PAMANTASAN NG CABUYAO

COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, ARTS AND SCIENCES

COURSE CODE: MAT101

COURSE TITLE: MATHEMATICS IN THE MODERN WORLD

COURSE A. Knowledge
INTENDED 1. Discuss and argue about the nature of mathematics, what it is, how its
LEARNING expressed, represented, and used.
OUTCOMES: 2. Use different types of reasoning to justify statements and arguments
made about mathematics and mathematical concepts.
3. Discuss the language and symbols of mathematics
B. Skills
4. Use a variety of statistical tools to process and manage numerical data;
5. Analyze codes and coding schemes used for identification, privacy, and
security purpose;
6. Use mathematics in other areas such as finance, voting, health and
medicine, business, environment, arts and design, and recreation.
C. Values
7. Appreciate the nature and uses of mathematics in everyday life.
8. Affirm honesty and integrity in the application of mathematics to
various human endeavours.

LEARNING
MATERIAL FOR
7
WEEK NUMBER:

I. TITLE: Apportionment and Voting

Section 1: Introduction to Apportionment
Section 2: The Voting Systems
Section 3 : The Weighted Voting Systems

II. OBJECTIVES: After this lesson, you are expected to:

1) use each method of apportionment to distribute items fairly to several

groups of a population
2) identify the apportionment methods that will satisfy the fairness criteria
3) identify if an apportionment problem will result in some paradoxes
4) use different voting methods to determine the winner among candidates or
options
5) identify which among the voting methods satisfy some fairness criteria
6) determine the winning coalitions in a weighted voting system
7) determine the critical voters
8) compute the Banzhaf power index and use this value to determine the
voter’s power

III. In this module, you will learn the different methods of apportionment and the two
INTRODUCTION: of the most important components of democracy: the right to vote and the weight of

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that vote. The basic idea of apportionment involves distributing a number of item
proportionally into several groups on the basis of the group population sizes. The
apportionment method can be used to determine the number of representatives a
city should have based on its present population. This module will focus on the
different methods of apportionment, paradoxical outcomes, and the behaviour of
each apportionment method according to the fairness of criteria.

IV. CONTENTS:

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION TO APPORTIONMENT

Apportionment is a method of distributing a number of items proportionally into several groups based on
population sizes. For example, the apportionment method can be used to determine the number of
representative a city should have based on its present population.

Hamilton Method

The Hamilton Method of apportionment was proposed by Alexander Hamilton to assign voting seats in
the House of Representatives to each represented state. This method is based on the standard divisor and
standard quota of the population. The standard divisor is defined by the formula

P
SD=
A
Where P is the total population and A is the total allocation or number of available seats to be assigned. On
the other hand, standard quota is given by:

G
SQ=
SD
Where G is the size of the group. The whole number portion of the standard quota is called lower quota
(LQ).

To get the lower quota of a group, round down the standard to a whole number. The standard quota of a
group with the highest decimal part is only rounded up to a whole number if the sum of the lower quotas is
less than the value of A. The process is repeated until the value of A is reached.

Example 1:

Consider a country with 6 states and 40 seats in the House of Representatives with population distributed
as follows.

Population

STATE A 58,805

STATE B 32,780

STATE C 109,111

STATE D 78,900

STATE E 67,430

STATE F 44,862

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TOTAL 391,888

Determine the apportionment of 40 seats to the states using Hamilton Method

Solution:

391 ,888
SD= =9797 . 2
40

STATE A STATE STATE STATE STATE STATE TOTAL

B C D E F

P 58,805 32,780 109,111 78,900 67,430 44,862 391,888

G
SQ= 6.00 3.35 11.14 8.05 6.88 4.58
SD
Lower quota 6 3 11 8 6 4 38

Final
Apportionment 6 3 11 8 7 5 40

A 40

SD 9,797.20

The sum of the lower quota does not meet A=40 . Thus, one additional seat is assigned to each state
starting with the state with the highest fractional standard quota, until all seats are assigned. In this case,
add one representative to state E and another one to state F.

Jefferson Method

The Jefferson method of apportionment uses a modified standard divisor (MSD) which is chosen by trial

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and error until the sum of the lower quota is equal to the required number of allocations. The lower quota
is the final apportionment obtained at the final value of the modified divisor. In this method, the modified
standard divisor is smaller than the original standard divisor.

Example 2:

Solve Example 1 using the Jefferson method.

