Technische Universität München

2 Flight Control Systems

2.1 Introduction to Flight Control Systems

2.2 Flight Control System Configuration
2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
2.4 Electronic Flight Control System

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2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
Technische Universität München

Overview

Flight Control System

Architecture

Flight Control Computer

Actuation and Linkage Power Systems

• Actuators (Power Actuation) • Control and monitoring • Power architecture

• Power Control Units • Signaling management • Power sources and distribution
• Redundancy • Fault Tolerance • Power demand

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2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
Technische Universität München

Background and Definitions

Fault Tolerance

Fault Tolerance is a term that is used to define the ability of any system to withstand single
or multiple failures which results in either no loss of functionality or a known loss of
functionality or reduced level of redundancy while maintaining the required level of safety.

There are two major classes of faults that any system design must deal with:

• Class 1 fault: A failure which results in some particular component becoming totally
inoperative. Example: Loss of power to an electronic component

• Class 2 fault: A failure which results in some particular component remaining active, but
the functionality it provides is in error. Example: False signals by erroneous operation of
sensor.

Fault tolerant flight control system requires the principal techniques of

redundancy, dissimilarity, and installation segregation.

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2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
Technische Universität München

Background and Definitions

Redundancy

Redundancy is the multiplication of flight critical

components or functions of the safety-critical system with
the intention of increasing reliability of the system
(backup or fail-safe).

Dissimilarity

Dissimilar implementations increase robustness to

common-mode faults for safety critical systems by
using dissimilar hardware and/or dissimilar software. The Source: moog.com

objective is to tolerate a “design error” of the system. Schematic of the quadruplex computer
controlled fly-by-wire system of the
Segregation Northrop Grumman B-2

Separation is a natural part of aircraft systems integration.

It is usually adopted for reasons of integrity or criticality and
is applied for wiring, hardware and software (partitioning).

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2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
Technische Universität München

Architectural Design Aspects

General

The architecture of the flight control system, in terms of number of actuators per surface,
number and distribution of power sources and flight control computers, is primarily driven by
safety considerations (< 𝟏𝟎−𝟗 extremely improbable)

• Complete loss of power supply for a fully powered

flight control actuation system Redundancy/dissimilarity required
• Power sources/systems
• Flutter of trailing edge control surfaces leading to
• Actuators/linkages
structural rupture

• Other safety considerations (particular risks)

 Engine or tire burst Segregation required
• Equipment
 Mid-air collision with minimal structural damage
• Interconnection routes
 Battle damage for military aircraft (electrical and hydraulic)

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2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
Technische Universität München

Architectural Design Aspects

Hardware redundancy
• Multiple flight control computer
RAT

• Different control surface actuation A340

3 hydraulic sources + RAT (hydraulic)
• Different power sources/systems

• Ram Air Turbine (RAT) as a last power backup E1 ES E2

RAT

Monitoring
• All the components (sensors, actuators, probes) A380
4 power sources (2 hydraulics + 2 electrical)
are monitored in real-time + RAT (electrical)

Power sources redundancy for control surface

• The information exchange between the computer actuation, including the Ram Air Turbine (RAT)
(more in Chapter 4 Power Generation and Distribution)
must also be monitored

Source: Goupil (2011)

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2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
Technische Universität München

Architectural Design Aspects

Reconfiguration (key point for a fault tolerant system) CONTROL SURFACE

• Level 1: Reconfiguration is based on hardware Actuator 1 Actuator 2

(Hyd. 1) (Hyd. 2)
redundancy (see schematic)
P1 P2

• Level 2: Flight control law reconfiguration (see more S1 S2

in Chapter 2.4) due to loss of hardware redundancy Active/stand by

Dissimilarity (key point for a fault tolerant system)

• Airbus: Different types of computer (hardware and Reconfiguration: Automatic
management following a failure
software) developed by different teams
• Boeing: 3 lanes with dissimilar hardware (L/C/R)
• Different types of actuators for same control surface

Source: Goupil (2011)

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2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
Technische Universität München

Architectural Design Aspects

Installation segregation
• Computer are not physically installed at the same
place on the aircraft
• Segregation of hydraulic and electrical routes

Perfect robustness (software and system equipment)

