Rocking the Cradle to Rocking the World: The Role of Muslim Female Fighters

By Farhana Ali1

Introduction
Attacks by the mujahidaat are arguably more deadly than those conducted by male
fighters and could motivate other Muslim women to adopt suicide as the tactic of choice.
The use of Muslim women to conduct martyrdom, or suicide, operations by male-
dominated terrorist groups could have implications on the jihadi mindset, challenging
more conservative groups such as Al Qaeda, to reconsider the utility of the Muslim
woman on the front lines of jihad. These terrorist groups will likely exploit women to
conduct operations on their behalf to advance their goals and achieve tactical gain.
Muslim women are increasingly joining the global jihad, partly motivated by
religious conviction to change the plight of Muslims under occupation, but others are
actively recruited by Al Qaeda and local terrorist groups strained by increased arrests and
deaths of male operatives to fight in the name of Islam. Convinced of the operational
advantages of using a female fighter, and the media attention she garners—including
some sympathy from the Muslim world—men began to rely on women to carry out
attacks.
While women enlisted and played a pivotal role in operations, including the
veteran Palestinian female Leila Khalid for a myriad of successful hijackings in the late
1960s and early 1970s, counterterrorism experts and analysts rarely focused on female
terrorists. According to Dr. Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist, the notion of a
woman perpetrating acts of violence “runs counter to Western stereotypes and
misconceptions of male terrorists; we assume that women are second-class citizens and
rely on the men to run the organization,” rather than challenging our prejudices of women
in these terror networks.2

Who Are the Mujahidaat?

The mujahidaat are identified as Muslim female fighters, but in this study, they
refer to female suicide bombers. The historical application of the term originated with the
early Muslim women on the battlefield, fighting alongside Muslim men, who provided
necessary logistics support, such as treating the wounded, donating their prized
possessions for the war effort, and/or encouraging their husbands, sons and brothers to
participate in jihad.3
Today, the role of the mujahidaat has evolved, to include the increasingly accepted
tactic of suicide as the preferred and popular weapon of choice. Within this amended
definition, the rules of engagement have been broadened, although nowhere in the
historical religious literature is suicide, the killing of non-combatants, and hostility
against the aggressor, sanctioned. Noted by an Islamic scholar, “Muslims are reminded
in many ayat (verses in the Qur’an) that they should never commit aggression even

1
International Policy Analyst RAND Corporation [email protected]
2
Interview with Dr. Marc Sageman, October 2005.
3
Busool, Assad Nimber, Muslim Women Warriors, Chicago: Al Huda Islamic Educational Foundation,
1995, pp. 34-35 and 64.

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 8 #1 November 2006 21

towards their sworn enemies. Their response must not be disproportionate or go beyond
the limits of the permission for armed jihad.”4

Jihad in the Qur’an

Laden with inaccurate perceptions, jihad is today synonymous with “terrorism”,
“extremism”, and “radicalism.” Before the early Muslims were granted permission to
fight the pagan Quraysh—the Arab tribe whose belief in polytheism and injustice to the
Muslims forced them to retreat to the city of Madina—jihad was, and is, an act of
worship. A more popular definition is derived from the Arabic root word jahada, which
means to struggle. For Muslims, regardless of their level of religiosity, jihad is a living,
breathing construct.
The more popularly cited verse, And fight in the way of Allah those who fight you,
but transgress not the limits. Truly Allah likes not the transgressors,5 permitted jihad
within certain perimeters for self-defense. In these verses, the aim of fighting was
threefold: “to stop aggression, to protect the Mission of Islam and to defend religious
freedom.”6 But these early verses were to be disregarded and new definitions of
permissible jihad were created after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1924,7 attributed in
part to the absence of a Caliph who could authorize the proclamation of jihad for Sunni
Muslims.8
The oversimplification of this term and the abrogation of the “lesser jihad”—or
militant resistance—for the “Greater Jihad”, which is the spiritual internal reflection of
Self, has historical depth in Islam and is supported by tradition and religious text.
While there are many forms of jihad, all of which are defined by a set of rules,
jihad is best described as self-defense. Defense against temptation, defense against Satan,
defense against the unjust, and most commonly known in the West, jihad is defense
against religious persecution. Senior Advisor of the Muslim Public Affairs Council
(MPAC) in Washington, DC, Dr. Maher Hathout says, “Historically, fighting back
against aggressors was prohibited during the thirteen years of the Meccan period…[but]
after the migration to Medina and the establishment of the Islamic state, Muslims were
concerned with how to defend themselves against aggression from their enemies.”9 After
years of persecution and living in exile, the permission to fight came in response to a
specific set of circumstances, and was “motivated by the fact that the Muslims suffered
injustice and were forced to emigrate…without justification.” Among the first Qur’ani
verses for fighting is Verse 22: Leave is given to those who fought because they were
wronged—surely God is able to help them—who were expelled from their habitations
without right.
Today, terrorists maintain that violence is the most effective means of
communication. In his martyr video, alleged ringleader of the July 2005 attacks in
London, Muhammad Saddique Khan says, “Our words are dead; they have no impact on

4
Dr. Louay Fatoohi, Jihad in the Qur’an: The Truth From The Source, Malaysia: A.S. Noordeen. 2002.
p. 39-40.
5
Qu’ran, 2:190.
6
Shaltut, Mahmud, “The Koran and Fighting,” in Bernard and Lwry, pp. 74-79.
8
David Cook, Understanding Jihad, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press:
2005. p. 93.
9
Mathout, Maher, Jihad vs. Terrorism, Los Angeles: Multimedia Vera International, 2002, p. 49.

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 8 #1 November 2006 22

you. We talk to you in a language you understand. We give them life with our blood.”10
Male terrorists contend that armed resistance is a language understood by the West. Bin
Ladin’s personal bodyguard, known by the name Abu Jandal, said in an interview, “They
[the armed groups] became convinced that the only effective way to stop the United
States’ interference is the Qa’ida way, i.e. by direct attacks and armed confrontations.”11
These attacks, in the name of “holy war”, are not representative of jihad but terrorism.
Dr. Hathout argues that jihad is not reflected in the United States Government definition
of terrorism, described in the Code of Federal Regulations as: “...the unlawful use of
force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the
civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social
objectives.”12
Therefore, Al Qaeda and like-minded groups unjustifiably argue that the use of
violence is legitimized jihad. But the rules for jihad are clear, and the salient points
include: 1) jihad is legitimized when it is “recognized and established [by the] Muslim
authority, as a policy of the collectivity of the Muslims, to deter aggression;”13 2) jihad is
to be declared publicly in order to be accepted, vice the coup de main that Al Qaeda and
other radical groups have been known for. Hence, their clandestine lifestyle and
operational behavior makes them identifiable with terrorism; 3) jihad is limited to
combatants; and 4) finally, the ultimate goal of jihad is to cease hostilities and live in
peace, rather than a continuum of conflict that has defined the war on terrorism with Al
Qaeda.
How jihad became confused with terrorism is the fault of contemporary jihadist
literature that reinterpreted jihad to suit their modern-day needs and struggles. Some
Muslim ulama (scholars) have justified the use of violence against civilian and military
targets by issuing fatwas (pronouncements) to grant terrorists permission to fight outside
the original perimeters of Islamic jurisprudence. These scholars argue that warfare today
is asymetrical, necessitating new rules of warfare, with new strategies and approaches to
defeating the perceived enemies of Islam. Hence, suicide operations are allowed, for both
Muslim men and women.
Drawing upon contemporary Muslim jurists, verses in the Qur’an were corrupted
by terrorists to justify violent acts. Twisting the verses’ intended meaning and taking out
of context the established Islamic rules of warfare, terrorists have transgressed the limits
of warfare, poisoned by their misunderstanding of jihad, and conflated by mixing local
and global grievances of the Muslim world. Religious extremists have conveniently
forgotten that Islam is a religion of balance, as stated in the Qur’an, We have made you a
middle people…and He [God] has set the Balance. Do not transgress the Balance.”14

Why Now?
Since at least 2000, there has been a gradual progression of suicide attacks
conducted by Muslim women in new theaters of operation, including Uzbekistan, Egypt,

10
Aired by the Doha-based Arabs news service, Al Jazirah. July 2005.
11
Afghanistan: Usama Bin Ladin’s Former Bodyguard on Al-Qa’ida Organization,” London Al Quds Al
Arabi, 29 March 2005, p. 17. GMP20050330000064
12
Definition of terrorism by terrorismfiles.org, http://www.terrorismfiles.org/encyclopaedia/terrorism.html
13
Hathout, pp. 65-66.
14
Qur’an, 2:143.

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 8 #1 November 2006 23

and more recently, Iraq.15 The attack in Talafar, northern Iraq, by a female suicide
bomber came as a surprise, but was predictable. Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for the
latest coup de main at an army recruitment center on 28 September 2005 by a “blessed
sister”. The Iraqi woman hid her weapon beneath her dress as she stood among job
applicants before detonating; a similar tactic was used by women in the Irish Republican
Army, who carried bombs beneath their clothing feigning pregnancy or wheeling
weapons in baby carriages. The attack in late September was not the first by an Iraqi
woman; in April 2003, two women, one pretending to be pregnant, blew up their car at a
coalition checkpoint, killing three soldiers.16 Although attacks by women in Iraq are still
relatively a new trend, an intelligence analyst argues that women will likely play a wider
role in operations where “jihad is more akin to an insurgency and mobilizes an entire
population against a clear aggressor.”17 That leaves Iraq vulnerable to attacks by female
suicide bombers in the near future.
The attacks in Egypt earlier this year by two women remain an anomaly. For years,
Egyptian men, not women, cradled the growth of the jihadi movement, which led to the
formation of different groups, varying in their membership and orientation. However, the
30 April 2005 shooting on a tourist bus in Cairo by two veiled Egyptian women is
evidence that women in the Arab Muslim world can play an increasing role in operations.
The women, both in their 20s, were related to the male perpetrator, Ehab Yousri Yassin.
Negat Yassin was the bomber’s sister and Iman Ibrahim Khamis, his fiancée; they
reportedly shot at the bus in revenge for Yassin’s death by Egyptian authorities, and shot
themselves,18 probably to avoid capture. It remains unclear if the two women intended to
commit suicide or chose the tactic to evade an arrest by Egyptian police.
While little is known about the two Egyptian women and their intentions for
suicide, the story of a young Uzbek girl illustrates her determination to participate in a
suicide attack in March 2003. Nineteen-year old Dilnoza Holmuradova detonated
explosives at Tashkent’s Chorsu Market, killing at least forty-seven people, including ten
policemen.19 Dilnoza came from a solid middle-class background, was well educated,
spoke five languages, and unlike the vast majority of Uzbek women, she had a driver’s
license.20 After dropping out of the police academy she was attending in 2002, Dilnoza
began praying regularly, and in January 2004, she and her sister left home without a word
to their parents, taking their Islamic literature in the house with them.21 Her recruitment
by the Islamic Jihad Group, a radical offshoot of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU), likely resulted in her decision to carry out the operation. Dilnoza’s actions are
reflective of a larger problem in Uzebekistan. According to an independent sociologist,

