RULE 72

Montaner vs. Sharia District

FACTS:
Luisa Kho Montañer married Alejandro Montañer, Sr. in 1956 and begotten three children.

In 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S.
Montañer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before
the Shari’a District Court, against the properties of Late Alejandro Alejandro Montañer, Sr.,
Luisa Kho Montañer, Lillibeth K. Montañer, Alejandro Kho Montañer, Jr., and Rhodora
Eleanor K. Montañer. They alleged that Alejandro Sr., is a Muslim and that they are the first
family of the decedent.

On the other hand, herein petitioners, the children of Luisa and Alejandro Sr., filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground that the Shari'a District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate
because Alejandro Sr. was a Roman Catholic, and that private respondent's complaint is
barred by prescription, as it seeks to establish filiation pursuant to Article 175 of the Family
Code.

The Shari'a District Court dismissed the complaint and held that Alejandro Sr. was not a
Muslim and its jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of
deceased Muslims.

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The Shari'a District Court reconsidered its
order of dismissal and allowed the private respondents to adduce further evidence. In its
second assailed order dated September 21, 2006, the Shari’a District Court ordered the
continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial
conference. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether Shari'a District Court has no jurisdiction over the case.
(2) Whether Shari’a District Court did not acquire jurisdiction over “The Estates and
Properties of the Late Alejandro Montaner Sr.” which is not a natural or juridical
person with capacity to be sued.

RULING:
(1)
The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments
and character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition. The designation given by
parties to their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to the
said designation. Rather than rely on "a falsa descriptio or defective caption," courts are
"guided by the substantive averments of the pleadings."

Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Shari’a District Court
as a "Complaint" for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains
sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim,
such as the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death as well as the allegation that he is a
Muslim.

We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have
jurisdiction over the case because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss
that Montañer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the
action and its subject matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an
answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on
the defendant or result in having "a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly
delayed by simple stratagem. Indeed, the "defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent
on a question of fact does not render the court to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction."

(2)
Special Proceedings
The underlying assumption in petitioners’ second argument, that the proceeding before the
Shari’a District Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an
erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the confusion may
be attributed to the proceeding before the Shari’a District Court, where the parties were
designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil
action. We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the
issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate
of the deceased, which is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court
(Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." This Court has applied the Rules,
particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
Muslim. In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement,
and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of
the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s heirs,
which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement
and liquidation of the estate of the decedent. Here, the respondents seek to
establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and, subsequently, for
private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among
his heirs, if such is the case in fact.

Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a
party defendant in a civil action applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the
estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a
special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a
special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in
which "a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong" necessarily has definite adverse parties, who
are either the plaintiff or defendant.

On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish a
status, right, or a particular fact," has one definite party, who petitions or
applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite
adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not
being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of
the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities, and to
distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.

Thus, the SC affirmed the orders of the Shari’a District Court. The Shari’a District Court
must be given the opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the decedent is a
Muslim in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction.

RULE 74

Heirs of Espinas vs. Luna

Simon had four (4) children, Heriberto, Genoviva, Felisa, and Juan.

The respondents in this case are Felix (son of Genoviva), Armando and Antonio (children of
Heriberto.

The respondents alleged that Juan and Felisa, through deceit, connivance, and
misrepresentation, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale, which adjudicated
the subject property to Leopoldo (son of Felisa).

In their defense, the children of Leopoldo (herein petitioners, Lilibeth and Onel) argued that
when Simon died intestate, his children agreed to partition his estate such that the property
situated in Magogon, Camalig, Albay went to Genoviva and the parcel of land located in
Ting-ting, Taloto, Camalig, Albay went to Heriberto. On the other hand, the subject property
was the joint share of Juan and Felisa who subsequently executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale on May 14, 1966, conveying the subject property to Leopoldo.

The RTC ruled that the co-owners of Simon's properties were his children. And as co-owners
of the subject property Felisa and Juan enjoyed full ownership of their portions and they had
the right to alienate the same. The trial court added that the sale by Felisa and Juan of their
respective undivided shares in the co-ownership was valid and the vendee, Leopoldo, became
the owner of the shares sold to him.