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Solution:

STATE STATE STATE STATE STATE STATE TOTAL

A B C D E F

P 58,805 32,780 109,111 78,900 67,430 44,862 391,888

MSQ=P /MSD 6.53 3.64 12.12 8.76 7.49 4.98

Lower quota 6 3 12 8 7 4 40

Final
Apportionment 6 3 12 8 7 4 40

A 40

Modified Std
Divisor (MSD) 9,000

Note that you can choose any divisor from 8,195 (from 32,780/4) to 9,092 (from 109,111/12) as modified
standard divisor. This can be done by trial and error.

The Hamilton and Jefferson methods may give different final apportionments as shown below.

Apportionment State State State State State State Total

Method A B C D E F

Final Hamilton Apportionment

6 3 11 8 7 5 40

Final Jefferson Apportionment

6 3 12 8 7 4 40

The Webster Method

The Webster method of apportionment is quite similar to the Jefferson method. Unlike the other method
discussed, this method uses ordinary rounding, making it completely unbiased. The modified standard
divisor is determined using trial and error.

Example 3:

Solve Example 1 using Webster method

Solution:

This time, choose 9,500 as the modified standard divisor. The sum of the lower quotas will be equal to 40.

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STATE STATE STATE STATE STATE STATE TOTAL

A B C D E F

P 58,805 32,780 109,111 78,900 67,430 44,862 391,888

SQ=P/ MSD 6.19 3.45 11.49 8.31 7.10 4.72

Lower quota 6 3 11 8 7 5 40

Final
Apportionment 6 3 11 8 7 5 40

A 40

Modified Std
Divisor (MSD) 9,500

The Huntington-Hill Method

The Huntington-Hill method of apportionment uses the geometric means to round standard quotas until
the sum of the modified quotas equals the exact number of seats to be apportioned. You may need to
modify the standard divisor to get the exact total allocation. To find the geometric mean, multiply the upper
and lower quotas then get the square root. If the geometric mean is less than the standard quota, the final
apportionment is based on the lower quota. If otherwise, assign the upper quota.

Example 4:

Solve Example 1 using the Huntington-Hill method

Solution:

Use 9,500 as the modified standard divisor.

STATE STATE STATE STATE STATE STATE TOTAL

A B C D E F

P 58,805 32,780 109,111 78,900 67,430 44,862 391,888

SQ=P/ MSD 6.19 3.45 11.49 8.31 7.10 4.72

Upper Quota 7 4 12 9 8 5

Lower Quota 6 3 11 8 7 5 40

Geometric Mean 6.48 3.46 11.49 8.49 7.48 5

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Final
Apportionment 6 3 11 8 7 5 40

A 40

Modified Std
Divisor (MSD) 9,500

Huntington-Hill Number

When there is a need to add one item to one of the several groups in a population, the additional one item is
given to the group with the highest Huntington-Hill number.

The formula is as follows

2
G
H=
A ( A+1 )
Where G is the size of the group and A is the current number of items assigned to this group.

Example 5:

The following table shows the number of computers assigned to the five departments of a university in
Manila and the number of students enrolled in each department. To which department should a new
computer be assigned using the Huntington-Hill method?

Department Number of Students Number of Computers

1 Chemical Engineering 289 40

2 Mechanical Engineering 785 74

3 Computer Engineering 590 59

4 Civil Engineering 892 85

5 Architecture 345 45

Solution:

Using the formula for the Huntington-Hill number, we obtain the following:

2892 7852
H 1= =50. 9 H 2= =111
40( 40+1) , 74(74+1)

5902 8922
H 3= =98 .3 H 4= =108. 8
59(59+1) 85 (85+1)

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2
345
H 5= =57 .5
45( 45+1)

The mechanical engineering department has the greatest Huntington-Hill number. Thus, the
additional computer should be given to the mechanical engineering department.

Fairness Criterion and Apportion Paradoxes

The final apportionment using the Hamilton method always yields to either equal to the lower
quota or higher than the lower quota. The said property is one criterion of fairness for apportionment
methods also known as the quota criterion. Thus, the Hamilton method always satisfies the quota criterion.
Although the Hamilton method satisfies the quota criterion, it may sometimes result in apportion
paradoxes when there is a change in the size of the group, the required number of allocation, and the
number of groups. For example, a change in the population of a group may result in losing one or more
items to a group with relatively lower population. An increase in the number of items to be apportioned
may result in a lower apportionment to some groups even though the population of the groups are not
changed.

