
is fully retracted) and in the configuration used in two-engined aeroplanes, 2.4% for three engined
JAR 25.111 but without ground effect, the steady aeroplanes, and 2.7% for four-engined aeroplanes,
gradient of climb must be positive for two-engined with –
aeroplanes, and not less than 0.3% for three-engined (1) The critical engine inoperative the
aeroplanes or 0.5% for four-engined aeroplanes, at remaining engines at the available take-off power
VLOF and with – or thrust;
(1) The critical engine inoperative and the (2) The maximum landing weight; and
remaining engines at the power or thrust available (3) A climb speed established in connection
when retraction of the landing gear is begun in with normal landing procedures, but not exceeding
accordance with JAR 25.111 unless there is a 1.5 VS.
more critical power operating condition existing
later along the flight path but before the point at (G) (3) (United Kingdom) A climb speed
[ which the landing gear is fully retracted (see established in accordance with normal landing
ACJ 25.121(a)(l)); and ] procedures, but not exceeding 1.5 VS, and such
that the horizontal distance required to accelerate
(2) The weight equal to the weight existing to this peed from the speed at the decision height,
when retraction of the landing gear is begun while following the recommended discontinued
determined under JAR 25.111. approach procedure, does not exceed 10,000 ft.
(b) Take-of; landing gear retracted. In the
take-off configuration existing at the point of the (4) Landing gear retracted.
flight path at which the landing gear is fully retracted,
and in the configuration used in JAR 25.111 but
without ground effect, the steady gradient of climb [ JAR 25.123 En-route flight paths (See
may not be less than 2.4% for two-engined aeroplanes, ACJ 25.123) ]
2.7% for three-engined aeroplanes and 3.0% for four-
engined aeroplanes, at V2 and with – (a) For the en-route configuration, the flight
paths prescribed in sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of
(1) The critical engine inoperative, the this paragraph must be determined at each weight,
remaining engines at the take-off power or thrust altitude, and ambient temperature, within the
available at the time the landing gear is fully operating limits established for the aeroplane. The
retracted, determined under JAR 25.111, unless variation of weight along the flight path, accounting
there is a more critical power operating condition for the progressive consumption of fuel and oil by
existing later along the flight path but before the the operating engines, may be included in the com-
point where the aeroplane reaches a height of putation. The flight paths must to determined at any
[ 400 ft above the take-off surface (see ACJ 25.121 selected speed, with –
(b)(1)); and ]
(1) The most unfavourable center of
(2) The weight equal to the weight existing gravity;
when he aeroplane's landing gear is fully retracted,
determined under JAR 25.111. (2) The critical engines inoperative;
(3) The remaining engines at the available
maximum continuous power or thrust; and
(4) The means for controlling the engine- (iii) Means other than wheel brakes
cooling air supply in the position that provides may be used if that means –
adequate cooling in the hot-day condition. – Is safe and reliable;
– Is used so that consistent results can be
(b) The one-engine-inoperative net flight path expected in service; and
data must represent the actual climb performance – Is such that exceptional skill is not required
diminished by a gradient of climb of 1.1% for two- to control the aeroplane.
engined aeroplanes, 1.4% for three-engined aeroplanes,
and 1.6% for four-engined aeroplanes. (7) The landing distance data must include
correction factors for not more than 50% of the
(c) For three- or four-engined aeroplanes, the nominal wind components along the landing path
two-engine-inoperative net flight path data must opposite to the direction. of landing, and not less
represent the actual climb performance diminished than 150% of the nominal wind components along
by a gradient climb of 0.3% for three-engined aero- the landing path in the direction of landing.
planes and 0.5% for four-engined aeroplanes.
(8) If any device is used that depends on
the operation of any engine, and if the landing
JAR 25.125 Landing distance would be noticeably increased when a
landing is made with that engine inoperative, the
The landing distance must be determined in landing distance must be determined with that
accordance with sub-paragraphs (a) or (b). engine inoperative unless the use of compensating
means will result in a landing distance not more
(a) First Method. The horizontal distance than that with each engine operating.
necessary to land and to come to a complete stop
from a point 50 ft above the landing surface must be (9) The Landing Distance determined in
determined (for standard temperatures, at each accordance with sub-paragraph (a) is properly
weight, altitude and wind within the operational related to the operational circumstances only
limits established by the applicant for the aeroplane) when it is used in conjunction with operating rules
as follows:— having the intent of those given in FAR 121.195
and FAR 121.197.
(1) The aeroplane must be in the landing
configuration.
(G) (10) (United Kingdom) Target threshold
(2) A steady gliding approach, with a speeds with all engines operating (VAT 0) and with
calibrated airspeed of not less than 1.3 VS, must one engine inoperative (VAT) must be established
be maintained down to the 50 ft height. in accordance with JAR 25.125 (c) (2) (i) and
JAR 25.125 (c) (2)(ii). The approach speed main-
(3) Changes in configuration, power or tained down to the 50 ft height in accordance with
thrust, and speed, must be made in accordance JAR 25.125 (a) (2) when determining the landing
with the established procedures for service oper- distances must not be less than the greater of –
ation. (See ACJ 25.125 (a) (3).)
(2) Repeat sub-paragraph (1) except JAR 25.147 Directional and lateral control
initially extend the wing-flaps and then retract
them as rapidly as possible. (See ACJ 25.145 (a) Directional control; general. It must be
(b)(2).) possible, while holding the wings approximately
level, to safely make reasonably sudden changes in
(3) Repeat sub-paragraph (2) except heading in both directions. This must be shown at
with take-off power. 1.4 VS1 for heading changes up to 15˚ (except that
the heading change at which the rudder pedal force
(4) With power off, wing-flaps retracted, is 150 pounds or the rudder pedal reaches its stops,
and the aeroplane trimmed at 1.4 VS1, apply need not be exceeded), and with –
take-off power rapidly while maintaining the
same airspeed. (1) The critical engine inoperative and its
propeller in the minimum drag position;
(5) Repeat sub-paragraph (4) except
with wing-flaps extended. (2) The power required for level flight at
1.4 VS1, but not more than maximum continuous
(6) With power off, wing-flaps extended, power;
and the aeroplane trimmed at 1.4 VS1, obtain
and maintain air speeds between 1.1 VS1 and (3) The most unfavourable centre of
either 1.7 VS1, or VFE, whichever is lower. gravity;
(2) The landing gear extended; and (1) The two critical engines must be in-
operative with their propellers (if applicable)
(3) The critical combinations of landing in the minimum drag position;
weights and altitudes.
(2) The centre of gravity must be in the
If gated high-lift device control positions are most forward position; and
provided, retraction must be shown from any
position from the maximum landing position to the (3) The wing-flaps must be in the most
first gated position, between gated positions, and favourable climb position.
from the last gated position to the full retraction (c) Lateral control; one engine inoperative
position. In addition, the first gated control
position from the landing position must correspond (1) It must be possible to make 20˚
with the high-lift devices configuration used to banked turns with and against the inoperative
establish the go-around procedure from the landing engine, from steady flight at a speed equal to
configuration. Each gated control position must 1.4 VS1, with –
require a separate and distinct motion of the control (i) The critical inoperative, and its
to pass through the gated position and must have propeller (if applicable) in the minimum
features to prevent inadvertent movement of the drag position;
control through the gated position.
(ii) The remaining engines at maxi-
mum continuous power;
[ (d) During the climb after take-off with one
engine inoperative and landing gear retracted, it (iii) The most unfavourable centre
must be possible in conditions of moderate atmos- of gravity;
pheric turbulence, to manoeuvre the aeroplane in a
manner appropriate to the phase of flight without (iv) Landing gear both retracted
and extended;
encountering natural or artificial stall warning.
(See ACJ 25.145 (d).) ] (v) Wing-flaps in the most favour-
able climb position; and
(vi) Maximum take-off weight.
(2) With the critical engine inoperative, (5) The aeroplane in the most critical
roll response must allow normal manoeuvres. take-off configuration existing along the flight
Lateral control must be sufficient, at the speeds path after the aeroplane becomes airborne,
likely to be used with one engine inoperative for except with the landing gear retracted; and
climb, cruise, descent and landing approach, to
(6) The aeroplane airborne and the
provide a peak roll rate necessary for safety with-
ground effect negligible; and
out excessive control forces or travel. (See
ACJ 25.147 (c) (2).) (7) If applicable, the propeller of the
inoperative engine –
(d) Lateral control; aeroplanes with four or
more engines. Aeroplanes with four or more (i) Windmilling;
engines must be able to make 20˚ banked turns,
with and against the inoperative engines, from (ii) In the most probable position
for the specific design of the propeller
steady flight at a speed equal to 1.4 VS1, with control; or
maximum continuous power, and with the
aeroplane in the configuration prescribed by sub- (iii) Feathered, if the aeroplane has
paragraph (b) of this paragraph. an automatic feathering device acceptable
for showing compliance with the climb
(e) Lateral control; all engines operating. With requirements of JAR 25.121.
the engines operating, roll response must allow
normal manoeuvres (such as recovery from upsets (d) The rudder forces required to maintain
produced by gusts and the initiation of evasive control at VMC may not exceed 150 pounds nor
manoeuvres). There must be enough excess lateral may it be necessary to reduce power or thrust
control in sideslips (up to sideslip angles that might of the operative engines. During recovery, the
be required in normal operation), to allow a limited aeroplane may not assume any dangerous attitude
amount of manoeuvring and to correct for gusts. or require exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or
Lateral control must be enough at any speed up to strength to prevent a heading change of more than
20°.
VFC/MFC to provide a peak roll rate necessary for
safety, without excess control forces or travel.
(e) VMCG the minimum control speed on the
(See ACJ 25.147 (e).)
ground, is the calibrated airspeed during the take-off
[JAR 25.149 Minimum control speed (see run, at which, when the critical engine is suddenly
ACJ 25.149) ] made inoperative, it is possible to recover control
of the aeroplane with the use of primary aerodynamic
(a) In establishing the minimum control controls alone (without the use of nose-wheel
speeds required by this paragraph, the method steering) to enable the take -off to be safely continued
used to simulate critical engine failure must represent using normal piloting skill and rudder control forces
the most critical mode of powerplant failure with not exceeding 150 pounds. In the determination of
respect to controllability expected in service. VMCG, assuming that the path of the aeroplane
accelerating with all engines operating is along the
(b) VMC is the calibrated airspeed, at which, centreline of the runway, its path from the point at
when the critical engine is suddenly made inoperative, which the critical engine is made inoperative to the
it is possible to recover control of the aeroplane point at which recovery to a direction parallel to
with that engine still inoperative, and maintain the centreline is completed may not deviate more
straight flight either with zero yaw or, at the option than 30 ft laterally from the centreline at any point.
of the applicant, with an angle of bank of not more VMCG must be established, with –
than 5°.
(1) The aeroplane in each take-off con-
(c) VMC may not exceed 1.2 VS with — figuration or, at the option of the applicant, in
the most critical take-off configuration;
(1) Maximum available take-off power (2) Maximum available take-off power or
or thrust on the engines; thrust on the operating engines;
(2) The most unfavourable centre of (3) The most unfavourable centre of
gravity; gravity;
(3) The aeroplane trimmed for take- (4) The aeroplane trimmed for take-off;
off; and
(4) The maximum sea-level take-off (5) The most unfavourable weight in the
weight (or any lesser weight necessary to show range of take-off weights. (See also ACJ 25.149
VMC); (e).)
(f) VMCL, the minimum control speed during (2) with the critical engine inoperative
landing approach with all engines operating, must be and the operating engines developing the power or
established with the aeroplane in the most critical thrust necessary to maintain a gradient of descent
configuration for approach and landing with all of 5%, and starting from a condition of steady
engines operating and the aeroplane trimmed for straight flight, to roll the aeroplane through an
approach and landing with all engines operating. angle of 20°, in the direction necessary to initiate
VMCL may not be lower than the calibrated airspeed a turn away from the inoperative engine, in not
at which it has been demonstrated that it is possible: more than 3.5 seconds.
(h) For aeroplanes with three or more engines, (b) Lateral and directional trim. The aero-
VMCL–2, the minimum control speed during landing plane must maintain lateral and directional trim
approach with two critical engines inoperative, must with the most adverse lateral displacement of the
be established with the aeroplane in the recommended centre of gravity within the relevant operating
configuration for approach with two engines in- limitations, during normally expected conditions
operative and the aeroplane trimmed as recommended of operation (including operation at any speed from
for approach with two engines inoperative. VMCL–2 1.4 VS1 to VMO/MMO).
may not be lower than the lowest calibrated airspeed
at which it has been demonstrated that it is possible: (c) Longitudinal trim. The aeroplane must
maintain longitudinal trim during –
(1) with the critical two engines in-
operative and the operating engines developing (1) A climb with maximum continuous
maximum take-off power or thrust; power at a speed not more than 1.4 VS1, with
the landing gear retracted, and the wing-flaps
(i) to maintain straight flight with (i) retracted and (ii) in the take-off position;
an angle of bank of not more than 5º;
and (2) Either a glide with power off at a
speed not more than 1.4 VS1, or an approach
(ii) starting from this condition of within the normal range of approach speeds
steady straight flight to roll the aeroplane appropriate to the weight and configuration with
through an angle of 20º, in the direction power settings corresponding to a 3° glidepath
necessary to initiate a turn away from the whichever is the most severe, with the landing
inoperative engines, in not more than gear extended, the wing-flaps (i) retracted and
5 seconds; and (ii) extended, the most unfavourable centre of
gravity position approved for landing with the
(2) with the two critical engines inoperative maximum landing weight, and with the most
and t he operating engines developing the power or unfavourable centre of gravity position approved
thrust necessary to maintain a gradient of descent for landing regardless of weight; and
of 5%, and starting from a condition of steady
straight flight, to roll the aeroplane through an
angle of 20º in the direction necessary to initiate (text continued on page 1–B–18)
a turn away from the inoperative engines, in not
more than 3.5 seconds.
TRIM
1–B–17–2 Change 9
JAR–25 SECTION 1
(3) Level flight at any speed from specified in JAR 25.175 (b), when the control force
1.4 VS1, to VMO/MMO, with the landing gear is slowly released from any speed within the range
and wing-flaps retracted, and from 1.4 VS1 to specified in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph.
VLE with the landing gear extended.
(c) The average gradient of the stable slope
(d) Longitudinal, directional, and lateral trim. of the stick force versus speed curve may not be less
The aeroplane must maintain longitudinal, direc- than 1 pound for each 6 knots. (See ACJ 25.173 (c).)
tional, and lateral trim (and for lateral trim, the
angle of bank may not exceed 5°) at 1.4 VS1 during (d) Within the free return speed range specified
climbing flight with – in sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph, it is permissible
for the aeroplane, without control forces, to stabilise
(1) The critical engine inoperative; on speeds above or below the desired trim speeds if
exceptional attention on the part of the pilot is not
(2) The remaining engines at maximum
continuous power; and required to return to and maintain the desired trim
speed and altitude.
(3) The landing gear and wing-flaps
retracted.
(e) Aeroplanes with four or more engines. JAR 25.175 Demonstration of static longitudinal
Each aeroplane with four or more engines must stability
maintain trim in rectilinear flight –
Static longitudinal stability must be shown as
(1) At the climb speed, configuration follows:
and power required by JAR 25.123 (a) for the
purpose of establishing gradient of climb; and (a) Climb. The stick force curve must have
a stable slope at speeds between 85% and 115%
(2) With the most unfavourable centre of the speed at which the aeroplane –
of gravity position.
(1) Is trimmed with –
STABILITY
(i) Wing-flaps retracted;
JAR 25.171 General (ii) Landing gear retracted;
(iii) Maximum take-off weight; and
The aeroplane must be longitudinally, direction- (iv) The maximum power or thrust
ally and laterally stable in accordance with the selected by the applicant as an operating
provisions of JAR 25.173 to 25.177. In addition, limitation for use during climb; and
suitable stability and control feel (static stability) is
required in any condition normally encountered in (2) Is trimmed at the speed for best rate-
service, if flight tests show it is necessary for safe of-climb except that the speed need not be less
operation. than 1.4 VS1.
JAR 25.173 Static longitudinal stability (b) Cruise. Static longitudinal stability must
be shown in the cruise condition as follows:
Under the conditions specified in JAR 25.175,
the characteristics of the elevator control forces (1) With the landing gear retracted at
(including friction) must be as follows: high speed, the stick force curve must have a
stable slope at all speeds within a range which
(a) A pull must be required to obtain and is the greater of 15% of the trim speed plus the
maintain speeds below the specified trim speed, and resulting free return speed range, or 50 knots
a push must be required to obtain and maintain plus the resulting free return speed range, above
speeds above the specified trim speed. This must be and below the trim speed (except that the speed
shown at any speed that can be obtained except range need not include speeds less than 1.4 VS1,
speeds higher than the landing gear or wing flap nor speeds greater than VFC/MFC, nor speeds
operating limit speeds or VFC/MFC, whichever is that require a stick force of more than 50 pounds),
appropriate, or lower than the minimum speed for with –
steady unstalled flight. (i) The wing-flaps retracted;
(ii) The centre of gravity in the
(b) The airspeed must return to within 10% most adverse position (see JAR 25.27);
of the original trim speed for the climb, approach (iii) The most critical weight between
and landing conditions specified in JAR 25.175 (a), the maximum take-off and maximum land-
(c) and (d), and must return to within 7.5% of the ing weights;
original trim speed for the cruising condition
(iv) The maximum cruising power (1) Wing-flaps in the approach position;
selected by the applicant as an operating (2) Landing gear retracted;
limitation (see JAR 25.1521), except that (3) Maximum landing weight; and
the power need not exceed that required (4) The aeroplane trimmed at 1.4 VS1
at VMO/MMO; and with enough power to maintain level flight at this
(v) The aeroplane trimmed for level speed.
flight with the power required in sub-para-
graph (iv) above. (d) Landing. The stick force curve must have a
stable slope and the stick force may not exceed
(2) With the landing gear retracted at low 80 pounds at speeds between 1.1 VS0 and 1.8 VS0
speed, the stick force curve must have a stable with —
slope at all speeds within a range which is the
greater of 15% of the trim speed plus the resulting (1) Wing-flaps in the landing position;
free return speed range, or 50 knots plus the (2) Landing gear extended;
resulting free return speed range, above and below (3) Maximum landing weight;
the trim speed (except that the speed range need (4) The aeroplane trimmed at 1.4 VS0
not include speeds less than 1.4 VS1, nor speeds with:—
greater than the minimum speed of the applicable
speed range prescribed in sub-paragraph (1), nor (i) power or thrust off, and
speeds that require a stick force of more than
50 pounds), with – (ii) power or thrust for level flight.
[ (i) gradual;
increased angles of sideslip. Unless the aeroplane has [ (2) As soon as the aeroplane is stalled,
a yaw indicator, there must be enough bank accom- recover by normal recovery techniques.
panying sideslipping to clearly indicate any departure
from steady unyawed flight. (See ACJ 25.177 (c).) (3) The requirements for turning flight
stalls must also be met with accelerated rates of
entry into the stall, i.e. in dynamic stalls. (See
JAR 25.181 Dynamic stability (See ACJ 25.181) ACJ 25.201 (c) (3).)
(a) Any short period oscillation, not including (d) The aeroplane may be considered stalled
combined lateral-directional oscillations, occurring when the behaviour of the aeroplane gives to the
between stalling speed and maximum allowable speed pilot a clear and distinctive indication of an
appropriate to the configuration of the aeroplane acceptable nature that the aeroplane is stalled.
must be heavily damped with the primary controls – (See ACJ 25.201 (d).)
Acceptable indications of a stall are –
(1) Free; and
(2) In a fixed position. (1) A nose-down pitch that cannot be
readily arrested and which may be accompanied
(b) Any combined lateral-directional oscillations simultaneously by a rolling motion which is not
('Dutch roll') occurring between stalling speed and immediately controllable (provided that the rolling
maximum allowable speed appropriate to the con- motion complies with JAR 25.203 (b) or (c) as
figuration of the aeroplane must be positively damped appropriate); or
with controls free, and must be controllable with
normal use of the primary controls without requiring (2) Severe buffeting, of a magnitude and
exceptional pilot skill. severity that is a strong and effective deterrent to
further speed reduction; or
(2) With wing-flaps and landing gear (1) Wheel brakes must operate smoothly
retracted; and and may not cause any undue tendency to nose
over; and
(3) With the remaining engines at up to
75% of maximum continuous power, or up to the (2) If a tail-wheel landing gear is used,
power at which the wings can be held level with it must be possible, during the take-off ground
the use of maximum control travel, whichever is run on concrete, to maintain any attitude up to
less. thrust line level, at 80% of VS1.
(b) The operating engines may be throttled back (b) Not required for JAR – 25.
during stall recovery from stalls with the critical
engine inoperative. JAR 25.233 Directional stability and control
[ (c) When the speed is reduced at rates not The shock absorbing mechanism may not damage
exceeding 1 knot per second, stall warning must begin, the structure of the aeroplane when the aeroplane is
in each normal configuration, at a speed exceeding taxied on the roughest ground that may reasonably
the stalling speed (i.e. the speed at which the stall is be expected in normal operation.
identified in accordance with JAR 25.201 (d), or the
minimum steady flight speed at which the aeroplane
is controllable with the longitudinal control on its JAR 25.237 Wind velocities
stop) by not less than the greater of 5% or 5 knots
CAS. Stall warning must continue throughout the (a) A 90° cross component of wind velocity,
demonstration, until the angle of attack is reduced demonstrated to be safe for take-off and landing,
to approximately that at which stall warning is must be established for dry runways and must be at
initiated. ] least 20 knots or 0.2 VS0, whichever is greater,
except that it need not exceed 25 knots.
MISCELLANEOUS FLIGHT
REQUIREMENTS
1–B–21–2 Change 11
JAR–25 SECTION 1
the aeroplane is free from such vibration that would (3) There may be no control reversal
prevent safe flight under the conditions in about any axis at any speed up to VDF/MDF.
JAR 25.629 (d). Any reversal of elevator control force or tendency
of the aeroplane to pitch, roll, or yaw must be
(c) Except as provided in sub-paragraph (d), mild and readily controllable, using normal piloting
there may be no buffeting condition, in normal techniques. Adequate roll capability to assure a
flight, including configuration changes during cruise, prompt recovery from a laterally upset condition
severe enough to interfere with the control of the must be available. (See ACJ 25.253 (a) (3).)
aeroplane, to cause excessive fatigue to the crew, or
to cause structural damage. Stall warning buffeting (4) It must be shown that no hazardous
within these limits is allowable. control problem will result after autopilot dis-
connect in extreme atmospheric draughts or
(d) There may be no perceptible buffeting disturbances. Consideration must be given to the
condition in the cruise configuration in straight flight effect of changes in the aeroplane longitudinal
at any speed up to VMO/MMO, except that the stall trim which might result from these circumstances.
warning buffeting is allowable.
(5) Trim change due to airbrake selection.
(e) With the aeroplane in the cruise config- With the aeroplane trimmed at VMO/MO,
uration, the positive manoeuvring load factors at extension of the airbrakes at speeds above
which the onset of perceptible buffeting occurs must VMO/MMO, over the available range of movements
be determined for the ranges of airspeed or Mach of the pilots control must not result in an excessive
Number, weight, and altitude for which the aeroplane positive load factor with the stick free, and any
is to be certificated. The envelopes of load factor, nose-down pitching moment must be small.
speed, altitude, and weight must provide a sufficient (See ACJ 25.253 (a) (5).)
range of speeds and load factors for normal operations.
Probable inadvertent excursions beyond the bound- (6) When the aeroplane is trimmed at
aries of the buffet onset envelopes may not result in VMO/MMO:-
2
[ unsafe conditions. (See ACJ 25.251 (e). ]
(i) the slope of the stick force versus
speed curve need not be positive at all points
but there must be a push force at all speeds
up to VDF/MDF.
JAR 25.253 High-speed characteristics
(a) Speed increase and recovery characteristics. (text continued on page 1–B–23)
The following speed increase and recovery character-
istics must be met:
JAR 25.255 Out-of-trim characteristics (See (e) During flight tests required by sub-para-
ACJ 25.255) graph (a) of this paragraph the limit manoeuvring
load factors prescribed in JAR 25.333 (b) and 25.337,
(a) From an initial condition with the aeroplane and the manoeuvring load factors associated with
trimmed at cruise speeds up to VMO/MMO, the aero- probable inadvertent excursions beyond the bound-
plane must have satisfactory manoeuvring stability aries of the buffet onset envelopes determined under
and controllability with the degree of out-of-trim in JAR 25.251 (e), need not be exceeded. In addition,
both the aeroplane nose-up and nose-down directions, the entry speeds for flight test demonstrations at
which results from the greater of – normal acceleration values less than 1 g must be
limited to the extent necessary to accomplish a
(1) A three-second movement of the long- recovery without exceeding VDF/MDF.
itudinal trim system at its normal rate for the
particular flight condition with no aerodynamic (f) In the out-of-trim condition specified in
load (or an equivalent degree of trim for aeroplanes sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, it must be
that do not have a power-operated trim system), possible from an overspeed condition at VDF/MDF to
except as limited by stops in the trim system, produce at least 1.5 g for recovery by applying not
including those required by JAR 25.655 (b) for more than 125 pounds of longitudinal control force
adjustable stabilisers; or using either the primary longitudinal control alone
or the primary longitudinal control and the long-
(2) The maximum mistrim that can be itudinal trim system. If the longitudinal trim is used
sustained by the autopilot while maintaining level to assist in producing the required loan factor, it must
flight in the high speed cruising condition. be shown at VDF/MDF that the longitudinal trim can
be actuated in the aeroplane nose-up direction with
(b) In the out-of-trim condition specified in the primary surface loaded to correspond to the least
sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, when the normal of the following aeroplane nose-up control forces:
acceleration is varied from + 1 g to the positive and
negative values specified in sub-paragraph (c) of this (1) The maximum control forces expected
paragraph – in service as specified in JAR 25.301 and 25.397.
(1) The stick force vs. g curve must have (2) The control force required to produce
a positive slope at any speed up to and including 1.5 g.
VFC/MFC; and (3) The control force corresponding to
buffeting or other phenomena of such intensity
(2) At speeds between VFC/MFC and that it is a strong deterrent to further application
VDF/MDF the direction of the primary long- of primary longitudinal control force.
itudinal control force may not reverse.
(c) Except as provided in sub-paragraphs (d) JAR 25X261 Flight in rough air
and (e) of this paragraph compliance with the
provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph Procedures for flight in turbulence must be
must be demonstrated in flight over the acceleration established. (See ACJ 25X261.)
range –
(a) The requirements of this Subpart BB apply (2) By systematic investigation of each
to aeroplanes for which the achievement of the probable combination of weight and centre of
scheduled performance depends on:– gravity, if compliance cannot be reasonably
inferred from combinations investigated.
(1) increasing the power or thrust of the
operating engine(s), in the event of engine failure (b) If there is less than a 2 knot difference
on take-off, either – in the forward and rearward centre of gravity stalling
speeds, the flying qualities may be based upon
(i) to not more than maximum the forward centre of gravity stalling speeds.
take-off power or thrust, or
(c) The controllability, stability, trim, and
(ii) to an engine operating con- stalling characteristics of the aeroplane must be
dition approved for use following engine shown for each altitude up to the maximum expected
failure which exceeds the limits, except in operation.
time, approved for normal operation with
all engines operating; or (d) The following general tolerances from
specified values are allowed during flight testing (see
(2) the use following engine failure in ACJ 25.21(d)). However, greater tolerances may be
any flight phase other than take-off, of engine allowed, or smaller tolerances may be required, in
operating conditions which exceed the limits particular tests. These tolerances are plus or minus
except time, approved for normal operation with
all engines operating. (text continued on page 1—BB—2)
variations unless otherwise noted in the particular (1) The highest weight selected by the
test: applicant for the particular conditions; or
JAR (BB) 25.23 Load distribution limits (a) The extremes selected by the applicant;
(a) Ranges of weights and centres of gravity (b) The extremes within which the structure
within which the aeroplane may be safely operated is proven; or
must be established. If a weight and centre of gravity
combination is allowable only within certain load (c) The extremes within which compliance
distribution limits (such as spanwise) that could be with each applicable flight requirement is shown.
inadvertently exceeded, these limits and the corre-
sponding weight and centre of gravity combinations
must be established. JAR (BB) 25.29 Empty weight and corresponding
centre of gravity
(b) The load distribution limits may not
exceed — (a) The empty weight and corresponding
centre of gravity must be determined by weighing the
(1) The selected limits; aeroplane with –
(i) Oil;
(ii) Hydraulic fluid; and
JAR (BB) 25.25 Weight limits (iii) Other fluids required for
normal operation of aeroplane systems,
(a) Maximum weights. Maximum weights except potable water, lavatory pre-charge
corresponding to the aeroplane operating conditions water, and water intended for injection in
(such as ramp, ground taxi, take-off, en-route, and the engine.
landing) environmental conditions (such as altitude
and temperature), and loading conditions (such as (b) The condition of the aeroplane at the time
zero fuel weight, centre of gravity position and of determining empty weight must be one that is well
weight distribution) must be established so that they defined and can be easily repeated.
are not more than —
Removable ballast may be used in showing (2) The power or equivalent thrust
compliance with the flight requirements of this absorbed by the accessories and services appro-
Subpart. priate to the particular ambient atmospheric
conditions and the particular flight condition
(see ACJ 25.101 (c)).
JAR(BB) 25.33 Propeller speed and pitch limits
(d) Unless otherwise prescribed, the applicant
(a) The propeller speed and pitch must be must select the take-off, en-route, approach, and
limited to values that will ensure – landing configurations for the aeroplane.
(1) Safe operation under normal (e) The aeroplane configurations may vary
operating conditions; and with weight, altitude, and temperature, to the extent
they are compatible with the operating procedures
(2) Compliance with the performance required by sub-paragraph (f) of this paragraph.
requirements in JAR(BB) 25.101 to 25.125
for turbo-propeller powered aeroplanes. (f) Unless otherwise prescribed, in deter-
mining the accelerate-stop distances, take-off flight
(b) There must be a propeller speed limiting paths, take-off distances and landing distances,
means at the governor. It must limit the maximum changes in the aeroplane's configuration, speed,
possible governed engine speed to a value not power and thrust must be made in accordance with
exceeding the maximum allowable rpm. procedures established by the applicant for operation
in service. (See ACJ(BB) 25.101 (f).)
(c) The low pitch blade stop, or other means
used to limit the low pitch position of the propeller (g) Procedures for the execution of balked
blades, must be set so that the engine speed does not landings and missed approaches associated with the
exceed 103% of the maximum allowable engine rpm conditions prescribed in JAR(BB) 25.119 and 25.121
with the propeller blades at the low pitch limit and (d) must be established.
governor inoperative.
(h) The procedures established under sub-
paragraphs (f) and (g) of this paragraph must –
[PERFORMANCE]
(1) Be able to be consistently executed
JAR(BB) 25.101 General (See ACJ 25.101) in service by crews of average skill,
(a) Unless otherwise prescribed, aeroplanes (2) Use methods or devices that are safe
must meet the applicable performance requirements and reliable, and
of this Subpart for ambient atmospheric conditions
and still air. (3) Include allowance for any time
delays in the execution of the procedures, that
(b) The performance, as affected by engine may reasonably be expected in service. (See
power or thrust, must be based on the following ACJ 25.101 (h) (3).)
relative humidities:
(i) Wet runway friction characteristics.
(1) 80%, at and below standard temp- Where performance characteristics on wet runways
eratures; and are shown, they must be presented in terms of a
specified wet surface. (See ACJ 25.101 (i).)
(2) 34%, at and above standard temp-
eratures plus 50°F. (j) Turbine-engine powered aeroplanes for
which compliance with the performance requirements
Between these two temperatures, the relative of this Subpart BB is dependent on the power or
humidity must vary linearly. thrust of any of the operating engines being automat-
ically increased following the failure of an engine
(c) Except as provided in sub-paragraph (k) during take-off must meet all the applicable require-
of this paragraph, the performance must correspond ments of this Subpart BB with the automatic system
to the propulsive thrust available under the particular functioning as designed.
ambient atmospheric conditions, the particular flight
condition, the particular engine operating condition, (k) (1) For the emergency take-off operating
and the relative humidity specified in sub-paragraph conditions for which T0/T1 is less than 0.9, the
(b) of this paragraph. The available propulsive thrust performance must correspond to a propulsive
must correspond to engine power or thrust, not thrust not exceeding T0 + 0.9 (T1—T0), unless
exceeding the approved power or thrust, less — the Authority requires.
(4) The most unfavourable centre of (1) Not more than 50% of nominal
gravity allowable; and wind components along the take-off path opposite
to the direction of take-off, and not less than
[ (5) The aeroplane trimmed for straight 150% of nominal wind components along the
flight at a speed selected by the applicant, but take-off path in the direction of take-off.
not less than 1.2 VS and not greater than 1.4 VS.
(2) Effective runway gradients.
(b) The stall speed VS is the greater of –
1
Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/1, Eff. 24.5.85)
Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/2, Eff. 18.11.85) 1—BB—4
SECTION 1 JAR—25
(1) VEF is the calibrated airspeed at (e) VR, in terms of calibrated air speed, must
which the critical engine is assumed to fail. be selected in accordance with the conditions of
VEF must be selected by the applicant, but may sub-paragraphs (1) to (4) of this paragraph:
not be less than VMCG determined under
JAR(BB) 25.149(e). (1) VR may not be less than: –
JAR(BB) 25.109 Accelerate-stop distance. (See (iii) Come to a full stop on a dry hard
ACJ(BB) 25.109.) runway from the point reached at the end of
the acceleration period prescribed in sub-
(a) The accelerate-stop distance (see ACJ paragraph (a) (1) (ii), assuming that the pilot
25.109 (a)) is the greater of the following distances: does not apply any means of retarding the
aeroplane until that point is reached and that
(1) The sum of the distances necessary the critical engine is still inoperative.
to –
(i) Accelerate the aeroplane from (2) The sum of the distances necessary to –
a standing start to VEF with all engines
operating; (i) Accelerate the aeroplane from a
standing start to. VEF corresponding to V1
(ii) Accelerate the aeroplane from for a wet runway with all engines operating;
VEF to V1 and continue the acceleration
for 2.0 seconds after V1 is reached, assum- (ii) Accelerate the aeroplane from
ing the critical engine fails at VEF; and VEF to V1 for a wet runway and continue
the acceleration for 2.0 seconds after V1
(iii) Come to a full stop from the for a wet runway is reached, assuming the
point reached at the end of the acceler- critical engine fails at VEF; and
ation period prescribed in sub-paragraph
(a) (1) (ii) of this paragraph assuming that (iii) Come to a full stop on the Ref-
the pilot does not apply any means of erence Wet Hard Surface from the point reached
retarding the aeroplane until that point is at the end of the acceleration period prescribed
reached and that the critical engine is still in sub-paragraph (a) (2) (ii), assuming that the
inoperative. pilot does not apply any means of retarding
the aeroplane until that point is reached and
(2) The sum of the distances necessary that the critical, engine is still inoperative.
to –
(i) Accelerate the aeroplane from (3) The sum of the distances necessary to –
a standing start to V1 and continue the
acceleration for 2.0 seconds after V1 is (i) Accelerate the aeroplane from a
reached with all engines operating; and standing start to V1 for a dry runway and
continue the acceleration for 2.0 seconds after
(ii) Come to a full stop from the V1 for a dry runway is reached with all engines
point reached at the end of the acceler- operating; and
ation period prescribed in sub-paragraph
(a) (2) (i) of this paragraph assuming that (ii) Come to a full stop on a dry hard
the pilot does not apply any means of runway from the point reached at the end of
retarding the aeroplane until that point is the acceleration period prescribed in sub-
reached and that all engines are still paragraph (a) (3) (i), assuming that the pilot
operating. does not apply any means of retarding the
aeroplane until that point is reached and that
(G) (a) (United Kingdom) The accelerate- all engines are still operating.
stop distance (see ACJ 25.109 (a)) is the greatest
of the following distances: (4) The sum of the distances necessary to –
(1) The sum of the distances necessary to – (i) Accelerate the aeroplane from a
standing start to V1 for a wet runway and
(i) Accelerate the aeroplane from a continue the acceleration for 2.0 seconds after
standing start to VEF corresponding to V1 for V1 for a wet runway is reached with all engines
a dry runway with all engines operating; operating; and
(ii) Accelerate the aeroplane from VEF (ii) Come to a full stop on the Ref-
to V1 for a dry runway and continue the erence Wet Hard Surface from the point reached
acceleration for 2.0 seconds after V1 for a at the end of the acceleration period prescribed
dry runway is reached, assuming the critical in sub-paragraph (a) (4) (i), assuming that the
engine fails at VEF; and pilot does not apply any means of retarding
the aeroplane until that point is reached and
that all engines are still operating.
1
Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/2, Eff. 12.7.84)
2
1–BB–7 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/3, Eff. 30.11.84)
JAR–25 SECTION 1
1
Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/1, Eff. 30.4.84)
Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/2, Eff. 18.11.85) 1–BB–7–1
SECTION 1 JAR–25
(d) The take-off path must be determined (b) If the take-off distance includes clear-
by a continuous demonstrated take-off or by way, the take-off run is the greater of:–
synthesis from segments. If the take-off path is (1) The horizontal distance along the
determined by the segmental method – take-off path from the start of the take-off
to the point equidistant between the point at
(1) The segments must be clearly which VLOF is reached and the point at which
defined and must be related to the distinct the aeroplane is 35 ft above the take-off
changes in the configuration, power or surface as determined under JAR(BB) 25.111
thrust, and speed; (a); or
(2) The weight of the aeroplane, the (2) 115% of the horizontal distance
configuration, and the power or thrust must along the take-off path, with all engines
be constant throughout each segment and operating, from the start of the take-off
must correspond to the most critical con- to a point equidistant between the point at
dition prevailing in the segment; which VLOF is reached and the point at which
(3) The flight path must be based on the aeroplane is 35 ft above the take-off
the aeroplane's performance without ground surface, determined under JAR(BB) 25.111
effect; and (b) (see ACJ 25.113 (a) (2)); or
(4) The take-off path data must be (3) For operations on runways covered
checked by continuous demonstrated take- with a significant depth of precipitation,
offs up to the point at which the aeroplane where approval for such operation is sought
is out of ground effect and its speed is by the applicant, the distance prescribed in
stabilised to ensure that the path is conser- sub-paragraph (b) (2) of this paragraph, but
vative relative to the continuous path. assuming the ground acceleration of the
aeroplane to take place in precipitation having
The aeroplane is considered to be out of the ground a depth equal to 150% of the nominal average
effect when it reaches a height equal to its wing depth. (See ACJ 25.113 (a) (3).)
span.
(G) JAR(BB) 25.113 (a) (continued) (G) JAR(BB) 25.113 (b) (continued)
of V2 before reaching 35 ft above the take- (4) For operations on runways covered
off surface, determined under JAR(BB) with a significant depth of precipitation, where
25.111 (a) corresponding to V1 appropriate approval for such operations is sought by the
to a wet runway; or applicant the distance prescribed in sub-para-
graph (b) (3) of this paragraph, but assuming
(3) 115% of the horizontal distance the ground acceleration of the aeroplane to
along the take-off path, with all engines take place in precipitation having a depth equal
operating, from the start of the take-off to 150% of the nominal average depth. (See
to the point at which the aeroplane is 35 ft ACJ 25.113 (a) (3).)
above the take-off surface, as determined
by a procedure which is consistent with
JAR(BB) 25.111 (b) and such that V3 (see
(G) JAR (BB) 25.107 (g) Steady initial climb JAR (BB) 25.115 Net take-off flight path
speed (United Kingdom)) is achieved before
reaching 400 ft above the take-off surface (see (a) The net take-off flight path begins at 35 ft
ACJ 25.113 (a) (2)); or above the take-off surface at the end of the take-off
distance determined in accordance with JAR(BB)
(4) For operations on runways 25.113 (a).
covered with a significant depth of precipi- (b) The net take-off flight path is the envelope
tation, where approval for such operations is of the lowest points of:–
sought by the applicant, the distance (1) A path which represents the actual
prescribed in sub-paragraph (a) (3) of this take-off path determined in accordance with
paragraph, but assuming the ground acceler- JAR(BB) 25.111(a), reduced in accordance with
ation of the aeroplane to take place in sub-paragraph (c) of this paragraph, by a gradient
precipitation having a depth equal to 150% of climb equal to: –
of the nominal average depth. (See ACJ
25.113 (a) (3).) (i) 0-8% for two-engined aeroplanes;
(ii) 0.9% for three-engined aero-
(b) If the take-off distance includes a planes; and
clearway, the take-off run is the greatest of– (iii) 1.0% for four-engined aero-
planes; and
(1) The horizontal distance along the
take-off path from the start of the take-off to a (2) A path which begins at 35 ft above
point equidistant between the point at which the take-off surface at the end of the distance
VLOF is reached and the point at which the specified in JAR(BB) 25.113 (a) (2), and which
aeroplane is 35 ft above the take-off surface, otherwise represents the actual take-off path
determined under JAR(BB) 25.111(a) corre- determined in accordance with JAR(BB) 25.111
sponding to V1 appropriate to a dry runway; (b), reduced in accordance with sub-paragraph (c)
or of this paragraph by a gradient of climb equal to
(2) The horizontal distance along the 3.2%.
take-off path from the start of the take-off to the
point at which VLOF is reached, determined (c) The reduction in climb gradient prescribed
under JAR(BB) 25.111 (a) corresponding to in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph must
V1 appropriate to a wet runway, or be applied at each point starting at the point at which
(3) 115% of the horizontal distance the aeroplane reaches 35 ft above the take-off surface
along the take-off path, with all engines operating, and may be applied as an equivalent reduction in
from the start of the take-off to a point equi- acceleration along that part of the take-off path in
distant between the point at which VLOF is which the aeroplane is accelerated in level flight.
reached and the point at which the aeroplane
is 35 ft above the take-off surface, as determined (d) The net take-off flight path must have a
by a procedure which is consistent with JAR(BB) positive slope at all points.
25.111 (b) and such that V3 (see (G) JAR(BB)
25.107 (g) Steady initial climb speed (United
Kingdom)) is achieved before reaching 400 ft
above the take-off surface (see ACJ 25.113(a)
(2)); or
(c) Landing. In the landing configuration, the (1) The critical engine inoperative, the
steady gradient of climb may not be less than 3.2%, remaining engines in the most critical power
with:– operating condition existing between:–
(1) The engines at the power or thrust that (i) The point in the flight path
is available 8 seconds after the initiation of move- where the aeroplane reaches a height of 35 ft
ment of the power or thrust controls from the above the take-off surface, or the landing
minimum flight idle position to the position gear is fully retracted in accordance with
corresponding to maximum take-off power or JAR(BB) 25.111 (a), whichever condition
[thrust (see ACJ 25.119(a)); and ] occurs later along the flight path; and
(2) A climb speed which is:– (ii) The point where the aeroplane
reaches a height of 400 ft above the take-
(i) Not less than:– off surface; and
(A) 1.15 VS for aeroplanes (2) The weight equal to the weight
with four engines on which the existing when the aeroplane's landing gear is fully
application of power results in a retracted, determined under JAR(BB) 25.111.
significant reduction in stalling speed;
or (c) Final take-off. In the en-route configuration
(B) 1.2 VS for all other at the end of the take-off path determined in accord-
aeroplanes; ance with JAR(BB) 25.111 (a) and (c) the steady
(ii) Not less than VMCL ; and gradient of climb may not be less than 1.2% for a
(iii) Not more than the greater of two-engined aeroplane, 1.5% for three-engined aero-
1.3 VS and VMCL. planes, and 1.7% for four-engined aeroplanes, at not
less than 1.25 Vs and with –
JAR(BB) 25.121 Climb: one-engine-inoperative
[ (See ACJ 25.121) ] (1) The critical engine inoperative and the
remaining engines in the emergency continuous
(a) Take-off; landing gear extended. In the engine operating condition; and
critical take-off configuration existing along the flight
path (between the points at which the aeroplane (2) The weight equal to the weight existing
reaches VLOF and at which the landing gear is fully at the end of the take-off path, determined under
retracted) and in the configuration used in JAR(BB) JAR(BB) 25.111(a) and (c).
25.111 (a) and (c) but without ground effect, the
steady gradient of climb must be positive for two- (d) Discontinued approach; landing gear
engined aeroplanes, and not less than 0.3% for three- retracted. In a configuration in which VS does not
engined aeroplanes or 0.5% for four-engined aero- exceed 110% of the VS for the related landing
planes, at VLOF and with – configuration, the steady gradient may not be less
than 2.1% for two-engined aeroplanes, 2.4% for
(1) The critical engine inoperative and the three-engined aeroplanes, and 2.7% for four-engined
remaining engines at the power or thrust condition aeroplanes with –
corresponding to the point at which the aeroplane
reaches VLOF in accordance with JAR(BB) 25.111 (1) The critical engine inoperative, the
(a) unless there is a more critical power operating remaining engines in the emergency take-off
condition existing later along the flight path but engine operating condition;
before the point at which the landing gear is fully (2) The maximum landing weight; and
retracted (see ACJ(BB) 25.121 (a) (1)), and (3) A climb speed established in connection
with normal landing procedures, but not exceeding
(2) The weight equal to the weight existing 1.5 VS.
when retraction of the landing gear is begun
determined under JAR(BB) 25.111 (a) and (c). (G) (3) (United Kingdom) A climb speed
established in accordance with normal landing
(b) Take-off; landing gear retracted. In the procedures, but not exceeding 1.5 VS, and such
take-off configuration existing at the point of the that the horizontal distance required to accelerate
flight path at which the landing gear is fully retracted, to this speed from the speed at the decision height,
and in the configuration used in JAR(BB) 25.111(a) while following the recommended discontinued
and (c) but without ground effect, the steady gradient approach procedure, does not exceed 10,000 ft.
of climb may not be less than 2.4% for two-engined
aeroplanes, 2.7% for three-engined aeroplanes and
3.0% for four-engined aeroplanes, at V2 and with: – (4) Landing gear retracted.
planes, 1.8% for three-engined aeroplanes and 1.6% (a) First Method. The horizontal distance
for four-engined aeroplanes, with:— necessary to land and to come to a complete stop
(or to a speed of approximately 3 knots for water
(1) The critical engine inoperative and the landings) from a point 50 ft above the landing surface
remaining engines in the emergency continuous must be determined (for standard temperatures, at
engine operating condition; each weight, altitude and wind within the operational
(2) The maximum landing weight; and limits established by the applicant for the aeroplane)
(3) A speed equal to the final approach as follows:—
speed established for use in still air conditions in (1) The aeroplane must be in the landing
connection with one-engine-inoperative landing configuration.
procedures.
(2) A steady gliding approach, with a
JAR(BB) 25.123 En-route flight paths (See calibrated airspeed of not less than 1-3 Vs, must
ACJ(BB) 25.123) be maintained down to the 50 ft height.
(a) For the en-route configuration, the flight (3) Changes in configuration, power or
paths prescribed in sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of this thrust, and speed, must be made in accordance
paragraph must be determined at each weight, with the established procedures for service
altitude, and ambient temperature, within the operation. (See ACJ 25.125 (a) (3))
operating limits established for the aeroplane. The
variation of weight along the flight path, accounting (4) The landing must be made without
for the progressive consumption of fuel and oil by excessive vertical acceleration, tendency to bounce,
the operating engines, may be included in the nose over or ground loop.
computation. The flight paths must be determined
at any selected speed, with — (5) The landing may not require excep-
tional piloting skill or alertness.
(1) The most unfavourable centre of
gravity; (6) The landing distance on land must be
(2) The critical engines inoperative; determined on a level, smooth, dry, hard-surfaced
runway (see ACJ 25.125 (a) (6)). In addition -
(3) The remaining engines in the emerg-
ency continuous engine operating condition; and (i) The pressures on the wheel
braking systems may not exceed those
(4) The means for controlling the engine- specified by the brake manufacturer;
cooling air supply in the position that provides
adequate cooling in the hot-day condition. (ii) The brakes may not be used so
as to cause excessive wear of brakes or tyres
(b) The one-engine-inoperative net flight path (see ACJ 25.125 (a) (6) (ii));
data must represent the actual climb performance
diminished by a gradient of climb of 1.1% for two- (iii) Means other than wheel brakes
engined aeroplanes, 1.4% for three-engined aero- may be used if that means –
planes, and 1-8% for four-engined aeroplanes. — Is safe and reliable;
— Is used so that consistent results can be
(c) For three- or four-engined aeroplanes, the expected in service; and
two-engine-inoperative net flight path data must — Is such that exceptional skill is not
represent the actual climb performance diminished required to control the aeroplane.
by a gradient climb of 0-3% for three-engined aero-
planes and 0-5% for four-engined aeroplanes. (7) The landing distance data must include
correction factors for not more than 50% of the
JAR(BB) 25.125 Landing nominal wind components along the landing path
opposite to the direction of landing, and not less
The landing distance must be determined in than 150% of the nominal wind components along
accordance with sub-paragraphs (a) or (b). the landing path in the direction of landing.
JAR (BB) 25X132 Take-off on runways covered (3) Configuration changes, including
with significant depth of pre- deployment or retraction of deceleration devices.
cipitation (See ACJ 25X132.)
(c) If, during the testing required by sub-
Where approval is sought for take-off operation paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, marginal
on runways covered with significant depth of precipi- conditions, exist with regard to required pilot strength,
tation, data must be established appropriate to such 1[ the 'strength of pilots' limits for conventional wheel
conditions, giving: type controls may not exceed the limits prescribed
(a) The latest point for a decision to abandon in the following table. (See ACJ 25.143(c)): ]
the take-off, and
(b) The earliest point for a decision to continue
the take-off with one engine inoperative.
1
Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/2, Eff. 12.7.84)
Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/2, Eff. 18.11.85) 1—BB—16
SECTION 1 JAR—25
(f) Stick forces must increase progressively (6) With power off, wing-flaps extended, and
with normal load factors in the en-route configuration the aeroplane trimmed at 1.4 VS1, obtain and maintain
at speeds up to VMO/MMO. air speeds between 1.1 VS1 and either
(1) The stick force to attain load factors 1.7 VS1 ,or VFE, whichever is lower.
likely to be reached in operation must not be
excessive with regard to the need for manoue- (c) It must be possible, without exceptional
vrability, and the stick force to reach the limit piloting skill, to prevent loss of altitude when
structural load must not be so small that this load complete retraction of the high lift devices from any
factor can easily be reached inadvertently. position is begun during steady, straight, level flight
(2) The variation of stick force with at 1.1 VS1 for propeller powered aeroplanes or
normal load factor within the range —1.0 g to 1.2 VS1 for turbo-jet powered aeroplanes, with —
+2.5 g must be such that there are no large or
sudden reductions in gradient such as might lead (1) Simultaneous application of not more
to over-control. (See ACJ 25.143 (f).) than take-off power taking into account the
critical engine operating conditions;
(2) The landing gear extended; and
JAR(BB) 25.145 Longitudinal control (3) The critical combinations of landing
weights and altitudes.
(a) It must be possible at any speed between
the trim speed prescribed in JAR(BB) 25.103 (b) (1) If gated high-lift device control positions are provided,
and VS, to pitch the nose downward so that the retraction must be shown from any position from the
acceleration to this selected trim speed is prompt maximum landing position to the first gated position,
with — between gated positions, and from the last gated
(1) The aeroplane trimmed at the trim position to the full retraction position. In addition,
speed prescribed in JAR(BB) 25.103 (b) (1); the first gated control position from the landing
(2) The landing gear extended; position must correspond with the high-lift devices
(3) The wing-flaps (i) retracted and (ii) configuration used to establish the go-around
extended; and procedure from the landing configuration. Each
(4) Power (i) off and (ii) at maximum gated control position must require a separate and
continuous power on the engines. distinct motion of the control to pass through the
gated position and must have features to prevent
(b) With the landing gear extended, no change inadvertent movement of the control through the
in trim control, or exertion of more than 50 pounds gated position.
control force (representative of the maximum
temporary force that readily can be applied by one [ (d) During the climb after take-off, with one
hand) may be required for the following manoeuvres: — engine inoperative and landing gear retracted, it
must be possible, in conditions of moderate atmos-
pheric turbulence, to manoeuvre the aeroplane in a
(1) With power off, wing-flaps retracted,
manner appropriate to the phase of flight without
and the aeroplane trimmed at 1.4 VS1, extend the
encountering natural or artificial stall warning.
wing-flaps as rapidly as possible while maintaining
(See ACJ(BB) 25.145 (d).) ]
the air speed at approximately 40% above the
stalling speed existing at each instant throughout
the manoeuvre. JAR(BB) 25.147 Directional and lateral control
(2) Repeat sub-paragraph (1) except (a) Directional control; general. It must be
initially extend the wing-flaps and then retract possible, while holding the wings approximately level,
them as rapidly as possible. (See ACJ 25.145 (b) to safely make reasonably sudden changes in heading
(2).) in both directions. This must be shown at 1.4 VS1
(3) Repeat sub-paragraph (2) except with for heading changes up to 15º (except that the
take-off power. heading change at which the rudder pedal force is
150 pounds or the rudder pedal reaches its stops,
(4) With power off, wing-flaps retracted, need not be exceeded), and with —
and the aeroplane trimmed at 1.4 VS1, apply
(1) The critical engine inoperative and its
take-off power rapidly while maintaining the same
propeller in the minimum drag position;
air speed.
(5) Repeat sub-paragraph (4) except with (2) The power required for level flight
wing-flaps extended. at 1.4 VS, but not more than that corresponding
to the emergency continuous engine operating
condition.
(3) The most unfavourable centre of (e) Lateral control; all engines operating. With
gravity; the engines operating roll response must allow normal
(4) Landing gear retracted; manoeuvres (such as recovery from upsets produced
(5) Wing-flaps in the approach position; by gusts and the initiation of evasive manoeuvres).
and There must be enough excess lateral control in side-
(6) Maximum landing weight. slips (up to side-slip angles that might be required in
normal operation), to allow a limited amount of man-
oeuvring and to correct for gusts. Lateral control
(b) Directional control; aeroplanes with four or
must be enough at any speed up to VFC/MFC to
more engines. Aeroplanes with four or more engines
provide a peak roll rate necessary for safety, without
must meet the requirements of sub-paragraph (a) of
excess control forces or travel. (See ACJ 25.147 (e).)
this paragraph except that —
(1) The two critical engines must be in-
JAR(BB) 25.149 Minimum control speed (See
operative with their propellers (if applicable) in
ACJ 25.149)
the minimum drag position;
(2) The centre of gravity must be in the (a) In establishing the minimum control speeds
most forward position; and required by this paragraph the method used to
(3) The flaps must be in the most simulate critical engine failure must represent the
favourable climb position. most critical mode of powerplant failure with respect
to controllability expected in service.
(c) Lateral control; one engine inoperative
(1) It must be possible to make 20° (b) VMC is the calibrated airspeed, at which,
banked turns, with and against the inoperative when the critical engine is suddenly made inoperative,
engine, from steady flight at a speed equal to it is possible to recover control of the aeroplane with
1.4 VS1, with— that engine still inoperative, and maintain straight
(i) The critical engine inoperative, flight either with zero yaw or, at the option of the
and its propeller (if applicable) in the mini- applicant, with an angle of bank of not more than 5°.
mum drag position;
(ii) The remaining engines in the (c) VMC may not exceed 1.2 VS with —
emergency continuous engine operating
condition; (1) Power:—
(iii) The most unfavourable centre
of gravity; (i) Up to the moment when the
(iv) Landing gear both retracted and critical engine is suddenly made inoperative
extended; the engines in the normal take-off engine
(v) Wing-flaps in the most favourable operating condition; and
climb position; and
(vi) Maximum take-off weight. (ii) From the moment when the
critical engine is suddenly made inoperative,
(2) With the critical engine inoperative, the power or thrust on the remaining engines
roll response must allow normal manoeuvres.
must be increased as rapidly as possible to
Lateral control must be sufficient, at the speeds the maximum authorised for use after engine
likely to be used with one engine inoperative for
failure.
climb, cruise, descent and landing approach, to
provide a peak roll rate necessary for safety with-
(2) The most unfavourable centre of
out excessive control forces or travel. (See gravity;
ACJ(BB) 25.147(c) (2).)
(3) The aeroplane trimmed for take-off;
(d) Lateral control; aeroplanes with four or
(4) The maximum sea-level take-off
more engines. Aeroplanes with four or more engines weight (or any lesser weight necessary to show
must be able to make 20° banked turns, with and
VMC);
against the operative engines, from steady flight at a (5) The aeroplane in the most critical
speed equal to 1.4 VS, in the emergency continuous
take-off configuration existing along the flight
engine operating condition, and with the aeroplane path after the aeroplane becomes airborne, except
in the configuration prescribed in sub-paragraph (b)
with the landing gear retracted; and
of this paragraph.
(6) The aeroplane airborne and the ground (3) The most unfavourable centre of
effect negligible; and gravity;
(7) If applicable, the propeller of the in- (4) The aeroplane trimmed for take-off;
operative engine — and
(g) VMCL–1, the minimum control speed during (2) with the critical engines inoperative
landing approach with one engine inoperative, must and the operating engines developing the power or
be established with the aeroplane in the most critical thrust necessary to maintain a gradient of descent
configuration for approach and landing with one of 5%, and starting from a condition of steady
engine inoperative and the aeroplane trimmed as straight flight, to roll the aeroplane through an
recommended for approach with the critical engine angle of 20° in the direction necessary to initiate
inoperative. VMCL–1 may not be lower than the a turn away from the operative engines, in not
calibrated airspeed at which it has been demonstrated more than 3.5 seconds.
that it is possible:
(i) In demonstrations of speeds VMCL,
(1) with the critical engine inoperative and VMCL–1 and VMCL–2:
the operating engine developing maximum take-off
power or thrust authorised for use after engine (1) the rudder pedal force may not exceed
failure; 150 lb and the lateral control force may not be
excessive;
(i) to maintain straight flight with
an angle of bank of not more than 5° ; and
(text continued on page 1–BB–20–1)
(ii) starting from this condition of
steady straight flight to roll the aeroplane
through an angle of 20°, in the direction
necessary to initiate a turn away from the in-
operative engine in not more than 5 seconds;
and
(2) the control of the aeroplane may not within the normal range of approach speeds appro-
require exceptional piloting skill, alertness or priate to the weight and configuration with
strength; power settings corresponding to a 3º glidepath,
(3) the aeroplane must be loaded to the whichever is the most severe, with the landing gear
most unfavourable centre of gravity; and extended, the wing-flaps (i) retracted and
(4) the aeroplane must be loaded to the (ii) extended, the most unfavourable centre of
most unfavourable weight, or at the option of the gravity position approved for landing with the
applicant, the speeds may be determined and maximum landing weight, and with the most
scheduled as a function of weight. unfavourable centre of gravity position approved
for landing regardless of weight; and
(b) Lateral and directional trim. The aeroplane (1) The critical engine inoperative;
must maintain lateral and directional trim with the
most adverse lateral displacement of the centre of (2) The remaining engines in the emergency
gravity within the relevant operating limitations, continuous power or thrust engine operating
during normally expected conditions of operation condition; and
(including operation at any speed from 1.4 VS1 to
VMO/MMO). (3) The landing gear and wing-flaps
retracted.
(c) Longitudinal trim. The aeroplane must
maintain longitudinal trim during – (e) Aeroplanes with four or more engines. Each
aeroplane with four or more engines must maintain
(1) A climb with maximum continuous trim in rectilinear flight –
power at a speed not more than 1.4 VS1 , with the
landing gear retracted, and the wing-flaps
(1) At the climb speed, configuration and
(i) retracted and (ii) in the take-off position;
power required by JAR(BB) 25.123 (a) for the
purpose of establishing gradient of climb; and
(2) Either a glide with power off at a
speed not more than 1.4 VS1, or an approach
(2) With the most unfavourable centre of
gravity position.
STABILITY
Change 11 1—BB—20—2
SECTION 1 JAR—25
or lower than the minimum speed for steady unstalled (ii) The centre of gravity in the most
flight. adverse position (see JAR(BB) 25.27);
(iii) The most critical weight between
(b) The airspeed must return to within 10% of the maximum take-off and maximum land-
the original trim speed for the climb, approach, and ing weights;
landing conditions specified in JAR(BB) 25.175 (a), (iv) The maximum cruising power
(c) and (d), and must return to within 7.5% of the selected by the applicant as an operating
original trim speed for the cruising condition specified limitation (see JAR 25.1521), except that
in JAR(BB) 25.175 (b), when the control force is the power need not exceed that required at
slowly released from any speed within the range VMO/MMO; and
specified in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph. (v) The aeroplane trimmed for level
flight with the power required in sub-para-
(c) The average gradient of the stable slope of graph (iv) above.
the stick force versus speed curve may not be less
than 1 pound for each 6 knots. (See ACJ 25.173 (c).) (2) With the landing gear retracted at low
speed, the stick force curve must have a stable
(d) Within the free return speed range specified slope at all speeds within a range which is the
in sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph, it is permissible greater of 15% of the trim speed plus the resulting
for the aeroplane, without control forces, to stabilise free return speed range, or 50 knots plus the
on speeds above or below the desired trim speeds if resulting free return speed range, above and below
exceptional attention on the part of the pilot is not the trim speed (except that the speed range need
required to return to and maintain the desired trim not include speeds less than 1.4 VS1, nor speeds
speed and altitude. greater than the minimum speed of the applicable
speed range prescribed in sub-paragraph (1), nor
JAR(BB) 25.175 Demonstration of static longi- speeds that require a stick force of more than
tudinal stability 50 pounds), with —
(i) Wing-flaps, centre of gravity
Static longitudinal stability must be shown as position, and weight as specified in sub-
follows: paragraph (1) of this paragraph;
(a) Climb. The stick force curve must have a (ii) Power required for level flight
stable slope at speeds between 85% and 115% of the
speed at which the aeroplane —
(1) Is trimmed with — at a speed equal to ; and
(i) Wing-flaps retracted;
(ii) Landing gear retracted; (iii) The aeroplane trimmed for level
(iii) Maximum take-off weight; and flight with the power required in sub-para-
(iv) The maximum power or thrust graph (ii) above.
selected by the applicant as an operating
limitation for use during climb; and (3) With the landing gear extended, the
(2) Is trimmed at the speed for best rate- stick force curve must have a stable slope at all
of-climb except that the speed need not be less speeds within a range which is the greater of 15%
than 1.4 VS1. of the trim speed plus the resulting free return
speed range, or 50 knots plus the resulting free
(b) Cruise. Static longitudinal stability must return speed range, above and below the trim
be shown in the cruise condition as follows: speed (except that the speed range need not include
(1) With the landing gear retracted at speeds less than 1.4 VS1, nor speeds greater than
high speed, the stick force curve must have a stable VLE, nor speeds that require a stick force of more
slope at all speeds within a range which is the than 50 pounds), with —
greater of 15% of the trim speed plus the resulting (i) Wing-flap, centre of gravity
free return speed range, or 50 knots plus the position, and weight as specified in sub-
resulting free return speed range, above and below paragraph (1);
the trim speed (except that the speed range need (ii) The maximum cruising power
not include speeds less than 1.4 VS1 , nor speeds selected by the applicant as an operating
greater than VFC/MFC, nor speeds that require a limitation, except that the power need not
stick force of more than 50 pounds), with — exceed that required for level flight at VLE;
and
(i) The wing-flaps retracted;
STALLS
(c) The following procedure must be used to JAR(BB) 25.205 Stalls: critical engine inoperative
show compliance with JAR(BB) 25.203;
(a) It must be possible to safely recover from a
[ (1) Starting at a speed sufficiently above stall with the critical engine inoperative —
the stalling speed to ensure that a steady rate of (1) Without applying power to the inop-
speed reduction can be established, apply the erative engine;
longitudinal control so that the speed reduction (2) With flaps and landing gear retracted;
does not exceed one knot per second until (i) the and
aeroplane is stalled, or (ii) the control reaches the (3) With the remaining engines at up to
stop. (See ACJ 25.103 (b) (1).) 75% of maximum continuous power, or up to the
(2) As soon as the aeroplane is stalled, power at which the wings can be held level with
recover by normal recovery techniques. the use of maximum control travel, whichever is
(3) The requirements for turning flight less.
stalls must also be met with accelerated rates of
entry into the stall, i.e. in dynamic stalls. (See (b) The operating engines may be throttled back
ACJ 25.201 (c) (3).) during stall recovery from stalls with the critical
(d) The aeroplane may be considered stalled engine inoperative.
when the behaviour of the aeroplane gives to the pilot
a clear and distinctive indication of an acceptable
nature that the aeroplane is stalled. (See
ACJ 25.201 (d).) JAR (BB) 25.207 Stall warning
Acceptable indications of a stall are —
(1) A nose-down pitch that cannot be (a) Stall warning with sufficient margin to
readily arrested and which may be accompanied prevent inadvertent stalling with the flaps and landing
simultaneously by a rolling motion which is not gear in any normal position must be clear and
immediately controllable (provided that the rolling distinctive to the pilot in straight and turning flight.
motion complies with JAR(BB) 25.203 (b) or (c) [ In addition, such stall warning must be provided in
as appropriate); or each abnormal configuration of the high-lift devices
(2) Severe buffeting, of a magnitude and which is likely to be used in flight following system
severity that is a strong and effective deterrent to failures (including all configurations covered by
further speed reduction; or Flight Manual procedures).]
(3) In the case of dynamic stalls only, (b) The warning may be furnished either through
a significant roll into or out of the turn which is the inherent aerodynamic qualities of the aeroplane
not immediately controllable.] or by a device that will give clearly distinguishable
indications under expected conditions of flight. How-
ever, a visual stall warning device that requires the
attention of the crew within the cockpit is not
acceptable by itself. If a warning device is used, it
JAR(BB) 25.203 Stall characteristics (See must provide a warning in each of the aeroplane
ACJ 25.203.) configurations prescribed in sub-paragraph (a) of
this paragraph at the speed prescribed in sub-paragraph
(a) It must be possible to produce and to (c) of this paragraph. (See ACJ 25.207 (b).)
correct roll and yaw by unreversed use of the aileron [ (c) When the speed is reduced at rates not
and rudder controls, up to the time the aeroplane is exceeding 1 knot per second, stall warning must begin,
stalled. No abnormal nose-up pitching may occur. in each normal configuration, at a speed exceeding
The longitudinal control force must be positive up to the staffing speed (i.e. the speed at which the stall is
and throughout the stall. In addition, it must be identified in accordance with JAR(BB) 25.201 (d),
possible to promptly prevent stalling and to recover or the minimum steady flight speed at which the
from a stall by normal use of the controls. aeroplane is controllable with the longitudinal control
(b) For level wing stalls, the roll occurring on its stop) by not less than the greater of 5% or
between the stall and the completion of the recovery 5 knots CAS. Stall warning must continue throughout
may not exceed approximately 20°. the demonstration, until the angle of attack is reduced
to approximately that at which stall warning is
(c) For turning flight stalls, the action of the
initiated. ]
aeroplane after the stall may not be so violent or
extreme as to make it difficult, with normal piloting
skill, to effect a prompt recovery and to regain
control of the aeroplane.
1—BB—23—2 Change 11
JAR—25 SECTION 1
(1) Wheel brakes must operate smoothly in any likely operating condition. This must be
and may not cause any undue tendency to nose shown by calculations, resonance tests, or other tests
over; and found necessary by the Authority.
(2) If a tail-wheel landing gear is used, (b) Each part of the aeroplane must be shown
it must be possible, during the take-off ground in flight to be free from excessive vibration, under
run on concrete, to maintain any attitude up to any appropriate speed and power conditions up to at
thrust line level, at 80% of VS1 least the minimum value of VD allowed in JAR 25.335.
The maximum speeds shown must be used in
(b) Not required for JAR—25. establishing the operating limitations of the aeroplane
in accordance with JAR 25.1505. In addition, it
must be shown by analysis or tests, that the aeroplane
JAR (BB) 25.233 Directional stability and control is free from such vibration that would prevent safe
flight under the conditions in JAR 25.629 (d).
(a) There may be no uncontrollable ground-
looping tendency in 90° cross winds, up to a wind (c) Except as provided in sub-paragraph (d),
velocity of 20 knots or 0.2 VS0, whichever is greater, there may be no buffeting condition, in normal flight,
except that the wind velocity need not exceed including configuration changes during cruise, severe
25 knots at any speed at which the aeroplane may be enough to interfere with the control of the aeroplane,
expected to be operated on the ground. This may to cause excessive fatigue to the crew, or to cause
be shown while establishing the 90° cross com- structural damage. Stall warning buffeting within
ponent of wind velocity required by JAR(BB) 25.237. these limits is allowable.
(b) Aeroplanes must be satisfactorily controll- (d) There may be no perceptible buffeting
able, without exceptional piloting skill or alertness, condition in the cruise configuration in straight
in power-off landings at normal landing speed, flight at any speed up to VM0/MM0, except that
without using brakes or engine power to maintain a stall warning buffeting is allowable.
straight path. This may be shown during power-off
landings made in conjunction with other tests. (e) With the aeroplane in the cruise config-
uration, the positive manoeuvring load factors at
(c) The aeroplane must have adequate direc- which the onset of perceptible buffeting occurs must
tional control during taxying. This may be shown be determined for the ranges of airspeed or Mach
during taxying prior to take-offs made in conjunction Number, weight, and altitude for which the aeroplane
with other tests. is to be certificated. The envelopes of load factor,
speed, altitude and weight must provide a sufficient
range of speeds and load factors for normal
JAR(BB) 25.235 Taxying condition operations. Probable inadvertent excursions beyond
the boundaries of the buffet onset envelopes may not
The shock absorbing mechanism may not damage [ result in unsafe conditions. (See ACJ 25.251 (e). ) ]
the structure of the aeroplane when the aeroplane is
taxied on the roughest ground that may reasonably
be expected in normal operation.
JAR (BB) 25.253 High-speed characteristics
JAR(BB) 25.237 Wind velocities (a) Speed increase and recovery characteristics.
The following speed increase and recovery character-
(a) A 90° cross component of wind velocity istics must be met:
demonstrated to be safe for take-off and landing, (1) Operating conditions and character-
must be established for dry runways and must be at istics likely to cause inadvertent speed increases
least 20 knots or 0.2 VS0, whichever is greater, (including upsets in pitch and roll) must be
except that it need not exceed 25 knots. simulated with the aeroplane trimmed at any
likely cruise speed up to VM0/MM0. These
(b) Not required for JAR—25. conditions and characteristics include gust upsets,
inadvertent control movements, low stick force
gradient in relation to control friction, passenger
MISCELLANEOUS FLIGHT movement, levelling off from climb, and descent
REQUIREMENTS from Mach to air speed limit altitudes.
(2) Allowing for pilot reaction time after
JAR (BB) 25.251 Vibration and buffeting effective inherent or artificial speed warning
(a) The aeroplane must be designed to with-
stand any vibration and buffeting that might occur
occurs, it must be shown that the aeroplane can down pitching moment must be small. (See
be recovered to a normal attitude and its speed ACJ 25.253 (a) (5).)
reduced to VM0/MM0, without — (6) When the aeroplane is trimmed at
VM0/MM0:-
(i) Exceptional piloting strength or
skill; (i) The slope of the stick force versus
(ii) Exceeding VD/MD, VDF/MDF, speed curve need not be positive at all points
or the structural limitations; and but there must be a push force at all speeds
1
[(iii) Buffeting that would impair up to VDF/MDF.
the pilot's ability to read the instruments (ii) There must be no sudden or
or control the aeroplane for recovery.] excessive reduction of stick force as speed
approaches VDF/MDF.
(3) There may be no control reversal (b) Maximum speed for stability characteristics,
about any axis at any speed up to VDF/MDF. Any VFC/MFC. VFC/MFC is the maximum speed at
reversal of elevator control force or tendency of which the requirements of JAR(BB) 25.147 (e),
the aeroplane to pitch, roll, or yaw must be mild 25.175 (b) (1), 25.177 and 25.181 must be met with
and readily controllable, using normal piloting flaps and landing gear retracted. It may not be less
techniques. Adequate roll capability to assure a than a speed midway between VM0/MM0 and
prompt recovery from a laterally upset condition VDF/MDF, except that, for altitudes where Mach
must be available. (See ACJ 25.253 (a) (3).) Number is the limiting factor, MFC need not exceed
(4) It must be shown that no hazardous the Mach Number at which effective speed warning
control problem will result after autopilot dis- occurs.
connect in extreme atmospheric draughts or
disturbances. Consideration must be given to the
effect of changes in the aeroplane longitudinal JAR (BB) 25.255 Out-of-trim-characteristics (See
trim which might result from these circumstances. ACJ 25.255.)
(5) Trim change due to airbrake selection. (a) From an initial condition with the aeroplane
With the aeroplane trimmed at VM0/MM0, exten- trimmed at cruise speeds up to VM0/MM0 the aero-
sion of the airbrakes at any speed above VM0/MM0 plane must have satisfactory manoeuvring stability
over the available range of movement of the pilots and controllability with the degree of out-of-trim
control must not result in an excessive positive in both the aeroplane nose-up and nose-down
load factor with the stick free, and any nose- directions, which results from the greater of —
1
Ch. 10 (Amend. 83/1, Eff. 17.3.83)
Reissued by Change 11 1—BB—25 Ch. 10 (Amend. 83/2, Eff. 30.8.83)
JAR–25 SECTION 1
(1) –l g to +2.5g; or
JAR 25.301 Loads (c) Where structural flexibility is such that any
rate of load application likely to occur in the
(a) Strength requirements are specified in terms operating conditions might produce transient stresses
of limit loads (the maximum loads to be expected appreciably higher than those corresponding to static
in service) and ultimate loads (limit loads multiplied loads, the effects of this rate of application must be
by prescribed factors of safety). Unless otherwise considered.
provided, prescribed loads are limit loads.
(d) The dynamic response of the aeroplane
(b) Unless otherwise provided the specified air, to vertical and lateral continuous turbulence must be
ground, and water loads must be placed in equilibrium taken into account. (See ACJ 25.305 (d).)
with inertia forces, considering each item of mass in
the aeroplane. These loads must be distributed to
conservatively approximate or closely represent
actual conditions. Methods used to determine load
intensities and distribution must be validated by JAR 25.307 Proof of structure
flight load measurement unless the methods used for
determining those loading conditions are shown to be (a) Compliance with the strength and defor-
reliable. (See ACJ 25.301 (b).) mation requirements of this Subpart must be shown
for each critical loading condition. Structural analysis
(c) If deflections under load would significantly may be used only if the structure conforms to those
change the distribution of external or internal loads, for which experience has shown this method to be
this redistribution must be taken into account. reliable. In other cases, substantiating load tests must
be made. Where substantiating load tests are made
JAR 25.303 Factor of safety these must cover loads up to the ultimate load, unless
it is agreed with the Authority that in the circum-
Unless otherwise specified, a factor of safety of stances of the case, equivalent substantiation can be
1.5 must be applied to the prescribed limit load obtained from tests to agreed lower levels. (See
which are considered external loads on the structure. ACJ 25.307.)
When a loading condition is prescribed in terms of
ultimate loads, a factor of safety need not be applied (b) Compliance with the fatigue evaluation
unless otherwise specified. requirements of JAR 25.571 and 25.573 must be
shown.
(a) The structure must be able to support limit (d) When static or dynamic tests are used to
loads without detrimental permanent deformation. show compliance with the requirements of
At any load up to limit loads, the deformation may JAR 25.305 (b) for flight structures, appropriate
not interfere with safe operation. material correction factors must be applied to the
test results, unless the structure, or part thereof,
(b) The structure must be able to support being tested has features such that a number of
ultimate loads without failure for at least 3 seconds. elements contribute to the total strength of the
However, when proof of strength is shown by dynamic structure and the failure of one element results in the
tests simulating actual load conditions, the 3-second redistribution of the load through alternate load
limit does not apply. Static tests conducted to paths.
ultimate load must include the ultimate deflections
and ultimate deformation induced by the loading.
When analytical methods are used to show compliance FLIGHT LOADS
with the ultimate load strength requirements, it must
be shown that – JAR 25.321 General
(1) The effects of deformation are not (a) Flight load factors represent the ratio of
significant; the aerodynamic force component (acting normal to
(2) The deformations involved are fully the assumed longitudinal axis of the aeroplane) to
accounted for in the analysis; or the weight of the aeroplane. A positive load factor
(3) The methods and assumptions used are is one in which the aerodynamic force acts upward
sufficient to cover the effects of these deformations. with respect to the aeroplane.
1–C–1 Change 8
JAR–25 SECTION 1
(b) Considering compressibility effects at each (b) Manoeuvring balanced conditions. Assuming
speed, compliance with the flight load requirements the aeroplane to be in equilibrium with zero pitching
of this Subpart must be shown – acceleration, the manoeuvring conditions A through I
on the manoeuvring envelope in JAR 25.333 (b) must
(1) At each critical altitude within the be investigated.
range of altitudes selected by the applicant;
(c) Manoeuvring pitching conditions
(2) At each weight from the design mini-
mum weight to the design maximum weight (1) Maximum elevator displacement at VA.
appropriate to each particular flight load condition; The aeroplane is assumed to be flying in steady
and level flight (point A1, JAR 25.333 (b)) and,
except as limited by pilot effort in accordance
(3) For each required altitude and weight, with JAR 25.397 (b), the pitching control is
for any practicable distribution of disposable suddenly moved to obtain extreme positive
load within the operating limitations recorded in pitching (nose up). In defining the tail load
the Aeroplane Flight Manual. condition, the response of the aeroplane may be
taken into account. Loads occurring beyond
the point in time where normal acceleration at the
FLIGHT MANOEUVRE c.g. exceeds the maximum positive limit man-
AND GUST CONDITIONS oeuvring factor n may be ignored.
(1) Enough points on the manoeuvring (d) Gust conditions. The gust conditions B’
and gust envelopes must be investigated to ensure to J’, JAR 25.333 (c), must be investigated. The
that the maximum load for each part of the aero- following provisions apply:
plane structure is obtained. A conservative
combined envelope may be used. (1) The air load increment due to a
specified gust must be added to the initial balancing
(2) The significant forces acting on the tail load corresponding to steady level flight.
aeroplane must be placed in equilibrium in a (2) The alleviating effect of wing down-
rational or conservative manner. The linear inertia wash and of the aeroplane’s motion in response to
forces must be considered in equilibrium with the gust may be included in computing the tail
thrust and all aerodynamic loads, while the angular gust load increment.
(pitching) inertia forces must be considered in (3) Instead of a rational investigation of
equilibrium with thrust and all aerodynamic the aeroplane response, the gust alleviation factor
moments, including moments due to loads on Kg may be applied to the specified gust intensity
components such as tail surfaces and nacelles. for the horizontal tail.
Critical thrust values in the range from zero to
maximum continuous thrust must be considered.
Change 8 1–C–2
SECTION 1 JAR–25
1–C–3 Change 8
JAR–25 SECTION 1
(b) Design dive speed, VD. VD must be selected (i) ng is the positive aeroplane gust
so that VC/MC is not greater than 0.8 VD/MD, or so load factor due to gust at speed VC (in
that the minimum speed margin between VC/MC and accordance with JAR 25.341) and at the
VD/MD is the greater of the following values: particular weight under consideration; and
(1) From an initial condition of stabilised (ii) VS1 is the stalling speed with the
flight at VC/MC, the aeroplane is upset, flown for flaps retracted at the particular weight under
20 seconds along a flight path 7.5º below the consideration.
initial path, and then pulled up at a load factor of (2) VB need not be greater than VC. (See
1.5 g (0.5 g acceleration increment). The speed JAR 25X1517 and JAR 25.1585.)
increase occurring in this manoeuvre may be (e) Design wing-flap speeds, VF. For VF, the
calculated if reliable or conservative aerodynamic following apply:
data issued. Power as specified in JAR 25.175 (b)
(1) (iv) is assumed until the pullup is initiated, at (1) The design wing-flap speed for each
which time power reduction and the use of pilot wing-flap position (established in accordance with
controlled drag devices may be assumed; JAR 25.697 (a)) must be sufficiently greater than
the operating speed recommended for the
(2) The minimum speed margin must be
corresponding stage of flight (including balked
enough to provide for atmospheric variations(such
landings) to allow for probable variations in control
as horizontal gusts, and penetration of jet streams
of airspeed and for transition from one wing-flap
and cold fronts) and for instrument errors and air-
frame production variations. These factors may be position to another.
considered on a probability basis. However, the (2) If an automatic wing-flap positioning
margin at altitude where MC is limited by com- or load limiting device is used, the speeds and
pressibility effects may not be less than 0.05 M. corresponding wing-flap positions programmed or
allowed by the device may be used.
(G) (2) (United Kingdom) The minimum speed (3) VF may not be less than –
margin must be enough to provide for atmospheric (i) 1.6 VS1 with the wing-flaps in
variations (such as horizontal gusts and penetration take-off position at maximum take-off
of jet streams and cold fronts) and for instrument weight;
errors and airframe production variations. These (ii) 1.8 VS1 with the wing-flaps in
factors may be considered on a probability basis. approach position at maximum landing
(See (G) ACJ 25.335 (b) (2).) weight; and
(iii) 1.8 VS0 with the wing-flaps in
(c) Design manoeuvring speed, VA. For VA, landing position at maximum landing weight.
the following apply:
(f) Design drag device speeds, VDD. The selected
(1) VA may not be less than V S1 √n design speed for each drag device must be sufficiently
where – greater than the speed recommended for the operation
(i) n is the limit positive manoeuvring of the device to allow for probable variations in speed
load factor at VC; and control. For drag devices intended for use in high
(ii) VS1 is the stalling speed with speed descents, VDD may not be less than VD. When
wing-flaps retracted. an automatic drag device positioning or load limiting
means is used, the speeds and corresponding drag
(2) VA and VS must be evaluated at the device positions programmed or allowed by the auto-
design weight and altitude under consideration. matic means must be used for design.
(3) VA need not be more than VC or the (g) Design wing-flap speed for procedure flight
speed at which the positive CNmax curve intersects conditions, VF1. VF1 is the speed at which the aero-
the positive manoeuvre load factor line, whichever plane must be flown during procedure flight
is less. conditions. This speed condition is related to
JAR 25.345.
(d) Design speed for maximum gust intensity,
VB
(1) VB may not be less than the speed JAR 25.337 Limit manoeuvring load factors
VBmin, determined by the intersection of the line
representing the maximum position lift CNmax and (a) Except where limited by maximum (static)
the line representing the rough air gust velocity on lift coefficients, the aeroplane is assumed to be
the gust V–n diagram, or (√ng ) VS1, whichever is
less, where –
Change 8 1–C–4
SECTION 1 JAR–25
(b) The positive limit manoeuvring load factor (3) Positive gusts of 25 fps at VD must
'n' for any speed up to VD may not be less than be considered at altitudes between sea-level and
20,000 ft. The gust velocity may be reduced
linearly from 25 fps at 20,000 ft to 12.5 fps at
except that 'n' may not be less 50,000 ft.
than 2.5 and need not be greater than 3.8 – where
‘W’ is the design maximum take-off weight. (4) Negative gust values must be chosen
for the cases (1) to (3) in such a way that the
(c) The negative limit manoeuvring load factor – overall safety level against negative or downward
gust loads is the same as that for upward gust
(1) May not be less than –1.0 at speeds up loads. (See (N) ACJ 25.341 (a) (4).)
to VC; and
(2) Must vary linearly with speed from the (b) The following assumptions must be made:
value at VC to zero at VD.
(1) The shape of the gust is
(d) Manoeuvring load factors lower than those
specified in this paragraph may be used if the aero-
plane has design features that make it impossible to
exceed these values in flight. (See ACJ 25.337 (d).) where –
S = distance penetrated into gust (ft);
JAR 25.341 Gust loads c = mean geometric chord of wing (ft); and
Ude = derived gust velocity referred to in
(a) The aeroplane is assumed to be subjected to sub-paragraph (a) (fps).
symmetrical vertical gusts in level flight. The resulting
limit load factors must correspond to the conditions (2) Gust load factors vary linearly between
determined as follows: the specified conditions B' through G', as shown
(1) Positive (up) and negative (down) [ on the gust envelope in JAR 25.333 (c). (See
rough air gusts of 66 fps at VB must be considered ACJ 25.341 (b) and (G) ACJ 25.341 (b) and(c)
at altitudes between sea-level and 20,000 ft. The (United Kingdom).) ]
gust velocity may be reduced linearly from 66 fps
at 20,000 ft to 38 fps at 50,000 ft. (c) In the absence of a more rational analysis,
the gust load factors must be computed as follows:
(2) Positive and negative gusts of 50 fps at
VC must be considered at altitudes between sea-
level and 20,000 ft. The gust velocity may be
reduced linearly from 50 fps at 20,000 ft to 25 fps where –
at 50,000 ft.
(1) Positive (up)_rough air gust of 66 fps c = mean geometric chord (ft);
at VB must be considered at altitudes between
sea-level and 20,000 ft. The gust velocity may be g = acceleration due to gravity (ft/sec2);
reduced linearly from 66 fps at 20,000 ft to
38 fps at 50,000 ft. V = aeroplanes equivalent speed (knots); and
a = slope of the aeroplane normal force co-efficient symmetrical manoeuvres and gusts within the range
curve CNA per radian if the gust loads are determined by –
applied to the wings and horizontal tail (1) Manoeuvring to a positive limit load
surfaces simultaneously by a rational method. factor of 2.0; and
The wing lift curve slope CL per radian may
be used when the gust load is applied to the (2) Positive and negative 25 fps derived
wings only and the horizontal tail gust loads gusts acting normal to the flight path in level flight.
are treated as a separate condition. (See (b) The aeroplane must be designed for the
ACJ 25.341 (c) and (G) ACJ 25.341 (b) and conditions prescribed in sub-paragraph (a) of this
(c) (United Kingdom).) paragraph, except that the aeroplane load factor
need not exceed 1.0, taking into account, as separate
(G) (d) (United Kingdom) The dynamic response
conditions, the effects of –
to a tuned discrete gust must be taken into account
(1) Propeller slipstream corresponding to
(see (G) ACJ 25.341 (d) (United Kingdom). The
maximum continuous power at the design flap
analysis must take account of unsteady aerody- speeds VF, and with take-off power at not less
namic characteristics and all significant structural than 1.4 times the stalling speed for the particular
degrees of freedom including rigid body motions. flap position and associated maximum weight; and
(b) If a structural reserve fuel condition is (1) Manoeuvring to a positive limit load
selected, it must be used as the minimum fuel weight factor as defined in JAR 25.337 (b); and ]
condition for showing compliance with the flight
load requirements as prescribed in this Subpart. (2) Positive and negative derived gusts as
In addition – prescribed in JAR 25.341 acting normal to the
flight path in level flight.
(1) The structure must be designed for
a condition of zero fuel and oil in the wing at limit (d) The aeroplane must be designed for a
loads corresponding to – manoeuvring load factor of 1.5 g at the maximum
take-off weight with the wing-flaps and similar high
(i) A manoeuvring load factor of lift devices in the landing configuration at maximum
+2.25; and approach speed.
(ii) Gust intensities equal to 85%
of the values prescribed in JAR 25.341; (e) When high lift devices such as flaps or slats
and are used under procedure flight conditions the aero-
plane with these high lift devices in the appropriate
(2) Fatigue evaluation of the structure position must withstand the loads associated with the
must account for any increase in operating stresses conditions prescribed in sub-paragraphs (1) and (2).
resulting from the design condition of sub-para-
graph (b) (1) of this paragraph; and (1) Up to VF1 speed
(i) Manoeuvre up to a positive load-
(3) The flutter, deformation, and vibration ing factor of between 0 and the positive
requirements must also be met with zero fuel. limit manoeuvre factor n1 prescribed by
JAR 25.337 (b).
(ii) Gusts as indicated in JAR 25.341
JAR 25.345 High lift devices (a) (2).
(a) If wing-flaps are to be used during take-off, (2) Above VF1 speed. In the absence of
approach, or landing, at the design flap speeds a more rational investigation of possible speed
established for these stages of flight under JAR 25.335 excursions beyond VF1 the following condition
(e) and with the wing-flaps in the corresponding will be applied. At the speed reached starting
positions, the aeroplane is assumed to be subjected to from level flight at speed VF1 and engine rating
appropriate to this condition with the landing gear (2) Positive and negative derived gust as
retracted and performing a dive of 7.5º for prescribed in JAR 25.341 acting normal to the
10 seconds. flight path in level flight.
(ii) Gusts as indicated in JAR 25.341 (d) The aeroplane must be designed for a
(a) (3). manoeuvring load factor of 1.5 g at the maximum
take-off weight with the wing-flaps and similar high
The foregoing calculations will be carried out for lift devices in the landing configuration at maxi-
an aeroplane weight not exceeding the landing mum appropriate approach speed.
weight and an altitude not exceeding 20,000 ft.
(e) Where the wing-flaps are intended to be
(G) JAR 25.345 High lift devices (United extended in en-route flight conditions, additional
Kingdom) alternative values of VA, VB, VC and VD (identi-
fied by VfA, VfB, VfC and VfD) must be selected
(a) If wing-flaps are to be used during take-off, and shall be appropriate to the en-route wing-flap
approach, or landing, at the design flap speeds positions. The criteria for these en-route speeds
established for these stages of flight under JAR must be based on the criteria of JAR 25.335, as
25.335 (e) and with the wing-flaps in the corre- amended by JAR 25.335 (b), account being taken
sponding positions, the aeroplane is assumed to be of the en-route wing-flap positions.
subjected to symmetrical manoeuvres and gusts
within the range determined by – (f) In the absence of any better information
hold-off conditions immediately prior to landing
(1) Manoeuvring to a positive limit load and prolonged periods immediately following
factor of 2.0; take-off or prior to landing (procedures normally
carried out at a height greater than 2000 ft) are
(2) Positive and negative 25 fps derived considered to be en-route flight.
gusts acting normal to the flight path in level
flight; and
(b) The aeroplane must be designed for the The aeroplane must be designed for rolling loads
conditions prescribed in sub-paragraph (a) of this resulting from the conditions specified in sub-
paragraph, except that the aeroplane load factor paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph. Unbalanced
need not exceed 1.0, taking into account, as aerodynamic moments about the centre of gravity
separate conditions, the effects of – must be reacted in a rational or conservative manner,
(1) Propeller slipstream corresponding to considering the principal masses furnishing the
maximum continuous power at the design flap reacting inertia forces.
speeds VF, and with take-off power at not less
than 1.4 times the stalling speed for the particular (a) Manoeuvring. The following conditions,
flap position and associated maximum weight; speeds, and aileron deflections (except as the
and deflections may be limited by pilot effort) must be
considered in combination with an aeroplane load
(2) A head-on gust of 25 fps velocity factor of zero and of two-thirds of the positive man-
(EAS). oeuvring factor used in design. In determining the
required aileron deflections, the torsional flexibility
(c) (See JAR 25.373.) If wing-flaps or other of the wing must be considered in accordance with
high lift devices are to be used in en-route JAR 25.301 (b):
conditions, (see (G) ACJ 25.345 (c)) and with
wing-flaps in the appropriate position at speeds up (1) Conditions corresponding to steady
to the wing-flap design speed chosen for these rolling velocities must be investigated. In addition,
conditions, the aeroplane is assumed to be conditions corresponding to maximum angular
subjected to symmetrical manoeuvres and gusts acceleration must be investigated for aeroplanes
within the range determined by – with engines or other weight concentrations out-
board of the fuselage. For the angular acceleration
(1) Manoeuvring to a positive limit load conditions, zero rolling velocity may be assumed
factor of JAR 25.337(b). in the absence of a rational time history investi-
gation of the manoeuvre.
(2) At VA, a sudden deflection of the absence of a rational investigation of the aeroplane's
aileron to the stop is assumed. response to a gust, the gust loading on the vertical tail
surface must be computed as follows:
(3) At VC, the aileron deflection must be
that required to produce a rate of roll not less than
that obtained in sub-paragraph (2) of this para-
graph. where –
(4) At VD, the aileron deflection must be Lt = vertical tail load (lb);
that required to produce a rate of roll not less than
one-third of that in sub-paragraph (2) of this = gust alleviation factor;
paragraph.
(3) For turbo-propeller installations, in (c) If landings may be made with the cabin
addition to the conditions specified in sub-para- pressurised, landing loads must be combined with
graphs (1) and (2) of this paragraph, a limit engine pressure differential loads from zero up to the maxi-
torque corresponding to take-off power and mum allowed during landing.
propeller speed, multiplied by a factor accounting
for propeller control system malfunction, including (d) The aeroplane structure must be strong
quick feathering, acting simultaneously with 1 g enough to withstand, omitting other loads, the
level flight loads. In the absence of a rational pressure differential loads corresponding to the
analysis, a factor of 1.6 must be used. greatest of:
JAR 25.363 Side load on engine and auxiliary Ho =maximum opening in square feet, not to
power unit mounts exceed 20 square feet.
(b) The side load prescribed in sub-paragraph (a) (f) In determining the probability of failure or
of this paragraph may be assumed to be independent penetration and probable size of openings, the fail-
of other flight conditions. safe features of the design may be considered if
possible improper operation of closure devices and
inadvertent door openings are also considered. The
JAR 25.365 Pressurised cabin loads pressure relief provided by intercompartment venting
may also be considered.
For each pressurised compartment for occupants,
the following apply: (g) Reasonable design precautions must be
taken to minimise the probability of parts becoming
(a) The aeroplane structure must be strong detached and injuring occupants while in their seats.
enough to withstand the flight loads combined with
pressure differential loads from zero to the maximum
nominal operational differential pressure.
[JAR 25.371 Gyroscopic loads (a) Control surfaces and supporting hinge
brackets must be designed for inertia loads acting
The structure supporting the engines and the parallel to the hinge line. (See ACJ 25.393 (a).)
auxiliary power units must be designed for gyroscopic
loads associated with the conditions specified in (b) In the absence of more rational data, the
JAR 25.331, 25.349 and 25.351 with the engine inertia loads may be assumed to be equal to KW,
or auxiliary power units at maximum continuous where—
rpm.] (1) K = 24 for vertical surfaces;
(2) K = 12 for horizontal surfaces; and
(3) W = weight of the movable surfaces.
JAR 25.373 Speed control devices
1—C—10—1 Change 10
JAR—25 SECTION 1
Change 10 1—C—10—2
SECTION 1 JAR−25
1−C−11 Change 8
JAR−25 SECTION 1
Change 8 1−C−12
SECTION 1 JAR—25
during transition from one wing-flap position and (1) The selected limit vertical inertia
airspeed to another. load factors at the centre of gravity of the aero-
plane may not be less than the values that would
be obtained –
JAR 25.459 Special devices
(i) In the attitude and subject to
The loading for special devices using aerodynamic the drag loads associated with the particular
surfaces (such as slots and spoilers) must be deter-
landing condition;
mined from test data.
(ii) With a limit descent velocity of
10 fps at the design landing weight (the
GROUND LOADS maximum weight for landng conditions
at the maximum descent velocity); and
JAR 25.471 General
(iii) With a limit descent velocity of
(a) Loads and equilibrium. For limit ground 6 fps at the design take-off weight (the
loads– maximum weight for landing conditions at a
reduced descent velocity).
(1) Limit ground loads obtained under
this Subpart are considered to be external forces (2) Aeroplane lift, not exceeding the aero-
applied to the aeroplane structure; and plane weight, may be assumed to exist throughout
the landing impact and to act through the centre
(2) In each specified ground load con- of gravity of the aeroplane.
dition, the external loads must be placed in
equilibrium with the linear and angular inertia (b) The prescribed descent velocities may be
loads in a rational or conservative manner. modified if it is shown that the aeroplane has design
features that make it impossible to develop these
(b) Critical centres of gravity. The critical velocities.
centres of gravity within the range for which certifi- (c) The minimum limit inertia load factors
cation is requested must be selected so that the corresponding to the required limit descent velocities
maximum design loads are obtained in each landing must be determined in accordance with JAR 25.723
gear element. Fore and aft, vertical, and lateral aero-
(a).
plane centres of gravity must be considered. Lateral
(d) The aeroplane must withstand landing at
displacements of the centre of gravity from the
the velocities of descent prescribed in sub-paragraph
aeroplane centreline which would result in main gear
(a) (1) (ii) above without bottoming of any of the
loads not greater than 103% of the critical design load
for symmetrical loading conditions may be selected energy absorbing elements including tyres, unless such
without considering the effects of these lateral centre bottoming can occur without detriment to the
of gravity displacements on the loading of the main continuing safe functioning of the element.
gear elements, or on the aeroplane structure provided –
(e) Except for aeroplanes for which the struct-
(1) The lateral displacement of the centre ural flexibility effects are negligible, the effect of the
of gravity results from random passenger or cargo dynamic response of the structure must be covered
disposition within the fuselage or from random by an analysis at a limit descent velocity of 10 ft/sec
unsymmetrical fuel loading or fuel usage; and for the complete flight structure. The method of
analysis must take into account at least the following
(2) Appropriate loading instructions for elements:
random disposable loads are included under the (1) the structural flexibility (excluding
provisions of JAR 25.1583 (c) (1) to ensure that landing gear),
the lateral displacement of the centre of gravity
is maintained within these limits. (2) the aerodynamic conditions assumed
to be constant, and
(c) Landing gear dimension data. Figure 1 of
Appendix A contains the basic landing gear dimension (3) an analytical model of the main landing
data. gear dynamic characteristics substantiated by drop
test:
JAR 25.473 Ground load conditions and
assumptions The method of analysis may be modified when appro-
priate flight test measurements are available.
(a) For the landing conditions specified in
JAR 25.479 to 25.485, the following apply:
1—C—13 Change 8
JAR—25 SECTION 1
JAR 25.479 to 25.485 apply to aeroplanes with (4) The worst combination of loads which
conventional arrangements of main and nose gears, are likely to arise during a lateral drift landing
or main and tail gears, when normal operating tech- must be taken into account. In the absence of a
niques are used. more rational analysis of this condition, the
following must be investigated:
JAR 25.479 Level landing conditions (i) A vertical load equal to 75% of
the maximum ground reaction of JAR 25.473
(a) In the level attitude,the aeroplane is assumed must be considered in combination with a
to contact the ground at forward velocity components, drag and side load of 40% and 25% respect-
ranging from VL1 to 1.25 VL2 , parallel to the ground, ively of that vertical load.
and to be subjected to the load factors prescribed in
JAR 25.473 (a) (1) with — (ii) The shock absorber and tyre
deflections must be assumed to be 75% of
(1) VL1 equal to VS0 (TAS) at the appro- the deflection corresponding to the maximum
priate landing weight and in standard sea-level ground reaction of JAR 25.473 (a) (1) (ii).
conditions; and This load case need not be considered in
combination with flat tyres.
(2) VL2 equal to VS0 (TAS) at the appro- (d) For the level landing attitude for aeroplanes
priate landing weight and altitudes in a hot-day with tail wheels, the conditions specified in sub-para-
temperature of 41°F above standard. graphs (a) through (c) of this paragraph must be
(b) The effects of increased contact speeds must investigated with the aeroplane horizontal reference
be investigated if approval of downwind landings line horizontal in accordance with Figure 2 of
exceeding 10 knots is desired. Appendix A.
(c) Assuming that the following combinations (e) For the level landing attitude for aeroplanes
of vertical and drag components act at the axle centre- with nose wheels, shown in Figure 2 of Appendix A,
line, the following apply: the conditions specified in sub-paragraphs (a) through
(c) of this paragraph must be investigated, assurriing
(1) For the condition of maximum wheel the following attitudes:
spin-up load, drag components simulating the (1) An attitude in which the main wheels
forces required to accelerate the wheel rolling are assumed to contact the ground with the nose
assembly up to the specified ground speed must be wheel just clear of the ground.
combined with the vertical ground reactions (2) If reasonably attainable at the specified
existing at the instant of peak drag loads. The co- descent and forward velocities, an attitude in
efficient of friction between the tyres and the which the nose and main wheels are assumed to
ground may be established by considering the contact the ground simultaneously. For this
effects of skidding velocity and tyre pressure. attitude –
However, this coefficient of friction need not be
(i) The nose and main gear may be
more than 0.8. This condition must be applied
separately investigated under the conditions
to the landing gear, directly affected attaching
in sub-paragraph (c) (1) and (3) of this
structure, and large mass items such as external
paragraph; and
fuel tanks and nacelles.
(ii) The pitching moment is assumed
(2) For the condition of maximum wheel
under the condition in sub-paragraphs (c) (2)
vertical load, an aft acting drag component of not
and (c) (4) of this paragraph, to be resisted
less than 25% of the maximum vertical ground
by the nose gear.
reaction must be combined with the maximum
ground reaction of JAR 25.473.
(3) For the condition of maximum spring-
back load, forward-acting horizontal loads resulting
JAR 25.481 Tail-down landing conditions
from a rapid reduction of the spin-up drag loads
must be combined with the vertical ground
(a) In the tail-down attitude, the aeroplane is
reactions at the instant of the peak forward load.
assumed to contact the ground at forward velocity
This condition must be applied to the landing gear,
directly affected attaching structure, and large components, ranging from VL1 to VL2, parallel to
mass items such as external fuel tanks and nacelles. the ground, and is subjected to the load factors
prescribed in JAR 25.473 (a) (1) with–
(1) VL1 equal to VS0 (TAS) at the appro-
priate landing weight and in standard sea-level
conditions; and
Change 8 1−C−14
SECTION 1 JAR—25
(2) VL2 equal to VS0 (TAS) at the appro- JAR 25.487 Rebound landing condition
priate landing weight and altitudes in a hot-day (a) The landing gear and its supporting structure
temperature of 41°F above standard. must be investigated for the loads occurring during
The combination of vertical and drag components rebound of the aeroplane from the landing surface.
specified in JAR 25.479 (c) (1) and (3) is considered
to be acting at the main wheel axle centreline. (b) With the landing gear fully extended and not
in contact with the ground, a load factor of 20.0
(b) For the tail-down landing condition for must act on the unsprung weights of the landing gear.
aeroplanes with tail wheels, the main and tail wheels This load factor must act in the direction of motion
are assumed to contact the ground simultaneously, in of the unsprung weights as they reach their limiting
accordance with Figure 3 of Appendix A. Ground positions in extending with relation to the sprung
reaction conditions on the tail wheel are assumed to parts of the landing gear.
act —
(1) Vertically; and JAR 25.489 Ground handling conditions
(2) Up and aft through the axle at 45° to
the ground line. Unless otherwise prescribed, the landing gear and
aeroplane structure must be investigated for the
(c) For the tail-down landing condition for conditions in JAR 25.491 to 25.509 with the aero-
aeroplanes with nose wheels, the aeroplane is assumed plane at the design ramp weight (the maximum
to be at an attitude corresponding to either the weight for ground handling conditions). No wing lift
stalling angle or the maximum angle allowing clearance may be considered. The shock absorbers and tyres
with the ground by each part of the aeroplane other may be assumed to be in their static position.
than the main wheels, in accordance with Figure 3
of Appendix A, whichever is less. JAR 25.491 Take-off run
JAR 25.483 One-wheel landing conditions The landing gear and the aeroplane structure are
For the one-wheel landing condition, the aero- assumed to be subjected to loads not less than those
plane is assumed to be in the level attitude and to obtained under conditions described in JAR 25.235.
contact the ground on one side of the main landing (See also ACJ 25.491.)
gear, in accordance with Figure 4 of Appendix A.
In this attitude — JAR 25.493 Braked roll conditions
(a) An aeroplane with a tail wheel is assumed
(a) The ground reactions must be the same as to be in the level attitude with the load on the main
those obtained on that side under paragraphs wheels, in accordance with Figure 6 of Appendix A.
JAR 25.479 (c) (2) and (c) (4) with the nose gear just The limit vertical load factor is 1.2 at the design
clear of the ground. landing weight, and 1.0 at the design ramp weight.
(b) Each unbalanced external load must be A drag reaction equal to the vertical reaction multi-
reacted by aeroplane inertia in a rational or conser- plied by a coefficient of friction of 0.8, must be
vative manner. combined with the vertical ground reaction and
applied at the ground contact point.
JAR 25.485 Side load conditions
(a) For the side load condition, the aeroplane (b) For an aeroplane with a nose wheel, the
is assumed to be in the level attitude with only the limit vertical load factor is 1.2 at the design landing
main wheels contacting the ground, in accordance weight, and 1.0 at the design ramp weight. A drag
with Figure 5 of Appendix A. reaction equal to the vertical reaction, multiplied by
a coefficient of friction of 0.8, must be combined
(b) Side loads of 0.8 of the vertical reaction (on with the vertical reaction and applied at the ground
one side) acting inward and 0.6 of the vertical reaction contact point of each wheel with brakes. The
(on the other side) acting outward must be combined following two attitudes, in accordance with Figure 6
with one-half of the maximum vertical ground of Appendix A, must be considered:
reactions obtained in the level landing conditions. (1) The level attitude with the wheels
These loads are assumed to be applied at the ground contacting the ground and the loads distributed
contact point and to be resisted by the inertia of the between the main and nose gear. Zero pitching
aeroplane. The drag loads may be assumed to be zero. acceleration is assumed.
1—C—15 Change 8
JAR—25 SECTION 1
(2) The level attitude with only the main (b) If there is a swivel, the tail wheel is assumed
gear contacting the ground and with the pitching to be swivelled 90° to the aeroplane longitudinal
moment resisted by angular acceleration. axis with the resultant load passing through the axle.
(c) A drag reaction lower than that prescribed (c) If there is a lock, steering device, or shimmy
in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph may damper the tail wheel is also assumed to be in the
be used if it is substantiated that an effective drag trailing position with the side load acting at the
force of 0.8 times the vertical reaction cannot be ground contact point.
attained under any likely loading condition. (See
ACJ 25.493 (c).) JAR 25.499 Nose-wheel yaw and steering
(G) (d) (United Kingdom) Due consideration (a) A vertical load factor of 1.0 at the aeroplane
should be given to the maximum likely comb- centre of gravity, and a side component at the nose
ination of vertical dynamic reaction and sudden wheel ground contact equal to 0.8 of the vertical
increase in drag load which could occur on the ground reaction at that point are assumed.
nose gear as a result of sudden main gear braking (b) With the aeroplane assumed to be in static
whilst encountering obstacles in circumstances equilibrium with the loads resulting from the use of
such as aborted take-offs resulting in over-runs on brakes on one side of the main landing gear, the nose
to semi-prepared surfaces, avoidance manoeuvres gear, its attaching structure, and the fuselage structure
resulting in running off the edge then back on to forward of the centre of gravity must be designed for
the runway, running over displaced or lowered the following loads:
edges of runway paving and inadvertent use of (1) A vertical load factor at the centre
runway paving and inadvertent use of runways of gravity of 1.0.
under repair. In the absence of a more rational (2) A forward acting load at the aeroplane
analysis of this condition, the following shall be centre of gravity of 0.8 times the vertical load on
investigated, applied to the nose gear and to the one main gear.
airframe considered as a rigid structure: (3) Side and vertical loads at the ground
contact point on the nose gear that are required
At design take-off weight, with nose and main for static equilibrium
gears in contact with the ground, a limit vertical (4) A side load factor at the aeroplane
load factor of 1.0 shall be combined with a total centre of gravity of zero.
drag reaction at both main gears equal to twice the
total drag reaction as determined under sub-para- (c) If the loads prescribed in sub-paragraph (b)
graphs JAR 25.493 (b) and (c). The resulting nose of this paragraph result in a nose gear side load higher
gear vertical reaction shall be combined with a drag than 0.8 times the vertical nose gear load, the design
load equal to 20% of the vertical reaction. This nose gear side load may be limited to 0.8 times the
condition shall be satisfied without bottoming of vertical load, with unbalanced yawing moments
any of the energy absorbing elements, including assumed to be resisted by aeroplane inertia forces.
tyres.
(d) For other than the nose gear, its attaching
structure, and the forward fuselage structure the
loading conditions are those prescribed in sub-para-
JAR 25.495 Turning graph (b) of this paragraph, except that —
In the static position, in accordance with Figure 7 (1) A lower drag reaction may be used if
of Appendix A, the aeroplane is assumed to execute an effective drag force of 0.8 times the vertical
a steady turn by nose gear steering, or by application reaction cannot be reached under any likely
of sufficient differential power, so that the limit load loading condition; and
factors applied at the centre of gravity are 1.0 verti- (2) The forward acting load at the centre
cally and 0.5 laterally. The side ground reaction of of gravity need not exceed the maximum drag
each wheel must be 0.5 of the vertical reaction. reaction on one main gear, determined in accord-
ance with JAR 25.493 (b).
JAR 25.497 Tail-wheel yawing
(e) At design take-off weight for. the nose-
(a) A vertical ground reaction equal to the static wheel in any steerable position the application of
load on the tail wheel, in combination with a side 1.33 times the full steering torque combined with a
component of equal magnitude, is assumed. vertical reaction equal to 1.33 times the maximum
static reaction on the nose wheel must be assumed.
Change 8 1−C−16
SECTION 1 JAR—25
JAR 25.503 Pivoting JAR 25.509 (a) (continued)
(a) The aeroplane is assumed to pivot about one (3) With WT as the design ramp weight,
side of the main gear with the brakes on that side the towing load, FTOW is —
locked. The limit vertical load factor must be 1.0 and
the coefficient of friction 0.8. (i) 0.3 WT for WT less than 30,000
pounds;
(b) The aeroplane is assumed to be in static
equilibrium, with the loads being applied at the (ii) for WT between
ground contact points, in accordance with Figure 8
of Appendix A. 30,000 and 100,000 pounds; and
(iii) 0.15 WT for WT over 100,000
JAR 25.507 Reversed braking pounds.
(a) The aeroplane must be in a three point static (b) For towing points not on the landing gear
ground attitude. Horizontal reactions parallel to the but near the plane of symmetry of the aeroplane,
ground and directed forward must be applied at the the drag and side tow load components specified for
ground contact point of each wheel with brakes. the auxiliary gear apply. For towing points located
The limit loads must be equal to 0.55 times the outbroad of the main gear, the drag and side tow load
vertical load at each wheel or to the load developed components specified for the main gear apply. Where
by 1.2 times the nominal maximum static brake the specified angle of swivel cannot be reached, the
torque, whichever is less. maximum obtainable angle must be used.
(b) For aeroplanes with nose wheels, the pitching (c) The towing loads specified in sub-paragraph
moment must be balanced by rotational inertia. (d) of this paragraph must be reacted as follows:
(c) For aeroplanes with tail wheels, the resultant (1) The side component of the towing
of the ground reactions must pass through the centre load at the main gear must be reacted by a side
of gravity of the aeroplane. force at the static ground line of the wheel to
which the load is applied.
JAR 25.509 Towing loads (2) The towing loads at the auxiliary gear
and the drag components of the towing loads at
(a) The towing loads specified in sub-paragraph the main gear must be reacted as follows:
(d) of this paragraph must be considered separately.
These loads must be applied at the towing fittings (i) A reaction with a maximum
and must act parallel to the ground. In addition — value equal to the vertical reaction must be
applied at the axle of the wheel to which
(1) A vertical load factor equal to 1.0 the load is applied. Enough aeroplane inertia
must be considered acting at the centre of gravity; to achieve equilibrium must be applied.
(2) The shock struts and tyres must be (ii) The loads must be reacted by
in their static positions, and aeroplane inertia.
(d) The prescribed towing loads are as specified
in the following Table.
1–C–17 Change 8
JAR—25 SECTION 1
JAR 25.511 Ground load: unsymmetrical loads on respect to the loading conditions specified in sub-
multiple-wheel units paragraphs (d) through (f) of this paragraph, taking
into account the physical arrangement of the gear
(a) General. Multiple-wheel landing gear units components. In addition —
are assumed to be subjected to the limit ground loads (1) The deflation of any one tyre for each
prescribed in this Subpart under sub-paragraphs (b) multiple wheel landing gear unit, and the deflation
though (f) of this paragraph. In addition — of any two critical tyres for each landing gear unit
using four or more wheels per unit, must be
(1) A tandem strut gear arrangement is considered; and
a multiple-wheel unit; and
(2) In determining the total load on a (2) The ground reactions must be applied
gear unit with respect to the provisions of sub- to the wheels with inflated tyres except that, for
paragraphs (b) through (f) of this paragraph, the multiple-wheel gear units with more than one
transverse shift in the load centroid, due to shock strut, a rational distribution of the ground
unsymmetrical load distribution on the wheels, reactions between the deflated and inflated tyres,
may be neglected. accounting for the differences in shock strut
extensions resulting from a deflated tyre, may be
(b) Distribution of limit loads to wheels; tyres used.
inflated. The distribution of the limit loads among
the wheels of the landing gear must be established (d) Landing conditions. For one and for two
for each landing, taxying, and ground handling con- deflated tyres, the applied load to each gear unit is
dition, taking into account the effects of the following assumed to be 60% and 50%, respectively, of the limit
factors: load applied to each gear for each of the prescribed
(1) The number of wheels and their landing conditions. However, for the drift landing
physical arrangements. For truck type landing condition of JAR 25.485, 100% of the vertical
gear units, the effects of any see-saw motion of the load must be applied.
truck during the landing impact must be considered (e) Taxying and ground handling conditions.
in determining the maximum design loads for the For one and for two deflated tyres —
fore and aft wheel pairs.
(1) The applied side or drag load factor,
(2) Any differentials in tyre diameters or both factors, at the centre of gravity must be
resulting from a combination of manufacturing the most critical value up to 50% and 40%,
tolerances, tyre growth, and tyre wear. A maxi- respectively, of the limit side or drag load factors,
mum tyre-diameter differential equal to two- or both factors, corresponding to the most severe
thirds of the most unfavourable combination of condition resulting from consideration of the
diameter variations that is obtained when taking prescribed taxying and ground handling conditions;
into account manufacturing tolerances, tyre (2) For the braked roll conditions of
growth and tyre wear, may be assumed. JAR 25.493 (a) and (b) (2), the drag loads on each
inflated tyre may not be less than those at each
(3) Any unequal tyre inflation pressure, tyre for the symmetrical load distribution with no
assuming the maximum variation to be ±5% of the deflated tyres;
nominal tyre inflation pressure. (3) The vertical load factor at the centre
(4) A runway crown of zero and a runway of gravity must be 60% and 50% respectively, of
crown having a convex upward shape that may be the factor with no deflated tyres, except that it
approximated by a slope of 1½% with the may not be less than 1 g; and
horizontal. Runway crown effects must be
considered with the nose gear unit on either slope (4) Pivoting need not be considered.
of the crown.
(f) Towing conditions. For one and for two
(5) The aeroplane attitude. deflated tyres, the towing load, FTOW, must be 60%
(6) Any structural deflections. and 50% respectively, of the load prescribed.
The resulting side to side distribution on the unit
must not be assumed less than the ratio 55:45. For JAR 25X519 Static ground load conditions
twin wheel units a loading distribution in the ratio
55:45 may be considered in lieu of the rational (a) Picketing. At all weights between the
analysis of this sub-paragraph (b). Weight Empty. and the maximum weight, stated in
(c) Deflated tyres. The effect of deflated the appropriate Manual, the main picketing points
tyres on the structure must be considered with and surrounding structure, control systems and
Change 8 1−C−18
SECTION 1 JAR—25
surfaces must be designed for the limit load conditions, (F) (D) (3) (France) (Germany) All combi-
arising when picketed resulting from wind speeds of nations of inertia forces (which are expressed as
up to 65 knots horizontally from any direction. accelerations) in the following ranges up to a maxi-
mum resultant of 9 g are experienced, taking the
1
[ (F) JAR 25X519 (a) Static ground load condi-] forces in each case as relative to the aeroplane —
tions (France)Not required for French certifi-
cation. 4.5 g downwards to 2.0 g upwards,
9 g forwards to 1.5 g rearwards
(b) Jacking. The aeroplane structure must be zero to 1.5 g sideways.
designed to the following limit load conditions when However, combinations of loads need not be taken
the aeroplane is supported on jacks taking into into account for seats, berths and other commercial
account the most adverse weight and centre of gravity accommodation equipment.
combinations:
(1) Jacking by landing gear up to the
maximum ramp weight. (c) Equipment, cargo in the passenger compart-
vertical load 1.33 F ment and other large masses must be positioned so
resultant of the longitudinal and lateral loads 0.33 F that if they break loose they are unlikely to cause
injury to the occupants, penetrate fuel tanks, or fuel
(2) Jacking by the aeroplane structure up lines, or to nullify any of the escape facilities provided
to the maximum weight and centre of gravity for use after an emergency alighting. When such
selected by the applicant. positioning is not practical (e.g. fuselage mounted
vertical load 2F engines; auxiliary power units) the attachment must
resultant of the longitudinal and lateral loads 0-33 F be designed to 1.33 times the accelerations of sub-
F is the vertical static reaction at each jacking point. paragraph (b) (3) of this paragraph. (See also
The weight and centre of gravity for each mode of ACJ 25.561 (c).)
jacking must be specified in the appropriate
manual.
JAR 25.563 Structural ditching provisions
EMERGENCY LANDING CONDITIONS Structural strength considerations of ditching
provisions must be in accordance with JAR 25.801 (e).
JAR 25.561 General
1
Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/1, Eff. 30.4.84)
1—C—19 Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/2, Eff. 18.11.85)
(iii) An analysis, supported by test
evidence, of the principal structural e1ements
and detail design points identified in sub
paragraph (a) (1) (ii) of this paragraph. [
(1) Sonic fatigue cracks are not probable (2) Incorporating acceptable means of
in any part of the flight structure to sonic diverting the resulting electrical current so as not
excitation; or to endanger the aeroplane.
(2) Catastrophic failure caused by sonic
cracks is not probable assuming that the loads
prescribed in sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph
are applied to all areas affected by those cracks.
LIGHTNING PROTECTION
JAR 25.581 Lightning protection
(a) The aeroplane must be protected against
catastrophic effects from lightning. (See JAR 25X899
and ACJ 25.581.)
(b) For metallic components, compliance with
sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph may be shown
by: —
(1) Bonding the components properly to
the airframe; or
(2) Designing the components so that a
strike will not endanger the aeroplane.
1—C—21 Change 8
JAR—25 SECTION 1
Change 8 1—C—22
SECTION 1 JAR—25
(a) Each removable bolt, screw, nut, pin or JAR 25.613 Material strength properties and
other removable fastener (see ACJ 25.607 (a)) must design values
[ incorporate two separate locking devices if —]
(a) Material strength properties must be based
(1) Its loss could preclude continued flight
on enough tests of material meeting approved speci-
and landing within the design limitations of the
fications to establish design values on a statistical
aeroplane using normal pilot skill and strength; or
basis.
(2) Its loss could result in reduction in
(b) Design values must be chosen so that the
pitch, roll or yaw control capability or response
probability of any structure being under-strength
below that required by Subpart B of this JAR—25.
because of material variations is extremely remote.
(d) The strength, detail design, and fabrication JAR 25.619 Special factors
of the structure must minimise the probability of
disastrous fatigue failure, particularly at points of The factor of safety prescribed in JAR 25.303
stress concentration. must be multiplied by the highest pertinent special
factor of safety prescribed in JAR 25.621 through
(e) Material specifications must be those JAR 25.625 for each part of the structure whose
contained in documents accepted either specifically strength is –
by the Authority or by having been prepared by an
organisation or person which the Authority accepts (a) Uncertain.
has the necessary capabilities. In defining design (b) Likely to deteriorate in service before
properties these material specification values must normal replacement; or
be modified and/or extended as necessary by the (c) Subject to appreciable variability because of
constructor to take account of manufacturing uncertainties in manufacturing processes or nspection
practices (for example method of construction, methods.
[ forming, machining and subsequent heat treatment). ]
Where the Authority is not satisfied in a specific case
that a special factor is the correct approach to
JAR 25.615 Design properties ensuring the necessary integrity of the parts of the
structure under service conditions, other appropriate
(a) Design properties outlined in the documents measures must be taken.
referred to in JAR 25.613 (e) may be used subject
to the following conditions:
(1) Where applied loads are eventually JAR 25.621 Casting factors
distributed through a single member within an
assembly, the failure of which would result in the The approved national standards of the partici-
loss of the structural integrity of the component pants are accepted by the Authorities as alternatives
involved, the guaranteed minimum design to FAR 25.621.
mechanical properties ('A' values) when listed in
the documents referred to in JAR 25.613 (e) must
be met. JAR 25.623 Bearing factors
(2) Redundant structures, in which the (a) Except as provided in sub-paragraph (b)
failure of the individual elements would result in of this paragraph, each part that has clearance (free
applied loads being safely distributed to other load fit), and that is subject to pounding or vibration,
carrying members, may be designed on the basis must have a bearing factor large enough to provide
of the ‘90% probability (‘B’ values)’ when listed for the effects of normal relative motion.
in the documents referred to in JAR 25.613 (e).
(b) No bearing factor need be used for a part
(3) ‘A’ and ‘B’ values are defined as for which any larger special factor is prescribed.
follows:
(i) An ‘A’ is a value above which at JAR 25.625 Fitting factors
least 99% of the population of values is
expected to fall with a confidence of 95%. For each fitting (a part or terminal used to join
one structural member to another), the following
(ii) A ‘B’ value is a value above apply:
which at least 90% of the population of
values is expected to fall with a confidence (a) For each fitting whose strength is not proven
of 95%. by limit and ultimate load tests in which actual
stress conditions are simulated in the fitting and
(b) Design values greater than the guaranteed surrounding structures, a fitting factor of at least
minimums required by sub-paragraph (a) of this 1.15 must be applied to each part of –
paragraph may be used where only guaranteed min-
mum values are normally allowed if a ‘premium (1) The fitting;
selection’ of the material is made in which a specimen (2) The means of attachment; and
of each individual item is tested before use to (3) The bearing on the joined members.
determine that the actual strength properties of that
(b) No fitting factor need be used –
particular item will equal or exceed those used in
design. (1) For joints made under approved
practices and based on comprehensive test data
(such as continuous joints in metal plating, welded
joints, and scarf joints in wood); or
(2) With respect to any bearing surface (c) Loss of control due to structural deformation.
for which a larger special factor is used. The aeroplane must be designed to be free from
control reversal and from undue loss of longitudinal,
(c) For each integral fitting, the part must be lateral, and directional stability and control, as a
treated as a fitting up to the point at which the result of structural deformation (including that of the
section properties become typical of the member. control surface covering) at speeds up to the speed
prescribed in sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph for
(d) For each seat, berth, safety belt, and harness, flutter prevention.
the fitting factors specified in JAR 25.785 (i) (3) and
25.1413 (c) apply. (d) Fail-safe criteria. The following fail-safe
criteria must be met:
JAR 25.62 Flutter, deformation, and fail-safe (1) It must be shown, by analysis or tests,
criteria that the aeroplane is free from such flutter or
divergence that would preclude safe flight, at any
(a) General. Compliance with this paragraph speed up to VD, after each of the following:
must be shown by calculations, resonance tests, or
other tests found necessary by the Authority. Full (i) Each of the failures, mal-
scale flight flutter tests at speeds up to VDF/MDF for functions, or adverse conditions listed in
the critical aeroplane flutter modes must be conducted sub-paragraph (4) of this paragraph.
when – (ii) Any other combination of
(1) MD is equal to or greater than 0.8 M; failures not shown to be extremely
improbable.
(2) The adequacy of flutter analysis and
wind tunnel tests have not been established by- (2) If a failure, malfunction, or adverse
previous experience with aircraft having similar condition described in sub-paragraph (4) of this
design features; or paragraph is simulated during a flight test in
showing compliance with this paragraph, the
(3) The conditions specified in sub-para- maximum speed investigated need not exceed
graph (1) or (2) of this paragraph exist, and VFC if it is shown, by correlation of the flight test
modifications to the type design have a significant data with other test data or analyses, that
effect on the critical flutter modes. hazardous flutter or divergence will not occur at
any speed up to VD.
(b) Flutter and divergence prevention. The
dynamic evaluation of the aeroplane must include an (3) The structural failures described in
investigation of the significant elastic, inertia, and sub-paragraph (4) (i) and (4) (ii) of this paragraph
aerodynamic forces associated with the rotations need not be considered in showing compliance
and displacements of the plane of the propeller. In with this paragraph if engineering data substantiate
addition, the following apply: that the probability of their occurrence is negligible
by showing that the structural element is designed
(1) The aeroplane must be designed to be with –
free from flutter and divergence (unstable
structural distoration due to aerodynamic loading) (i) Conservative static strength
for all combinations of altitude and speed margins for each ground and flight loading
encompassed by the VD/MD versus altitude condition specified in this JAR–25; or
envelope enlarged at. all points by an increase of
20% in equivalent air-speed at both constant Mach (ii) Sufficient fatigue strength for
number and constant altitude, except that Mach the loading spectrum expected in operation.
effects for Mach numbers greater than 1.0 need
(4) The failures, malfunctions, or adverse
not be included when MD is less than 1.0 at all
conditions used to show compliance with this
design altitudes and the following is established – paragraph are as follows:
(i) A proper margin of damping (i) Failure of any single element of
exists at all speeds up to MD; and the structure supporting any engine, inde-
pendently mounted propeller shaft, large
(ii) There is no large and rapid auxiliary power unit, or large externally
reduction in damping as MD is approached. mounted aerodynamic body (such as an
external fuel tank).
(2) If concentrated balance weights are
used on control surfaces, their effectiveness and (ii) Any single failure of the engine
strength, including supporting structure, must be structure, on turbo-propeller aeroplanes,
that would reduce the yaw or pitch rigidity
substantiated.
of the propeller rotational axis.
1–D–3 Change 8
JAR–25 SECTION 1
(iii) Absence of propeller aerody- (b) Compliance with the special factors require-
namic forces resulting from the feathering ments of JAR 25.619 to 25.625 and 25.657 for
of any single propeller, and, for aeroplanes control surface hinges must be shown by analysis or
with four or more engines, the feathering of individual load tests.
the critical combination of two propellers.
In addition, any single feathered propeller
must be paired with the failures, specified JAR 25.655 Installation
in (d) (4) (i) of this sub-paragraph, involving
failure of any single element of the structure (a) Movable tail surfaces must be installed so
supporting any engine or independently that there is no interference between any surfaces
mounted propeller shaft, and the failures when one is held in its extreme position and the others
specified in (d) (4) (ii) of this sub-paragraph. are operated through their full angular movement.
(iv) Any single propeller rotating at (b) If an adjustable stabiliser is used, it must
the highest likely overspeed. have stops that will limit its range of travel to the
maximum for which the aeroplane is shown to meet
(v) Failure of each principal struc- the trim requirements of JAR 25.161.
tural element selected for compliance with
JAR 25.571(b). Safety following a failure
may be substantiated by showing that JAR 25.657 Hinges
losses in rigidity or changes in frequency,
mode shape, or damping are within the (a) For control surface hinges, including ball,
parameter variations shown to be satis- roller, and self-lubricated bearing hinges, the approved
factory in the flutter and divergence invest- rating of the bearing may not be exceeded. For non-
igations. standard bearing hinge configurations; the rating must
be established on the basis of experience or tests and,
(vi) Any single failure or mal- in the absence of a rational investigation, a factor
function, or combinations thereof, in the of safety of not less than 6.67 must be used with
flight control system considered under respect to the ultimate bearing strength of the softest
JAR 25.671, 25.672 and 25.1309, and any material used as a bearing.
single failure in any flutter damper system.
Investigation of forced structural vibration (b) Hinges must have enough strength and
other than flutter, resulting from failures, rigidity for loads parallel to the hinge line.
malfunctions, or adverse conditions in the
automatic flight control system may be
limited to airspeed up to VC.
CONTROL SYSTEMS
Change 8 1–D–4
SECTION 1 JAR–25
(1) Any single failure not shown to be limitations that is critical for the type of failure
extremely improbable, excluding jamming, (for being considered. (See ACJ 25.672 (c) (1 ).)
example, disconnection or failure of mechanical
elements, or structural failure of hydraulic com- (2) The controllability and manoeuvrability
ponents, such as actuators, control spool housing, requirements of this JAR–25 are met within a
and valves). (See also ACJ 25.671 (c) (1).) practical operational flight envelope (for example,
speed, altitude, normal acceleration, and aeroplane
(2) Any combination of failures not configurations) which is described in the Aeroplane
shown to be extremely improbable, excluding Flight Manual; and
jamming (for example, dual electrical or hydraulic
system failures, or any single failure in combination (3) The trim, stability, and stall character-
with any probable hydraulic or electrical failure). istics are not impaired below a level needed to
permit continued safe flight and landing.
(3) Any jam in a control position normally
encountered during take-off, climb, cruise, normal
turns, descent and landing unless the jam is shown JAR 25.673 Two-control aeroplanes
to be extremely improbable, or can be alleviated.
A runaway of a flight control to an adverse position Two-control aeroplanes must be able to continue
and jam must be accounted for if such runaway safely in flight and landing if any one connecting
and subsequent jamming is not extremely element in the directional-lateral flight control system
improbable. fails.
(c) It must be shown that after any single (c) Trim control systems must be designed
failure of the stability augmentation system or any to prevent creeping in flight. Trim tab controls must
other automatic or power-operated system – be irreversible unless the tab is appropriately balanced
and shown to be free from flutter.
(1) The aeroplane is safely controllable
when the failure or malfunction occurs at any
speed or altitude within the approved operating
(d) If an irreversible tab control system is used, (b) It must be shown by analysis and, where
the part from the tab to the attachment of the necessary, by tests that in the presence of deflections
irreversible unit to the aeroplane structure must of the aeroplane structure due to the separate appli-
consist of a rigid connection. cation of pitch, roll and yaw limit manoeuvre loads,
the control system, when loaded to obtain these
limit loads and operated within its operational range
JAR 25.679 Control system gust locks of deflections, can be exercised about all control
axes and remain free from:
(a) There must be a device to prevent damage
to the control surfaces (including tabs), and to the (1) Jamming;
control system, from gusts striking the aeroplane (2) Excessive friction;
while it is on the ground. If the device, when engaged, (3) Disconnection, and
prevents normal operation of the control surfaces by (4) Any form of permanent damage.
the pilot, it must –
(c) It must be shown that under vibration loads
(1) Automatically disengage when the in the normal flight and ground operating conditions,
pilot operates the primary flight controls in a no hazard can result from interference or contact
normal manner; or with adjacent elements.
(2) Limit the operation of the aeroplane
so that the pilot receives unmistakable warning at
the start of take-off. JAR 25.685 Control system details
(b) The device must have means to preclude the (a) Each detail of each control system must be
possibility of it becoming inadvertently engaged in designed and installed to prevent jamming, chafing,
flight. and interference from cargo, passengers, loose objects
or the freezing of moisture. (See ACJ 25.685 (a).)
JAR 25.681 Limit load static tests (b) There must be means in the cockpit to
prevent the entry of foreign objects into places
(a) Compliance with the limit load require- where they would jam the system.
ments of this JAR–25 must shown by tests in
which – (c) There must be means to prevent the slapping
of cables or tubes against other parts.
(1) The direction of the test loads produces
the most severe loading in the control system; and (d) JAR 25.689 and JAR 25.693 apply to cable
systems and joints.
(2) Each fitting, pulley, and bracket used
in attaching the system to the main structure is
included. JAR 25.689 Cable systems
(b) Compliance must be shown (by analyses or (a) Each cable, cable fitting, turnbuckle, splice,
individual load tests) with the special factor require- and pulley must be approved. In addition –
ments for control system joints subject to angular
motion. (1) No cable smaller than ⅛ in diameter
may be used in the aileron, elevator, or rudder
systems; and
JAR 25.683 Operation tests
(2) Each cable system must be designed
so that there will be no hazardous change in cable
(a) It must be shown by operation tests that
tension throughout the range of travel under
when portions of the control system subject to pilot
operating conditions and temperature variations.
effort loads are loaded to 80% of the limit load
specified for the system and the powered portions of
(b) Each kind and size of pulley must correspond
the control system are loaded to the maximum load
to the cable with which it is used. Pulleys and
expected in normal operation, the system is free
sprockets must have closely fitted guards to prevent
from –
the cables and chains from being displaced or fouled.
Each pulley must lie in the plane passing through the
(1) Jamming;
cable so that the cable does not rub against the pulley
(2) Excessive friction; and flange.
(d) Clevis pins subject to load or motion and must be provided when such indication is necessary
retained only by cotter pins may not be used in the to enable the pilots to prevent or counteract an un-
control system. safe flight or ground condition, considering the
effects on flight characteristics and performance.
(e) Turnbuckles must be attached to parts
having angular motion in a manner that will positively (b) There must be means to indicate to the
prevent binding throughout the range of travel. pilots the take-off, en-route, approach, and landing
lift device positions.
(f) There must be provisions for visual inspection
of fairleads, pulleys, terminals, and turnbuckles. (c) If any extension of the lift and drag device
beyond the landing position is possible, the control
must be clearly marked to identify this range of
JAR 25.693 Joints extension.
(2) Wing spoilers (except lateral control JAR 25.723 Shock absorption tests
spoilers meeting the requirements of JAR 25.671),
speed brakes, or longitudinal trim devices are in a (a) It must be shown that the limit load factors
position that would not allow a safe take-off. selected for design in accordance with JAR 25.473
for take-off and landing weights, respectively, will not
[ (3) The parking brake is unreleased. ] be exceeded. This must be shown by energy
absorption tests except that analysis based on tests
(b) The warning required by sub-paragraph (a) conducted on a landing gear system with identical
of this paragraph must continue until – energy absorption characteristics may be used for
increases in previously approved take-off and landing
[ weights. (See ACJ 25.723 (a).) ]
(1) The configuration is changed to allow
a safe take-off;
(b) The landing gear may not fail in a test,
[ (2) Action is taken by the pilot to
demonstrating its reserve energy absorption capacity,
abandon the take-off roll; ]
simulating a descent velocity of 12 fps at design
(3) The aeroplane is rotated for take-off; landing weight, assuming aeroplane lift not greater
or than the aeroplane weight acting during the landing
(4) The warning is manually de-activated impact.
by the pilot. (See ACJ 25.703 (b)(4).)
(c) The drop test attitude of the landing gear loads, and gyroscopic loads resulting from
unit and the application of appropriate drag loads the wheels rotating at a peripheral speed
during the test must simulate the aeroplane landing equal to 1.3 VS (with the flaps in take-off
conditions in a manner consistent with the develop- position at design take-off weight), occurring
ment of a rational or conservative limit load factor during retraction and extension at any air-
value. speed up to 1.6 VS1 with the wing-flaps
in the approach position at design landing
(d) The value of d used in the computation of weight, and
We in sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph may not
exceed the value actually obtained in the drop test. (iii) Any load factor up to those
specified in JAR 25.345 (a) for the wing-
(e) The limit inertia load factor n must be flaps extended condition.
determined from the free drop test in sub-paragraph
(b) of this paragraph according to the following (2) Unless there are other means to
formula: decelerate the aeroplane in flight at this speed,
the landing gear, the retracting mechanism, and
the aeroplane structure (including wheel well
where– doors) must be designed to withstand the flight
loads occurring with the landing gear in the
nj = the load factor developed in the drop test (that is, the extended position at any speed up to 0.67 VC.
acceleration dv/dt in g's recorded in the drop test)
plus 1.0; and (3) Landing gear doors, their operating
mechanism, and their supporting structures must
We, W, and L are the same as in the drop test computation. be designed for the yawing manoeuvres prescribed
for the aeroplane in addition to the conditions of
(f) The value of n determined in sub-paragraph airspeed and load factor prescribed in sub-para-
(e) of this paragraph may not be more than the imit graphs (1) and (2) of this paragraph.
inertia load factor used in the landing conditions in
JAR 25.473. (b) Landing gear lock. There must be positive
means to keep the landing gear extended in flight and
on the ground. There must be positive means to keep
JAR 25.727 Reserve energy absorption drop tests the landing gear and doors in the correct retracted
position in flight, unless it can be shown that lowering
(a) If compliance with the reserve energy of the landing gear or doors, or flight with the landing
absorption condition specified in JAR 25.723 (b) is gear or doors extended, at any speed, is not hazardous.
shown by free drop tests, the drop height may not
be less than 27 in. (c) Emergency operation. There must- be an
emergency means for extending the landing gear in
(b) If aeroplane lift is simulated by air cylinders the event of –
or by other mechanical means, the weight used for
the drop must be equal to W. If the effect of aero- (1) Any reasonably probable failure in the
plane lift is represented in free drop tests by an normal retraction system; or
equivalent reduced mass, the landing gear must be
(2) The failure of any single source of
dropped with an effective mass, We = W hydraulic, electric, or equivalent energy supply.
where the symbols and other details are the same as (d) Operation test. The proper functioning of
in JAR 25.725 (b). the retracting mechanism must be shown by operation
tests.
JAR 25.729 Retracting mechanism (e) Position indicator and warning device. If
a retractable landing gear is used, there must be a
(a) General. For aeroplanes with retractable landing gear position indicator easily visible to the
landing gear, the following apply: pilot or to the appropriate crew members (as well
as necessary devices to actuate the indicator) to
(1) The landing gear retracting mechanism, indicate without ambiguity that the retractable units
wheel well doors, and supporting structure, must and their associated doors are secured in the extended
be designed for – (or retracted) position. (See ACJ 25.729 (e).) The
(i) The loads occurring in the flight means must be designed as follows:–
conditions when the gear is in the retracted
position; (1) If switches are used, they must be
(ii) The combination of friction located and coupled to the landing gear mechanical
loads, inertia loads, brake torque loads, air systems in a manner that prevents an erroneous
indication of ‘down and locked’ if the landing (c) The maximum limit load rating of each
gear is not in a fully extended position, or of ‘up Wheel must equal or exceed the maximum radial limit
and locked’ if the landing gear is not in the fully load determined under the applicable ground load
retracted position. The switches may be located requirements of this JAR–25.
where they are operated by the actual landing gear
locking latch or device.
JAR 25.733 Tyres
(2) Aeroplanes must have an aural warning
device that will function continuously when one (a) When a landing gear axle is fitted with a
or more throttles are closed, if the landing gear is single wheel and tyre assembly, the wheel must be
not fully extended and locked. fitted with a suitable tyre (see ACJ 25.733 (a)) of
proper fit with a speed rating approved by the
(3) If there is a manual shut-off for the Authorities that is not exceeded under critical con-
aural warning device prescribed in sub-paragraph ditions, and with a load rating approved by the
(e) (2) of this paragraph the warning system must Authorities that is not exceeded under —
be designed so that, when the warning has been
suspended after one or more throttles are closed, (1) The loads on the main wheel tyre,
subsequent retardation of any throttle to or corresponding to the most critical combination of
beyond the position for a normal landing approach aeroplane weight (up to the maximum ramp
will activate the aural warning. weight), centre of gravity position, and the effect
of engine thrust reacted by inertia at the aero-
(4) Aeroplanes must have an aural warning plane centre of gravity (see ACJ 25.733 (a) (1));
device that will function continuously, when the and
wing-flaps are extended beyond the maximum
[ approach position determined under JAR 25.121 (2) The loads corresponding to the ground
(d) if the gear is not fully extended and locked.] reactions in sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph,
There may not be a manual shut-off for this on the nose-wheel tyre, except as provided in sub-
warning device. The wing-flap position sensing unit paragraphs (b) (2) and (b) (3) of this paragraph.
may be installed at any suitable location. The system
for this device may use any part of the system (b) The applicable ground reactions for nose-
(including the aural warning device) for the device wheel tyres are as follows:
required in sub-paragraph (2) of this paragraph.
(1) The static ground reaction for the tyre
(5) A clear indication or warning must be corresponding to the most critical combination of
provided whenever the landing gear position is aeroplane weight (up to maximum ramp weight)
not consistent with the landing gear selector lever and centre of gravity position with a force of 1.0 g
position. acting downward at the centre of gravity. This
load may not exceed the load rating of the tyre.
(f) Protection of equipment on landing gear and
in wheel wells. Equipment that is essential to the
(2) The ground reaction of the tyre corre-
safe operation of the aeroplane and that is located
on the landing gear and in wheel wells must be sponding to the most critical combination of aero-
protected from the damaging effects of — plane The weight (up to maximum landing weight)
and centre of gravity position combined with
(1) a bursting tyre, (see ACJ 25.729 (f)), forces of 1.0 g downward and 0.31 g forward
acting at the centre of gravity. The reactions in
(2) a loose tyre tread unless it is shown this case must be distributed to the nose and main
that a loose tyre tread cannot cause damage, and wheels by the principles of statics with a drag
reaction equal to 0.31 times the vertical load at
(3) possible wheel brake temperatures, each wheel with brakes capable of producing this
(see ACJ 25 .729 (f)) ground reaction. This nose tyre load may not
exceed 1.5 times the load rating of the tyre.
each wheel with brakes capable of producing this loss of braking ability or directional control of the
ground reaction. This nose lyre load may not aeroplane. (See ACJ 25.735 (e).)
exceed 1.5 times the load rating of the tyre.
(f) The design landing brake kinetic energy
(c) When a landing gear axle is fitted with more capacity rating of each main wheel-brake assembly
than one wheel and lyre assembly, such as dual or may not be less than the kinetic energy absorption
dual-tandem, each wheel must be fitted with a suitable requirements determined under either of the following
tyre of proper fit with a speed rating approved by the methods:
Authority that is not exceeded under critical
conditions, and with a load rating approved by the (1) The brake kinetic energy absorption
Authority or that is not exceeded by – requirements must be based on a rational analysis of
the sequence of events expected during operational
(1) 1.07 times the loads specified in sub- landings at maximum landing weight. This analysis
paragraph (a) (1) of this paragraph on each main must include conservative values of aeroplane speed
wheel tyre; and at which the brakes are applied, braking coefficient
of friction between tyres and runway, aerodynamic
(2) Loads specified in sub-paragraphs drag, propeller drag or powerplant forward thrust,
(a) (2), (b) (1), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of this paragraph and (if more critical) the most adverse single or
on each nose-wheel tyre. propeller malfunction. Means of retardation other
than wheel brakes may be taken into account where
(d) Each tyre installed on a retractable landing approved and subject to compliance with JAR
gear system must, at the maximum size of the tyre [ 25.125 (a) (6) (iii) and JAR 25.125 (b) (1) (iii).]
type expected in service, have a clearance to
surrounding structure and systems that is adequate to (F) (1) (France) The brake kinetic energy
prevent unintended contact between the tyre and any absorption requirements must be based on a
part of the structure or systems. rational analysis of the sequence of events expected
during operational landings at maximum landing
JAR 25.735 Brakes weight. This analysis must include conservative
values of aeroplane speed at which the brakes are
(a) Each brake must be approved. (See applied, braking coefficient of friction between
ACJ 25.735 (a).) tyres and runway, aerodynamic drag, propeller
drag or powerplant forward thrust, and (if more
(b) The brake system must be designed and critical) the most adverse single engine or pro-
constructed so that, if any connecting or transmitting peller malfunction.
element (excluding the operating pedal or handle)
fails, or if any single source of hydraulic or other
brake operating energy supply is lost, it is possible to (2) Instead of a rational analysis, the
bring the aeroplane to rest under conditions specified kinetic energy absorption requirements for each
in JAR 25.125, with a mean deceleration during the main wheel brake assembly may be derived from
landing roll of at least 50% of that obtained in the following formula, which assumes an equal
determining the landing distance as prescribed in that distribution of braking between main wheels:
section. Unless the leakage of hydraulic fluid resulting
from failure of the sealing elements in hydraulic
brakes, the brake drum, shoes, and actuators, (or KE = 0.0443 WV2/N
their equivalents) does not reduce the braking effect- where –
iveness below that required by this paragraph, these
units are considered to be connecting or transmitting
elements. (See ACJ 25.735 (b).) KE = Kinetic energy per wheel (ft.lb);
W = Design landing weight (lb);
(c) Brake controls may not require excessive V = Aeroplane speed in knots. V must be not less than
control force in their operation. (See ACJ 25.735 Vs0, the poweroff stalling speed of the aeroplane
at sea-level, at the design landing weight, and in the
(c).) landing configuration; and
N = Number of main wheels with brakes.
(d) The aeroplane must have a parking control
that, when set by the pilot, will without further
The formula must be modified in cases of unequal
attention, prevent the aeroplane from rolling on a
braking distribution.
paved, level runway with take-off power on the
critical engine. (See ACJ 25.735 (d).)
(g) In the landing case the minimum stalling
speed rating of each main wheel-brake assembly
(e) If antiskid devices are installed, the devices
(that is, the initial speed used in the dynamometer
and associated systems must be designed so that no
single probable malfunction will result in a hazardous
tests) may not be more than the V used in the (2) Instead of a rational analysis, the
determination of kinetic energy in accordance with kinetic energy absorption requirements for each
sub-paragraph (f) of this paragraph, assuming that main wheel brake assembly may be derived from
the test procedures for wheel-brake assemblies involve the following formula, which assumes an equal
a specified rate of deceleration, and, therefore, for distribution of braking between main wheels:—
the same amount of kinetic energy, the rate of
energy absorption (the power absorbing ability of the
brake) varies inversely with the initial speed.
(d) The pilot compartment must be constructed (i) Heavy rain at speeds up to
so that, when flying in rain or snow, it will not leak 1.6 VS1, with wing-flaps retracted (see
in a manner that will distract the crew or harm the ACJ 25.773 (b) (1)(i)) and
structure.
(ii) The icing conditions specified in
(e) Vibration and noise characteristics of cock- JAR 25.1419 if certification with ice
pit equipment may not interfere with safe operation protection provisions is requested. (See
of the aeroplane. ACJ 25 .773 (b) (1) (ii).)
1–D–13 Change 8
JAR–25 SECTION 1
(F) (4) (France) The openable window specified (3) Has any part of the pane located
in sub-paragraph (3) need not be provided if it is where its fragmentation will constitute a hazard
shown that at least one pilot will have sufficient to the pilots.
forward vision to land the aeroplane safely:–
(d) The design of windshields and windows in
(i) Under the precipitation conditions speci- pressurised aeroplanes must be based on factors
fied in sub-paragraph (1) after a single failure peculiar to high altitude operation, including the
affecting the system required in sub-paragraph (1) effects of continuous and cyclic pressurisation
and the associated systems (including ice protection. loadings, the inherent characteristics of the material
dc-misting and generation systems); furthermore, used, and the effects of temperatures and temperature
no single failure must affect, at the same time, the differentials. The windshield and window panels
means required to provide the view through two must be capable of withstanding the maximum cabin
adjacent transparent surfaces allowing forward pressure differential loads combined with critical
vision. aerodynamic pressure and temperature effects after
any single failure in the installation or associated
(ii) After exposure to hail. systems. It may be assumed that, after a single failure
that is obvious to the flight crew (established under
(iii) After any two transparent surfaces allow- JAR 25.1523), the cabin pressure differential is
ing forward vision have been obscured as a result reduced from the maximum, in accordance with
of bird or insect strikes. appropriate operating limitations, to allow continued
safe flight of the aeroplane with a cabin pressure
(c) Internal windshield and window fogging. altitude of not more than 15,000 ft (see ACJ 25 .775
The aeroplane must have a means to prevent fogging (d)).
to the internal portions of the windshield and
window panels over an area which would provide (e) The windshield panels in front of the pilots
the visibility specified in sub-paragraph (a) of this must be arranged so that, assuming the loss of vision
paragraph under all internal and external ambient through any one, panel, one or more panels remain
conditions, including precipitation conditions, in available for use by a pilot seated at a pilot station to
which the aeroplane is intended to be operated. permit continued safe flight and landing.
Change 8 1–D–14
SECTION 1 JAR—25
(h) If a flight engineer is required as part of the (b) There must be a means to lock and safe-
minimum flight crew (established under JAR 25.1523), guard each external door against opening in flight
the aeroplane must have a flight engineer station (either inadvertently by persons or as a result of
located and arranged so that the flight-crew members mechanical failure or failure of a single structural
can perform their functions efficiently and without [ element either during or after closure). Each external ]
interfering with each other. door must be openable from both the inside and the
outside, even though persons may be crowded against
the door on the inside, of the aeroplane. Inward
JAR 25.779 Motion and effect of cockpit controls opening doors may be used if there are means to
prevent occupants from crowding against the door to
Cockpit controls must be designed so that they
an extent that would interfere with the opening of
operate in accordance with the following movement
the door. The means of opening must be simple and
and actuation:
obvious and must be arranged and marked so that it
can be readily located and operated, even in darkness.
(a) Aerodynamic controls:
Auxiliary locking devices may be used.
(1) Primary.
(c) Each external door must be reasonably free
from jamming as a result of fuselage deformation in
Controls Motion and effect
a minor crash.
Aileron Right (clockwise) for right
wing down.
(d) Each external door must be located where
Elevator Rearward for nose up.
persons using them will not be endangered by the
Rudder Right pedal forward for nose
propeller when appropriate operating procedures are
right.
used.
(2) Secondary.
[ (e) There must be provision for direct visual
Controls Motion and effect
inspection of the locking mechanism to determine
Flaps (or Forward for wing-flaps up;
if external doors, for which the initial opening move-
auxiliary rearward for flaps down.
ment is not inward (including passenger, crew, service,
lift devices).
and cargo doors), are fully closed and locked. The
Trim tabs (or Rotate to produce similar
provision must be discernible under operational
equivalent). rotation of the aeroplane
lighting conditions by appropriate crew members
about an axis parallel to the
using a flashlight or equivalent lighting source. In
axis of the control
addition there must be a visual warning means to
signal the appropriate flight-crew members if any
external door is not fully closed and locked. The
(b) Powerplant and auxiliary controls: means must be designed such that any failure or
combination of failures that would result in an
(1) Powerplant. erroneous closed and locked indication is improbable
for doors for which the initial opening movement
Controls Motion and effect is not inward. ]
Throttles Forward to increase forward
thrust and rearward to increase
rearward thrust.
Propellers Forward to increase rpm.
[ (f) External doors must have provisions to by a safety belt and, as appropriate to the type,
prevent the initiation of pressurisation of the aero- location and angle of facing of each seat, by one or
plane to an unsafe level if the door is not fully more of the following:
closed and locked. In addition, it must be shown by
safety analysis that inadvertent opening is extremely (1) A shoulder harness that will prevent
improbable. the head from contacting any injurious object.
(2) The elimination of any injurious
(g) Cargo and service doors not suitable for use object within striking radius of the head.
as an exit in an emergency need only meet sub-para- (3) An energy absorbing rest that will
graph (e) of this paragraph and be safeguarded against support the arms, shoulders, head and spine.
opening in flight as a result of mechanical failure or
failure of a single structural element. (d) If the seat backs do not have a firm hand
hold, there must be a hand grip or rail along each
(h) Each passenger entry door in the side of the aisle to enable occupants to steady themselves while
fuselage must qualify as a Type A, Type I, or Type II using the aisles in moderately rough air.
passenger emergency exit and must meet the require-
ments of JAR 25.807 to 25.813 that apply to that (e) Each projecting object that would injure
type of passenger emergency exit. persons seated or moving about the aeroplane in
normal flight must be padded.
(i) If an integral stair is installed in a passenger
entry door that is qualified as a passenger emergency (f) Each berth must be designed so that the
exit, the stair must be designed so that under the forward part has a padded end board, canvas
following conditions the effectiveness of passenger diaphragm, or equivalent means, that can withstand
emergency egress will not be impaired. the static load reaction of the occupant when
(1) The door, integral stair, and operating subjected to the forward inertia force specified in
mechanism have been subjected to the inertia JAR 25.561. Berths must be free from corners and
forces specified in JAR 25.561 (b) (3), acting protuberances likely to cause serious injury to a
separately relative to the surrounding structure. person occupying the berth during emergency
(2) The aeroplane is in the normal ground conditions.
attitude and in each of the attitudes corresponding
to collapse of one or more legs of the landing gear. (g) Each crew member seat at flight-deck stations
must have a shoulder harness. These seats must meet
(j) All lavatory doors must be designed to the strength requirements of sub-paragraph (i) of this
preclude anyone, from becoming trapped inside the paragraph, except that where a seat forms part of the
lavatory, and if a locking, mechanism is installed, it load path, the safety belt or shoulder harness attach-
must be capable of being unlocked from the outside ments need only be proved to be not less strong than
without the aid of special tools. ] the actual strength of the seat. (See ACJ 25.785 (g).)
(2) Each pilot seat must be designed for INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
the reactions resulting from the application of the
pilot forces prescribed in JAR 25.395; and
1–D–16–1 Change 10
JAR–25 SECTION 1
Change 10 1–D–16–2
SECTION 1 JAR–25
(c) If cargo compartment lamps are installed, (c) The probable behaviour of the aeroplane
each lamp must be installed so as to prevent contact in a water landing must be investigated by model tests
between lamp bulb and cargo. or by comparison with aeroplanes of similar config-
uration for which the ditching characteristics are
known. Scoops, wing-flaps, projections, and any (2) The aeroplane must be in a normal
other factor likely to affect the hydrodynamic attitude with landing gear extended.
characteristics of the aeroplane, must be considered.
(3) Stands or ramps may be used for
(d) It must be shown that, under reasonably descent from the wing to the ground, and safety
probable water conditions, the flotation time and equipment such as mats or inverted life rafts may
trim of the aeroplane will allow the occupants to be placed on the floor or ground to protect part-
leave the aeroplane and enter the liferafts required by icipants. No other equipment that is not part of
JAR 25.1415. If compliance with this provision is the aeroplane's emergency evacuation equipment
shown by buoyancy and trim computations, appro- may be used to aid the participants in reaching the
priate allowances must be made for probable structural ground.
damage and leakage. If the aeroplane has fuel tanks
(with fuel jettisoning provisions) that can reasonably (4) Except as provided in sub-paragraph (c)
be expected to withstand a ditching without leakage, (1) of this paragraph, only the aeroplane's emer-
the jettisonable volume of fuel may be considered gency lighting system may provide illumination.
as buoyancy volume.
(5) All emergency equipment required for
(e) Unless the effects of the collapse of external the planned operation of the aeroplane must be
doors and windows are accounted for in the invest- installed.
igation of the probable behaviour of the aeroplane (6) Each external door and exit, and each
in a water landing (as prescribed in sub-paragraphs (c) internal door or curtain, must be in the take-off
and (d) of this paragraph), the external doors and configuration.
windows must be designed to withstand the probable
maximum local pressures. (7) Each crew member must be seated in
the normally assigned seat for take-off and must
remain in that seat until receiving the signal for
JAR 25.803 Emergency evacuation commencement of the demonstration. Each crew
member must be —
(a) Each crew and passenger area must have
emergency means to allow rapid evacuation in crash
(i) For compliance with this Para-
landings, with the landing gear extended and retracted,
graph, a member of a regularly scheduled
considering the possibility of the aeroplane being on
line crew, or
fire.
(b) Passenger ventral and tail cone exits and (ii) For compliance with this para-
any floor level door or exit in the side of the fuselage graph a person having knowledge of the
(other than those leading into a cargo or baggage operation of exits and emergency equipment.
compartment that is not accessible from the passenger
cabin) that is 44 or more inches high and 20 or more (8) A representative passenger load of
inches wide, but not wider than 46 inches, must persons in normal health must be used as follows:
meet the applicable emergency exit requirements of
(i) At least 30% must be females.
this paragraph and JAR 25.807 to 25.813.
(c) Except as provided in sub-paragraph (d) of (ii) At least 5% must be over 60 years
this paragraph, for aeroplanes having a seating capacity of age with a proportionate number of
of more than 44 passengers, it must be shown by females.
actual demonstration that the maximum seating
(iii) At least 5% but not more than
capacity, including the number of crew members
10% must be children under 12 years of age,
required by the operating rules for which certification
prorated through that age group.
is requested, can be evacuated from the aeroplane to
the ground within 90 seconds. The demonstration (iv) Three life-size dolls, not included
must be conducted under the following conditions: as part of the total passenger load, must
be carried by passengers to simulate live
(1) It must be conducted either during infants 2 years old or younger.
the dark of the night or during daylight with the
dark of night simulated. If the demonstration is (v) Crew members, mechanics and
conducted indoors during daylight hours, it must training personnel, who maintain or operate
be conducted with each window covered and each the aeroplane in the normal course of their
door closed to minimise the daylight effect. duties, may not be used as passengers.
Illumination on the floor or ground may be used,
but it must be kept low and shielded against shin- (9) No passenger may be assigned a
ing into the aeroplane's windows or doors. specific seat except as the Authority may require.
Except as required by sub-paragraph (c) (12) of
this paragraph, no employee of the applicant may
be seated next to an emergency exit.
(10) Seat belts and shoulder harnesses (as (20) The evacuation time period is
required) must be fastened. completed when the last occupant has evacuated
the aeroplane and is on the ground. Provided that
(11) Before the start of the demonstration the acceptance rate of the stand or ramp is no
approximately one-half of the total average greater than the acceptance rate of the means
amount of carry-on baggage, blankets, pillows, and available on the aeroplane for descent from the
other similar articles must be distributed at several wing during an actual crash situation, evacuees
locations in the aisles and emergency exits access using stands or ramps allowed by sub-paragraph
ways to create minor obstructions. (c) (3) of this paragraph are considered to be on
the ground when they are on the stand or ramp.
(12) Each crew member must be seated in
his normally assigned seat for take-off and must (d) A combination of analysis and tests may
remain in that seat until receiving the signal for be used to show that the aeroplane is capable of being
commencement of the demonstration. evacuated within 90 seconds under the conditions
specified in sub-paragraph (c) of this paragraph if the
(13) No prior indication may be given to Authority finds that the combination of analysis and
any crew member or passenger of the particular tests will provide data with respect to the emergency
exits to be used in the demonstration. evacuation capability of the aeroplane equivalent to
that which would be obtained by actual demonstration.
(14) The applicant may not practice,
rehearse, or describe the demonstration for the (e) An escape route must be established from
participants nor may any participants have taken each overwing emergency exit, and (except for flap
part in this type of demonstration within the surfaces suitable as slides) covered with a slip resistant
preceding 6 months. surface. Except where a means for channelling the
flow of evacuees is provided–
(15) A representative pre-take-off briefing
may be given. The passengers may also be advised (1) The escape route must be at least
to follow directions of crew members but not be 42 inches wide at Type A passenger emergency
instructed on the procedures to be followed in the exits and must be at least 2 ft wide at all other
demonstration. passenger emergency exits, and
(16) If safety equipment is allowed by (2) The escape route surface must have a
sub-paragraph (c) (3) of this paragraph is provided, reflectance of at least 80%, and must be defined
either all passenger and cockpit windows must be by markings with a surface-to-marking contrast
blacked out or all of the emergency exits must ratio of at least 5:1. (See ACJ 25.803 (e) (2).)
have safety equipment in order to prevent dis-
closure of the available emergency exits.
(17) Not more than 50% of the emergency JAR 25.805 Flight crew emergency exits
exits in the sides of the fuselage of an aeroplane
that meet all of the requirements applicable to the Except for aeroplanes with a passenger capacity
required emergency exits for that aeroplane may of 20 or less in which the proximity of passenger
be used for the demonstration. Exits that are not emergency exits to the flight-crew area offers a
to be used in the demonstration must have the convenient and readily accessible means of evacuation
exit handle de-activated or must be indicated by for the flight crew, the following apply:
red lights, red tape, or other acceptable means,
placed outside the exits to indicate fire or other (a) There must be either one exit on each side
reason why they are unusable. The exits to be of the aeroplane or a top hatch, in the flight-crew
used must be representative of all of the emergency area.
exits on the aeroplane and must be designated by
the applicant, subject to approval by the Authority. (b) Each exit must be of sufficient size and
At least one floor level exit must be used. must be located so as to allow rapid evacuation of the
crew. An exit size and shape of other than at least 19
(18) All evacuees, except those using an by 20 inches unobstructed rectangular opening may
over-the-wing exit, must leave the aeroplane by be used only if exit utility is satisfactorily shown, by
a means provided as part of the aeroplane's a typical flight-crew member, to the Authority.
equipment.
(19) The applicant's approved procedures JAR 25.807 Passenger emergency exits (See
must be fully utilised during the demonstration. ACJ 25.807.)
1—D—19 Change 8
JAR–25 SECTION 1
(1) Type 1. This type must have a the main aisle to that exit from both the
rectangular opening of not less than 24 inches forward and aft direction.
wide by 48 inches high, with corner radii not
greater than one-third the width of the exit. Type (iv) There must be an unobstructed
I exits must be floor level exits. passageway at least 36 inches wide leading
from each exit to the nearest main aisle.
(2) Type II. This type must have a
rectangular opening of not less than 20 inches (v) If two or more main aisles are
wide by 44 inches high, with corner radii not provided, there must be unobstructed cross
greater than one-third the width of the exit. Type aisle at least 20 inches wide between main
II exits must be floor level exits unless located aisle. There must be a cross aisle leading
over the wing, in which case they may not have a directly to each passageway between the
step-up inside the aeroplane of more than 10 inches exit and the nearest main aisle.
nor a stepdown outside the aeroplane of more
than 17 inches. (vi) There must be at least one flight
attendant seat, which meets the requirements
(3) Type III. This type must have a of JAR 25.785 (h) and (i), adjacent to each
rectangular opening of not less than 20 inches such exit.
wide by 36 inches high, with corner radii not
greater than one-third the width of the exit, and (vii) Adjacent assist space next to
with a step-up inside the aeroplane of not more each Type A exit must be provided at each
than 20 inches. If the exit is located over the wing side of the passageway, to allow the crew-
the step-down outside the aeroplane may not member(s) to assist in the evacuation of
exceed 27 inches. passengers without reducing the unobstructed
width of the passageway below that required
(4) Type IV. This type must have a by (a) (7) (iv) of this sub-paragraph.
rectangular opening of not less than 19 inches
wide by 26 inches high, with corner radii not (viii) At each non-over-wing exit there
greater than one-third the width of the exit, must be installed a slide capable of carrying
located over the wing, with a step-up inside the simultaneously two parallel lines of evacuees.
aeroplane of not more than 29 inches and a step- (ix) Each overwing exit having a
down outside the aeroplane of not more than step-down must have an assist means unless
36 inches. the exit without an assist means can be
shown to have a rate of passenger egress at
(5) Ventral. This type is an exit from the least equal to that of the same type of non-
passenger compartment through the pressure shell over-wing exit. If an assist means is required
and the bottom fuselage skin. The dimensions and it must be automatically deployed, and auto-
physical configuration of this type of exit must matically erected, concurrent with the
allow at least the same rate of egress as a Type I opening of the exit and self-supporting
with the aeroplane in the normal ground attitude, within 10 seconds.
with landing gear extended.
Step-down distance as used in this paragraph
(6) Tail cone. This type is an aft exit means the actual distance between the bottom of
from the passenger compartment through the the required opening and a usable foothold,
pressure shell and through an openable cone of extending out from the fuselage, that is large
the fuselage aft of the pressure shell. The means enough to be effective without searching by sight
of opening the tail cone must be simple and or feel.
obvious, and must employ a single operation.
(b) Accessibility. Each required passenger
(7) Type A. An emergency exit may be emergency exit must be accessible to the passengers
designated as a Type A exit if the following and located where it will afford the most effective
criteria are met: means of passenger evacuation. Openings larger than
those specified in this paragraph, whether or not of
(i) There must be a rectangular rectangular shape, may be used if –
opening not less than 42 inches wide by 72
inches high, with corner radii not greater (1) The specified rectangular opening can
than one-sixth of the width of the exit. be inscribed within the opening; and
(ii) It must be a floor level exit. (2) The base of the inscribed rectangular
opening meets the specified step-up and step-
(iii) Unless there are two ore more down heights.
main (fore and aft) aisles, the exit must be
located so that there is passenger, flow along
Change 8 1–D–20
SECTION 1 JAR–25
(c) Passenger emergency exits. (See ACJ seats is allowed for each pair of Type A exits and
25.807 (c).) The prescribed exits need not be a passenger seating configuration of 45 seats is
diametrically opposite each other nor identical in allowed for each pair of Type I exits.
size and location on both sides. They must be
distributed as uniformly as practicable taking into (4) If a passenger ventral or tail cone
account passenger distribution. If only one floor exit is installed and can be shown to allow a rate
level exit per side is prescribed, and the aeroplane of egress at least equivalent to that of a Type III
does not have a tail cone or ventral emergency exit, exit with the aeroplane in the most adverse exit
the floor level exits must be in the rearward part of opening condition because of the collapse of one
the passenger compartment, unless another location or more legs of the landing gear, an increase in the
affords a more effective means of passenger evacuation. passenger seating configuration beyond the limits
When more than one floor level exit per side is specified in sub-paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this
prescribed, at least one floor level exit per side must paragraph may be allowed as follows:
be located near each end of the cabin, except that
this provision does not apply to combination cargo/ (i) For a ventral exit, 12 additional
passenger configurations. Exits must be provided as passenger seats.
follows:
(ii) For a tail cone exit incorporating
(1) Except as provided in sub-paragraphs a floor level opening of not less than 20
(2) to (6) of this paragraph, the number of type of inches wide by 60 inches high, with corner
passenger emergency exits must be in accordance radii not greater than one-third the width
with the following table: of the exit, in the pressure shell and in-
corporating an approved assist means in
accordance with JAR 25.809 (f) (l), 25 addi-
tional passenger seats.
(2) For aeroplanes that have a passenger flight, either inadvertently by persons or as a result
seating configuration, excluding pilots seats, of mechanical failure. In addition, there must be a
of 10 seats or more, one exit above the waterline means for direct visual inspection of the locking
in a side of the aeroplane, meeting at least the mechanism by crew members to determine that each
dimensions of a Type III exit, for each unit (or emergency exit, for which the initial opening move-
part of a unit) of 35 passenger seats, but no less ment is outward, is fully locked.
than two such exits in the passenger cabin, with
one on each side of the aeroplane. However, (e) There must be provisions to minimise the
where it has been shown through analysis, ditching probability of jamming of the emergency exits
demonstrations, or any other tests found necessary resulting from fuselage deformation in a minor crash
by the Authority, that the evacuation capability of landing.
the aeroplane during ditching is improved by the
use of larger exits, or by other means, the passenger (f) Each aeroplane emergency exit (other than
seat/exit ratio may be increased. [ exits located over the wing for which escape routes
established in accordance with JAR 25.803 (e) uses
(3) If side exits cannot be above the the wing as part of the escape route) more than 6 ft ]
waterline, the side exits must be replaced by an from the ground with the aeroplane on the ground
equal number of readily accessible overhead and the landing gear extended must have an approved
hatches of not less than the dimensions of a Type means to assist the occupants in descending to the
III exit except that, for aeroplanes with a passenger ground as follows:
configuration, excluding pilots seats, of 35 seats or
less, the two required Type III side exits need be (1) The assisting means for each passenger
replaced by only one overhead hatch. emergency exit must be a self-supporting slide or
equivalent, and must be designed to meet the
following requirements:
(1) With the aeroplane in the normal (iii) It must be of such length after
ground attitude and in each of the attitudes full deployment that the lower end is self-
corresponding to collapse of one or more legs supporting on the ground and provide safe
of the landing gear; and evacuation of occupants to the ground after
collapse of one or more legs of the landing
(2) Within ten seconds measured from the gear.
time when the opening means is actuated to the (iv) It must have the capability, in
time when the exit is fully opened. 25-knot winds directed from the most
critical angle, to deploy and, with the
(c) The means of opening emergency exits must assistance of only one person, to remain
be simple and obvious and may not require excep- usable after full deployment to evacuate
tional effort. Internal exit-opening means involving occupants safely to the ground.
sequence operations (such as operation of two handles
or latches or the release of safety catches) may be (v) For each system installation
used for flight crew emergency exits if it can be (mockup or aeroplane installed), five con-
reasonably established that these means are simple secutive deployment and inflation tests
and obvious to crew members trained in their use. must be conducted (per exit) without
failure, and at least three tests of each
(d) There must be a means to lock each such five-test series must be conducted using
emergency exit and to safeguard against its opening in
a single representative sample of the device. (b) The identity and location of each passenger
The sample devices must be deployed and emergency exit must be recognisable from a distance
inflated by the system’s primary means after equal to the width of the cabin.
being subjected to the inertia forces specified
in JAR 25.561 (b). If any part of the sytem (c) Means must be provided to assist the
fails or does not function properly during occupants in locating the exits in conditions of dense
the required tests, the cause of the failure or smoke.
malfunction must be corrected by positive
means and after that the full series of five (d) The location of each passenger emergency
consecutive deployment and inflation tests exit must be indicated by a sign visible to occupants
must be conducted without failure. approaching along the main passenger aisle (or aisles).
There must be –
(2) The assisting means for flight crew
emergency exits may be a rope or any other means (1) A passenger emergency exit locator
demonstrated to be suitable for the purpose. If sign above the aisle (or aisles) near each passenger
the assisting means is a rope, or an approved device emergency exit, or at another overhead location
equivalent to a rope, it must be – if it is more practical because of low headroom,
except that one sign may serve more than one
(i) Attached to the fuselage structure exit if each exit can be seen readily from the
at or above the top of the emergency exit sign;
opening, or, for a device at a pilot's emer-
gency exit window, at another approved (2) A passenger emergency exit marking
location if the stowed device, or its attach- sign next to each passenger emergency exit, except
ment, would reduce the pilot's view in flight; that one sign may serve two such exits if they
both can be seen readily from the sign; and
(ii) Able (with its attachment) to
with-stand a 400-pound static load. (3) A sign on each bulkhead or divider
that prevents fore and aft vision along the passenger
(g) Each emergency exit must be shown by tests, cabin to indicate emergency exits beyond and
or by a combination of analysis and tests, to meet the obscured by the bulkhead or divider, except that
requirements of sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of this if this is not possible the sign may be placed at
paragraph. another appropriate location.
(h) If the place on the aeroplane structure (e) The location of the operating handle and
at which the escape route required in JAR 25.803 (e) instructions for opening exits from the inside of the
terminates is more than 6 ft from the ground with the aeroplane must be shown in the following manner:
aeroplane on the ground and the landing gear extended,
means must be provided to assist evacuees (who have (1) Each passenger emergency exit must
used the overwing exits) to reach the ground. If the have, on or near the exit, a marking that is readable
escape route is over a wing-flap, the height of the from a distance of 30 inches.
terminal edge must be measured with the flap in the
take-off or landing position, whichever is higher (2) Each Type I and Type A passenger
from the ground. The assisting means must be of emergency exit operating handle must –
such length that the lower end is self-supporting on
the ground after collapse of any one or more landing (i) Be self-illuminated with an
gear legs. initial brightness of at least 160 micro-
lamberts; or
(i) If a single power-boost or single power-
operated system is the primary system for operating (ii) Be conspicuously located and
more than one exit in an emergency, each exit must well illuminated by the emergency lighting
be capable of meeting the requirements of sub- even in conditions of occupant crowding
paragraph (b) of this paragraph in the event of failure at the exit.
of the primary system. Manual operation of the exit
(after failure of the primary system) is acceptable. (3) Each Type III passenger emergency
exit operating handle must be self-illuminated with
[ (j) Not required for JAR–25. ] an initial brightness of at least 160 microlamberts.
If the operating handle is covered, self-illuminated
cover removal instructions having an initial bright-
JAR 25.811 Emergency exit marking ness of at least 160 microlamberts must also be
provided.
(a) Each passenger emergency exit, its means
of access, and its means of opening must be con- (4) Each Type A, Type I and Type II
spicuously marked. passenger emergency exit with a locking mechanism
released by rotary motion of the handle must be
marked –
(i) With a red arrow, with a shaft main lighting system. The emergency lighting system
at least three-quarters of an inch wide and a must include:
head twice the width of the shaft, extending
along at least 70° of arc at a radius approxi- (1) Illuminated emergency exit marking
mately equal to three-quarters of the handle and locating signs, sources of general cabin illumi-
length. nation, and interior lighting in emergency exit
areas.
(ii) So that the centreline of the exit (2) Exterior emergency lighting.
handle is within ±1 inch of the projected
point of the arrow when the handle has (b) Emergency exit signs –
reached full travel and has released the
locking mechanism, and (1) For aeroplanes that have a passenger
seating configuration, excluding pilot seats, of 10
(iii) With the word 'open' in red seats or more must meet the following require-
letters 1 inch high, placed horizontally near ments:
the head of the arrow. (i) Each passenger emergency exit
locator sign required by JAR 25.811 (d) (1)
(f) Each emergency exit that is required to be and each passenger emergency exit marking
openable from the outside, and its means of opening, sign required by JAR 25.811 (d) (2) must
must be marked on the outside of the aeroplane. have red letters at least 1½ inches high on an
In addition, the following apply: illuminated white background, and must
have an area of at least 21 square inches
(1) The outside marking for each passenger excluding the letters. The lighted back-
emergency exit in the side of the fuselage must ground-to-letter contrast must be at least 10:1.
include a 2-inch coloured band outlining the exit. The letter height to stroke-width ratio may
not be more than 7:1 nor less than 6:1.
(2) Each outside marking includng the These signs must be internally electrically
band, must have colour contrast to be readily illuminated with a background brightness
distinguishable from the surrounding fuselage of at least 25 foot-lamberts and a high-to-
surface. The contrast must be such that if the low background contrast no greater than 3:1.
reflectance of the darker colour is 15% or less, the
reflectance of the lighter colour must be at least (ii) Each passenger emergency exit
45%. 'Reflectance' is the ratio of the luminous sign required by JAR 25.811 (d) (3) must
flux reflected by a body to the luminous flux it have red letters at least 1½ inches high on a
receives. When the reflectance of the darker white background having an area of at least
colour is greater than 15%, at least a 30% difference 21 square inches excluding the letters.
between its reflectance and the reflectance of the These signs must be internally electrically
lighter colour must be provided. illuminated or self-illuminated by other
than electrical means and must have an
(3) In the case of exits other than those initial brightness of at least 400 micro-
in the side of the fuselage, such as ventral or tail lamberts. The colours may be reversed in
cone exits, the external means of opening, including the case of a sign that is self-illuminated by
instructions if applicable, must be conspicuously other than electrical means.
marked in red, or bright chrome yellow if the
background colour is such that red is inconspicuous. (2) For aeroplanes that have a passenger
When the opening means is located on only one seating configuration, excluding pilot seats, of nine
side of the fuselage, a conspicuous marking to that seats or less, that are required by JAR 25.811 (d)
effect must be provided on the other side. (1), (2), and (3) must have red letters at least
1 inch high on a white background at least 2 inches
(g) Each sign required by sub-paragraph (d) high. These signs may be internally electrically
of this paragraph may use the word ‘exit’ in its legend illuminated, or self-illuminated by other than
in place of the term ‘emergency exit’. electrical means, with an initial brightness of at
least 160 microlamberts. The colours may be
JAR 25.812 Emergency lighting reversed in the case of a sign that is self-illuminated
by other than electrical means.
(a) An emergency lighting system, independent
of the main lighting system, must be installed. How- (c) General illumination, in the passenger cabin
ever, the sources of general cabin illumination may be must be provided so that when measured along the
common to both the emergency and the main lighting centreline of main passenger aisle(s), and cross aisle(s)
systems if the power supply to the emergency lighting between main aisles, at seat armrest height and at
system is independent of the power supply to the
Change 8 1–D–24
SECTION 1 JAR–25
40-inch intervals, the average illumination is not less 42 inches for a Type A overwing emergency
than 0.05 foot-candle and the illumination at each exit and of 2 ft for all other overwing emer-
40-inch interval is not less than 0.01 foot-candle. A gency exits along the 30% of the slip-resistant
main passenger aisle(s) is considered to extend along portion of the escape route required in
the fuselage from the most forward passenger JAR 25.803 (e) that is farthest from the exit;
emergency exit or cabin occupant seat, whichever is and
farther forward, to the most rearward passenger (iii) Not less than 0.03 foot-candle
emergency exit or cabin occupant seat, whichever on the ground surface with the landing gear
is farther aft. extended (measured normal to the direction
of the incident light) where an evacuee using
(d) The floor of the passageway leading to each the established escape route would normally
floor-level passenger emergency exit, between the make first contact with the ground.
main aisles and the exit openings, must be provided
with illumination that is not less than 0.02 foot- (2) At each non-overwing emergency exit
candle measured along a line that is within six inches not required by JAR 25.809 (f) to have descent
of and parallel to the floor and is centered on the assist means the illumination must be not less than
passenger evacuation path. 0.03 foot-candle (measured normal to the direction
of the incident light) on the ground surface with
(e) Except for subsystems provided in accord- the landing gear extended where an evacuee is
ance with sub-paragraph (g) of this paragraph that likely to make his first contact with the ground
serve no more than one assist means, are independent outside the cabin.
of the aeroplane's main emergency lighting system,
and are automatically activated when the assist means (g) The means required in JAR 25.809 (f) (1)
is erected, the emergency lighting system must be and (h) to assist the occupants in descending to the
designed as follows: ground must be illuminated so that the erected assist
means is visible from the aeroplane. In addition –
(1) The lights must be operable manually
from the flight crew station and from a point in (1) If the assist means is illuminated by
the passenger compartment that is readily accessible exterior emergency lighting, it must provide
to a normal flight attendant seat. illumination of not less than 0.03 foot-candle
(measured normal to the direction of the incident
(2) There must be a flight crew warning light) at the ground end of the erected assist means
light which illuminates when power is on in the where an evacuee using the established escape
aeroplane and the emergency lighting control route would normally make first contact with the
device is not armed. ground, with the aeroplane in each of the attitudes
corresponding to the collapse of one or more
(3) The cockpit control device must have legs of the landing gear.
an ‘on’, ‘off’ and ‘armed’ position so that when
armed in the cockpit or turned on at either the (2) If the emergency lighting sub-system
cockpit or flight attendant station the lights will illuminating the assist means serves no other assist
either light or remain lighted upon interruption means, is independent of the aeroplane's main
(except an interruption caused by a transverse emergency lighting system, and is automatically
vertical separation of the fuselage during crash activated when the assist means is erected, the
landing) of the aeroplane's normal electric power. lighting provisions –
There must be a means to safeguard against inad-
vertent operation of the control device from the (i) May not be adversely affected
‘armed’ or ‘on’ positions. by stowage; and
(f) Exterior emergency lighting must be provided (ii) Must provide illumination of not
as follows: less than 0.03 foot-candle (measured normal
to the direction of incident light) at the
(1) At each overwing emergency exit the ground end of the erected assist means
illumination must be – where an evacuee would normally make first
contact with the ground, with the aeroplane
(i) Not less than 0.03 foot-candle in each of the attitudes corresponding to
(measured normal to the direction of the the collapse of one or more legs of the
incident light) on a two-square-foot area landing gear.
where an evacuee is likely to make his first
step outside the cabin; (h) The energy supply to each emergency lighting
unit must provide the required level of illumination
(ii) Not less than 0.05 foot-candle for at least 10 minutes at the critical ambient con-
(measured normal to the direction of the ditions after emergency landing.
incident light) for a minimum width of
1–D–25 Change 8
JAR–25 SECTION 1
(i) If storage batteries are used as the energy (2) For aeroplanes that have a passenger
supply for the emergency lighting system, they may seating configuration, excluding pilots seats, of
be recharged from the aeroplane's main electric 19 or less, there may be minor obstructions in
power system: Provided, That, the charging circuit is this region, if there are compensating factors to
designed to preclude inadvertent battery discharge maintain the effectiveness of the exit.
into charging circuit faults.
(d) If it is necessary to pass through a passage-
(j) Components of the emergency lighting way between passenger compartments to reach any
system, including batteries, wiring relays, lamps, and required emergency exit from any seat in the
switches must be capable of normal operation after passenger cabin, the passageway must be unobstructed.
having been subjected to the inertia forces listed in However, curtains may be used if they allow free
JAR 25.561 (b). entry through the passageway.
(k) The emergency lighting system must be (e) No door may be installed in any partition
designed so that after any single transverse vertical between passenger compartments.
separation of the fuselage during crash landing –
(f) If it is necessary to pass through a doorway
(1) Not more than 25% of all electrically separating the passenger cabin from other areas to
illuminated emergency lights required by this reach any required emergency exit from any passenger
section are rendered inoperative, in addition to seat, the door must have a means to latch it in open
the lights that are directly damaged by the position. The latching means must be able to with-
separation; stand the loads imposed upon it when the door is
subjected to the ultimate inertia forces, relative to
(2) Each electrically illuminated exit sign the surrounding structure, listed in JAR 25.561 (b).
required under JAR 25.811 (d) (2) remains
operative exclusive of those that are directly
damaged by the separation; and
JAR 25.815 Width of aisle
(3) At least one required exterior emer-
gency light for each side of the aeroplane remains The passenger aisle width at any point between
operative exclusive of those that are directly seats must equal or exceed the values in the following
damaged by the separation. table:
(1) For aeroplanes that have a passenger JAR 25.819 Lower deck service compartments
seating configuration, excluding pilot's seats, of
(including galleys)
20 or more, the projected opening of the exit
provided may not be obstructed and there must be
For aeroplanes with a service compartment located
no interference in opening the exit by seats, berths,
below the main deck, which may be occupied during
or other protrusions (including seatbacks in any
taxi or flight but not during take-off or landing, the
position) for a distance from that exit not less
following apply:
than the width of the narrowest passenger seat
installed on the aeroplane.
Change 8 1–D–26
SECTION 1 JAR–25
(a) There must be at least two emergency (3) There must be a hatch capable of
evacuation routes, one at each end of lower deck being used for evacuating persons from the lift
service compartment or two having sufficient that is openable from inside and outside the lift
separation within each compartment, which could without tools, with the lift in any position.
be used by each occupant or the lower deck service
compartment to rapidly evacuate to the main deck
under normal and emergency lighting conditions.
The routes must provide for the evacuation of in- VENTILATION AND HEATING
capacitated persons, with assistance. The use of the
evacuation routes may not be dependent on any JAR 25.831 Ventilation
powered device. The routes must be designed to
minimise the possibility of blockage which might (a) Each passenger and crew compartment
result from fire, mechanical or structural failure, or must be ventilated and each crew compartment must
persons standing on top of or against the escape have enough fresh air (but not less than 10 cubic ft
routes. In the event the aeroplane's main power per minute per crew member) to enable crew members
system or compartment main lighting system should to perform their duties without undue discomfort or
fail, emergency illumination for each lower deck fatigue. (See ACJ 25.831 (a).)
service compartment must be automatically provided.
(b) Crew and passenger compartment air must
(b) There must be a means for two-way voice be free from harmful or hazardous concentrations of
communication between the flight deck and each gases or vapours. In meeting this requirement, the
lower deck service compartment. following apply:
(c) There must be an aural emergency alarm (1) Carbon monoxide concentrations in
system, audible during normal and emergency con- excess of one part in 20,000 parts of air are
ditions, to enable crew members on the flight deck considered hazardous. For test purposes, any
and at each required floor level emergency exit to acceptable carbon monoxide detection method
alert occupants of each lower deck service compart- may be used.
ment of an emergency situation.
(2) Carbon dioxide in excess of 3% by
(d) There must be a means, readily detectable volume (sea-level equivalent) is considered
by occupants of each lower deck service compart- hazardous in the case of crew members. Higher
ment, that indicates when seat belts should be concentrations of carbon dioxide may be allowed
fastened. in crew compartments if appropriate protective
breathing equipment is available.
(e) If a public address system is installed in the
aeroplane, speakers must be provided in each lower (c) There must be provisions made to ensure
deck service compartment. that the conditions prescribed in sub-paragraph (b)
of this paragraph are met after reasonably probable
(f) For each occupant permitted in a lower failures or malfunctioning of the ventilating, heating,
deck service compartment, there must be a foreward pressurisation or other systems and equipment.
or aft facing seat which meets the requirements of (See ACJ 25.831 (c).)
JAR 25.785 (c) and must be able to withstand maxi-
mum flight loads when occupied. (d) If accumulation of hazardous quantities of
smoke in the cockpit area is reasonably probable,
(g) For each powered lift system installed smoke evacuation must be readily accomplished,
between a lower deck service compartment and the starting with full pressurisation and without depress-
main deck for the carriage of persons or equipment, urising beyond safe limits.
or both, the system must meet the following require-
ments: (e) Except as provided in sub-paragraph (f) of
this paragraph, means must be provided to enable
(1) Each lift control switch outside the lift, the occupants of the following compartments and
except emergency stop buttons, must be designed areas to control the temperature and quantity of
to prevent the activation of the lift if the lift door, ventilating air supplied to their compartment or area
or the hatch required by sub-paragraph (g) (3) of independently of the temperature and quantity of
this paragraph, or both are open. air supplied to other compartments and areas:
(2) An emergency stop button, that when (1) The flight-crew compartment.
activated will immediately stop the lift, must be
installed within the lift and at each entrance to the (2) Crew-member compartments and areas
lift. other than the flight-crew compartment unless the
crew-member compartment or area is ventilated by
air interchange with other compartments or areas
under all operating conditions.
1–D–27 Change 8
JAR–25 SECTION 1
(f) Means to enable the flight crew to control not cause an appreciable rise in the pressure
the temperature and quantity of ventilating air differential. The pressure differential is positive
supplied to the flight-crew compartment independ- when the internal pressure is greater than the
ently of the temperature and quantity of ventilating external.
air supplied to other compartments are not required
if all of the following conditions are met: (2) Two reverse pressure differential relief
valves (or their equivalents) to automatically
(1) The total volume of the flight-crew prevent a negative pressure differential that would
and passenger compartments is 800 cubic ft or damage the structure. One valve is enough, how-
less. ever, if it is of a design that reasonably precludes
its malfunctioning.
(2) The air inlets and passages for air to
flow between flight-crew and passenger compart- (3) A means by which the pressure dif-
ments are arranged to provide compartment ferential can be rapidly equalised.
temperatures within 5°F of each other and
adequate ventilation to occupants in both com- (4) An automatic or manual regulator for
partments. controlling the intake or exhaust airflow, or both,
for maintaining the required internal pressures
(3) The temperature and ventilation and airflow rates.
controls are accessible to the flight crew.
(5) Instruments at the pilot or flight
[ JAR 25.832 Cabin ozone concentration engineer station to show the pressure differential,
the cabin pressure altitude, and the rate, of change
Not required for JAR –25 at present.] of the cabin pressure altitude.
(2) Tests of the pressurisation system to (6) There must be at least one hand fire
show proper functioning under each possible extinguisher conveniently located in the pilot
condition of pressure, temperature, and moisture, compartment (see ACJ 25.851(a)(6)).
up to the maximum altitude for which certification
is requested. (b) Built-in fire extinguishers. If a built-in
fire extinguisher system is required –
(3) Flight tests, to show the performance
(1) The capacity of each system, in
of the pressure supply, pressure and flow reg-
relation to the volume of the compartment
ulators, indicators, and warning signals, in steady
where used and the ventilation rate, must be
and stepped climbs and descents at rates corre-
adequate for any fire likely to occur in that
sponding to the maximum attainable within the
compartment; and
operating limitations of the aeroplane, up to the
maximum altitude for which certification is
(2) Each system must be installed so
requested.
that –
(4) Tests of each door and emergency exit,
(i) No extinguishing agent likely
to show that they operate properly after being
to enter personnel compartments will be
subjected to the flight tests prescribed in sub-
hazardous to the occupants; and
paragraph (3) of this paragraph.
(ii) No discharge of the extinguisher
can cause structural damage.
FIRE PROTECTION
JAR 25.853 Compartment interiors
JAR 25.851 Fire extinguishers
Materials (including finishes or decorative surfaces
(a) Hand fire extinguishers. For hand fire applied to the materials) used in each compartment
extinguishers the following apply (see ACJ 25.851 occupied by the crew or passengers must meet the
(a)): following test criteria as applicable:
(1) Each hand extinguisher must be (a) Interior ceiling panels, interior wall panels,
approved. partitions, galley structure, large cabinet walls,
structural flooring and materials used in the con-
(2) The types and quantities of each extin- struction of stowage compartments (other than
guishing agent used must be appropriate to the underseat stowage compartments and compartments
kinds of fires likely to occur where used. for stowing small items such as magazines and maps)
must be self-extinguishing when tested vertically in
(3) Each extinguisher for use in a accordance with the applicable portions of
personnel compartment must be designed to Appendix F, or other approved equivalent methods.
minimise the hazard of toxic gas concentrations. The average burn length may not exceed six inches
and the average flame time after removal of the
(4) A readily accessible hand fire extin- flame time after removal of the flame source may
guisher must be available for use in each Class A not exceed 15 seconds. Drippings from the test
or Class B cargo compartment. specimen may not continue to flame for more than
an average of three seconds after falling.
(5) There must be at least the following
number of hand fire extinguishers conveniently
located in passenger compartments (see ACJ
25.851 (a) (5)).
(1) Motion picture film must be safety contained removable ashtrays located conspicuously
film meeting an approved Standard. If the film on or near the entry side of each lavatory door,
travels through ducts, the ducts must meet the except that one ashtray may serve more than one
requirements of sub-paragraph (b) of this lavatory door if the ashtray can be seen readily from
paragraph. the cabin side of each lavatory door served. The
placards must have red letters at least one-half inch
(2) Acrylic windows and signs, parts high on a white background of at least one inch
constructed in whole or in part of elastomeric high. (A 'No Smoking' symbol may be included on
materials, edge lighted instrument assemblies the placard.)
consisting of two or more instruments in a
common housing, seat belts, shoulder harnesses,
and cargo and baggage tiedown equipment,
including containers, bins, pallets, etc., used in JAR 25.855 Cargo and baggage compartments
passenger or crew compartments, may not have
an average burn rate greater than 2.5 inches per (a) Thermal and acoustic insulation (including
minute when tested horizontally in accordance coverings) and liners, used in each cargo and baggage
with the applicable portions of Appendix F or compartment not occupied by passengers or crew,
other approved equivalent methods. must be constructed of materials that at least meet
the requirements set forth in JAR 25.853 (b).
(3) Except for electrical wire and cable
insulation, and for small parts (such as knobs, (1) Class B through Class E cargo or
handles, rollers, fasteners, clips, grommets, rub baggage compartments as defined in JAR 25.857,
strips, pulleys, and small electrical parts) that the must have a liner and the liner must be con-
Authority finds would not contribute significantly structed of materials that at least meet the
to the propagation of a fire, materials in items requirements set forth in JAR 25.853 (b), must be
not specified in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (b) (1), separate from (but may be attached to) the
or (b) (2) of this paragraph may not have a burn aeroplane structure, and must be tested at a
rate greater than 4.0 inches per minute when 45° angle in accordance with the applicable
tested horizontally in accordance with the portions of Appendix F or other approved
applicable portions of Appendix F or other equivalent methods. In the course of the 45º
approved equivalent methods. angle test, the flame may not penetrate (pass
through) the material during application of the
(c) If smoking is to be prohibited, there must flame or subsequent to its removal, the average
be a placard so stating, and if smoking is to be flame time after removal of the flame source
allowed – may not exceed 15 seconds, and the average
glow time may not exceed 10 seconds.
(1) There must be an adequate number
of self-contained, removable ashtrays; and (2) Insulation blankets and cargo covers
used to protect cargo in compartments not
(2) Where the crew compartment is occupied by passengers or crew must be con-
separated from the passenger compartment, structed of materials that at least meet the
there must be at least one sign meeting the requirements of JAR 25.853 (b), and tiedown
'No Smoking' sign requirements of JAR 25.791 equipment (including containers, bins, and
notifying all passengers when smoking is pallets) used in each cargo and baggage compart-
prohibited. ment not occupied by passengers or crew must
be constructed of materials that at least meet
(d) Each disposal receptacle for towels, paper, the requirements set forth in JAR 25.853 (b) (3).
or waste must be fully enclosed and constructed of
[ at least fire resistant materials, and must contain ] (b) No compartment may contain any controls,
fires likely to occur in it under normal use. The wiring, lines, equipment, or accessories whose
ability of the disposal receptacle to contain those damage or failure would affect safe operation,
fires under all probable conditions of wear, misalign- unless those items are protected so that –
ment, and ventilation expected in service must be
demonstrated by test. A placard containing the (1) They cannot be damaged by the
legible words 'No Cigarette Disposal' must be movement of cargo in the compartment; and
located on or near each disposal receptacle door.
(2) Their breakage or failure will not
(e) Lavatories must have 'No Smoking' or create a fire hazard.
'No Smoking in Lavatory' placards located con-
spicuously on each side of the entry door, and self- (c) There must be means to prevent cargo
or baggage from interfering with the functioning
of the fire-protective features of the compartment.
(d) Sources of heat within the compartment (3) There are means to exclude hazardous
must be shielded and insulated to prevent igniting quantities of smoke, flames, or extinguishing
the cargo. agent, from any compartment occupied by the
crew or passengers; and
(e) Cargo compartments must meet one of the
class requirements of JAR 25.857. In addition, flight (4) There are means to control ventilation
tests must be conducted to show compliance with and draughts within the compartment so that the
the provisions of JAR 25.857 concerning – extinguishing agent used can control any fire
that may start within the compartment.
(1) Compartment accessibility;
(d) Class D. (See ACJ 25.857 (d).) A Class D
(2) The entry of hazardous quantities of cargo or baggage compartment is one in which:
smoke or extinguishing agent into compartments
occupied by the crew or passengers; and (1) A fire occurring in it will be
completely confined without endangering the
(3) The dissipation of the extinguishing safety of the aeroplane or the occupants;
agent in Class C compartments.
(2) There are means to exclude hazardous
During these tests, it must be shown that no in- quantities of smoke, flames, or other noxious
advertent operation of smoke or fire detectors in gases, from any compartment occupied by the
any compartment would occur as a result of fire crew or passengers;
contained in any one compartment, either during
or after extinguishment, unless the extinguishing (3) Ventilation and draughts are
system floods each such compartment simul- controlled within each compartment so that any
taneously. fire likely to occur in the compartment will not
progress beyond safe limits;
JAR 25.857 Cargo compartment classification
(4) Reserved.
(a) Class A. Class A cargo or baggage com-
partment is one in which – (5) Consideration is given to the effect
of heat within the compartment on adjacent
(1) The presence of a fire would be critical parts of the aeroplane.
easily discovered by a crew member while at his
station; and For compartments of 500 cubic ft or less, an airflow
of 1500 cubic ft per hour is acceptable.
(2) Each part of the compartment is
easily accessible in flight. (e) Class E. A Class E cargo compartment is
one on aeroplanes used only for the carriage of
(b) Class B. (See ACJ 25.857 (b).) A Class B cargo and in which –
cargo or baggage compartment is one in which –
(1) Reserved.
(1) There is sufficient access in flight to
enable a crew member to effectively reach any (2) There is a separate approved smoke
part of the compartment with the contents of or fire detector system to give warning at the
a hand fire extinguisher; pilot or flight engineer station;
(2) When the access provisions are being (3) There are means to shut off the
used no hazardous quantity of smoke, flames or ventilating airflow to, or within, the compartment,
extinguishing agent will enter any compartment and the controls for these means are accessible
occupied by the crew or passengers; and to the flight crew in the crew compartment;
(3) There is a separate approved smoke (4) There are means to exclude hazardous
detector or fire detector system to give warning quantities of smoke, flames, or noxious gases,
to the pilot or flight engineer station, from the flight-crew compartment; and
(c) Class C. A Class C cargo or baggage com- (5) The required crew emergency exits
partment is one not meeting the requirements for are accessible under any cargo loading condition.
either a Class A or B compartment but in which –
[ JAR 25.858 Cargo compartment fire detection
(1) There is a separate approved smoke systems
detector or fire detector system to give warning
at the pilot or flight engineer station; If certification with cargo compartment fire
detection provisions is requested, the following
(2) There is an approved built-in fire- must be met for each cargo compartment with those
extinguishing system controllable from the provisions: ]
pilot or flight engineer stations;
[ (a) The detection system must provide a visual (c) Combustion air ducts. Each combustion
indication to the flight crew within one minute after air duct must be fireproof for a distance great
the start of a fire. enough to prevent damage from backfiring or
reverse flame propagation. In addition –
(b) The system must be capable of detecting a
fire at a temperature significantly below that at (1) No combustion air duct may have a
which the structural integrity of the aeroplane is common opening with the ventilating airstream
substantially decreased. unless flames from backfires or reverse burning
cannot enter the ventilating airstream under any
(c) There must be means to allow the crew to operating condition, including reverse flow or
check in flight, the functioning of each fire detector malfunctioning of the heater or its associated
circuit. components; and
(d) The effectiveness of the detection system (2) No combustion air duct may restrict
must be shown for all approved operating configur- the prompt relief of any backfire that, if so
ations and conditions.] restricted, could cause heater failure.
JAR 25.859 Combustion heater fire protection (d) Heater controls; general. Provision must
be made to prevent the hazardous accumulation of
(a) Combustion heater fire zones. The water or ice on or in any heater control component,
following combustion heater fire zones must be control system tubing, or safety control.
protected from fire in accordance with the
applicable provisions of JAR 25.1181 to 25.1191 (e) Heater safety controls. For each com-
and 25.1195 to 25.1203: bustion heater there must be the following safety
control means:
(1) The region surrounding the heater,
if this region contains any flammable fluid (1) Means independent of the com-
system components (excluding the heater fuel ponents provided for the normal continuous
system), that could – control of air temperature, airflow, and fuel flow
must be provided, for each heater, to auto-
(i) Be damaged by heater mal- matically shut off the ignition and fuel supply
functioning; or to that heater at a point remote from that heater
when any of the following occurs:
(ii) Allow flammable fluids or
vapours to reach the heater in case of (i) The heat exchanger temperature
leakage. exceeds safe limits.
(2) The region surrounding the heater, (ii) The ventilating air temperature
if the heater fuel system has fittings that, if they exceeds safe limits.
leaked, would allow fuel or vapours to enter
this region. (iii) The combustion airflow be-
comes inadequate for safe operation.
(3) The part of the ventilating air passage
that surrounds the combustion chamber. How- (iv) The ventilating airflow becomes
ever, no fire extinguishment is required in cabin inadequate for safe operation.
ventilating air passages.
(2) The means of complying with sub-
(b) Ventilating air ducts. Each ventilating air paragraph (1) of this paragraph for any individual
duct passing through any fire zone must be fire- heater must –
proof. In addition –
(i) Be independent of components
(1) Unless isolation is provided by fire- serving any other heater whose heat out-
proof valves or by equally effective means, the put is essential for safe operation; and
ventilating air duct downstream of each heater
must be fireproof for a distance great enough to (ii) Keep the heater off until
ensure that any fire originating in the heater can restarted by the crew.
be contained in the duct; and
(3) There must be means to warn the
(2) Each part of any ventilating duct crew when any heater whose heat output is
passing through any region having a flammable essential for safe operation has been shut off
fluid system must be constructed or isolated by the automatic means prescribed in sub-
from that system so that the malfunctioning of paragraph (1) of this paragraph.
any component of that system cannot introduce
flammable fluids or vapours into the ventilating (f) Air intakes. Each combustion and
airstream. ventilating air intake must be located so that no
flammable fluids or vapours can enter the heater
system under any operating condition –
1–D–32–1 Change 10
JAR–25 SECTION 1
Change 10 1–D–32–2
SECTION 1 JAR–25
(h) Heater fuel systems. Each heater fuel JAR 25.865 Fire protection of flight controls,
system must meet each powerplant fuel system engine mounts, and other flight
requirement affecting safe heater operation. Each structure
heater fuel system component within the ventilating
airstream must be protected by shrouds so that no Essential flight controls, engine mounts, and
leakage from those components can enter the other flight structures located in designated fire
ventilating airstream. zones or in adjacent areas which would be subjected
to the effects of fire in the fire zone must be
(i) Drains. There must be means to safely constructed of fireproof material or shielded so that
drain fuel that might accumulate within the they are capable of withstanding the effects of fire.
combustion chamber or the heat exchanger. In
addition –
JAR 25.867 Fire protection: other components
(1) Each part of any drain that operates
at high temperatures must be protected in the (a) Surfaces to the rear of the nacelles, within
same manner as heater exhausts; and one nacelle diameter of the nacelle centerline, must
be at least fire-resistant.
(2) Each drain must be protected from
hazardous ice accumulation under any operating (b) Sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph does
condition. not apply to tail surfaces to the rear of the nacelles
that could not be readily affected by heat, flames,
JAR 25.863 Flammable fluid fire protection or sparks coming from a designated fire zone or
engine compartment of any nacelle.
(a) In each area where flammable fluids or
vapours might escape by leakage of a fluid system,
there must be means to minimise the probability MISCELLANEOUS
of ignition of the fluids and vapours, and the
resultant hazards if ignition does occur. (See JAR 25.871 Levelling means
ACJ 25.863 (a).)
There must be means for determining when the
(b) Compliance with sub-paragraph (a) of aeroplane is in a level position on the ground.
this paragraph must be shown by analysis or tests,
and the following factors must be considered:
(1) Possible sources and paths of fluid JAR 25.875 Reinforcement near propellers
leakage, and means of detecting leakage.
(a) Each part of the aeroplane near the pro-
(2) Flammability characteristics of fluids, peller tips must be strong and stiff enough to with-
including effects of any combustible or absorbing stand the effects of the induced vibration and of
materials. ice thrown from the propeller.
(3) Possible ignition sources, including (b) No window may be near the propeller
electrical faults, overheating of equipment, and tips unless it can withstand the most severe ice
malfunctioning of protective devices. impact likely to occur.
(4) Means available for controlling or JAR 25X899 Electrical bonding and protection
extinguishing a fire, such as stopping flow of against lightning and static elec-
fluids, shutting down equipment, fireproof tricity (See also ACJ 25X899.)
containment, or use of extinguishing agents.