• Protection against Electro-Magnetic Interference
Source: AIRBUS (2004)
(EMI) and lightning strikes
Physical installation segregation of the
• No false alarms Flight Control Computer in the Airbus A380

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 2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
Technische Universität München

Example: Airbus A320

Primary Flight Control System Architecture

Slat PCU

B G
SPOILERS SPOILERS
SFCC1 SFCC2
5 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5
SFCC1 SFCC2
AILERON G Y B Y G G Y B Y G AILERON
LEFT G Y RIGHT
SEC 2 1 1 3 3 3 3 1 1 2 SEC
B G Flap PCU G B
ELAC1 ELAC2 ELAC1 ELAC2
THS Actuator

LEFT ELEVATOR G Y RIGHT ELEVATOR

HYDRAULIC FAC1 FAC2
B G Y B
M TLU
B = Blue system RUDDER
ELAC1 ELAC2 ELAC2 ELAC1
G = Green system SEC1 SEC2 SEC1
SEC2 G
Y = Yellow system
1 2 3 Electrical Motors
Note: Underlined letters = priority servo control Y
ELAC1 ELAC2
COMPUTER SEC1 SEC2 B
FAC 1 G
ELAC 1/2 2 Elevator Aileron Computers
M
SEC 1/2/3 3 Spoiler Elevator Computers FAC 2 Y (Mechanical control)
FAC 1/2 2 Flight Augmentation Computers
Yaw Damper
SFCC 2 Slat Flap Control Computers Servo-Actuator
TRIM
1 2 Computer Reconfiguration Order
FAC1 FAC2

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2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
Technische Universität München

Example: Airbus A320

Primary Flight Control System Architecture

• 2 Elevator/Aileron Computer (ELAC), each controls and monitors one hydraulic servo
actuator on each aileron and elevator

• 3 Spoiler/Elevator Computer (SEC) achieve the spoiler control, standby elevator control
and standby THS control (through the second electromechanical actuator).

• 2 Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC) provide Yaw Damper function and travel
limitation by a Travel Limitation Unit (TLU)

• 3 hydraulic systems Green, Blue, Yellow (G, B, Y) provide hydraulic power

• Direct mechanical links (to THS/rudder) if all computers fail (very unlikely event)

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2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
Technische Universität München

High-Lift Control System Architecture

Design Aspects and Requirements

• Emerging loads
𝑛𝑧 Flaps retracted
 Static loads (structure) 3
Flaps extended 2.5
2.0
 Operational load cases (drive system design) 2

1
 Maneuver loads (inertial forces) 0
𝑉𝑆1 𝑉𝐹 𝑉𝐶 𝑉𝐷 𝐸𝐴𝑆
 Loads in cases of failure (e.g. jam)
-1
-1
Typical flight maneuvering envelope
• Assure synchronous setting

• Avoid asymmetry flap and slat deflections

• Automatic monitoring functions

 Automatic flap retracting if max. speed is exceeded (flap load relief)
 Automatic, speed-dependent flap extension to first position (flap auto command)
 Avoids slat retracting if a given angle of attack is exceeded (slat alpha lock)
 Avoids slat retracting if speed falls below a given min. speed (slat baulk)
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2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
Technische Universität München

High-Lift Control System Architecture

State of the Art

• Central Power Control Units (PCU) transmit energy over mechanical shafts to the
actuators

• Mechanical transmission shaft with rotary or ball-screw actuators

• Synchronized hydraulic actuators with control valves

• Gearboxes necessary for larger direction changes

Trailing edge flap actuation system of the Airbus A340 (Recksiek, 2009)

The mechanical transmission shaft system consists of a high number of

components and requires high design-engineering and installation effort

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2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
Technische Universität München

Example: Airbus A320

ECAM Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor
High-Lift Control System Architecture LGCIU Landing Gear Control Interface Unit
Control
PCU Power Control Unit
lever Command
SF(CC) Slat/Flap Control Computer
sensor unit

Flap Slat
Slat/Flap PCU
ECAM PCU Slat/Flap
Control Computer 2 Control Computer 1
(SFCC 2) (SFCC 1)

Flap Attachment Flap Attachment

Sensor
LGCIU LGCIU Sensor

Slat
Rotary PCU
Actuator SF1 B G SF2

SF2 SF1 SF2 SF1 SF2 SF1

G
Flap Flight Warning Slat G
B PCU PCU B
Computer SF2
SF1 Drive Gear
Wing Tip Wing Tip Asymmetry
SF2 SF1 Box SF2 SF1
SF2 Brake Brake SF2 Position
B B Pick up unit
Y G
SF1 SF1 Rotary
Actuator
Flap
Support
PCU Track
SF1 G Y SF2
Flap
Carriage
Flap Flap
Attachment Sensor Attachment Sensor
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2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
Technische Universität München

Example: Airbus A320

High-Lift Control System Architecture

• Slat and flap control lever is signaled (electrically) via a command sensor unit

• 2 Slat/Flap Control Computer (SFCC) control and monitor the drive systems

• Each SFCC controls one slat and one flap hydraulic motor of the PCU

• Each drive system consist of two similar hydro-mechanical systems:

 Two hydraulic motors
 Differential gear and transverse torque shafts
 Rotary actuators operate the slats and flaps
 Wing Tip Brakes (WTB) to prevent asymmetric
operation, blow back, runaway or overspeed
 Position pick-up units (PPUs) used for
Source: liebherr.com
detection of asymmetric operation and for
Central Power Control Unit (PCU) for the
system monitoring high-lift control system of the A380

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 2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
Technische Universität München

Flight Control Computer

Top Level Architecture Comparison

Boeing 777 Airbus A330/340

3x Flight Control Primary

Power Control Computer (FCPC)
Units (PCU)
ACE L1 Spoilers
PFC Left Ailerons
COMMAND MONITOR
Spoilers Elevator
Rudder
ACE L2 Flaperons Stabilizer

Ailerons

PFC Center ACE C Elevator

Rudder Spoilers
COMMAND MONITOR Ailerons (standby)
ACE R Elevator (standby)
Rudder (trim/travel limit)

2x Flight Control Secondary

PFC Right
Computer (FCSC)

3 x Primary Flight Control

Computers (PFC)
Source: Moir and Seabridge, Aircraft Systems (2008)

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2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
Technische Universität München

Flight Control Computer

Boeing 777

• 3 Primary Flight Computer (PFCs) LCR

Left PFC commands shown on left bus

• Each PFC has three similar lanes with dissimilar A629 Command
Terminal Flight
hardware (independent computer sections) Interface Lane Control DC
Power
System
A629 Standby
•
Lane 1
Each lane has a separate role during an Terminal
Interface Lane Lane 2
Lane 3
operating period (roles cycled after power up) A629
Terminal
Monitor
Interface Lane
• Separate DC power system powers the flight
PFC Left
control system Center and Right PFCs similarly operate on center
and (C) and right (R) buses
LCR
• Communication with the four Actuator Control ARINC 629
Flight Control
Electronics (ACE) is by multiple A629 data bus Data Buses

• ACEs control the aircraft’s primary flight-critical

surface and provide normal flight control modes

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2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
Technische Universität München

Flight Control Computer

Airbus A330

• 5 main flight control computer (redundancy) Power Source

 3 Flight Control Primary Computer (FCPC) COM RAM

Processor
 2 Flight Control Secondary Computer
ROM

Power Input/
Supply
(FCSC) Output
Watchdog
Relay
Bulkhead
• Each computer comprises command and monitor Watchdog
Input/
elements with different software (dissimilarity) Power
Supply Output
RAM
• FCPC and FCSC have different architectures MON
Processor
ROM

and hardware (dissimilarity) Lightning strike protection

Actuators

• FCSC: Standby commands for aileron, elevator

and rudder (redundancy)

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2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
Technische Universität München

Flight Control Computer

Evolution of Airbus Fly-By-Wire Computer

A320 Family A330/A340 A380

COM MON COM MON COM MON

2 Elevator/Aileron Computer 3 FC Primary Computer 3 FC Primary Computer (integrated

Flight Guidance and Envelope functions)

COM MON COM MON COM MON

3 Spoiler/Elevator Computer 2 FC Secondary Computer 3 FC Secondary Computer

2 Flight Augmentation Computer 2 Slat/Flap Control Computer 2 Slat/Flap Control Computer

Autopilot and Flight Management Functions 2 FC Data Concentrator 2 FC Data Concentrator

Autopilot Autopilot
FMC
FMC
FMC

Flight Management and

Guidance Computer (FMGC) Source: Moir and Seabridge, Aircraft Systems (2008)

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Technische Universität München

Actuation and Linkage

Overview

Actuation and linkage – to power sources and flight control computer – is one key element in
electrical flight control systems, increasingly so with the advent of fly-by-wire and active
control units.

• Actuation and linkage is important to attain the specified flight control performance

• Control surfaces have 1-3 actuators, depending on criticality and sensitivity to flutter

• Actuators can be categorized as

 Simple Mechanical/Hydraulic Actuation
 Fly-By-Wire Hydraulic Actuator (HA)
 Electro Hydrostatic Actuator (EHA)
 Electro-Mechanical Actuator (EMA)
 Electrical Backup Hydraulic Actuator (EBHA) Source: liebherr.com

Fly-By-Wire hydraulic actuator (HA) of

spoiler 4 of the Airbus A380

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Actuation and Linkage

Simple Mechanical/Hydraulic Actuators

• Powered by one hydraulic system, one back-up channel (for critical application)

• Mechanical operated Servo Valve (SV) directs the hydraulic supply

• Electrical signaling from autopilot converted to mechanical signaling over

an electronic servo-valve (ESV)

Channel 1
Hydraulic
Power Channel 2
Pilot Input
(mechanical)
Mechanical
Signaling Summing
SV SV Link

Piston Hydraulic mechanical

ESV Actuator

Feedback
Autopilot Input Link
(electrical)

Source: Moir and Seabridge, Aircraft Systems (2008)

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Technische Universität München

Actuation and Linkage

Fly-by-wire Hydraulic Actuator (HA)

• FBW flight control system: Sophisticated interface between the flight control system and
actuation was required  electrical signaled HA

• Digital commands from the flight control system are processed by the Actuator Control
Electronics (ACE) which further commands the actuator servo valve (SV)

Full FBW Mode: Hydraulic

Normal mode of operation; Power
Full FBW algorithms and protection
Analogue
Fly-By-Wire Loop Closure
Command
Actuator Servo Valve
Control analogue
digital SV
Electronics
(ACE) mechanical
Direct Electrical
Link
LVDT
Direct Electrical Link Mode: Backup Linear Variable
mode; provides rudimentary algorithms Analogue Feedback Differential Transducer
or possibly only a direct electrical
signaling capability

Source: Moir and Seabridge, Aircraft Systems (2008)

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Technische Universität München

Actuation and Linkage

Electro-Hydrostatic Actuator (EHA)

• Combines advantages of electric power and hydraulic actuation – more efficient form of
actuation (power when required  MEA)

• 3-phase AC power to feed power drive electronics which drives a variable speed motor
together with a hydraulic pump

3 Phase
AC Power

Electro-Hydrostatic
Feedback
Fly-By-Wire Actuator (EHA)
Command
Actuator Fixed
Power Variable
Displacement
digital Control Speed Motor
Drive Hyd Pump
Electronics
Electronics
(ACE)
mechanical
Direct Electrical
Link
LVDT
Linear Variable
Feedback Differential Transducer

Source: Moir and Seabridge, Aircraft Systems (2008)

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Technische Universität München

Actuation and Linkage

Electro-Mechanical Actuator (EMA)

• EMAs are therefore used to power the THS, flap and slat drives

• Problematic for EMA is the actuator jamming case  no use for primary flight controls
on conventional transport aircraft

3 Phase
AC Power

Electro-Mechanical
Feedback
Fly-By-Wire Actuator (EMA)
Command
Actuator Electric
Power
digital Control Motor
Drive
Electronics
Electronics
(ACE) Reduction mechanical
Direct Electrical Gear
Screw
Link
RVDT Jack

Rotational Variable
Feedback Differential Transducer

Source: Moir and Seabridge, Aircraft Systems (2008)

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Technische Universität München

Actuation and Linkage

Electrical Backup Hydraulic Actuator (EBHA)

• Combines the features of a conventional HA and an EHA

• Same performances in normal (hydraulic) mode, reduced deflection rate in backup

(electrical) mode, compared to EHA and HA.
3 Phase
Hydraulic AC Power
Power
Flight
“Conventional Normal Backup “Electro-Hydrostatic
Control
Hydraulic Actuator” Mode
Computer
Mode Actuator”
Electrical Backup
In the normal mode the actuator In the backup mode the
Power Drive Hydraulic Actuator (EBHA)
receives hydraulic power from the actuator operates like an
appropriate green or yellow hydraulic Electronics EHA. Electrical power is
system and the SV moderates the Variable received from the aircraft
supply to the actuator according to the Speed Motor AC electrical system and
Flight Control Computer demand Fixed the Flight Control Computer
Displacement feeds demands to the EHA
SV Hyd Pump control package. The
rotational direction and
speed of the electrical motor
mechanical
determine the direction and
rate of travel of the actuator
ram

Source: Moir and Seabridge, Aircraft Systems (2008)

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2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
Technische Universität München

Actuation and Linkage

Actuator Tasks for Civil Transport Aircraft

Primary
Power Horizontal Flaps and
Actuator Type Flight Spoilers
Source Tailplane Slats
Control
Conventional Linear Hydraulic
Actuator System
X X

Conventional Hydraulic or
Screw-jack Actuator Electrical
X X

Integrated Actuator Electrical

Package (IAP) System
X X

Fly-By-Wire Hydraulic Hydraulic

Actuator (HA) Systems
X X

Electro-Hydrostatic Electrical
Actuator (EHA) System
X X

Electro-Mechanical Electrical
Actuator (EMA) System
X X

Electrical Backup
Hydraulic or
Hydraulic Actuators
Electrical
X X
(EBHA)

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Actuation and Linkage

Hydraulic Actuator vs. Electric Actuator (1)

Hydraulic Actuator Electric Actuator

“Speed on Demand” “Power on Demand”

• Direct drive or lever arm • Gearbox and ballscrew

Control of speed and between actuator and control between motor and control
movement surface surface
• Linear • Rotational

• Maximum temperature of
• Maximum force and speed
Choice of actuator size actuator (varies with mission
(nominal)
(weight) profile)
• Fatigue
• Fatigue

• Speed dependent and • Force dependent (Motor,

Power losses
permanent losses (valves, power electronics,
leakage, friction) hydrostatic transmissions)

Maintenance cost • High • Low

Source: SAAB (2014)

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Technische Universität München

Actuation and Linkage

Technical Issues

Hydraulic Actuator Electric Actuator

“Speed on Demand” “Power on Demand”

Problematic are Problematic are

• High Power losses • Cooling (motor, hydrostatic transmission,
• Leakage power electronics)
• Assembly of piping • EMI and electric protection distances
• Maintenance (cleanliness) • Jamming has no good solution (today)
• Toxic oil in aircraft • Gearbox introduce
• Cavitation of pumps  start/stop wear on control surfaces
 backlash in control loop
 maintenance (lubrication)
• Lack of damped end stop at failure

OK are OK are
• Anti-jamming • Torque limiters
• Damped end stops
• Overload protection
• Cooling
Source: SAAB (2014)

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Actuation and Linkage

Benefits of Electric Powered Actuation

• Reduced Weight
 Fewer hydraulic components: Weight reduction of approx. 450kg for the Airbus
A380 has been attributed to electric actuation due to savings from additional hydraulic
systems (weight savings are dependent upon the aircraft size)

• Improved Performance and Optimization

 Hydraulic pump/system is a continuous load on the engine  electric load is on
demand/when needed
 25% reduction in peak non-propulsive power usage with 5% reduced fuel
consumption: approx. fuel saving of 25kg/hr for Airbus A340

• Improved Maintainability and Robustness

 Elimination of hydraulic system improves reliability  higher Mean Time Between
Failure (MTBF) for electrical system compared to hydraulic system
 Efficient Segregation & independence of the Actuation Power provides robustness

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 2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
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Example: Airbus A380

Flight Control System Actuation Distribution (1)

SLATS

G E1
SPOILERS SPOILERS
SFCC1 SFCC2
AILERONS 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 AILERONS
SFCC1 SFCC2
LEFT G Y G
E1 Y
E2 G Y G Y Y G Y G YE2 GE1 Y G RIGHT
G Y
O/B M/D I/B S3 S2 P1 P2 P3 S1 S2 S3 S3 S2 S1 P3 P2 P1 S2 S3 I/B M/D O/B
FLAPS E2 G E1 Y
G Y Y E1 G E2 Y G
P2 P3 P3 P1 P1 P2 P2 P1 P1 P3 P3 P2
Trim switches
S3 S1 S1 S2 S2 S1 S1 S3
B
B S3 S1 B
COMPUTER P3 P1 P2
THS VERTICAL
G Y E2
P1/P2/P3 = 3 Prim. FCC Actuator STABILIZER
S1/S2/S3 = 3 Sec. FCC S1 P1 YE1
THS B UPPER
S2 P2 GE2
1 2 = Reconfiguration Order ELEVATORS ELEVATORS
B = Ultimate Backup control O/B I/B I/B O/B RUDDERS
S1 P1 GE1
G E2 G E1 E2 Y E1 Y B LOWER
ACTUATION
P1 P2 P3 P1 S3 P3 YE3
P2 P3 P1 P2
G Y = Conventional Hydraulic Actuator (HA) S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2
B B
E1 E2 = Electro-Hydrostatic Actuator (EHA)

G
E1 Y
E2 = Electrical Backup Hydraulic Actuator (EBHA)

E1 E2 = Electrical Motor

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2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
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Example: Airbus A380

Flight Control System Actuation Distribution (2)

• Hydraulic Actuator (HA) Electronic Module

 2 out-board aileron surfaces

 12 spoiler surfaces

• HA + Electro-Hydrostatic Actuator (EHA)

 2 mid-board + 2 in-board aileron surfaces Hydraulic Pump +
Electric Motor

 2 out-board + 2 in-board elevator surfaces

Electro-Hydrostatic actuator of an aileron
of the Airbus A380
• Electrical Backup Hydraulic Actuator (EBHA)
 4 spoiler surfaces (number 5 and 6 on each wing)
 2 rudder sections

• The Tailplane Horizontal Stabilizer (THS) actuator is powered independently from green
and yellow channels and from E2

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 Technische Universität München

2 Flight Control Systems

2.1 Introduction to Flight Control Systems

2.2 Flight Control System Configuration
2.3 Flight Control System Architecture
2.4 Electronic Flight Control System

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2.4 Electronic Flight Control System
Technische Universität München

Overview
In this chapter all relevant electronic flight control systems (hardware and software), affecting
flight control and flight guidance are presented:

Multifunction
Flight Control
Control Display
Unit (FCU) Pilot Controls Displays
Unit (MCDU)
Primary
Navigation
Flight
Display
Display

FMS AFDS FBW

Aircraft Sensors
Dynamics

Attitude (inner loop)

A generic example of the main control (middle
Trajectory loops asloop)
they apply to aircraft flight control,
flight guidance and flight management.
Flight Mission (outer loop)

Note: More details to (information based) systems and subsystems can be found in Chapter
7 Avionics and in specific literature. Source: Moir and Seabridge, Aircraft Systems (2008)

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2.4 Electronic Flight Control System
Technische Universität München

Flight Management System

The Flight Management System (FMS) is typically comprised of following functions:
• Navigation
• Flight planning
• Trajectory prediction
• Performance computations (e.g. fuel consumption)
• Guidance

The FMS must interface with several other systems:

• Navigation sensors, radios and air data systems
• Displays
• Flight control system
• Engine and fuel system
• Data link system
• Surveillance system

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Technische Universität München

Flight Management System

Systems and Interfaces

Navigation
Inertial Reference Air Data
Receivers

Position, velocities, vertical Altitude, speeds,

Frequencies, range, bearing, LOC
speed, roll, heading, temperatures
deviation, GPS position, GPS ground
accelerations
speed time
Initial position
Tuning
Initial data commands
Flight plans
Data Link
clearance,
weather Fuel weight,
Flight Management engine thrust Engine and Fuel
System Thrust limits Systems
Entered data
MCDU
Display data
Flight plan/path, Commands: Flight ID, Aircraft
navigation data, -roll axis state, trajectory
route data, -pitch axis
-thrust axis
Map scale Tactical Laws/
Display selections commands Modes Trajectory conflicts

Surveillance
Aircraft Displays Flight Controls
Systems

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Aircraft Systems | Prof. Dr.-Ing. M. Hornung Summer Term 2020
2.4 Electronic Flight Control System
Technische Universität München

Autopilot Flight Director System

General

• Civil transport aircraft are typically equipped

with an Autopilot Flight Director System
(AFDS) which includes an auto-thrust system
(auto throttle).

• The aircraft can usually be operated in two

basic system states which are covered below:
 Strategic Operation: FMS Programming
with Lateral and Vertical Navigational
(LNAV/VNAV) Modes selected Multifunctional Control and Display Unit
(MCDU) of the Airbus A320 including the Flight
 Tactical Operation: Mode Control Management System (FMS) control
Source: unit
en.wikipedia.org

Panel/Flight Control Unit (MCP/FCU)

Manipulation

Flight Control Unit (FCU) Panel

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2.4 Electronic Flight Control System
Technische Universität München

Autopilot Flight Director System

Schematic
Instinctive disconnect

Primary Flight
Display (PFD)
Flight Director (FD) engagement
Autopilot (AP) engagement Flight Mode Annunciator
FMA
(FMA)
Modes engagement
FCU
Engaged mode Targets

Selected target

+ Control
Managed
FMS Law
-

Aircraft attitude
IRS
AFDS
Flight Controls
FCU …Flight Control Unit
FMS …Flight Management System
IRS …Inertial Reference System Reference

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Aircraft Systems | Prof. Dr.-Ing. M. Hornung Summer Term 2020
2.4 Electronic Flight Control System
Technische Universität München

Fly-By-Wire Control Laws and Protections

Definitions
Flight control law/mode determines the relationship between a flight crew order and the
aircraft response.

The main objectives of the normal control law are to provide:

• instinctive and comfortable handling characteristics
• comfort to the passengers and crew

Protections prevent the aircraft from leaving the normal flight envelope:
• Full pilot authority prevails within the normal flight envelope.
• The pilot authority is progressively reduced when exiting the normal flight envelope and
entering the peripheral flight envelope.

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Aircraft Systems | Prof. Dr.-Ing. M. Hornung Summer Term 2020
2.4 Electronic Flight Control System
Technische Universität München

Fly-By-Wire Control Laws and Protections

Overview Normal Law

There are typically three different levels of control Most double failures:
Computer, hydraulics
laws (Airbus and Boeing), that are a combination of ailerons

control laws/modes and protections: Certain triple

or double
• Normal Law undetected failure

• Alternate Law
• Direct Law Alternate Law

Note: A single failure cannot cause to the loss of Crew

Action
the normal flight control law Direct Law

Mechanical Back Up is designed to allow the pilots

to maintain control of the aircraft while restoring
Final failure
flight control computers after a complete power
interruption.
Mechanical Back Up

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Aircraft Systems | Prof. Dr.-Ing. M. Hornung Summer Term 2020
2.4 Electronic Flight Control System
Technische Universität München

Flight Control Laws and Protections

Example: Airbus A380
Bank Angle

Load Factor Pitch Attitude

1g/2.5g in clean -15°/25° to 30°

-66°/66°
0g/2g flaps extended f(Vcas)

Speed VMO +25

Normal flight envelope Angle-of-Attack
Protections not activated alpha max
Mach VMO +0.06 Low Speed
AP domain (approx.)

Peripheral flight envelope beta max Sideslip

Manual flight in this domain is possible and

indicated by effort on the controls

Stick release or AP active Maneuvering A/C will fly at this If exceptional upsets bring the A/C in
will not fly beyond this limit safe limit with controls on stop this domain, protections are deactivated
and full authority is restored

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Aircraft Systems | Prof. Dr.-Ing. M. Hornung Summer Term 2020
2.4 Electronic Flight Control System
Technische Universität München

Flight Control Laws and Protections

Example: Airbus A380

Normal Law Alternate Law Direct Law

Longitudinal Control Pitch normal law

Pitch normal law Pitch direct law
Law (less efficient)

Depending on failures: Lateral

normal law (less efficient) Roll direct law
Lateral Control Law Lateral normal law
or Yaw alternate law
Roll direct/Yaw alternate law

Protections All active Most protections lost No

Available depending on
Autopilot All modes available No
failures

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Aircraft Systems | Prof. Dr.-Ing. M. Hornung Summer Term 2020