15
Two female suicide bombers killed themselves and three US Army Rangers at a checkpoint in western
Iraq. One of the women appeared to be pregnant, and as she exited the vehicle, she screamed for
assistance, according to a US military officer. This attack by Iraqi women was the second attack in less
than a week. Liz Sly and Hugh Dellios, Tribue foreign correspondents,“Women kill 3 Rangers in suicide
bombing,” 5 April 2003. www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationsworld/
16
“Woman suicide bomber strikes Iraq,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4289168.stm
17
Email correspondence with a counterterrorism expert, September 2005.
18
“Attacks injure nine in Egypt,” Columbia Daily Tribune, published 1 May 2005.
http://www.showmenews.com/2005/May/20050501News020.asp
19
IWPR Staff in Central Asia, “Uzbekistan: Affluent Suicide Bombers,” RCA No. 278, 20 April 2004.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 8 #1 November 2006 24

the ideological vacuum that resulted in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet
Union—in which people became “impoverished and demoralized”—partly explains why
Uzbek women were susceptible to being influenced by extremist organizations.22
The attacks by women in Iraq, Egypt, and Uzbekistan—three women unrelated in
culture, religion, and national identities—is reflective of a crisis in Muslim societies. In
both instances, women who had never before conducted terrorist operations, are
beginning to challenge their perceived enemies and male-only terror groups. Their
actions could provide an impetus for other Muslim women to either enlist in extremist
organizations or volunteer for future attacks.

Historical Precedence for Female Fighters

For centuries, Muslim women in different struggles and communities have joined
men on the front lines of war, and have died alongside them. The most prominent
example of an early Muslim woman in jihad is Nusayba bint K’ab, who fought in the
Battle of Uhud with her husband and two sons and during the Caliphate of Abu Bakr, she
joined the Muslim troops, suffered eleven wounds, and lost one arm.23 The Prophet’s
own female relatives took part in jihad; his wife, Ayesha, led the Battle of the Camel, and
his granddaughter Zaynab bint Ali fought in the Battle of Karbala. Other women were
recognized for tending to the wounded, donating their jewelry for the jihad, and
encouraging their male family members to fight to ensure the survival of Islam.24
The involvement of the early Arab women in jihad is celebrated today throughout
the Muslim world, serving as icons and a precedent25 for contemporary Muslim women
who choose suicide operations. In modern-day resistance movements, a Christian
Lebanese woman, Loula Abboud, “may have been the model for the first Palestinian
women who became suicide bombers in 2002.”26 Before Palestinian women made
headlines for conducting a series of terrorist attacks beginning in 2002, the dark-eyed
petite girl of nineteen conducted a suicide operation in the Bekaa valley in southern
Lebanon in April 1985, “exceeding all expectations” for men and women in war.27
Described by her brother as a woman “fighting for the liberation of her own homeland,”
Aboud’s struggle for “self-defense” and to “save the children” is echoed by other women
around the world, including women of the first Palestinian intifada, who led a campaign
to reopen schools, taught underground classes for children, and played an important role
in “street activism that directly confronted the occupations forces.”28
However heroic the modern-day female fighter may be regarded by her
community, contemporary women warriors do not compare to her predecessors, whose
sacrifice for Islam is venerated within Islamic textbooks, stories, and historical memory.
The involvement of early women in jihad is recognized in the Qur’an and hadith, or

22
Ibid.
23
Busool, Assad Nimer, Muslim Women Warriors, Chicago, Illinois: Al Huda, 1995. p.35-37
24
Ibid, pp. 34-35.
26
Davis, Joyce. Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance and Despair in the Middle East, New York: Palgrave
MacMillian. 2003. p. 68.
27
Davis, pp.68-72.
28
Jennifer Plyler interview with Hanadi Loubani, founding member of Women for Palestine. “Palestinian
Women’s Political Participation,” WHRnet, 23 November 2003. www.whrnet.org/docs/interview-loubani-
0311.html

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 8 #1 November 2006 25

Muslim traditions. Women also were rewarded for performing the same duties as men. A
Qur’anic verse was revealed to reflect the equal status of both men and women: “Lo!
Muslim men and Muslim women, and believer men and believer women, and men who
obey and women who obey…Allah has prepared for them forgiveness and a vast
reward.”

Eager to Level the Playing Field

By taking part in operations, women are contesting the traditional roles assigned to
them by patriarchal societies and terrorist groups. While women enlisted and played a
pivotal role in operations, including the veteran Palestinian female Leila Khalid for a
myriad of successful hijackings in the late 1960s and early 1970s, “the trouble is [that
Muslim women] are not on the winning side, at least not yet.”29
Her actions ensure, in part, that the discourse of women’s rights and position in
society remains in the open forum. Attacks she conducts could stir a needed debate in the
Muslim world regarding the role of women within the patriarchal “space,” that could
force existing binding norms into temporary disarray. Reasons why male fighters have
welcomed, though previously denied, Muslim women access to operations is explained
by organizational and societal needs. Her vital contribution is assessed by the operational
advantages and maximized media shock value that has helped to sustain, at least in the
interim, by her involvement.
But despite their involvement in war, women did not enjoy equal status with men
until a woman from the Quraysh aristocracy, Umm Salama, one day asked the Prophet,
“Why are men mentioned in the Quran and why are we not?”30 Her reply came in the
form of a verse, “Lo! Men who surrender unto Allah, and women who surrender to Allah,
and men who believe and women who believe, and men who obey, and women who
obey…Allah hath prepared for them forgiveness and a vast reward.”31 This verse, alone,
revolutionized the Muslim community, illuminating a “break with pre-Islamic practices,
the calling into question of the customs that ruled relations between the sexes.”32
Muslim women today often cite the early examples of the mujahidaat, but misplace
their own struggles within a historical narrative that fails to explain contextual pressures,
a term coined by Dr. Karla Cunningham, which refers to the impact of
domestic/international enforcement, conflict, and social dislocation. She argues that
contextual pressures “impact societal controls over women [and could]
facilitate…participation up to, and including, political violence.”33 The cycles of protest
these women participate in, often leading to their recruitment into violent organizations,
helps to frame their conflicts within a specific contextual background that they are often
responding to. For many Chechen women, including Hawa Barayev, the first Chechen
female suicide bomber who targeted her husband’s assassin, revenge for the loss of male
family members is a prime motivator.

29
Eileen MacDonald, Shoot the Women First, p.8
30
Tabari, Tafsir, Dar al-Fikr edn, vol. 22, p. 10.
31
Pickthall, The Meaning of the Glorious Koran, sura 33, verse 35.
32
Mernissi, p. 119.
33
Cunningham, Karla, “Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,
26:171-195, 2003. (p. 172)

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 8 #1 November 2006 26

 In earlier conflicts, women rarely were granted an elevated status, regardless of her
participation and at times, leading role in operations. For example, the Algerian women
who fought alongside the men in the Battle of Algiers against French colonial rule were
instrumental on the war front, but assumed their traditional roles within Algerian society
after independence of the Algerian state. Algerian women fought against the French
colonial rule in 1958-1964 but returned to their homes after independence.34 Learning
from the past, women in the Palestinian intifada were determined not to meet the fate of
their Algerian sisters. For example, Palestinian women formed a Women’s Higher
United Council in and in June 1989, “had drafted an Equal Rights for Women bill and
placed it before the Unified Leadership….’we wanted the men to know that we have
teeth too, said one of the women from the Higher United Council.”35
Despite the previous prejudices and obstacles against women, they have an
opportunity in present-day conflicts to change the perception that al-Qa’ida and local
terrorist groups are a “men” only confederation. Her participation could prove other
women that she has a right to the rewards of martyrdom and her action can change the
way local governments respond to the war on terror. Many women are determined to
raise the gender equality issue. According to Umm Usamah, the success of attacks by
Palestinian women elevated the status of the Arab woman and ended the debate about
equality between men and women, particularly after Wafa Idris’ suicide bombing.
Exonerated for being the first Palestinian women to commit suicide, Idris’ likely inspired
four other Palestinian women to commit suicide operations within four months. Adel
Hammudu, editor of the Egyptian opposition weekly, Saut al-Umma, referred to Idris as
“the bride of heaven, [who] elevated the value of the Arab woman and in one moment,
[and] put an end to the unending debate about equality between men and women.”
The unintentional debate that women in conflict arouses is plastic; no conflict
today has elevated the status of the Muslim woman, nor attempted to address the societal
and religious norms that solidify the role of the Muslim woman. While her participation
in suicide attacks serves the overall group or social movement, her individual
contribution is seldom recognized, except in martyrdom fests within the Palestinian
territories where female bombers are deemed necessary for operational and strategic
adaptation against a well-armed adversary.

Diverse Motivations for Female Fighters

Local conflicts are critical motivators. Each conflict is unique and women choose
suicide terror for a host of different reasons. For instance, aside from being linked by
gender, the mujahidaat in Chechnya have little in common with women in Palestine, and
women in Saudi Arabia have absolutely nothing to share with their “sisters” in
Uzbekistan.
While conflicts and motivations vary, a woman’s decision to pursue violent action
is impacted by personal experiences and outcomes. The absence of change to local
conflicts around the world has motivated some women to opt for martyrdom operations
to end their suffering. For some women, the decision for martyrdom is rooted within the
local struggle for freedom from the social and worldly responsibilities women have to
bear within a weak civil society but more importantly, freedom from the tyranny women

34
MacDonald, Eileen, Shoot The Women First, London: UK: Fourth Estate Limited, 1991. Pp. 74-75.
35
Ibid. p. 75.

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 8 #1 November 2006 27

experience as a result of living under occupation, under the reign of despot rulers, and
under the jihadist rhetoric and propaganda that convinces women that her local
community can not afford inaction. Suicide aso becomes the preferred tactic when
Muslim women believe that their social structure, which is the fabric of an Islamic
society, is threatened or has been violated by the prevailing authority.
Contemporary resistance movements and conflicts have publicly endorsed suicide
and male fighters encourage Muslim women to select the tactic for one of the following
reasons: to preserve her honor and dignity; to seek revenge for the loss of male family
members; to win respect from the larger Muslim community; to gain reassurance for
herself and her community that she is a capable and equal partner in jihad; and perhaps
most importantly to the violent organization, to ensure its survival. Therefore, her
involvement in a predominantly male conflict helps to guarantee the existence of the
national and/or social movement. In a March 2003 interview with the London-based Arab
newspaper, Al Sharq al-Awsat, the leader of the women’s organization, Umm Usama,
said Muslim women join the jihad to seek revenge for the capture of “our brothers Ramzi
Bin al Shibah and Khalid al-Shaykh”36—both of whom were detained by Pakistani
authorities in 2002 and 2003, respectively.
The perceived threat against Islam is another powerful motivator to sanction the
use of violence as an effective means of communication. For all Muslim women, faith
likely plays a role, if only a minor one. Men are able to manipulate some Muslim women
by shrouding the local or transnational struggle or for which they are fighting in religious
undertones. In clever propaganda, they claim that Islam is under attack by Western
imperialism, and argue that every able Muslim man and woman has a duty to defend the
faith. Often, they cite the early Muslim women who fought and supported the early
battles during the times of the Prophet to convince women that they are equal partners in
jihad. Using historical precedence to argue their point, men could gain new female
recruits to take part in future operations. Equally appealing to some women are female
fighters who have either staged spectacular attacks or those who have survived in a male-
dominated terrorist organization, such as Leila Khaled,37 who said, Islam has “only a role
in determining the choice in how the [Palestinian] struggle is to be waged.”38
Assured of the rewards of martyrdom, women perceive they have nothing to lose.
Printed in a HAMAS monthly publication al-Muslimah, Palestinian operative Reem
Rayishi said, “I am proud to be the first female HAMAS martyr. I have two children and
love them very much. But my love to see God was stronger than my love for my children,
and I’m sure that God will take care of them if I become a martyr.”39 Even Dilnoza
believed she would be granted spiritual rewards for her operation; in a letter to her
mother, she wrote: “martyrs without a doubt will go to Paradise.” For the believer of
martyrdom, subjugation to the faith (i.e., Islam) is rewarding. The individual, knowing

36
Ibid
37
Leila Khaled, a member of the Marxist group, The Palestine Front For the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP), became widely known after her role in a series of airline hijackings in 1969-1970. She is most
famously known for leading a daring hijacking of four airlines on 6 September 1970, which resulted in the
destruction of three aircraft and her own capture.
38
Westerman, Toby. “Cheerleader for female suicide bombers,” WorldNetDaily.com. 31 January 2002.
39
Al-Muslimah, February 2004.

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 8 #1 November 2006 28

that death is likely, “inspires other Muslims to continue the struggle and the martyr’s
death is kindling wood for jihad and Islam.”40

Al Khansaa—A Call to Arms

Among the many functions women serve, their increasing role in exploiting the
media and technology affords them a greater chance of broadening their chances for
recruitment, even within the most patriarchal Muslim societies, such as Saudi Arabia.
The “CNN factor” enables the female fighter to “generate a huge amount of publicity for
the cause…and enabled global awareness.”41 Without television, print media, and now
the colossal impact of the Internet, female suicide bombers would gain no less attention
than male bombers. Sageman argues that the Internet has changed the amount of access
women now have to join operations in jihadist chat rooms, which had not existed before.
He maintains that there had been a precedent for female fighters, but “now you have the
mechanism [the Internet],”42 a gender-neutral forum that allows Muslim women to
interact with men with a relatively low-cost output and high-value input.
The use of the Internet offers Muslim women in restrictive societies—that adhere
to the strict space separation between men and women—to initiate contact with Muslim
men, develop relationships, and eventually become full members of radical organizations.
Umm Usamah confirmed the extensive use of the Internet:

with those who do no have access to the Internet,

we have formed small groups or cells that
are guided and backed personally and
supervised like those using the Internet.
Each of the women who have joined through
the Internet is trained where she is because
we cannot bring all the mujahidaat sisters in one
place as each one is in a different country in the
land of Islam.”43

Among the various influential magazines is Sawt al-Jihad, the propaganda arm of
the Saudi-based al-Qa’ida network, which could have a significant impact on drawing
women to the fight. The magazine’s first issue of Al-Khansaa—the new online women’s
magazine and also the name of a pre-Islamic poetess who lost four sons to jihad44—made
its debut in August 2004 at www.kidwi.com/khansa. The publication implores Muslim
women worldwide to join the war on terror against the perceived enemies of Islam. For
example, in an article titled “What Role can Sisters Play in Jihad,” the anonymous author
says, “there are many ways a Muslim woman can participate in Jihad…the sisters’ role
on the battlefield [include]: 1. participation in the actual fighting; 2. supporting the

40
Lustwick, Ian S., “Terrrism in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Targets and Audiences,” in Martha Crenshaw,
ed., Terrorism in Context. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University, 1995. p. 536.
41
Bloom, Mia, Dying To Kill, Columbia University Press: New York, 2005. p. 39
42
Interview with Dr. Marc Sageman, October 2005.
43
“Al-Qa’ida’s Women Organization ‘Commander’ on Women’s Role in Jihad,” Al Sharq Al Awsat, 12
March 2003. p. 3. GMP200303120000069.

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 8 #1 November 2006 29

fighters in the battlefield; 3. Guard duty and protection.”45 Al-Khansaa also glorifies
martyrs, including Abu Hajir, the former al-Qa’ida leader in Saudi Arabia,46 and
celebrates the lives of the early Muslims who have died in battle.