The electrical bonding and protection against
(5) Ability of aeroplane components lightning and static electricity systems must be such
that are critical to safety of flight to withstand as to:–
fire and heat.
(a) Protect the aeroplane, including its systems
(c) If action by the flight crew is required to and equipment, against the dangerous effects of
prevent or counteract a fluid fire (e.g. equipment lightning discharges;
shutdown or actuation of a fire extinguisher) quick
acting means must be provided to alert the crew. (b) Prevent dangerous accumulation of electro-
static charge;
(d) Each area where flammable fluids or
vapours might escape by leakage of a fluid system (c) Minimise the risk of electrical shock to
must be identified and defined. crew, passengers and servicing personnel and also to
1—D—33 Change 8
JAR–25 SECTION 1
Change 8 1–D–34
SECTION 1 JAR–25
Subpart E — Powerplant
(3) Affects the safety of the major propul- (1) In particular, where no means is
sive units between normal inspections or overhauls. provided to prevent continued rotation, the safety
of the aeroplane must be shown in the event of
(b) For each powerplant – failure of the engine oil supply. (See JAR–E,
Chapter C3–4, paragraph 27 and Chapter C3–4
(1) The installation must comply with – Appendix, paragraph 9.)
generating system must be provided to permit (3) Positive clearance between other
in-flight engine ignition for restarting. rotating parts of the propeller or spinner and
stationary parts of the aeroplane.
[ (f) Contingency ratings. Where an application is
made for a maximum and/or intermediate contingency JAR 25.929 Propeller de-icing
rating, demonstration of compliance with JAR 25.939,
25.961 (a) (2), 25.965 (b) (3) and 25.1041 must (a) For aeroplanes intended for use where icing
include operation at the maximum and/or intermedite may be expected, there must be a means to prevent
contingency rating. ] or remove hazardous ice accumulation on propellers
or on accessories where ice accumulation would
JAR 25.905 Propellers jeopardise engine performance. (See ACJ 25.929 (a).)
(a) Each propeller must meet the requirements (b) If combustible fluid is used for propeller
of JAR–P. de-icing, JAR 25.1181 to JAR 25.1185 and
JAR 25.1189 apply.
(b) Engine power and propeller shaft rotational
speed may not exceed the limits for which the
propeller is certificated. (See JAR–P, C5–2, JAR 25.933 Reversing systems
paragraph 4.)
(a) Each engine reversing system intended for
(c) Each component of the propeller blade ground operation only must be designed so that
pitch control system must meet the requirements during any reversal in flight the engine will produce
of JAR–P, C5–A, paragraph 4. no more than flight idle thrust. In addition, it must
be shown by analysis or test, or both, that –
JAR 25.907 Propeller vibration
(See JAR–P, C5–A, paragraph 3.) (1) The reverser can be restored to the
forward thrust position; or
JAR 25.925 Propeller clearance
(2) The aeroplane is capable of continued
Unless smaller clearances are substantiated, pro- safe flight and landing under any possible position
peller clearances with the aeroplane at maximum of the thrust reverser.
weight, with the most adverse centre of gravity, and
with the propeller in the most adverse pitch position, (b) Turbo-jet reversing systems intended for
may not be less than the following: inflight use must be designed so that no unsafe
condition will result during normal operation of the
(a) Ground clearance. There must be a clearance system, or from any failure (or reasonably likely
of at least seven inches (for each aeroplane with nose combination of failures) of the reversing system,
wheel landing gear) or nine inches (for each aeroplane under any anticipated condition of operation of the
with tail-wheel landing gear) between each propeller aeroplane including ground operation. Failure of
and the ground with the landing gear statically structural elements need not be considered if the
deflected and in the level take-off, or taxying attitude, probability of this kind of failure is extremely remote.
whichever is most critical. In addition, there must be
positive clearance between the propeller and the (c) Compliance with this paragraph may be
ground when in the level take-off attitude with the shown by failure analysis, testing, or both, for
critical tyre completely deflated and the corresponding propeller systems that allow propeller blades to move
landing gear strut bottomed. from the flight low-pitch position to a position that is
substantially less than that at the normal flight low-
(b) Not required for JAR–25. pitch stop position. The analysis may include or be
supported by the analysis made to show compliance
(c) Structural clearance. There must be – with JAR–E, C2–2, paragraph 1.1.2 and C3–2,
paragraph 1.2.1 for the propeller and associated
(1) At least one inch radial clearance installation components.
between the blade tips and the aeroplane structure,
plus any additional radial clearance necessary to (d) Each turbo-jet reversing system must have
prevent harmful vibration; means to prevent the engine from producing more
than idle forward thrust when the reversing system
(2) At least one-half inch longitudinal malfunctions, except that it may produce any greater
clearance between the propeller blades or cuffs forward thrust that is shown to allow directional
and stationary parts of the aeroplane; and control to be maintained, with aerodynamic means
alone, under the most critical reversing condition
expected in operation.
1–E–2–1 Change 10
JAR–25 SECTION 1
Change 10 1–E–2–2
SECTION 1 JAR–25
failure or malfunction of any of the systems during JAR 25.943 Negative acceleration
normal or emergency operation results in propeller
drag in excess of that for which the aeroplane was No hazardous malfunction of an engine or any
designed under JAR 25.367. Failure of structural component or system associated with the powerplant
elements of the drag limiting systems need not be may occur when the aeroplane is operated at the
considered if the probability of this kind of failure is negative accelerations within the flight envelopes
extremely remote. prescribed in JAR 25.333. This must be shown for
the greatest duration expected for the acceleration.
(See also JAR 25X1315.)
JAR 25.939 Turbine engine operating characteristics
(a) Turbine engine operating characteristics JAR 25.945 Thrust or power augmentation system
must be investigated in flight to determine that no
adverse characteristics (such as stall, surge, or flame- (a) General. Each fluid injection system must
out) are present, to a hazardous degree, during provide a flow of fluid at the rate and pressure
normal and emergency operation within the range of established for proper engine functioning under each
operation limitations of the aeroplane and of the intended operating condition. If the fluid can freeze,
[
engine. (See ACJ 25.939(a).) ] fluid freezing may not damage the aeroplane or
adversely affect aeroplane performance.
(b) Reserved.
(b) Fluid tanks. Each augmentation system
(c) The turbine engine air inlet system may not, fluid tank must meet the following requirements:
as a result of air flow distortion during normal
operation, cause vibration harmful to the engine. (1) Each tank must be able to withstand
(See ACJ 25 .939 (c).) without failure the vibration, inertia, fluid, and
structural loads that it may be subjected to in
.(d) It must be established over the range of operation.
operating conditions for which certification is required
that the powerplant installation does not induce (2) The tanks as mounted in the aeroplane
engine carcase vibration in excess of the acceptable must be able to withstand without failure or
levels established during engine type certification leakage an internal pressure 1.5 times the
under JAR–E, C3–4, paragraph 3.4. (See ACJ maximum operating pressure.
25.939 (d).)
(3) If a vent is provided, the venting must
be effective under all normal flight conditions.
For aeroplanes using variable inlet or exhaust (5) Each tank must have an expansion
system geometry, or both – space of not less than 2% of the tank capacity.
It must be impossible to fill the expansion space
(a) The system comprised of the inlet, engine inadvertently with the aeroplane in the normal
(including thrust augmentation systems, if in- ground attitude.
corporated), and exhaust must be shown to function
properly under all operating conditions for which (c) Augmentation system drains must be designed
approval is sought, including all engine rotating speeds and located in accordance with JAR 25.1455 if —
and power settings, and engine inlet and exhaust
configurations; (1) The augmentation system fluid is
subject to freezing; and
(b) The dynamic effects of the operation of
these (including consideration of probable mal- (2) The fluid may be drained in flight or
functions) upon the aerodynamic control of the during ground operation.
aeroplane may not result in any condition that would
require exceptional skill, alertness, or strength on the (d) The augmentation liquid tank capacity
part of the pilot to avoid exceeding an operational or available for the use of each engine must be large
structural limitation of the aeroplane; and enough to allow operation of the aeroplane under the
approved procedures for the use of liquid-augmented
(c) In showing compliance with sub-paragraph power. The computation of liquid consumption must
(b) of this paragraph, the pilot strength required may be based on the maximum approved rate appropriate
not exceed the limits set forth in JAR 25.143 (c) for the desired engine output and must include the
or JAR(BB) 25.143 (c) (as appropriate) subject to effect of temperature on engine performance as well
the conditions set forth in sub-paragraphs (d) and (e) as any other factors that might vary the amount of
of JAR 25.143, or JAR(BB) 25.143 (as appropriate). liquid required.
(e) This paragraph does not apply to fuel JAR 25.954 Fuel system lightning protection
injection systems.
The fuel system must be designed and arranged to
prevent the ignition of fuel vapour within the system
(see ACJ 25.954) by –
[ (c) Each fuel heat exchanger must be able to (2) For each engine, in addition to having
withstand without failure any vibration, inertia and appropriate manual switching capability, be
fuel pressure load to which it may be subjected in designed to prevent interruption of fuel flow to
operation. ] that engine, without attention by the flight crew,
when any tank supplying fuel to that engine is
JAR 25.953 Fuel system independence depleted of usable fuel during normal operation,
and any other tank, that normally supplies fuel to
Each fuel system must meet the requirements that engine alone, contains usable fuel.
of JAR 25.903 (b) by –
JAR 25.957 Flow between interconnected tanks
(a) Allowing the supply of fuel to each engine
through a system independent of each part of the If fuel can be pumped from one tank to another in
system supplying fuel to any other engine; or flight, the fuel tank vents and the fuel transfer system
must be designed so that no structural damage to the
(b) Any other acceptable method. tanks can occur because of over-filling.
1—E—4—1 Change 9
JAR–25 SECTION 1
Change 9 1—E—4—2
SECTION 1 JAR―25
fuel feed condition for all intended operations and (c) Integral fuel tanks must have facilities for
flight manoeuvres involving fuel feeding from that interior inspection and repair.
tank. Fuel system component failures need not be
considered. [ (d) Fuel tanks must, so far as it is practicable,
be designed, located and installed so that no fuel is
released in or near the fuselage or near the engines in
quantities sufficient to start a serious fire in other-
JAR 25.961 Fuel system hot weather operation wise survivable crash conditions. (See also ACJ
25.963 (d) and (G) ACJ 25.963 (d) (United
(a) The fuel system must perform satisfactorily Kingdom.). ]
in hot weather operation. This must be shown by
showing that the fuel system from the tank outlets [ (e) ] Fuel tanks within the fuselage contour must
to each engine is pressurised, under all intended be able to resist rupture, and to retain fuel, under the
operations, so as to prevent vapour formation, or inertia forces prescribed for the emergency landing
must be shown by climbing from the altitude of the conditions in JAR 25.561. In addition, these tanks
airport elected by the applicant to the maximum must be in a protected position so that exposure of
altitude established as an operating limitation under the tanks to scraping action with the ground is
JAR 25.1527. If a climb test is elected, there may be unlikely.
no evidence of vapour lock or other malfunctioning
during the climb test conducted under the following (f) For pressurised fuel tanks, a means with fail-
conditions: safe features must be provided to prevent the build-
up of an excessive pressure difference between the
(1) Not required for JAR–25. inside and the outside of the tank.
1—E—5—2 Change 11
JAR–25 SECTION 1
(d) For pressurised fuel tanks, it must be shown JAR 25.971 Fuel tank sump
by analysis or tests that the fuel tanks can withstand
the maximum pressure likely to occur on the ground (a) Each fuel tank must have a sump with an
or in flight. effective capacity, in the normal ground attitude, of
not less than the greater of 0.10% of the tank
[ capacity or one-quarter of a litre unless operating ]
limitations are established to ensure that the
JAR 25.967 Fuel tank installation accumulation of water in service will not exceed the
sump capacity.
(a) Each fuel tank must be supported so that
tank loads (resulting from the weight of the fuel in (b) Each fuel tank must allow drainage of any
the tanks) are not concentrated on unsupported tank hazardous quantity of water from any part of the
surfaces. In addition – tank to its sump with the aeroplane in the ground
attitude.
(1) There must be pads, if necessary, to
prevent chafing between the tank and its supports; (c) Each fuel tank sump must have an accessible
drain that –
(2) Padding must be non-absorbent or
treated to prevent the absorption of fluids; (1) Allows complete drainage of the sump
on the ground;
(3) If a flexible tank liner is used, it must
(2) Discharges clear of each part of the
aeroplane; and
(3) Has manual or automatic means for (b) Not required for JAR—25.
positive locking in the closed position.
(a) Each filler must be marked as prescribed in (2) Prevent the passage of any object that
JAR 25.1557 (c); could restrict fuel flow or damage any fuel system
component.
(b) Each recessed filler connection that can
retain any appreciable quantity of fuel must have a (b) Reserved.
drain that discharges clear of each part of the aero-
plane; (c) The clear area of each fuel tank outlet
strainer must be at least five times the area of the out-
(c) Each filler cap must provide a fuel-tight seal; let line.
and
(d) The diameter of each strainer must be at
(d) Each fuel filling point must have a provision least that of the fuel tank outlet.
for electrically bonding the aeroplane to ground
fuelling equipment. (e) Each finger strainer must be accessible for
inspection and cleaning.
JAR 25.975 Fuel tank vents JAR 25.979 Pressure fuelling system
(a) Fuel tank vents. Each fuel tank must be For pressure fuelling systems, the following apply:
vented from the top part of the expansion space so
that venting is effective under any normal flight (a) Each pressure fuelling system fuel manifold
condition. In addition – connection must have means to prevent the escape of
hazardous quantities of fuel from the system if the
(1) Each vent must be arranged to avoid fuel entry valve fails.
stoppage by dirt or ice formation;
(b) An automatic shut-off means must be
(2) The vent arrangement must prevent provided to prevent the quantity of fuel in each tank
siphoning of fuel during normal operation; from exceeding the maximum quantity approved for
that tank. This means must –
(3) The venting capacity and vent pressure
levels must maintain acceptable differences of (1) Allow checking for proper shut-off
pressure between the interior and exterior of the operation before each fuelling of the tank; and
tank, during –
(2) Provide indication, at each fuelling
(i) Normal flight operation; station, of failure of the shut-off means to stop
fuel at the desired level.
(ii) Maximum rate of ascent and
descent; and (c) A means must be provided to prevent
damage to the fuel system in the event of failure of
(iii) Refuelling and defuelling (where the automatic shut-off means prescribed in sub-
applicable); paragraph (b) of this paragraph.
(4) Airspaces of tanks with interconnected (d) The aeroplane pressure fuelling system (not
outlets must be interconnected; including fuel tanks and fuel tank vents) must with-
stand an ultimate load that is 2.0 times the load
(5) There may be no point in any vent arising from the maximum pressures, including surge,
line where moisture can accumulate with the that is likely to occur during fuelling. The maximum
aeroplane in the ground attitude or the level surge pressure must be established with any com-
flight attitude, unless drainage is provided; and bination of tank valves being either intentionally
or inadvertently closed. ( See ACJ 25.979 (d).)
(6) No vent or drainage provision may
end at any point –
(i) Where the discharge of fuel from (e) The aeroplane defuelling system (not
the vent outlet would constitute a fire including fuel tanks and fuel tank vents) must with-
hazard; or stand an ultimate load that is 2.0 times the load
(ii) From which fumes could enter arising from the maximum permissible defuelling
personnel compartments.
1–E–7 Change 8
JAR–25 SECTION 1
pressure (positive or negative) at the aeroplane JAR 25.994 Fuel system components
fuelling connection.
Fuel system components in an engine nacelle or
in the fuselage must be located or protected from
JAR 25.981 Fuel tank temperature damage which could cause the release of dangerous
quantities of fuel as a result of a wheels-up landing.
(a) The highest temperature allowing a safe
margin below the lowest expected auto-ignition JAR 25.995 Fuel valves
temperature of the fuel in the fuel tanks must be
determined. In addition to the requirements of JAR 25.1189
for shut-off means, each fuel valve must –
(b) No temperature at any place inside any fuel
tank where fuel ignition is possible may exceed the (a) Reserved.
temperature determined under sub-paragraph (a) of
this paragraph. This must be shown under all (b) Be supported so that no loads resulting
probable operating, failure, and malfunction from their operation or from accelerated flight
conditions of any component whose operation, conditions are transmitted to the lines attached to the
failure, or malfunction could increase the temper- valve.
ature inside the tank.
JAR 25.997 Fuel strainer or filter
FUEL SYSTEM COMPONENTS (This paragraph does not apply to fuel strainers or
JAR 25.991 Fuel pumps filters already approved as part of an engine type
certificated under JAR–E.)
(a) Main pumps. Each fuel pump required for
proper engine operation, or required to meet the fuel There must be a fuel strainer or filter between the
system requirements of this Subpart (other than fuel tank outlet and the inlet of either the fuel
those in sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph), is a metering device or an engine driven positive displace-
main pump. For each main pump, provision must ment pump, whichever is nearer the fuel tank outlet.
be made to allow the bypass of each positive dis- This fuel strainer or filter must –
placement fuel pump approved as part of the engine.
(a) Be accessible for draining and cleaning and
(b) Emergency pumps. There must be must incorporate a screen or element which is easily
emergency pumps or another main pump to feed each removable;
engine immediately after failure of any main pump.
(b) Have a sediment trap and drain except that
it need not have a drain if the strainer or filter is
JAR 25.993 Fuel system lines and fittings easily removable for drain purposes;
(a) Each fuel line must be installed and supported (c) Be mounted so that its weight is not
to prevent excessive vibration and to withstand loads supported by the connecting lines or by the inlet or
due to fuel pressure and accelerated flight conditions. outlet connections of the strainer or filter itself; and
(b) Each fuel line connected to components of (d) Have the capacity (with respect to operating
the aeroplane between which relative motion could limitations established for the engine) and the mesh
exist must have provisions for flexibility. to ensure that engine fuel system functioning is not
impaired, with the fuel contaminated to a degree
(c) Each flexible connection in fuel lines that (with respect to particle size and density) that is
may be under pressure and subject to axial loading greater than that established for the engine in
must use flexible hose assemblies or equivalent means. JAR–E.
(d) Flexible hose must be approved or must JAR 25.999 Fuel system drains
be shown to be suitable for the particular application.
(a) Drainage of the fuel system must be accom-
(e) No flexible hose that might be adversely plished by the use of fuel strainer and fuel tank
affected by exposure to high temperatures may be sump drains.
used where excessive temperatures will exist during
operation or after engine shut-down. (b) Each drain required by sub-paragraph (a) of
this paragraph must –
(f) Each fuel line within the fuselage must be
designed and installed to allow a reasonable degree of (1) Discharge clear of all parts, of the
deformation and stretching without leakage. aeroplane:
Change 8 1—E—8
SECTION 1 JAR–25
(2) Have manual or automatic means for (g) During the flight tests prescribed in sub-
positive locking in the closed position; and paragraph (f) of third paragraph, it must be shown
that –
(3) Have a drain valve – (1) The fuel jettisoning system and its
operation are free from fire hazard;
(i) That is readily accessible and
which can be easily opened and closed; and (2) The fuel discharges clear of any part
of the aeroplane;
(ii) That is either located or protected
to prevent fuel spillage in the event of a (3) Fuel or fumes do not enter any parts
landing with landing gear retracted. of the aeroplane;
(a) Not required for JAR–25. (h) Not required for JAR–25.
(b) The aeroplane must have a fuel jettisoning (i) Means must be provided to prevent jettison-
system installed that meets the requirements of this ing the fuel in the tanks used for take-off and landing
paragraph unless it is shown that the aeroplane meets below the level allowing climb from sea level to
the climb requirements of JAR 25.119 and 25.121 (d) 10,000 ft and thereafter allowing 45 minutes cruise at
at the weight specified in sub-paragraph (c) of this a speed for maximum range. However, if there is an
paragraph. auxiliary control independent of the main jettisoning
control, the system may be designed to jettison the
(c) Compliance with the climb performance remaining fuel by means of the auxiliary jettisoning
requirements of sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph control .
must be shown at a weight equal to the maximum
take-off weight less the actual or computed weight (j) The fuel jettisoning valve must be designed
of the fuel that would be consumed by the engines to allow flight personnel to close the valve during any
during a 15-minute flight in which the aeroplane is part of the jettisoning operation.
involved in a take-off, go-around, and landing at the
airport of departure, with the aeroplane's config- (k) Unless it is shown that using any means
uration, speed, power, and thrust the same as that (including flaps, slots and slats) for changing the
used in meeting the applicable take-off, approach and airflow across or around the wings does not adversely
landing climb performance requirements of this affect fuel jettisoning, there must be a placard,
JAR–25. adjacent to the jettisoning control, to warn flight-
crew members against jettisoning fuel while the
(d) Not required for JAR–25. means that change the airflow are being used.
(e) The fuel jettisoning system must be able to (l) The fuel jettisoning system must be designed
jettison enough fuel within 15 minutes to bring the so that any reasonably probable single malfunction
weight specified in sub-paragraph (c) of this paragraph in the system will not result in a hazardous condition
down to the weight at which the aeroplane will meet due to unsymmetrical jettisoning of, or inability to
the climb requirements of JAR 25.119 and 25.121 (d) jettison, fuel.
assuming that the fuel is jettisoned under the condition
found least favourable during the flight test prescribed
in sub-paragraph (f) of this paragraph.
OIL SYSTEM
(f) Fuel jettisoning must be demonstrated
beginning at maximum take-off weight with wing- JAR 25.1011 General
flaps and landing gear up and in –
(a) Each engine must have an independent oil
(1) A power-off glide at 14 VS1; system that can supply it with an appropriate quantity
of oil at a temperature not above that safe for contin-
(2) A climb at the one-engine inoperative uous operation.
best rate-of-climb speed, with the critical engine
inoperative and the remaining engines at maximum (b) The usable oil capacity may not be less
continuous power; and than the product of the endurance of the aeroplane
under critical operating conditions and the approved
(3) Level flight at 1.4 VS1, if the results of maximum allowable oil consumption of the engine
the tests in the condition specified in sub-para- under the same conditions, plus a suitable margin
graphs (1) and (2) of this paragraph show that this to ensure system circulation.
condition could be critical.
(c) Not required for JAR–25.
1–E–9 Change 8
JAR–25 SECTION 1
(d) Vent. Oil tanks must be vented as follows: (1) Condensed water vapour that might
freeze and obstruct the line cannot accumulate
(1) Each oil tank must be vented from the at any point;
top part of the expansion space so that venting is
effective under any normal flight condition. (2) The breather discharge does not con-
stitute a fire hazard if foaming occurs or causes
(2) Oil tank vents must be arranged so emitted oil to strike the pilot's wind-shield; and
that condensed water vapour that might freeze and
obstruct the line cannot accumulate at any point. (3) The breather does not discharge into
the engine air induction system.
(e) Outlet. There must be means to prevent
entrance into the tank itself, or into the tank outlet,
of any object that might obstruct the flow of oil JAR 25.1019 Oil strainer or filter
through the system. No oil tank outlet may be
enclosed by any screen or guard that would reduce (This paragraph does not apply to oil strainers or
the flow of oil below a safe value at any operating filters already approved as part of an engine type
temperature. There must be a shut-off valve at the certificated under JAR–E.)
outlet of each oil tank, unless the external portion of
the oil system (including the oil tank supports) is (a) Each turbine engine installation must in-
fireproof. corporate an oil strainer or filter through which all
of the engine oil flows and which meets the following
(f) Flexible oil tank liners. Each flexible oil requirements:
tank liner must be approved or must be shown to be
suitable for the particular application. (1) Each oil strainer or filter that has a
bypass, must be constructed and installed so that
oil will flow at the normal rate through the rest of
JAR 25.1015 Oil tank tests the system with the strainer or filter completely
blocked.
(This paragraph does not apply to oil tanks already
approved as part of an engine type certificated under (2) The oil strainer or filter must have the
JAR–E.) capacity (with respect to operating limitations
established for the engine) and the mesh to ensure
Each oil tank must be designed and installed so that engine oil system functioning is not impaired
that –
Change 8 1—E—10
SECTION1 JAR–25
when the oil is contaminated to a degree (with JAR 25.1027 Propeller feathering system (See
respect to particle size and density) that is greater ACJ 25.1027.)
than that established for the engine under JAR–E.
(a) If the propeller feathering system depends
(3) The oil strainer or filter, unless it is on engine oil, there must be means to trap an amount
installed at an oil tank outlet, must incorporate of oil in the tank if the supply becomes depleted due
an indicator that will indicate contamination of to failure of any part of the lubricating system other
the screen before it reaches the capacity established than the tank itself.
in accordance with sub-paragraph (2) of this
paragraph. (b) The amount of trapped oil must be enough
to accomplish the feathering operation and must be
(4) The bypass of a strainer or filter must available only to the feathering pump. (See
be constructed and installed so that the release of ACJ 25.1027 (b).)
collected contaminants is minimised by appropriate
location of the bypass to ensure that collected (c) The ability of the system to accomplish
contaminants are not in the bypass flow path. feathering with the trapped oil must be shown.
This may be done on the ground using an auxiliary
(5) Not required for JAR–25. source of oil for lubricating the engine during
operation.
(b) Not required for JAR–25.
(d) Provision must be made to prevent sludge
or other foreign matter from affecting the safe
JAR 25.1021 Oil drains operation of the propeller feathering system.
(b) Each oil radiator air duct must be located so (a) General. Compliance with JAR 25.1041
that, in case of fire, flames coming from normal must be shown by tests, under critical ground, water,
openings of the engine nacelle cannot impinge directly and flight operating conditions. For these tests, the
upon the radiator. following apply:
(b) The closing of oil shut-off means may not (2) No corrected temperatures determined
prevent propeller feathering. under sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph may
exceed established limits.
(c) Each oil valve must have positive stops or
suitable index provisions in the 'on' and 'off' positions (3) Not required for JAR–25.
and must be supported so that no loads resulting
from its operation or from accelerated flight con- (b) Maximum ambient atmospheric temperature.
ditions are transmitted to the, lines attached to the A maximum ambient atmospheric temperature corre-
valve. sponding to sea level conditions of at least 100ºF
must be established. The assumed temperature lapse
rate is 3.6ºF per thousand feet of altitude above sea
level until a temperature of –69.7ºF is reached,
above which altitude the temperature is considered
1–E–11 Change 8
JAR–25 SECTION 1
Change 8 1–E–12
SECTION 1 JAR–25
JAR 25.1103 Induction system ducts and air duct (b) Each exhaust system part with a surface hot
systems enough to ignite flammable fluids or vapours must be
located or shielded so that leakage from any system
[ (a) Not required for JAR–25. ] carrying flammable fluids or vapours will not result
in a fire caused by impingement of the fluids or
(b) Each induction system duct must be – vapours on any part of the exhaust system including
shields for the exhaust system. (See ACJ 25.1121 (b).)
(1) Strong enough to prevent induction
system failures resulting from normal back-fire (c) Each component that hot exhaust gases
conditions (see ACJ 25.1103 (b) (1)); could strike, or that could be subjected to high
temperatures from exhaust system parts, must be
(2) Fire-resistant if it is in any fire zone fireproof. All exhaust system components must be
For which a fire extinguishing system is required. separated by fireproof shields from adjacent parts of
the aeroplane that are outside the engine compartment.
(c) Each duct connected to components between
which relative motion could exist must have means (d) No exhaust gases may discharge so as to
for flexibility. cause a fire hazard with respect to any flammable
fluid vent or drain.
(d) For bleed air systems no hazard may result
If a duct rupture or failure occurs at any point (e) No exhaust gases may discharge where they
between the engine port and the aeroplane unit will cause a glare seriously affecting pilot vision at
served by the bleed air. (See ACJ 25.1103 (d).) night.
(e) Not required for JAR–25. (f) Each exhaust system component must be
ventilated to prevent points of excessively high
(f) Not required for JAR–25. temperature.
(b) No screen may be in any part of the induction JAR 25.1123 Exhaust piping
system that is the only passage through which air can
reach the engine, unless it can be de-iced by heated For powerplant installations, the following apply:
air;
(a) Exhaust piping must be heat and corrosion
(c) No screen may be de-iced by alcohol alone; resistant, and must have provisions to prevent failure
and due to expansion by operating temperatures.
(d) It must be impossible for fuel to strike any (b) Piping must be supported to withstand any
screen. vibration and inertia loads to which it would be
subjected in operation; and
JAR 25.1107 Inter-coolers and after-coolers
(c) Piping connected to components between
Each inter-cooler and after-cooler must be able which relative motion could exist must have means
to withstand any vibration, inertia, and air pressure for flexibility.
load to which it would be subjected in operation.
(3) Each exchanger must have cooling (c) Each control must have sufficient strength
provisions wherever it is subject to contact with and rigidity to withstand operating loads without
exhaust gases (see ACJ 25.1125 (a) (3)), and failure and without excessive deflection.
(4) No exhaust heat exchanger or muff (d) Each control must be able to maintain any
may have any stagnant areas or liquid traps that set position without constant attention by flight-
would increase the probability of ignition of crew members and without creep due to control
flammable fluids or vapours that might be present loads or vibration.
in case of the failure or malfunction of com-
ponents carrying flammable fluids. (e) Reserved.
(b) If an exhaust heat exchanger is used for (f) Powerplant valve controls located in the
heating ventilating air – cockpit must have –
(1) There must be a secondary heat (1) For manual valves, positive stops or
exchanger between the primary exhaust gas heat in the case of fuel valves suitable index provisions,
exchanger and the ventilating air system; or in the open and closed positions; and
(2) Other means must be used to preclude (2) In the case of valves controlled from
the harmful contamination of the ventilating air. the cockpit other than by mechanical means,
where the correct functioning of such a valve is
essential for the safe operation of the aeroplane, a
JAR 25.1127 Exhaust driven turbo-superchargers valve position indicator operated by a system
which senses directly that the valve has attained
[ Not required for JAR–25. ] the position selected, unless other indications in
the cockpit give the flight crew a clear indication
that the valve has moved to the selected position.
(See ACJ 25.1141 (f).)
POWERPLANT CONTROLS
AND ACCESSORIES
JAR 25.1143 Engine controls
JAR 25.1141 Powerplant controls: general
(a) There must be a separate power or thrust
Each powerplant control must be located, control for each engine.
arranged, and designed under JAR 25.777 to 25.781
and marked under JAR 25.1555. In addition, it must (b) Power and thrust controls must be arranged
meet the following requirements: to allow –
(1) Separate control of each engine; and
(a) Each control must be located so that it
cannot be inadvertently operated by persons entering, (2) Simultaneous control of all engines.
leaving, or moving normally in, the cockpit.
(c) Each power and thrust control must provide
(b) Each flexible control must be approved or a positive and immediately responsive means of
must be shown to be suitable for the particular controlling its engine.
application. (d) If there is an antidetonant injection system,
the flow of ADI Fluid must be automatically controlled
with relation to the amount of power produced by
the engine. In addition to the automatic control,
there must be a separate control for the ADI pumps.
(e) If a power or thrust control incorporates a
fuel shut-off feature, the control must have a means
to prevent the inadvertent movement of the control into
the shut-off position. The means must –
(1) Have a positive lock or stop at the
idle position; and
(2) Require a separate and distinct
operation to place the control in the shut-off
position.
control system that automatically applies an increase (c) Each group of ignition switches and each
in power/thrust on the operating engines after failure master ignition control, except ignition switches for
of an engine, the automatic system must be designed turbine engine installations for which continuous
to:– ignition is not required, must have a means to prevent
their inadvertent operation.
(1) Select the power/thrust on each
operating engine necessary to meet the performance
requirements of Subpart BB without exceeding
any approved engine limitation;
JAR 25.1149 Propeller speed and pitch controls
(2) Provide a means for the flight crew to
override or disengage the automatic function in (a) There must be a separate propeller speed
the event of failure or inadvertent operation of and pitch control for each propeller.
the system;
(b) The controls must be grouped and arranged
(3) Permit the flight crew to increase or to allow –
decrease power/thrust without exceeding any
engine limitations; and (1) Separate control of each propeller;
and
(4) Provide for the crew to verify prior to
take-off that the automatic selection system is in (2) Simultaneous control of all propellers.
a condition to operate in the intended manner.
(c) The controls must allow synchronisation of
1
[ (F) (f) (France) Not required for French ] all propellers.
certification.
(d) The propeller speed and pitch controls
(g) Where the achievement of the scheduled must be to the right of, and at least one inch below,
take-off performance is dependent on a manual the pilot's throttle controls.
increase in power/thrust on the operating engines
after failure of an engine, the engine control system JAR 25.1153 Propeller feathering controls
must be designed to permit such increase by a single
instinctive action. It must not be necessary for the (a) There must be a separate propeller
flight crew to identify which engine has failed before feathering control for each propeller. The control
taking this action and it must not be necessary to must have means to prevent its inadvertent operation.
take any subsequent action to prevent engine
limitations being exceeded. (See ACJ 25.1143 (g).) (b) If feathering is accomplished by movement
Manual selection of emergency operating conditions of the propeller pitch or speed control lever, there
in other flight phases must be of an ease, rapidity and must be means to prevent the inadvertent movement
accuracy of execution appropriate to the fight phase of this lever to the feathering position during normal
under consideration. operation.
1,2 (F) (g) (France) Not required for French JAR 25.1155 Reverse thrust and propeller pitch
[ ] settings below the flight regime
certification
Each control for reverse thrust and for propeller
JAR 25.1145 Ignition switches pitch settings below the flight regime must have
means to prevent its inadvertent operation. The
means must have a positive lock or stop at the flight
(a) Ignition switches must control each engine
idle position and must require a separate and distinct
ignition circuit on each engine.
operation by the crew to displace the control from
the flight regime (forward thrust engine regime for
(b) There must be means to quickly shut off
turbo-jet powered aeroplanes).
all ignition by the grouping of switches or by a master
ignition control. JAR 25.1161 Fuel jettisoning system controls
1
Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/3, Eff. 30.11.84)
2
1–E–15 Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/2, Eff. 18.11.85)
JAR–25 SECTION 1
(a) Engine-mounted accessories must be For aeroplanes equipped with an accessory gear-
approved for installation on the engine concerned and box that is not certificated as part of an engine –
use the provisions on the engine for mounting.
(a) The engine with gearbox and connecting
(b) Electrical equipment subject to arcing or transmissions and shafts attached must be subjected
sparking must be installed to minimise the probability to the test specified in JAR–E, C2–4, paragraph 7 or
of contact with any flammable fluids or vapours that JAR–E, C3–4, paragraph 6 as applicable;
might be present in a free state.
(b) The accessory gearbox must meet the require-
(c) If continued rotation of an engine-driven ments of JAR–E, C2–2, paragraph 2.3 or C3–2,
cabin supercharger or of any remote accessory driven paragraph 3.1 and JAR–E, C1–1, paragraph 3 as
by the engine is hazardous if malfunctioning occurs, applicable, and
there must be means to prevent rotation without
interfering with the continued operation of the (c) Possible misalignments and torsional loadings
engine. of the gearbox, transmission, and shaft system,
expected to result under normal operating conditions
must be evaluated.
designated fire zones. However, engine pod attaching (c) Absorbent materials close to flammable
structures need not contain fire detection or extin- fluid system components that might leak must
guishing means. be covered or treated to prevent the absorption of
hazardous quantities of fluids.
(b) For each area covered by sub-paragraph
(a) of this paragraph that contains a retractable
landing gear, compliance with that sub-paragraph JAR 25.1187 Drainage and ventilation of fire zones
need only be shown with the landing gear retracted.
(a) There must be complete drainage of each
part of each designated fire zone to minimise the
JAR 25.1183 Flammable fluid-carrying components hazards resulting from failure or malfunctioning of
any component containing flammable fluids. The
(a) Except as provided in sub-paragraph (b) drainage means must be –
of this paragraph, each line, fitting, and other com-
ponent carrying flammable fluid in any area subject (1) Effective under conditions expected to
to engine fire conditions, and each component which prevail when drainage is needed; and
conveys or contains flammable fluid in a designated (2) Arranged so that no discharged fluid
fire zone must be fire resistant, except that flammable will cause an additional fire hazard.
fluid tanks and supports in a designated fire zone
must be fireproof or be enclosed by a fireproof shield (b) Each designated fire zone must be ventilated
unless damage by fire to any non-fireproof part will to prevent the accumulation of flammable vapours.
not cause leakage or spillage of flammable fluid.
Components must be shielded or located to safeguard (c) No ventilation opening may be where it
against the ignition of leaking flammable fluid. would allow the entry of flammable fluids, vapours,
or flame from other zones.
(b) Sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph does not
apply to – (d) Each ventilation means must be arranged so
that no discharged vapours will cause an additional
(1) Lines and fittings already approved as fire hazard.
part of a type certificated engine under JAR–E;
and (e) Unless the extinguishing agent capacity and
rate of discharge are based on maximum air flow
(2) Vent and drain lines, and their fittings, through a zone, there must be means to allow the
whose failure will not result in, or add to, a fire crew to shut off sources of forced ventilation to any
hazard. fire zone except the engine power section of the
nacelle and the combustion heater ventilating air
(c) All components, including ducts, within a ducts.
designated fire zone must be fireproof if, when
exposed to or damaged by fire, they could –
JAR 25.1189 Shut-off means
(1) Result in fire spreading to other
regions of the aeroplane, or (a) Each engine and each fire zone specified in
JAR 25.1181 (a) (4) and (5) must have a means to
(2) Cause unintentional operation of, or shut off or otherwise prevent hazardous quantities
inability to operate, essential services or equipment. of fuel, oil, de-icer, and other flammable fluids, from
flowing into, within, or through any designated fire
zone, except that shut-off means are not required
JAR 25.1185 Flammable fluids
for –
(1) Lines forming an integral part of an
(a) Except for the integral oil sumps specified in
engine; and
JAR 25.1013 (a), no tank or reservoir that is a part
of a system containing flammable fluids or gases may
be in a designated fire zone unless the fluids contained (2) Oil systems in which all external
be in a design of the system, the materials used in the components of the oil system, including the oil
tank, the shut-off means, and all connections, lines tanks, are fireproof.
and control provide a degree of safety equal to that
which would exist if the tank or reservoir were out- (b) The closing of any fuel shut-off valve for any
side such a zone. engine may not make fuel unavailable to the remaining
engines.
(b) There must be at least one-half inch of clear
airspace between each tank or reservoir and each (c) Operation of any shut-off may not interfere
or shroud isolating a designated fire zone. with the later emergency operation of other equip-
ment, such as the means for feathering the propeller.
1–E–17 Change 8
JAR–25 SECTION 1
(d) Each flammable fluid shut-off means and (d) Each part of the cowling subject to high
control must be fireproof or must be located and temperatures due to its nearness to exhaust system
protected so that any fire in a fire zone will not parts or exhaust gas impingement must be fireproof.
affect its operation. (e) Each aeroplane must –
(e) No hazardous quantity of flammable fluid
may drain into any designated fire zone after shut off. (1) Be designed and constructed so that
(f) There must be means to guard against inad- no fire originating in any fire zone can enter, either
vertent operation of the shut-off means and to make through openings or by burning through external
it possible for the crew to reopen the shut-off means skin, any other zone or region where it would
in flight after it has been closed. create additional hazards;
(g) Each tank-to-engine shut-off valve must be (2) Meet sub-paragraph (1) of this para-
located so that the operation of the valve will not be graph with the landing gear retracted (if applicable);
affected by powerplant or engine mount structural and
failure. (3) Have fireproof skin in areas subject
(h) Each shut-off valve must have a means to to flame if a fire starts in the engine power or
relieve excessive pressure accumulation unless a accessory sections.
means for pressure relief is otherwise provided in the
system. JAR 25.1195 Fire-extinguisher systems
(a) Except for combustor, turbine, and tail
pipe sections of turbine engine installations that
JAR 25.1191 Firewalls contain lines or components carrying flammable
fluids or gases for which it is shown that a fire
(a) Each engine, fuel-burning heater, other com- originating in these sections can be controlled, there
bustion equipment intended for operation in flight, must be a fire extinguisher system serving each
and the combustion, turbine, and tailpipe sections of designated fire zone.
turbine engines, must be isolated from the rest of the (b) The fire-extinguishing system, the quantity
aeroplane by firewalls, shrouds, or equivalent means. of the extinguishing agent, the rate of discharge, and
the discharge distribution must be adequate to
(b) Each firewall and shroud must be – extinguish fires. It must be shown by either actual
(1) Fireproof; or simulated flight tests that under critical airflow
(2) Constructed so that no hazardous conditions in flight the discharge of the extinguishing
quantity of air, fluid, or flame can pass from the agent in each designated fire zone specified in sub-
compartment to other parts of the aeroplane; paragraph (a) of this paragraph will provide an agent
(3) Constructed so that each opening is concentration capable of extinguishing fires in that
sealed with close fitting fireproof grommets, zone and of minimising the probability of re-ignition.
bushings, or firewall fittings; and An individual 'one-shot' system may be used for fuel
(4) Protected against corrosion. burning heaters, and other combustion equipment.
For each other designated fire zones, two discharges
must be provided each of which produces adequate
JAR 25.1193 Cowling and nacelle skin
agent concentration. (See ACJ 25.1195 (b).)
(c) The fire-extinguishing system for a nacelle
(a) Each cowling must be constructed and must be able to simultaneously protect each zone
supported so that it can resist any vibration, inertia, of the nacelle for which protection is provided.
and air load to which it may be subjected in
operation.
(b) Cowling must meet the drainage and venti-
lation requirements of JAR 25.1187. JAR 25.1197 Fire-extinguishing agents
(c) On aeroplanes with a diaphragm isolating
the engine power section from the engine accessory (a) Fire-extinguishing agents must. –
section, each part of the accessory section cowling (1) Be capable of extinguishing flames
subject to flame in case of fire in the engine power emanating from any burning of fluids or other
section of the powerplant must – combustible materials in the area protected by the
fire extinguishing system; and
(1) Be fireproof; and (2) Have thermal stability over the tem-
perature range likely to be experienced in the
(2) Meet the requirements of JAR 25.l 191. compartment in which they are stored.
Change 8 1–E–18
SECTION 1 JAR–25
(b) If any toxic extinguishing agent is used, (e) If a pyrotechnic capsule is used to discharge
provisions must be made to prevent harmful con- the extinguishing agent, each container must be
centrations of fluid or fluid vapours (from leakage installed so that temperature conditions will not
during normal operation of the aeroplane or as a cause hazardous deterioration of the pyrotechnic
result of discharging the fire extinguisher on the capsule.
ground or in flight) from entering any personnel
compartment, even though a defect may exist in the
extinguishing system. This must be shown by test JAR 25.1201 Fire extinguishing system materials
except for built-in carbon dioxide fuselage compart-
ment fire extinguishing systems for which – (a) No material in any fire extinguishing system
may react chemically with any extinguishing agent so
(1) Five pounds or less of carbon dioxide as to create a hazard.
will be discharged, under established fire control
procedures, into any fuselage compartment; or (b) Each system component in an engine com-
partment must be fireproof.
(2) There is protective breathing equip-
ment for each flight-crew member on flight deck
duty.
JAR 25.1203 Fire-detector system
JAR 25.1199 Extinguishing agent containers
(a) There must be approved, quick acting fire
(a) Each extinguishing agent container must or overheat detectors in each designated fire zone,
have a pressure relief to prevent bursting of the and in the combustion, turbine, and tailpipe sections
container by excessive internal pressures. of turbine engine installations, in numbers and
locations ensuring prompt detection of fire in those
(b) The discharge end of each discharge line zones.
from a pressure relief connection must be located so
that discharge of the fire extinguishing agent would (b) Each fire detector system must be con-
not damage the aeroplane. The line must also be structed and installed so that –
located or protected to prevent clogging caused by
ice or other foreign matter. (1) It will withstand the vibration, inertia,
and other loads to which it may be subjected in
(c) There must be a means for each fire operation;
extinguishing agent container to indicate that the
container has discharged or that the charging pressure (2) There is a means to warn the crew in
is below the established minimum necessary for the event that the sensor or associated wiring
proper functioning. within a designated fire zone is severed at one
point, unless the system continues to function as
(d) The temperature of each container must a satisfactory detection system after the severing;
be maintained, under intended operating conditions, and
to prevent the pressure in the container from –
(3) There is a means to warn the crew in
(1) Falling below that necessary to the event of a short circuit in the sensor or associ-
provide an adequate rate of discharge; or ated wiring within a designated fire zone, unless
the system continues to function as a satisfactory
(2) Rising high enough to cause premature detection system after the short circuit.
discharge.
(c) No fire or overheat detector may be affected
by any oil, water, other fluids, or fumes that might be
present.
(d) Analysis.
1
Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/2, Eff. 12.7.84)
1–F–1 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/3, Eff. 30.11.84)
JAR–25 SECTION 1
Change 11 1—F—2—2
SECTION 1 JAR—25
(f) For aeroplanes equipped with fluid systems condition which would reduce the capability of
(other than fuel) for thrust or power augmentation, the aeroplane or the ability of the crew to cope
an approved means must be provided to indicate the with adverse operating conditions is improbable.
proper functioning of that system to the flight crew.
(e) Two systems for radio navigation, with (3) The resulting effects on the aeroplane
controls for each accessible from each pilot station, and occupants, considering the stage of flight and
designed and installed so that failure of one system operating conditions, and
will not preclude operation of the other system. The
use of a common antenna system is acceptable if (4) The crew warning cues, corrective
adequate reliability is shown. action required, and the capability of detecting
faults.
(f) A windshield wiper, or equivalent, for each
pilot station. (e) Each installation whose functioning is
required for certification and that requires a power
(g) An ignition switch, for each engine. supply, is an 'essential load' on the power supply.
The power sources and the system must be able to
(h) Portable fire extinguishers as prescribed in supply the following power loads in probable operating
JAR 25.851(a) (5) and (a) (6). combinations and for probable durations (see ACJ's
Nos. 5 and 6 to JAR 25 .1309);
JAR 25.1309 Equipment, systems and installations (1) Loads connected to the system with
the system functioning normally.
(a) The equipment, systems, and installations
whose functioning is required by the JAR and national (2) Essential loads, after failure of any one
operating regulations must be designed to ensure that prime mover, power converter, or energy storage
they perform their intended functions under any device.
foreseeable operating conditions. (See ACJ's Nos. 1
and 2 to JAR 25.1309.) However, systems used for (3) Essential loads after failure of —
non-essential services need only comply so far as is
necessary to ensure that the installations are neither (i) Any one engine on two-engined
a source of danger in themselves nor liable to prejudice aeroplanes; and
the proper functioning of any essential service.
(ii) Any two engines on three-or-
(b) The aeroplane systems and associated more engined aeroplanes.
components, considered separately and in relation to After the failure of any two engines on a three-
other systems, must be designed so that (see ACJ's engined aeroplane, those services essential to
Nos. 1 and 3 to JAR 25.1309) — airworthiness must continue to function and
perform adequately within the limits of operation
(1) The occurrence of any failure condition implied by the emergency conditions. (See ACJ
[ which would prevent the continued safe flight and] No. 7 to JAR 25.1309.)
landing of the aeroplane is extremely improbable,
and (4) Essential loads for which an alternate
source of power is required by any applicable JAR
(2) The occurrence of any other failure or national operating regulations, after any failure
or malfunction in any one power supply system,
distribution system, or other utilisation system.
(f) In determining compliance with sub-para- (3) The instrument that most effectively
graphs (e) (2) and (3) of this paragraph, the power indicates altitude must be adjacent to and directly
loads may be assumed to be reduced under a monitor- to the right of the instrument in the top centre
ing procedure consistent with safety in the kinds of position; and
operation authorised. Loads not required in controlled
flight need not be considered for the two-engine- (4) The instrument that most effectively
inoperative condition on aeroplanes with three or indicates direction of flight must be adjacent to
more engines. and directly below the instrument in the top
centre position.
(g) In showing compliance with sub-paragraphs
(a) and (b) of this paragraph with regard to system (c) Required powerplant instruments must be
and equipment design and installation, critical closely grouped on the instrument panel. In
environmental conditions including vibration and addition –
acceleration loads, handling by personnel and where
appropriate fluid pressure effects, must be considered. (1) The location of identical powerplant
instruments for the engines must prevent confusion
For power generation, distribution and utilisation as to which engine each instrument relates; and
equipment required by or used for certification, the
ability to provide continuous safe service under fore- (2) Powerplant instruments vital to the
seeable environmental conditions may be shown by safe operation of the aeroplane must be plainly
environmental tests, design analysis or reference to visible to the appropriate crew members.
previous comparable service experience on other
aeroplanes. (d) Instrument panel vibration may not damage
or impair the accuracy of any instrument.
JAR 25.1321 Arrangement and visibility (b) Amber, for caution lights (lights indicating
the possible need for future corrective action);
(a) Each flight, navigation, and powerplant (c) Green, for safe operation lights; and
instrument for use by any pilot must be plainly visible
to him from his station with the minimum practicable (d) Any other colour, including white, for
deviation from his normal position and line of vision lights not described in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) of
when he is looking forward along the flight path. this paragraph, provided the colour differs sufficiently
Where a third (stand-by) instrument is fitted, to from the colours prescribed in sub-paragraphs (a) to
comply with JAR 25.1333 (b), it must be installed (c) of this paragraph to avoid possible confusion.
so that both pilots can use it. (See ACJ 25.1321 (a).)
(b) Each system must be calibrated to determine JAR 25.1325 Static pressure systems (See
the system error (that is, the relation between IAS ACJ 25.1325.)
and CAS) in flight and during the accelerated take-off
ground run. The ground run calibration must be (a) Each instrument with static air case
determined – connections must be vented to the outside atmosphere
through an appropriate piping system.
(1) From 0.8 of the minimum value of V1
to the maximum value of V2, considering the (b) Each static port must be designed and
approved ranges of altitude and weight; and located in such manner that static pressure system
performance is least affected by airflow variation, or
(2) With the wing-flaps and power settings by moisture or other foreign matter, and that the
corresponding to the values determined in the correlation between air pressure in the static pressure
establishment of the take-off path under JAR 25.59 system and true ambient atmospheric static pressure
or JAR 25.111 assuming that the critical engine is not changed when the aeroplane is exposed to the
fails at the minimum value of V1. continuous and intermittent maximum icing
conditions defined in Appendix C. (See ACJ 25.1323
(c) (1) The airspeed error of the installation, (e).)
excluding the airspeed indicator instrument cali-
bration error, may not exceed 3% or five knots, (c) The design and installation of the static
whichever is greater, throughout the speed range, pressure system must be such that —
from –
(1) Positive drainage of moisture is
(i) VMO to 1.3 VS1 with wing-flaps provided; chafing of the tubing and excessive
retracted; and distortion or restriction at bends in the tubing is
avoided; and the materials used are durable,
(ii) 1.3 VS0 to VFE with wing-flaps suitable for the purpose intended, and protected
in the landing position. against corrosion; and
(2) From 1.3 VS to stall warning speed (2) It is airtight except for the port into
the IAS must change perceptibly with CAS and in the atmosphere. A proof test must be conducted
the same sense, and at speeds below stall warning to demonstrate the integrity of the static pressure
speed the IAS must not change in an incorrect system in the following manner:
sense. (See ACJ 25.1323 (c) (2).)
(i) Unpressurised aeroplanes. Evac-
(3) From VMO to VMO + ⅔ (VDF–VMO) uate the static pressure system to a pressure
the IAS must change perceptibly with CAS and in differential of approximately 1 inch of
the same sense, and at higher speeds up to VDF mercury or to a reading on the altimeter,
the IAS must not change in an incorrect sense. 1000 ft above the aeroplane elevation at the
(See ACJ 25.1323 (c) (3).) time of the test. Without additional pumping
for a period of 1 minute, the loss of indicated
(4) There must be no indication of air-
altitude must not exceed 100 ft on the
speed which would cause undue difficulty to the
altimeter.
pilot during the take-off between the initiation of
rotation and the achievement of a steady climbing
condition. (ii) Pressurised aeroplanes. Evacuate
the static pressure system until a pressure
(d) Each system must be arranged, so far as differential equivalent to the maximum
practicable, to prevent malfunction or serious error cabin pressure differential for which the
due to the entry of moisture, dirt, or other substances. aeroplane is type certificated is achieved.
(See ACJ 25.1323 (d).) Without additional pumping for a period of
1 minute, the loss of indicated altitude must
(e) Each system must have a heated pitot tube not exceed 2% of the equivalent altitude of
or an equivalent means of preventing malfunction the maximum cabin differential pressure or
due to icing. (See ACJ 25.1323 (e).) 100 ft, whichever is greater.
(f) Where duplicate airspeed indicators are (d) Each pressure altimeter must be approved
required, their respective pitot tubes must be far and must be calibrated to indicate pressure altitude in
enough apart to avoid damage to both tubes in a a standard atmosphere, with a minimum practicable
collision with a bird. calibration error when the corresponding static
pressures are applied.
level, with a standard atmosphere, excluding instru- JAR 25.1 327 Magnetic direction indicator
ment calibration error, does not result in an error
of more than ±30 ft per 100 knots speed for the (a) Each magnetic direction indicator must be
appropriate configuration in the speed range between installed so that its accuracy is not excessively affected
1.3 VS0 with wing-flaps extended and 1.8 VS1 with by the aeroplane's vibration or magnetic fields.
wing-flaps retracted. However, the error need not be
less than ±30 ft. (b) The magnetic direction indicator required by
JAR 25.1303 (a) (3) may not have a deviation, after
(f) If an altimeter system is fitted with a device compensation in normal level flight, greater than
that provides corrections to the altimeter indication, 10° on any heading.
the device must be designed and installed in such
manner that it can be bypassed when it malfunctions,
unless an alternate altimeter system is provided. Each JAR 25X1328 Direction indicator
correction device must be fitted with a means for
indicating the occurrence of reasonably probable Direction indicators required by JAR 25.1303 (b)
malfunctions, including power failure, to the flight [ (6) must have an accuracy adequate for the safe
crew. The indicating means must be effective for any operation of the aeroplane (see ACJ 25X1328 and
cockpit lighting condition likely to occur. (D) ACJ 25X1328 (Germany)). ]
If a flight instrument pitot heating system is (e) Attitude controls must operate in the plane
installed, an indication system must be provided to and sense of motion specified in JAR 25.777 (b) and
indicate to the flight crew when that pitot heating 25.779 (a) for cockpit controls. The direction of
system is not operating. The indication system must motion must be plainly indicated on, or adjacent to,
comply with the following requirements: each control.
(a) The indication provided must incorporate an (f) The system must be designed and adjusted
amber light that is in clear view of a flight-crew so that, within the range of adjustment available to
member. the human pilot, it cannot produce hazardous loads
on the aeroplane, or create hazardous deviations in
(b) The indication provided must be designed to the flight path, under any condition of flight
alert the flight crew if either of the following con- appropriate to its use, either during normal operation,
ditions exist: or in the event of a malfunction, assuming that
corrective action begins within a reasonable period of
(1) The pitot heating system is switched time.
'off'.
(g) If the automatic pilot integrates signals from
(2) The pitot heating system is switched auxiliary controls or furnishes signals for operation
'on’ and any pitot tube heating element is in- of other equipment, there must be positive interlocks
operative. and sequencing of engagement to prevent improper
operation. Protection against adverse interaction of
integrated components, resulting from a malfunction,
is also required.
(h) If the automatic pilot system can be coupled available to assure control of the aeroplane in speed,
to airborne navigation equipment, means must be altitude, heading and attitude by one of the pilots
provided to indicate to the flight crew the current without immediate crew action after any single
mode of operation. Selector switch position is not failure or combination of failures that is not assessed
acceptable as a means of indication. to be extremely improbable (see ACJ 25.1333 (b))
and (F) ACJ 25.1333 (b) (France)) and
JAR 25.1331 Instruments using a power supply (c) Additional instruments, systems, or equip-
(a) For each instrument required by JAR ment may not be connected to the operating systems
25.1303 (b) that uses a power supply, the following for the required instruments, unless provisions are
apply: made to ensure the continued normal functioning
(1) Each instrument must have a visual of the required instruments in the event of any
means integral with the instrument, to indicate malfunction of the additional instruments, systems,
when power adequate to sustain proper instrument or equipment which is not shown to be extremely
performance is not being supplied. The power improbable.
must be measured at or near the point where it
enters the instruments. For electric instruments, JAR 25.1335 Flight director systems
the power is considered to be adequate when the If a flight director system is installed, means must
voltage is within approved limits. be provided to indicate to the flight crew its current
mode of operation. Selector switch position is not
(2) Each instrument must, in the event of acceptable as a means of indication.
the failure of one power source, be supplied by
another power source. This may be accomplished JAR 25.1337 Powerplant instruments
automatically or by manual means. The failure
of one power source must not affect the instruments (a) Instruments and instrument lines
of both pilot stations.
(1) Each powerplant instrument line must
(3) If an instrument presenting flight and/ meet the requirements of JAR 25.993 and JAR
or navigation data receives information from 25.1183.
sources external to that instrument and loss of
that information would render the presented data (2) Each line carrying flammable fluids
unreliable, a clear and unambiguous visual warning under pressure must —
must be given to the crew when such loss of
information occurs that the presented data should (i) Have restricting orifices or other
not be relied upon. (See ACJ 25.1331 (a) (3).) safety devices at the source of pressure to
prevent the escape of excessive fluid if
(b) As used in this paragraph, 'instrument' the line fails; and
includes devices that are physically contained in one
unit, and devices that are composed of two or more (ii) Be installed and located so that
physically separate units or components connected the escape of fluids would not create a
together (such as a remote indicating gyroscopic hazard.
direction indicator that includes a magnetic sensing
element, a gyroscopic unit, an amplifier, and an (3) Each powerplant instrument that
indicator connected together). utilises flammable fluids must be installed and
located so that the escape of fluid would not
create a hazard.
JAR 25.1333 Instrument systems
(b) Fuel quantity indicator. There must be
For systems that operate the instruments required means to indicate to the flight-crew members, the
by JAR 25.1303 (b) which are located at each pilot's quantity, in gallons or equivalent units, of usable fuel
station — in each tank during flight. In addition —
(a) Means must be provided to connect the (1) Each fuel quantity indicator must be
required instruments at the first pilot's station to calibrated to read 'zero' during level flight when
operating systems which are independent of the the quantity of fuel remaining in the tank is
operating systems at other flight crew stations, or equal to the unusable fuel supply determined
other equipment; under JAR 25.959;
(b) The equipment, systems, and installations (2) Tanks with interconnected outlets and
must be designed so that sufficient information is airspaces may be treated as one tank and need not
have separate indicators; and
1—F—7 Change 8
JAR—25 SECTION 1
(3) Each exposed sight gauge, used as a and collective disconnection of the electrical
fuel quantity indicator, must be protected against power sources from the system. (See ACJ 25.1351
damage. (b) (5).)
(c) Fuel flowmeter system. If a fuel flowmeter (6) There are means to indicate to appro-
system is installed, each metering component must priate crew members the generating system
have a means for bypassing the fuel supply if mal- quantities essential for the safe operation of the
function of that component severely restricts fuel system, such as the voltage and current supplied
flow. by each generator.
(d) Oil quantity indicator. There must be a (c) External power. If provisions are made
stick gauge or equivalent means to indicate the for connecting external power to the aeroplane, and
quantity of oil in each tank. If an oil transfer or that external power can be electrically connected to
reserve oil supply system is installed, there must be a equipment other than that used for engine starting,
means to indicate to the flight crew, in flight, the means must be provided to ensure that no external
quantity of oil in each tank. power supply having a reverse polarity, or a reverse
phase sequence, can supply power to the aeroplane's
(e) Turbo-propeller blade position indicator. electrical system.
Required turbo-propeller blade position indicators
must begin indicating before the blade moves more (d) Operation without normal electrical power.
than 8º below the flight low pitch stop. The source It must be shown by analysis, tests, or both, that the
of indication must directly sense the blade position. aeroplane can be operated safely in VFR conditions,
for a period of not less than five minutes, with the
(f) Not required for JAR —25. normal electrical power (electrical power sources
excluding the battery) inoperative, with critical type
fuel (from the standpoint of flameout and restart
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT capability), and with the aeroplane initially at the
maximum certificated altitude. Parts of the electrical
JAR 25.1351 General system may remain on if (see ACJ 25.1351 (d)) —
(a) Electrical system capacity. The required
generating capacity, and number and kinds of power (1) A single malfunction, including a wire
sources must — bundle or junction box fire, cannot result in loss
of the part turned off and the part turned on;
(1) Be determined by an electrical load
analysis; and (2) The parts turned on are electrically
and mechanically isolated from the parts turned
(2) Meet the requirements of JAR 25.1309. off; and
(b) Generating system. The generating system (3) The electrical wire and cable insulation,
includes electrical power sources, main power busses, and other materials, of the parts turned on are self-
transmission cables, and associated control, regulation, extinguishing when tested in accordance with
and protective devices. It must be designed so that — JAR 25.1359 (d).
(4) System transients due to switching, (b) Cables must be grouped, routed and spaced
fault clearing, or other causes do not make so that damage to essential circuits will be minimised
essential loads inoperative, and do not cause a if there are faults in cables, particularly heavy current-
smoke, or fire hazard. carrying cables.
(5) There are means accessible, in flight, (c) Storage batteries must be designed and
to appropriate crew members for the individual installed as follows:
Change 8 1—F—8
SECTION 1 JAR—25
(6) Nickel cadmium battery installations (e) Each circuit for essential loads must have
that are not provided with low-energy charging individual circuit protection. However, individual
means must have – protection for each circuit in an essential load system
(i) A system to control the charging (such as each position light circuit in a system) is not
rate of the battery automatically so as to required.
prevent battery overheating;
(ii) A battery temperature sensing (f) If fuses are used, there must be spare fuses
and over-temperature warning system with a for use in flight equal to at least 50% of the number
means for disconnecting the battery from its of fuses of each rating required for complete circuit
charging source in the event of an over- protection.
temperature condition; or
(iii) A battery failure sensing and (g) Automatic reset circuit breakers may be
warning system with a means for dis- used as integral protectors for electrical equipment
connecting the battery from its charging (such as thermal cut-outs) if there is circuit protection
source in the event of battery failure. to protect the cable to the equipment.
JAR 25.1355 Distribution system JAR 25.1359 Electrical system fire and smoke
Protection
(a) The distribution system includes the (a) Components of the electrical system must
distribution busses, their associated feeders, and each meet the applicable fire and smoke protection
control and protective device. [ requirements of JAR 25.831 (c) and 25.863. (See]
ACJ 25.1359 (a).)
(b) Electrical cables, terminals and equipment in (2) The equipment must simulate the
designated fire zones, that are used during emergency electrical characteristics of the distribution wiring
procedures, must be at least fire resistant. and connected loads to the extent necessary for
(c) Main power cables (including generator valid test results; and
cables) in the fuselage must be designed to allow a (3) Laboratory generator drives must
reasonable degree of deformation and stretching simulate the actual prime movers on the aeroplane
without failure and must ― with respect to their reaction to generator loading,
(1) Be isolated from flammable fluid including loading due to faults.
lines; or (b) For each flight condition that cannot be
(2) Be shrouded by means of electrically simulated adequately in the laboratory or by ground
insulated flexible conduit, or equivalent, which is tests on the aeroplane, flight tests must be made.
in addition to the normal cable insulation.
(d) Insulation on electrical wire and electrical
cable installed in any area of the fuselage must be LIGHTS
self-extinguishing when tested at an angle of 60º in
accordance with the applicable portions of Appendix F JAR 25.1381 Instrument lights
or other approved equivalent methods. The average
burn length may not exceed 3 inches and the average (a) The instrument lights must —
flame time after removal of the flame source may not
exceed 30 seconds. Drippings from the test specimen (1) Make each instrument, switch, and
may not continue to flame for more than an average other device for which they are provided easily
of 3 seconds after falling. readable; and
(2) Be installed so that —
(i) Their direct rays are shielded
JAR 25X1360 Precautions against injury from the pilot's eyes; and
(ii) No objectionable reflections are
(a) Shock. The electrical system must be visible to the pilot.
designed so as to minimise the risk of electric shock to
crew, passengers and servicing personnel and also to (b) Unless undimmed instrument lights are
maintenance personnel using normal precautions. satisfactory under each expected flight condition,
(See ACJ 25X1360 (a).) there must be a means to control the intensity of
illumination.
(b) Burns. The temperature rise of any part,
which, has to be handled during normal operation by
the flight crew, must not be such as to cause JAR 25.1383 Landing lights
dangerous inadvertent movement, or injury to the (a) Each landing light must be approved, and
crew member. (See ACJ 25X1360(b).) must be installed so that –
(a) When laboratory tests of the electrical JAR 25.1385 Position light system installation
system are conducted – (a) General. Each part of each position light
(1) The tests must be performed on a system must meet the applicable requirements of this
mock-up using the same generating equipment paragraph and each system as a whole must meet the
used in the aeroplane; requirements of JAR 25.1387 to 25.1397.
(b) Forward position lights. Forward position must be determined with the light source operating
lights must consist of a red and a green light spaced at a steady value equal to the average luminous out-
laterally as far apart as practicable and installed for- put of the source at the normal operating voltage of
ward on the aeroplane so that, with the aeroplane in the aeroplane. The light distribution and intensity of
the normal flying position, the red light is on the left each position light must meet the requirements of
side, and the green light is on the right side. Each sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph.
light must be approved.
(b) Forward and rear position lights. The
(c) Rear position light. The rear position light light distribution and intensities of forward and rear
must be a white light mounted as far aft as practicable position lights must be expressed in terms of minimum
on the tail or on each wing tip, and must be approved. intensities in the horizontal plane, minimum inten-
sities in any vertical plane, and maximum intensities
(d) Light covers and colour filters. Each light in overlapping beams, within dihedral angles L, R and
cover or colour filter must be at least flame resistant A, and must meet the following requirements:
and may not change colour or shape or lose any
appreciable light transmission during normal use. (1) Intensities in the horizontal plane.
Each intensity in the horizontal plane (the plane
containing the longitudinal axis of the aeroplane
JAR 25.1387 Position light system dihedral angles and perpendicular to the plane of symmetry of the
aeroplane) must equal or exceed the values in
(a) Except as provided in sub-paragraph (e) of JAR 25.1391.
this paragraph, each forward and rear position light
must, as installed, show unbroken light within the (2) Intensities in any vertical plane. Each
dihedral angles described in this section. intensity in any vertical plane (the plane perpen-
dicular to the horizontal plane) must equal or
(b) Dihedral angle L (left) is formed by two exceed the appropriate value in JAR 25.1393,
intersecting vertical planes, the first parallel to the where I is the minimum intensity prescribed in
longitudinal axis of the aeroplane, and the other at JAR 25.1391 for the corresponding angles in
110º to the left of the first, as viewed when looking the horizontal plane.
forward along the longitudinal axis.
(3) Intensities in overlaps between adjacent
(c) Dihedral angle R (right) is formed by two signals. No intensity in any overlap between
intersecting vertical planes, the first parallel to the adjacent signals may exceed the values given in
longitudinal axis of the aeroplane, and the other at JAR 25.1395, except that higher intensities in
110º to the right of the first, as viewed when looking overlaps may be used with main beam intensities
forward along the longitudinal axis. substantially greater than the minima specified in
JAR 25.1391 and 25.1393 if the overlap inten-
(d) Dihedral angle A (aft) is formed by two sities in relation to the main beam intensities do
intersecting vertical planes making angles of 70º to not adversely affect signal clarity. When the peak
the right and to the left, respectively, to a vertical intensity of the forward position lights is more
plane passing through the longitudinal axis, as viewed than 100 candles, the maximum overlap intensities
when looking aft along the longitudinal axis. between them amy exceed the values given in
JAR 25.1395 if the overlap intensity in Area A
(e) If the rear position light when mounted as is not more than 10% of peak position light
far aft as practicable in accordance with JAR 25.1385 intensity and the overlap intensity in Area B is
(c), cannot show unbroken light within dihedral angle not greater than 2.5% of peak position light
A (as defined in sub-paragraph (d) of this paragraph), intensity.
a solid angle or angles of obstructed visibility totaling
not more than 0.04 steradians is allowable within
that dihedral angle, if such solid angle is within a
cone whose apex is at the rear position light and
whose elements make an angle of 30º with a vertical JAR 25.1391 Minimum intensities in the hori-
line passing through the rear position light. zontal plane of forward and rear
position lights
JAR 25.1389 Position light distribution and
intensities Each position light intensity must equal or exceed
(a) General. The intensities prescribed in this the applicable values in the following table:
paragraph must be provided by new equipment with
light covers and colour filters in place. Intensities
which the aeroplane's complete anti-collision light JAR 25.1403 Wing icing detection lights
system is observed from a distance, and applies to
each section of light including any overlaps that Unless operations at night in known or forecast
exist when the system consists of more than one icing conditions are prohibited by an operating limit-
light source. In overlaps, flash frequencies may ation, a means must be provided for illuminating or
exceed 100, but not 180 cycles per minute. otherwise determining the formation of ice on the
parts of the wings that are critical from the stand-
(d) Colour. Each anti-collision light must be point of ice accumulation. Any illumination that is
[ either aviation red or aviation white and must meet ] used must be of a type that will not cause glare or
the applicable requirements of JAR 25.1397. reflection that would handicap crew members in the
performance of their duties.
(e) Light intensity. The minimum light inten-
sities in all vertical planes, measured with the red
filter (if used) and expressed in terms of 'effective'
intensities, must meet the requirements of sub- SAFETY EQUIPMENT
paragraph (f) of this paragraph. The following
relation must be assumed: JAR 25.1411 General
(a) Accessibility
(1) Required safety equipment to be used
by the crew in an emergency must be readily
accessible.
where:
(2) Where a public address system is
Ie = effective intensity (candles) required by the operating rules, at least one micro-
phone intended for flight attendant use must be
I(t) = instantaneous intensity as a function of time positioned at each floor level exit in a passenger
compartment and be readily accessible to a flight
t2–t1 = flash time interval (seconds). attendant seated in any seat adjacent to that exit.
Normally, the maximum value of effective intensity (b) Stowage provisions. Stowage provisions for
is obtained when t2 and t1 are chosen so that the required emergency equipment must be furnished and
effective intensity is equal to the instantaneous must –
intensity at t2 and t1. (1) Be arranged so that the equipment is
directly accessible and its location is obvious; and
(f) Minimum effective intensities for anti-
collision lights. Each anti-collision light effective (2) Protect the safety equipment from
intensity must equal or exceed the applicable values inadvertent damage.
in the following table.
(c) Emergency exit descent device. The stowage
provisions for the emergency exit descent device
required by JAR 25.809 (f) must be at the exits for
which they are intended.
(d) Liferafts
(1) The stowage provisions for the life-
rafts described in JAR 25.1415 must accommodate
enough rafts for the maximum number of
occupants for which certification for ditching is
requested.
(2) Liferafts must be stowed near exits JAR 25.1415 Ditching equipment
through which the rafts can be launched during (a) Ditching equipment, required to be carried
an unplanned ditching. by the National Operating Rules, must meet the
(3) Rafts automatically or remotely requirements of this paragraph.
released outside the aeroplane must be attached (b) Each liferaft and each life preserver must
to the aeroplane by means of the static line be approved. In addition —
prescribed in JAR 25.1415. (1) Unless excess rafts of enough capacity
(4) The stowage provisions for each are provided, the buoyancy and seating capacity
portable liferaft must allow rapid detachment and beyond the rated capacity of the rafts must
removal of the raft for use at other than the accommodate all occupants of the aeroplane in
intended exits. the event of a loss of one raft of the largest rated
(e) Long-range signalling device. The stowage capacity; and
provisions for the long-range signalling device required (2) Each raft must have a trailing line,
by JAR 25.1415 must be near an exit available during and must have a static line designed to hold the
an unplanned ditching. raft near the aeroplane but to release it if the
(f) Life-preserver stowage provisions. The aeroplane becomes totally submerged.
stowage provisions for life preservers described in (c) Approved survival equipment must be
JAR 25.1415 must accommodate one life preserver attached to, or stored adjacent to, each liferaft.
for each occupant for which certification for ditching (d) Survival type emergency locator trans-
is requested. Each life preserver must be within mitters for use in liferafts must meet the applicable
easy reach of each seated occupant. [ requirements of TSO—C91 or an acceptable equivalent.]
(g) Life line stowage provisions. If certification (e) For aeroplanes not having approved life
for ditching under JAR 25.801 is requested, there preservers, there must be an approved flotation means
must be provisions to store the life lines. These for each occupant. This means must be within easy
provisions must — reach of each seated occupant and must be readily
(1) Allow one life line to be attached to removable from the aeroplane.
each side of the fuselage; and
(2) Be arranged to allow the life lines to
be used to enable the occupants to stay on the JAR 25.1416 Pneumatic de-icer boot system
wing after ditching. This requirement is not
applicable to aeroplanes having no over-wing If certification with ice protection provisions is
ditching exits. desired and a pneumatic de-icer boot system is
installed —
(c) In addition to the analysis and physical (b) Each vacuum air system line and fitting
evaluation prescribed in sub-paragraph (b) of this on the discharge side of the pump that might contain
paragraph, the effectiveness of the ice protection flammable vapours or fluids must meet the require-
system and its components must be shown by flight ments of JAR 25.1183 if they are in a designated
tests of the aeroplane or its components in measured fire zone.
natural atmospheric icing conditions and by one or (c) Other vacuum air system components in
more of the following tests as found necessary to designated fire zones must be at least fire resistant.
determine the adequacy of the ice protection system:
(i) Will be within 90 to 110% of pump (11) Where any part of the system is subject
average discharge pressure at each pump out- to fluctuating or repeated external or internal
let or at the outlet of the pump transient loads, adequate allowance must be made for
pressure dampening device, if provided; and fatigue.
(ii) Except as provided in sub-para- (b) Tests
graph (a) (7), will not exceed 125% of the (1) A complete hydraulic system must be
design operating pressure, excluding pressure static tested to show that it can withstand a
at the outlets specified in sub-paragraph (i) of pressure of 1.5 times the working pressure without
this paragraph. (See ACJ 25.1435 (a) (4).) a deformation of any part of the system that
Design operating pressure is the maximum would prevent it from performing its intended
steady operating pressure. function. Clearance between structural members
(5) Each hydraulic element must be installed and hydraulic system elements must be adequate
and supported to prevent excessive vibration, abra- and there must be no permanent detrimental
sion, corrosion, and mechanical damage, and to with- deformation. For the purpose of this test, the
stand inertia loads. If a hydraulic fluid which could pressure relief valve may be made inoperable to
be harmful to occupants when liberated in any form permit application of the required pressure.
is used, there must be a means to prevent harmful or (2) Compliance with JAR 25.1309 for
hazardous concentration of the fluid or vapours in hydraulic systems must be shown by functional
the crew or passenger compartments during flight. tests, endurance tests, and analyses. The entire
(6) Means for providing flexibility must be system or appropriate subsystems must be tested
used to connect points in a hydraulic fluid line in an aeroplane or in a mock-up installation to
between which relative motion or differential determine proper performance and proper
vibration exists. relation to other aeroplane systems. The
(7) Transient pressure in a part of the functional tests must include simulation of
system may exceed the limit specified in sub- hydraulic system failure conditions. The tests
paragraph (a) (4) (ii) of this paragraph if – must account for flight loads, ground loads, and
hydraulic system working, limit and transient
(i) A survey of those transient pressures expected during normal operation, but
pressures is conducted to determine their need not account for vibration loads or for loads
magnitude and frequency; and due to temperature effects. Endurance tests must
(ii) Based on the survey, the fatigue simulate the repeated complete flights that could
strength of that part of the system is sub- be expected to occur in service. Elements which
stantiated by analysis or tests, or both. fail during the tests must be modified in order to
have the design deficiency corrected and, where
(8) Each hydraulic pump must be designed necessary, must be sufficiently retested. Simulation
and installed so that loss of hydraulic fluid to the of operating and environmental conditions must
pump cannot create a hazard that might prevent con- be completed on elements and appropriate portions
tinued safe flight and landing. (See ACJ 25.1435 of the hydraulic system to the extent necessary
(a) (8).) to evaluate the environmental effects. (See
(9) The system must be designed to avoid ACJ 25.1435 (b) (2).)
hazard to the aeroplane arising from the effects (3) Parts, the failure of which will signific-
of abnormally high temperatures which may antly lower the airworthiness or safe handling of
occur in certain parts of the system under fault the aeroplane must be proved by suitable testing,
conditions. (See ACJ 25.1435 (a) (4).) taking into account the most critical combination
(10) The elements of the system must be of pressures and temperatures which are applicable.
able to withstand the loads due to the pressure given
in Appendix J, for the proof condition without leak- (c) Fire protection. Each hydraulic system
age or permanent distortion and for the ultimate
using flammable hydraulic fluid must meet the
condition without rupture. Temperatures must be
applicable requirements of JAR 25.863, 25.1183,
those corresponding to normal operating conditions.
Where elements are constructed from materials other 25.1185 and 25.1189.
than aluminium alloy, tungum, or medium-strength
steel, the Authority may prescribe or agree other (d) The constructor must specify the hydraulic
factors. The materials used must in all cases be resist- fluid which is suitable to be used in the aeroplane.
ant to deterioration arising from the environmental
conditions of the installation, particularly the
effects of vibration.
or agree other factors. The materials used should JAR 25.1438 Pressurisation and low pressure
in all cases be resistant to deterioration arising pneumatic systems
from the environmental conditions of the install-
ation, particularly the effects of vibration. Pneumatic systems (ducting and components)
served by bleed air, such as engine bleed air, air
(8) Where any part of the system is subject conditioning, pressurisation, engine starting and hot-
to fluctuating or repeated external or internal
air ice-protection systems, which are essential for the
loads, adequate allowance must be made for
safe operation of the aeroplane or whose failure may
fatigue.
adversely affect any essential or critical part of the
aeroplane or the safety of the occupants, must be so
(c) Tests
designed and installed as to comply with JAR 25.1309.
(1) A complete pneumatic system must be
In particular account must be taken of bursting or
static tested to show that it can withstand a
excessive leakage. (See ACJ 25.1438 paragraph 1
pressure of 1.5 times the working pressure without
for strength and ACJ 25.1438 paragraph 2 for testing.
a deformation of any part of the system that
would prevent it from performing its intended
function. Clearance between structural members
JAR 25.1439 Protective breathing equipment
and pneumatic system elements must be adequate
and there must be no permanent detrimental
(a) Protective breathing equipment must be
deformation. For the purpose of this test, the
installed for use of appropriate crew members. Such
pressure relief valve may be made inoperable to
equipment must be located so as to be available for
permit application of the required pressure.
use in compartments accessible in flight.
(2) The entire system or appropriate
(b) For protective breathing equipment required
sub-systems must be tested in an aeroplane or in a
by JAR 25.1439 (a) or by the National Operating
mock-up installation to determine proper
Regulations, the following apply:
performance and proper relation to other aeroplane
systems. The functional tests must include
(1) The equipment must be designed to
simulation of pneumatic system failure conditions.
protect the appropriate crew member from smoke,
The tests must account for flight loads, ground
carbon dioxide, and other harmful gases while on
loads, and pneumatic system working, limit and
flight deck duty or while combating fires.
transient pressures expected during normal
operation, but need not. account for vibration
(2) The equipment must include —
loads or for loads due to temperature effects.
(i) Masks covering the eyes, nose
Endurance tests must simulate the repeated
and mouth , or
complete flights that could be expected to occur
(ii) Masks covering the nose and
in service. Elements which fail during the tests
mouth, plus accessory equipment to cover
must be modified in order to have the design
the eyes.
deficiency corrected and, where necessary, must
be sufficiently retested. Simulation of operating
(3) Equipment, including portable equip-
and environmental conditions must be completed
ment, while in use must allow communication
on elements and appropriate portions of the
with other crew members. Equipment available at
pneumatic system to the extent necessary to
flight crew assigned duty stations must enable the
evaluate the environmental effects. (See
flight crew to use radio equipment.
ACJ 25X1436 (c) (2).)
(4) The part of the equipment protecting
(3) Parts, the failure of which will signific-
the eyes may not cause any appreciable adverse
antly lower the airworthiness or safe handling of
effect on vision and must allow corrective glasses
the aeroplane must be proved by suitable testing,
to be worn.
taking into account the most critical combination
of pressures and temperatures which are applicable.
(5) Each dispensing equipment must
supply protective oxygen of 15 minutes duration
at a pressure altitude of 8000 ft with a respiratory
minute volume of 30 litres per minute BTPD. The
equipment and system must be designed to prevent
any leakage to the inside of the mask and any
significant increase in the oxygen content of the
local ambient atmosphere. (See ACJ 25.1439
(b) (5).)
(6) The equipment must meet the require-
ments of JAR 25.1441.
JAR 25.1441 Oxygen equipment and supply tracheal oxygen partial pressure of 100 mm Hg when
breathing 15 litres per minute, BTPS, and with a
(a) When oxygen equipment is installed the tidal volume of 700 cc with a constant time
equipment must meet the requirements of this interval between respirations.
paragraph and of applicable sub-paragraphs of
JAR 25.1443 to JAR 25.1453. The number of (2) At cabin pressure altitudes above
occupants to be provided with oxygen and the 18,500 ft up to and including 40,000 ft, a mean
duration of the supplies is defined by the National tracheal oxygen partial pressure of 83.8 mmHg
Operational Regulations. when breathing 30 litres per minute, BTPS, and
with a tidal volume of 1100 cc with a constant time
(b) The oxygen system must be free from interval between respirations.
hazards in itself, in its method of operation, and in its
effect upon other components. (See ACJ 25.1441 (d) If first-aid oxygen equipment is installed,
(b).)
the minimum mass flow of oxygen to each user may
not be less than 4 litres per minute, STPD. However,
(c) Except with regard to chemically generated
there may be a means to decrease this flow to not less
oxygen, there must be a means to allow the crew to
than two litres per minute, STPD, at any cabin
readily determine, during flight, the quantity of
altitude. The quantity of oxygen required is based
oxygen available in each source of supply. (See
upon an average flow rate of 3 litres per minute per
ACJ 25.1441(c).)
person for whom first-aid oxygen is required.
(d) The oxygen flow rate and the oxygen (e) If portable oxygen equipment is installed
equipment for aeroplanes for which certification for use by crew members, the minimum mass flow of
for operation above 40 000 ft is requested must be supplemental oxygen is the same as specified in sub-
approved. (See ACJ 25.1441(d).) paragraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph, whichever is
applicable.
1–F–19 Change 8
JAR–25 SECTION 1
for each occupant for whom supplemental oxygen is (3) There must be at least two outlets
to be supplied. Units must be designed to cover the and units of dispensing equipment of a type
nose and mouth and must be equipped with a suitable similar to that required by sub-paragraph (1) of
means to retain the unit in position on the face. this paragraph in all other compartments or work
Flight crew masks for supplemental oxygen must areas that may be occupied by passengers or crew
have provisions for the use of communication equip- members during flight, i.e. toilets. washrooms,
ment. galley work areas, etc.
(b) If certification for operation up to and (4) Portable oxygen equipment must be
including 25,000 ft is requested, an oxygen supply immediately available for each cabin attendant.
terminal, either a supply terminal with the unit of (See ACJ 25.1447 (c) (4).)
oxygen dispensing equipment already connected
or a connection which ensures that the oxygen is
immediately available, must be within easy reach of JAR 25.1449 Means for determining use of oxygen
each crew member. For any other occupants the
supply terminals and dispensing equipment must be There must be a means to allow the crew to
located to allow use of oxygen as required by the determine whether oxygen is being delivered to the
applicable National Operational Regulations. dispensing equipment. (See ACJ 25.1449.)
(ii) Allows, while in place, the per- (a) Oxygen equipment and lines may not be
formance of normal communication in any designated fire zone. o
functions.
(b) Oxygen equipment and lines must be
protected from heat that may be generated in, or
escape from, any designated fire zone.
Change 8 1–F–20
SECTION 1 JAR–25
(c) Oxygen equipment and lines must be in- (b) The recording requirements of sub-paragraph
stalled so that escaping oxygen cannot cause ignition (a) (2) of this paragraph must be met by installing a
of grease, fluid, or vapour accumulations that are cockpit-mounted are microphone, located in the
present in normal operation or as a result of failure best position for recording voice communications
or malfunction of any system. originating at the first and second pilot stations and
voice communications of other crew members on the
flight deck when directed to those stations. The
JAR 25.1453 Protection of oxygen equipment microphone must be so located and, if necessary,
from rupture (See ACJ 25.1453.) the pre-amplifiers and filters of the recorder must be
so adjusted or supplemented, that the intelligibility of
(a) Each element of the system must have the recorded communications is as high as practicable
sufficient strength to withstand the maximum when recorded under flight cockpit noise conditions
pressures and temperatures in combination with any and played back. Repeated aural or visual playback
externally applied load, arising from consideration of the record may be used in evaluating intelligibility.
of limit structural loads that may be acting on that
part of the system in service. (c) Each cockpit voice recorder must be installed
so that the part of the communication or audio
(b) Oxygen pressure sources and pipe lines signals specified in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph
between the sources and shut-off means must be: obtained from each of the following sources is
recorded on a separate channel:
(1) Protected from unsafe temperatures,
and (1) For the first channel, from each micro-
(2) Located where the probability and phone, headset, or speaker used at the first pilot
hazard of rupture in a crash landing are minimised. station.
(a) Each cockpit voice recorder required by the (ii) If the stations specified in sub-
operating rules must be approved and must be in- paragraph (i) of this paragraph are not
stalled so that if will record the following: required or if the signal at such a station is
picked up by another channel, each micro-
(1) Voice communications transmitted phone on the flight deck that is used with
from or received in the aeoplane by radio. the passenger loudspeaker system, if its
signals are not picked up by another channel.
(2) Voice communications of flight-crew
members on the flight deck.
(G) (c) (United Kingdom) Each cockpit voice
(3) Voice communications of flight-crew recorder must be installed –
members on the flight deck, using the aeroplane's
interphone system. (1) So that the part of the communication of
audio signals specified in sub-paragraph (a) of this
(4) Voice or audio signals identifying paragraph obtained from each of the following
navigation or approach aids introduced into a sources is recorded on a separate channel:
headset or speaker. (i) For the first channel from each micro-
phone, and headset used at the first pilot station;
(5) Voice communication of flight-crew (ii) For the second channel from each
members using the passenger loudspeaker system, microphone and headset used at the second pilot
if there is such a system and if the fourth channel station;
is available in accordance with the requirements (iii) For the third channel from the cock-
of sub-paragraph (c) (4) (ii) of this paragraph. pit-mounted area microphone;
(iv) For the fourth channel from each to the container which is secured in such a manner
microphone and headset used at the station for that they are not likely to be separated during
the third crew member; or if this station is not crash impact.
required, each microphone on the flight deck
that is used with the passenger loudspeaker
system, if its signals are not recorded on another JAR 25.1459 Flight recorders
channel.
(a) Each flight recorder required by the operating
(2) So that as far as is practical all sounds rules must be installed so that –
received by the microphone listed in sub-paragraphs
(i), (ii) and (iv) must be recorded irrespective of (1) It is s with airspeed, altitude,
and directional data obtained from sources that
the position(s) of the R/T – I/C selector switch(es):
the wiring must be such that side tone is produced meet the accuracy requirements of JAR 25.1323,
only when R/T or I/C is selected. 25.1325, and 25.1327, as appropriate;
(3) Detailed requirements relative to this sub- (2) The vertical acceleration sensor is
paragraph (c) are given in CAA (AD) Specification rigidly attached, and located, longitudinally either
within the approved centre of gravity limits of the
No. 11.
aeroplane, or at a distance forward or aft of these
limits that does not exceed 25% of the aeroplane's
mean aerodynamic chord;
(d) Each cockpit voice recorder must be installed
so that—
(3) It receives its electrical power from the
bus that provides the maximum reliability for
(1) It receives its electric power from the
bus that provides the maximum reliability for operation of the flight recorder without jeopardis-
operation of the cockpit voice recorder without ing service to essential or emergency loads;
jeopardising service to essential or emergency
loads; (4) There is an aural or visual means for
preflight checking of the recorder for proper
recorder tape movement;
(2) There is an automatic means to sim-
ultaneously stop the recorder and prevent each
erasure feature from functioning, within 10 minutes (G) (4) (United Kingdom) There is an aural or
after crash impact; and
visual means for pre-flight checking that valid data
are being recorded
(3) There is an aural or visual means for
pre-flight checking of the recorder for proper
operation.
(5) Except for recorders powered solely
by the engine-driven electrical generator system,
(e) The record container, must, be located and
mounted to minimise the probability of rupture of there is an automatic means to simultaneously
the container as a result of crash impact and conse- stop a recorder that has a data erasure feature and
prevent each erasure feature from functioning,
quent heat damage to the record from fire. In meeting
this requirement, the record container must be as far within 10 minutes after crash impact; and
aft as practicable, but may not be where aft mounted
(6) There is a means to record data from
engines may crush the container during impact.
However, it need not be outside of the pressurised which the time of each radio transmission either to
compartment. or from ATC can be determined.
(f) If the cockpit voice recorder has a bulk (b) Each non-ejectable record container must be
erasure device, the installation must be designed to located and mounted so as to minimise the probability
of container rupture resulting from crash impact and
minimise the probability of inadvertent operation and
actuation of the device during crash impact. subsequent damage to the record from fire. In
meeting this requirement the record container must
(g) Each recorder container must – be located as far aft as practicable, but need not be
aft of the pressurised compartment, and may not be
(1) Be either bright orange or bright where aft-mounted engines may crush the container
yellow; upon impact. (See (G)ACJ 25.1459(United Kingdom).)
(2) Have reflective tape affixed to its (c) A correlation must be established between
external surface to facilitate its location under the flight recorder readings of airspeed, altitude, and
water; and heading and the corresponding readings (taking into
account correction factors) of the first pilot's instru-
(3) Have an underwater locating device, ments. The correlation must cover the airspeed range
[ when required by the operating rules, on or adjacent ]
over which the aeroplane is to be operated, the range (c) Domestic appliances, particularly those in
of altitude to which the aeroplane is limited, and galley areas, be so installed or protected as to prevent
360% of heading. Correlation may be established on
the ground as appropriate. damage or contamination of other equipment or
systems from fluids or vapours which may be present
(d) Each recorder container must – during normal operation or as a result of spillage,
where such damage or contamination may hazard
(1) Be either bright orange or bright the aeroplane.
yellow;
(d) All electrical domestic appliances must be
(2) Have reflective tape affixed to its
external surface to facilitate its location under suitably bonded.
water; and
1–F–23 Change 8
JAR–25 SECTION 1
Change 8 1–F–24
SECTION 1 JAR–25
JAR 25.1501 General (See ACJ 25.1501) JAR 25.1513 Minimum control speed
(a) Each operating limitation specified in Not required for JAR –25.
JAR 25.1503 to 25.1533 and other limitations and
information necessary for safe operation must be
established.
JAR 25.1515 Landing gear speeds
(b) The operating limitations and other infor-
mation necessary for safe operation must be made (a) The established landing gear operating
available to the crew members as prescribed in speed or speeds, VLO, may not exceed the speed
JAR 25.1541 to 25.1587. at which it is safe both to extend and to retract the
landing gear, as determined under JAR 25.729 or
by flight characteristics. If the extension speed is
not the same as the retraction speed, the two speeds
OPERATING LIMITATIONS must be designated as VLO(EXT) and VLO(RET),
respectively.
JAR 25.1503 Airspeed limitations: general
(b) The established landing gear extended speed
When airspeed limitations are a function of weight, VLE may not exceed the speed at which it is safe to
weight distribution, altitude, or Mach number, limit- fly with the landing gear secured in the fully extended
ations corresponding to each critical combination of position, and that determined under JAR 25.729.
these factors must be established.
JAR 25.1505 Maximum operating limit speed JAR 25X1516 Other speed limitations
The maximum operating limit speed (VMO/MMO Any other limitation associated with speed must
airspeed or Mach Number, whichever is critical at a be established (see ACJ 25X1516).
particular altitude) is a speed that may not be deliber-
ately exceeded in any regime of flight (climb, cruise,
or descent), unless a higher speed is authorised for JAR 25X1517 Rough air speed
flight test or pilot training operations. VMO/MMO
must be established so that it is not greater than the A rough air speed, VRA, for use in conjunction
design cruising speed VC and so that it is sufficiently with the techniques of JAR 25X261, must be estab-
below VD/MD or VDF/MDF, to make it highly lished, which –
improbable that the latter speeds will be inadvertently
exceeded in operations. The speed margin between (a) lies within the range of speeds for which the
VMO/MMO and VD/MD or VDF/MDF may not be less requirements associated with the design speed for
than that determined under JAR 25.335 (b) or found maximum gust intensity, VB, specified in JAR 25.335
(d) are met, and
necessary during the flight tests conducted under
JAR 25.253. (b) is sufficiently less than VMO to ensure that
likely speed variation during rough air encounters
will not cause the overspeed warning to operate too
JAR 25.1507 Manoeuvring speed frequently (see ACJ 25X1517).
JAR 25.1511 Flap extended speed The aeroplane weight, centre of gravity, and
weight distribution limitations including those
The established flap extended speed VFE must be determined under JAR 25.23 to JAR 25.27 must
established so that it does not exceed the design flap be established as operating limitations. (See
speed VF chosen under JAR 25.335(e) and 25.345, ACJ 25.1519.)
for the corresponding wing-flap positions and engine
powers.
JAR 25.1521 Powerplant limitations (See [ JAR 25.1529 Instruction for Continued Air-
ACJ 25.1521.) worthiness
(a) The powerplant limitations must be estab- The applicant must prepare instructions for
lished so that they do not exceed the corresponding Continued Airworthiness in accordance with
type certificated or approved limits for the engine, Appendix H that are acceptable to the Authority.
propeller and systems which comprise the powerplant. The instructions may be incomplete at type certific-
ation if a programme exists to ensure their completion
(b) Reserved.
prior to delivery of the first aeroplane or issuance of
(c) Reserved. a certificate of airworthiness , whichever occurs later. ]
JAR 25.1543 Instrument markings; general (See JAR 25.1551 Oil quantity indicator
ACJ 25.1543)
For each instrument — Each oil quantity indicator must be marked with
(a) When markings are on the cover glass of the enough increments to indicate readily and accurately
instrument, there must be means to maintain the the quantity of oil.
correct alignment of the glass cover with the face of
the dial; and
JAR 25.1553 Fuel quantity indicator
(b) Each arc and line must be wide enough, and
located, to be clearly visible to the relevant flight.
If the unusable fuel supply for any tank exceeds
crew member(s).
one gallon, or 5% of the tank capacity, whichever is
greater, a red arc must be marked on its indicator
extending from the calibrated zero reading to the
lowest reading obtainable in level flight.
1
Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/1, Eff. 30.4.84)
Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/3, Eff. 30.11.84) 1-G-6
SECTION 1 JAR–25
(d) The satisfactory functioning of the APU (a) APU operating characteristics must be
must be demonstrated by ground and flight tests over investigated in flight to determine that no adverse
characteristics (such as stall, surge, or flame-out) are
the range of operating conditions for which certifi-
cation is required and must include tests under hot present, to a hazardous degree, during normal and
climatic conditions, unless equivalent evidence can emergency operation within the range of operation
limitations of the aeroplane and of the APU. Com-
be produced (see ACJ 25A901(d)).
pliance need not be shown if operation of the APU is
limited to ground use only with the aeroplane station-
ary. (see ACJ 25A939(a)).
JAR 25A903 Auxiliary power unit
(c) The APU air inlet system may not, as a
result of air-flow distortion during normal operation,
(a) Each APU must meet the requirements of
JAR–APU for the corresponding category and class cause vibration harmful to the APU.
of operation intended.
(d) It must be established over the range of
(c) Control of APU rotation and shut-down operating conditions for which certification is
capability required, that the APU installation vibratory
conditions do not exceed the critical frequencies and
(1) It shall be possible to shut down the amplitudes established under JAR–APU, Section 4,
APU from the flight deck in normal and emergency paragraph 5.15. ]
conditions.
*Definitions of non-essential APU's and essential APU's are
given in JAR–APU.
[ JAR 25A943 Negative acceleration (e) No flexible hose that might be adversely
affected by exposure to high temperatures may be
No hazardous malfunction of an APU or any com- used where excessive temperatures will exist during
ponent or system associated with the APU may occur operation or after an APU shutdown.
when the aeroplane is operated at the negative acceler-
ations within the flight envelopes prescribed in JAR (f) Each fuel line within the fuselage must be
25.333. This must be shown for the greatest duration designed and installed to allow a reasonable degree of
expected for the acceleration. (See ACJ 25A943.) deformation and stretching without leakage.
(a) through a system independent of each part (b) Each drain required by sub-paragraph (a) of
of the system supplying fuel to the main engines, or this paragraph must –
(b) by any other acceptable method. (See ACJ (1) Discharge clear of all parts of the
25A953(b).) aeroplane;
(a) Each fuel line must be installed and supported (ii) That is either located or protected
to prevent excessive vibration and to withstand loads to prevent fuel spillage in dangerous quant-
due to fuel pressure and accelerated flight conditions. ities in the event of a landing with landing
gear retracted.
(b) Each fuel line connected to components of
the aeroplane between which relative motion could
exist must have provisions for flexibility.
of oil at a temperature not above that safe for con- JAR 25A1043 Cooling tests
tinuous operation. The oil system for the APU must
comply with JAR–APU even if the oil system is not (a) General. Compliance with JAR 25A1041
an integral part of the APU. must be shown by tests under critical ground, water
and flight operating conditions. For these tests, the
following apply:
JAR 25A1017 Oil lines and fittings (1) If the tests are conducted under
conditions deviating from the maximum ambient
(b) Breather lines must be arranged so that – atmospheric temperature, the recorded APU
temperatures must be corrected under sub-para-
(1) Condensed water vapour that might graph (c) of this paragraph.
freeze and obstruct the line cannot accumulate at
any point; (2) No corrected temperatures determined
under sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph may
(2) The breather discharge does not exceed established limits.
constitute a hazard if foaming occurs, or
(3) The breather does not discharge into (3) The fuel used during the cooling tests
the APU air induction system. must be the grade approved for the APU’s. The
test procedures must be as prescribed in
JAR 25A1045.
The APU cooling provisions must be able to main- (b) Temperatures must be stabilised under the
tain the temperatures of APU components and fluids conditions from which entry is made into each stage
of flight being investigated, unless the entry con-
within the temperature limits established for these
components and fluids, under ground, water and dition normally is not one during which component
flight operating conditions, and after normal shut- and APU fluid temperatures would stabilise (in which
case, operation through the full entry condition must
down.
be conducted before entry into the stage of flight
[ being investigated in order to allow temperatures to [ moisture in the ground attitude. The drains may not
reach their natural levels at the time of entry). The discharge in locations that might cause a fire hazard.
take-off cooling test must be preceded by a period
during which the APU component and APU fluid (b) Each induction system duct must be –
temperatures are stabilised with the APU operating
normally. (1) Strong enough to prevent induction
system failures resulting from reverse flow due to
(c) Cooling tests for each stage of flight must be APU surging; and
continued until –
(2) Fireproof within the APU compart-
(1) The component and APU fluid temp- ment. Outside the APU compartment the materials
eratures stabilise;
used to form the inlet duct and plenum chamber
(2) The stage of flight is completed; or of the APU must be capable of resisting the
maximum heat conditions likely to occur under
(3) An operating limitation is reached. reverse flow conditions.
JAR 25A1093 Induction system de-icing and anti- (a) Each exhaust system must ensure safe
-icing provisions disposal of exhaust gases without fire hazard or
carbon monoxide contamination in any personnel
(b)(3) Each non-essential APU induction compartment. For test purposes, any acceptable
system which does not comply with JAR 25B1093 carbon monoxide detection method may be used to
(b)(2) will be restricted to use in non-ice conditions, show the absence of carbon monoxide.
unless it can be. shown that the APU complete
with induction system, if subjected to icing (b) Unless suitable precautions are taken, no
conditions, will -not affect the safe operation of exhaust system part may be dangerously close to
aeroplane. parts of any system carrying flammable fluids or
vapours, or under parts of such a system that may
leak.
JAR 25A1103 Induction system ducts
(c) Each component that hot exhaust gases
(a) Each induction system duct upstream of the could strike, or that could be subjected to high temp-
first stage of the APU compressor must have a drain eratures from exhaust system parts, must be fire-
to prevent the hazardous accumulation of fuel and ] proof. All exhaust system components must be ]
Each APU control must be located, arranged and (b) Each designated fire zone must meet the
designed to meet the objectives of JAR 25.777 requirements of JAR 25A1185 through JAR25A1203.
through JAR 25.781 and marked in accordance with
JAR 25.1555. In addition, it must meet the following
requirements: JAR 25A1183 Lines, fittings and components
(a) Each control must be located so that it can- (a) Except as provided in sub-paragraph (b) of
not be inadvertently operated by persons entering, this paragraph, each line, fitting, and other com-
leaving, or moving normally in the cockpit. ponent carrying flammable fluid in any area subject
to APU fire conditions, and each component which
(b) Each flexible control must be approved or conveys or contains flammable fluid in a designated
must be shown to be suitable for the particular fire zone must be fire resistant, except that flammable
application. fluid tanks and supports in a designated fire zone
must be fireproof or be enclosed by a fireproof shield
(c) Each control must have sufficient strength unless damage by fire to any non-fireproof part will
and rigidity to withstand operating loads without not cause leakage or spillage of flammable fluid.
failure and without excessive deflection. Components must be shielded or located to safeguard
against the ignition of leaking flammable fluid. An
(d) Each control must be able to maintain any integral oil sump of less than 20 quart capacity need
set position without constant attention by flight-crew not be fireproof nor be enclosed by a fireproof shield.]
members and without creep due to control loads or
vibration.
[ (b) Sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph does not (d) Each ventilation means must be arranged so
apply to − that no discharged vapours will cause an additional
fire hazard.
(1) Lines and fittings already approved as
part of an APU , and (e) Unless the extinguishing agent capacity and
rate of discharge are based on maximum air flow
(2) Vent and drain lines, and their fittings, through a zone, there must be means to allow the
whose failure will not result in, or add to, a fire crew to shut off sources of forced ventilation to any
hazard. fire zone.
(b) There must be at least one-half inch of clear (c) Operation of any shut off may not interfere
airspace between each’ tank or reservoir and each fire- with the later emergency operation of other equip-
wall or shroud isolating a designated fire zone. ment.
(c) Absorbent materials close to flammable fluid (d) Each flammable fluid shut-off means and
system components that might leak must be covered control must be fireproof or must be located and
or treated to prevent the absorption of hazardous protected so that any fire in a fire zone will not affect
quantities of fluids. its operation.
(2) Arranged so that no discharged fluid (h) Each shut-off valve must have a means to
will cause an additional fire hazard. relieve excessive pressure accumulation unless a
means for pressure relief is otherwise provided in the
(b) Each designated fire zone must be ventilated system.
to prevent the accumulation of flammable vapours.
(b) Each firewall and shroud must be – (a) Fire extinguishing agents must –
JAR 25A1195 Fire extinguisher systems (c) There must be a means for each fire extin-
guishing agent container to indicate that the container
(a) There must be a fire extinguisher system has discharged or that the charging pressure is below
serving the APU compartment. the established minimum necessary for proper
functioning.
(b) The fire extinguishing system, the quantity
of the extinguishing agent, the rate of discharge, and
the discharge distribution must be adequate to extin-
guish fires. An individual ‘one shot’ system is
acceptable. (See ACJ 25A1195(b).)
(2) There is a means to warn the crew in JAR 25A1305 APU instruments
the event that the sensor or associated wiring with-
in a designated fire zone is severed at one point, (a) The following instruments are required:
unless the system continues to function as a satis-
factory detection system after the severing; and (1) A fire warning indicator.
(2) Any other instrumentation necessary
(3) There is a means to warn the crew in to ensure safe operation of the APU.
the event of a short circuit in the sensor or assoc-
iated wiring within a designated fire zone, unless
the system continues to function as a satisfactory JAR 25A1337 APU instruments
detection system after the short circuit.
(a) Instruments and instrument lines
(c) No fire or overheat detector may be affected
by any oil, water, other fluids, or fumes that might be (1) Each APU instrument line must meet
present. the requirements of JAR 25A993 and JAR 25A1183.
(d) There must be means to allow the crew to (2) Each line carrying flammable fluids
check, in flight, the functioning of each fire or over- under pressure must –
heat detector electric circuit.
(i) Have restricting orifices or other
(e) Wiring and other components of each fire or safety devices at the source of the pressure
overheat detector system in a fire zone must be at to prevent the escape of excessive fluid if the
least fire-resistant. ] line fails; and ]
(3) Each APU instrument that utilises (b) APU limitations. APU limitations established
flammable fluids must be installed and located so under JAR 25A1521 and information to explain the
that the escape of fluid would not create a hazard. instrument markings provided under JAR 25A1549
and JAR 25A1551 must be furnished. ]
OPERATlNG LIMITATlONS
JAR 25B903 Auxiliary power units (b) If an APU can be supplied with fuel from
more than one tank, the fuel system must –
(e) Restart capability
(2) For the APU, in addition to having
(1) Means to restart any APU in flight appropriate manual switching capability, be
must be provided. designed to prevent interruption of fuel flow to
the APU, without attention by the flight crew,
(2) An altitude and airspeed envelope when any tank supplying fuel to the APU is
must be established for in-flight APU restarting, depleted of usable fuel during normal operation
and the APU must have a restart capability within and any other tank, that normally supplies fuel to
that envelope. (See ACJ 25B903(e)(2).) the APU alone, contains usable fuel.
FUEL SYSTEM
JAR 25B961 Fuel system hot weather operation
JAR 25B951 General
(a) The fuel supply of an APU must perform
(a) Each fuel system must be constructed and satisfactorily in hot weather operation. It must be
arranged to ensure a flow of fuel at a rate and shown that the fuel system from the tank outlet to
pressure established for proper auxiliary power unit the APU is pressurised under all intended operations
functioning under each likely operating condition, so as to prevent vapour formation. Alternatively, it
including any manoeuvre for which certification is must be shown that there is no evidence of vapour
requested and during which the APU is permitted to lock or other malfunctioning during a climb from the
be in operation. altitude of the airport selected by the applicant to
the maximum altitude established as an operating
(b) Each fuel system must be arranged so that limitation under JAR 25.1527, with the APU
any air which is introduced into the system will not operating at the most critical conditions for vapour
result in – formation but not exceeding the maximum essential
load conditions. If the fuel supply is dependent on
(2) Flameout of the APU. the same fuel pumps or fuel supply as the main
engines, the main engines must be operated at
maximum continuous power.
JAR 25B955 Fuel flow (5) The fuel temperature must be at least
110ºF (43ºC) at the start of the climb. (See
(a) The fuel system must provide at least 100% ACJ 25B961 (a)(5).)
of the fuel flow required under each intended
operating condition and manoeuvre. Compliance (b) The test prescribed in sub-paragraph (a) of
must be shown as follows: this paragraph may be performed in flight or on the
ground under closely simulated flight conditions. If a
(1) Fuel must be delivered to the APU at flight test is performed in weather cold enough to
a pressure within the limits specified in the APU interfere with the proper conduct of the test, the fuel
type approval. tank surfaces, fuel-lines, and other fuel system parts
subject to cold air must be insulated to simulate, inso-
(2) The quantity of fuel in the tank may far as practicable, flight in hot weather.
not exceed the amount established as the unusable
fuel supply for that tank under the requirements
of JAR 25.959 plus that necessary to show
compliance with this paragraph.
JAR 25B977 Fuel tank outlet
(3) Each main pump must be used that is
necessary for each operating condition and (a) There must be a fuel strainer for the fuel
attitude for which compliance with this paragraph tank outlet or for the booster pump. This strainer
is shown, and the appropriate emergency pump must –
must be substituted for each main pump so used.
(2) For the APU, prevent, the passage of
*A definition of an essential APU is given in JAR–APU. any object that could restrict fuel flow or damage
any fuel system component. ]
[ (c) The clear area of each fuel tank outlet OIL SYSTEM
strainer must be at least five times the area of the out-
let line. JAR 25B1011 General
(d) The diameter of each strainer must be at (b) The usable oil capacity may not be less than the
least that of the fuel tank outlet. product of the endurance of the aeroplane under
critical operating conditions and the approved max-
(e) Each finger strainer must be accessible for imum allowable oil consumption of the APU under
inspection and cleaning. the same conditions, plus a suitable margin to ensure
system circulation.
(a) Be accessible for draining and cleaning and JAR 25B1105 Induction system screens
must incorporate a screen or element which is easily
removable; (b) No screen may be in any part of the induction
system that is the only passage through which air can
(b) Have a sediment trap and drain except that reach the APU unless it can be shown that the screen
it need not have a drain if the strainer or filter is does not ice up to an unacceptable degree.
easily removable for drain purposes;
EQUIPMENT
Appendix A
Appendix A (continued)
Appendix A (continued)
APPENDIX A (continued)
Appendix A (continued)
Appendix B
Appendix C (continued)
FIGURE 1
NOTE: Source of data – NACA TN No, 1855, Class III–M, Continuous Maximum.
Appendix C (continued)
FIGURE 2
Appendix C (continued)
FIGURE 3
Appendix C (continued)
FIGURE 4
NOTE: Source of date –– NACA TN No. 1855, Class II ––M, Intermittent Maximum.
Appendix C (continued)
FIGURE 5
Appendix C (continued)
FIGURE 6
Appendix D
Criteria for determining minimum flight crew. (10) Incapacitation of a flight-crew member
The following are considered by the Authorities in whenever the applicable operating rule requires
determining the minimum flight crew under a minimum flight crew of at least two pilots.
JAR 25.1523.
(c) Kind of operation authorised. The
(a) Basic workload functions. The following determination of the kind of operation authorised
basic workload functions are considered: requires consideration of the operating rules under
(1) Flight path control. which the aeroplane will be operated. Unless an
(2) Collision avoidance. applicant desires approval for a more limited kind of
(3) Navigation. operation, it is assumed that each aeroplane certi-
(4) Communications. ficated under this JAR—25 will operate under IFR
(5) Operation and monitoring of aircraft conditions.
engines and systems.
(6) Command decisions.
Appendix E
Appendix F
An Acceptable Test Procedure for Showing Compliance with 25.853, 25.855 and 25.1359
(a) Conditioning. Specimens must be con- Method Standard 191 Method 5903 (revised Method
ditioned to 70°F, ±5°, and at 50%, ±5%, relative 5902) for the vertical test, or Method 5906 for
humidity until moisture equilibrium is reached or horizontal test or other approved equivalent methods.
for 24 hours. Only one specimen at a time may be Specimens which are too large for the cabinet must
removed from the conditioning environment immedi- be tested in similar draught-free conditions.
ately before subjecting it to the flame.
(d) Vertical test, in compliance with JAR 25.853
(b) Specimen configuration. Except as provided (a) and (b). A minimum of three specimens must be
for materials used in electrical wire and cable tested and the results averaged. For fabrics, the
insulation and in small parts, materials must be tested direction of weave corresponding to the most critical
either as a section cut from a fabricated part as flammability conditions must be parallel to the
installed in the aeroplane or as a specimen simulating longest dimension. Each specimen must be supported
a cut section, such as: a specimen cut from a flat vertically. The specimen must be exposed to a
sheet of the material or a model of the fabricated Bunsen or Tirrill burner with a nominal ⅜ inch
part. The specimen may be cut from any location inside diameter tube adjusted to give a flame of
in a fabricated part; however, fabricated units, such 1½ inches in height. The minimum flame temperature
as sandwich panels, may not be separated for test. measured by a calibrated thermocouple pyrometer in
The specimen thickness must be no thicker than the the centre of the flame must be 1550°F. The lower
minimum thickness to be qualified for use in the edge of the specimen must be ¾ inch above the top
aeroplane, except that: (1) thick foam parts, such as edge of the burner. The flame must be applied to
seat cushions, must be tested in ½ inch thickness; the centreline of the lower edge of the specimen.
(2) when showing compliance with JAR 25.853 For materials covered by JAR 25.853 (a), the flame
(b)(3) for materials used in small parts that must be must be applied for 60 seconds and then removed.
tested, the materials must be tested in no more than For materials covered by JAR 25.853 (b), the flame
⅛ inch thickness; (3) when showing compliance must be applied for 12 seconds and then removed.
with JAR 25.1359 (d) for materials used in electrical Flame time, burn length, and flaming time of
wire and cable insulation, the wire and cable speci- drippings, if any, must be recorded. The burn length
mens must be the same size as used in the aeroplane. [ determined in accordance with paragraph (h) of this]
In the case of fabrics, both the warp and weft direction Appendix must be measured to the nearest 1/10 inch.
of the weave must be tested to determine the most
critical flammability condition. When performing the (e) Horizontal test in compliance with
tests prescribed in paragraphs (d) to (e) of this JAR 25.853 (b)(2)and (b) (3). A minimum of
Appendix, the specimen must be mounted in a metal three specimens must be tested and the results
frame so that; (1) in the vertical tests of paragraph (d), averaged. Each specimen must be supported
the two long edges and the upper edge are held horizontally. The exposed surface when installed in
securely; (2) in the horizontal test of paragraph (e), the aeroplane must be face down for the test. The
the two long edges and the edge away from the flame specimen must be exposed to a Bunsen burner or
are held securely; (3) the exposed area of the specimen Tirrill burner with a nominal ⅜ inch inside diameter
is at least 2 inches wide and 12 inches long, unless the tube adjusted to give a flame of 1½ inches in height.
actual size used in the aeroplane is smaller; and The minimum flame temperature measured by a
(4) the edge to which the burner flame is applied calibrated thermocouple pyrometer in the centre of
must not consist of the finished or protected edge of the flame must be 1550°F. The specimen must
the specimen but must be representative of the actual be positioned so that the edge being tested is ¾ inch
cross-section of the material or part installed in the above the top of, and on the centreline of, the
aeroplane. When performing the test prescribed in burner. The flame must be applied for 15 seconds
paragraph (f) of this Appendix, the specimen must and then removed. A minimum of 10 inches of the
be mounted in a metal frame so that all four edges specimen must be used for timing purposes, approxi-
are held securely and the exposed area of the specimen mately 1½ inches must burn before the burning front
is at least 8 inches by 8 inches. reaches the timing zone, and the average burn rate
must be recorded.
(c) Apparatus. Except as provided in paragraph
[ (g)] of this Appendix, tests must be conducted in a (f) 45° test, in compliance with JAR 25.855
draught-free cabinet in accordance with Federal Test (a) (1). A minimum of three specimens must be
tested and the results averaged. The specimens must
Appendix F (continued)
be supported at an angle of 45° to a horizontal (h) Bum length. Bum length is the distance
surface. The exposed surface when installed in the from the original edge to the farthest evidence of
aircraft must be face down for the test. The damage to the test specimen due to flame impinge-
specimens must be exposed to a Bunsen or Tirrill ment, including areas of partial or complete con-
burner with a nominal ⅜ inch inside diameter tube sumption, charring, or embrittlement, but not
adjusted to give a flame of 1H inches in height. The including areas sooted, stained, warped, or discoloured,
minimum flame temperature measured by a calibrated nor areas where material has shrunk or melted away
thermocouple pyrometer in the centre of the flame from the heat source.
must be 1550°F. Suitable precautions must be taken
to avoid draughts. One-third of the flame must
contact the material at the centre of the specimen
and must be applied for 30 seconds and then removed.
Flame time, glow time, and whether the flame
penetrates (passes through) the specimen must be
recorded.
[ Appendix G
[Appendix H
(a) This Appendix specifies requirements for the [ (3) Basic control and operation inform-
preparation of Instructions for Continued Airworthi- ation describing how the aeroplane components
ness as required by JAR 25.1529. and systems are controlled and how they operate,
including any special procedures and limitations
(b) The Instructions for Continued Airworthiness that apply.
for each aeroplane must include the Instructions for
Continued Airworthiness for each engine and propeller (4) Servicing information that covers
(hereinafter designated 'products'), for each appliance details regarding servicing points, capacities of
required by this JAR–25 and any required inform- tanks, reservoirs, types of fluids to be used,
ation relating to the interface of those appliances and pressures applicable to the various systems, location
products with the aeroplane. If Instructions for of access panels for inspection and servicing,
Continued Airworthiness are not supplied by the locations of lubrication points, lubricants to be
manufacturer of an appliance or product installed in used, equipment required for servicing, tow
the aeroplane, the Instructions for Continued Air- instructions and limitations, mooring, jacking, and
worthiness for the aeroplane must include the levelling information.
information essential to the continued airworthiness
of the aeroplane. (b) Maintenance Instructions
(c) The applicant must submit to the Authority (1) Scheduling information for each part
a programme to show how changes to the Instructions of the aeroplane and its engines, auxiliary power
for Continued Airworthiness made by the applicant units, propellers, accessories, instruments, and
or by the manufacturers of products and appliances equipment that provides the recommended periods
installed in the aeroplane will be distributed. at which they should be cleaned, inspected,
adjusted, tested, and lubricated, and the degree of
inspection, the applicable wear tolerances, and
H25.2 Format work recommended at these periods. However,
the applicant may refer to an accessory, instrument
(a) The Instructions for Continued Airworthiness or equipment manufacturer as the source of this
must be in the form of a manual or manuals as information if the applicant shows that the item
appropriate for the quantity of data to be provided. has an exceptionally high degree of complexity
requiring specialised maintenance techniques, test
(b) The format of the manual or manuals must equipment, or expertise. The recommended over-
provide for a practical arrangement. haul periods and necessary cross references to the
Airworthiness Limitations section of the manual
must also be included. In addition, the applicant
H25.3 Content must include an inspection programme that
includes the frequency and extent of the
The contents of the manual or manuals must be inspections necessary to provide for the continued
prepared in a language acceptable to the Authority. airworthiness of the aeroplane.
The Instructions for Continued Airworthiness must
contain the following manuals or sections, as (2) Troubleshooting information describing
appropriate, and information: probable malfunctions, how to recognise those
malfunctions, and the remedial action for those
(a) Aeroplane maintenance manual or section malfunctions.
(1) Introduction information that includes (3) Information describing the order and
an explanation of the aeroplane's features and data method of removing and replacing products and
to the extent necessary for maintenance or parts with any necessary precautions to be taken.
preventive maintenance.
(4) Other general procedural instructions
(2) A description of the aeroplane and its including procedures for system testing during
systems and installations including its engines, ground running, symmetry checks, weighing and
propellers, and appliances. ] determining the centre of gravity, lifting and
shoring, and storage limitations. ]
H25.3 (continued)
[1 GENERAL ]
[ 1.1 ] This Section contains Acceptable Means of Compliance and Interpretative Material that has been agreed
for inclusion into JAR. These Acceptable Means of Compliance and Interpretations have been developed on the
basis of the study of FAR 25 and their publication does not imply that the TSOs and Advisory Circulars
associated with these Subparts of FAR 25 have been found acceptable as part of the JAR; consideration has still
to be given to the acceptability of such documents.
[ 2 PRESENTATION
2.1 The Acceptable Means of Compliance and Interpretative Material are presented in full page width on
loose pages, each page being identified by the date of issue or the Change number under which it is amended or
reissued. ]
[ 2.2 ] A numbering system has been used in which the Acceptable Means of Compliance or Interpretative
Material uses the same number as the paragraph in JAR to which it is related. The number is introduced by the
letters ACJ (Advisory Circular – Joint) to distinguish the material from the JAR.
[ 2.3 The nature of the advisory material is indicated immediately following the heading and for this purpose ]
the two types of material are defined as follows:–
[ Acceptable Means of Compliance illustrate a means, but not the only means, by which a requirement can be met.
2.4 Explanatory Notes not forming part of the ACJ text appear in a smaller typeface.
2.5 National Variants (those ACJs stated to be applicable by individual countries) are prefaced by a letter
indicating the country which has stated the National Variant. National Variants are contained within boxes and
are printed in italic typeface.]
[ 2.6 ] Subpart J – Gas Turbine Auxiliary Power Unit Installations – uses a similar numbering system to that
used in Subpart E – power -plant Installations, except that the number is prefaced either by the letter A or B,
according to whether the requirement applies to all APUs or only to an Essential APU. This numbering system is
continued in this Section 2, but to assist in the more rapid identification of ACJs relating to Supart J, the words
'(Auxiliary Power Unit)' are added beside the title in each case.
[ 2.7 New, amended and corrected text is enclosed within heavy brackets. ]
[ ACJ – SUBPART B ]
ACJ 25.21(d)
Proof of Compliance (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.21(d)
1 The tolerances specified in JAR 25.21(d) are the allowable deviations from the specified flight conditions
for a particular test. They are not allowable tolerances on specific requirements, nor are they to be considered
as allowable inaccuracies of measurement or of the method of determination. For example, when demonstrating
static longitudinal stability with a specified trim speed of 1.4 VS1 the trim speed may be 1.4 VS1 ±3 knots or 3%;
however, no positive tolerance is permitted when demonstrating the trim speed of not more than 1.4 VS1 required
by JAR 25.161 (c) (1).
2 Where variation of the parameter on which a tolerance is permitted will have an appreciable effect on the
test, the result should be corrected to the specified value of the parameter; otherwise no correction is necessary.
3 In areas of critical handling or stability, notwithstanding the tolerance of JAR 25.21 (d) (7% total travel),
aft centre of gravity tests should be flown at a centre of gravity not more forward than the certificate aft centre
of gravity limit. Tests which are critical on the forward centre of gravity limit should be flown at centres of
gravity at least as forward as the certificate forward limit.
ACJ 25.101
General (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.101
The test aeroplane used in the determination of the scheduled performance should be in a condition which, as far
as is reasonably possible, is representative of the average new production aeroplane. Where the test aeroplane
differs from this standard (e.g. with regard to engine idle thrust settings, flap rigging, etc.) it will be necessary to
correct the measured performance for any significant performance effects of such differences.
[ ACJ 25.101(c)
General (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.101(c) and JAR (BB) 25.101(c)
1 In expanding flight test performance results to produce flight manual scheduled performance data, the
following extrapolation limits and conservatism factors should normally be applied. These guide lines assume
that the expansion will be made in the conventional way (i.e. using engine thrust data to derive an aeroplane drag
polar and then to expand the results to cover the certification range). If any other expansion method is used the
Authority should be consulted for appropriate extrapolation guide lines.
1.1.1 Weight. The variation of take-off performance with weight may be extrapolated without conservatism
to a weight greater, by up to 10%, than the maximum weight tested and to a weight lower, by up to 10%, than
the lowest weight tested. These ranges may not be applicable if there are significant discontinuities, or unusual
variations, in the scheduling of take-off speeds with weight, in the weight ranges covered by extrapolation.
1.1.2 Altitude
a. Where the variation of engine thrust with altitude has been derived from acceptable altitude test facility
testing, and has been confirmed by climb performance measurements over the required altitude range, the
variation of take-off performance with altitude may be extrapolated by 6000 ft above the *W/δ range tested,
without conservatism. The take-off performance may be extrapolated beyond this 6000 ft figure provided a
conservative margin of 2% is included in the scheduled distance, for each 1000 ft of extrapolation beyond 6000 ft. ]
b. In any other situation, altitude extrapolation without conservatism should be limited to 3000 ft and the
above conservatism should be added for any further extrapolation.
*W = Weight
1.1.3 Temperature
a. The variation of take-off performance with temperature may be extrapolated, without conservatism, to
a temperature which exceeds the maximum temperature tested by:
i. 15°C or
ii. the amount by which the maximum temperature tested exceeds the minimum temperature tested,
b. The performance may also be extrapolated, without conservatism, by a similar amount below the
minimum temperature tested.
c. The take-off performance may be extended beyond these limits provided a conservative margin of 2%
is included in the scheduled distance for each 5°C of extrapolation beyond the ranges quoted above.
[ d. The extent of permitted temperature extrapolation, or the magnitude of any margin of conservatism;
where there are changes of engine limiting parameter (e.g. a change from pressure limit to TGT limit) in the range
covered by the extrapolation, will depend on the availability of sufficient data from an appropriate test facility
or heated inlet tests to allow extrapolation to be made with acceptable confidence. ]
1.2 Climb
1.2.2 Altitude. Climb performance should normally be measured over a sufficiently large range of altitudes
to warrant extrapolation without conservatism over the certificated range.
1.2.3 Temperature
b. For extrapolation beyond the ranges permitted without conservatism, the thrust assumed should be
reduced by a conservative margin of 2% for each 5°C of extrapolation beyond the 'without conservatism' limits.
1.3 Landing
1.3.2 Altitude
a. The variation of landing distance with altitude may be extrapolated by 6000 ft above the maximum
altitude tested, without conservatism.
b. Landing performance may be extrapolated beyond this 6000 ft value provided a margin of conservatism
of 2% is included in the scheduled distance for each 1000 ft of extrapolation beyond 6000 ft.
[2 Where the performance of an engine type has been verified over an acceptable range of altitudes and
temperatures in one aeroplane type, other aeroplane types with the same type of engine in essentially similar
installations may be permitted altitude and temperature extrapolation ranges, without conservatism, greater
than those detailed in 1. above. The degree of alleviation permitted will depend on the amount of read across
available from the results of the earlier aeroplane tests, and should be agreed with the Authority for each
individual case.
3 Where aeroplane testing over a range of attitudes and temperatures is not required, the basic performance
test programme may need to be augmented to ensure that the aeroplane is tested over essentially the full range of
thrust to weight ratios for which performance data is to be scheduled.]
ACJ 25.101(h)(3)
General (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.101(h)(3)
There should be a minimum time delay of one second between operating each device which assists in the
deceleration of the aeroplane motion in addition to, or in lieu of wheel brakes.
The minimum specified time delay should be applied as an additional margin to the actual time required for
executing each procedure. However, if cockpit procedures require other crew members to operate devices on the
captain's command, an additional time delay of one second should be required after the transmittal of each order
to the other crew members by the captain.
ACJ 25.101(i)
Wet Runway Friction Characteristics (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.101(i) and JAR(BB) 25.101(i)
1 Introduction If aeroplane performance characteristics on wet runways are scheduled in the Flight
Manual, the performance should correspond to the aeroplane braking characteristics on the Reference Wet Hard
Surface. The braking characteristics of the aeroplane on the Reference Wet Hard Surface should be derived by
correcting measurements of the braking characteristics made during tests on a wet runway. Acceptable methods
of correcting test results are given in paragraph 3 of this ACJ.
2 Definitions
2.1 Reference Wet Hard Surface. A hard surface for which the relationship between ground speed and the
trailer braking force coefficient is given in Table 1.
2.2 Trailer Braking Force Coefficient. The tangential force applied by a runway surface (expressed as a
proportion of the normal force) upon an appropriately loaded patterned-tyred locked wheel when it is being
propelled across the surface in a direction parallel to the plane of the wheel.
3 Method of Correction of Measured Braking Performance Characteristics to the Reference Wet Hard
Surface
3.1 The measured aeroplane wheelbraking drag should be corrected in accordance with either 3.2 or 3.3.
3.2 a. The friction characteristics of the test surface should be measured with an approved test apparatus which
is calibrated against an acceptable standard (e.g. the TRRL/Miles Trailer with a patterned tyre, see paragraph 3.4).
b. The actual wheelbraking drag of the aeroplane at a particular speed should be multiplied by the ratio
of the trailer braking force coefficient for the Reference Wet Hard Surface (Table 1) to the trailer braking force
coefficient for the test runway at the same speed.
c. If it is not possible for the test apparatus to be operated over the full range of speeds of which the
aeroplane is capable, a conservative extrapolation of the measured friction characteristics may be made.
3.3 Where the friction characteristics of the test surface are not measured with a suitable test apparatus, the
actual wheelbraking drag of the aeroplane at a particular speed should be multiplied by the conservative correction
factor of Table 2 appropriate to that same speed.
Tyre 4.00 x 16 in
Wheel load 320 lb
[ The stall entry rate is defined as the mean rate of speed reduction (in knots EAS/second) in the deceleration to ]
the minimum speed achieved in the particular stall demonstration, from a speed 10% above that minimum speed, i.e.
Where Vmin is defined as the minimum speed achieved in the particular stall demonstration.
[ACJ 25.103(c)
Stall Speed (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.103(c)
In flight tests to determine stall speeds it is generally not possible to maintain a load factor of unity until the
stall occurs. VS1g should be taken to be the minimum value of V/ √n obtained during the approach to the stall
(up to the moment of stall identification), where V is the calibrated airspeed and n is the aeroplane load factor
normal to the flight path, measured simultaneously.]
ACJ 25.107(d)
Take-off Speeds (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.107(d) and JAR(BB) 25.107(d)
1 If cases are encountered where it is not possible to obtain the actual VMU at forward centre of gravity
with aeroplanes having limited elevator power (including those aeroplanes which have limited elevator power
only over a portion of the take-off weight range), it will be permissible to test with a more aft centre of gravity
and/or more than normal nose-up trim to obtain VMU.
1.1 When VMU is obtained in this manner, the values should be corrected to those which would have been
attained at forward centre of gravity if sufficient elevator power had been available. The variation of VMU with
centre of gravity may be assumed to be the same as the variation of stalling speed in free air with centre of gravity
for this correction.
[ 1.2 In such cases where VMU has been measured with a more aft centre of gravity and/or with more than
normal nose-up trim, the VR selected should (in addition to complying with the requirements of JAR 25.107(e))
be greater by an adequate margin than the lowest speed at which the nose wheel can be raised from the runway
with centre of gravity at its most critical position and with the trim set to the normal take-off setting for the
weight and centre of gravity.
NOTE: A margin of 5 knots between the lowest nose-wheel raising speed and VR would normally be considered to be adequate.]
2–B–3–2 Change 11
JAR–25 SECTION 2
[2 Take-offs made to demonstrate VMU should be continued until the aeroplane is out of ground effect.
The aeroplane pitch attitude should not be decreased after lift-off.]
In the demonstration will all engines operating, the take-off distance to a height of 35 ft should not exceed
the take-off distance determined in accordance with (G) JAR 25.113, Take-off distance and take-off run
(United Kingdom) paragraph (a)(3).
ACJ 25.107(e)(1)(iv)
Take-off Speeds (Interpretative Material)
[ See JAR 25.107(e)(1)(iv) and JAR(BB) 25.107(e)(1)(iv)]
1 In establishing the maximum practical rate of rotation the effect of centre of gravity position should be
considered.
[ 2 To be defined as a geometry limited aeroplane, the aeroplane should be geometry limited to the extent
that a maximum gross weight take-off with the tail dragging wilt result in a clean lift-off and fly-away in the all-
engines configuration. During such a take-off for all-engines-operating configurations, the resulting distance to
the 35 ft height should not be greater than 105% of the normal take-off distance under similar weight, altitude
and temperature conditions before the 15% margin is added. Lastly the VMU demonstrated should be sound and
repeatable.
The criteria concerning the demonstration of the geometry limited proof test with regard to the capability for a
clean lift-off and fly-away are as follows:
i. The aeroplane's pitch attitude from a speed 96% of the actual lift-off speed should be within 5% (in
degrees) of the tail dragging attitude to the point of lift-off.
ii. During the above speed range (96% to 100% of the actual lift-off speed) the aft undersurface of the
aeroplane should have achieved actual runway contact, It has been found practical in tests for contact to be
maintained for at least 50% of the time that the aeroplane is in this speed range.
iii. It is acceptable for the undersurface of the test aeroplane to be modified in such a manner as to protect
it from damage during these tests, provided that the effect on the limiting attitude (i.e. the pitch attitude at which
the undersurface makes contact with the runway) is small.]
ACJ 25.107(e)(3)
Take-off Speeds (Interpretative Material)
[ See JAR 25.107(e)(e) and JAR(BB) 25.107(e)(e)]
a. rotation at a speed of VR–5 knots should be carried out using, up to the point of lift-off, the same
rotation technique, in terms of control input, as that used in establishing the one-engine-inoperative distance of
JAR 25.113(a)(1);
b. the engine failure speed used in the VR–5 knots demonstration should be the same as that used in the
comparative take-off rotating at VR; ]
[ c. the tests should be carried out both at the lowest practical weight (such that VR–5 knots is not less
than VMCG) and at a weight approaching take-off climb limiting conditions;
Reasonably expected variations in service from established take-off procedures should be evaluated in respect of
out-of-trim conditions during certification flight test programmes. For example, normal take-off should be made
with the longitudinal control trimmed to its most adverse position within the allowable take-off trim band.
1 JAR 25.107(e)(4) and JAR(BB) 25.107(e)(4) state that there must be no marked increase in the scheduled
take-off distance when reasonably expected service variations, such as over-rotation, are encountered. This can be
interpreted as requiring take-off tests with all engines operating with an abuse on rotation speed.
2 The expression 'marked increase' in the take-off distance is defined as any amount in excess of 1% of the
scheduled take-off distance. Thus the abuse test should not result in a field length more than 101% of the
scheduled field length.
3 For the early rotation abuse condition with all engines operating and at a weight as near as practicable to
the maximum sea-level take-off weight, it should be shown by test that when the aeroplane is rotated rapidly at a
speed which is 7% or 10 knots, whichever is lesser, below the scheduled VR speed, no 'marked increase' in the
scheduled field length would result. ]
[ ACJ 25.109(a)
Accelerate-stop Distance (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.109(a) and JAR (BB) 25.109(a)
Propeller pitch position. When conducting accelerate-stop tests on propeller-driven aeroplanes, it is permissible
to place the propellers of the operating engines in the ground idle pitch setting, with a suitable time delay after
engine failure (see also ACJ 25.101 (h)(3)) and provided that the aeroplane remains controllable on a slippery
runway. The propeller on the inoperative engine should be in the position it would normally take up upon closing
all power levers. ]
[ ACJ 25.111
Takeoff Path (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.111 and JAR (BB) 25.111
The height references in JAR 25.111 and JAR (BB) 25.111 should be interpreted as geometrical heights.]
ACJ 25.111(b)
Take-off Path (Interpretative Material)
[ See JAR 25.111(b) and JAR(BB) 25.111(b)]
[1 ] Rotation speed, VR, is intended to be the speed at which the pilot initiates action to raise the nose gear
off the ground, during the acceleration to V2; consequently, the take-off path determination, in accordance with
JAR 25.111(a) and (b), should assume that pilot action to raise the nose gear off the ground will not be initiated
until the speed VR has been reached.