To eliminate paradoxes that can occur using the Hamilton method, other methods were introduced.
The three most important are Jefferson, Webster, and Huntington-Hill methods which, however, may
violate the quota criterion. Unfortunately, all apportionment methods are not perfect. They actually have
some flaws which were proved by Michael Balinski and Peyton Young.

Paradoxes in Hamilton Method

Paradoxical outcomes may exist using the Hamilton method. A new apportionment may occur to
one of the groups which is lower than its original apportionment when you change the sizes of the groups,
the number of the groups, or the number of items to be allocated. Note the paradoxes cannot occur in
Jefferson, Webster, and Huntington-Hill methods.

Example 6:

A country decides to apportion 200 representatives to three states.

State Population

A 940

B 9,000

C 10,000

a. Use the Hamilton method to find the apportionment for the three states.

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b. If one particular state requests 201 seats, what is the final apportionment? Where will the extra seat
go?

Solution:

a. Using the Hamilton method, we obtain the following results.

State State State

A B C Total

State Population 940 9,000 10,000 19,940

Standard Quota 9.43 90.27 100.30

Lower Quota 9 90 100 199

Final Apportionment 10 90 100 200

Allocation Number 200

Standard Divisor 99.7

b. If the number of representatives is changed to 201, the new apportionment will be as follows:

State State State

A B C Total

State Population 940 9,000 10,000 19,940

Standard Quota 9.48 90.23 100.81

Lower Quota 9 90 100 199

Final Apportionment 9 91 101 201

Allocation Number 201

Standard Divisor 99.2

Note that the addition of one representative forces State A to lose one representative which is not
fair. This apportionment paradox is known as the Alabama paradox.

The Balinski-Young Impossibility Theorem

The Balinski-Young Impossibility Theorem states that it is mathematically impossible to develop an

apportionment method that can avoid all types of paradoxes and at the same time can satisfy the quota
criterion.

Fairness Measurement

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The average constituency is used to measure the fairness of an apportionment. It is defined as

follows:

group size
Average Constituency =
number of representative assigned in the group

A group is poorly represented if it has a greater average constituency as compared to other groups.
If a group has a greater average constituency than another group, then the difference between their
average constituencies is called absolute unfairness of the apportionment. If the absolute unfairness is zero,
then the two groups are equally well represented.

Example 7:

An art guild is having a show and it has decided that the group of painters with 152 members will
have 8 booths and the group of sculptors with 95 members will have 5 booths. Calculate the absolute
unfairness of this assignment of booths.

Solution:

The average constituency of the painters is

152
=19
8
And the average constituency of the sculptors is

95
=19
5
The absolute unfairness is 19−19=0 . Thus, the booths are equally well assigned to the two groups.

Test yourself:

1. A mother of four children plans to distribute 35 identical pieces of Cadbury chocolate bars among her
children based on the number of minutes they spent doing chores. If she uses the Hamilton method,
what will be the fair way to divide the chocolate bars?

Child 1 Child 2 Child 3 Child 4

Minutes Worked 90 145 180 320

Solution:

Standard Divisor _______________________________________________

Child 1 Child 2 Child 3 Child 4

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Minutes Worked 90 145 180 320

Final Pieces of Chocolate Bars

Received

How many minutes of chores is needed for each child to receive one piece of chocolate?
2. Answer Problem 1 using the Jefferson method.

Solution:
Standard Divisor ___________________________________________

Child 1 Child 2 Child 3 Child 4

Minutes Worked 90 145 180 320

Final Pieces of Chocolate Bars

Received

3. Answer Problem 1 using Webster method.

Standard Divisor __________________________________________

Child 1 Child 2 Child 3 Child 4

Minutes Worked 90 145 180 320

Final Pieces of Chocolate Bars

Received

SECTION 2: THE VOTING SYSTEM

Voting is a tool used by groups of people in making a collective decision. It can be presented
conveniently in terms of an election system in which one can select a particular candidate out of a set of
candidates on the basis of ballots cast by voters.

The Majority System and Plurality of Voting

The majority system is the most common voting system applied to an election with only
twocandidates. The winner in the majority system requires more than half of the people voting for an issue
or a candidate. Majority means more than 50% of the total voters or all the other votes combined. Thus, in
an election process consisting of two candidates and 100 voters, the candidate with 51 votes or higher wins
the election.

For more than two candidates, it is possible that the one with the most votes may not constitute a
majority. In this case, the winner of this election will be based on the plurality method of voting. The

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winner by this method is the candidate with the most votes or most first-place votes for ranked candidates.
In the plurality system, alternative choices are not considered.

Example 1:

The table below shows the popular vote for three candidates in a student council election.

Candidate Votes

A 206

B 116

C 92

Total 414

a. Which candidate receives the majority of the votes?

b. Who wins the election?

Solution:

414
+1=208
a. The majority requires at least 2 votes. Hence, no one gets the majority vote.
b. Based on the plurality method of voting, candidate A receives the most votes so he should be declared
as the winner of this election.

Example 2:

The results of an election with 4 candidates and 50 voters are shown in the preference list below.
Using the plurality method of voting, which candidate wins this election?

Candidate Ranking

A 1 4 2 4 2

B 2 3 1 3 4

C 3 1 4 1 3

D 4 2 3 2 1

No. of Votes 12 8 16 10 4

Solution:

Getting all the total of first-place votes, you will obtain the following:

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Candidate Ranking Total First-Place

Votes

A 1 4 2 4 2 12

B 2 3 1 3 4 16

C 3 1 4 1 3 18

D 4 2 3 2 1 4

No. of Votes 12 8 16 10 4 50

Candidate C has the most number of first-place votes but he wins in this election according to the
plurality method. [Candidate C did not get the majority of the votes (at least 26 votes).]

Borda Count Method

In this method, each candidate is assigned a weight according to their rank in the preference list.
For n number of candidates, the highest rank (the most favourite) will have n points and the lowest rank
(the least favourite) will have 1 point. The Borda count is the sum of these weights given to a candidate.
The candidate who receives the highest Borda count will be declared the winner.

Example 3:
Using the Borda count method, determine the winner in the preference list in Example 2.

Solution:

n=4 CANDIDATE A

Rank Rank Point No. of Votes Total

1 4 12 48

4 1 8 8

2 3 16 48

4 1 10 10

2 3 4 12

Borda Count = 126

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n=4 CANDIDATE B

Rank Rank Point No. of Votes Total

3 2 12 24

3 2 8 16

1 4 16 64

3 2 10 20

4 1 4 4

Borda Count = 128

n=4 CANDIDATE C

Rank Rank Point No. of Votes Total

2 3 12 36

1 4 8 32

4 1 16 16

1 4 10 40

3 2 4 8

Borda Count = 132

n=4 CANDIDATE D

Rank Rank Point No. of Votes Total

4 1 12 12

2 3 8 24

3 2 16 32

2 3 10 30

1 4 4 6

Borda Count = 114

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The candidate with the highest Borda count is candidate C. Thus, candidate C wins the election.

Plurality with Elimination

Plurality with elimination is a variation of the plurality method in which the alternative choices of
the voters are taken into consideration.

The candidate with fewest number of first-place votes is first eliminated. In case there are two
alternatives with the same lowest votes, then both are to be eliminated. The remaining candidates are re-
ranked with the assumption that voters’ preference do not change from round to round.

Example 4

Answer example 2 using the method of plurality with elimination

Candidate Ranking

A 1 4 2 4 2

B 3 3 1 3 4

C 2 1 4 1 3

D 4 2 3 2 1

No. of Votes 12 8 16 10 4

Solution:

For round 1, candidate D should be eliminated.

Candidate Total First-Place Votes

A 12

B 16

C 28

D 4

Round 2

Candidate Ranking

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A 1 4 2 4 2

B 3 3 1 3 4

C 2 1 4 1 3

No. of Votes 12 8 16 10 4

Candidate Total First-Place Votes

A 12 + 4 = 16

B 16

C 8 + 10 = 18

Candidates A and B have the same lowest first-place votes, so both should be eliminated. Thus, the
winner for this method is candidate C.

The Top Two Runoff Method

The candidates with the most number of first-place votes are removed from the preference list and
are then re-ranked for new preference list. The one with the higher first-place votes in the new preference
list between these two candidates will be declared the winner. The top two runoff method satisfies the
majority criterion.

Example 5

Apply the top two runoff method to the preference list from Example 2.
Solution:

Counting the total first-place votes for each candidate, you will obtain the following.

Candidate Ranking Total First-Place Votes

A 1 4 2 4 2 12

B 2 3 1 3 3 16

C 3 1 4 1 4 18

D 4 2 3 2 1 4

No. of Votes 12 8 16 10 4

The top two candidates with the most number of first-place votes are candidates B and C. Thus,
remove candidates A and D from the list. This gives us the following preference list.

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Candidate Ranking Total First-Place Votes

B 1 2 1 2 1 32

C 2 1 2 1 2 18

No. of Votes 12 8 16 10 4

Thus, candidate B wins the election. Note that in the plurality method, candidate C wins the
election.

Approval Voting System

In this type of voting, a voter may choose more than one option or candidate. Each vote coming
from one voter will be counted as one vote, and the one with the most number of total votes will be
declared the winner. For large elections, approval voting may be considered a better method because it
measures the overall support for a candidate.

Example 6:

The members of a scholarship council have picked their choices from the top four applicants for a
scholarship. The results are indicated in the table of preference below.

Choices Number of Votes

Harry, Liam, and Louis 5

Harry, Liam, and Niall 3

Niall and Louis 2

Harry and Niall 4

Who got the scholarship using the approval voting system?

Solution:
Tallying the votes, you will obtain the following:

Candidate Number of Votes

Harry 5 + 3 + 4 = 12

Liam 5+3=8

Louis 5+2=7

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Niall 3+2+4=9

Hence, Harry gets the scholarship with a total of 12 votes.

The Method of Pairwise Comparison

In the method of pairwise comparison, each candidate is compared head-to-head with each of the
candidates. The candidate with the most number of wins from these comparisons will be declared the
winner. This method satisfies the majority, Condorcet, and monotonicity criteria of fairness in voting which
will be discussed in detail in the next section.

Example 7:

The members of a mechanical engineering club consisting of 165 active members were asked to
decide in which sports event the club should participate in the coming intercollegiate games. If the
members marked their ballots as shown in the preference table below, which event wins as the top choice
using the method of pairwise comparison?

c Number of 26 60 35 44
Voters

1st choice volleyball basketball football volleyball

2nd choice basketball volleyball basketball basketball

3rd choice swimming swimming volleyball football

4th choice football football swimming swimming

Solution:

Number of 26 60 35 44 Total First-

Voters Place Votes

Volleyball (V) 1 2 3 1 70

Basketball (B) 2 1 2 2 60

Football (F) 4 4 1 3 35

Swimming (S) 3 3 4 4 0

Possible comparison are highlighted in the table show

V B F S

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Number of Voters 26 60 35 44 Total First-Place Votes

V 1 2 3 1 26 + 44 = 70

B (winner) 2 1 2 2 60 + 35 = 95

Number of Voters 26 60 35 44 Total First-Place Votes

V (winner 1 2 3 1 26 + 60 + 44 = 130

F 4 4 1 3 35

Number of Voters 26 60 35 44 Total First-Place Votes

V (winner) 1 2 3 1 165

S 3 3 4 4 0

Number of Voters 26 60 35 44 Total First-Place Votes

B (winner) 2 1 2 2 26 + 60 + 44 = 130

F 4 4 1 3 35

Number of Voters 26 60 35 44 Total First-Place Votes

B (winner) 2 1 2 2 26 + 60 + 35 + 44 = 165

S 3 3 4 4 0

Number of Voters 26 60 35 44 Total First-Place Votes

F 4 4 1 3 34 + 44 = 79

S (winner) 3 3 4 4 26 + 60 = 86

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Below is the summary of the winner in each comparison

V B F S

V B V V

B B B

F S

Form the above table, basketball has the most number of wins. Therefore, this option should be the
top choice by pairwise comparison method.

Measuring Fairness in Voting

In voting, what does the word fair mean? When are the results of an election or a particular voting
method considered fair? People normally think that a majority candidate is a very strong candidate and it is
not fair when candidate loses an election. This thinking leads to one notion of fairness which is the majority
criterion. On the other hand, a single example of an election that fails to meet the fairness criterion would
be sufficient to show that a particular method is not fair. The following are the four basic criteria of
fairness.

1. The Majority Criterion

If a candidate receives the majority of first-place votes in an election, then this candidate should be
declared the winner. The method of plurality is an extension of the majority system. If the candidate is a
majority candidate then clearly he should also be the plurality winner. In some cases, the winner may not
have the approval of majority; nevertheless, the plurality method satisfies the majority fairness criterion.

2. The Condorcet Criterion

If a candidate is a Condorcet candidate, then he should be the winner of the election. A candidate is
said to be a Condorcet candidate if he wins in all of the one-to-one comparison with other candidates. The
pairwise comparison method is the only method satisfies the Condorcet criterion of fairness.

3. Monotonicity Criterion

Suppose candidate x wins an election. If the supporters of other candidates change their votes to
support candidate x, then this candidate must win the new election as well. The monotonicity fairness
criterion is satisfied by plurality, pairwise comparison, and Borda count methods.

4. Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)

Suppose candidate x wins an election. If a losing candidate withdraws from the race, then candidate
x should remain the winner of the new election.

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Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

It is impossible to develop a voting method that will satisfy all of the four basic criterion of fairness.

The following table summarizes the performance of the voting method discussed in this chapter
with respect to the four fairness criteria. The term “yes” means the method always satisfies the criterion
and “no” means it may violate the said criterion.

Fairness Plurality Borda Pairwise Top Two

Criterion Count Comparison Runoff

Majority Yes No Yes Yes

Condorcet No No Yes No

Monotonicit Yes Yes Yes No

y

IIA No No No No

Test yourself:

The following is the preference table form a science club election where the candidates are Arrow (A),
Bennett (B), Candice (C), and Danny (D)

Number of Voters 42 23 35 28 14

1st choice A B C A D

2nd choice D A D B A

3rd choice B C B D C

4th choice C D A C B
Determine the winner of the election
using the indicated method.

a. Plurality method
b. Plurality with elimination method
c. Borda count
d. Top two runoff

SECTION 3: THE WEIGHTED VOTING SYSTEMS

A weighted voting system is a biased voting system where voters have different amounts of
influence in the outcome of an election. The best examples are the stockholders of a company and the
United Nations Security Council.

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The weighted voting system W is characterized by three elements: n players, the quota q, and the
weights w of voters. Conveniently, it can be expressed as follows.

W={q : w1 , w 2 , w3 ,. .. w n } with w 1≥w2 ≥w 3≥. . .≤w n

The minimum number of votes needed to approve a resolution or to pass a measure is called a
quota. The weight of a voter is the number of votes controlled by the voter. There are different types of
weighted voting system.

Types of Weighted Voting Systems

1. One Voter – One Vote System

Each person has only one vote. Thus, a majority of the votes is required to pass a resolution.

Example 1: W= { q:1,1,1,1,1,1,1 }
Since the total number of votes is 7, then q=4 is the required number of votes to pass a
resolution. Hence, the quota is q=4 .

2. Dictatorship

This type of system has one person whose weight is enough to pass any resolution.

Example 2: W= { 9 :10 ,2,3,1,1 }

In this system, even if the other 4 candidates vote for the resolution, the sum of votes is only 7
which is less than the quota of 9 votes.

3. Null System
This is a weighted voting system which cannot pass any resolution because the sum of all votes is
always less than the quota.

Example 3: W= { 17: 2,1,8,3,2 }

Here, ∑ w=2+1+8+3+2=16 and 16 < q which is equal to 17.

4. The Veto Power System

This is one type of weighted voting system where each voter has a veto power. This means that if
one voter does not vote, no resolution will be passed. This type of voting system will occur when
the quota is equal to the sum of all the votes.

If at least one voter in a weighted voting system has veto power, the system is considered to
be a veto power system.

Example 4: W= { 18: 4,5,1,2,6 }

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Here, ∑ w=4+5+1+2+6=18 which is equal to the quota, q=18 .

Even the voter with one vote will have a veto power.

Coalition

A coalition in a voting system is an alliance formed by a group of voters with a common goal which
is either to vote in favor or against a resolution. Below are some of the terms related in a coalition.

1. A winning coalition is a group of voters whose sum of all votes is greater than or equal to the quota.
2. A losing coalition is a group of voters whose sum of all votes is less than the quota.
3. A critical voter is a voter who turns a winning coalition into a losing coalition if he or she leaves for
another group.
4. A blocking coalition is a group of voters who can prevent the approval of a resolution.
5. A dummy is a voter whose weight does not affect any voting outcome. Note that when a system has a
dictator, all other players are considered dummies.

The number of possible coalition with n voters is the number of possible subsets that can be formed
from these voters. This includes the set containing all the voters and the singleton subsets.

n
The number of possible coalition with n voters is given by 2 −1 .

The United Nations Security Council

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the 6 principal organs of the United Nations
which is given an executive power to make resolutions that will maintain peace and security in the
international community. The council members are limited to only 15 countries: 5 permanent members
(US, China, France, United Kingdom, and Russia) and 10 non-permanent members. Each of the five
members is given a veto power. Thus, if one of them votes against a resolution of the council, it will fail. The
decision of the council also requires that 9 members must vote in favour of the resolution. Based on the
current system, the UN Security Council is a veto power system.

Example 5:

Express the UNSC as a weighted voting system. Find the quota and the voting weight of each member.

Solution:

Let q be the quota for a resolution to pass and w be the voting weight of each permanent member.
Assuming a voting weight of 1 vote for each of the non-permanent members, you have the following
inequalities.

Condition 1: If one permanent member votes against a resolution, it fails.

4 w+10<q
Note that even if all 10 permanent vote for the resolution, if one permanent member will vote against it, the
quota will not be met.

Condition 2: Nine members including the five permanent members must vote for the resolution.

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q≤5 w+4
Combining the two inequalities,

4 w+10<5 w+4

w> 6
The smallest integer number after 6 is 7. Hence, w = 7, q = 39, and the weighted system of the UNSC
is defined by

W= { 39:7,7,7,7,7,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 } .

Example 6:

The weighted voting system for a company owned by 5 people is given by

W= { 160: 425 ,250 , 175 , 350 }

a. Find all the winning coalitions.
b. For each winning coalition, determine the critical voters.

Solution:

425+250+ 175+350
q= =601
Note that 2

Owners Shares

A 425

B 250

C 175

D 350

Quota = 601

4
The total possible coalitions are 2 −1=15
The winning coalitions (WC) are the combinations whose total votes are greater than the quota
601. These are {A, B}, {A, D}, {A, B, C}, {A, B, D}, {B, C, D}, {A, C, D}, AND {A, B, C, D}.

If a critical voter of a winning coalition is removed, the winning coalition becomes a losing coalition.
The following table summarizes the critical voters for each winning coalition.

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Coalition Total Winning Coalition Critical Voters

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1 A 425

2 B 250

3 C 175

4 D 350

5 AB 675 YES A&B

6 AC 600

7 AD 775 YES A&D

8 BC 425

9 BD 600

10 CD 525

11 ABC 850 YES A&B

12 ABD 1025 YES A

13 BCD 775 YES B, C & D

14 ACD 950 YES A&D

15 ABCD 1200 YES None

QUOTA = 601 >601

Banzhaf Power Index

The Banzhaf Power Index (BPI) measures the power of a voter in a weighted voting system. The
value of BPI ranges from 0 to 1. If the BPI value of voter A is greater than of voter B, then A has greater
power than B. This means that A can be part of more winning coalitions than B. The voting power of a voter
is measured by the Banzhaf Power Index which is defined as follows:

the number of times a voter becomes a critical voter

B=
the total number of critical voters in all winning coalitions

Example 7:

Compute the voting power of each voter in Example 6.

Solution:

The total number of critical voters in all 7 winning coalitions is 12.

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Owners B

A 5/12 0.42

B 3/12 0.25

C 1/12 0.08

D 3/12 0.25

Owner A has the most power and owner C has the least power.

TEST YOURSELF:

A weighted voting system consist of four A, B, C, and D whose vote weights are 8, 3, 3, and 2respectively.
Find

a. the quota
b. the type of weighted voting system
c. the weight of coalition {A, D}
d. the winning coalitions
e. for what values of q is there a dummy in the system
f. the values of q that will make the system a veto power system
g. the minimum value of q that gives a null system

V. REFERENCES: Aufman, Richard N., et al, Mathematical Excursions

Lipschutz, Saymour, et al, Schhaum’s Outline of Beginning Finite
Mathematics
Voting Systems and the Condorcet Paradox. “ by PBS Infinite
series/https://www.youtube.com
http://www.mathscareers.org.uk/article/how-the-tiger-got-its- stripes/

VI. ASSESSMENT TASK:

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

Solve the following:

1. A state university in Manila has three freshman dormitories, building A, B, and C has 82 rooms; building
B has 45 rooms; and building C has 64 rooms. A 15-person resident council will be apportioned to three
buildings who will set rules governing the dormitories. If all rooms are occupied, assign the
representatives using the Hamilton method which is based on the number of rooms occupied.
2. What will be the new apportionment of representatives in Problem 1 if the Jefferson method is used?
3. What will be the new apportionment in Problem 1 if the Webster method is used?

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