Scholars Support Female Martyrs

To isolate this study from the ideological underpinnings of suicide terror, as
delineated by some members of the Muslim clergy, would be to misplace the importance
of scripture in determining when, and how, violence can be used. The debate now being
waged in various Islamic circles about the utility of suicide, and conversely, the use of
women in warfare, has divided the Muslim ummah (community).
The Muslim clergy have failed to reach consensus on whether suicide is an
acceptable means of warfare, but several scholars in the wake of the September 2001 and
July 2005 attacks in London have issued various fatwas (provocations) condemning
suicide bombings. The former head of Al-Azhar Fatwa Committee Shaykh ‘Atiyyah Saqr
uses references to historical Islamic literature to argue that the Prophet Muhammad said a
believer would be forbidden from entering Paradise if he committed suicide.47 More
recently, a prominent Syrian cleric, Abdel Mon’em Mustafa Abu Halima, issued a fatwa
prohibiting suicide operations. A resident of London, Abu Halima, also known as Abu
Naseer Al Tartusi, said “whoever hurts a Miuslim has no Jihad reward”, and quotes the
Prophet as having said: “whoever murders a non-Muslim enjoying protection under the
Islamic state would never smell the scent of Paradise.”48
However, the practice is justified by other clerics, including Doha-based Shaykh
Yusuf Qaradawi and a veteran Afghan mujahid, Abdallah Azzam. Both have justified
the use of suicide and permit women to participate in jihad. Qaradawi refutes the term
“suicide” as being “incorrect and misleading” and prefers the usage of “heroic operations
of martyrdom.” In an interview in an Egyptian newspaper, Qaradawi justifies suicide on
the basis that it is “the weapon of the weak,49 and provides the following ruling on
warfare:

when jihad becomes an individual duty, as

when the enemy seizes the Muslim territory,
a woman becomes entitled to take part in it
alongside men.. and she can do what is
impossible for men to do,” even if it means
taking off her hijab to carry out an operation.50

Qaradawi first issued a fatwa on the role of women in jihad following the suicide
attack by Wafa Idris, the first Palestinian Muslim woman to perpetrate an attack on 27

45
Strategic Arabic Translations, Al Khansaa, August 2004.
46
Abu Hajir was killed by Saudi security forces in June 2004.
47
‘Ask the Scholar,” IslamOnline.net. 21 May 2003. www.islamonline.net
48
“Salafi Jihadi Trend Theorist Turns against Al Qaeda and Issues a Religious Opinion of the
Imipermissibility of Suicidal Operations,” Al Sharq Al Awsat, 2 September 2005. News from Al Mendhar.
www.almendhar.com
49
“Debating the Religious, Political and Moral Legitimacy of Suicide Bombings,” MEMRI – No. 53, 2 Ma
2001. http://memri.org
50
“Ask the Scholar,” IslamOnline.net, 22 March 2004. www.islamonline.net

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 8 #1 November 2006 30

January 2002 when she detonated explosives at the entrance to a shopping mall in Afula,
a city in the northern part of Israel. First published on the HAMAS Internet site,
www.palestine-info.info in January 2004, Qaradawi said that Muslim women could
disregard certain codes of dress and Islamic law to participate in suicide operations:
“when jihad becomes an individual duty, as when the enemy seizes the Muslim territory,
a woman becomes entitled to take part in it alongside men…and she can do what is
impossible for men to do,” even if it means taking off
her hijab (headscarf) to carry out an operation.51 Before Qaradawi’s fatwas, Abdullah
Azzam in his book, Defense of Muslim Lands, empowered women when he said they did
not need their husband’s permission to participate in jihad. In a separate fatwa published
in 1984, Azzam said, “jihad was the action required (fardh ‘ayn) of every Muslim,
regardless of gender.”52
Today, the debate among the ulama on the permissibility of suicide continues to
divide the Muslim world; some view suicide as a legitimate tactic while others defy it on
the basis that it was never employed by the Prophet of Islam, and therefore, suicide is
haram (forbidden). Many scholars argue that suicide is one of the major sins in Islam that
annuls one’s faith,53 and those well versed in religious text often cite the Qur’anic verse,
Al Maeda, that clearly rebukes those who kill: He who kills anyone not in retaliation for
murder or to spread mischief in the land, it would be as if he killed all of mankind, and if
anyone saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole people.54

A Short-Lived Panorama
The liberal door that now permits women to participate in operations will close
once male jihadists gain new recruits and score a few successes in the war on terror. The
sudden increase in female bombers over the past year may represent nothing more than a
riding wave of Al Qaeda’s success rather than a lasting effort in the global jihad. Male
jihadists could find it difficult to accept a female operative as the revolutionary vanguard
of Islam, and while younger members of Al Qaeda and like-minded groups are
encouraging Muslim women to join the ranks, there is little indication that these men
would allow the mujahidaat to prevail in their authority and replace images of the male
folk-hero. There is also no evidence that Muslim female operatives will have contact
with senior male leaders, calling into question the male jihadists’ willingness to directly
deal with women on an equal footing.
The more conservative terrorist regards a Muslim woman as key to maintaining the
family structure, while the new, younger generation of terrorists could increasingly
encourage women to join their ranks to offset the losses of male operatives. She provides
the male jihadist with multiple operational advantages, but while she is indispensable to
the war effort, she also is expendable.
While a female fighter might not enjoy the same status and rank as her male
counterpart, her participation in suicide bombings could, in the near-term, provide
impetus for other women to participate in future operations. A Muslim female academic
states that “by resorting to this tactic [suicide], women would most likely appeal to the

51
“Ask the Scholar,” IslamOnline.net, 22 March 2004. www.islamonline.net
52
“The Union of Good”, www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/2_05/funds_f.htm
53
Abualrub, Pp. 209-211.
54
Verse 32.

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 8 #1 November 2006 31

female Muslims in the world; that is, to those who are not aware, or have been prevented
from becoming aware of the actual teachings of the Qur’an.”55 Suicide arguably attracts
to those women who have an alienated view of Islam; that is, they have subscribed to the
patriarchal interpretations of the Qur’an, rather than understand the religious verses in
their historical context. Coupled with the dire sociopolitical conditions under which some
Muslims live, these women probably believe they have nothing to lose in this life, but
have everything to gain from that-world (the Hereafter).
Should suicide attacks become a trend among Muslim women, it would be the
exception rather than the rule. Some terrorism experts understand that the jihad
movement is not homogenous, and there are places where social mores are perhaps
conducive to more ‘progressive’ treatment of women’s status. Even in Muslim societies
where female fighters are the norm, (i.e., Palestinian territories) it still remains unclear
whether traditional societal norms will make adjustments to afford women equal rights
once the conflict ends.

Policy Recommendations: Making Muslims Part of the Solution

Compared to men, Muslim women have participated in a relatively small number
of suicide attacks, but increased security measures against male jihadists and the ongoing
struggles of national identity, couched in religious overtones and a socialization toward
violence, forces Western and Muslim governments to reexamine their counter-terrorism
policies. Sageman argues that the solution lies with “countering the entire terrorist
movement rather than just the women,” and suggests looking at previous terrorism
studies for insights. While women are a part of the overall movement, they represent an
important element, and therefore, this uniqueness demands specific strategies to counter
female participation.
Countering the increased use of Muslim women for suicide operations requires a
multi-pronged approach looking closely at developing a set of common denominators,
such as the factors that enhance a strong civil society, balanced economics, full political
participation, and opportunities to question existing, and sometimes archaic, social and
cultural norms that restrict women’s liberation and democratic movements. To achieve
this, Western and Muslim governments need to make a concerted, long-term effort
towards improving the social, economic, and political structures in their countries.
Without addressing the local concerns, men will continue to recruit women, and rely on
female volunteers, to gain visibility through terrorist operations. Negative visibility can
be reversed with positive reflections of women helping to steer Muslim women into
active members of society. But who has the power to enforce progress and carry this
enormous responsibility? A Muslim female academic says she doesn’t believe “in the
ability of the West to counter this trend, [but] ‘believing women,’ who are intellectually
capable and active in the pubic sphere, will unread the patriarchal interpretations of the
Qur’an and thus will represent the teachings.”56 Many experts agree that Muslim
Governments may have more power to counter religious extremists due to their deep
cultural knowledge and understanding of local problems. Any effective counterterrorism
policy will need to include the Muslim youth to ensure that their concerns are

55
Interview with female Muslim professor in the United States who teaches courses on Islam and gender.
September 2005.
56
Interview with Muslim female academic in the United States, September 2005.

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 8 #1 November 2006 32

represented. Absent their involvement, the next generation of terrorists could sustain
collective action against the prevailing authority, threatening a government’s ability to
suppress and manage emerging extremist networks.
While many experts agree that the burden lies with the Muslim world to counter
terrorism, the West can help by channeling much needed resources, financial aid, and
development to alleviate some of the local grievances. Eroding the power of violent
movements and support for militant groups can largely be achieved by encouraging an
open political system that includes active female participation, rebuilding civil society,
legislating education reform, accounting for human rights abuses and abetting Muslim
women’s organizations, including religious-based groups managed by women. However,
for any of these processes to take shape, the conflicts in the Muslim world must first end.
Absent any resolution to the conflicts that resonate on the Muslim “street”, violence will
remain the preferred course of action.
Strategically, specific policy recommendations for the West should include:
1) Promote democracy and democratic institutions. Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic
Studies at American University, Akbar Ahmed, says that “there is no alternative [but to]
institute and ensure the success of democracy” to close the gap between the rich and
poor, to “emphasize the compassionate nature of Islam,” and “to rediscover the tolerance
that once characterized their societies.”57
2) Establish a more robust diplomatic relationship with the countries that support
terrorist organizations; putting pressure on these countries with the support of the
international community, rather than unilateral action, could force the countries that
sponsor terrorism and countries in conflict to seize hostilities. Playing the role of an
honest broker, the US can help mediate conflicts and facilitate dialogue;
3) Provide financial and organizational support to local groups, such as Muslim
NGOs, think tanks, social activists, and legitimate religious establishments to help them
counter extremist and terrorist elements within their societies. Western aid and resources
should only be donated when local institutions guarantee their goal is to improve the lives
of women in their respective communities, to include vocational training, access to higher
education, and membership to religious-based parties and groups that have often closed
the door to women.
The Muslim world has an equal, if not greater, burden to bear. Since most female
bombers come from Muslim-dominated societies, the governments under which these
women live have a responsibility to its people—not just women alone—to eradicate
violent organizations. Recommended policies for the Muslim world should include, but
is not limited to, the following:
1) Reclaiming the right to Ijtehad (interpretation), a tool that can serve as “an
effective weapon to cure the cancer of illiteracy, inaction, immobility, and diffidence.”58
What is needed is a look towards the present and future, rather than the archaic traditions
of the past that have handicapped Muslim societies from further achievement. As noted in
the Qur’an, Verily Allah changeth not the condition of a people until they first change
their conditions by themselves.59 By reexamining the practice of Islam within Muslim
societies—much of which is influenced by culture and a skewed understanding of holy