[ 2 The time between lift-off and the initiation of gear retraction should be not less than 3 seconds and may
need to be longer than 3 seconds if, on a particular aeroplane type, a longer delay is found to be appropriate. ]
ACJ 25.113(a)(2)
Take-off Distance and Take-off Run (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.113(a)(2), JAR 25.113(b)(2), (G) JAR 25.113(a)(3) (United Kingdom)
and (G) JAR 25.113(b)(3) (United Kingdom)
In establishment of the take-off distance and take-off run, with all engines operating, in accordance with
JAR 25.113(a) and (b), the flight technique should be such:
a. a speed of not less than V2 is achieved before reaching a height of 35 ft above the take-off surface,
b. it is consistent with the achievement of a smooth transition to a steady initial climb speed of not less
than V2 + 10 knots at a height of 400 ft above the take-off surface.
[ ACJ 25.113(a)(3)
Take-off Distance on Precipitation Covered Runways (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.113(a)(3) and JAR 25.113(b)(3)
Three acceptable methods of establishing compliance with JAR 25.113(a)(3) and (b)(3) are as follows:–
1 A prohibition on take-off from runways covered with precipitation to an average depth exceeding 3 mm.
This prohibition should appear as a Limitation in the Flight Manual. (See also ACJ 25.1533(b)).
2 The estimation of the retardation effects of runway precipitants on take-off run and take-off distance.
Estimates should cover a range of precipitant specific gravity between 0.2 and 1.0. Estimated data is not
acceptable for water equivalent depths exceeding 15 mm.
In the absence of any relevant test evidence relating to the retardation effects of runway precipitants, the
following factors will apply:–
b. The estimated landing gear displacement drag co-efficient should be factored by 1.30.
3. The establishment of the retardation effects of runway precipitants on take-off run and take-off distance
by test measurements on runways covered with actual or simulated precipitation. Such tests should establish the
variation of retardation effects with aeroplane speed and precipitation depth over the ranges for which certification
is sought. It will not usually be acceptable for data obtained from tests in high-density precipitants (eg water) to
be extrapolated to depths of low density precipitants exceeding 6 cm.
b. In the case of partial test evidence being available, the following factors may be applied:–
i. The aquaplaning speed increased by an appropriate factor not less than 1.10.
ii. The landing gear displacement drag co-efficient increased by an appropriate factor not less than 1.10.
iii The spray impingement drag co-efficient increased by an appropriate factor not less than 1.50. ]
ACJ 25.119(a)
Landing Climb All-engines-operating (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.119(a) and JAR (BB) 25.119(c)(1)
In establishing the thrust specified in JAR 25.119(a) or JAR (BB) 25.119(c)(1), either:–
a. engine acceleration tests should be conducted using the most critical combination of the following
parameters:
i. altitude;
ii. airspeed;
likely to be encountered during an approach to a landing airfield within the altitude range for which landing
certification is sought; or
b. the thrust specified in JAR 25.119(a) and JAR(BB) 25.119(c)(1) should be established as a function
of these parameters..
ACJ 25.121
Climb One-engine-inoperative (Acceptable Means of Compliance and Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.121 and JAR (BB) 25.121
1 In showing compliance with JAR 25.121 and JAR(BB) 25.121 it is accepted that bank angles of up to
2º to 3º toward the operating engine(s) may be used.
2 The height references in JAR 25.121 and JAR (BB) 25.121 should be interpreted as geometrical heights.
[ ACJ 25.121(a)(1)
Climb: One-engine-inoperative (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.121(a)(1)
A 'power operating condition' more critical than that existing at the time when retraction of the landing gear is
begun would occur, for example, if water injection were discontinued prior to reaching the point at which the
landing gear is fully retracted.]
[ACJ 25.121(b)(1)
Climb: One-engine-inoperative (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.121(b)(1)
A 'power operating condition' more critical than that existing at the time the landing gear is fully retracted would
occur, for example, if water injection were discontinued prior to reaching a gross height of 400 ft. ]
[ACJ 25.123
En route Flight Paths (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.123
If, in showing compliance with JAR 25.123, any credit is to be taken for the progressive use of fuel by the
operating engines, the fuel flow rate should be assumed to be 80% of the engine specification flow rate at
maximum continuous power, unless a more appropriate figure has been substantiated by flight tests]
ACJ 25.125(a)(3)
Change of Configuration (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.125(a)(3)
No changes in configuration, addition of thrust, or nose depression should be made after reaching 50 ft height .
[ ACJ 25.125(a)(6)
Landing (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.125(a)(6) and JAR (BB) 25.125(a)(6)
1 During measured landings, if the brakes can be consistently applied in a manner permitting the nose
gear to touch down safely, the brakes may be applied with only the main wheels firmly on the ground. Other-
wise, the brakes should not be applied until all wheels are firmly on the ground.
2 This is not intended to prevent operation in the normal way of automatic braking systems which, for
instance, permit brakes to be selected on before touchdown. ]
[ ACJ 25.125(a)(6)(ii)
Landing (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.125(a)(6)(ii) and JAR(BB) 25.125(a)(6)(ii)
To ensure compliance with JAR 25.125(a)(6)(ii) and JAR(BB) 25.125(a)(6)(ii), a series of six measured landings
should be conducted on the same set of wheel brakes and tyres. ]
ACJ 25.125(b)
Reference Landing Distance (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.125(b)
1 Conditions at Threshold
Air Speed Equal to the Maximum Threshold Speed determined in accordance with
JAR 25.125(c)(3).
Height Not less than 30 feet.
Power See (g)
Gradient of Descent Not greater than 5%.
2 Flare. The nose of the aeroplane should not be depressed between the commencement of the landing
manoeuvre and the completion of the flare-out. The acceleration normal to the flight path during the flare-out
and rate of change of this acceleration should not exceed those associated with a normal smooth operational
landing.
3 Touchdown Technique
3.1 The touchdown should be made at a time after passing the 30 feet Height Point of not less than:—
where VTMAX is the Maximum Threshold Speed in knots, appropriate to the number of operating engines.
3.2 The touchdown, while it may be definite, should not be made with excessive acceleration normal to the
flight path.
4 Wing-flaps
4.1 Airborne Portion of the Reference Landing Distance. The wing-flaps should be in the Landing Setting.
4.2 Groundborne Portion of the Reference Landing Distance. The Wing-flap Setting may be changed from
that used for the airborne portion of the Reference Landing Distance, provided that such a practice can be
established as a satisfactory normal operational procedure. Such a change of Wing-flap Setting should not be
initiated sooner than 3 seconds after the completion of any previous actions.
[6] Power
[ 6.1] In demonstrating the Reference Landing Distance, one engine inoperative, the condition of the
inoperative engine should be consistent with correct action having been taken to deal with the occurrence of
fire in the zone(s) related to that engine.
6.2 The power should not be reduced until the aeroplane has descended to a height of 30 ft. Until the
aeroplane has descended to this height the operating engines should be developing the power which, at a steady
approach speed enabling the achievement of the threshold conditions of 1 will maintain a steady gradient of
descent of 5%.
6.3 Until the aeroplane is on the ground, power should not be reduced below the Flight Idling Power
Conditions.
6.4 If power is used to provide reverse thrust it should be within any limitations on its use for this purpose.
7 Cooling Gills. Cooling gills on the operating engines should be in the position used for showing
compliance with the landing climb requirement of JAR 25.119.
8 Wheel Brakes
[ 8.1 During measured landings, if the brakes can be consistently applied in a manner permitting the nose
gear to touch down safely, the brakes may be applied with only the main wheels firmly on the ground. This is
not intended to prevent operation in the normal way of automatic braking systems which, for instance, permit
brakes to be selected on before touchdown.]
8.2 If an anti-skid device is fitted, full credit for its use subject to compliance with 9.1 may be taken.
8.3 If no anti-skid device is fitted, the allowance to be made for any difference between the ability to use
the brakes to the best advantage in test and in operational conditions should be agreed. It is intended that the
amount of braking to be assumed should be that associated with a pilot of average skill.
[ 8.4 Brakes should not be used so as to cause excessive wear of the brakes and tyres.
9 Special Devices for Deceleration. Special devices for deceleration (e.g. reverse thrust installations, lift
spoilers, ground fine and reverse pitch propellers) may be used when determining the Reference Landing Distance
provided that they are used after touchdown, and:
b. are either brought into operation automatically or are not initiated into operation until 3 seconds after
the aeroplane has touched down; except that where limited use of a device is permitted while airborne a delay of
1 second after touchdown may be assumed if the device is controlled by means of the main power controls, and
it has been demonstrated that no hazardous characteristics result when the device is selected 'fully on' 3 seconds
before touchdown,
c. are only used asymmetrically if the handling characteristics of the aeroplane when the devices are so
used are not appreciably worse than when they are used symmetrically.
11 Methods of Derivation. The Reference Landing Distance should be determined from measurements of
actual landings with all power-units operating and one power-unit inoperative. The Reference Landing Distance
may be derived from separate measurements of the airborne distance (see 12) and the groundborne distance
(see 13), provided that, in order to ensure that correct allowance has been made for the effect on total landing
distance of touchdown technique and subsequent delay periods, sufficient of the airborne distance prior to
touchdown is recorded in the measurement of the groundborne distance, so that the overlap of airborne and
groundborne data will permit their proper co-ordination.
[ 12 ] Airborne Distance. Measured airborne distances may be corrected (before averaging the results from a
group of runs) for errors of threshold height and speed from those specified in 1 so long as the errors do not result
in appreciable change in the contribution of ground effect.
[ 13 ] Groundborne Distance. In the derivation of the groundborne distance on the Reference Wet Hard Surface,
direct-measurement should be made on a suitably wetted surface with appropriate correction of the distances to allow
for the difference between the wheel brake contribution to retardation achieved on the test surface and that which
would be achieved on the Reference Wet Hard Surface. (See also ACJ 25.101(i).)
[ 14.1 ] The contribution of wheel brakes to the total retardation during the groundborne portion of the Reference
Landing Distance may be determined by means of additional test runs in which wheel brakes are inoperative and
other means of retardation are operated in the manner used for establishing the corresponding Reference Landing
Distance. The difference in retardation at a given speed in the braked and unbraked runs should then be assumed
to be the contribution of the wheel brakes.
[ 14.2 ] Suitable instrumentation may be fitted to the landing gear to enable the measurement of the contribution
of the wheel brakes to the total retardation during the measurement of the groundborne portion of the landing;
[ 15 ] Contribution of Reverse Thrust. The contribution of reverse thrust to the total retardation during the
Reference Landing Distance may be determined by means of additional tests in which, with wheel braking not used,
runs are made with and without reverse thrust. The difference in retardation at a given speed in the runs with and
without reverse thrust should then be assumed to be the contribution of reverse thrust, allowance having been
made for the effect of the residual thrust of the engines in the runs without reverse thrust.
[ 16 ] Field Length Factors. The Field Length Factors specified should be established using the value of
CDG/CDA determined in accordance with this paragraph. These factors may be taken as the Field Length Factors
applicable to the whole range of conditions for which Landing Field Length data are scheduled.
[ 16.1 ] Conditions
b. aeroplane weight equal to the Maximum Landing Weight appropriate to the Altitude and Temperature,
c. still air,
[ 16.2 ] Effective Airborne/Drag Weight Ratio. The Effective Airborne Drag/Weight Ratio, represented by
DA/W, should be calculated as follows:—
where, for the case considered (e.g. all engines operating, one engine inoperative),
SA .. ft .. is the length of that portion of the Reference Landing Distance, during which the
aeroplane is airborne.
VTD .. ft/sec .. is the touchdown speed used in determining the Reference Landing Distance.
[ 16.3 ] Effective Groundborne Aerodynamic Drag/Weight Ratio. The Effective Groundbome Aerodynamic
Drag/Weight Ratio, represented by DG/W, at any speed should be the total drag of the aeroplane during the
ground roll (in which the same technique as the reference landing technique is employed except that the wheel
brakes remain inoperative), divided by the weight of the aeroplane. DG/W may be derived from the tests specified
in 13, 14 and 15. The value of DG/W to be used should be that determined at 65% of the reference touchdown
speed (see JAR 25.125(c) (6)).
[ 16.4 ] Ratio of Effective Groundborne and Airborne Aerodynamic Drag Coefficients. The Ratio of Effective
Groundborne and Airborne Aerodynamic Drag Coefficients, represented by CDG/CDA should be determined as
follows:—
ACJ 25X131
Abandoned Take-off on a Very Low Friction Surface (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25X131
The information required by JAR 25X131, on the latest point recommended for decision to abandon a take-off
in conditions of a very low braking coefficient of friction, should be such that the Accelerate-Stop Distance (for
a runway surface the braking coefficient of which does not exceed 0.05, and using all available means of
retardation) will not exceed the available runway plus stopway distance. In addition data should be provided,
based on the use of 50% of full reverse thrust on all engines. It is acceptable to determine these distances by
estimation.
[ ACJ 25X132
Take-off on Runways Covered with Significant Depth of Precipitation (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25X132
a. The information required by JAR 25X132(a), on the latest point recommended for a decision to abandon
a take-off on runways covered with 3 mm or more of precipitation, where such an operation is approved, should
be such that the Accelerate-Stop Distance (for a runway surface the braking co-efficient of which does not exceed
0.05 and using all available means of retardation) will not exceed the available runway plus stopway distance.
The precipitation drag should be incorporated into the accelerating portion and may be incorporated into the
stopping portion of the accelerate-stop distance. In addition, data should be provided, based on the use of 50%
of full reverse thrust on all engines. It is acceptable to determine these data by estimation but see ACJ 25.113(a)(3).
b. The information required by JAR 25X132(b), on the earliest point for a decision to continue a take-off
with engine failure on a runway covered with 3 mm or more of precipitation should be such that lift-off is achieved
within the length of the runway and a height of at least 15 feet is achieved within the length of the runway plus the
length of any clearway. In determining these data, due account should .be taken of controllability on the ground.
It is acceptable to determine these data by estimation but see ACJ 25.113(a)(3). Information on recommended
flight techniques should be based on best available information. ]
ACJ 25X133
Take-off from a Wet Runway (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25X133
The information required by JAR 25X133 should be presented in a simple form and should include the following:—
a. the lowest value of V1 at which controllability by primary aerodynamic controls alone has been shown
to be adequate (see JAR 25.107(a)).
b. the lowest value of V1 consistent with the attainment of a height of at least 15 feet at the end of the
take-off distance specified in JAR 25.113(a).
c. the lowest value of V1 consistent with lifting off within the take-off run specified in JAR 25.113(b), and
d. the highest value of V1 consistent with the aeroplane being stopped on a wet runway within the accelerate-
stop distance specified in JAR 25.109(a) except that reverse thrust can be used if recommended operational
procedures assume its use on a wet runway:—
ACJ 25X135
Landing on a Very Low Friction Surface (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25X135
1 The information required by JAR 25X135 should be the landing distance determined in accordance
with JAR 25.125(a) but corrected to a runway surface with a braking co-efficient of friction of 0.05. All engines
should be operating and all means of retardation may be used. In addition, data should be provided giving the
effect on the low friction landing distance:—
a. of using less than full reverse thrust (i.e. using as little as 50% of full reverse thrust on all engines) and
b. of passing through the screen height at a speed in excess of the target speed; exceedences of up to
10 knots should be covered.
2 It is acceptable to determine these distances by estimation. Where approval for operations on runways
covered with 3 mm or more of precipitation is sought, precipitation drag should not be incorporated into the
landing distance estimates.
3 It is not intended that any testing should necessarily be conducted to evaluate the aeroplane's
controllability during a landing on a very slippery surface. However, where such testing has not been carried out
this should be stated, and where it has been carried out, any limiting factors found should be stated.
In showing compliance with the requirements of JAR 25.143(a) and (b) account should be taken of aeroelastic
effects and structural dynamics (including aeroplane response to rough runways and water waves) which may
influence the aeroplane handling qualities in flight and on the surface. The oscillation characteristics of the
flightdeck, in likely atmospheric conditions, should be such that there is no reduction in ability to control and
manoeuvre the aeroplane safely.
ACJ 25.143(b)(1)
Control Following Engine Failure (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.143(b)(1)
a. At each take-off flap setting at the lowest speed recommended for initial steady climb with all engines
operating after take-off, with:
i. all engines, prior to the critical engine becoming inoperative, at maximum take-off power or thrust;
i. all engines, prior to the critical engine become inoperative, at maximum continuous power or thrust;
2 The demonstrations should be made with simulated engine failure occurring during straight flight with
wings level. In order to allow for likely delay in the initiation of recovery action, no action to recover the
aeroplane should be taken for 2 seconds following engine failure. The recovery action should not necessitate
movement of the engine, propeller or trimming controls, nor require excessive control forces. The aeroplane
will be considered to have reached an unacceptable attitude if a bank angle of 45° is exceeded during recovery.
ACJ 25.143(c)
Controllability and Manoeuvrability (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.143(c)
[1 The maximum forces given in the table in JAR 25.143(c) for pitch and roll control for temporary
application are applicable to manoeuvres in which the control force is only needed for a short period. Where the
manoeuvre is such that the pilot will need to use one hand to operate other controls (such as the landing flare, or
changes of configuration or power which result in a change of control force which must be trimmed out) the
single-handed maximum control forces will be applicable. In other cases (such as take-off rotation, or manoeuvring
during en-route flight) the two-handed maximum forces will apply.
2 The maximum forces for prolonged application are intended to apply to periods in excess of approximately
10 minutes. For periods shorter than 10 minutes, reasonable interpolation between the 'temporary' and
'prolonged' forces will be permitted.
3 These maximum forces apply under probable operating conditions (see JAR 25.143(b)). In the event of
failure conditions which are assessed as Improbable (see ACJ No. 1 to JAR 25.1309) greater forces may be
acceptable. ]
ACJ 25.143(f)
Controllability and Manoeuvrability (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.143(f)
Load factors which require stick force greater than 150 lb or at which the aeroplane will be subject to severe
buffeting, need not be considered in applying this requirement.
ACJ 25.145(b)(2)
Longitudinal Control (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.145(b)(2)
Where high lift devices are being retracted and where large and rapid changes in maximum lift occur as a result of
movement of high-lift devices, some reduction in the margin above the stall may be accepted.
[ ACJ 25.145(d)
Longitudinal Control – Take-off Climb (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.145(d)
An acceptable method of demonstrating compliance with the requirement of JAR 25.145(d) would be to
demonstrate that the speeds used to show compliance with JAR 25.121(b) and (c) and JAR 25.111 (c)(3) are not
less than 1.08 times the respective speeds at which stall warning first occurs under the same conditions of
configuration and power. This may be demonstrated in still air and with a slow reduction of speed until stall
warning is encountered. Where natural pre-stall buffeting is followed at a lower speed by artificial stall warning
which satisfies the requirements of JAR 25.207, the natural buffeting should, nevertheless be considered to
constitute stall warning for the purposes of this requirement if it is of such an intensity as to make it likely that a
pilot would take action to increase speed. ]
ACJ 25.147(c)(2)
Lateral Control; One Engine Inoperative (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.147(c)(2)
It should be possible in the conditions specified below to roll the aeroplane from a steady 30° banked turn
through an angle of 60° so as to reverse the direction of the turn in not more than 11 seconds. In this demonstration
the rudder may be used to the extent necessary to minimise sideslip. The demonstration should be made rolling
the aeroplane in either direction, and the manoeuvre may be unchecked.
Power. The critical engine inoperative and its propeller (if applicable) in the minimum drag
condition; the remaining engines operating at maximum take-off power.
Trim. The aeroplane should be in trim, or as nearly as possible in trim, for straight flight in these
conditions, and the trimming controls should not be moved during the manoeuvre.
ACJ 25.147(e)
Lateral Control; All Engines Operating (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.147(e)
An acceptable method of demonstrating that roll response and peak roll rates are adequate for compliance with
JAR 25.147(e) is as follows:
It should be possible in the conditions specified below to roll the aeroplane from a steady 30° banked turn through
an angle of 60° so as to reverse the direction of the turn in not more than 7 seconds. In these demonstrations the
rudder may be used to the extent necessary to minimise sideslip. The demonstrations should be made rolling the
aeroplane in either direction, and the manoeuvres may be unchecked.
Conditions:
(a) En-route: Airspeed. All speeds between the minimum value of the scheduled all-engines-operating
climb speed and VMO/MMO.
Power. All engines operating at all powers from flight idle up to maximum continuous
power.
Trim. The aeroplane should be in trim from straight flight in these conditions, and the
trimming controls should not be moved during the manoeuvre.
(b) Approach: Airspeed. Either the speed maintained down to the 50 ft height in compliance with
JAR 25.125(a)(2), or the target threshold speed determined in accordance with JAR
25.125(c)(2)(i) as appropriate to the method of landing distance determination used.
Power. All engines operating at the power required to give a gradient of descent of 5.0%.
Trim. The aeroplane should be in trim for straight flight in these conditions, and the
trimming controls should not be moved during the manoeuvre.
[ ACJ 25.149
Minimum Control Speeds (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.149 and JAR (BB) 25.149
1 The determination of the minimum control speed, VMC, and the variation of VMC with available thrust,
may be made primarily by means of ‘static' testing, in which the speed of the aeroplane is slowly reduced, with
the thrust asymmetry already established, until the speed is reached at which straight flight can no longer be
maintained. A small number of 'dynamic' tests, in which sudden failure of the critical engine is simulated, should
be made in order to check that the VMC's determined by the static method are valid.
2 When minimum control speed data are expanded for the determination of minimum control speeds
(including VMC, VMCG and VMCL) for all ambient conditions, these speeds should be based on the maximum
values of thrust which can reasonably be expected from a production engine in service. The minimum control
speeds should not be based on specification thrust, since this thrust represents the minimum thrust as guaranteed
by the manufacturer, and the resulting speeds would be unconservative for most cases. ]
ACJ 25.149(e)
Minimum Control Speed (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.149(e) and JAR (BB) 25.149(e)
1 The effect of cross-winds on VMCG should be established. This may be achieved by means of computations
based on data obtained by wind tunnel testing, supplemented by data obtained from a limited amount of flight
testing in moderate cross-winds.
2 When carrying out tests for the determination of VMCG the pilot conducting the tests should recognise
engine failure by external reference only and not by reference to the engine instruments. The pilot conducting the
tests should not be aware of which engine is to be made inoperative, nor of the precise speed at which this is to
occur.
ACJ 25.173(c)
Static Longitudinal Stability (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.173(c)
The average gradient is taken over each half of the speed range between 0.85 and 1.15 V trim.
[ ACJ 25.177(b)
Static Lateral Stability (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.177(b) and JAR(BB) 25.177(b)
1 For speeds between 1.2 VS1 and 1.3 VS1 for wing-flap positions more extended than the most extended
take-off wing-flap setting, the symmetric power used during demonstrations need not exceed the power required
for level flight in the conditions (speed and configuration) in which the demonstration is made.
2 Demonstration of compliance with JAR 25.177(b) or JAR(BB) 25.177(b) should be made from side-
slip angles appropriate to the operation of the aeroplane. Sideslip angles corresponding to half rudder deflection
would normally be considered appropriate for this purpose.
3 The requirement is concerned with the short-term response of the aeroplane, and long term effects, due
to factors such as fuel movement, need not be taken into account. If the initial response of the aeroplane on
releasing the aileron control is neutral this will be acceptable, even though the response gradually becomes
unstable in the longer term. ]
ACJ 25.177(c)
Static Directional and Lateral Stability (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.177(c)
For the range of sideslip angles appropriate to the operation of the aeroplane the speed range covered should be
as specified in JAR 25.177(a). For greater angles the tests should cover all permitted or scheduled operational
speeds, configurations and associated power settings.
ACJ 25.181
Dynamic Stability (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.181 and JAR(BB) 25.181
The requirements of JAR 25.181 are applicable at all speeds between the stalling speed and VFE, VLE or VFC/
MFC, as appropriate.
The power for all power-on stall demonstrations is that power necessary to maintain level flight at a speed of
1.6 Vs1 at maximum landing weight, with flaps in the approach position and landing gear retracted, where Vs1
is the stall speed in the same conditions (except with idle power). The flap position to be used to determine this
power setting is that position in which the stall speed does not exceed 110% of the stall speed with the flaps in the
most extended landing position. ]
Stall demonstrations for compliance with JAR 25.201 should include demonstrations with deceleration devices
deployed for all flap positions unless limitations against use of the devices with particular flap positions are
imposed. 'Deceleration devices' include spoilers when used as air brakes, and thrust reversers when use in flight is
permitted. Stall demonstrations with deceleration devices deployed should normally be carried out with power
off, except where deployment of the deceleration devices while power is applied is likely to occur in normal
operations (e.g. use of extended air brakes during landing approach). ]
a. Establish the aeroplane in a 30° banked turn at a speed between 1.3 Vs and 1.4 Vs.
c. At a speed between 1.3 Vs and the speed at which stall warning commences, increase the rate of change
of angle of attack so that the stall occurs at a normal acceleration of between 1.3 g and 1.5 g. Maintain the
increased rate of change of angle of attack until the stall occurs.
[1 ] The behaviour of the aeroplane includes the behaviour as affected by the normal functioning of any
systems with which the aeroplane is equipped, including devices intended to alter the stalling characteristics of the
aeroplane.
[2 Unless the design of the automatic flight control system of the aeroplane protects against such an event,
the stalling characteristics and adequacy of stall warning, when the aeroplane is stalled under the control of the
automatic flight control system, should be investigated. (See also JAR 25.1329 (f).) ]
ACJ 25.203
Stall Characteristics (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.203
[1 Static Longitudinal Stability during the Approach to the Stall During the approach to the stall the
longitudinal control pull force should increase continuously as speed is reduced from the trimmed speed to
approximately 1.1 Vs. At speeds below 1.1 Vs some reduction in longitudinal control pull force will be
acceptable provided that it is not sudden or excessive.
2.1 In level wing stalls the bank angle may exceed 20° occasionally, provided that lateral control is
effective during recovery.
2.2 For stalls from a 30° banked turn with an entry rate of 1 knot per second, the maximum bank angle
which occurs during the recovery should not exceed approximately 60° in the original direction of the turn,
or 30° in the opposite direction.
2.3 For dynamic stalls the maximum bank angle which occurs during the recovery should not exceed
approximately 90° in the original direction of the turn, or 60° in the opposite direction.
3 Deep Stall Penetration Where the results of wind tunnel tests reveal a risk of a catastrophic phenomenon
(e.g. superstall, a condition at angles beyond the stalling incidence from which it proves difficult or impossible to
recover the aeroplane), studies should be made to show that adequate recovery control is available at and
sufficiently beyond the stalling incidence to avoid such a phenomenon. ]
[1 A warning which is clear and distinctive to the pilot is one which cannot be misinterpreted or mistaken
for any other warning, and which, without being unduly alarming, impresses itself upon the pilot and captures his
attention regardless of what other tasks and activities are occupying his attention and commanding his
concentration. Where stall warning is to be provided by artificial means, a stick shaker device producing both a
tactile and an audible warning is an Acceptable Means of Compliance. ]
2 Where stall warning is provided by means of a device, compliance with the requirement of JAR 25.21(e)
should be established by ensuring that the device has a high degree of reliability. One means of complying with this
criterion is to provide dual independent systems.
1.1 JAR 25.251 (e) states that probable inadvertent excursions beyond the buffet onset boundary may not
result in unsafe conditions.
1.2 An acceptable means of compliance with this requirement is to demonstrate by means of flight tests
beyond the buffet onset boundary that hazardous conditions will not be encountered within the permitted
manoeuvring envelope (as defined by JAR 25.337) without adequate prior warning being given by severe
buffeting or high stick forces.
1.3 Buffet onset is the lowest level of buffet intensity consistently apparent to the flight crew during normal
acceleration demonstrations in smooth air conditions.
1.4 In flight tests beyond the buffet onset boundary to satisfy paragraph 1.2, the load factor should be
increased until either:–
a. the level of buffet becomes sufficient to provide an obvious warning to the pilot which is a strong
deterrent to further application of load factor; or
b. further increase of load factor requires a stick force in excess of 100 pounds, or is impossible because of
the limitations of the control system or
c. the positive limit manoeuvring load factor established in compliance with JAR 25.337 (b) is achieved.
1.5 Within the range of load factors defined in paragraph 1.4 no hazardous conditions (such as hazardous
involuntary changes of pitch or roll attitude, engine or systems malfunctioning which require urgent corrective
action by the flight crew, or difficulty in reading the instruments or controlling the aeroplane) should be encountered.
2.1 JAR 25.251 (e) requires that the envelopes of load factor, speed, altitude and weight must provide a
sufficient range of speeds and load factors for normal operations.
2.2 An acceptable means of compliance with the requirement is to establish the maximum altitude at which
it is possible to achieve a positive normal acceleration increment of 0.3 g without exceeding the buffet onset
boundary. See also ACJ 25.1585(c). ]
ACJ 25.253(a)(3)
Lateral Control at Speeds in Excess of VMO/MMO (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.253(a)(3)
An acceptable method of demonstrating that roll capability is adequate to assure prompt recovery from a laterally
upset condition is as follows:
It should be possible using lateral control alone to roll the aeroplane from a steady 20º banked turn through an
angle of 40º so as to reverse the direction of the turn in not more than 8 seconds. The demonstration should be
made rolling the aeroplane in either direction in the conditions specified below. The manoeuvres may be unchecked.
Conditions: Air Speed. All speeds from VMO/MMO to a speed close to VDF/MDF but limited to the extent
necessary to accomplish the manoeuvre and recovery without exceeding VDF/MDF.
Power (i) All engines operating at the power required to maintain level flight at VMO/MMO,
except that maximum continuous power need not be exceeded; and
Trim. The aeroplane trimmed for straight flight at VMO/MMO. The trimming controls should
not be moved during the manoeuvre.
In addition it should be demonstrated that use of rudder in the conventional sense, if it results in an adverse effect
on roll rate, will not result in a dangerous reduction in lateral control capability.
ACJ 25.253(a)(5)
High Speed Characteristics (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.263(a) (5)
1.1 A load factor should be regarded as excessive if it exceeds 2.0 with stick free.
1.2 A nose-down pitching moment should be regarded as small if it necessitates a stick-force of less than
20 lb to maintain 1g flight.
1.3 Compliance with the requirements of JAR 25.253(a)(5) should be demonstrated at speeds up to a speed
close to VDF/MDF but limited to the extent necessary to accomplish the manoeuvre and recovery without
exceeding VDF/MDF.
ACJ 25.255
Out-of-trim Characteristics (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.255 and JAR (BB) 25.255
1.1 The equivalent degree of trim, specified in JAR 25.255(a) (1) for aeroplanes which do not have a power-
operated longitudinal trim system, has not been specified in quantitative terms, and the particular characteristics
of each type of aeroplane must be considered. The intent of the requirement is that a reasonable amount of out-
of-trim should be investigated, such as might occasionally be applied by a pilot.
1.2 In establishing the maximum mistrim that can be sustained by the autopilot the normal operation of the
autopilot and associated systems should be taken into consideration. Where the autopilot is equipped with an
auto-trim function the amount of mistrim which can be sustained will generally be small or zero. If there is no
auto-trim function consideration should be given to the maximum amount of out-of-trim which can be sustained
by the elevator servo without causing autopilot disconnect.
2.1 For showing compliance with JAR 25.255(b)(1) for speeds up to VMO/MMO, the datum trim setting
should be the trim setting required for trimmed flight at the particular speed at which the demonstration is to be
made.
2.2 For showing compliance with JAR 25.255(b)(1) for speeds from VMO/MMO to VFC/MFC ,and for
showing compliance with JAR 25.255(b) (2) and (f), the datum trim setting should be the trim setting required
for trimmed flight at VMO/MMO.
3.1 JAR 25.255(b) (2) requires that the direction of the primary longitudinal control force may not reverse
when the normal acceleration is varied, from +1 g to the positive and negative values specified, at speeds above
VFC/MFC. The intent of the requirement is that it is permissible that there is a value of g for which the stick
force is zero, provided that the stick force versus g curve has a positive slope at that point (see Figure 1).
FIGURE 1 ]
[ 3.2 If stick force characteristics are marginally acceptable, it is desirable that there should be no reversal of
normal control sensing, i.e. an aft movement of the control column should produce an aircraft motion in the nose-
up direction and a change in aircraft load factor in the positive direction, and a forward movement of the control
column should change the aircraft load factor in the negative direction.
3.3 It is further intended that reversals of direction of stick force with negative stick-force gradients should
not be permitted in any mistrim condition within the specified range of mistrim. If test results indicate that the
curves of stick force versus normal acceleration with the maximum required mistrim have a negative gradient of
speeds above VFC/MFC then additional tests may be necessary. The additional tests should verify that the
curves of stick force versus load factor with mistrim less than the maximum required do not unacceptably reverse,
as illustrated in the upper curve of Figure 2. Control force characteristics as shown in Figure 3, may be considered
acceptable, provided that the control sensing does not reverse (see paragraph 3.2).
FIGURE 2 FIGURE 3
4 Probable Inadvertent Excursions beyond the Boundaries of the Buffet Onset Envelopes. JAR 25.255(e)
states that manoeuvring load factors associated with probable inadvertent excursions beyond the boundaries of
the buffet onset envelopes determined under JAR 25.251(e) need not be exceeded. It is intended that tests flights
need not be continued beyond a level of buffet which is sufficiently severe that a pilot would be reluctant to
apply any further increase in load factor.
5.1 JAR 25.255(f) requires the ability to produce at least 1.5 g for recovery from an overspeed condition of
VDF /MDF, using either the primary longitudinal control alone or the primary longitudinal control and the
longitudinal trim system. Although the longitudinal trim system may be used to assist in producing the required
normal acceleration, it is not acceptable for recovery to be completely dependent upon the use of this system.
It should be possible to produce 1.2 g by applying not more than 125 pounds of longitudinal control force using
the primary longitudinal control alone.
5.2 Recovery capability is generally critical at altitudes where airspeed (VDF) is limiting. If at higher altitudes
(on the MDF boundary) the manoeuvre capability is limited by buffeting of such an intensity that it is a strong
deterrent to further increase in normal acceleration, some reduction of manoeuvre capability will be acceptable,
provided that it does not reduce to below 1.3 g. The entry speed for flight test demonstrations of compliance
with this requirement should be limited to the extent necessary to accomplish a recovery without exceeding
VDF/MDF, and the normal acceleration should be measured as near to VDF/MDF as is practical. ]
ACJ 25X261
Flight in Rough Air (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25X261.
The procedures should give the maximum protection against loss of control and against structural damage occurring
either directly as the result of turbulence or occurring in the recovery from any disturbance of the flight path. The
procedures should, where necessary, distinguish also between the procedure to be followed when deliberately entering
an area of known turbulence and that to be followed when the encounter is unexpected.
[ ACJ ― SUBPART BB
ACJ(BB) 25.101(f)
Engine Operating Conditions (Interpretative Material)
See JAR (BB) 25.101(f)
In showing compliance with JAR(BB) 25.101(f) the applicant should establish for each relevant flight phase, operating
procedures, including operating limitations and engine control settings, for the selection of each of the following engine
operating conditions:–
a. Emergency take-off engine operating condition, which does not exceed the limitations established in JAR–E
for maximum contingency power or thrust, where applicable, or maximum take-off power or thrust.
b. Normal take-off engine operating condition, which does not exceed the limitations established in JAR–E
for maximum take-off power or thrust.
c. Emergency continuous engine operating condition, which does not exceed the limitations established in
JAR–E for intermediate contingency power or thrust, where applicable, or maximum continuous power or thrust.
d. Normal continuous engine operating condition, which does not exceed the limitations established in JAR–E
for maximum continuous power or thrust.
ACJ(BB) 25.101(k)
Automatic Take-off Thrust Control Systems (ATTCS) (Interpretative Material)
See JAR(BB) 25.101(k)
1 An Automatic Take-off Thrust Control System (ATTCS) is defined as a system which automatically increases
thrust on each operating engine following an engine failure on take-off. For the purpose of these requirements, an
ATTCS includes all elements of equipment necessary for the control and performance of each intended function
including the engine control system and all devices, both mechanical, and electrical that sense engine failure, transmit
signals, actuate fuel controls to increase thrust on operating engines, and furnish cockpit information on system
operation.
2 The Authority may limit the performance credit allowed for the use of the automatic system based on
consideration of the following factors:–
a. The degree of reliability of the automatic system, as demonstrated by analysis and/or tests;
b. The difference between the performance with the automatic system functioning as designed and the
performance with manual control after failure of the automatic system, taking into account the time required for the
pilot to recognise, in accordance with JAR(BB) 25.101(h)(3), the failure of the automatic system and to use the means
required by JAR 25.1143(f)(2);
c. The margins provided in the performance requirements for expected variation in performance.
3. The target level of safety implicit in the performance requirements assumes a reliability of the ATTCS of at
least 10-4. A reliability of 10-3, for example, would limit performance credit.
ACJ(BB) 25.109
Accelerate-Stop: Pilot Time Delay (Interpretative Material)
See JAR(BB) 25.109
The time delay before action is assumed to be taken to disengage any automatic take-off thrust control system (ATTCS)
with which the aeroplane is equipped, should be in accordance with ACJ 25.101(h)(3).
ACJ(BB) 25.121(a)(1)
Climb: One Engine Inoperative (Interpretative Material)
See JAR(BB) 25.121(a)(1)
The requirement of JAR(BB) 25.121(a)(1) has the effect of allowing credit for an increased thrust level only if achieved
automatically.
[ ACJ(BB) 25.123
En-route Flight Paths (Interpretative Material)
See JAR(BB) 25.123
If, in showing compliance with JAR(BB) 25.123, any credit is to be taken for the progressive use of fuel by the
operating engines, the fuel flow rate should be assumed to be 80% of the engine specification flow rate at
emergency continuous engine operating condition, unless a more appropriate figure has been substantiated by
flight tests. ]
ACJ(BB) 25.145(d)
Longitudinal Control — Take-off Climb (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR(BB) 25.145(d)
An acceptable method of demonstrating compliance with the requirement of JAR(BB) 25.145(d) would be to
demonstrate that the speeds used to show compliance with JAR(BB) 25.121(b) and (c) and JAR(BB) 25.111(a)(5)
are not less than 1.08 times the respective speeds at which stall warning first occurs under the same conditions of
configuration and power. This may be demonstrated in still air and with a slow reduction of speed until stall warning
is encountered. Where natural pre-stall buffeting is followed at a lower speed by artificial stall warning which satisfies
the requirements of JAR(BB) 25.207, the natural buffeting should, nevertheless, be considered to constitute stall
warning for the purposes of this requirement if it is of such an intensity as to make it likely that a pilot would take
action to increase speed.
ACJ(BB) 25.147(c)(2)
Lateral Control; One Engine Inoperative (Interpretative Material)
See JAR(BB) 25.147(c)(2)
It should be possible in the conditions specified below to roll the aeroplane from a steady 30º banked turn through an
angle of 60º so as to reverse the direction of the turn in not more than 11 seconds. In this demonstration the rudder
may be used to the extent necessary to minimise sideslip. The demonstration should be made rolling the aeroplane in
either direction, and the manoeuvre may be unchecked.
Conditions: Airspeed. V2
Power. The critical engine inoperative and its propeller (if applicable) in the minimum drag
condition; the remaining engines operating in the emergency take-off engine operating condition.
Trim. The aeroplane should be in trim, or as nearly as possible in trim, for straight flight in these
conditions, and the trimming controls should not be moved during the manoeuvre.
Change 10 2–BB–2–2
SECTION 2 JAR–25
ACJ – SUBPART C
ACJ 25.301(b)
Loads (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.301(b) and JAR 25.361(d)
The engine and its mounting structure are to be stressed to the loading cases for the aeroplane as a whole,
including manoeuvring and gust loading conditions, together with conservative estimates of torque thrust,
gyroscopic loading and any loading which may result from engine fans. Full allowance should be made
for structural flexibility effects in landing cases. This also applies to auxiliary power units.
ACJ 25.305(d)
Strength and Deformation (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.305(d)
1 General. When effects of dynamic response to turbulence are assessed by the continuous
turbulence method, the following criteria can be used. ]
2 Continuous Gust Design Criteria*. The gust loads criteria of this paragraph 2 should be applied to
mission analysis or design envelope analysis.
2.1 The limit gust loads utilizing the continuous turbulence concept should be determined in accordance
with the provisions of either paragraph 2.2 or paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4. For components stressed by both
vertical and lateral components of turbulence, the resultant combined stress should be considered. The
combined stress may be determined on the assumption that vertical and lateral components are uncorrelated.
2.2 Design Envelope Analysis. The limit loads should be determined in accordance with this
paragraph 2.2.
2.2.1 All critical altitudes, weights, and weight distributions, as specified in JAR 25.321(b)(1) to (b)(3),
and all critical speeds within the ranges indicated in paragraph 2.3, should be considered.
2.2.2 Values of Ā (ratio of root-mean-square incremental load to root-mean-square gust velocity) should
be determined by dynamic analysis. The power spectral density of the atmospheric turbulence should be as
given by the equation:–
where ―
2
Φ = power-spectral density, (m/s) /rad/m [(ft/s)2/rad/ft]
* See Technical Reference FAA-ADS-53 'Development of a Power Spectral Gust Design Procedure for civil Aircraft' and
Technical Report FAA-ADS-54 ‘Contributions to the Development of a Power Spectral Gust Design Procedure for Civil
Aircraft' for detailed information.
2.2.3 The limit loads should be obtained by multiplying the A values given by the dynamic analysis by the
following values of Uσ (true gust velocity).
a. At speed VC. Uσ = 25 m/s (85 ft/s) true gust velocity on the interval 0 to 9150 m (30,000 ft)
altitude and is linearly decreased to 9 m/s (30 ft/s) true at 24,400 m (80,000 ft) altitude.
d. At speeds between VB and VC, and between VC and VD. As given by linear interpolation.
2.2.4 When a stability augmentation system is included in the analysis, the effect of system non-linearities
on loads at the limit load level should be realistically or conservatively accounted for.
2.3 Mission analysis. Limit loads should be determined in accordance with this paragraph 2.3.
2.3.1 The expected utilization of the aeroplane should be represented by one or more flight profiles in
which the load distribution and the variation with time of speed, altitude, gross weight, and centre of
gravity position are defined. These profiles should be divided into mission segments, or blocks for analysis
and average or effective values of the pertinent parameters defined for each segment.
2.3.2 For each of the mission segments defined under paragraph 2.3.1 values of A and NO should be
determined by dynamic analysis. A is defined as the ratio of root-mean-square incremental load to root-mean-
square gust velocity and NO as the radius of gyration of the load power-spectral density function about zero
frequency. The power spectral density of the atmospheric turbulence should be given by the equation in
paragraph 2.2.2.
2.3.3 For each of the load and stress quantities selected, the frequency of exceedance should be determined
as a function of load level by means of the equation,
where –
2.3.4 The limit gust loads should be read from the frequency of exceedance curves at a frequency of
exceedance of 2x10–5exceedances per hour. Both positive and negative load directions should be considered
in determination of the limit loads.
2.3.5 If a stability augmentation system is utilized to reduce the gust loads, consideration should be given
to the fraction of flight time that the system may be inoperative. The flight profiles of paragraph 2.3.1
should include flight with the system inoperative for this fraction of the flight time. When a stability
augmentation system is included in the analysis, the effect of system non-linearities on loads at the limit
load level should be realistically or conservatively accounted for.
2.4 Supplementary Design Envelope Analysis. In addition to the limit loads defined by paragraph
2.3, limit loads should also be determined in accordance with paragraph 2.2, modified as follows:–
2.4.1 In paragraph 2.2.3 a. the values of Uσ = 25 m/s (85 ft/s), true is replaced by Uσ = 18 m/s
(60 ft/s), true on the interval 0 to 9150 m (30,000 ft) altitude and is linearly decreased to 7.5 m/s (25 ft/s)
true at 24 400 m (80,000 ft) altitude.
2.4.2 In paragraph 2.2, the reference to paragraphs 2.2.3 a. to 2.2.3 c. should be understood as referring
to the paragraph as modified by paragraph 2.4.
ACJ 25.307
Proof of Structure (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.307
In deciding the need for and the extent of testing including the load levels to be achieved the following
factors will be considered by the Authority.
a. The confidence which can be attached to the constructors overall experience in respect to certain
types of aeroplanes in designing, building and testing aeroplanes.
b. Whether the aeroplane in question is a new type or a development of an existing type having the
same basic structural design and having been previously tested, and how far static strength testing can be
extrapolated to allow for development of the particular type of aeroplane.
c. The importance and value of detail and/or component testing including representation of parts
of structure not being tested, and
d. The degree to which credit can be given for operating experience where it is a matter of importing
for the first time an old type of aeroplane which has not been tested.
The aeroplane being initially in balanced flight at n=1 at any speed between VA and VD, checked pitch
manoeuvres should be studied up to the proof factors (n1 and Og) the load factors being maximum values
obtained under transient conditions. It will be assumed that the manoeuvres meet the following description:
The elevator is moved rapidly in one direction then in the other to a position well beyond the original
position before returning to that position: η = ηo sin ωt, η being the control surface deflection angle and
ω being the circular frequency of the angular movement of the control surface, taken to be equal to the
undamped natural frequency of the short period rigid mode, but not being less than:
In general, it will only be necessary to analyse three quarters of the movement, assuming that the return
of the control is effected in a less sudden manner.
The speed of movement of the pitching control specified above whilst maintaining the maximum normal
acceleration to be achieved in the manoeuvre, may be adjusted to take into account limitations which may
be imposed by maximum pilot effort specified in paragraph JAR 25.397(b), control system stops and any
indirect effect imposed by limitations in the output side of the control system, such as stalling torque or
maximum rate obtainable by a power control system.
1 Atmospheric Variations
i. The effect of encounters with a substantially head-on draught, which should be assumed to act at the
most adverse angle between 30º above and 30º below the flight path, should be considered. The draught velocity
should be 50 ft/sec EAS at altitudes up to 20,000 ft; at altitudes above 20,000 ft the draught velocity may be
reduced linearly from 50 ft/sec at 20,000 ft to 25 ft/sec at 50,000 ft, above which altitude the draught velocity
should be considered constant. The draught should be assumed to build up in not more than 2 seconds and to
last for 30 seconds.
ii. The effect of encounters with major atmospheric phenomena (e.g. extreme wind shear associated with
jet-stream or active frontal conditions) should be considered. Where the aeroplane or performance is such that
these cases may be critical, detailed investigation of the effect of certain extremes of atmospheric variations may
be required. ]
ACJ 25.337(d)
Limit Manoeuvring Load Factors (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.337(d)
Limitations in control movement will not normally be accepted as a sufficient justification for reducing the
manoeuvring load factor.
The assumption on which this National Variant is based is that in the atmosphere positive and negative gusts
occur with the same frequency and amplitude. 'It has been assumed further that the safety factor of 1.5
contains a certain margin for the uncertainties in the strength calculation and material properties. The
remaining part of the factor 1.5 can be considered as a margin for gust loads in excess of the limit load.
This being so the ultimate gust load factors in negative direction should be sufficiently greater than the
negative gust load factors calculated according to JAR 25, in order to obtain in downward direction the
same safety level as in upward direction.
ACJ 25.341(b)
Gust Loads (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.341(b)
In showing compliance with JAR 25.341(b) the requirement of JAR 25.305(c) should be taken into account.
ACJ 25.341(c)
Gust Loads (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.341(c)
In showing compliance with JAR 25.341(c) the requirements of JAR 25.305(c) should be taken into account.
Compliance with JAR 25.341(b) and (c) may be demonstrated by analysis in which the effects of structural
flexibility are accounted for on a quasi-static basis (i.e. using aerodynamic derivatives and load distributions
corresponding to the distorted structure.
]
Compliance with (G) JAR 25.341(d) (United Kingdom) may be achieved by making the analysis as under
JAR 25.341(b) but including gradient distances each side of 25 c to establish the most unfavourable response
of the aeroplane. This investigation may take into account:- 2
a. evidence which may be brought to bear for comparison of comparable aeroplane designs having
statistically significant experience in a similar operational role and a proven safety record. In the absence of
such evidence the gust velocities may be based on 90% of those given in JAR 25.341(a);
b. a mission analysis, accounting for the effect of the flight profile taken in conjunction with a gust
velocity frequency distribution shown to be compatible with the gust velocities given in JAR 25.341(a) and
an acceptable limit load exceedance probability by agreement with the Authority. A realistic range of ]
expected operational usage should be covered; and
[ c. a variation of gust velocity with gradient distance on the basis of an agreed assessment of such variation
based on meteorological evidence.
NOTE: In the absence of better in formation, a variation of gust velocities proportional to the cube root of the gradient
distance would normally be approved. ]
For the purpose of JAR 25.345(c), 'en route' is taken to mean flight conditions other than:
[ACJ 25.351(b)]
Yawing Conditions (Interpretative Material)
[See JAR 25.351(b)]
[In showing compliance with JAR 25.351(b) the requirement of JAR 25.305(c) should be taken into account.]
Compliance with JAR 25.351(b) may be demonstrated by analysis in which the effects of structural ]
flexibility are accounted for on a quasi-static basis (i.e. using aerodynamic derivatives and load distributions
corresponding to the distorted structure).
ACJ 25.393(a)
Loads Parallel to Hinge Line (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.393(a)
The loads parallel to the hinge line on primary control surfaces and other movable surfaces, such as tabs, spoilers,
speedbrakes, flaps, slats and all-moving tailplanes, should take account of axial play between the surface and its
supporting structure in complying with JAR 25.393(a). For the rational analysis, the critical airframe acceleration
time history in the direction of the hinge line from all flight and ground design conditions (except the emergency
landing conditions of JAR 25.561) should be considered. The play assumed in the control surface supporting
structure, should include the maximum tolerable nominal play and the effects of wear. In showing compliance
with this paragraph it would be acceptable to assume a linear mass-spring system with no damping.
The following wording expresses more clearly the intent of JAR 25.427(b)(2):—
The empennage arrangements where the horizontal tail surfaces have appreciable dihedral or are supported by
the vertical tail surfaces, the surfaces and supporting structure must be designed for the prescribed flight load
conditions. For each condition, considered separately, the resultant loads on the vertical and horizontal
surfaces must be combined for stressing purposes.
ACJ 25.491
Take-off Run (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.491
In the absence of a more rational analysis the following can be considered as an Acceptable Means of Compliance:
a. At attitudes ranging from JAR 25.479(e)(1) to JAR 25.481(c) for the condition of combined vertical,
side and drag loads, a drag and side load of 20% respectively, of the ground reaction should be combined with
this ground reaction where the latter is defined as 150% of WT/2 on each main gear, where WT is the design
take-off weight of the aeroplane.
b. With the nose and main gear in contact with the ground the condition of a vertical load equal to 1.7 times
the static ground reaction should be investigated under the most adverse aeroplane loading distribution at design
take-off weight, taking into account thrust from the engines.
ACJ 25.493(c)
Braked Roll Conditions (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.493(c)
1 In seeking a reduced drag reaction for the total aeroplane, the most likely consideration would be
limitations in brake energy absorption capability. The drag due to this would be derived from the maximum
value of the summation per wheel fitted with brakes, where:–
T = the time dependent brake torque the maximum value of which corresponds to the
Certified Maximum Braking Torque T1, and
r = the rolling radius under normal tyre pressure and appropriate vertical reaction.
2 The Certified Maximum Braking Torque for each wheel fitted with brakes will be determined as the value
never likely to be exceeded during the operation of the aeroplane. This will be equal to the product of the
maximum recorded brake torque and the production variability factor. The maximum recorded brake torque will
be established from tests covering all practical ranges of brake operating conditions likely to be encountered. In
particular, the ranges of speed, temperature and operating pressure of the brake should be considered. In the
absence of better evidence the production variability factor, used in the determination of T and T1, may be taken
as 1·33.
ACJ 25.561(c)
General (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.561(c)
In the case of equipment such as galleys, a simplified set of loadings resulting from applying the accelerations of
paragraph JAR 25.561(b)(3) may be agreed for test purposes with the Authority.
In complying with the conditions of JAR 25.561(c), the loads from seats and items of equipment etc. need only
be taken into the structure to a point where appreciable energy can be absorbed (e.g. for items
attached to the fuselage floor the load paths from the attachments into the transverse floor beams are to be
included, but the beams and the more distant structure may be excluded).
The strength of seats, belts and harnesses and their attachment, and of cargo compartments to withstand emergency
alighting conditions are covered in JAR 25.785 and JAR 25.787 respectively.
ACJ 25.571(a)
Damage Tolerance and Fatigue Evaluation of Structure (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.571(a) and JAR 25.571(e)
1 Introduction
1.1 The contents of this ACJ are considered by the Authority in determining compliance with the damage-
tolerance and fatigue requirements of JAR 25.571.
1.1.1 Although a uniform approach to the evaluation required by JAR 25.571 is desirable, it is recognised that
in such a complex field new design features and methods of fabrication, new approaches to the evaluation, and
new configurations could necessitate variations and deviations from the procedures described in this ACJ.
[ 1.1.2 Damage-tolerance design is required, unless it entails such complications that an effective damage-tolerant
structure cannot be achieved within the limitations of geometry, inspectability, or good design practice. Under
these circumstances, a design that complies with the fatigue evaluation (safe-life) requirements is used. Typical
examples of structure that might not be conductive to damage-tolerance design are landing gear, engine mounts,
and their attachments.
1.1.3 Experience with the application of methods of fatigue evaluation indicate that a test background should
exist in order to achieve the design objective. Even under the damage-tolerance method discussed in paragraph 2,
'Damage-tolerance (fail-safe) evaluation', it is the general practice within industry to conduct damage-tolerance
tests for design information and guidance purposes. Damage location and growth data should also be considered
in establishing a recommended inspection programme.
1.1.4 Assessing the fatigue characteristics of certain structural elements, such as major fittings, joints, typical
skin units, and splices, to ensure that the anticipated service life can reasonably be attained, is needed for structure
to be evaluated under JAR 25.571(c).
1.2 Typical Loading Spectra Expected in Service. The loading spectrum should be based on measured
statistical data of the type derived from government and industry load history studies and, where insufficient data
are available, on a conservative estimate of the anticipated use of the aeroplane. The principal loads that should be
considered in establishing a loading spectrum are flight loads (gust and manoeuvre), ground loads (taxiing, landing
impact, turning, engine runup, braking, and towing) and pressurisation loads. The development of the loading
spectrum includes the definition of the expected flight plan which involves climb, cruise, descent, flight times,
operational speeds and altitudes, and the approximate time to be spent in each of the operating regimes.
Operations for crew training, and other pertinent factors, such as the dynamic stress characteristics of any flexible
structure excited by turbulence, should also be considered. For pressurised cabins, the loading spectrum should
include the repeated application of the normal operating differential pressure, and the super-imposed effects of
flight loads and external aerodynamic pressures.
1.3 Components to be Evaluated. In assessing the possibility of serious fatigue failures, the design should
be examined to determine probable points of failure in service. In this examination, consideration should be given,
as necessary, to the results of stress analyses, static tests, fatigue tests, strain gauge surveys, tests of similar
structural configurations, and service experience. Service experience has shown that special attention should be
focused on the design details of important discontinuities, main attachment fittings, tension joints, splices, and
cutouts such as windows, doors and other openings. Locations prone to accidental damage (such as that due to
impact with ground servicing equipment near aeroplane doors) or to corrosion should also be considered.
1.4 Analyses and Tests. Unless it is determined from the foregoing examination that the normal operating
stresses in specific regions of the structure are of such a low order that serioud damage growth is extremely
improbable, repeated load analyses or tests should be conducted on structure representative of components or sub-
components of the wing, control surfaces, empennage, fuselage, landing gear, and their related primary attachments.
Test specimens should include structure representative of attachment fittings, major joints, changes in section,
cutouts, and discontinuities. Any method used in the analyses should be supported, as necessary, by test or service
experience. Generally it will be required to substantiate the primary structure against the provisions of
JAR 25.571(b) and (c) by representative testing. The nature and extent of tests on complete structures or on
portions of the primary structure will depend upon applicable previous design and structural tests, and service
experience with similar structures. The scope of the analyses and supporting test programmes should be agreed with
the Authority.
1.5 Repeated Load Testing. In the event of any repeated load testing necessary to support the damage
tolerance or safe life objectives of JAR 25.571(b) and (c) respectively, is not concluded at the issuance of type
certificate, at least one year of safe operation should be substantiated at the time of certification. In order not to
invalidate the certificate of airworthiness the fatigue substantiation should stay sufficiently ahead of the service
exposure of the lead aerop!ane. ]
2.1 General. The damage-tolerance evaluation of structure is intended to ensure that should serious fatigue,
corrosion, or accidental damage occur within the operational life of the aeroplane, the remaining structure can
withstand reasonable loads without failure or excessive structural deformation until the damage is detected.
Included are the considerations historically associated with fail-safe design. The evaluation should encompass
establishing the components which are to be designed as damage-tolerant, defining the loading conditions and
extent of damage, conducting sufficient representative tests and/or analyses to substantiate the design objectives
(such as life-to-crack initiation, crack propagation rate and residual strength) have been achieved and establishing
data for inspection programmes to ensure detection of damage. Interpretation of the test results should take into
account the scatter in crack propagation rates as well as in lives to crack initiation. Test results should be
corrected to allow for variations between the specimen and the aeroplane component thickness and sizes. This
evaluation applies to either single or multiple load path structure.
2.1.1 Design features which should be considered in attaining a damage-tolerant structure include the following:
a. Multiple load path construction and the use of crack stoppers to control the rate of crack growth, and to
provide adequate residual static strength;
b. Materials and stress levels that, after initiation of cracks, provide a controlled slow rate of crack
propagation combined with high residual strength. For single load path discrete items, such as control surface
hinges, wing spar joints or stabiliser pivot fittings the failure of which could be catastrophic, it should be clearly
demonstrated that cracks starting from material flaws, manufacturing errors or accidental damage (including
corrosion) have been properly accounted for in the crack propagation estimate and inspection method.
c. Arrangement of design details to ensure a sufficiently high probability that a failure in any critical
structural element will be detected before the strength has been reduced below the level necessary to withstand
the loading conditions specified in JAR 25.571(b) so as to allow replacement or repair of the failed elements; and
d. Provisions to limit the probability of concurrent multiple damage, particularly after long service, which
could conceivably contribute to a common fracture path. The achievement of this would be facilitated by ensuring
sufficient life to crack initiation. Examples of such multiple damage are:
i A number of small cracks which might coalesce to form a single long crack;
ii. Failures, or partial failures, in adjacent areas, due to the redistribution of loading following a failure of a
single element; and
iii. Simultaneous failure, or partial failure, of multiple load path discrete elements, working at similar stress
levels.
In practice it may not be possible to guard against the effects of multiple damage and fail-safe substantiation may
be valid only up to a particular life which would preclude multiple damage.
e. The aeroplane may function safely with an element missing. This feature would be admitted only,
provided its separation will not prevent continued safe flight and landing and the probability of occurrence is
acceptably low.
2.1.2 In the case of damage which is readily detectable within a short period (50 flights, say) for which
JAR 25.571(b) allows smaller loads to be used, this relates to damage which is large enough to be detected by
obvious visual indications during walk around, or by indirect means such as cabin pressure loss, cabin noise, or fuel
leakage. In such instances, and in the absence of a probability approach the residual load levels except for the
trailing edge flaps may be reduced to not less than the following:
a. The maximum normal operating differential pressure (including the expected external aerodynamic
pressures under 1g level flight) multiplied by a factor of 1·10 omitting other loads. ]
[ b. 85% of the limit flight manoeuvre and ground conditions of JAR 25.571(b) (1) to (6) inclusive, excluding
(5)(ii) and separately 75% of the limit gust velocities (vertical or lateral) as specified at speeds up to VC in
JAR 25.571 (b)(2) and (b)(5)(i). On the other hand if the probability approach is used the residual load levels may not
in any case be lower than the values given in paragraph 2.7.2 of this ACJ for one flight exposure. In the case
where fatigue damage is arrested at a readily detectable size following rapid crack growth or a sudden load
path failure under the application of high loads, the structure must be able to withstand the loads defined
in JAR 25.571 (b)(1) to (6) inclusive up to that size of damage. For the subsequent growth of that damage
lower loads as stated above may be used.
2.2 Identification of Principal Structural Elements. Principal structural elements are those which
contribute significantly to carrying flight, ground, and pressurisation loads, and whose failure could result in cata-
strophic failure of the aeroplane. Typical examples of such elements are as follows:
a. Control surfaces, slats, flaps, and their attachment hinges and fittings;
c. Primary fittings;
d. Principal splices;
f. Skin-stringer combinations;
h. Spar webs.
2.2.2 Fuselage
b. Door frames;
d. Pressure bulkheads;
j. Window frames. ]
[ 2.3 Extent of Damage. Each particular design should be assessed to establish appropriate damage criteria
in relation to inspectability and damage-extension characteristics. In any damage determination, including those
involving multiple cracks, it is possible to establish the extent of damage in terms of detectability with the
inspection techniques to be used, the associated initially detectable crack size, the residual strength capabilities of
the structure, and the likely damage-extension rate considering the expected stress redistribution under the
repeated loads expected in service and with the expected inspection frequency. Thus, an obvious partial failure
could be considered to be the extent of the damage or residual strength assessment, provided a positive
determination is made that the fatigue cracks will be detectable by the available inspection techniques at a
sufficiently early stage of the crack development. In a pressurised fuselage, an obvious partial failure might be
detectable through the inability of the cabin to maintain operating pressure or controlled decompression after
occurrence of the damage. The following are typical examples of partial failures which should be considered in
the evaluation:
2.3.1 Detectable skin cracks emanating from the edge of structural openings or cutouts;
2.3.2 A detectable circumferential or longitudinal skin crack in the basic fuselage structure;
2.3.3 Complete severance of interior frame elements or stiffeners in addition to a detectable crack in the
adjacent skin;
2.3.4 A detectable failure of one element where dual construction is utilised in components such as spar caps,
window posts, window or door frames, and skin structure;
2.3.5 The presence of a detectable fatigue failure in at least the tension portion of the spar web or similar
element; and
2.3.6 The detectable failure of a primary attachment, including a control surface hinge and fitting.
2.4 Inaccessible Areas. Every reasonable effort should be made to ensure inspectability of all structural
parts, and to qualify them under the damage-tolerance provisions. In those cases where inaccessible and uninspectable
blind areas exist, and suitable damage tolerance cannot practically be provided to allow for extension of damage into
detectable areas, the structure should be shown to comply with the fatigue (safe-life) requirements in order to ensure
its continued airworthiness. In this respect particular attention should be given to the effects of corrosion.
2.5 Testing of Principal Structural Elements. The nature and extent of tests on complete structures or on
portions of the primary structure will depend upon applicable previous design, construction, tests, and service
experience, in connection with similar structures. Simulated cracks should be as representative as possible of actual
fatigue damage. Where it is not practical to produce actual fatigue cracks, damage can be simulated by cuts made with
a fine saw, sharp blade, guillotine, or other suitable means. In those cases where bolt failure, or its equivalent, is to
be simualted as part of a possible damage configuration in joints or fittings, bolts can be removed to provide that
part of the simulation, if this condition would be representative of an actual failure under typical load. Where
accelerated crack propagation tests are made, the possibility of creep cracking under real time pressure conditions
should be recognised especially as the crack approaches its critical length.
2.6 Identification of Locations to be Evaluated. The locations of damage to structure for damage-tolerances
evaluation should be identified as follows:
2.6.1 Determination of General Damage Locations. The location and modes of damage can be determined by
analysis or by fatigue tests on complete structures or subcomponents. However, tests might be necessary when the
basis for analytical prediction is not reliable, such as for complex components. If less than the complete structure
is tested, care should be taken to ensure that the internal loads and boundary conditions are valid. Any tests should
be continued sufficiently beyond the expected service life to ensure that, as far as practicable, the likely locations
and extent of crack initiation are discovered.
a. If a determination is made by analysis, factors such as the following should be taken into account: ]
[ i. Strain data on undamaged structure to establish points of high stress concentration as well as the
magnitude of the concentration;
iv. Design details which service experience of similarly designed components indicate are prone to fatigue or
other damage.
b. In addition, the areas of probable damage from sources such as corrosion, disbonding, accidental damage
or manufacturing defects should be determined from a review of the design and past service experience.
2.6.2 Selection of Critical Damage Areas. The process of actually locating where damage should be simulated
in principal structural elements identified in paragraph 2.2 of this ACJ should take into account factors such as the
following:
a. Review analysis to locate areas of maximum stress and low margin of safety;
b. Selecting locations in an element where the stresses in adjacent elements would be the maximum with the
damage present;
c. Selecting partial fracture locations in an element where high stress concentrations are present in the
residual structure; and.
2.7 Damage-tolerance Analysis and Tests. It should be determined by analysis, supported by test evidence,
that the structure with the extent of damage established for residual strength evaluation can withstand the
specified design limit loads (considered as ultimate loads), and that the damage grovvth rate under the repeated
loads expected in service (between the time at which the damage becomes initially detectable .and the time at
which the extent of damage reaches the value for residual strength evaluation) provides a practical basis for
development of the inspection programme and procedures described in paragraph 2.8 of this ACJ. The repeated
loads should be as defined in the loading, temperature, and humidity spectra. The loading conditions should take
into account the effects of structural flexibility and rate of loading where they are significant.
2.7.1 The damage-tolerance characteristics can be shown analytically by reliable or conservative methods such
as the following:
b. By demonstrating that the damage would be detected before it reaches the value for residual strength
evaluation; or
c. By demonstrating that the repeated loads and limit load stresses do not exceed those of previously verified
designs of similar configuration, materials and inspectability.
2.7.2 The maximum extent of immediately obvious damage from discrete sources should be determined and the
remaining structure shown to have static strength for the maximum load (considered as ultimate load) expected
during the completion of the flight. In the absence of a rational analysis the following ultimate loading conditions
should be covered: ]
i. the maximum normal operating differential pressure (including the expected external aerodynamic
pressures during 1g level flight) multiplied by a factor 1.1 combined with 1g flight loads.
ii. The aeroplane, assumed to be in 1g level flight should be shown to be able to survive the overswing
condition due to engine thrust asymmetry and pilot corrective action taking into account any damage to the flight
controls which it is presumed the aeroplane has survived.
b. Following the incident: 70% limit flight manouevre loads and, separately, 40% of the limit gust
velocity (vertical or lateral) as specified at VC up to the maximum likely operational speed following failure, each
combined with the maximum appropriate cabin differential pressure (including the expected external aerodynamic
pressures). Further, any loss in structural stiffness which might arise shall be shown to result in no dangerous
reduction in freedom from flutter up to speed VC/MC.
2.8 Inspection. Detection of damage before it becomes dangerous is the ultimate control in ensuring the
damage-tolerance characteristics of the structure. Therefore, the applicant should provide sufficient guidance
information to assist operators in establishing the frequency, extent, and methods of inspection of the critical
structure, and this kind of information must, under JAR 25.571 (a)(3), be included in the maintenance manual
required by JAR 25.1529. Due to the inherent complex interactions of the many parameters affecting damage
tolerance, such as operating practices, environmental effects, load sequence on crack growth, and variations in
inspection methods, related operational experience should be taken into account in establishing inspection
procedures. It is extremely important to ensure by regular inspection the detection of damage in areas vulnerable
to corrosion or accidental damage. However for crack initiation arising from fatigue alone, the frequency and
extent of the inspections may be reduced during the period up to the demonstrated crack-free life of the part of
the structure, including appropriate scatter factors (see paragraph 3.2). Comparative analysis can be used to guide
the changes from successful past practice when necessary. Therefore, maintenance and inspection requirements
should recognise the dependence on experience and should be specified in a document that provides for revision as
a result of operational experience, such as the one containing the Manufacturers Recommended Structural
Inspection Programme.
