DIMAPILIS vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 227158

April 18, 2017

FACTS:
Petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the October 2010
Barangay Elections. He ran for re-election for the same position in the 2013 Barangay
Elections, and filed his CoC4 on October 11, 2013, declaring under oath that he is "eligible for
the office [he seeks] to be elected to." Ultimately, he won in the said elections and was
proclaimed as the duly elected Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung Maragul on October 29,
2013.

On even date, the COMELEC Law Department filed a Petition for Disqualification6 against
petitioner pursuant to Section 40 (b)7 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
"Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC). It claimed that petitioner was barred from running in
an election since he was suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to
hold public office as a consequence of his dismissal from service as then Kagawad of Brgy.
Pulung Maragul, after being found guilty, along with others, of the administrative offense of
Grave Misconduct, in a Consolidated Decision dated June 23, 2009 (OMB Consolidated
Decision) and an Order dated November 10, 2009 (collectively, OMB rulings) rendered by the
Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) in OMB-L-A-08-0401-G, and allied cases.

Petitioner averred that the petition should be dismissed, considering that: (a) while the petition
prayed for his disqualification, it partakes the nature of a petition to deny due course to or
cancel CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (OEC), and
combining these two distinct and separate actions in one petition is a ground for the dismissal
of the petition pursuant to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure (COMELEC Rules); (b) the
COMELEC Law Department is not a proper party to a petition for disqualification, and cannot
initiate such case motu proprio; and (c) the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 58
(RTC of Angeles City) had permanently enjoined the implementation of the aforesaid OMB
Consolidated Decision in a November 8, 2013 Resolution in Civil Case No. 15325, grounded
on the condonation doctrine.

The COMELEC Law Department countered petitioner's averments, maintaining that it has the
authority to file motu proprio cases, and reiterating its earlier arguments.

Comelec Second Division Ruling - COMELEC Second Division granted the petition, and
cancelled petitioner's CoC, annulled his proclamation as the winner, and directed the
Barangay Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the qualified candidate who
garnered the highest number of votes as the duly-elected Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung
Maragul.

It treated the petition as one for cancellation of CoC pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC,
notwithstanding that it was captioned as a "Petition for Disqualification" under Section 40 (b)
of the LGC, holding that the nature of the petition is not determined by the caption given to it
by the parties, but is based on the allegations it presented. It ruled that petitioner committed
material misrepresentation in solemnly avowing that he was eligible to run for the office he
seeks to be elected to, when he was actually suffering from perpetual disqualification to hold
public office by virtue of a final judgment dismissing him from service.

The COMELEC Second Division likewise upheld its Law Department's authority to initiate
motu proprio the Petition for Disqualifcation as being subsumed under the COMELEC's
Constitutional mandate to enforce and administer laws relating to the conduct of elections.

Finally, it rejected petitioner's invocation of the condonation doctrine as jurisprudentially

established in Aguinaldo v. Santos31 since the same had already been abandoned in the
2015 case of Carpio Morales v. Binay, Jr. (Carpio Morales). It ruled that the doctrine cannot
apply to petitioner, who was clearly established to be suffering from perpetual disqualification
to hold public office, which rendered him ineligible, voided his CoC from the beginning, and
barred his re-election. Consequently, it declared petitioner to be not a candidate at all in the
2013 Barangay Elections; hence, the votes cast in his favor should not be counted.

COMELEC EN BANC RULING - denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration and affirmed
the ruling of its Second Division.

ISSUE: WON the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the petitioner’s COC

HELD:
I.
Petitioner's perpetual disqualification to hold public office is a material fact involving
eligibility.
A CoC is a formal requirement for eligibility to public office. Section 74 of the OEC provides
that the CoC of the person filing it shall state, among others, that he is eligible for the office he
seeks to run, and that the facts stated therein are true to the best of his knowledge. To be
"eligible" relates to the capacity of holding, as well as that of being elected to an
office. Conversely, "ineligibility" has been defined as a "disqualification or legal incapacity to
be elected to an office or appointed to a particular position." In this relation, a person
intending to run for public office must not only possess the required qualifications for
the position for which be or she intends to run but must also possess none of the
grounds for disqualification under the law.

In this case, petitioner had been found guilty of Grave Misconduct by a final judgment and
punished with dismissal from service with all its accessory penalties, including perpetual
disqualification from holding public office. Verily, perpetual disqualification to bold public
office is a material fact involving eligibility which rendered petitioner's CoC void from the
start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed the same.

II.
The COMELEC has the duty to motu proprio bar from running for public office those
suffering from perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
Under Section 2 (1), Article IX (C) of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC has the duty to
"[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election x x x."
The Court had previously ruled that the COMELEC has the legal duty to cancel the CoC of
anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold
public office, albeit, arising from a criminal conviction. Considering, however, that Section 52
(a), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service similarly
imposes the penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to
the penalty of dismissal from service, the Court sees no reason why the ratiocination
enunciated in such earlier criminal case should not apply here, viz.:

Even without a petition under either x x x Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel
the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of
perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final
judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the
disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict
from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of
conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but
also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.

Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement

the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on
disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because
under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "[e]nforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." The disqualification of a
convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of
a competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of "all laws" relating to the
conduct of elections.

To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of one suffering from perpetual special disqualification will result in the anomaly
that these cases so grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special disqualification,
Jalosjos was elected and served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in
its constitutional duty to "enforce and administer all laws" relating to the conduct of
elections if it does not motu proprio bar from running for public office those suffering
from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment.

In Romeo G. Jalosjos v. COMELEC(Jalosjos), the Court had illumined that while the denial of
due course to and/or cancellation of one's CoC generally necessitates the exercise of the
COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions commenced through a petition based on either
Sections 12 or 78 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC, when the grounds therefor are
rendered conclusive on account of final and executorv judgments, as in this case,
such exercise falls within the COMELEC's administrative functions.

As petitioner's disqualification to run for public office pursuant to the final and executory OMB
rulings dismissing him from service now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the
COMELEC to cancel petitioner's CoC as a matter of course, else it be remiss in fulfilling
its Constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election.

Accordingly, the Court finds no merit to petitioner's claim of denial of due process because
even though the special circumstance extant herein calls for the outright cancellation of his
CoC in the exercise of the COMELEC's administrative function, it even allowed him to submit
his Verified Answer cum Memorandum to explain his side, and to file a motion for
reconsideration from its resolution.

III.
Petitioner's re-election as Punong Barangav  of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the 2013
Barangay Elections cannot operate as a condonation of his alleged misconduct.
In Carpio Morales, the Court abandoned the "condonation doctrine," explaining that "[e]lection
is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or
statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different
term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior
term.

Although Carpio Morales clarified that such abandonment should be prospectively applied

(thus, treating the condonation doctrine as "good law" when the COMELEC's petition was
commenced on October 29, 2013, and when petitioner filed his Verified
Answer cum Memorandum invoking the same), the parameters for the operation of such
doctrine simply do not obtain in petitioner's favor.

In this case, the OMB rulings dismissing petitioner for Grave Misconduct had already
attained finality on May 28, 2010, which date was even prior to his first election as Punong
Barangay of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the October 2010 Barangay Elections. As above-stated,
"[t]he penalty of dismissal [from service] shall carry with it that of cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for re-
employment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the
decision." Although the principal penalty of dismissal appears to have not been effectively
implemented (since petitioner was even able to run and win for two [2] consecutive elections),
the corresponding accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office
had already rendered him ineligible to run for any elective local position. Bearing the same
sense as its criminal law counterpart, the term perpetual in this administrative penalty should
likewise connote a lifetime restriction and is not dependent on the term of any principal
penalty. It is undisputable that this accessory penalty sprung from the same final OMB rulings,
and therefore had already attached and consequently, remained effective at the time
petitioner filed his CoC on October 11, 2013 and his later re-election in 2013. Therefore,
petitioner could not have been validly re-elected so as to avail of the condonation doctrine,
unlike in other cases where the condonation doctrine was successfully invoked by virtue of re-
elections which overtook and thus, rendered moot and academic pending administrative
cases.

IV.
With the cancellation of his CoC, petitioner is deemed to have not been a candidate in
the 2013 Barangay Elections, and all his votes are to be considered stray votes.

A person whose CoC had been cancelled is deemed to have not been a candidate at all
because his CoC is considered void ab initio, and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy
and necessarily to valid votes. The cancellation of the CoC essentially renders the votes
cast for him or her as stray votes and are not considered in determining the winner of
an election. This would necessarily invalidate his proclamation and entitle the qualified
candidate receiving the highest number of votes to the position. Apropos is the Court's ruling
in Maquiling v. COMELEC, to wit:
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are
participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is
awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor
lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
In light of the cancellation of petitioner's CoC due to ineligibility existing at the time of filing, he
was never a valid candidate for the position of Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in
the 2013 Barangay Elections, and the votes cast for him are considered stray votes. Thus, the
qualified candidate for the said post who received the highest number of valid votes shall be
proclaimed the winner.

It is likewise imperative for the eligible candidate who garnered the highest number of votes to
assume the office. In Svetlana P. Jalosjos v. COMELEC, the Court explained:

There is another more compelling reason why the eligible candidate who garnered the
highest number of votes must assume the office. The ineligible candidate who was
proclaimed and who already assumed office is a de facto officer by virtue of the ineligibility.

The rule on succession in Section 44 of the Local Government Code cannot apply in
instances when a de facto officer is ousted from office and the de jure officer takes over. The
ouster of a de facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy as contemplated in the Local
Government Code. There is no vacancy to speak of as the de jure officer, the rightful winner
in the elections, has the legal right to assume the position.