57
Ahmed, Akbar, Islam Under Siege, Polity Press: Malden, MA, 2003. pp. 154-155.
58
Ahmed, Al-Haj Moinuddin, The Urgency of Ijtihad, Kitab Bhavan: New Delhi, India, 1992, pp. 122-123.
59
Qur’an, Verse Ar-Ra’d, 13:11

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 8 #1 November 2006 33

text—a female Muslim academic argues, Muslims need to “unread the patriarchal
interpretations of Qur’anic teachings…[and Muslim countries] must allow, even
encourage translations of the Qur’an into any language…to diffuse the power of
patriarchal structures…to avoid anyone from claiming sole knowledge” of the religion.60
Echoed by Akbar Ahmed, rebuilding “an idea of Islam, which includes justice, integrity,
tolerance, and the quest for knowledge”61 is imperative to restoring the classical Islamic
civilization, as well as rooting out “deviants’ such as religious extremists, terrorists, and
anyone who manipulates faith for personal gain. Reopening the gates of ijtehad is
essential to encouraging the liberal Islamist rationale.62
2) Reserving for women political seats and membership to religious
organizations; including women in key government decisions, if not positions, can help
improve the country’s public image. Allowing women to participate in all levels of
governance is an important way of routing frustration and anger into positive action;
3) Rebuilding civil society, particularly in conflict-prone areas. Nothing could be
more important to Muslims today than their basic needs, such as water, food, shelter, and
a nominal sense of security. Muslim governments can upset terrorist recruitment in
demographic areas that lack these basic needs by ensuring that people are self-sufficient.
While terrorism is not always tied to economics, one’s level of frustration with their
living conditions—or the poor living standards of Muslims in a distant land—is arguably
one of the many motivations terrorists use to join violent organizations. As long as
grievances exist, terrorists will have a canon-fodder readily available to gain new recruits
and appeal to uneducated Muslims.
On a tactical level, improving Western intelligence agencies, using both human and
technical information gathering,63 is at the heart of operational success. First, sensitizing
law enforcement to Muslim communities is essential to gaining their trust and
cooperation. Training should involve: 1) knowing the enemy; and 2) understanding the
various cultural and religious traditions in Muslim communities. By educating the police,
law enforcement, and intelligence organizations, targeting efforts and collection activities
can be more precise, and less of a shot in the dark. Knowing who the enemies of the
West—also the demons of the Muslim world—are will help foreign liaison services
predict the terrorists’ next move and could encourage support from the local community.
But forcing cooperation between Muslim community leaders and the host government is
ineffectual unless authorities offer incentives to these communities, such as immunity
from arrest, improved access to employment and other public goods that fall under the
state jurisdiction. Establishing these relationships is not without growing pains. For
example, the Dutch service indicated that relations with its local Muslim communities is
dependent on cooperation from the imam (cleric) of a mosque or someone who has
religious authority, and that, in light of their [the Muslims’] perceived alienation, is a
difficult hurdle to overcome.64

60
E-mail correspondence with Muslim female professor in the US. September 2005.
61
Akbar, Ahmad, pp. 155-156.
62
For more information on this worldview, see Graham Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, New York:
Palgrave MacMillian, 2003, pp.54-56.
63
Zedalis, Debra D., Female Suicide Bombers, June 2004. http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi
64
Informal conversations with the Ministry of Interior in the Netherlands. September 2005.

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 8 #1 November 2006 34

 Secondly, learning from policies adopted by countries struggling with suicide
bombers could help other governments learn what works, and what clearly does not. For
example, terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman argues that “we must change our approach to
defending against suicide attacks” because profiling ne marche pas.65 Profiling is less
effective today because the face of terror has changed. Once only a man’s “sport,”
women are now terrorists, as are younger members of society. Hoffman maintains that in
the absence of knowing who the perpetrator is, “the best defense relies on mobilizing the
entire security force against the threat.” This requires increasing training for police and
adding special units to law enforcement whose job it is to combat suicide bombers.66
Also key to uprooting terrorism is to know what has failed. For example, abduction of
Chechen women by Russian security forces to avenge attacks against Russian civilians by
Chechen female terrorists may fuel resentment and motivate, rather than deter, women
from joining terrorist groups.67
In addition, improving liaison services’ email collection of female, and male, users
seeking participation in attacks can provide opportunities to disrupt the terrorist networks
online. As more violent organizations escape the public eye and operate underground, the
Internet will be the key to their survival; that is, the Internet can replenish the
organization’s losses with new recruits, a stable source of income, an exchange of
operational tactics, and ultimately, evade capture by the security service. Women have
the most to gain from this open venue, particularly women residing in a dominant culture
that prohibits interaction with men, and disallows women equal opportunities. Tapping
into this “market” will require that authorities’ have technical abilities and linguistic
skills to veil their identities when entering the chat room.
Finally, intelligence would not be intelligence without recruitment. Perhaps the
only way to acquire operational nuggets about the plans and intentions of terrorist
organizations is to enter the network. How this can be accomplished without exposing the
Western hand will require additional research and focus. If access to male terrorists is a
hurdle we continue to face, then entrée to militant Muslim women is an even greater
challenge.

65
French for “it doesn’t work.”
66
Hoffman, Bruce, “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism” The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 291, no. 5, June 2003, pp.
46-47.
67
Baker, Peter, “New Stage of Fear For Chechen Women,” Washington Post, October 19, 2004. A Section:
A12.

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 8 #1 November 2006 35