3.1 General. The evaluation of structure under the following fatigue (safe-life) strength evaluation methods
is intended to ensure that catastrophic fatigue failure, as a result of the repeated loads of variable magnitude
expected in service, is extremely improbable throughout the structure's operational life. Under these methods,
loading spectra should be established, the fatigue life of the structure for the spectra should be determined, and a
scatter factor should be applied to the fatigue life to establish the safe-life for the structure. The evaluation should
include the following; however, in some instances it might be necessary to correlate the loadings used in the
analysis with flight load and strain surveys:
3.1.1 Estimating or measuring the expected loading spectra for the structure;
3.1.2 Conducting a structural analysis including consideration of the stress concentration effects;
3.1.3 Fatigue testing of structure which cannot be related to a test background to establish response to the
typical loading spectrum expected in service;
3.1.4 Determining reliable replacement times by interpreting the loading history, variable load analyses, fatigue
test data, service experience, and fatigue analyses; and
3.1.5 Providing data for inspection and maintenance instructions and guidance information to the operators. ]
[ 3.1.6 In addition fatigue initiation from sources such as corrosion, stress corrosion, disbonding, accidental
damage and manufacturing defects should be covered based on a review of the design and past service experience.
3.2 Safe-Life Determinations: Scatter Factor. In the interpretation of fatigue analyses and test data, the
effect of variability should, under JAR 25.571(c), be accounted for by an appropriate scatter factor. There are a
number of considerations peculiar to each design and test that necessitate evaluation by the applicant. These
considerations will depend on the scope of the analyses and supporting test evidence and for example the number
and representativeness of test specimens, the material, the type of repeated load test, the extent of information on
the expected loading spectra, consequence of failure and environmental conditions.
3.3 Replacement Times. Replacement times should be established for parts with established safe-lives and
should, under JAR 25.571(a)(3), be included in the information prepared under JAR 25.1529. These replacement
times can be extended if additional data indicates an extension is warranted. Important factors which should be
considered for such extensions include, but are not limited to, the following:
3.3.2 Recorded Load and Stress Data. Recorded load and stress data entails instrumenting aeroplanes in
service to obtain a representative sampling of actual loads and stresses experienced. The data to be measured
includes airspeed, altitude, and load factor versus time data; or airspeed, altitude and strain ranges versus time data;
or similar data. This data, obtained by instrumenting aeroplanes in service, provides a basis for correlating the
estimated loading spectrum with the actual service experience;
3.3.3 Additional Analyses and Tests. If test data and analyses based on repeated load tests of additional
specimens are obtained, a re-evaluation of the established safe-life can be made;
3.3.4 Tests of Parts Removed from Service. Repeated load tests of replaced parts can be utilised to
re-evaluate the established safe-life. The tests should closely simulate service loading conditions. Repeated load
testing of parts removed from service is especially useful where recorded load data obtained in service are available
since the actual loading experienced by the part prior to replacement is known; and
3.3.5 Repair or Rework of the Structure. In some cases, repair or rework of the structure can gain further
life.
3.4 Type Design Developments and Changes. For design developments, or design changes, involving
structural configurations similar to those of a design already shown to comply with the applicable provisions of
JAR 25.571(c), it might be possible to evaluate the variations in critical portions of the structure on a comparative
basis. Typical examples would be redesign of the wing structure for increased loads, and the introduction in
pressurised cabins of cutouts having different locations or different shapes, or both. This evaluation should involve
analysis of the predicted stresses of the redesigned primary structure and correlation of the analysis with the
analytical and test results used in showing compliance of the original design with JAR 25.571(c). ]
[ ACJ 25.571(b)
Damage-tolerance (fail-safe) Evaluation (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.571(b) and JAR 25.571(e)
In the above mentioned conditions the dynamic effects are included except that if significant changes in stiffness
and/or geometry follow from the failure or partial failure the response should be further investigated. ]
ACJ 25.581
Lightning Protection (Acceptable Means of Compliance and Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.581
b. so designed and/or protected that a lightning discharge to the part (e.g. a radio aerial) will cause only local
damage which will not endanger the aeroplane or its occupants.
1.2 In addition, where internal linkages are connected to external parts (eg control surfaces), the linkages
should be bonded to main earth or airframe by primary boanding paths as close to the external part as possible.
[ 1 .3 Where a primary conductor provides or supplements the primary bonding path across an operating jack
(eg on control surfaces or nose droop) it should be of such an impedance and so designed as to limit to a safe
value the passage or current through the jack.
1.4 In considering external metal parts, consideration should be given to all flight configurations (eg lowering
of landing gear and wing-flaps) and also the possibility of damage to the aeroplane electrical system due to surges
caused by strikes to protruberances (such as pitot heads) which have connections into the electrical system.
a. they are provided with effective lightning diverters which will safely carry the lightning discharges described
in Table 1 of ACJ 25X899.
b. damage to them by lightning discharges will not endanger the aeroplane or its occupants, or
c. a lightning strike on the insulated portion is improbable because of the shielding afforded by other portions
of the aeroplane.
Where lightning diverters are used the surge carrying capacity and mechanical robustness of associated conductors
should be at least equal to that required for primary conductors.
2.2 Where unprotected non-metallic parts are fitted externally to the aeroplane in situations where they may be
exposed to lightning discharges (eg radomes) the risks include the following:–
a. the disruption of the materials because of rapid expansion of gases within them (eg water vapour).
b. the rapid build up of pressure in the enclosures provided by the parts, resulting in mechanical disruption
of the parts themselves or of the structure enclosed by them,
c. fire caused by the ignition of the materials themselves or of the materials contained within the enclosures, and
d. holes in the non-metallic part which may present a hazard at high speeds.
2.3 The materials used should not absorb water and should be of high dielectric strength in order to
encourage surface flash-over rather than puncture. Laminates made entirely from solid material are preferable to
those incorporating laminations of cellular material.
2.4 Those external non-metallic parts which are classified as primary structure should be protected by
primary conductors.
2.5 Where damage to an external non-metallic part which is not classified as primary structure may endanger the
aeroplane, the part should be protected by adequate lightning diverters.
2.6 Confirmatory tests may be required to check the adequacy of the lightning protection provided
(e.g. to confirm the adequacy of the location and size of bonding strips on a large radome.) ]
ACJ – SUB-PART D
[ ACJ 25.607(a)
Fasteners (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.607(a)
In control systems where the means of connecting parts (e.g. a bolt) is assumed not to fail or become disconnected,
it should be provided with secondary means of retention so that when the connection is installed the secondary
means of retention becomes automatically effective in preventing the connection from moving out of position
even though its primary means of retention (e.g. a nut) may have been omitted.
NOTE: A permanently locked (e.g. bench riveted with adequate dimensional control) connection, which is never broken down
when assembled in the aeroplane, is not considered as a removable fastener. ]
ACJ 25.609
Protection of Structure (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.609
The comprehensive and detailed national material standards accepted in the participating countries will be accepted
as satisfying the requirement of JAR 25.609.
ACJ 25.631
Bird Strike Damage (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.631
Consideration should be given in the early stages of the design to the installation of items in essential services,
such as control system components, and items which, if damaged, could cause a hazard, such as electrical
equipment. As far as practicable, such items should not be installed immediately behind areas liable to be struck
by birds.
ACJ 25.671(a)
Control Systems — General (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.671(a)
Control systems for essential services should be so designed that when a movement to one position has
been selected, a different position can be selected without waiting for the completion of the initially
selected movement, and the system should arrive at the finally selected position without further
attention. The movements which follow and the time taken by the system to allow the required sequence
of selection should not be such as to adversely affect the airworthiness of the aeroplane.
For control systems which, if incorrectly assembled, would hazard the aeroplane, the design should be
such that at all reasonably possible break-down points it is mechanically impossible to assemble elements
of the system to give:–
a. an out-of-phase action,
c. interconnection of the controls between two systems where this is not intended.
Only in exceptional circumstances should distinctive marking of control systems be used to comply with
the above.
ACJ 25.671(c)(1)
Control Systems – General (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.671(c)(1)
[ However, where a single component is used on the basis that its failure is extremely improbable, it should comply
with JAR 25.571(a) and (b).]
ACJ 25.672(c)(1)
Stability Augmentation and Automatic and Power-operated Systems (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.672(c)(1)
The severity of the flying quality requirement should be related to the probability of the occurrence in a progressive
manner such that probable occurrences have not more than minor effects and improbable occurrences have not more
than major effects.
ACJ 25.685(a)
Control System Details (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.685(a)
In assessing compliance with JAR 25.685(a) account should be taken of the jamming of control circuits
by the accumulation of water in or on any part which is likely to freeze. Particular attention should be paid
to the following:–
b. Components in parts of the aeroplane which could be contaminated by the water systems of
the aeroplane in normal or fault conditions; if necessary such components should be shielded.
c. Components in parts of the aeroplane where rain and/or condensed water vapour can drip or
accumulate.
d. Components inside which water vapour can condense and water can accumulate.
ACJ 25.697(a)
Lift and Drag Devices, Controls (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.697
The lift-device operating control, in so far as selection of position is not automatic should be a lever
working in a gated quadrant such that the pilot can readily and surely select by feel each take-off, en route,
approach and landing position established under JAR 25.101 (d).
The lift-device operating control should be provided with a safety catch or similar device, operative at
each position prescribed above, such that the action needed to release it is distinct from that used for
releasing any other operating control operable by the same hand.
NOTE: Detents are not acceptable substitute for gates at the intermediate positions for which gates are required.
ACJ 25.703(b)(4)
Take-off Warning System (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.703(b)(4)
1 Means provided to de-activate the warning should not be readily available to the flight-crew during the
take-off run.
2 Re-arming of the warning before each take-off may be accomplished either:–
i. automatically, or
ACJ 25.723(a)
Shock Absorption Tests (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.723(a)
1 The prediction of landing loads should always be backed-up by energy absorption testing. However, it is
acceptable to cover certain changes by calculations, providing the design concept is the same and the calculations
have been shown to cover the test results realistically. For example, the following changes can be accepted in this
sense.
f. Tyre changes.
2 The extent to which extrapolation can be accepted depends on the mathematical model employed and
should therefore be subjected to negotiations with the Authority.
[ ACJ 25.729(e)
Retracting Mechanism (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.729(e)
1 A green light for each unit is illuminated only when the unit is secured in the correct landing position.
2 A warning light consistent with JAR 25.1322 is illuminated at all times except when the landing gear and
its doors are secured in the landing or retracted position.
ACJ 25.729(f)
Protection of Equipment on Landing Gear and in Wheel Wells (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.729(f)
The use of fusible plugs in the wheels is not a complete safeguard against damage due to tyre explosion.
Where brake overheating could be damaging to the structure of, or equipment in, the wheel wells, an indication of
brake temperature should be provided to warn the pilot.]
ACJ 25.733(a)
Tyres (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.733(a)
The depth of tread below which friction characteristics are impaired should be specified and it should be possible
to determine when the tread depth has worn below this limit.
ACJ 25.733(a)(1)
Tyres (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.733(a)(1)
The various materials should be so chosen that the tyres (whether re-treaded or not) are capable of the following:–
a. Resisting deterioration, so far as practicable, resulting from the leakage of products used in the aeroplane
such as hydraulic fluid, which might affect their serviceability.
b. Retaining sufficient strength and endurance when subjected to the environmental conditions existing in
the landing-gear bay and to the heat generated by the normal use of the brakes, including the case of failure of
the brake cooling system (if fitted).
ACJ 25.735(a)
Brakes (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.735(a)
The brakes and their various components should be appropriately protected against the ingress of such foreign
bodies (water, mud, oil and other products) which may adversely affect their satisfactory performance. The shapes,
sizes, and nature of the materials used in the manufacture of the various brake components should be so chosen that
these materials will:–
a. Withstand the hydraulic pressure and the loads to which they are subjected in normal conditions.
b. Withstand simultaneous application of normal and emergency pressures following a failure unless measures,
agreed by the Certificating Authorities, have been taken to avoid such a contingency.
c. Maintain sufficient strength and endurance to withstand the temperature during normal braking of the
aeroplane, even in the case of failure of the brake cooling system (if fitted).
d. Not induce, at any likely ground speed, vibrations likely to produce resonance in the aircraft structure or
landing gear.
ACJ 25.735(b)
Brakes (Acceptable Means of Compliance and Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.735(b)
The normal braking and emergency systems should be independent and supplied by separate power sources. After
failure of the normal system, operation of the emergency system, and of the source of power supplying it, should
be effected rapidly and safely either by the pilot or by an automatic device. In particular; all necessary steps should
be taken to ensure that transfer from the normal system to the emergency system and generally from one braking
system to another, while the brakes are not applied will not involve a risk-of wheel locking. Unless equivalent safety
is shown to be achieved by other means power-operated installations should, either after the failure of any single
source of hydraulic supply or of any single hydraulic component, or if no main or auxiliary power unit is operating,
be capable of operation to the extent necessary for compliance with a, or b, as appropriate.
a. When no anti-skid device would be operating, provision for six applications of the brakes between fully off
2–D–3–2 Change 10
SECTION 2 JAR–25
b. When an anti-skid device would be operating, provision for sufficient operation of the brakes to bring the
aeroplane to rest when landing under the runway surface conditions for which the aeroplane is certificated.
NOTE: This recommendation is for the purpose of assessing the capacity of the emergency braking system.
Brake pipe protection. The run of the pipe-lines to the brakes should be such as to minimise the possibility
of their being damaged by a burst tyre or shedding or flailing of tyre tread (see JAR 25.729(f)). The pipe lines
should in any case be separated so that complete failure of the braking system would be improbable as a result
of a single tyre failure.
Protection against fire. Unless it can be shown that hydraulic fluid which may be spilt on to hot brakes is
unlikely to catch fire, the hydraulic system should be protected so as to limit the loss of fluid in the event
of a serious leak. The precautions taken in the latter case should be such that the amount of fluid lost in the
vicinity of the brakes is not sufficient to support a fire which is likely to hazard the aeroplane on the ground or
in flight.
ACJ 25.735(c)
Brakes (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.735(c)
The braking force should increase or decrease progressively as the force or movement applied to the brake control
is increased or decreased and the braking force should respond to the control as quickly as is necessary for safe
and satisfactory operation. A brake control intended only for parking is excepted.
ACJ 25.735(d)
Brakes (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.735(d)
The cont rol of the parking brake system should be protected against inadvertent operation during ground handling
of the aeroplane and should be fitted with a suitable guard to prevent such operation. Alternatively, means should
be provided to warn the pilot of possible braking during take-off. The parking brake control, whether or not it is
independent of the emergency brake control, should be marked with the words 'Parking Brake' and should be
constructed in such a way that, once operated, it remains locked in the 'on' position.
ACJ 25.735(e)
Brakes (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.735(e)
The anti-skid device should be designed to be no less reliable than the rest of the braking system. No single failure,
occurring without the pilot's control being applied, in the hydraulic or electrical supply of the anti-skid valves
should be the cause of wheel locking. In the event of any probable failure causing the poor operation of the anti-
skid units, an automatic device, or a device which could be controlled by the pilot, should cut-out their action
on the brakes and cut-in the appropriate circuit allowing the aeroplane to brake without making use of the anti-
skid units. Should the supply for the anti-skid units be electrical, any failure in this supply should be indicated
to the pilot.
ACJ 25X745(a)
Nose-wheel Steering (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25X745(a)
In a powered nose-wheel steering system the normal supply for steering should continue without interruption in
the event of failure of any one power-unit. With the remaining power-units operating at ground idling condition,
the power supply should be adequate –
a. to complete an accelerate-stop manoeuvre following a power-unit failure which occurs during take-off,
and
b. to complete a landing manoeuvre following a power-unit failure which occurs during take-off or at any
later stage of flight.
ACJ 25X745(c)
Nose-wheel Steering (Interpretative Material)
[ See JAR 25X745 (c) ]
1 No failure or disconnection need be assumed in respect of parts of proven integrity e.g. a simple jack or
manual selector valve, but slow leakage from pipe joints and fracture of pipes should be considered as probable o
failures.
2 In assessing where the inadvertent application of steering torque as a result of a single failure would lead
to danger, allowance may be made for the pilot's instinctive reaction to the effects of the fault. However,
dependent on the urgency and rapidity of warning of the failure given to the pilot, allowance should be made for
a reaction time before it is assumed that the pilot takes any corrective action.
ACJ 25.773(b)(1)(i)
Pilot Compartment View (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.773(b)(1)(i)
ACJ 25.773(b)(1)(ii)
Pilot Compartment View (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.773(b)(1)(ii)
2
For windshields protected by the application of electrical heat; a nominal heating capacity of 70 W/dm would be
adequate.
1.1 The design of the mounting should be such that it will not transmit any unacceptable loads to the panel
resulting from the items listed in 1.2, over the most adverse ranges of loading and climatic conditions.
1.2 Major items to be considered in designing the mounting for suitability over the ranges of loading and
climatic conditions are:-
c. differential contraction and expansion between the panel and the mounting, and
d. deflection of the panel resulting from temperature gradient across the thickness of the panel.
2.1 General. Panels of conventional design complying with the recommendations of this ACJ 25.775(d)
will normally be acceptable if the conditions required to be fulfilled for the strength analysis and the
tests of this paragraph 2 are satisfactorily completed. By conventional design is meant a laminated or double
pane panel in which the main pressure bearing plies or panes, upon which the main and residual strength
capability depends, are made from either thermally toughened soda lime glass or from acrylic material. It also
assumes for the laminated panel that the plies are bonded together with an interlayer material not having inferior
qualities to poly-vinyl butyral (PVB). Any other combination of plies or panes or materials should be discussed
with the Authority as regards the applicability of the strength factors specified in this paragraph 2.
2.2 Reliability and Functioning Tests. It is recommended that cyclic tests on the window assemblies under
closely representative operating conditions should be made to ensure an acceptable level of reliability in service of
the transparencies and any associated heating systems. Such tests should also ensure that the panel installation is
satisfactory when subjected to the most adverse combinations of panel heat, ambient temperature and pressure
loading.
2.3 Fatigue. The substantiation of the fatigue integrity of the pressure cabin will be expected to include the
window assemblies and their surrounding structure.
2.4.1 General
a. Compliance with the analysis of 2.4.2 and the tests of 2.4.3 as appropriate will be accepted as
establishing that the strength of the weakest panel, in the most adverse operating conditions will be sufficient to
ensure the safety objectives of JAR 25.775(d) are met.
b. The panel should be subjected to the most adverse likely combination of loads resulting from:-
c. Failure of the panel is considered to have occurred when the panel fails to hold pressure or there is a drastic
increase in deflection of the panel. The failure of the outer thin facing glass in a laminated panel in the pilot's cabin is
not considered to be a panel failure, unless this results in an unacceptable loss of vision, taking into account all other
transparencies in the pilot's cabin.
2.4.2 Analysis
a. Laminated and Double Pane Glass Panels. The complete panel should be designed to a minimum
ultimate factor of 4 on the most adverse pressure loading given by 2.4.1 (b) without rupture. This analysis should
be based on the appropriate strength of the glass as declared by the material manufacturer under loading
conditions sustained for at least 30 minutes. The panel assembly should be assumed to be maintained at its
normal working temperature as given by the panel heating system, if installed, ambient temperature on the
outside and cabin temperature on the inside. The most adverse likely ambient temperature should be covered.
2–D–5 1.8.74
JAR–25 SECTION 2
ii In interpreting JAR 25.775(d) regarding structural integrity following any single failure in the installation
or associated systems, the importance of avoiding overheat conditions for acrylic materials must be strongly
emphasised, particularly for stretched acrylics in relation to the relaxation temperature for the material.
a. Laminated and Double Pane Glass Panels. With any one main pressure bearing glass ply failed, it should
be demonstrated that the panel can withstand an average value of twice the load of 2.4.1 (b) long enough to give
assurance that the pilot will have time to reduce the cabin pressure to a level at which the panel can withstand
twice this reduced cabin pressure. The panel should then withstand this reduced factored pressure for a period
sufficient to give assurance that the aeroplane can safely complete the flight.
i This test should be done so as to be as representative as possible of a sudden failure of the main pressure
bearing glass ply in flight under once times the load of 2.4.1 (b), with the load being gradually increased thereafter
to the fully factored condition. Ambient air temperature should be reproduced on the outside of the panel and
cabin temperature on the inside. The most adverse likely ambient temperature should be covered. The panel
assembly should be heated in the same way as in the aeroplane at the beginning of the test.
i Complete Panel. The analysis of the distribution of the working stress level over the panel given by
2.4.2(b) should be verified by test measurement.
ii Damaged Panel. With any one main pressure bearing acrylic ply failed for a laminated panel assembly, or with
the normal load bearing pane failed for a double pane panel, it should be demonstrated that the panel can withstand an
average value of four times the load of 2.4.1(b) long enough to give assurance that the pilot will have time to reduce the
cabin pressure to a level at which the panel can withstand four times this reduced cabin pressure. The panel
should then withstand this reduced factored pressure for a period sufficient to give assurance that the aeroplane
can safely complete the flight.
— The failed acrylic ply may be represented either by a broken pattern to give an adequate representation
of the worst which could occur, or, perhaps conservatively, by omission of the, failed ply in the test
panel. In either case the test should be done so as to be as representative as possible of a sudden failure
of the particular acrylic ply in flight under once times the load of 2.4.1.(b), with the load being
gradually increased thereafter to the fully factored condition. Ambient air temperature should be
reproduced on the outside of the panel and cabin temperature on the inside. The most adverse likely
ambient temperature should be covered.
The panel should be heated in the same way as on the aeroplane at the beginning of the test.
— In the case of a laminated panel, in confirmation of the inherent fail-safe character of the design, it
should be further demonstrated by suitable tests that a crack ma particular ply cannot propagate
through into an adjacent ply.
— Additional testing may be required if the design incorporates bolt-holes, cut-outs or other forms of stress
raisers, particularly if non-stretched acrylic material is used.
3 Heating Systems. In considering any single failure in the installation or in associated systems, fire risks
should be taken into account.
1.8.74 2–D–6
SECTION 2 JAR–25
ACJ 25.777(a)
Cockpit Controls (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.777(a)
If the operating controls intended for operation by one pilot during take-off, accelerate stop, balked landing and
landing are so arranged that the sequences of control actions during these manoeuvres necessitate the pilot
having to change hands on the control column, these sequences should not involve such rapid hand changes that
controllability will be prejudiced.
ACJ 25.777(e)
Cockpit Controls (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.777(e)
Except where a smaller distance is shown to be adequate, the distance aft of the landing gear control should not
be less than 10 inches.
ACJ 25.777(g)
Cockpit Control Knob Shape (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.777(g)
Cockpit control knobs should conform to the general shapes (but not necessarily the exact sizes or specific
proportions) in the following figure:
ACJ 25.785(c)
Seats and Safety Belts (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.785(c)
1 Sharp edges or excrescences on the seats or parts of the passenger accommodation which might prove a
source of danger not only to the occupants of the seats but particularly to the occupant seated to the rear should
be avoided. All surfaces of passenger accommodation and those areas of the seat back lying within the arc of
travel of the head of an occupant seated to the rear and restrained by a safety belt should be smooth and of large
radius.
2 The radius of the arc of travel, representing the extremity of the occupant's head, should be taken as 710 mm
(28 in). This allows for tall occupants and stretch in the safety belt. The centre of the radius of the arc of travel
should be taken as 460mm (18 in) forward and upward of the junction of the seat back and bottom at 35º to the
latter (see Figure 1).
FIGURE 1
3 If the top of the seat back occurs within the arc of travel of the head, it should be padded to at least 25 mm
(1 in) radius with at least 12.5 mm (0.5 in) of firm padding.
4 Any other substantially horizontal members occurring within the areas defined by paragraph 2 should either
be padded as recommended in paragraph 3 or should be so arranged that the head will be deflected past them
rather than strike them a direct blow. The tops of vertical members occurring within these areas should be so
protected as to be at least as safe as horizontal members. No member should occur where it might be struck by
the throat.
5 Where practicable, it is recommended that seat backs should be pivoted so as to move forward under
emergency alighting acceleration loads so that the occupant of the seat behind only strikes a glancing blow on
the seat back.
[ ACJ 25.785(g)
Seats, Berths, Safety Belts and Harnesses (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.785(g)
Where there is a risk that a safety belt or harness might, when not in use, foul the controls or impede the crew,
suitable stowage should be provided, unless it can be shown that the risk can be avoided by the application of
suitable crew drills. ]
Account should be taken of any unusual dynamic loading resulting from movement causing change in the
geometry of the means of restraint, and from wear and tear of means of restraint and local attachments. Wear
and tear of local attachments which are similar to seat attachments may be taken into account by using an
additional factor of 1.33.
ACJ 25X799
Water Systems (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25X799
Where water is provided in the aeroplane for consumption or use by the occupant, the associated system should
be designed so as to ensure that no hazard to the aeroplane can result from water coming into contact with
electrical or other systems.
Service connections (filling points) should be of a different type from those used for other services, such that water
could not inadvertently be introduced into the systems for other services.
ACJ 25.803(e)(2)
Emergency Evacuation (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.803(e)(2)
Acceptable methods of measurement of reflectance are given in AC20–38A and AC20–47, published by the
Federal Aviation Administration.
[ ACJ 25.807
Emergency Exit Access (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.807 and JAR 25.813 ]
The term 'unobstructed’ should be interpreted as referring to the space between the adjacent wall(s) and/or seat(s),
the seatback(s) being in the most adverse position, in vertical projection from floor level to at least the prescribed
minimum height of the exit.
ACJ 25.807(c)
Passenger Emergency Exits (Interpretative Material)
JAR 25.807(c)
The optimum fore and aft location of Types I, II and Ill exits should be agreed between the applicant
and the Certificating Authority bearing in mind the relevant considerations, including:–
a. the varying likelihood of damage to different parts of the fuselage in emergency alighting
conditions, and
b. the need to avoid the passengers having to evacuate the aeroplane where dangerous conditions
(spilt fuel, hot engine parts, etc.) may exist.
Change 6 2–D–8–2
SECTION 2 JAR–25
The supply of fresh air in the event of the loss of one source, should not be less than 0.4 lb/min per person for
any period exceeding five minutes. However, reductions below this flow rate may be accepted provided that the
compartment environment can be maintained at a level which is not hazardous to the occupant.
ACJ 25.831(c)
Ventilation (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.831(c)
1 To avoid contamination the fresh air supply should be suitably ducted where it passes through any
compartment inaccessible in flight.
2 Where the air supply is supplemented by a recirculating system, it should be possible to stop the
recirculating system and:–
b. still achieve 1.
[ ACJ 25.851(a)
Fire Extinguishers (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.851(a)
1 Each extinguisher should be readily accessible and mounted so as to facilitate quick removal from its
mounting bracket.
2 Unless an extinguisher is clearly visible, its location should be indicated by a placard or sign having
letters of at least ⅜ inch in height on a contrasting background. Appropriate symbols may be used to supplement
such a placard or sign. ]
1 The number and location of hand fire extinguishers should be such as to provide adequate availability
for use, account being taken of the number and size of the passenger compartments and the location of toilets,
galleys, etc. These considerations may result in the number being greater than the minimum prescribed.
2 Where only one hand extinguisher is required it should be located at the cabin attendant station, where
provided, otherwise near the main entrance door.
3 Where two or more hand extinguishers are required and their location is not otherwise dictated by
consideration of paragraph 1 above, an extinguisher should be located at each end of the cabin and the remainder
distributed throughout the cabin as evenly as is practicable. ]
There should be at least one fire extinguisher suitable for both flammable fluid and electrical equipment fires
installed in each pilot's compartment. Additional extinguishers may be required for the protection of other
compartments accessible to the crew in flight (e.g. electrical equipment bays) or from consideration of
JAR 25.851(a)(2).
NOTE: Dry chemical fire extinguishers should not be used in pilot compartments because of the adverse effects on vision
during discharge and, if non-conductive, Interference with electrical contacts by the chemical residues. ]
ACJ 25.857(b)
Cargo Compartment Classification (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.857(b)
In showing compliance with JAR 25.857(b) consideration should be given to the effect of representative cargo
loading conditions on the ability of the crew member to gain effective access to all parts of the compartment
with a fire extinguisher. Where such access cannot be shown, it is recommended that means are provided to
shut off all air supply within the compartment to increase the effectiveness of the extinguisher when used.
ACJ 25.857(d)
Cargo Compartment Classification (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.857(d)
1 The rate of ventilation and leakage into and out of Class D cargo compartments should be as low as
practicable and should not exceed the value obtained from the following formula:–
W = 2,000 – V
NOTE: Compliance with the ventilation rate should be shown by flight test in both pressurised and unpressurised flight. See
also JAR 25.855(e).
2 When the volume of the compartment is greater than 1,000 cu. ft. it should be demonstrated by a full
scale test that a fire can safely be contained.
NOTE: The fire test may be waived if the cargo within the compartment is limited to container cargo and the containers are
so constructed that they, in themselves, are individual Class D compartments.
2–D–9–2 Change 4
JAR–25 SECTION 2
3 The design of the compartment should be such that its mechanical integrity, including sealing,
will be maintained when the compartment is exposed to those temperatures and pressures resulting from
a fire within it and also in service, taking into account instructions contained in the service manual.
NOTE: The temperatures and pressures considered should, where appropriate, be those presented In FAA Reports
RD 70–42, and 71–68 unless alternative values are substantiated by a fire test on the specific compartment design.
ACJ 25.863(a)
Flammable fluid fire protection (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.863(a)
The cooling air supply for any electrical or electronic equipment should be conveyed and discharged so
as not to create a hazard following failure of the equipment.
Zones with surfaces which may be exposed to flammable fluids or vapours should be ventilated, if the
temperature of the surfaces may exceed (under normal or failure conditions) a dangerous value with
regard to these fluids or vapours. Unless a higher value can be substantiated, a temperature exceeding
200ºC is considered dangerous.
[ ACJ 25X899
Electrical Bonding and Protection against Lightning and Static Electricity (Interpretative Material and
Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25X899
1 Protection against Lightning Discharges. The aeroplane should be provided with means to conduct
lightning strikes so that the aeroplane and its occupants will not be endangered. The means provided should be
such as to:–
b. prevent the dangerous malfunctioning of the aeroplane and its equipment as a result of the passage of
lightning currents,
2.1 The data contained in Table 1 should be used for the purpose of assessing the adequacy of lightning
discharge protection of aeroplanes. ]
[ TABLE 1
2.2 Where confirmatory tests are agreed with the Authority as being required to show compliance with the
requirements of para. 1, then a discharge current having two components as given in Table 2, should be taken as
being equivalent to a lightning strike from the aspects of heating and disruptive forces.
NOTE: This test is equally acceptable to that specified in FAA Advisory circular AC 20-53 for fuel tank access doors and filler
caps.
TABLE 2
NOTE: The above table gives typical test values, but the choice of either or both components for testing
a given Item of equipment will depend upon the relevance of these test components to the hazard in each
particular case, such test conditions should be agreed with the Authority.
3.1 General. All items, which by the accumulation and discharge of static charges may cause a danger of
electrical shock, ignition of flammable vapours or interference with essential equipment (e.g. radio communications
and navigational aids) should be adequately bonded to the main earth systems.
3.2 Intermittent Contact. The design should be such as to ensure that no fortuitous intermittent contact
can occur between metallic and/or metallized parts.]
[ 3.3 ] High Pressure Refuelling and Fuel Transfer. Where provision is made for high pressure refuelling and/or
for high rates of fuel transfer it should be established, by test, or by consultation with the appropriate fuel
manufacturers, that dangerously high voltages will not be induced within the fuel system. If compliance with
this requirement involves any restriction on the types of fuel to be used or on the use of additives, this should
be established.
[ 3.3.1 ] With standard refuelling equipment and standard aircraft turbine fuels, voltages high enough to cause
sparking may be induced between the surface bf the fuel and the metal parts of the tank at refuelling rates above
approximately 250 gal/min. These induced voltages may be increased by the presence of additives and contaminants
(e.g. anti-corrosion inhibitors, lubricating oil, free water), and by splashing or spraying of the fuel in the tank.
a. by means taken in the refuelling equipment such as increasing the diameter of refuelling lines and
designing filters to give the minimum of electrostatic charging, or
b. by changing the electrical properties of the fuel by the use of anti-static additives and thus reducing the
accumulation of static charge in the tank to negligible amount.
[ 3.3.3 ] The critical refuelling rates are related to the aeroplane refuelling installations, and the designer should
seek the advice of fuel suppliers on this problem.
4.1 Primary bonding paths are those paths which are required to carry lightning discharge currents. These
paths should be of as low an electrical impedance as is practicable. Secondary bonding paths are those paths
provided for other forms of bonding.
4.2 Where additional conductors are required to provide or supplement the inherent primary bonding paths
provided by the structure or equipment, then the cross-sectional area of such primary conductors made from
2
copper should be not less than 3 mm except that, where a single conductor is likely to carry the whole discharge
2
from an isolated section, the cross-sectional area would be not less than 6 mm . Aluminium primary conductors
should have a cross-sectional area giving an equivalent surge carrying capacity.
a. connecting together the main earths of separable major components which may carry lightning discharges,
c. connecting to the main earth all metal parts presenting a surface on or outside of the external surface of
the aeroplane, and
4.4 Where additional conductors are required to provide or supplement the inherent secondary bonding paths
provided by the structure or equipment then the cross-sectional area of such secondary conductors made from
2 .
copper should be not less than 1 mm . Where a single wire is used its size should be not less than 1 2 mm dia.
[5 Resistance and Continuity Measurements. Measurements should be made to determine the efficacy
of the bonding and connection between at least the following.
5.1.1 The extremities of the fixed portions of the aeroplane and such fixed external panels and components
where the method of construction and/or assembly leads to doubt as to the repeatability of the bond, e.g. removable
panels.
5.1.3 External movable metal surfaces or components and the main aeroplane earth.
5.1.4 The bonding conductors of external non-metallic parts and the main aeroplane earth.
5.1.5 Internal components for which a primary bond is specified and the main aeroplane earth.
5.2.1 Metallic parts, normally in contact with flammable fluids, and the main aeroplane earth.
5.2.2 Isolated conducting parts subject to appreciable electrostatic charging and the main aeroplane earth.
5.2.3 Electrical panels and other equipment accessible to the occupants of the aeroplane and the main
aeroplane earth.
5.2.4 Earth connections, which normally carry the main electrical supply and the main aeroplane earth.
The test on these connections should be such as to ensure that the connections can carry, without risk of fire or
damage to the bond, or excessive volt drop, such continuous normal currents and intermittent fault currents
as are applicable.
5.2.5 Electrical and electronic equipment and the aeroplane main earth, where applicable, and as specified
by the aeroplane constructor.
Change 2 2–D–14
SECTION 2 JAR–25
ACJ – SUBPART E
ACJ 25.901(b)(2)
Assembly of Components (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.901 (b)(2)
The objectives of JAR 25.671(b) should be satisfied with respect to powerplant systems, where the safety of the
aeroplane could otherwise be jeopardised.
Where the engine is not in direct electrical contact with its mounting the engine should be electrically connected
to the main earth system by at least two removable primary conductors, one on each side of the engine.
ACJ 25.901(e)
General (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.901(e)
The need for additional tests, if any, in hot climatic conditions should take account of any tests made by the
engine constructor to establish engine performance and functioning characteristics and of satisfactory operating
experience of similar power units installed in other types of aeroplane.
The applicant should declare the maximum climatic conditions for which compliance will be established and this
should not be less severe than the ICAO Intercontinental Maximum Standard Climate (100ºF (37.8ºC) at sea level).
If the tests are conducted under conditions which deviate from the maximum declared ambient temperature, the
maximum temperature deviation should not normally exceed 25Fº (13.88Cº).
As part of the tests referred to in JAR 25.901(e), the minimum drainage period following an abortive start before
a further attempt to restart should be established. It should be demonstrated that successive attempts to restart
do not create a fire hazard.
Where design precautions to minimise the hazard in the event of a combustion chamber burnthrough involve the
use of torching flame resistant components and/or materials, satisfaction of the standards prescribed in British
Standards Institution Specification 3G100: Part 2: Section 3: Sub-section 3.13, dated December 1973, is
acceptable.
1 Turbine Engine Installations. Where containment of engine rotor debris has not been established,
the following material provides a basis on which compliance may be shown with JAR 25.903(d)(1). ]
2.1 All practical design precautions should be taken to minimise, on the basis of good engineering judgement
the risk of catastrophic damage due to non-contained engine rotor debris. This should include the position of the
engine with respect to critical components or regions of the aeroplane such as:—
a. the other engine(s) (especially those located on the same side of the aeroplane;
d. fuel system/tanks. (Consideration should be given to spillage of fuel into the engine compartment and
any other region of the aeroplane where a fire hazard could result);
e. essential control systems, including primary flight controls, electrical systems, hydraulic systems and
shut-off means;
2.2 Practical design measures to minimise the risk of catastrophic damage may include for example, location
of critical components or systems outside the vulnerable areas; duplication and adequate separation of critical
components of systems, and/or protection by substantial airframe structure, taking account of the possible risk
of simultaneous damage caused by the release (in random directions) of single fragments; location of shut-off
means so that flammable fluids can be isolated in the event of damage to the system; use of protective armour or
deflection shields; precautions to ensure that flammable fluids released from damaged lines or other components
are not likely to contact possible ignition sources; possible redundant design or crack stoppers to limit the dynamic
propagation of tears which have been caused by debris impact.
[ (G) 2.2 (United Kingdom) Practical design measures to minimise the risk of catastrophic damage may ]
include for example, location of critical components or systems outside the vulnerable areas; duplication
and adequate separation of critical components of systems, and/or protection by substantial airframe
structure, taking account of the possible risk of simultaneous damage caused by the release (in random
directions) of single or multiple fragments; location of shut-off means so that flammable fluids can be isolated
in the event of damage to the system; use of protective armour or deflection shields; precautions to ensure
that flammable fluids released from damaged lines or other components are not likely to contact possible
ignition sources; possible redundant design or crack stoppers to limit the dynamic propagation of tears which
have been caused by debris impact.
NOTE: Although it is practically impossible to consider all types of simultaneous damage which could possibly be caused by
the re/ease (in random directions) of multiple fragments, compliance with the arbitrary risk level given in paragraph 4.5 for
duplicated or multiplicated systems would be acceptable.
2.3 Where protection by substantial airframe structure or by protective armour or deflection shields is claimed,
the adequacy of protection should be demonstrated by tests and/or analysis based on test data, using the criteria
of the engine failure model of paragraph 3.
3 Engine Failure Model. The safety analysis required in paragraph 4 should be made using the following
engine failure model unless, for the particular engine type concerned, evidence can be produced based on operating
experience or engine design features to justify a different model.
3.1 Single One-Third Piece of Disc. It should be assumed that the one-third piece of disc has the maximum
dimension corresponding to one-third of the disc with one-third blade height and an angular spread of ±3º
relative to the plane of rotation of the disc. Where energy considerations are relevant, the mass should be
assumed to be one-third the bladed disc mass and its energy the translational energy (i.e. neglecting rotational
energy) of the sector. (See Figure 1.)
[ 3.2 Small Pieces of Debris. It should be assumed that the small piece of debris has a maximum dimension
corresponding to one-third the bladed disc radius and an angular spread of ±5º relative to the plane of the disc.
1
Where energy considerations are relevant, the mass should be assumed to be /30th of the bladed disc mass and its
energy the translational energy (neglecting rotational energy) of the piece travelling at rim speed (see Figure 2).
3.3 Alternative Engine Failure Model. For the purpose of the analysis, as an alternative to the engine failure
model of paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2, the use of a single one third piece of disc having an axial spread angle of ±5º
would be acceptable, provided that the objectives of paragraphs 2.1, 2.2 and 4.3 a. are satisfied.
4.1 An analysis should be made using the engine model defined in paragraph 3 to determine the critical areas
of the aeroplane likely to be damaged by rotor debris and to evaluate the consequences. This should be determined
in relation to the most critical flight phases.
4.1.1 A minimum delay of at least 15 seconds but in any event not more than 60 seconds should be assumed
for the emergency engine shut down drill depending on the circumstances resulting from non-containment,
taking into account the various phases of flight, and the fact that damage due to non-containment could result
in a considerable increase in flight-crew work load and delay in starting any of the emergency drills, for example,
where there may be a multiplicity of warnings which require analysis of the situation by the flight crew to
determine the cause.
4.1.2 Some degradation of the flight characteristics of the aeroplane or operation of a system may be
permissible subject to the safe continuation of the flight. Account should be taken of the behaviour of the
aeroplane under asymmetrical engine thrust or power conditions together with any possible damage to the flight
control system, and of the predicted aeroplane recovery manoeuvre.
4.2 Drawings showing the trajectory paths of engine debris relative to critical areas should be provided. The
analysis should include at least the following:—
a. Damage to primary structure including the pressure cabin, engine mountings and airframe surfaces.
NOTE: The structural analysis should be made in accordance with ACJ 25.571.
b. Damage to any other engines (the consequences of subsequent non-containment of debris from the
other engine(s)), need not be considered.
c. Damage to services and equipment essential for safe flight (including indicating and monitoring systems),
particularly control systems for flight, engine power, engine fuel supply and shut-off means and fire indication and
extinguishing systems.
d. Pilot incapacitance.
e. Penetration of the fuel system, where this could result in the release of fuel into personnel compartments
or an engine compartment or other regions of the aeroplane where this could lead to a fire (or explosion).
f. Damage to the fuel system, especially tanks, resulting in the release of a large quantity of fuel.
NOTE: Consideration of the effect of damage should include degradation of the performance and handling characteristics
of the aeroplane. ]
4.3 When all practical design precautions have been taken (see paragraph 2.1) and the safety analysis made
using the engine failure model defined in paragraph 3 shows that catastrophic risk still exist for some components
or systems of the aeroplane, the level of catastrophic risk should be evaluated. It is considered that the objective
of the requirement will have been met if the levels of risk stated in a. and b., as appropriate, have been achieved.
NOTE: It is accepted that due allowance should be made for the size and broad configuration of the aeroplane and that this
may prevent the prescribed levels of risk being achieved.
a. Single One-third Piece of Disc. There is not more than a 1 in 20 chance of catastrophe resulting from the
release of a single one-third piece of disc as defined in paragraph 3.1.
b. Small Piece of Debris. There is not more than a 1 in 40 chance of catastrophe resulting from the release
of a piece of debris as defined in paragraph 3.2.
4.4 The aeroplane risk levels specified, resulting from the release of rotor debris, are the mean values
obtained by averaging those for all discs on all engines of the aeroplane, assuming a typical flight. Individual
discs or engines need not meet these risk levels nor need these risk levels be met for each phase of flight if
either:—
a. No disc shows a higher level of risk averaged throughout the flight greater than twice those stated in
paragraph 4.3.
NOTE: The purpose of this paragraph is to ensure that a fault which results in repeated failures of any particular disc design,
would have only a limited effect on aeroplane safety.
b. Where failures would be catastrophic in particular phases of flight only, allowance is made for this on
the basis of conservative assumptions as to the proportion of failures likely to occur in these phases. A greater
level of risk could be accepted if the exposure exists only during a particular phase of flight e.g. during take-off.
The proportional risk of engine failure during the particular phases of flight is given in SAE Paper AIR 1537
dated October 1977 'Report on Aircraft Engine Containment'. See also data contained in the CAA paper
'Engine Non-Containment – The CAA View', which includes Figure 3. This paper is published in NASA Report
CP–2017, 'An Assessment of Technology for Turbo-jet Engine Rotor Failures', dated August 1977.
[(G) 4.5 Multiple Fragments (United Kingdom) There should not be more than a 1 in 10 chance of ]
catastrophe resulting from the release in three random directions of three one-third fragments of
disc each having a uniform probability of ejection over the 360º, causing co-incidental damage to systems
which are duplicated or multiplicated. It should be assumed that the angular spread is ±3º in relation to the
plane of rotation of the disc.
ACJ 25.903(e)(2)
Engines (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.903(e)(2)
1 General
1.1 In general the relight envelope required in JAR 25.903(e)(2) may consist of two zones:—
a. one zone where the engine is rotated by windmilling at or beyond the minimum rpm to effect a
satisfactory relight, and
b. another zone where the engine is rotated with assistance of the starter at or beyond the minimum rpm to
effect a satisfactory relight.
2.1 Sufficient flight tests should be made over the range of conditions detailed in 2.2 and 2.3, to establish
the envelope of altitude and airspeed for reliable engine restarts, taking into account the results of restart tests
completed by the engine constructor on the same type of engine in an altitude test facility or flying test bed, if
available, and the experience accumulated in other aircraft with the same engine. The effect of engine deterioration
in service should be taken into account.
2.2 Altitude and Configuration From sea-level to the maximum declared restarting altitude in all appropriate
configurations likely to affect restarting, including the emergency descent configuration.
2.3 Airspeed From the minimum to the maximum declared airspeed at all altitudes up to the maximum
declared engine restarting altitude. The airspeed range of the declared relight envelope should cover at least 30 kt.
[ 2.4 Delay Tests The tests referred to in paragraph 2.2 should include the effect on engine restarting
performance of delay periods between engine shut-down and restarting of:—
b. at least fifteen minutes or until the engine oil temperatures are stabilised at their cold soak value. ]
ACJ 25.929(a)
Propeller De-icing (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.929(a)
Where the propeller has been fitted to the engine in complying with the tests of JAR—E, Chapter C3—4
Appendix, 12, compliance with JAR 25.929(a) will be assured.
ACJ 25.939(a)
Turbine Engine Operating Characteristics (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.939(a)
1 The wording 'in flight' should be interpreted to cover all operating conditions from engine start until
shut-down.
2 If the airflow conditions at the engine air intake can be affected by the operating conditions of an
adjacent engine, the investigation should include an exploration of the effects of running the adjacent engine
at the same and at different conditions over the whole range of engine operating conditions, including reverse
thrust. An investigation of the effect of malfunctioning of an adjacent engine should also be included.
ACJ 25.939(c)
Turbine Engine Operating Characteristics (Acceptable Means of Compliance and Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.939(c)
1 The investigation should cover the complete range, for which certification is required, of aeroplane speeds,
attitudes, altitudes and engine operating conditions including reverse thrust, and of steady and transient conditions
on the ground and in flight, including crosswinds, rotation, yaw and stall. Non-critical conditions of operation
which need not be considered should be agreed with the Authority.
2 If the airflow conditions at the engine air intake can be affected by the operating conditions of an
adjacent engine, the investigation should include an exploration of the effects of running the adjacent engine at
the same and at different conditions over the whole range of engine operating conditions, including reverse thrust.
An investigation of the effect of malfunctioning of an adjacent engine should also be included.
3 Compliance with the requirement may include any suitable one or combination of the following methods;
as agreed with the Authority.
a. Demonstration that the variations in engine inlet airflow distortion over the range defined in 1 are within
the limits established for the particular engine type.
b. An investigation of blade vibration characteristics by the method and of the scope indicated in JAR—E,
C3—4 para 3.3 (except that Maximum Take-off r.p.m. need not be exceeded) carried out on:—
i a representative installation on the ground using test equipment where the actual conditions of operation
in the aeroplane are reproduced, or
ii a representative aeroplane on the ground and in flight as appropriate to the conditions being investigated.
c. The completion of sufficient flying with representative installations prior to certification such as to
demonstrate that the vibration levels are satisfactory.
[ ACJ 25.939(d)
Turbine Engine Operating Characteristics (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.939(d)
Compliance with JAR 25.939(d) may consist of flight tests using vibration measuring equipment on which
engine test bed vibration levels were established, or the equipment intended to be supplied on production engines
provided the Authority considers the equipment sensitive enough for the purpose of showing compliance with
the requirements. ]
ACJ 25.954
Fuel System Lightning Protection (Acceptable Means of Compliance and Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.954
1 The fuel storage system and the outlets of the venting and jettisoning systems of the aeroplane, should
be so situated and/or protected, that the probability of a catastrophe being caused by them being struck by
lightning is extremely improbable.
NOTE: The location of the fuel tanks and vents within the airframe may be such as to satisfy this.
2 In addition, the outlets of venting and jettisoning systems should be so located and designed that:—
a. they will not, under any atmospheric conditions which the aeroplane may encounter, experience
electrical discharges of such magnitudes as will ignite any fuel/air mixture of the ratios likely to be present, and
b. the fuel and its vapours inflammable concentrations will not pass close to parts of the aeroplane which
will produce electrical discharges capable of igniting fuel/air mixtures.
NOTE: Electrical discharges may, in addition to direct lightning strikes, be caused by corona and streamer formation in the
vicinity of thunder-storms.
3 The fuel system of the aeroplane should be so designed that the passage of lightning discharges through
the main aeroplane structure will not produce, by the process of conduction or induction, such potential differences
as will cause electrical sparking through areas where there may be flammable vapours.
NOTE: For aeroplanes of conventional shape, an acceptable method of complying With JAR 25.954 is given in FAA Advisory
circular AC20-53 — 'Protection of Aircraft Fuel Systems against Lightning.' For aeroplanes of non-conventional shape,
re-definition of the zones may be necessary.
Subject to agreement with the Authority, fuel with a higher vapour pressure may be used at a correspondingly
lower fuel temperature provided the test conditions closely simulate flight conditions corresponding to an initial
fuel temperature of 110ºF at sea level.
Precautions should be taken against the possibility of corrosion resulting from microbiological contamination of
fuel.
Fuel tank installations should be such that the tanks will not be ruptured by the aeroplane sliding with its landing
gear retracted, nor by a landing gear, nor an engine mounting tearing away.
Fuel tanks inboard of the landing gear or inboard of or adjacent to the most outboard engine, should have the
strength to withstand fuel inertia loads appropriate to the accelerations specified in JAR 25.561 (b) (3) of this
section, considering the maximum likely amount of fuel at the design landing weight. For the maximum likely
fuel condition corresponding to take-off weight a somewhat lesser acceleration value may be considered.
NOTE: For the strength of fuel tanks within the fuselage see JAR 25.963 (e) ]
Fuel tank installations should be such that the tanks will not be ruptured by the aeroplane sliding with its
landing gear retracted, nor a landing gear, nor an engine mounting tearing away.
Fuel tanks inboard of the landing gear or inboard of or adjacent to the most outboard engine, should have the
strength to withstand fuel inertia loads appropriate to the accelerations specified in JAR 25.561 (b) (3) of this
section, considering the maximum amount of fuel in the tank(s).
NOTE: For the strength of fuel tanks within the fuselage see JAR 25.963 (e). ]
The analysis or tests should be performed on each complete tank in the configuration ready and capable of flight.
Each complete tank means any tank fully equipped which is isolated from other tanks by tank walls or which may
be isolated by valves under some flight configuration.
The installation of a flexible tank and its venting, according to JAR 25.975 (a) (3) should be such that the tank
liner will not be deformed in such a way as to significantly affect the fuel quantity indication.
1 Pressure fuelling systems, fuel tanks and the means preventing excessive fuel pressures, should be designed
2
to withstand normal maximum fuelling pressure of not less than 345 kN/m (50 psi) at the coupling to the
aeroplane.
2 Pressure fuelling systems should be so arranged that the fuel entry point is at or near the bottom of the
tank so as to reduce the level of electrostatic charge in the tank during fuelling.
ACJ 25.1027
Inadvertent Propeller Feathering (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1027
The design of the propeller feathering system should be such that it is possible to complete the feathering and
unfeathering operation under all normal operating conditions.
ACJ 25.1027(b)
Propeller Feathering (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1027(b)
The amount of trapped oil should be sufficient to cover one feathering operation; taking into account the
maximum oil leakage in the feathering system due to wear and deterioration in service.
ACJ 25.1091(d)(2)
Precipitation Covered Runways (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.1091(d)(2)
1 Except where it is obvious by inspection or other means, that precipitation on the runway would not
enter the engine air intake under the declared operating conditions, including the use of the thrust reverser,
compliance with the requirements should be demonstrated by tests using tyres representative of those to be
approved for operational use. These tests should clear the aeroplane for operation from runways which are
normally clear and also for operation in precipitation up to 13 mm (0.5 in) depth of water or dense slush. The
tests should be conducted with the minimum depth of 13 mm (0.5 in) and an average depth of 19 mm (0.75 in),
or if approval is sought for a greater depth than 0.5 in, the average depth should be 1.5 times the depth for
which the take-offs are to be permitted, and the minimum depth should be not less than the depth for which
take-offs are to be permitted.
2 It should be shown that the engines operate satisfactorily without unacceptable loss of power at all speeds
from zero up to lift-off speed and in the attitudes likely to be used. Any special aeroplane handling techniques
necessary to ensure compliance with the requirement should comply with the handling techniques assumed in
establishing the scheduled performance of the aircraft.
[ 3 The tests may be made in water or slush either by complete take-offs and landings as necessary in the
specified precipitation conditions, or by a series of demonstrations in areas of precipitation sufficiently large to
permit the spray pattern to become stabilised and to determine engine behaviour and response. Experience has
shown that where a trough is used, a length of 70 to 90 m is usually satisfactory. If marginal results are obtained,
the effect of the difference between water and slush should be examined.
4 The effects of cross-winds should be examined and where necessary a cross-wind limitation established for
inclusion in the Flight Manual for operation from precipitation covered runways.
5 It may be difficult to deduce the effect of low density, precipitation (dry snow) from high density testing,
but nevertheless clearance of the aeroplane for operation in dense precipitation up to 13 mm (0.5 in) will usually
clear the aeroplane for operation in low density precipitation up to 10 cm (4 in) depth. If clearance is required
for operation in low density precipitation of depths greater than 10 cm (4 in) additional tests (in low density
precipitation having a depth close to that for which approval is sought) will be necessary.
6 When auxiliary devices are fitted to prevent spray from being ingested by the engines it will be necessary
to do additional tests in low density precipitation to permit operations in depths greater than 25 mm (1 in). ]
ACJ 25.1093(b)
Propulsion Engine Air Intakes (Acceptable Means of Compliance and Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1093(b) ]
[ 1 General. Two ways of showing compliance with JAR 25.1093(b) are given. ]
1.1 Method 1. Method 1 is an arbitrary empirical method based on United Kingdom and French practice.
This method is acceptable to all participating countries.
1.2 Method 2. Method 2 is a general approach based on US practice in applying FAR Part 25, Appendix C.
If this method is used, each application will have to be evaluated on its merits.
[ 2.1 In establishing compliance with the requirements of JAR 25.1093(b), reference should be made to ]
ACJ 25.1419, paragraph 1.
2.2 The intake may be tested with the engine and propeller where appropriate in accordance with the
requirements of JAR—E, Chapter C3—4, 29 and Chapter C3—4 Appendix, 12.
2.3 When the intake is assessed separately (e.g. lack of suitable test facilities, change in the design of the
intake, intake different from one tested with the engine) it should be shown that the effects of intake
icing would not invalidate the engine tests of JAR—E. Factors to be considered in such evaluation are:
b. The shedding into the engine of intake ice of a size greater than the engine is known to be able to ingest.
c. The icing of any engine sensing devices, other subsidiary intakes or equipment contained within the intake.
d. The time required to bring the protective system into full operation.
2.4 Tests in Ice-forming Conditions. An acceptable method of showing compliance with the requirements of
[ JAR 25.1093(b), including Appendix C, is given in this paragraph. ]
2.4.1 When the tests are conducted in non-altitude conditions, the system power supply and the external
aerodynamic and atmospheric conditions should be so modified as to represent the required altitude condition
as closely as possible. The altitudes to be represented should be as indicated in Table 1 for simulated tests, or
that appropriate to the desired temperature in flight tests, except that the test altitude need not exceed any
limitations proposed for approval. The appropriate intake incidences or the most critical incidence, should be
simulated.
2.4.2 A separate test should be conducted at each temperature condition of Table 1, the test being made up
of repetitions of either the cycle:—
a 28 km in the conditions of Table 1 column (a) appropriate to the temperature, followed by 5 km in the
conditions of Table 1 column (b) appropriate to the temperature, for a duration of 30 minutes, or
b 6 km in the conditions of Table 1 column (a) appropriate to the temperature, followed by 5 km in the
conditions of Table 1 column (b) appropriate to the temperature, for a duration of 10 minutes.
TABLE 1
2.4.3 Either by separate tests, or in combination with those of 2.4.2 it should be demonstrated that the ice
accretion is acceptable after a representative delay in the selection of the ice-protection systems, such as might
occur during inadvertent entry into the conditions. In lack of other evidence a delay of two minutes (to switch
on the system) should normally be achieved. The time for the system to warm up should be represented.
2.4.4 For each test, the ice protection supply should be representative of the minimum engine power for
which satisfactory operation in icing conditions is claimed.
2.4.5 If at the conclusion of each of the tests of 2.4.2 there is excessive ice accretion then the heat flow and
airflow should be changed simultaneously to simulate an engine acceleration to demonstrate the pattern of ice
shedding, which should be acceptable to the engine.
2.4.6 Where the minimum engine power necessary to provide adequate protection (as established in 2.4.2) is
greater than that required for descent, an additional test representative of the minimum engine power associated
with descent should be conducted by means of either:—
a. a run at the –10ºC condition of Table 1, column (a), for sufficient duration to cover an anticipated
descent of 10,000 ft, or
b. a run simulating an actual descent, at the conditions of Table 1 column (a), covering an altitude change
of not less than 10,000 ft, the highest total temperature reached being not more than 0ºC.
2.4.7 If at the conclusion of the test in 2.4.6 there is excessive ice accretion then the heat flow and airflow
should be changed simultaneously to simulate an engine acceleration and the ambient temperature should be
increased to above 0ºC to demonstrate the pattern of total ice shedding which should be acceptable to the engine.
2.4.8 If the intake contains features or devices which could be affected by freezing fog conditions then in
addition to the above tests of 2.4.2, 2.4.3 and 2.4.6 a separate test on these parts should be conducted for a
3
duration of 30 minutes, in an atmosphere of—2ºC and a liquid water concentration of 0.3 g/m , with the heat
supply to the tested part as would be available with the engine set to the minimum ground idle conditions approved
for use in icing. The mean effective droplet size for the test should be 20 µm. At the end of the period the ice
accretion on the tested part should not prevent its proper functioning, nor should the ice be of such size as to
hazard the engine if shed.
[ 3.1 In establishing compliance with the requirements of JAR 25.1093(b), reference should be made to ]
JAR 25.1419 and ACJ 25.1419.
3.2 The intake may be tested with the engine and propeller where appropriate in accordance with a programme
of tests which results from an analysis of the icing conditions and the engine conditions appropriate to the
installation.
3.3 When the intake is assessed separately it should be shown that the effects of intake icing would not
invalidate any engine certification tests. Factors to be considered in such evaluation are:
b. The shedding into the engine of intake ice of a size greater than the engine is known to be able to ingest.
c. The icing of any engine sensing devices, other subsidiary intakes or equipment contained within the
intake.
d. The time required to bring the protective system into full operation.
3.4 When tests are conducted in non-altitude conditions, the system power supply and the external
aerodynamic and atmospheric conditions should be so modified as to represent the altitude condition as closely
as possible. The appropriate intake incidences or the most critical incidence, should be simulated.
3.5 Following the analysis required in JAR 25.1419(b), which will determine the critical icing conditions
within the envelope of icing conditions defined by Appendix C Figures 1 to 3 and Appendix C Figures 4 to 6,
tests should be conducted at such conditions as are required to demonstrate the adequacy of the design points.
3.6 It should be demonstrated that the ice accretion is acceptable after a representative delay in the selection
of the ice protection systems, such as might occur during inadvertent entry into the conditions. In lack of other
evidence a delay of two minutes (to switch on the system) should normally be achieved in continuous maximum
icing conditions. The time for the system to warm up should be represented.
3.7 If at the conclusion of each of the tests there is excessive ice accretion then the heat flow and airflow
should be changed simultaneously to simulate an engine acceleration to demonstrate the pattern of ice shedding,
which should be acceptable to the engine.
3.8 Where the minimum engine power necessary for adequate protection as established above is greater than
that required for descent, this should be considered in the analysis and test evidence may' have to be provided to
demonstrate acceptability. The icing conditions and its vertical extent are as in Figure 1 of Appendix C. Any ice
able to be shed from the intake into the engine should be acceptable to the engine.
3.9 If the intake contains features or devices which could be affected by freezing fog conditions then a separate
assessment for these parts should be conducted assuming a duration of 30 minutes and an atmosphere of —2ºC,
3
and a liquid water concentration of 0.3 g/m , with the heat supply to the tested part as would be available with
the engine set to the minimum ground idle conditions approved for use in icing. The mean effective droplet size
should be 20 µm. At the end of the period the ice accretion on the part should not prevent its proper functioning,
nor should the ice be of such size as to hazard the engine if shed.
[ ACJ 25.1103(b)(1)
Induction System Ducts (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1103(b)(1)
In complying with JAR 25.1103(b)(1), account should be taken of the intake duct loads that could result from
turbine engine surging. ]
ACJ 25.1103(d)
Induction System Ducts (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1103(d)
For a single failure case leading to a fire and air duct rupture, consideration should be given to the possibility of
fire aggravation due to air flowing into a designated fire zone of an engine from the remaining engine(s), or another
source outside the affected fire zone.
[ ACJ 25.1121(a)
General (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1121(a)
1 If necessary, each exhaust system should be provided with drains to prevent hazardous accumulation of
fuel under all-conditions of operation.
2 Tests should be made to demonstrate compliance with JAR 25.1121(a) and these should include engine
starting in downwind conditions and thrust reversal.
ACJ 25.1121(b)
General (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1121(b)
Leakage should be interpreted to include fuel discharged from the jet pipe under false start conditions, both on the
gound and in flight.]
ACJ 25.1125(a)(3)
Exhaust Heat Exchangers (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1125(a)(3)
The cooling provisions should be arranged so that it is not possible to use the heat exchanger unless the cooling
provisions are in operation.
ACJ 25.1141(f)
Power-plant Controls, General (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1141(f)
ACJ 25.1143(g)
Engine Controls (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
1,2
[ See JAR 25.1143(g) ]
The manual increase in thrust or power by a single instinctive action may be achieved by movement of the throttle
levers to a stop, or the actuation of a switch.
ACJ 25.1181
Designated Fire Zones (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.1181
1 British Standard Institution Specification 3G100: Part 2: Section 3: subsection 3.13, dated December 1973,
the appropriate US MIL Specification, and test standards required to satisfy the appropriate TSO, gives methods of
demonstrating compliance with the Fire Resistance and Fireproof requirements in designated fire zones.
2 Tests to demonstrate compliance with the standard grades of resistance to fire may not be necessary if
similarity can be shown with other components which have been tested in accordance with this standard.
3 For example, materials which are considered satisfactory for use in firewalls without being subjected to
fire tests include:
b. Mild steel sheet protected against corrosion 0.45 mm (0.018 in) thick; and
1
Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/3, Eff. 30.11.84)
2
2—E—8—1 Ch. 11 (Amend. 85/2, Eff. 18.11.85)
JAR—25 SECTION 2
ACJ 25.1195(b)
Fire Extinguisher Systems (Interpretative Material and Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.1195(b)
[ Acceptable methods to establish the adequacy of the fire extinguisher system are laid down in Advisory Circular
20—100. ]
Change 7 2—E—10
SECTION 2 JAR—25
ACJ ― SUBPART F
ACJ 25.1301(b)
Function and Installation (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.1301(b)
1 Adequate means of identification should be provided for all cables, connectors and terminals. The
means employed should be such as to ensure that the identification does not deteriorate under service conditions.
2 When pipelines are marked for the purpose of distinguishing their functions, the markings should be
such that the risk of confusion by maintenance or servicing personnel will be minimised. Distinction by means
of colour markings alone is not acceptable. The use of alphabetic or numerical symbols will be acceptable if
recognition depends upon reference to a master key and any relation between symbol and function is carefully
avoided. Specification ISO. 12 gives acceptable graphical markings.
ACJ 25.1303(b)(5)
Attitude Displays (Interpretative Material and Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.1303(b)(5)
1.1 For turbo-jet aeroplanes each display should be usable over the full range of 360° in pitch and in roll.
For propeller-driven aeroplanes the pitch range may be reduced to ±75° provided that no misleading indication
is given when the limiting attitude is exceeded.
1.2 Paragraph 1.1 is not intended to prohibit the use of vertical references having controlled gyro precession,
or its equivalent in the case of a stable platform, but precession should not occur at a pitch attitude closer to the
horizontal than 70°, and should be completed within an attitude change of 15° .
1.3 The display should take the form of an artificial horizon line which moves relative to a fixed reference
aeroplane symbol so as to indicate the position of the true horizon.
NOTES:
1 It is acceptable for the fixed reference aeroplane symbol to be positioned so that it is aligned with the horizon line during
cruising flight.
2 If a variable index is provided in addition to the fixed aeroplane symbol it should be so designed that it will not introduce
any risk on mis-interpretation of the display.
[ 1.4 There should be no means accessible to the flight crew of adjusting the relationship between the
horizon line and the reference aeroplane symbol. ]
[ 1.5 ] The artificial horizon line should move in roll so as to remain parallel to the true horizon, i.e. when the
aeroplane rolls through an angle of 30º the artificial horizon line should also rotate through 30º relative to the
fixed index.
[ 1.6 ] The artificial horizon line should remain in view over a range of pitch attitudes sufficient to cover all
normal operation of the aeroplane plus a margin of not less than 2º in either direction. Additional 'ghost' horizon
lines should be provided parallel to the main horizon line so that beyond this range at least one such line is in
view at an attitude with the range of the display.
[ 1.7 ] The pitch attitude scale should be sensibly linear while the main horizontal line is in view, but may
become non-linear beyond this range.
[ 1.8 All the attitude displays in the aeroplane should have a similar presentation so as to prevent any risk of
confusion in transferring attention from one display to another.
1.9 Sufficient pitch and bank angle graduations and markings should be provided to allow an acceptably
accurate reading of attitude and to minimise the possibility of confusion at extreme attitudes.
1.10 A bank angle index and scale should be provided. The index may be on the fixed or moving part of the
display. ]
[1.11 ] The 'earth' and 'sky' areas of the display should be of contrasting colours or shades. The distinction
should not be lost at any pitch or roll angle.
2
[ 1.12 ] Any additional information (e.g. flight director commands) displayed on an attitude display should not
obscure or significantly degrade the attitude information.
2
[ 1.13 ] The display should be clearly visible under all conditions of daylight and artificial lighting.
2
[ 1.14 ] Words which may be ambiguous (e.g. 'climb', 'dive', 'push', 'pull', 'up', 'down') should not be used.
2.1 The probability of indication of dangerously incorrect information without a warning being given
should be Extremely Remote.
2.2 The warning may be provided by means of self- or comparison- monitoring and should be clear and
unambiguous, e.g. a flashing light. Instrument flags are unlikely to be acceptable as a comparator warning
unless they exclude a significant portion of the display in which case means should be provided to permit the
removal of the flag from the display which is not in error.