The Court of Appeals adjudged that Heriberto and Genoviva were excluded in the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement executed by Juan and Felisa. It noted that the extrajudicial
settlement adjudicated and sold properties which still formed part of the estate of Simon and
were, therefore, co-owned by his heirs. The appellate court emphasized that under Section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person
who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. It opined that fraud had been
committed against the excluded heirs, thus, the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale
must be annulled.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an actual partition done by the heirs of Simon long before the
subject property was sold to Leopoldo. If so, is the oral partition valid?

RULING:
YES.

Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among
those to whom it may belong. It may be effected extrajudicially by the heirs themselves
through a public instrument filed before the register of deeds.

However, as between the parties, a public instrument is neither constitutive nor an inherent
element of a contract of partition. Since registration serves as constructive notice to third
persons, an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors, are affected. Moreover, even the
requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to
partitions effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such
transaction is not a conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but merely a
designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the
ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of
land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of
individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and
decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as
between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.

A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have
acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of
ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.

In the case at bar, it has been shown that upon the death of Simon, his children, Genoviva,
Heriberto, Juan and Felisa, orally partitioned the estate among themselves, with each one of
them possessing their respective shares and exercising acts of ownership. Respondents did
not dispute that the property situated in Magogon, Camalig, Albay went to Genoviva while
the property situated in Ting-ting, Taloto, Camalig, Albay went to Heriberto.

Further, they did not raise any objection to the fact that the subject property was given to
Juan and Felisa as their share in Simon's estate. It must be emphasized that no one among
the children of Simon disturbed the status quo which has been going on from the year 1966.
To be sure, Genoviva and Heriberto were not without knowledge that the subject property
was transferred to Leopoldo and that the latter had introduced improvements thereon. They
could have easily questioned the transfer, but they chose to remain silent precisely because
they were already given their respective shares in the estate.

Hence, it can be gleaned unerringly that the heirs of Simon agreed to orally partition his
estate among themselves, as evidenced by their possession of the inherited premises, their
construction of improvements thereon, and their having declared in their names for taxation
purposes their respective shares. Actual possession and exercise of dominion over definite
portions of the property in accordance with an alleged partition are considered strong proof
of an oral partition.

DR. NIXON L. REYES

FACTS:

Rosie Larlar and petitioner Dr. Nixon Treyes are married but did not have any children with
petitioner. Rosie died without any will and left behind 14 real estate properties which she
owned together with Treyes as their conjugal properties.

Subsequently, Treyes executed two Affidavits of Self-Adjudication, as a result new titles of

Meanwhile, Rosie’s siblings contend that they are entitled to one half of the inheritance as
part of the estate of their sister. Thus, they filed a complaint for the Annulment of the
Affidavits of Self-Adjudication, cancellation of TCTs, reconveyance of ownership and
possession, partition, and damages against Treyes.

Treyes filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue, prescription, and lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.

ISSUE:
 (1) Whether the complaint should have been dismissed due to improper venue.
(2) Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the
complaint since the period for the filing of the complaint had already supposedly
prescribed.
(3) Whether a prior determination of the status as a legal or compulsory heir in a
separate special proceeding is a prerequisite to an ordinary civil action seeking for the
protection and enforcement of ownership rights given by law of succession.

RULING:

(1)
The Court finds and holds that the complaint cannot be dismissed on the ground of improper
venue on the basis of Rule 73 because such Rule refers exclusively to the special proceeding
of settlement of estates and NOT to ordinary civil actions. Involving Rule 73 to allege
improper venue is entirely inconsistent with petitioner Treyes’ assertion in the instant
Petition that the complaint is not a special proceeding but an ordinary civil action.

(2)
The argument is without merit.

The basis of petitioner Treyes in arguing that the Complaint is already barred by prescription
is Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules, which states that an heir or other persons unduly deprived
of lawful participation in the estate may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts at
any time within two years after the settlement and distribution of the estate.

The Court stresses that Rule 74 pertains exclusively to the settlement of estates, which is a
special proceeding and NOT an ordinary civil action.

The complaint in this case are ordinary civil action.

(3)
 RULE 78
Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012

FACTS: