1 Heck V Santos

2/17/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 423
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 329

Heck vs. Santos
*
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657. February 23, 2004.
HEINZ R. HECK, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTHONY E.

SAN-TOS, REGIONAL TRIAL
1
COURT, BRANCH 19,
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, respondent.
Attorneys; Disbarment; Courts; Judges; Resolution A.M. No.

02-9-02-SC; Pursuant to Resolution No. 02-9-02-SC, which took
effect on 1 October 2002, administrative cases against erring
justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, judges,
and lawyers in the government service may be automatically
treated as disbarment cases; The new rule shall apply to
administrative cases already filed where the respondents have not
yet been required to comment on the complaints.–On September
17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, to wit: Some
administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the
court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are
likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar
for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such
other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally
recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers. In any of the
foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be
considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice,
judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The
respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the
complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended,
disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the
Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one
decision or resolution. Before the Court approved this resolution,
administrative and disbarment cases against members of the bar
who were likewise members of the court were treated separately.
Thus, pursuant to the new rule, administrative cases against
erring justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan, judges, and
lawyers in the government service may be automatically treated
as disbarment cases. The Resolution, which took effect on October
1, 2002, also provides that it shall supplement Rule 140 of the
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000168fbda8e69bab255d9003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/32
Rules of Court, and shall apply to administrative cases already

filed where the respondents have not yet been required to comment
on the complaints.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A complaint for disbarment is
cognizable by the Court itself and its indorsement to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines is not mandatory; Although a judge may
have already retired from
_______________
* EN BANC.
1 The respondent compulsorily retired from the judiciary on May 22, 2002.
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330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Heck vs. Santos
the judiciary, he is still considered as a member of the bar and as

such, is not immune to the disciplining arm of the Supreme Court,
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution.–It is
clear from the Rules then that a complaint for disbarment is
cognizable by the Court itself, and its indorsement to the IBP is
not mandatory. The Court may refer the complaint for
investigation, report and recommendation to the Solicitor
General, any officer of the court or a judge of a lower court, on
which the Court will thereafter base its final action. Although the
respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he is still
considered as a member of the bar and as such, is not immune to
the disciplining arm of the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article
VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, at the time
of the filing of the complaint, the respondent was still the
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19; Cagayan
de Oro City. As such, the complaint was cognizable by the Court
itself, as the Rule mandates that in case the respondent is a
justice of the Court of Tax Appeals or the lower court, the
complaint shall be filed with the Supreme Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The fact that a judge has retired or
has otherwise been separated from the service does not necessarily
divest the Court of its jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the
allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority
over members of the bench.–The fact that a judge has retired or
has otherwise been separated from the service does not
necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to determine the
veracity of the allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its

disciplinary authority over members of the bench. As we held in
Gallos v. Cordero: The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of
the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere
fact that the respondent had ceased in office during the pendency
of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the
respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him
guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and
pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications . . . If
innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name
and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served
well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the
corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under
the situation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC; The Court,
recognizing “the proliferation of unfounded or malicious
administrative or criminal cases against members of the judiciary
for purposes of harassment,” issued AM. No. 03-10-01-SC which
took effect on 3 November 2003; Requisites for Outright Dismissal
of Administrative Complaints Against a Retiring or Retired Judge
or Justice.–However, recognizing “the proliferation of unfounded
or malicious administrative or criminal cases against members of
the judiciary for purposes of harassment,” we issued A.M. No. 03-
10-01-SC which took effect on November 3, 2003. It reads in part:
1. If
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Heck vs. Santos
upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the Court

Administrator, an administrative complaint against any Justice of
the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan or any Judge of the lower
courts filed in connection with a case in court is shown to be
clearly unfounded and baseless and intended to harass the
respondent, such a finding should be included in the report and
recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator. If the
recommendation is approved or affirmed by the Court, the
complainant may be required to show cause why he should not be
held in contempt of court. If the complainant is a lawyer, he may
further be required to show cause why he or she should not be
administratively sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as an
officer of the court. 2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six
months before the compulsory retirement of a Justice or Judge;
(b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year
before such filing; and (c) shown prima facie that it is intended to
harass the respondent, it must forthwith be recommended for
dismissal. If such is not the case, the Office of the Court
Administrator must require the respondent to file a comment
within ten (10) days from receipt of the complaint, and submit to
the Court a report and recommendation not later than thirty (30)
days from receipt of the comment. The Court shall act on the
recommendation before the date of compulsory retirement of the
respondent, or if it is not possible to do so, within six (6) months
from such date without prejudice to the release of the retirement
benefits less such amount as the Court may order to be withheld,
taking into account the gravity of the cause of action alleged in
the complaint. Thus, in order for an administrative complaint
against a retiring or retired judge or justice to be dismissed
outright, the following requisites must concur: (1) the complaint
must have been filed within six months from the compulsory
retirement of the judge or justice; (2) the cause of action must
have occurred at least a year before such filing; and, (3) it is
shown that the complaint was intended to harass the respondent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A judge may be disciplined for acts
committed prior to his appointment to the judiciary.–It is settled
that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his
appointment to the judiciary. In fact, even the new Rule itself
recognizes this, as it provides for the immediate forwarding to the
Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication of charges against
justices and judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to
their appointment to the judiciary. It need not be shown that the
respondent continued the doing of the act or acts complained of; it
is sufficient that the evidence on record supports the charge on
the respondent, considering the gravity of the offense.
Same; Same; Legal Ethics; The Supreme Court, as guardian
of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over
attorneys, which authority is not only a right but a bounded duty
as well.–The practice of law is so ultimately affected with public
interest that it is both the right
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Heck vs. Santos
and duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to

promote the public welfare. The Constitution vests this power of
control and regulation in this Court. The Supreme Court, as
guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power
over attorneys, which authority is not only a right but a bounden

duty as well. This is why respect and fidelity to the Court is
demanded of its members.
Same; Same; Notarial Law; Words and Phrases; Notarization
by a notary public converts a private document into a public one,
making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of
preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.–It must be
remembered that notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization by a notary
public converts a private document into a public one, making it
admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof
of its authenticity and due execution.
Same; Same; Same; Falsification of Public Documents; The
Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing documents
without the requisite commission therefor as “reprehensible,
constituting as it does not only malpractice, but also the crime of
falsification of public documents.”–The requirements for the
issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as
a mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyer’s
act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission
therefore as “reprehensible, constituting as it does not only
malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of public
documents.” For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has
sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law,
revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from
acting as such, and even disbarment.
Same; Same; Same; When the integrity of a member of the bar
is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges–he must
meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.–The
respondent in this case was given an opportunity to answer the
charges and to controvert the evidence against him in a formal
investigation. When the integrity of a member of the bar is
challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges; he must
meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.
Same; Same; Legal Ethics; Administrative Complaints; Any
interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate
disciplinary proceedings–there can be no doubt as to the right of a
citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and
doings of public officers which citizens feel are incompatible with
the duties of the office and from which conduct the citizen or the
public might or does suffer undesirable consequences.– The
respondent’s allegation that the complainant was not a party in
any of
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Heck vs. Santos
the documents so notarized, and as such was not prejudiced

thereby, is unavailing. An attorney may be disbarred or
suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an
attorney and counselor which include the statutory grounds under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Any interested
person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary
proceedings. There can be no doubt as to the right of a citizen to
bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of
public officers which citizens feel are incompatible with the duties
of the office and from which conduct the citizen or the public
might or does suffer undesirable consequences.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Possession of good moral character
is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a
continuing requirement to the practice of law–a lawyer’s admission
to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all
the qualifications to become a lawyer.–The qualification of good
moral character is a requirement which is not dispensed with
upon admission to membership of the bar. This qualification is
not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal
profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain
one’s good standing in the profession. It is a continuing
requirement to the practice of law and therefore does not preclude
a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any
question concerning one’s mental or moral fitness before he
became a lawyer. This is because his admission to practice merely
creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the qualifications
to become a lawyer. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to
his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of
good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the
bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Administrative cases against
lawyers belong to a class of their own, distinct from and may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.–Administrative
cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own, distinct from
and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. As we
held in the leading case of In re Almacen: [D]isciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a
suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of
one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they
are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is

neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their]
primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations
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Heck vs. Santos
as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the

purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members
who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. . . .
Same; Same; Same; Same; Notarial Law; Judges;
Prescription; An administrative complaint against an erring
lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed only
after twenty-four years after the offending act was committed, is
not barred by prescription–no matter how much time has elapsed
from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the
time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the
bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court;
Even the lapse of considerable time from the commission of the
offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint
will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer who
notarizes documents without the requisite authority therefor.–
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than
that an administrative complaint against an erring lawyer who
was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed only after twenty-
four years after the offending act was committed, is not barred by
prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would
be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers,
prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant
would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being
completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability
they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the
integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of
justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of
the commission of the act complained of and the time of the
institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar
cannot, escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical

pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench
and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct,
or the Lawyer’s Oath. This should particularly apply in this case,
considering the seriousness of the matter involved–the
respondent’s dishonesty and the sanctity of notarial documents.
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the commission of
the offending act to the institution of the administrative
complaint, will not erase the administrative culpability of a
lawyer who notarizes documents without the requisite authority
therefor.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A lawyer, in representing
that he was possessed of the requisite notarial commission when he
was, in fact, not so authorized, violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer that he shall
do no falsehood.–Time and again, we have stressed the settled
principle that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they
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Heck vs. Santos
possess the qualifications required by law for the conferment of

such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is
expected and required of a member of the bar. By his actuations,
the respondent failed to live up to such standards; he undermined
the confidence of the public on notarial documents and thereby
breached Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
The respondent also violated Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. In representing that he was possessed of the
requisite notarial commission when he was, in fact, not so
authorized, the respondent also violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer that he shall
do no falsehood.
Same; Same; Same; The supreme penalty of disbarment is
meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court–the
Court will not disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice to
accomplish the desired end.– The supreme penalty of disbarment

is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect
the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the
esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it,
we will likewise not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice
to accomplish the desired end. Furthermore, a tempering of
justice is mandated in this case, considering that the complaint
against the respondent was filed twenty-four years after the
commission of the act complained of; that there was no private
offended party who came forward and claimed to have been
adversely affected by the documents so notarized by the
respondent; and, the fact that the respondent is a retired judge
who deserves to enjoy the full measure of his well-earned
retirement benefits. The Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is
justified in this case.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion (Concurring in the Result):
Attorneys; Disbarment; The circumstances that the

administrative charge for alleged violation of the Notarial Law is
said to have been committed more than twenty years ago by
respondent judge prior to his appointment in the judiciary, filed
several years after that appointment and just about a year prior to
his retirement, and that no specific injury or damage has been
shown for the alleged violation are enough to warrant the
dismissal of the complaint.–While the cause of action does not
prescribe, it is to be assumed, however, that the complaint must
be filed within a reasonable time. What may or may not be a
reasonable time is determined by circumstances peculiar and
pertinent to the case. The administrative charge for alleged
violation of the Notarial Law in this instance is said to
336
Heck vs. Santos
have been committed more than twenty years ago by respondent

judge prior to his appointment in the judiciary, filed several years
after that appointment and just about a year prior to his
retirement. No specific injury or damage has been shown for the
alleged violation. The circumstances are enough, in my view, to
warrant the dismissal of the complaint, and I so vote.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.

Notarizing Documents Without Notarial Commission.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents

without the requisite notary commission more than twenty
years ago be disciplined therefor? This is the novel issue
presented for resolution before this Court.
The instant case arose when in a verified Letter-
Complaint dated March 21, 2001 Heinz R. Heck prayed for
the disbarment of Judge Anthony E. Santos, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City.
The complainant alleged that prior to the respondent’s
appointment as RTC judge on April 11, 1989, he violated
the notarial law, thus:
“Judge Santos, based on ANNEX “A,” was not duly commissioned

as notary public until January 9, 1984 but still subscribed and
forwarded (on a non-regular basis) notarized documents to the
Clerk of Court VI starting January 1980 uncommissioned until
the 9th of January 1984.
a) Judge Santos was commissioned further January 16th

1986 to December 31st 1987 and January 6th 1988 to
December 31st 1989 but the records fail to show any entry
at the Clerk of Court after December 31st 1985 until
December 31st 1989.
b) Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial Register
2
after
the expiration of his commission in December 1989.
...
“WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing complainant pray[s] to
order respondent:”
_______________
2 Rollo, pp. 5-6.
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VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 337

Heck vs. Santos
1. To disbar Judge Anthony E. Santos and to prohibit him

from all future public service.
2. To forfeit [the] retirement benefits of Judge Santos.
3. To prohibit Judge Santos from future practice of Law.

4. To file a criminal suit against Judge Santos.
5. To conduct a speedy investigation and not to grant/accept
any delaying tactics from Judge Santos or any agency and
or public servants involved in this administrative case.
6. To pay all costs and related costs involved in this
administrative case.
and prays for other relief3 in accordance with equity and

fairness based on the premises.
The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk of

Court, Atty. Beverly Sabio-Beja, Regional Trial Court,
Misamis Oriental, which contained the following:
THIS CERTIFIES that upon verification from the records found

and available in this office, the following data appear:
1. The name Atty. Anthony E. Santos is listed as a duly
commissioned notary public in the following years:
a. Januarys 1984 to December 31, 1985

b. January 16, 1986 to December 31, 1987
c. January 6, 1988 to December 31, 1989
2. Based on the records of transmittals of notarial reports,

Atty. Anthony E. Santos submitted his notarial reports in the ff.
years:
a. January 1980 report–was submitted on Feb. 6, 1980

b. February to April 1980 report–was submitted on June 6,
1980
c. May to June 1980 report–was submitted on July 29, 1980
d. July to October 1980 report–submitted but no date of
submission
e. November to December 1980–no entry
f. January to February 1981–no entry
g. March to December 1981–submitted but no date of
submission
_______________
3 Id., at p. 8.
338

Heck vs. Santos
h. January to December 1982–submitted but no date of

submission
i. January to June 1983–submitted on January 5, 1984
j. July to December 1983–no entry
k. January to December 1984–submitted on January 20,
1986
l. January to December 1985–submitted on January 20,
1986
4. Records fail to show any entry of transmittal of notarial

documents under the name Atty. Anthony Santos after December
1985.
5. It is further certified that the last notarial commission
issued to Atty. Anthony
4
Santos was on January 6, 1988 until
December 31, 1989.
In his Answer dated June 13, 2001, the respondent judge

categorically denied the5 charges against him. He also
submitted a certification from Clerk of Court, Atty. Sabio-
Beja, to prove that there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro as
well as the submitted notarized documents/notarial
register. The respondent further averred as follows:
That the complainant has never been privy to the documents

notarized and submitted by the respondent before the Office of
the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental, nor his rights prejudiced on account of the said
notarized documents and therefore not the proper party to raise
the said issues;
That the complainant was one of the defendants in Civil Case
No. 94-334 entitled Vinas Kuranstalten Gesmbh et al. versus
Lugait Aqua Marine Industries, Inc., and Heinz Heck, for Specific
Performance & Sum of Money, filed before the Regional Trial
Courr, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City, wherein respondent is
the Presiding Judge.
6
The undersigned resolved the case in favor
of the plaintiffs.
Pursuant to the report of the Office, of the Court

Administrator recommending the need to resort to a full-
blown investigation to determine the veracity of the
parties’ assertions, the Court, in a Resolution dated
September 10, 2001, resolved to: (a) treat the matter as a
regular administrative complaint; and (b) refer the
_______________
4 Annex “A,” Rollo, p. 22.

5 Rollo, p. 16.
6 Id., at p. 14.
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Heck vs. Santos
case to Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the Court of

Appeals (CA) 7 for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In his Letters dated December 10, 2001 and February 1,
2002, the complainant requested that the hearing be held
at Cagayan de Oro City. Justice Cruz initially denied the
request but upon the complainant’s insistence, the matter
was forwarded to the Court, which favorably
8
acted thereon
in a Resolution dated July 8, 2002. The complainant
presented his evidence in Cagayan de Oro City9 before
retired Court of Appeals Justice Romulo S. Quimbo.
In a Sealed Report dated August 14, 2003, Investigating
Justice Edgardo P. Cruz made the following
recommendation:
It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired on May 22,

2002) be found guilty of violation of the Notarial Law by (a)
notarizing documents without commission; (b) tardiness in
submission of notarial reports; and (c) non-forwarding of his
notarial register to the Clerk of Court upon expiration of his
commission; and [ii] that for these infractions, he be suspended
from the practice of law and barred from being commissioned as
notary public, both
10
for one year, and his present commission, if
any, be revoked.
According to the Investigating Justice, the respondent did

not adduce evidence in his defense, while the complainant
presented documentary evidence to support the charges:
It is noteworthy that in his answer, respondent did not claim that

he was commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983
nor deny the accuracy of the first certification. He merely alleged
that “there was no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers
in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized
Documents/Notarial Register.” And, as already observed, he
presented no evidence, particularly on his appointment as notary
public for 1980 to 1983 (assuming he was so commissioned) and
submission of notarial reports and notarial register.
On the other hand, the second certification shows that “there,
were only two Record Books available in the notarial section” of
the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Cagayan de Oro City); and that the
“(f)irst book titled Petitions for Notarial Commission contains

items on the Name, Date
_______________
7 Id., at p. 79.
8 Id., at pp. 208-209.
9 Resolutions dated July 8, 2002 and November 13, 2002.
10 Report, p. 18.
340

Heck vs. Santos
Commission was issued and Expiration of Commission of the

notary public. First entry appearing was made on December
1982.”
If respondent was commissioned in 1980 to 1983, then the
“first book” would disclose so (at least, for the years 1982 and
1983). However, he did not present said book. Neither did he
present a certification from the Clerk of Court, RTC of Misamis
Oriental, or documents from his files showing that he was
commissioned in 1980 to 1983. Similarly, he did not submit a
certificate of appointment for all those years. Under Section 238 of
the Notarial Law, such certificate must be prepared and
forwarded by the Clerk of Court, RTC, to the Office of the Solicitor
11
General, together with the oath of office of the notary public.
Thus, the Investigating Justice concluded, based on the

evidence presented by the complainant, that the
respondent notarized documents in 1980 and 1983 without
being commissioned as a notary public therefor,
considering that 12his earliest commission of record was on
January 9, 1984.
The Procedural Issues
Before the Court passes upon the merit of the instant

complaint, a brief backgrounder.
On the Applicability of
Resolution A.M. No.
02-9-02-SC
On September
13
17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No. 02-
9-02-SC, to wit:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of

Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special
courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on
grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of
members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional
Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 10-11.

12 Id., at pp. 11-12.
13 Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of
the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special
Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings
Themselves Both as Such Officials and Members of the Philippine Bar.
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Heck vs. Santos
that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the

discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall
also be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent
justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar.
The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the
complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended,
disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the
Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one
decision or resolution.
Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative

and disbarment cases against members of the bar who
were likewise members of the court were treated
separately. Thus, pursuant to the new rule, administrative
cases against erring justices of the CA and the
Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers in the government
service may be automatically treated as disbarment cases.
The Resolution, which took effect on October 1, 2002, also
provides that it shall supplement Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, and shall apply to administrative cases already filed
where the respondents have not yet been required to
comment on the complaints.
Clearly, the instant case is not covered by the foregoing
resolution, since the respondent filed his Answer/Comment
on June 13, 2001.
The Procedure To Be Followed

In Disbarment Cases Involving
A Retired Judge For Acts

Committed While He Was Still
A Practicing Lawyer
The undisputed facts are as follows: (1) the respondent is a
retired judge; (2) the complainant prays for his disbarment;
and (3) the acts constituting the ground for disbarment
were committed when the respondent was still a practicing
lawyer, before his appointment to the judiciary. Thus, the
respondent is being charged not for acts committed as a
judge; he is charged, as a member of the bar, with
notarizing documents without the requisite notarial
commission therefor.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on
Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys provides:
342

Heck vs. Santos
Section 1. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or

discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu
proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon
verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly
and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by
affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts
therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate
said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon
referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers,
or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper
charges against erring attorneys including those in the
government service. Provided, however, That all charges against
Justices of the Court of Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if
lawyers are jointly charged with them, shall be filed with the
Supreme Court: Provided, further, That charges filed against
Justices and Judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to
their appointment to the Judiciary, shall be immediately
forwarded to 14
the Supreme Court for disposition and
adjudication.
The investigation may thereafter commence either before

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), in accordance
with Sections 2 to Sections 12 of Rule 139-B, or before the
Supreme Court in accordance with Sections 13 and 14,
thus:
Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators.–In proceedings initiated

motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when
the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer
the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer
of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the
investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in
Sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report shall be
conducted directly by the Supreme Court.
Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court
designated Investigator.–Based upon the evidence adduced at the
investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator
designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to the Supreme
Court a report containing his findings of fact and
recommendations together with the record and all the evidence
presented in the investigation for the final action of the Supreme
Court.
It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for disbarment
is cognizable by the Court itself, and its indorsement to the IBP is
not mandatory. The Court may refer the complaint for
investigation, report and recommendation to the Solicitor
General, any
_______________
14 As amended by Bar Matter No. 1960, May 1, 2000.
343
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 343

Heck vs. Santos
officer of the court or a judge of a lower

15
court, on which the Court
will thereafter base its final action.
Although the respondent has already retired from the

judiciary, he is still considered as a member of the bar and
as such, is not immune to the disciplining arm16 of the
Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 6 of the
1987 Constitution. Furthermore, at the time of the filing of
the complaint, the respondent was still the presiding judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19; Cagayan de Oro
City. As such, the complaint was cognizable by the Court
itself, as the Rule mandates that in case the respondent is
a justice of the Court of Tax Appeals or the lower17court, the
complaint shall be filed with the Supreme Court.
The Substantive Issues
The Retirement Or Resignation

Of A Judge Will Not Preclude
The Filing Thereafter Of An
Administrative Charge Against
Him For Which He Shall Still
Be Held Answerable If Found
Liable Therefor
The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been
separated from the service does not necessarily divest the
Court of its jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the
allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary
authority over
18
members of the bench. As we held in Gallos
v. Cordero:
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent had ceased in office during the pendency of his case.
The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent
public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty
thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and
pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications . . . If
innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name
and
_______________
15 Bautista v. Gonzales, 182 SCRA 151 (1990).

16 Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof.
17 See Section 1, Rule 139-B, supra.
18 245 SCRA 218 (1995).
344

Heck vs. Santos
integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well

and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding
19
censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.
However, recognizing “the proliferation of unfounded or

malicious administrative or criminal cases against
members of the judiciary for purposes
20
of harassment,” we
issued A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC which took effect on
November 3, 2003. It reads in part:
1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the

Court Administrator, an administrative complaint against any
Justice of the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan or any Judge of
the lower courts filed in connection with a case in court is shown
to be clearly unfounded and baseless and intended to harass the
respondent, such a finding should be included in the report and
recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator. If the
recommendation is approved or affirmed by the Court, the
complainant may be required to show cause why he should not be
held in contempt of court. If the complainant is a lawyer, he may
further be required to show cause why he or she should not be
administratively sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as an
officer of the court.
2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the
compulsory retirement of a Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged
cause of action that occurred at least a year before such filing; and
(c) shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the respondent,
it must forthwith be recommended for dismissal. If such is not the
case, the Office of the Court Administrator must require the
respondent to file a comment within ten (10) days from receipt of
the complaint, and submit to the Court a report and
recommendation not later than thirty (30) days from receipt of the
comment. The Court shall act on the recommendation before the
date of compulsory retirement of the respondent, or if it is not
possible to do so, within six (6) months from such date without
prejudice to the release of the retirement benefits less such
amount as the Court may order to be withheld, taking into
account the gravity of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.
Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a

retiring or retired judge or justice to be dismissed outright,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the complaint
must have been filed within six months from the
compulsory retirement of the judge or justice; (2) the cause
of action must have occurred at least a year
_______________
19 Id., at p. 226.
20 RESOLUTION PRESCRIBING MEASURES TO PROTECT
MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY FROM BASELESS AND
UNFOUNDED ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS.
345
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 345

Heck vs. Santos
before such filing; and, (3) it is shown that the complaint

was intended to harass the respondent.
In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated March
21, 2001 was received by the21 Office of the Court
Administrator on March 26, 2001. The respondent retired
compulsorily from the service more than a year later, or on
May 22, 2002, Likewise, the ground for disbarment or
disciplinary action alleged to have been committed by the
respondent did not occur a year before the respondent’s
separation from the service. Furthermore, and most
importantly, the instant complaint was not prima facie
shown to be without merit and intended merely to harass
the respondent. Clearly, therefore, the instant case does
not fall within the ambit of the foregoing resolution.
A Judge May Be Disciplined

For Acts Committed Before His
Appointment To The Judiciary
It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for 22acts
committed prior to his appointment to the judiciary. In
fact, even the new Rule itself recognizes this, as it provides
for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for
disposition and adjudication of charges against justices and
judges before the IBP, including
23
those filed prior to their
appointment to the judiciary. It need not be shown that
the respondent continued the doing of the act or acts
complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record
supports the charge on the respondent, considering the
gravity of the offense.
Indeed, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the act
complained of must be continuing in order for the
respondent
24
judge to be disciplined therefor. In Sevilla v.
Salubre, the respondent judge was charged with violating
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for
acts committed while he was still a practicing lawyer. The
respondent therein refused to turn over the funds of his
client despite demands, and persisted in his refusal
_______________
21 Rollo, p. 5.
22 Sevilla v. Salubre, 348 SCRA 592 (2000).
23 Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, as amended by Bar
Matter No. 1960, May 1, 2000.
24 348 SCRA 592 (2000).
346

Heck vs. Santos
even after he was appointed as a judge. However, the Court

also stated in this case that the respondent’s subsequent
appointment as a judge will not exculpate him from taking
responsibility
25
for the consequences of his acts as an officer
of the court. 26
In the case of Alfonso v. Juanson, we held that proof of
prior immoral conduct cannot be used as basis for
administrative discipline against a judge if he is not
charged with immorality prior to his appointment. We
ratiocinated, thus:
. . . [I]t would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since

he had wandered from the path of moral righteousness, he could
never retrace his steps and walk proud and tall again in that
path. No man is beyond information and redemption. A lawyer
who aspires for the exalted position of a magistrate knows, or
ought to know, that he must pay a high price for that honor–his
private and official conduct must
27
at all times be free from the
appearance of impropriety. . . .
The Court ruled in that case that the complainant failed

