Dorotheo vs. CA

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4. LOURDES L.

DOROTHEO, petitioner, vs. C.A., NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-


Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents. [G.R. No. 108581.  December 8, 1999]

FACTS: Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta
Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter.  Sometime
in 1977, after Alejandro’s death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died,
filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter’s last will and testament.  In 1981, the court
issued an order admitting Alejandro’s will to probate.  
Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a “Motion to Declare the
Will Intrinsically Void.” The trial court granted the motion and issued an order, declaring Lourdes
Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of
Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors as the only heirs of the late
spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective estates shall be liquidated and
distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and other taxes due to the
government.”
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she
took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not married to each
other, which was denied. On appeal, the same was dismissed for failure to file appellant’s brief within
the extended period granted. This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989.  An Order
was issued by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and executory Order on the ground that the
order was merely “interlocutory”, hence not final in character.  The court added that the dispositive
portion of the said Order even directs the distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses.  Private
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied, private respondents then filed a
petition before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the two assailed Orders
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed by private
respondents before the Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion or lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order
that has become final and executory still be given effect?

HELD: No.
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will
sought to be probated, particularly on three aspects:
ð  whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent’s last will and testament;
ð  compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
ð  the testamentary capacity of the testator;
ð  and the due execution of the last will and testament.
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of
sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not
acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery,
that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law
from making a will.
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even
after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last
will and testament is always intrinsically valid.  Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator
provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful
inheritance according to the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot
be given effect.  This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory
decision that the will is intrinsically void.  Such determination having attained that character of finality
is binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed.  Not that this Court finds the will to be
intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to
challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail
of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver.  And if the party does not avail of other remedies
despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully
agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order.  As early as 1918, it has been declared that public
policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must at
some point of time fixed by law become final otherwise there will be no end to litigation.  Interes rei
publicae ut finis sit litium - the very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to
controversies. To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary,
have to be set up to spur on the slothful. The only instance where a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence,which
circumstances do not concur herein.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights that
testacy is preferred to intestacy. But before there could be testate distribution, the will must pass the
scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased testator is no longer
available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is
usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give - Nemo praesumitur donare. No
intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its
extrinsic and intrinsic validity.  If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of
the intrinsic validity thereof.  If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity –
that is whether the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession.  In this case, the
court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof
were void.  Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandro’s disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal properties of
his late spouse, whom he described as his “only beloved wife”, is not a valid reason to reverse a final
and executory order.  Testamentary dispositions of properties not belonging exclusively to the testator
or properties which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be given effect.  Matters with respect to
who owns the properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly
ventilated and determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late
spouse’s estate.
Petitioner’s motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot considering that she was
not married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir.

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