Chua

Topic: Factors in Determining Appropriate Bargaining Unit

85. Belyca Corporation v. Ferrer-Calleja
Belyca Corporation v. Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. 77395, Nov. 29, 1988
Doctrine: A proper bargaining unit maybe said to be a group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interests of
all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
Among the factors considered are: (1) will of employees (Glove Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity
of employee's interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties or similarity of
compensation and working conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary employees.
The test of proper grouping – community and mutuality of interest (substantial mutual interest
test)
The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally
the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights.
Action Sequence: LA -> BLR -> SC
Facts: On June 3, 1986, Associated Labor Union (ALU)-TUCP, a legitimate labor organization
duly registered with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, filed a petition for direct certification
as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees/workers of the
Livestock and Agro Division of Belyca Corporation, a corporation engaged in the business of
poultry raising, piggery and planting of agricultural crops such as corn, coffee and various
vegetables, employing approximately 205 rank and file employees/workers. In case of doubt on
its majority representation, it sought for the issuance of an order authorizing the immediate
holding of a certification election.
Belyca opposed the petition and contended that the bargaining unit must include all the workers
in its integrated business concerns ranging from piggery, poultry, to supermarts and cinemas so
as not to split an otherwise single bargaining unit into fragmented bargaining units.
The Labor Arbiter granted the certification election. Belyca appealed to the BLR, which denied
the appeal and MR. Belyca filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction with the SC. A TRO was issued and the SC gave due course to the petition.
Issue 1: Whether the proposed bargaining unit is an appropriate bargaining unit
Ruling 1: YES.
The Labor Code does not specifically define what constitutes an appropriate collective
bargaining unit. Article 256 of the Code provides: 
Art. 256. Exclusive bargaining representative.—The labor organization designated or
selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit
 shall be exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining. However, an individual employee or group of employee shall have
the right at any time to present grievances to their employer.
According to Rothenberg, a proper bargaining unit maybe said to be a group of employees of a
given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the
collective interests of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be
best suited to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law.
Among the factors considered in Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc.
are: "(1) will of employees (Glove Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of employee's interest, such as
substantial similarity of work and duties or similarity of compensation and working conditions; (3)
prior collective bargaining history; and (4) employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and
probationary employees".
Under the circumstances of that case, the Court stressed the importance of the fourth factor and
sustained the trial court's conclusion that two separate bargaining units should be formed in
dealing with respondent company, one consisting of regular and permanent employees and
another consisting of casual laborers or stevedores. Otherwise stated, temporary employees
should be treated separately from permanent employees. But more importantly, this Court laid
down the test of proper grouping, which is community and mutuality of interest.
In Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing Co. v. Alhambra Employees' Association, where
the employment status was not at issue but the nature of work of the employees concerned, the
Court stressed the importance of the second factor otherwise known as the substantial-mutual-
interest test and found no reason to disturb the finding of the lower Court that the employees in
the administrative, sales and dispensary departments perform work which has nothing to do
with production and maintenance, unlike those in the raw leaf, cigar, cigarette and packing and
engineering and garage departments and therefore community of interest which justifies the
format or existence as a separate appropriate collective bargaining unit.
PLASLU v. CIR et al. reiterated the above rulings, holding that among the factors to be
considered are: employment status of the employees to be affected, that is the positions and
categories of work to which they belong, and the unity of employees' interest such as
substantial similarity of work and duties.
In any event, whether importance is focused on the employment status or the mutuality of
interest of the employees concerned, "the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all
employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.”
Hence, following the substantial-mutual-interest test, the Court ruled in LVN Pictures v.
Philippine Musicians Guild that there is a substantial difference between the work performed by
musicians and that of other persons who participate in the production of a film which suffice to
show that they constitute a proper bargaining unit.
In the present case, the employees of the livestock and agro division of petitioner corporation
perform work entirely different from those performed by employees in the supermarts and
cinema. Among others, the noted difference are: their working conditions, hours of work, rates
of pay, including the categories of their positions and employment status. As stated by petitioner
corporation in its position paper, due to the nature of the business in which its livestock-agro
division is engaged, very few of its employees in the division are permanent, the overwhelming
majority of which are seasonal and casual and not regular employees. Definitely, they have very
little in common with the employees of the supermarts and cinemas. To lump all the employees
of petitioner in its integrated business concerns cannot result in an efficacious bargaining unit
comprised of constituents enjoying a community or mutuality of interest. Undeniably, the rank
and file employees of the livestock-agro division fully constitute a bargaining unit that satisfies
both requirements of classification according to employment status and of the substantial
similarity of work and duties which will ultimately assure its members the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights.
Issue 2: Whether the statutory requirement that 30% (now 20%) of the employees in the
proposed bargaining unit ask for a certification election had been strictly complied with
Ruling 2: Yes.
Belyca employs more or less 205 rank-and-file employees, has no duly existing CBA, and there
has been no certification election in the proposed bargaining unit within the last 12 months prior
the filing of the petition, and there is no contending union requesting for certification as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative in the proposed bargaining unit. 124 employees or
workers, more than a majority of the rank-and—file employees in the proposed bargaining unit,
had signed membership with ALU and expressed written consent and authorization. Thus, the
statutory requirement under Art. 258 has been met.
Belyca contended that 4 employees resigned, 6 withdrew their membership, 5 were retrenched,
12 were dismissed, and 100 abandoned their work. However, the Memorandum of its personnel
officer showed that 119 employees were on strike, and that there is a complaint for unfair labor
practice and illegal dismissal filed by the union for the dismissal of its president, vice president
and 3 other active members of the union, later amended to include 138 others.
Under Art. 257 of the Labor Code, once the statutory requirement is met, the Director of Labor
Relations has no choice but to call a certification election. Once the requirement is met, any
doubt cast on the authenticity of signatures to the petition for holding a certification election
cannot be a bar to its being granted. Once the required percentage requirement has been
reached, the employees' withdrawal from union membership taking place after the filing of the
petition for certification election will not affect said petition.
Until a decision, final in character, has been issued declaring the strike illegal and the mass
dismissal or retrenchment valid, the strikers cannot be denied participation in the certification
election notwithstanding, the vigorous condemnation of the strike and the fact that the picketing
were attended by violence. Under the foregoing circumstances, it does not necessarily follow
that the strikers in question are no longer entitled to participate in the certification election on the
theory that they have automatically lost their jobs. 
Finally, as a general rule, a certification election is the sole concern of the workers. The only
exception is where the employer has to file a petition for certification election pursuant to Art.
259 of the Labor Code because the latter was requested to bargain collectively. But thereafter
the role of the employer in the certification process ceases. The employer becomes merely a
bystander
There is no showing that the instant case falls under the above mentioned exception. However,
petitioner corporation from the outset has actively participated and consistently taken the
position of adversary in the petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative and/or certification election filed by ALU to the extent of filing this petition for
certiorari in this Court. Considering that a petition for certification election is not a litigation but a
mere investigation of a non-adversary character to determining the bargaining unit to represent
the employees and its only purpose is to give the employees true representation in their
collective bargaining with an employer, there appears to be no reason for the employer's
objection to the formation of subject union, much less for the filing of the petition for a
certification election.
Dispositive: Petition is denied.