Question - 2 - Answer (1) (New) As at 4.34am

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Question 2

There are two issues involved here. The first issue is whether the contracts
entered into by Tiffany, who is a minor, with Mr. Tay Sui Lee and One Stop Packages
are valid or not valid. The second issue is whether the contract is valid or invalid if
Tiffany misrepresented her age when entering into the contracts.

According to Section 10(1) of Contracts Act 1950, an agreement is a contract


when they are made by free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful
consideration and with a lawful object, and not it is considered void. Section 11 of
Contracts Act 1950 further provides the person that are competent to contract must be
of the age of majority according to the law to which he is subject to, and who is of
sound mind, and is a legal object. Section 2 of the Age of Majority Act 1971 stated
that the age of majority is 18 years old and above. Therefore, as provided from the
statue, a person can only enter into a contract when he is of sound mind, 18years old
and above and not barred by the law he is subject to.

However there are few exceptions to the general rule. In Rajeswary & Anor. v.
Balakrishnan & Ors. (1958) 3 MC 1781, the High Court held that marriage contracts
were not affected by the general rule. The second exception is the contract for
necessaries. As provided in Section 69 of Contracts Act 1950, the minor is liable for
the necessaries supplied to him (not the contract) but it must depends on the minor’s
station in life, his actual needs, the circumstances in which it was supplied and the
purpose it was served. The definition of necessaries is defined in Nash v. Inman
(1908) 2 KB 12 as things essential to existence and reasonable comfort of an infant.
The third exception is the Scholarship Agreements. Section 4(a) of Contracts
(Amendment) Act 1976 provides that no scholarship agreements shall be invalidated
on the ground that the scholar entering into such agreement is not of age of majority.
There are other legislations that allow minors to enter into valid agreement such as
Contract of Insurance under Insurance Act 1963 (Revised 1972), and Apprenticeship
Contracts under Children and Young Persons Employment Act 1966.

Applying the general rule in Mohori Bibee v. Dhurmodas Ghose (1903) I.L.R .
30 Cal.539 Privy Council3, contracts entered into by minors are void. Tiffany, who is
1
Rajeswary & Anor. v. Balakrishnan & Ors. (1958) 3 MC 178
2
Nash v. Inman (1908) 2 KB 1
3
Mohori Bibee v. Dhurmodas Ghose (1903) I.L.R .30 Cal.539 Privy Council

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of 16 year old, is below age of majority and therefore considered as a minor and the
contracts entered by her with other parties are invalid. This can be seen in Section 11
of Contracts Act 1950 that provided the competent person to contract must be of age
of majority and Section 2 of Age of Majority Act 1971 provided that the age of
majority is 18 years old and above. Therefore, the contracts entered into by Tiffany
with Tay Sui Lee and One Stop Package Sdn. Bhd are void at initials, as Tiffany is a
16 years old minor. The land transfer contract executed by Tiffany to Mr.Tay Sui Lee
is not valid, though the contract is witnessed and subsequently registered. In Leha bte.
Jusoh v. Awang Johari (1978) 1 MLJ 2114, the Federal Court also ruled that the
agreement entered into by a minor purchaser is void.

In this case, the contract between Tiffany and Mr Tay Sui Lee does not fall
under the exceptions of the general rule of Section 11 of Contracts Act 1950.
Therefore, the contract is not valid for the reason stated earlier.

However, the contract between Tiffany and One Stop Package Sdn Bhd may
fall under the exception of the general rule of Section 11 of Contracts Act 1950
because it involves “necessaries” supplied. If the supplies that have been proven to be
a necessary to Tiffany had been supplied by One Stop Package Sdn Bhd, then Section
69 of Contracts Act 1950 applies. The contract is void like any other agreement
entered into by a minor but the minor is liable for the supplies supplied, given that the
supplies supplied are proven to be a necessary to Tiffany. It is not a contractual
liability but a statutory liability. The statue further states that if a person who
incapable of entering into a contract or anyone whom he is legally bound to support,
is supplied by another with necessaries suited to his condition in life, the person who
has furnished such supplies is entitled to be reimbursed from the property of such
incapable person.

Another question raised here is whether the goods supplied or going to be


supplied to Tiffany by One Stop Package Sdn Bhd are considered as necessaries? The
statue does not define necessaries specifically but the common law: Government of
Malaysia v. Gurcharan Singh & Ors (1971) 1 MLJ 2115 defined necessaries as the
conditions and circumstances in which the supply was made and the purpose which
was served, subject to the nature of goods supplied, the infant actual needs, and the
4
Leha bte. Jusoh v. Awang Johari (1978) 1 MLJ 211
5
Government of Malaysia v. Gurcharan Singh & Ors (1971) 1 MLJ 211

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minor’s station in life. Another rule under Gurcharan’s case is that the supplier is
entitled to be reimbursed from the property of such incapable person but the supplier
is only entitled to a reasonable price for the necessaries supplied.

Tiffany who is a 16 years old minor and student, is studying in a boarding


school. She entered into the contract to purchase uniforms, shoes, and stationeries but
the question does not state that she had been supplied by One Stop Package or not.
Generally, uniforms, shoes and stationeries are essentials for a student. Hence, they
are considered as necessaries to Tiffany. Therefore, Tiffany is liable for the
necessaries supplied by One Stop Package Sdn Bhd as provided in Section 69 of
Contracts Act 1950, if and only if she had been supplied with supplies that have been
proven to be a necessary to Tiffany.

For instance, One Stop Package Sdn Bhd is only entitled to be reimbursed
from the property of Tiffany with a reasonable price for the necessaries supplied. This
means that One Stop Package Sdn Bhd will only be reimbursed from Tiffany’s
property, if Tiffany does have property. So if Tiffany does not have any property, then
she does not have to pay One Stop Package Sdn Bhd but Madam Sheila will have to
pay for her because Section 69 of Contracts Act 1950 states that “anyone whom he is
legally bound to support” is required to reimburse the supplier. In this case, Madam
Sheila is the guardian for Tiffany, thus she is legally bound to support Tiffany. In
addition, if Tiffany does have property, the company is only able to be reimbursed
with the cost price of the supplies supplied to Tiffany, as “reasonable price” always
refers to the cost price but not the same as the contract price. This principle is applied
in Government of Malaysia v. Gurcharan Singh & Ors (1971) 1 MLJ 211

The second issue for this question is whether Tiffany is liable for the contracts
if she had misrepresented her age to Mr. Tay Sui Lee and One Stop Package Sdn Bhd.
In Natesan v. Thanaletchumi & Anor. [1952] MLJ 6, the court held that even if the
minor had induced a person to contract with him by falsely misrepresented his age, is
not estopped or precluded from pleading minority to avoid the contract. The court
applied the concept laid down in an Indian decision of Khan Gul v Lakha Singh AIR
1928 Lah. 609.7 From the rules established from the cases, we can know that even
Tiffany had misrepresented her age to induce Mr Tay Sui Lee and One Stop Package
6
Natesan v. Thanaletchumi & Anor. [1952] MLJ
7
Khan Gul v Lakha Singh AIR 1928 Lah. 609

3
Sdn Bhd to contract with her, she is not precluded from pleading her minority and the
agreement is void as far as she is concerned.

In conclusion, Madam Sheila can challenge the contract entered into by


Tiffany with Mr Tay Sui Lee, as Tiffany is a 16 year old minor. The contracts
between Tiffany with Mr Tay Sui Lee and Tiffany with One Stop Package are both
void at initial because Tiffany is not competent to contract. On the other hand, Tiffany
will only be liable for the necessaries supplied by One Stop Package Sdn Bhd but not
the contract to purchase, if Tiffany had been supplied by the supplies and they are
proven to be necessaries to Tiffany.

As for Mr Tay Sui Lee, there is no contract on which he can sue because
infant is totally incompetent and incapable of entering into a contract. Even if Tiffany
misrepresented her age, Tiffany is not precluded from pleading her minority.
Therefore, Mr Tay Sui Lee has no right against the contract and Tiffany.

Contract to purchase between One Stop Package Sdn Bhd and Tiffany is void
at initial as well. They can only pursue their rights if Tiffany had been supplied by the
supplies which might be a necessary to Tiffany. Generally, uniforms, stationeries and
shoes are essentials for a student. However, Section 69 of Contracts Act 1950 only
applies if and only if One Stop Package Sdn Bhd able to prove that the items supplied
to Tiffany are essentials to her and suited to her station in life. The burden of prove
lies on One Stop Package Sdn Bhd. If One Stop Package Sdn Bhd cannot prove the
items supplied are necessaries to Tiffany, then One Stop Package Sdn Bhd will have
no right against Tiffany. The result would also be the same even if Tiffany had
misrepresented her age.

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