2.3 The definition of dangerously incorrect information depends to some extent on the characteristics of
the aeroplane, but in general an error greater than 5° in pitch or 10° in roll will be considered to be dangerous.
ACJ 25.1303(c)(1)
Flight and Navigation Instruments (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1303(c)(1)
In the absence of warning through the inherent aerodynamic qualities of the aeroplane (e.g. buffeting), it should
be shown that no single faults can result both in misleading airspeed information and in operation of the warning
system outside its tolerances, such as would be likely to lead to exceedance of VMO /MMO.
1
[ ACJ 25.1305 (d) (1)
Powerplant Instruments (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.1305 (d) (1)
The following are examples of parameters which are considered to be directly related to thrust; fan RPM(N1),
integrated engine pressure ratio (IEPR) and engine pressure ratio (EPR), depending on engine type. ]
1 This ACJ consists of interpretative material and acceptable means of compliance, together with definition
of the terms associated with probabilities.
2 Definitions. For the purpose of this ACJ the following definitions apply.
1
Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/1, Eff. 30.4.84)
2
Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/3, Eff. 30.11.84) 2—F—2
SECTION 2 JAR—25
2.1 Failure Condition. A Failure Condition is defined at the level of each system by its effects on the
functioning of that system. It is characterised by its effects on other systems and on the complete aircraft. All
single failures and combinations of failures, including failures in other systems, which have the same effects on
the system under consideration are grouped in the same Failure Condition.
2.2 Event. An occurrence which has its origin distinct from the aeroplane, such as atmospheric
conditions (e.g. gusts, temperature variations, icing and lightning strikes) runway conditions, cabin and baggage
fires. The term is not intended to cover sabotage.
2.3 Error. An occurrence arising as a result of incorrect action by the flight crew or maintenance
personnel.
2.4 Airworthiness Cause. A lack of aeroplane capability resulting from inherent design or a Failure
Condition which could be an accident cause or factor.
2.5 Probable. May occur once or several times during the total operational life of each aeroplane of the
type.
2.6 Improbable. Improbable occurrences are divided into two categories as follows:—
a. Remote. Unlikely to occur to each aeroplane during its total operational life but which may occur
several times when considering the total operational life of a number of aeroplanes of the type.
b. Extremely Remote. Unlikely to occur when considering the total operational life of all aeroplanes
of the type, but nevertheless, has to be considered as being possible.
2.7 Extremely Improbable. So extremely Remote that it does not have to be considered as possible to
occur.
2.8 Numerical Values. Where numerical probabilities are used in assessing compliance with JAR 25.1309(a)
to (d) the following values may be used in providing a common point of reference. The probabilities should be
established as the risk per hour in a flight where the duration is equal to the expected mean flight time for the
aeroplane. For example, in systems where the hazard results from multiple failure in the same flight, the
numerical assessment must take account of the likelihood that this will occur in a flight of expected average
duration. Similarly, in those cases where failures are only critical for a particular period of flight, the hazard may
be averaged over the whole of the expected mean flight time.
-5
Probable ― More than 10 per hour
-3
Frequent ― More than 10 per hour
Reasonably Probable ― 10-3 – 10-5 per hour
2.9 Effects. An Effect is classified according to the severity of the following criteria:
a. The reduction of safety margins related to performance, handling qualities, structure and systems
operation.
b. An increase in workload above the level normally required of the flight crew.
Using these criteria the classifications of 2.9.2 to 2.9.4 can be made reflecting the likelihood of the effect
becoming a Catastrophe.
2.9.1 Catastrophic Effect. An Effect which results in the loss of the aeroplane and/or in fatalities.
ii Physical distress or a workload such that the flight crew cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks
accurately or completely, or
ii. A reduction in the ability of the flight crew to cope with adverse operating conditions as a result of
increase in workload or as a result of conditions imparing their efficiency, or
[ 2.9.4 Minor Effect. An Effect less severe than a Major Effect, in the event of which airworthiness is not
significantly affected, and any actions are well within the capability of the crew, such as:
3.1 For the purpose of this paragraph 3, a system should be taken to include all elements of equipment
necessary for the control and performance of a particular major function e.g. electrical power generation system,
roll control system. It therefore includes both the equipment specifically provided for the function in question,
and other basic aeroplane equipment such as power supplies.
3.2 Systems, considered separately and in relation to other systems, should be designed with the objective
that there is an inverse relationship between the maximum acceptable probability of an occurrence and the
severity of its Effect, such that a Catastrophe from all systems causes is Extremely Remote. Paragraphs 3.3, 3.4
and 3.5 below are consistent with this objective. (See Figure 1.)
3.3.1 Each Failure Condition which results in a Catastrophe should be assessed to be Extremely Improbable,
or all Failure Conditions taken together which result in Catastrophes should be assessed to be Extremely Remote.
3.3.2 A Failure Condition assessed as Probable should not result in worse than Minor Effects.
3.3.3 A Failure Condition assessed as Remote should not result in worse than Major Effects.
3.3.4 A Failure Condition assessed as Extremely Remote may result in Hazardous Effects. However the
assessment should take into account that a Hazardous Effect may sometimes become a Catastrophic Effect with
a particular probability. In such cases, where it is practicable, the combination of the probability of the Failure
Condition and the probability that the Hazardous Effect becomes a Catastrophic Effect should be evaluated,
and should be Extremely Improbable in order to satisfy JAR 25.1309(b)(1). For example the collapse of an
undercarriage during landing, which is generally considered as Hazardous, can sometimes become Catastrophic.
3.3.5 In assessing the Effects of Failure Condition account should be taken of factors which might alleviate
or aggravate the direct Effects of the initial Failure Condition, including consequent or related conditions
existing within the aeroplane which may affect the ability of the crew to deal with direct Effects, such as the
presence of smoke, acceleration vectors, interruption of communication, interference with cabin pressurisation, etc.
3.3.6 Flight crew action. When assessing the consequences of a given Failure Condition including the
necessary crew action, account should be taken of the probability of the failure(s), the complexity of the crew
action and the likely frequency of the relevant crew training. The number of overall Failure Conditions involving
other than instinctive crew actions may influence the flight crew performance that can be expected. Training
requirements may need to be specified in some cases.
3.4 Operation with Failure Conditions and Events. In assessing the consequences of a Failure Condition
account should be taken of critical Events and their probabilities.
3.5 Operation without Failure Conditions. Systems, considered separately and in relation to other systems,
should be so designed that, when they are operating within their specifications, it is Extremely Improbable that
an Event will occur such as to cause a Catastrophe. ]
2―F―5
FIGURE 1– RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROBABILITY AND SEVERITY OF EFFECTS
JAR―25
Ch. 9 (corrected)
JAR—25 SECTION 2
[ 4 The method of demonstrating compliance with JAR 25.1309(d) will depend upon the complexity of
the system and this ACJ gives guidance on this matter. Agreement should be reached with the appropriate
Authority at an early stage regarding the extent of application of this paragraph 4.
i. where it can be shown that compliance with the requirements prescribed for a specific system provides
an equivalent safety level, or
ii. in the case of Minor Effects, where compliance may normally be expected to be provided by good design
and manufacturing practices.
b. Where, exceptionally, the current state of the art does not permit the attainment of the objective stated
in JAR 25.1309(b)(1),
ii. the design and construction of the system should utilise well-proven methods.
4.2 Compliance with JAR 25.1309(a), (b) and (c) should be shown by assessment of the systems operating
separately and in relation to other systems. This assessment should, where necessary be supported by appropriate
ground, flight or flight simulator tests.
a. The assessment should include the possible modes of normal operation and of failure, the resulting
Effects on the aeroplane and occupants considering the stage of flight and operating conditions, the awareness
of the crew of the Failure Conditions and the corrective action required, the capability of detecting failures, and
the aeroplane inspection and maintenance procedures. Consideration should be given to Failure Conditions
being accompanied or caused by Events or Errors. In such combinations allowance may be made for the
probabilities of the Failure Conditions, Events and Errors.
b. In assessing individual systems account may be taken of previous experience of similar systems.
c. The assessment should take account of the variation of performance of the system(s). In so doing the
statistical distribution of performance may be used.
4.3 Acceptance of probability levels, which are related in the requirements to Castastrophic Effects, should
not be obtained on the basis of assessed numerical values alone, unless these values can be substantiated beyond
reasonable doubt. See also 4.6 and 4.7.
4.4 In considering the probability of crew error combined with system failures it may be difficult to
substantiate this in meaningful statistical terms. In such cases two possible lines of action are as follows:—
b. to evaluate the consequences of the error, and taking into account the actual cockpit layout to estimate
the speed of action required and the likely frequency of this action. In appropriate cases account may be taken
of the provision of special crew training.
a. Those errors which increase the failure rates of items and which can to some extent be allowed for in
the assessment of failure rates. ]
b. Those errors which may modify the design concept of a system in a dangerous manner. It is not usually
possible to quantify such errors. An engineering assessment should be made of the design and of the maintenance
instructions with the object of eliminating the possibility of such errors as could produce Hazardous and
Catastrophic Effects.
4.6 A single failure of a system or component may only be accepted to be a Remote Failure when the
system or component is assessed to have the necessary order of reliability based on either
a. service experience which analysis shows to be applicable, supported by analysis and/or testing of the
particular design, or
4.7 A single failure may only be assessed to be an Extremely Improbable Failure when it applies to a
particular mode of failure (e.g. jamming) and it can be shown to the satisfaction of the aeroplane designer and
the appropriate Authority, from the aspects of construction and installation, that such a Failure need not be
considered as a practical possibility. When a particular short phase of flight is concerned this may be taken into
account when considering the probability of single or multiple Failures.
5.1 The manufacturer may develop a list of equipment and functions, which need not be operative at the
time of despatch of the aeroplane, and state the compensating precautions which need to be taken for the
particular flight (e.g. operational limitations, flight crew or maintenance procedures).
5.2 The list should take account of the analysis carried out in accordance with JAR 25.1309(d), together
with any other relevant information, and supported by engineering and operational judgement. ]
The effects of fluid or vapour contamination, due either to the normal environment or accidental leaks or
spillage, should be taken into account.
The effects of mechanical damage or deterioration including short circuits or earths caused by such damage, in
particular the failure of an earth connection should be taken into account.
Each source of electrical supply (e.g. generators and batteries) should be provided with means to give the flight
crew immediate warning of the failure of its output. These warning means are additional to the system indication
requirements of JAR 25.1351(b)(6). For multiphase systems the warning should also indicate the loss of any
phase.
1 All possible combinations of engine and electrical power source failures should be considered, except
those that are shown to be extremely improbable. The failures considered should include the total loss of all
main generated electrical power. Emergency supplies should be provided to those services which are necessary to
complete the flight in safety. Such emergency supplies should be mechanically and electrically isolated from the
normal system and be such that no single malfunction, including the cutting of a cable bundle or the loss of a
junction box, will affect both the normal and emergency supplies.
NOTES:
1 Where the design of the electrical system is such that the airworthiness standard can be satisfied with parts of the system
inoperative, these conditions should also be considered when assessing the failure cases.
2 Where means are provided to regain the output from one or more main generators, such means should use separate control
and switching arrangements, upstream of the main busbars and be so designed and installed that no fault, other than an Extremely
Improbable one, will lose both the main system and the alternative means of control and distribution.
2 Failures of main busbars which may affect one or more source of generated electrical power should be
considered.
3 Failures of secondary power supplies e.g. inverters and transformers, should be considered.
4 The consideration of failure cases should include earth connections as well as supply failures.
NOTES:
1 Electrical supplies of different characteristics should not be connected to the same earth point unless it can be shown that the
joining of the circuits, with the earth disconnected, does not constitute a hazard.
2 The failure of a single earth connection should not cause the loss of more than one essential circuit nor should such a
failure cause a hazardous inadvertent operation of any circuit.
[ Where alternative or multiplication of systems and equipment is provided to meet the requirements of
JAR 25.1309(e), the segregation between circuits should be such as to minimise the risk of a single occurrence
causing multiple failures of circuits or power supplies of the system concerned. For example, electrical cable
bundles or groups of hydraulic pipes should be so segregated as to prevent damage to the main and alternative
systems and power supplies.]
For aeroplanes for which the two-power-units-inoperative performance is scheduled, such services should remain
operative as will enable the flight to be safely continued and terminated. In achieving this:—
a. some reduction in the performance of particular services is permissible (e.g. airframe ice-protection),
b. it may be assumed that electrical loads are reduced in accordance with a pre-determined procedure which
is consistent with safety in the types of operation of which the aeroplane is certificated, and
c. consideration should be given to any restrictions that may be necessary should the air supply for cabin
pressure be interrupted or seriously reduced consequent upon the failure of the power-units.
1 The reliability of each warning system should be compatible with the general reliability of the system for
which it provides a warning.
ACJ 25X1315
Negative Accelerations (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25X1315
1 Demonstration of compliance with JAR 25X1315 should be made by analysis and/or ground tests,
and should be supported by flight tests.
2 Analysis and/or Ground Tests. Appropriate analysis and/or ground tests should be made on components
of essential fluid systems and such other components as are likely to be adversely affected by negative acceleration
to demonstrate that they will not produce a hazardous malfunction.
3 Flight Tests
2—F—7—2 Change 5
JAR—25 SECTION 2
a. one continuous period of at least five seconds at less than zero g, and, separately,
b. a period containing at least two excursions to less than zero g in rapid succession, in which the total
time at less than zero g is at least five seconds.
3.2 The tests should be made at the most critical condition from the fuel flow standpoint, e.g. with fuel
flow corresponding to maximum continuous power and with the fuel system representing a typical operational
low fuel condition as for a missed approach.
Where an optimum position for both pilots is not possible, any bias should be in favour of the first pilot.
ACJ 25.1323(c)(2)
Airspeed Indicating System (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1323(c)(2)
From 1.3 VS to stall warning speed the rate of change of IAS with CAS should not be less than 0.75.
ACJ 25.1323(c)(3)
Airspeed Indicating System (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1323(c)(3)
From VMO to VMO + ⅔(VDF —VMO) the rate of change of IAS with CAS should not be less than 0.5.
ACJ 25.1323(d)
Airspeed Indicating System (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1323(d)
The design and installation of the pitot system should be such that positive drainage of moisture is provided,
chafing of the tubing and excessive distortion at bends is avoided, and the lag and the possibility of moisture
blockage in the tubing should be kept to an acceptable minimum.
ACJ 25.1323(e)
Airspeed Indicating System (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
[ See JAR 25.1323(e) and JAR 25.1325(b) ]
1 Tests should be conducted to the same standard as recommended for turbine engine air intakes
(see ACJ 25.1093(b)(1)) unless it can be shown that the items are so designed and located as not to be
susceptible to icing conditions. Ice crystal and mixed ice and water cloud will need to be considered where the
system is likely to be susceptible to such conditions.
2 However, in conducting these tests due regard should be given to the presence of the aeroplane and its
effect on the local concentration of the cloud.
ACJ 25.1325
Static Pressure System (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1325
The lag and the possibility of moisture blockage in the tubing should be kept to an acceptable minimum.
ACJ 25X1328
Direction Indicator (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25X1328
1 After correction the deviation on any heading should not exceed 1º, except that:
a. On aeroplanes with a short cruising range, the above limit may be extended after consultation with the
National Authority.
b. A change in deviation due to the current flow in any item of electrical equipment and its associated
wiring is permissible, but should not exceed 1º. The combined change for all such equipment, with all
combinations of electrical load, should not exceed 2º.
c. A change in deviation due to the movement of any component, e.g. controls or undercarriage in normal
flight is permissible, but should not exceed 1º.
2 The change in deviation due to the proximity of any item of equipment containing magnetic material
should not exceed 1°, and the combined change for all such equipment should not exceed 2º.
After correction the deviation on any heading should not exceed 4º, including the effects of all electrical loads
other than short period (impulse) loads. Short period loads should not cause marked disturbances.
ACJ 25.1329
Automatic-pilot System (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.1329
1 General
1.1 For the purpose of this ACJ the automatic-pilot system should be considered to include the various sensors,
computers, power supplies, controllers, instruments, servo motors/actuators, and associated wiring.
1.2 Adequate precautions should be taken to prevent the incorrect adjustment of parts of the automatic-
pilot if such errors would hazard the aeroplane (e.g. torque clutches or limit switches with so great a range of
adjustment that maladjustment could be catastrophic).
1.3 The automatic pilot should comply with JAR 25.671(a) and in making the safety analysis, failures of
the engines, control systems and trim systems should be taken into account.
2.1.1 The more critical of the following should be induced into the automatic-pilot system. If auto-throttles
are installed, they should be operating.
a. A signal about any axis equivalent to the cumulative effect of the most critical of those failures,
including a failure of autotrim, if installed, which are not shown to be Extremely Remote or Extremely Improbable.
b. The combined signals about all affected axes, if multiple axis failures can result from a failure which is
not shown to be Extremely Remote or Extremely Improbable.
2.1.2 Corrective action should not be initiated until three seconds after the pilot has become aware, through
either the behaviour of the aircraft or a reliable failure warning system, that a malfunction has occurred. The
simulated failure and the subsequent corrective action should not cause:—
a. the imposition on any part of the aeroplane structure of a load greater than its proof strength,
e. a bank angle of more than 60º en-route or more than 30º during the final approach,
2.1.3 The power or thrust for climb should be the most critical of:—
c. that actually used for operational climb speeds. The altitude loss should be measured.
2.2 Manoeuvring Flight. Malfunctions should also be induced into the automatic-pilot system similar to
2.1. When corrective action is taken one second after the result of the malfunction has alerted the pilot, the
resultant loads and speeds should not exceed the values in 2.1. Manoeuvring flight tests should include turns
with the malfunction induced when maximum bank angles for normal operation of the system have been
established and in the critical aeroplane configuration and/or stages of flight likely to be encountered when
using the automatic-pilot. The altitude loss should be measured.
2.3.1 An investigation should be made to determine the effects of an oscillatory signal of sufficient
amplitude to saturate the servo amplifier of each device that can move a control surface. The investigation should
cover the range of frequencies which can be induced by a malfunction of the automatic-pilot system and systems
functionally connected to it, including an open circuit in a feedback loop. The investigated frequency range
should include the highest frequency which results in apparent movement of the system driving the control
.
surface to the lowest elastic or rigid body response frequency of the aircraft. Frequencies less than 0 2 cps may,
however, be excluded from consideration. The investigation should also cover the normal speed and configuration
ranges of the aeroplane. The results of this investigation should show that the peak loads imposed on the parts of
the aircraft by the application of the oscillatory signal are within the limit loads for these parts.
2.3.2 The investigation may be accomplished largely through analysis with sufficient flight data to verify the
analytical studies or largely through flight tests with analytical studies extending the flight data to the conditions
which impose the highest percentage of limit load to the parts.
2.3.3 When flight tests are conducted in which the signal frequency is continuously swept through a range, the
rate of frequency change should be slow enough to permit determining the amplitude of response of any part
under steady frequency oscillation at any critical frequency within the test range.
[ (G) 3 Recovery of Flight Control (United Kingdom). Recovery should be demonstrated either by overpowering
or by manual use of an emergency quick disconnect device after the appropriate delay. The pilot should be able
to return the aeroplane to its normal flight attitude under full manual control without exceeding the loads or
speed limits defined in this paragraph and without engaging in any dangerous manoeuvres during recovery, or
without the use of unusual skill. It should be possible to overpower servo forces plus resultant airloads in all
configurations and attitudes of flight demonstrated, including maximum speed for which approval is sought
and without exceeding the following transient control forces measured at the pilot's controls; pitch 50 pounds;
roll 30 pounds (force applied at rim); yaw 150 pounds. The maximum servo forces used for these tests should
not exceed those values shown to be within the structural limits for which the aeroplane was designed. The
maximum altitude loss experienced during these tests should be measured. ]
4 Performance of Function. The automatic pilot system should be demonstrated to perform its intended
function in all configurations in which the auto-pilot may be used throughout all appropriate manoeuvres and
5.1 Throughout an approach, no signal or combination of signals simulating the cumulative effect of any
single failure or malfunction in the automatic-pilot system should provide hazardous deviations from flight path
or any degree of loss of control if corrective action is initiated one second after the pilot has become alerted to
the malfunction.
5.2 The aircraft should be flown down the ILS in the configuration and at the approach speed specified
by the applicant for approach. Simulated automatic-pilot malfunctions should be induced at critical points
along the ILS, taking into consideration all possible variations in automatic-pilot sensitivity and authority. The
malfunctions should be induced in each axis. While the pilot may know the purpose of the flight, he should not
be informed when a malfunction is to be or has been applied except through aeroplane action, control movement,
or other acceptable warning devices.
5.3 An engine failure during an automatic ILS approach should not cause a lateral deviation of the aeroplane
from the flight path at a rate greater than three degrees per second or produce hazardous attitudes.
5.4 If approval is sought for ILS approaches initiated with one-engine inoperative, the automatic-pilot should
be capable of conducting the approach. The deviation from the ILS course following the failure of a second
critical engine should not be greater than three degrees per second.
5.5 The minimum engagement height should be determined. Either of the following methods is acceptable
for uncoupled ILS approaches. If approval is being sought for coupled ILS approaches, however, the method
given in 5.5.2 should be used.
5.5.1 Altitude Loss Method. Recoveries should be initiated one second after the pilot recognizes the failure.
The altitude loss shall be measured as the vertical distance between the glide slope path and the lowest point
in the recovery manoeuvre.
ii the point along the glidepath when the simulated malfunction is induced;
iii point where the pilot indicates recognition of the malfunction; and
iv the point along the path of the aeroplane where recovery action is initiated. Data obtained from the
point of the indicated malfunction to the point where the aeroplane has either again intersected the glide slope
or is in level flight will define the deviation profile. When changes to the aeroplane automatic pilot configuration
are made during the approach and these changes alter the deviation profile, additional data should be obtained
to define each of the applicable deviation profiles. An example of a deviation profile may be found in Figure 1.
b. Recoveries from malfunctions should simulate under-the-hood instrument conditions with a one-second
time delay between pilot recognition of the fault and initiation of the recovery at all altitudes down to 80 per-
cent of the minimum decision altitude for which the applicant requests approval.
c. Recoveries from malfunctions at altitudes between 80 percent of the minimum decision altitude for
which the applicant requests approval and the minimum altitude for which the applicant requests approval to
operate the automatic-pilot may be visual with no time delay between pilot recognition of fault and initiation of
recovery.
FIGURE 1
2–F–13
EXAMPLE DEVIATION PROFILE ]
JAR–25
d. The minimum altitude at which the autopilot may be used should be determined as the altitude which
results in the critical deviation profile becoming tangent with a minimum operational tolerance line. An example
of this may be found in Figure 2. The 29:1 slope of the minimum operational tolerance line provides a one percent
gradient factor of safety over the 50:1 obstacle clearance line. An additional factor of safety is provided by
measuring the 29:1 slope from the horizontal at a point 15 feet above the runway threshold. It is recognized
that this minimum altitude will vary with glide slope angle. Information regarding these variations should be
obtained and presented.
5.6 A malfunction of the automatic-pilot during a coupled ILS approach should not place the aeroplane in an
attitude which would preclude conducting a satisfactory go-around, or landing.
6 Servo Stall Forces. The automatic-pilot system should be so installed and adjusted that the system
tolerances established during certification tests can be maintained in normal operation. This may be assured by
conducting flight tests at the extremes of the tolerances. Those tests conducted to determine that the automatic-
pilot system will adequately control the aeroplane should establish the lower limit; and those tests to determine
that the automatic-pilot will not impose dangerous loads or deviation from the flight path should be conducted
at the upper limit. Appropriate aeroplane loadings to produce the critical results should be used.
7 Operating Procedures. Operating procedures for use at the automatic pilot should be established.
(See ACJ 25.1585(a).)
8 Malfunction Tests. In malfunction tests described in 2.1.1, 2 1.2, 2.2 and 5.1, the recognition
point should be that at which a pilot in service operation may be expected to recognise the need to take action
and not that at which a test pilot engaged in flight trials might do so.
[ (G) 8 Malfunction Tests (United Kingdom). In malfunction tests described in 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.2 and 5.1 the
recognition point should be that at which a pilot in service operation may be expected to recognize the need
to take action and not that at which a test pilot engaged in flight trials might do so. It should not in any case
be less than one second after the occurrence of the failure.
]
ACJ 25.1331(a)(3)
Instruments Using a Power Supply (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1331 (a)(3)
ACJ 25.1333(b)
Instrument Systems (Interpretative Material and Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.1333(b)
1 In showing compliance with JAR 25.1333(b) account may be taken of the probability with which loss
of information will lead to a catastrophe.
2 Attitude Display Systems. Three displays should be provided, except that a turn-and-slip indicator may
be accepted as an alternative to a third attitude display on aeroplanes for which the flight characteristics are such
that it can safely be flown without a need for exceptional skill using the turn-and-bank indicator together with
those instruments that remain usable after total failure of the electrical generating system. The reliability and
independence of the three attitude displays should be confirmed by a suitable assessment. Each display should
have independent sensors and power supplies. The power supply to the standby display and its lighting should
be such that the display is usable for not less than 30 minutes if a total failure of the generated electrical power
causes the loss of both main instruments.
NOTE: The time for which the display remains usable will be stated in the Flight Manual.
1 In Showing Compliance with JAR 25.1333(b) account may be taken of the probability with which loss of
information will lead of a catastrophe.
]
[ 2 Attitude Display Systems. One acceptable means of compliance with JAR 25.1333(b) is to provide
three displays, the reliability and independence of which should be confirmed by a suitable assessment. Each
display should have independent sensors and power supplies.
NOTE: The time for which the display remains usable will be stated in the Flight Manual. ]
The disconnect means required by JAR 25.1351 (b)(5) should be accessible to the appropriate flight-crew members
in their normal seated positions.
ACJ 25.1351(d)
General (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1351(d)
1 Where the main battery is used as the source of power with normal electrical power inoperative no single
malfunction, electrical or mechanical, should affect simultaneously the normal electrical power and the power
from the battery.
2 No crew action on the electrical supplies should be required to satisfy this requirement.
ACJ 25.1353(a)
Electrical Equipment and Installations (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1353(a)
a. conducted and radiated interference caused by electrical noise generation from apparatus connected
to the busbars,
d. parasitic currents and voltages in the electrical distribution and earth systems, including the effects of
lightning currents or static discharge,
[ ACJ 25.1355(c)
Distribution System (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1355(c)
The arrangement, protection and control of the feeders from the busbars to the distribution points, and the
divisions of loads among the feeders, should be such that no single fault occurring in any feeder or associated
control circuit will hazard the aeroplane.
ACJ 25.1357(a)
Circuit Protective Devices (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1357(a)
No hazard should result from the effects of variations in ambient temperatures on either the protective device
or the equipment it protects. See also JAR 25.1309. ]
Change 5 2—F—16—2
SECTION 2 JAR—25
[ ACJ 25.1359(a)
Electrical System Fire and Smoke Protection (Interpretative Material and Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.1359(a)
These requirements, and those of JAR 25.863 applicable to electrical equipment, may be satisfied by the
following:
a. Electrical components in regions immediately behind firewalls and in engine pod attachment structures
should be of such materials and at such a distance from the firewall that they will not suffer damage that could
hazard the aeroplane if the surface of the firewall adjacent to the fire is heated to 1100ºC for 15 minutes.
b. Electrical equipment should be so constructed and/or installed that in the event of failure, no hazardous
quantities of toxic or noxious (e.g. smoke) products will be distributed in the crew or passenger compartments.
c. Electrical equipment, which may come into contact with flammable vapours should be so designed and
installed as to minimize the risk of the vapours exploding under both normal and fault conditions. This can be
satisfied by meeting the Explosion Proofness Standards of draft ISO document TC20/SC5/N.43, dated 1974.
ACJ 25X1360(a)
Protection Against Injury (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25X1360(a)
1 Where there may be a hazard during maintenance or servicing, aeroplane panels etc., carrying voltages
of above 50V RMS, should be marked with the voltage.
2 Where socket outlets are provided, e.g. for electric razors, these should be labelled as to use and with the
output voltage or voltages. Where the output voltage exceeds 100 volts d.c. and/or 50 volts a.c. RMS either the
output should be electrically isolated from the aeroplane structure, or means shall be provided to prevent inadvertent
contact with live parts.
ACJ 25X1360(b)
Protection Against Injury (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25X1360(b)
1 For equipment which has to be handled during normal operation by the flight or cabin crew, a
temperature rise of the order of 25ºC, for metal parts, should not be exceeded. For other equipment, mounted
in parts of the aeroplane normally accessible to passengers or crew, or which may come into contact with objects
such as clothing or paper, the surface temperature should not exceed 100ºC, in an ambient of 20ºC.
2 The heating surfaces of properly installed cooking apparatus are excluded from these requirements.
3 The provision of guards around hot surfaces is an acceptable method of complying with these
requirements.
ACJ 25.1419
Ice Protection (Interpretative Material and Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.1419
1 General. Two ways of showing compliance with JAR 25.1419 are given. ]
[ 1.1 Method 1. Method 1 is an arbitrary empirical method based on United Kingdom and French practice.
This method is acceptable to all participating countries.
1.2 Method 2. Method 2 is a general approach based on US practice in applying FAR Part 25, Appendix C.
If this method is used, each application will have to be evaluated on its merits.
1.3 Additional material, based on UK practice, appropriate to operating in ice crystal conditions is given in 4.
This material should be used only where design features of the aeroplane are susceptible to this form of icing.
2.1 Any part of the aeroplane (including its equipment) which is susceptible to ice accretion in ice forming
conditions, should be subjected to such evaluation as would demonstrate the suitability of the aeroplane to fly
in the ice forming conditions defined in JAR Appendix C.
2.2 For the purposes of analysis and tests on protected surfaces the conditions of Figures 1,2, 4 and 5 only
of Appendix C should apply. In determining the rates of catch, the full spectrum of the droplet sizes should be
considered but in determining impingement areas, a maximum droplet size of 50µm need only be considered.
2.3 The natural icing tests carried out on the aeroplane will be judged for their acceptability by
evaluation of icing conditions through which the aeroplane has flown in relation to the envelope of conditions
of Appendix C.
2.4 Where there are parts of the aeroplane which are not amenable to analysis, or when testing is considered
necessary, the following paragraphs describe an acceptable method of demonstration that the requirements are
complied with.
2.5.1 General. When considering simulated icing tests, the flight conditions selected for testing at each
temperature should be the most unfavourable taking account of aeroplane speed, altitude, angle of incidence
and power supply. Where altitude is a critical parameter, the tests should be conducted in flight or on the ground
so as to simulate the effects of altitude. When the tests are conducted in non-altitude conditions the system
supply and the external aerodynamic and atmospheric conditions should be so modified as to represent the
required altitude conditions as closely as possible.
a. Those parts of the airframe where the accretion of ice under the conditions of Appendix C is likely to
have an adverse effect on the airworthiness of the aeroplane should be tested for a period of 30 minutes duration
at each of the conditions specified in the following Table 1.
TABLE 1
b. At the end of the tests the total ice accretion should be such as not to adversely affect the safety of the
aeroplane.]
[ c. The duration of the above tests can be reduced if it can be demonstrated that the surface is completely
ice free or that the total ice accretion is obviously contained by repetitive shedding either naturally or enforced by
cyclic operation of the protective system.
2.5.3 Check Concerning Intermittent Maximum Conditions. It would be necessary to check that Intermittent
Maximum icing conditions of Figures 4 and 5 of Appendix C do not hazard the aeroplane. The encounters
considered should include three clouds of 5 km horizontal extent with Intermittent Maximum concentrations as
in Table 2 separated by spaces of clear air of 5 km.
TABLE 2
a. Where ice can accrete on unprotected parts it should be demonstrated that the effect of such ice will
not critically affect the characteristics of the aeroplane as regards safety (e.g. flight, structure and flutter). The
subsequent operation of retractable devices should be considered.
b. Irrespective of what is required by paragraph 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 from service experience the amount of ice
on the most critical unprotected main aero-foil surface need not exceed a pinnacle height of 75 mm (3 in) in a
plane in the direction of flight. For other unprotected main surfaces an analysis may be performed to determine
the maximum ice accretion associated with this maximum pinnacle height. In the absence of such an acceptable
analysis a uniform pinnacle height of 75 mm (3 in) should be assumed. The shape and apparent density, taking
into account the texture of the ice, are important. Unless suitable evidence is already available, icing tests should
be conducted to determine the critical values of these properties.
c. The critical ice accretion on unprotected parts will normally occur during the hold near 15,000 feet at
about —10ºC so as to give a total temperature of around 0ºC.
2.5.5 Ice Shedding. Parts of the aeroplane which can accrete ice which upon shedding could interfere with
the continuous safe operation of the engines or essential services should be so protected as to prevent the shedding
of ice having more than critical dimensions for the engine or device or it should be demonstrated that the
trajectories of such ice are not critical. The protection or otherwise should be demonstrated assuming the icing
conditions against which the engine air intake is required to be demonstrated.
2.5.6 Essential Equipment. Tests should be conducted to the same standard as recommended for turbine
engine air intakes (see ACJ 25.1093(b)(1)) unless it can be shown that the items are so designed and located as not to
be susceptible to icing conditions. Ice crystal and mixed ice and water cloud will need to be considered. However,
in conducting these tests due regard should be given to the presence of the aeroplane and its effect on the local
concentration of the cloud.
3.1 Any part of the aeroplane (including its equipment) which is susceptible to ice accretion in ice-forming
conditions, should be subjected to such evaluations as would demonstrate the suitability of the aeroplane to fly
in ice-forming conditions defined in JAR 25, Appendix C, using FAA Advisory Circular AC 20—73, dated
21st April, 1971, and FAA Technical Report ADS4, dated March, 1964. ]
b. the operational conditions which would affect the accumulation of ice on protected and unprotected
surfaces of the aeroplane,
c. the operational conditions of the engine and propeller (if applicable) which would affect the accumulation
of ice and/or the availability of energy to operate systems, and
3.3 For the purpose of analysis and tests on protected and unprotected surfaces all Figures 1 to 6 of
Appendix C are used. In determining the more critical conditions of rate of catch and limits of impingements,
the full spectrum of droplet sizes should be considered, taking into account the droplet size distribution
(Langmuir D distribution is acceptable for this use).
3.4 The natural icing tests carried out on the aeroplane will be judged for their acceptability by the
evaluation of the icing conditions through which the aeroplane has flown in relation to the envelope of conditions
of Appendix C.
3.5 In following the alternative procedures as listed in JAR 25.1419(c)(1) and (3), the conditions selected
for testing should be the most critical as determined from the analysis.
3.6 Where ice can accrete on protected or unprotected parts it should be demonstrated that the effect of
such ice will not critically affect the characteristics of the aeroplane as regards safety (e.g. flight, structure and
flutter). The subsequent operation of retractable safety deyices should be considered.
3.7 From service experience the amount of ice on the most critical unprotected main aerofoil surface
need not usually exceed a pinnacle height of 75 mm (3 in) in a plane in the direction of flight. For other
unprotected main surfaces an analysis may be performed to determine the maximum ice accretion associated
with this maximum pinnacle height. In the absence of such an acceptable analysis a uniform pinnacle height
of 75mm (3 in) should be assumed. The shape and apparent density, taking into account the texture of the ice,
are important. Unless suitable evidence is already available, icing tests should be conducted to determine the
critical values of these properties.
3.8 The critical ice accretion on unprotected parts will normally occur during the hold near 15,000 feet so as
to give a total temperature of around 0ºC.
3.9 Parts of the aeroplane which can accrete ice, which, upon shedding, could interfere with the continuous
safe operation of the engines or essential services should, if necessary, be so protected as to prevent the shedding
of ice having more than critical dimensions for the engine or device, or it should be demonstrated that the
trajectories of such ice are not critical.
4 Ice Crystal Conditions. An assessment should be made into the vulnerability of the aeroplane and its
systems to ice crystal conditions.
a. turbine engine intakes with bends particularly reverse flow (see JAR 25.1093), and
4.3 Where any doubt exists as to the safe operation in ice crystal conditions appropriate tests should be
conducted to establish the proper functioning of the system likely to be affected.
4.4 For guidance Table 3 gives provisional details of the conditions likely to be encountered in service.
TABLE 3
NOTES:
1 In the temperature range 0 to –10°C the ice crystals are likely to be mixed with water droplets (with a maximum diameter
3
of 2 mm) up to a content of 1 g/m or half the total content whichever is the lesser, the total content remaining numerically
the same.
2 The source of information is RAE Tech. Note Mech. Eng. 283 dated May 1959.
It is recommended that, in achieving compliance with this requirement, reliance should not be placed upon a
simple pressure relief device. Experience gained from hydraulic systems in which the pump has failed to off-
load and has therefore delivered maximum flow at maximum pressure, shows that the resultant temperature
rise across the pressure-reducing valve can produce fluid degradation and a potentially serious fire hazard,
depending on the type of fluid being used. This may also affect the integrity of items such as joints, seals and
flexible hoses.
[ ACJ 25.1435(a)(8)
Hydraulic Systems (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.1435(a)(8)
Prevention of hazard may be achieved either by design of the pump or by its location or by both. ]
ACJ 25.1435(b)(2)
Hydraulic Systems (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1435(b) (2)
The loads due to vibration and the loads due to temperature effects are those loads which act upon the elements
of the system due to environmental conditions.
ACJ 25X1436(b)(3)
Pneumatic Systems (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25X1436(b) (3)
1 In systems in which the air pressure of the supply source is significantly greater than the system operating
pressure (e.g. an engine bleed-air tapping) due account should be taken of the consequences of failure of the
pressure-regulating device when assessing the strength of the system, downstream of the device relative to the
values of PW , PL and PR.
2 Such devices should be protected as necessary against deleterious effects resulting from the presence of
oil, water or other impurities which may exist in the system.
ACJ 25X1436(c)(2)
Pneumatic Systems (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25X1436(c)(2)
The loads due to vibration and the loads due to temperature effects are those loads which act upon the elements
of the system due to environmental conditions.
ACJ 25.1438
Pressurisation and Low Pressure Pneumatic Systems (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.1438
1 Strength
1.1 Compliance with JAR 25.1309(b) in relation to leakage in ducts and components will be achieved if it is
shown that no hazardous effect will result from any single burst or excessive leakage.
1.2 Each element (ducting and components) of a system, the failure of which is likely to endanger the
aeroplane or its occupants, should satisfy the most critical conditions of Table 1.
[ TABLE 1
T1 = the combination of internal and external temperatures which can be encountered in association with
pressure P1.
P2 = the most critical value of pressure corresponding to a probability of occurrence 'reasonably probable'.
T2 = the combination of internal and external temperatures which can be encountered in association with
pressure P2.
T3 = the combination of internal and external temperatures which can be encountered in association with
pressure P3.
T4 = the combination of internal and external temperatures which can be encountered in association with
pressure P4.
1.3 After being subjected to the conditions given in column 1 of Table 1, and on normal operating conditions
being restored, the element should operate normally and there should be no detrimental permanent distortion.
1.4 The element should be capable of withstanding the conditions given in column 2 of Table 1 without
bursting or excessive leakage. On normal operating conditions being restored, correct functioning of the element
is not required.
1.5 The element should be capable of withstanding, simultaneously with the loads resulting from the
temperatures and pressures given in the Table, the loads resulting from:
a. Any distortion between each element of the system and its supporting structures.
1.6 The system should be designed to have sufficient strength to withstand the handling likely to occur in
operation (including maintenance operations).
2 Tests
2.1 Static tests. Each element examined under 1.2 should be static-tested to show that it can withstand the
most severe conditions derived from consideration of the temperatures and pressures given in the Table. In
addition, when necessary, sub-systems should be tested to the most severe conditions of 1.2 and 1.5. The test
facility should be as representative as possible of the aircraft installation in respect of these conditions.
2.2 Endurance tests. When failures can result in hazardous conditions, elements and/or sub-systems should
be fatigue-tested under representative operating conditions that simulate complete flights to establish their lives. ]
[ ACJ 25.1439(b)(5)
Protective Breathing Equipment (Interpretative Material and Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.1439(b)(5)
1 If a demand system is used, a supply of 300 litres of free oxygen at 70ºF and 760 mm Hg pressure is
considered to be of 15 minutes duration at the prescribed altitude and minute volume. (Interpretative Material)
2 Any other system such as a continuous flow system is acceptable provided that it does not result in any
significant increase in the oxygen content of the local ambient atmosphere above that which would result from
the use of a demand oxygen system. (Interpretative Material.)
3 A system with safety over-pressure would be an acceptable means of preventing leakage. (Acceptable
Means of Compliance.)
4 A continuous flow system of the closed circuit rebreather type is an acceptable system. (Acceptable
Means of Compliance.) ]
[ ACJ 25.1441(b)
Oxygen Equipment and Supply (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1441(b)
1 No material should be used which, in direct contact with oxygen, may give off noxious or toxic gases.
2 Couplings and connectors shall be suitable for their intended use and should satisfy the following:—
a. Where used in close proximity to one another, they should be protected against incorrect assembly.
b. If intended for connection and disconnection in flight by a crew member they should be:
ii automatically ejected, or otherwise provide an obvious indication that the connection is not properly
made
iii self sealing and designed to minimize leakage during coupling and uncoupling, and
iv so arranged that where electrical connections are also combined the oxygen circuit is complete and sealed
before the electrical connections are made.
ACJ 25.1441(c)
Oxygen Equipment and Supply (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1441(c)
1 For the purposes of JAR 25.1439 to 1453 a 'source' may be a single container or a number of
containers connected together into a single supply line. A chemical oxygen generator is considered to be a
container.
2 In the case of chemically-generated oxygen systems it is not possible to determine directly the quantity
available, but for portable units or where oxygen is supplied to more than five occupants from a single supply
source, means should be provided readily to determine on the ground and in flight whether the units have been
discharged.
3 Indication of the operational state of the flight-crew system and its supplies should be provided at the
appropriate flight-crew station.
ACJ 25.1441(d)
Oxygen Equipment and Supply (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1441(d)
In assessing the required oxygen flow rates and equipment performance standards, consideration should be given
to the most critical cabin altitude/time-history following any failure, not shown to be Extremely Improbable,
which will result in the loss of cabin pressure taking into account the associated emergency procedures. ]
[ ACJ 25.1443
Minimum Mass Flow of Supplemental Oxygen (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1443
The curves shown in Figure 3 may be used to determine the minimum oxygen flow rates required.
Altitude х 1000 ft ]
FIGURE 3
ACJ 25.1445(a)(2)
Equipment Standards for the Oxygen Distributing System (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1445(a)(2)
Where the separate reserve is provided by an automatic device, means should be provided to override this device
manually unless its failure can be shown to be Extremely Remote.
ACJ 25.1445(a)(3)
Equipment Standards for the Oxygen Distributing System (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1445(a)(3)
The requirements of this paragraph need not be applied to chemical generator systems which supply not more
than five occupants from a single supply source.
ACJ 25.1447(c)
Equipment Standards for Oxygen Dispensing Units (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1447(c)
Where National Operational Regulations do not require all passengers to be provided with oxygen, (c)(3) and
(c)(4) may not apply.
ACJ 25.1447(c)(1)
Equipment Standards for Oxygen Dispensing Units (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1447(c)(1)
1 When oxygen masks are presented, oxygen should be supplied to the mask but without flow.
2 Oxygen flow from the mask should be initiated automatically on pulling the mask to the face.
3 Facilities for manual presentation by a crew member should be provided on each dispensing unit.
4 Indication of the operation of the automatic presentation system should be provided at the appropriate
flight-crew station.
[5] The design of the automatic presentation system should take into account that when the landing field
altitude is less than 2,000 feet below the normal preset automatic presentation altitude, the automatic presentation
altitude may be reset to landing field altitude plus 2,000 feet.
ACJ 25.1447(c)(2)
Equipment Standards for Oxygen Dispensing Units (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1447(c)(2)
Unless it is required that the pilot at the controls is wearing his mask and breathing oxygen while the altitude
exceeds 25,000 feet, the design of the flight-crew masks and their stowages should be such that each mask can
be placed in position and put into operation in not more than five seconds, one hand only being used, and will
thereafter remain in position, both hands being free.
1 The equipment should be so located as to be within reach of the cabin attendants while seated and
restrained at their seat stations.
2 The mask/hose assembly should be already connected to the supply source, and oxygen should be
delivered with no action being required except turning it on and donning the mask.
3 Where a cabin attendant's work area is not within easy reach of the equipment provided at his seat
station, an additional unit should be provided at the work area.
ACJ 25.1449
Means for Determining Use of Oxygen (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1449
A simple flow indicator should be provided unless it can be shown that the inflation of the economiser system
provides effective indication. A system using a simple re-breathing bag would not be acceptable.
[ ACJ 25.1450
Chemical Oxygen Generators (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1450
Where substained operation is achieved by successive replacement of generator elements, adequate provision should
be made for the handling and disposal of used elements. ]
ACJ 25.1451
Fire Protection for Oxygen Equipment (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1451
1 High-pressure shut-off valves should be designed to provide effective slow opening and closing, so as to
avoid the possible risk of fire or explosion.
2 Re-charging systems, if installed, should be provided with means to prevent excessive rates of charging
which could result in dangerously high temperatures within the system. The charging system should also provide
protection from contamination.
[ 3 The compartments in which high-pressure system components, including source(s) are located should
have adequate ventilation so ensure the rapid dilution of leaked oxygen. Such compartments should also provide
adequate protection against contamination by liquids and other products which could result in the risk of fire.
4 Where in-situ charging facilities age provided, the compartments in which they are located should be
accessible from outside the aircraft and as remote as possible from other service points and equipment. Placards
should be provided, located adjacent to the servicing point, with adequate instructions covering the precautions
to be observed when the system is being charged. ]
2—F—27—2 Change 5
JAR-25 SECTION 2
5 The installation of the system should be such that components and pipe lines:—
d. are protected against grease or other lubricants, and are protected against the effects of vibration.
In addition, joints should where possible be assembled dry, but where compounds are used for sealing they should
be approved for that purpose.
6 Where the oxygen is supplied from chemical generators, the effects of heat emission, during both normal
and inadvertent operation, on both the installation and other adjacent equipment, should be taken into account.
[ ACJ 25.1453
Protection of Oxygen Equipment from Rupture (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1453
1 Parts of the system subjected to high oxygen pressure should be kept to a minimum and should be
remote from occupied compartments. Where such parts are installed within occupied compartments they should
be adequately protected from accidental damage.
2 Each container, component, pipe and coupling should have sufficient strength to withstand a pressure
equivalent to not less than the maximum working pressure acting on that part of the system when multiplied by
the appropriate Proof and Ultimate factors given in Table 1. The maximum working pressure includes tolerances
of any pressure limiting means and possible pressure variations in the normal operating modes. Account should
also be taken of the effects of temperature up to the maximum anticipated temperature to which the system may
be subjected. Transient or surge pressures need not be considered except where these exceed the maximum
working pressure multiplied by 1.10.
TABLE 1
3 Each source should be provided with a protective device (e.g. rupture disc). Such devices should prevent
the pressure from exceeding the maximum working pressure multiplied by 1.5.
4 Pressure limiting devices (e.g. relief valves), provided to protect parts of the system from excessive pressure,
should prevent the pressures from exceeding the applicable maximum working pressure multiplied by 1.33 in the
event of malfunction of the normal pressure controlling means (e.g. pressure reducing valve).
5 The discharge from each protective device and pressure limiting device should be vented overboard in
such a manner as to preclude blockage by ice or contamination, unless it can be shown that no hazard exists by
its discharge within the compartment in which it is installed. In assessing whether such hazard exists consideration
should be given to the quantity and discharge rate of the oxygen released, the volume of the compartment into
which it is discharging, the rate of ventilation within the compartment and the fire risk due to the installation of
any potentially flammable fluid systems within the compartment. ]
6 In addition to meeting the requirements of JAR 25.1453, oxygen containers may have to be approved
in accordance with national regulations.
NOTES:
1 The proof pressure should not cause any leakage or permanent distortion.
2 The ultimate pressure should not cause rupture but may entail some distortion.
3 In the case of containers in which oxygen is stored under pressure, the above proof and ultimate factors are only
applicable where fatigue endurance tests are performed from which a permissible fatigue life is declared. The ultimate pressure
test should be performed on the specimen used for the fatigue life evaluation. In the absence of such evaluation the Authority
may prescribe higher factors. Portable cylinders are subject to other national regulations.
1 The phrase 'as far aft as practicable', when this could imply mounting aft of the pressurised compartment,
should be interpreted as a position sufficiently aft as to be consistent with reasonable maintenance access and
in a position to minimise the probability of damage from crash impact and subsequent fire.
2 The container should remain attached to the local structure under normal, longitudinal and transverse
accelerations of 15g. ]
ACJ 25X1499(a)
Domestic Services and Appliances (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25X1499(a)
When considering failures of domestic appliances, the effect of the loss of the water supply to a water heater,
with the electrical supply maintained, should be taken into account.
ACJ 25X1499(b)
Domestic Services and Appliances (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25X1499(b)
The design of galley and cooking appliance installations should be such as to facilitate cleaning to limit the
accumulation of extraneous substances which may constitute a fire risk.
ACJ — SUBPART G
ACJ 25.1501
Operating Limitations and Information — General (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1501
The limitations and information established in accordance with Subpart G should be only those which are within
the competence of the flight crew to observe, and should relate only to those situations (including pre- and post-
flight) with which a flight crew member might reasonably be concerned.
ACJ 25X1516
Other Speed Limitations (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25X1516
[ Speed limitations for devices such as spoilers, speed brakes, high lift devices, thrust reversers, landing lights and ]
the opening of doors and direct vision windows, should be included.
ACJ 25X1517
Rough Air Speed (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25X1517
ACJ 25.1519
Weight, Centre of Gravity and Weight Distribution (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1519
A statement of the maximum certificated take-off and landing weights, and the minimum certificated take- off
and landing weights, should be established, together with the maximum ramp or taxying weight, the maximum
zero-fuel weight and any other fixed limit on weight, including weight limitations resulting from such factors
as brake energy limits, tyre limits, etc., established in accordance with the airworthiness standards of JAR—25.
Any limitations on aeroplane loading associated with the stated weight limitations (e.g. fuel load and usage,
maximum fuel for landing) should be considered.
[ ACJ 25.1521
Power-Plant Limitations (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1521
1 In furnishing limitations, consideration should be given to the following. The list does not necessarily
include all the items to be considered for a given aeroplane.
a. Rotational speeds.
f. Anti-icing.
2 Other parameters, e.g. time, altitude, ambient temperatures, airspeed, may be necessary in defining
power-plant limitations.
ACJ 25.1523
Minimum Flight Crew (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1523
1 Both the number and identity of the flight grew members should be established.
2 If the minimum flight crew varies with the kinds of operation to which the aeroplane is limited, the
approved number and identity of the flight crew members should be stated for each kind of operation.
3 If a particular flight crew member's station has to be occupied at all material times, this should be stated
when specifying the minimum flight crew.
ACJ 25X1524
Systems and Equipment Limitations (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25X1524
Examples of systems and equipment installations for which limitations may be appropriate include, but are not
limited to, electrical, fuel, hydraulic, pneumatic, cabin pressurisation, air conditioning, airframe fire protection,
airframe ice protection, anti-skid and auto-braking systems, also autopilot, auto-throttle, flight director, approach
coupler and yaw damper
ACJ 25.1533(b)
Maximum Depths of Runway Precipitants (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1533(b)
The maximum depths of runway precipitants (e.g. snow, slush or standing water on the runway) established as
an operating limitation for take-off may be, at the option of the Applicant, either –
a. An average depth for any one-third part of the runway not exceeding 3 mm, or –
b. The maximum depths of runway precipitants at which compliance is shown with JAR 25.1091(d)(2)
and for which the effect of significant depth of precipitation on performance in accordance with JAR 25.113
and JAR 25X132 is established and scheduled in the Aeroplane Flight Manual.
ACJ 25.1541
Markings and Placards – General (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1541
Markings or placards should be placed close to or on (as appropriate) the instrument or control with which
they are associated. The terminology and units used should be consistent with those used in the Flight Manual.
The units used for markings and placards should be those that are read on the relevant associated instrument.
ACJ 25.1543
Instrument Markings – General (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1543
The markings should be such that the instrument remains easily readable with the minimum of confusion.
ACJ 25.1545
Airspeed Limitation Information (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1545
A placard could be used when the speed limitation can be a simple presentation (e.g. an lAS speed up to a given
altitude and an indicated Mach number thereafter). A complex speed limitation should be presented automatically
on the instrument, (e.g. by means of an additional moving pointer).
ACJ 25.1549
Power-plant Instruments (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1549
1 Power-plant instrument range markings are intended to indicate to flight crew members, at a glance, that
the power-plant operation is being accomplished in a safe or desirable, undesirable but allowable, or unsafe region.
The colour red indicates an unsafe condition which requires immediate and precise action by the flight crew. The
use of multiple red lines should be avoided to minimise confusion.
2 A precautionary range is a range where limited operation is permissible, as indicated in the aeroplane
Flight Manual. Experience has shown that to satisfy the requirement for clearly visible markings, the following
minimum dimensions should be observed.
a. [ Red, yellow and green lines. ] 0.05 in wide and 0.03 in long.
b. [ Red, yellow and green arcs and areas. ] 0.1 in wide, length as required.
ACJ 25.1557(a)
Baggage and Cargo Compartments and Ballast Location (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.1557(a)
If baggage, cargo compartment and ballast location limitations are complex and involve, for example, additional
limitations on loading intensity and distribution, it is acceptable to provide a placard making reference to the
appropriate document.
The layout of the Flight Manual should be in accordance with the Provisional Acceptable Means of Compliance
[ for the standardisation of approved aeroplane Flight Manuals, as prescribed in ICAO Airworthiness Technical
Manual 9051–AN 896. The terminology and units used in the Flight Manual should be in accordance with the
recommendation of ICAO Airworthiness Technical Manual 9051–AN 896 or as prescribed by the Authority. ]
ACJ 25.1583(c)
Centre-of-Gravity Limitations (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1583(c)
1 Indication should be given in tabular or graphic form of the c.g. limits for take-off and landing and for any
other practicably separable flight condition, as appropriate for the range of weights between the maximum take-
off weight and the minimum landing weight presented in accordance with JAR 25.1583(c). The landing gear
position appropriate to each condition should be shown, or, alternatively, data should be presented for landing-
gear-extended position only and should include the moment change due to gear retraction. C.g. limits should be
presented in terms of both distance-from-datum and percentage of the mean aerodynamic chord (MAC). The
datum for the former should be defined and the length and location of the MAC should be stated.
2 For those weight limitations which vary with runway length, altitude, temperature and other variables,
the variation in weight limitation may be presented as graphs in the performance section of the Flight Manual,
and included as limitations by specific reference, in the limitations section, to the appropriate graph or page.
ACJ 25.1583(i)
Manoeuvring Flight Load Factors (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1583(i)
The flight manoeuvring limit load factors for which the structure is approved, expressed in terms of normal
acceleration, or g, should be included. If more restrictive flight load factors are established for particular
operations outside the normal operating envelope (e.g. landing flap position with maximum take-off weight) such
factors should be presented and defined.
ACJ 25.1585(a)
Operating Procedures (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1585(a)
1 In furnishing information and instructions, consideration should be given to the following. The lists do not
necessarily include all items to be considered for a given aeroplane. The categorisation of certain items may need
to be modified because of design features or other considerations.
2 Emergency Procedures
e. Runaway stabiliser
g. Ditching
3 Other Procedures
a. Engine starting
b. APU operation
c. Fuel management. The effect on unusable fuel quantity due to fuel booster pump failure should be
stated.
e. Navigation system
i. Oxygen system
j. Hydraulic system
k. Electrical system
l. Anti-ice/de-ice system
m. Operation in turbulence
n. Equipment cooling
o. Flight controls
q. Braking system
r. Fuel dumping
Change 9 2–G–4–2
SECTION 2 JAR–25
5 Observance of these procedures may not be mandatory and approval of such procedures is not intended
to prohibit or discourage development and use of improved or equivalent alternative procedures based on
operational experience with the aeroplane.
6 The procedures to be followed by the flight crew in the event of an engine fire, severe damage or
separation of the engine should be similar, and should include identification of the failed engine as the primary
action as far as the powerplant is concerned.
1
[ ACJ 25.1585 (c)
Cruise Manoeuvring Capability (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.1585 (c)
The buffet onset envelopes should be accompanied by information on the maximum altitude at which it is
possible to achieve a positive normal acceleration increment of 0.3 g without exceeding the buffet onset boundary,
at any given combination of weight, centre of gravity location and airspeed. (See also ACJ 25.251 (e).) ]
The bank angle used in showing compliance with JAR 25.121 should be scheduled in the Flight Manual. Where it
is more practical to quote the degree of lateral control (e.g. control wheel level) instead of the bank angle, this
would be acceptable.
2
[
ACJ 25X1588 ]
Supplementary Performance Information (Interpretative Material)
2
[ See JAR 25X1588 (a), (b) and (d) ]
Notes should be added to the supplementary performance information presented in the Flight Manual, established
in accordance with JAR 25X131, JAR 25X132 and JAR 25X135, explaining how this information was derived
(e.g. by calculation or tests). Furthermore, it should be pointed out that this information does not necessarily
ensure adequate handling capabilities of the aeroplane unless handling qualities have been assessed in very low
friction conditions, in which case the limiting factors found should be presented in the Flight Manual.
1
Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/1, Eff. 30.4.84)
2
2–G–5 Ch. 11 (Amend. 84/3, Eff. 30.11.84)
JAR–25 SECTION 2
[ ACJ – SUB-PART J
The objectives of JAR 25.671(b) should be satisfied with respect to APU systems, where the safety of the aeroplane
could otherwise be jeopardised.
Where the APU is not in direct electrical contact with its mounting the engine should be electrically connected to the
main earth system by at least two removable primary conductors, one on each side of the APU.
The need for additional tests, if any, in hot climatic conditions should take account of any tests made by the APU
constructor to establish APU performance and functioning characteristics and of satisfactory operating experience
of similar power units installed in other types of aeroplane.
The applicant should declare the maximum climatic conditions for which compliance will be established and this
should not be less severe than the ICAO Intercontinental Maximum Standard Climate (100°F (37·8°C) at sea-level).
If the tests are conducted under conditions which deviate from the maximum declared ambient temperature, the
maximum temperature deviation should not normally exceed 25F° (13.88C°).
ACJ 25B903(e)(2)
APU's (Auxiliary Power Units) (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25B903(e)(2)
2.1 Sufficient flight tests should be made over the range of conditions detailed in 2.2 and 2.3 to establish the
envelope of altitude and airspeed for reliable APU restarts, taking into account the results of restart tests completed
by the APU constructor on the same type of APU in an altitude test facility or flying test bed, if available, and the
experience accumulated in other aircraft with the same APU. The effect of APU deterioration in service should be
taken into account.
2.2 Altitude and Configuration. From sea-level to the maximum declared restarting altitude in all appropriate
configurations likely to affect restarting, including the emergency descent configuration.
2.3 Airspeed. From the minimum to the maximum declared airspeed at all altitudes up to the maximum
declared APU restarting altitude. The airspeed range of the declared relight envelope should cover at least 30 kt. ]
[ 2.4 Delay Tests. The tests referred to in 2.2 should include the effect on APU restarting performance of a
delay period between APU shut-down and restarting.
ACJ 25A939(a)
Turbine APU Operating Characteristics (Auxiliary Power Units) (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25A939(a)
1 The wording 'in flight' should be interpreted to cover all operating conditions from APU start until shut-down.
ACJ 25A943
APU Operating Characteristics (Auxiliary Power Units) (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25A943
1 Compliance with JAR 25A943 should be shown by design analysis and flight tests. The flight tests should
include manoeuvre in which less than zero 'g' occurs for one continuous period of at least 5 seconds and a further
manoeuvre with two periods of less than zero 'g' with a total time for these two periods of at least 5 seconds.
2 In the case of non-essential APU's, inadvertent shut-down due to negative accelerations is acceptable.
ACJ 25A953(b)
Fuel System Independence (Auxiliary Power Units) (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25A953(b)
The fuel supply to an APU may be taken from the fuel supply to the main engine if provision is made for a shut-off
means to isolate the APU fuel line.
Subject to agreement with the Authority, fuel with a higher vapour pressure may be used at a correspondingly lower
fuel temperature provided the test conditions closely simulate flight conditions corresponding to an initial fuel
temperature of 110°F (43·3°C) at sea-level.
ACJ 25B991
Fuel Pumps (Auxiliary Power Units) (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25B991
If the fuel supply to the APU is taken from the fuel supply to the main engine, no separate pumps need be provided
for the APU. ]
1 General. Two ways of showing compliance with JAR 25B1093(b)(2) are given.
1.1 Method 1. Method 1 is an arbitrary empirical method based on United Kingdom and French practice.
This method is acceptable to all participating countries.
1.2 Method 2. Method 2 is a general approach based on US practice in applying FAR Part 25, Appendix C. If
this method is used, each application will have to be evaluated on its merits.
2.1 In establishing compliance with the requirements of JAR 25B1093(b)(2), reference should be made to
ACJ 25.1419, paragraph 1.
2.2 The intake may be tested with the APU in accordance with the requirements of JAR—APU, Section 1,
paragraph 5.2 and the Advisory Material for the testing of APU's in Icing Conditions.
2.3 When the intake is assessed separately it should be shown that the effects of intake icing would not
invalidate the icing tests of JAR—APU. Factors to be considered in such evaluation are:—
b. The shedding into the APU of intake ice of a size greater than the APU is known to be able to ingest.
c. The icing of any APU sensing devices, other subsidiary intakes or equipment contained within the intake.
d. The time required to bring the protective system into full operation.
2.4 Tests in Ice-forming Conditions. An acceptable method of showing compliance with the requirements of
JAR 25B1093(b)(2), including Appendix C, is given in this paragraph.
2.4.1 When the tests are conducted in non-altitude conditions, the system power supply and the external aero-
dynamic and atmospheric conditions should be so modified as to represent the required altitude conditions as
closely as possible. The altitudes to be represented should be as indicated in Table 1 for simulated tests, or that
appropriate to the desired temperature in flight tests, except that the test altitude need not exceed any limitations
proposed for approval. The appropriate intake incidences or the most critical incidence, should be simulated.
2.4.2 Two tests (which may be separate or combined) should be conducted at each temperature condition of
Table 1, at or near the indicated altitude.
b. Three repetitions of 5 km in the conditions of Table 1, column (b), appropriate to the temperature,
followed by 5 km in clear air. ]
[ TABLE 1
2.4.3 At the conclusion of each of the tests of 2.4.2 the ice accretion should be such as not to adversely affect
the subsequent running and functioning of the APU.
2.4.4 If the APU intake contains features or devices which could be affected by freezing fog conditions then in
addition to the above tests of 2.4.2 a separate test on these parts or devices should be conducted for a duration of
30 minutes with the heat supply to the tested parts as would be available with the APU set to the minimum ground
3
idle conditions approved for use in icing in an atmosphere of —2°C and a liquid water concentration of 0.3 g/m .
The mean effective droplet size for the test should be 20 µm. At the end of the period the ice accretion on the
tested part should not prevent its proper functioning nor should the ice be of such size as to hazard the APU if shed.
3.1 In establishing compliance with the requirements of JAR 25B1093(b)(2), reference should be made to
JAR 25.1419 and ACJ 25.1419.
3.2 The intake may be tested with the APU in accordance with a programme of tests which results from an
analysis of the icing conditions and the APU conditions appropriate to the installation.
3.3 When the intake is assessed separately it should be shown that the effects of intake icing would not
invalidate any APU certification tests. Factors to be considered in such evaluation are:
b. The shedding into the APU of intake ice of a size greater than the APU is known to be able to ingest.
c. The icing of any APU sensing devices, other subsidiary intakes or equipment contained within the intake.
d. The time required to bring the protective system into full operation.
3.4 When tests are conducted in non-altitude conditions, the system power supply and the external aerodynamic
and atmospheric conditions should be so modified as to represent the altitude condition as closely as possible. The
appropriate intake incidences or the most critical incidence, should be simulated.
3.5 Following the analysis required in JAR 25.1419(b), which will determine the critical icing conditions
within the envelope of icing conditions defined by Appendix C Figures 1 to 3 and Appendix C Figures 4 to 6, tests
should be conducted at such conditions as are required to demonstrate the adequacy of the design points.
3.6 At the conclusion of each of the tests the ice accretion should be such as not to adversely affect the
subsequent running and functioning of the APU. ]
[ 3.7 If the APU intake contains features or devices which could be affected by freezing fog conditions then a
separate assessment for these parts should be conducted assuming a duration of 30 minutes and an atmosphere of
3
—2º C and a liquid water concentration of 0.3 g/m , with the heat supply to the part as would be available with the
APU set to the minimum ground idle conditions approved for use in icing. The mean effective droplet size should be
20 µm. At the end of the period the ice accretion on the part should not prevent its proper functioning, nor should
the ice be of such size as to hazard the engine if shed.
ACJ 25A1195(b)
Fire Extinguisher Systems (Auxiliary Power Units) (Interpretative Material and Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25A1195(b)
Acceptable methods to establish the adequacy of the fire extinguisher system are laid down in Advisory Circular
20—100. ]
Change 7 2—J—6
SECTION 2 JAR—25
1 Transport Category Aeroplanes: turbine engine powered: limitations related to Landing. (To be used
in conjunction with the Alternative Landing Distance Requirement in accordance with JAR 25.125(b)).
2 The aeroplane must not be taken off at a weight such that, allowing for normal consumption of fuel
and oil in flight, the weight at the estimated time of arrival at the aerodrome of intended destination or
at any alternate aerodrome will exceed the maximum landing weight specified in the Flight Manual for
the elevation of each of the aerodromes involved and for the air temperature expected at the estimated
time of landing.
The aeroplane must not be taken off at a weight in excess of that which, in accordance with the Landing
Distance Required as shown in the Flight Manual for the altitude of the aerodrome of intended destination,
will permit the aeroplane to be brought to rest at the aerodrome within the length of the runway, this
length being as declared by the aerodrome authorities having regard to the obstructions in the approach.
Compliance must be shown with 3.1 and either with 3.2 or with 3.3.
3.1 It must be assumed that the aeroplane is landed in still air on the most suitable runway for a landing in
still air.
3.2 It must be assumed that the aeroplane is landed on the runway which is the most suitable for the wind
conditions expected at the aerodrome at the time of landing.
3.3 If full compliance with 3.2 is not shown, the aeroplane may be taken off if an alternate aerodrome is
designated which permits compliance with 5.
4.1 The weight of the aeroplane must be assumed to be reduced by the weight of the fuel and oil expected
to be consumed in flight to the aerodrome of intended destination.
4.2 The runway gradient must be assumed to be zero, unless the runway is usable only in one direction.
4.3 For the purpose of compliance with 3.2 account must be taken of not more than 50% of the forecast
wind component opposite to the direction of landing or not less than 150% of the forecast wind
component in the direction of landing.
The aeroplane must not be taken off at a weight in excess of that which will permit the aeroplane to
comply with 3 and 4 in relation to any alternate aerodrome designated in the operational flight plan, at
the expected time of arrival at that aerodrome, except that the Landing Distance Required may be that
shown in the Flight Manual for the alternate aerodrome. ]