28
to
prove the charges by substantial evidence. The
complainant therein presented evidence pertaining to the
respondent’s previous indiscretion while still a practicing
lawyer; no evidence was, however, adduced to prove that
the latter continued to engage in illicit acts after being
appointed to the bench. Thus, the respondent was
exonerated in this case because the complainant failed to
present evidence that the indiscretion continued even after
the respondent was appointed to the judiciary.
The practice of law is so ultimately affected with public
interest that it is both the right and duty of the State to
control and regulate it in order to promote the public
welfare. The Constitution 29
vests this power of control and
regulation in this Court. The Supreme Court, as guardian
of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over
attorneys, which authority is not only a right but a
bounden duty as well. This is why respect
30
and fidelity to
the Court is demanded of its members.
_______________
25 Id., at p. 601.
26 228 SCRA 239 (1993).
27 Id., at p. 254.
28 Id., at p. 254.
29 Sevilla v. Salubre, supra, citing Fernando Cruz and Amelia Cruz v.
Atty. Ernesto Jacinto, 328 SCRA 636 (2000).
30 Dumadag v. Lumaya, 334 SCRA 512 (2000).
347
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 347

Heck vs. Santos
Notarizing Documents Without

The Requisite Commission
Therefore Constitutes Malpractice
If Not The Crime Of Falsification
Of Public Documents
It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those who 31
are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public one, making it admissible in
evidence without the necessity32of preliminary proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as
notary public
33
must not be treated as a mere casual
formality. The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of
notarizing documents without the requisite commission
therefore as “reprehensible, constituting as it does not only
malpractice,34 but also the crime of falsification of public
documents.” For such reprehensible conduct, the Court
has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the
practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission and 35
disqualification from acting as such, and
36
even disbarment.
In the case of Nunga v. Viray, the Court had the
occasion to state–
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the

Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or
commission to do
_______________
31 Ma. Corazon D. Fulgencio v. Atty. Bienvenido G. Martin, A.C. 3223, May 29,
2003, 403 SCRA 216.
32 Ruiz, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 362 SCRA 40 (2001).
33 Section 2632 of the Notarial Law, provides:
SEC. 2632. Certification of document after expiration of authority of notary.–

Any person who, after the expiration of his commission as notary or after the
termination of his authority to act as such, shall affix his seal or official signature
to any document with intent to impart the appearance of notarial authenticity
thereto, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos or
imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year, or both.
34 Buensuceso v. Barrera, 216 SCRA 309 (1992).
35 Joson v. Baltazar, 194 SCRA 114 (1991).
36 306 SCRA 487 (1999).
348

Heck vs. Santos
so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one,

performing a notarial [act] without such commission is a violation
of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the
Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly
commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and
purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s
oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the
prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides: “A lawyer shall 37not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
The importance of the function of a notary public cannot

therefore, be over-emphasized. No less than the public faith
in the integrity of public
38
documents is at stake in every
aspect of that function.
The Charge Against The

Respondent Is Supported By
The Evidence On Record
The respondent did not object to the complainant’s formal
offer of evidence, prompting the Investigating Justice
39
to
decide the case on the basis of the pleadings filed. Neither
did he claim that he was commissioned as notary public for
the years 1980 to 1983, nor deny the accuracy of the first
certification. The respondent merely alleged in his answer
that “there was no proper recording of the commissioned
lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted
Notarized Documents/Notarial Register.” Furthermore, as
found by the Investigating Justice, the respondent
presented no evidence of his commission as notary public
for the years 1980 to 1983, as well as proof
40
of submission of
notarial reports and the notarial register.
The respondent in this case was given an opportunity to

answer the charges and to controvert the evidence against
him in a formal investigation. When the integrity of a
member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
deny the charges; he must
41
meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him.
_______________
37 Id., at pp. 491-492.

38 Mena U. Gerona vs. Atty. Alfredo Datingaling, A.C. No. 4801,
February 27, 2002, 398 SCRA 148.
39 Rollo, Vol. II, p. 514; Report and Recommendation, p. 6.
40 Report and Recommendation, p. 10.
41 Radjaie v. Alovera, 337 SCRA 244 (2000).
349
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 349

Heck vs. Santos
The respondent’s allegation that the complainant was not a

party in any of the documents so notarized, and as such
was not prejudiced thereby, is unavailing. An attorney may
be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of
his duties as an attorney and counselor which include
42
the
statutory grounds under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Any interested person or the court
motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings. There
can be no doubt as to the right of a citizen to bring to the
attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public
officers which citizens feel are incompatible with the duties
of the office and from which conduct the citizen or 43
the
public might or does suffer undesirable consequences.
An Administrative Complaint
Against A Member Of The Bar
Does Not Prescribe
The qualification of good moral character is a requirement
which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership
of the bar. This qualification is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its
continued possession is essential to maintain one’s good
standing in the profession. It is a continuing requirement
to the practice of law and therefore does not preclude a
subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into
any question concerning one’s mental or moral fitness
before he became a lawyer. This is because his admission to
practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption

44
that he
has all the qualifications to become a lawyer. The rule is
settled that a lawyer may be suspended or
_______________
42 Sec.27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,

grounds therefor.–A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law, for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice . . . .
43 Marcelo v. Javier, Sr., 214 SCRA 1 (1992).
44 Carmelita I. Zaguirre v. Atty. Alfredo Castillo, Adm. Case No. 4921,
March 6, 2003, 398 SCRA 658.
350

Heck vs. Santos
disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his

private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
Possession of good moral character is not only a
prerequisite to admission to the bar 45
but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law.
Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers
belong to a class of their own, distinct from and 46
may
proceed independently of civil and criminal47
cases. As we
held in the leading case of In re Almacen:
[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.

Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a
trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to
inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein.
[They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest
is [their] primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with
the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession

and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n]
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties 48
and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. . . .
49
In a case involving a mere court employee, the Court
disregarded the Court Administrator’s recommendation
that the charge for immorality against the respondent be
dismissed on the ground that the complainants failed to
adduce evidence that the respondent’s immoral conduct
was still ongoing. Aside from being found guilty of illicit
conduct, the respondent was also found guilty of dishonesty
for falsifying her children’s certificates of live birth to show
that her paramour was the father. The complaint in this
case was filed on August 5, 1999, almost twenty years after
the illicit
_______________
45 Nakpil v. Valdes, 286 SCRA 758 (1998).

46 Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza, 315 SCRA 406
(1999).
47 31 SCRA 562 (1970).
48 Cited in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza, supra.
49 Floria v. Sunga, 368 SCRA 550 (2001).
351
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 351

Heck vs. Santos
50
affair ended. The 51
Court held that administrative offenses
do not prescribe.
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other
conclusion than that an administrative complaint against
an erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge,
albeit filed only after twentyfour years after the offending
act was committed, is not barred by prescription. If the rule
were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened
to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers,
prescinding from the fact that as long as no private
complainant would immediately come forward, they stand
a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever
administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the
duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of
law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how
much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of
the act complained of and the time of the institution of the

complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot,
escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical
pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the
bench and bar, to deter them from committing acts which
violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of
Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath. This should
particularly apply in this case, considering the seriousness
of the matter involved–the respondent’s dishonesty and the
sanctity of notarial documents.
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the
commission of the offending act to the institution of the
administrative complaint, will not erase the administrative
culpability of a lawyer who notarizes documents without
the requisite authority therefor.
At Most, The Delay In The Institution

Of The Administrative Case Would
Merely Mitigate The Respondent’s
Liability
Time and again, we have stressed the settled principle that
the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by
the State on those who show that they possess the
qualifications required by
_______________
50 The complainant admitted having indulged in an illicit relation from

1974 to 1980, with a married co-employee whose wife was employed in the
same court (Id., at p. 558).
51 Id., at p. 559.
352

Heck vs. Santos
law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the

bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of
morality, honesty, and fair
52
dealing is expected and required
of a member of the bar. By his actuations,
53
the respondent
failed to live up to such standards; he undermined the
confidence of the public on notarial documents and thereby
breached Canon I of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which requires lawyers to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for the law and legal processes. The respondent also
violated Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes lawyers from
engaging54 in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful

conduct. In representing that he was possessed of the
requisite notarial commission when he was, in fact, not so
authorized, the respondent also violated Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a
lawyer that he shall do no falsehood.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in
clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While
we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the
esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls
for it, we will likewise not disbar him where a lesser 55
penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.
Furthermore, a tempering of justice is mandated in this
case, considering that the complaint against the
respondent was filed twenty-four56 years after the
commission of the act complained of; that there was no
private offended party who came forward and claimed to
have been adversely affected by the documents so notarized
by the respondent; and, the fact that the respondent is a
retired judge who deserves to enjoy 57
the full measure of his
well-earned retirement benefits. The Court finds that a
fine of P5,000.00 is justified in this case.
_______________
52 Emiliana U. Eustaquio, Piorillo Gutierrez Rubis and Alicia Montero

Rubis v. Atty. Rex Rimorin, A.C. 5081, March 24, 2003, 399 SCRA 422.
53 Fidel D. Aquino v. Atty. Oscar Manese, A.C. No. 4958, April 3, 2003,
400 SCRA 458.
54 Saburnido v. Madroño, 366 SCRA 1 (2001).
55 Floria v. Sunga, supra at p. 561.
56 Sanlakas ng Barangay Julo, San Antonio, Incorporated v.
Empaynado, Jr., 351 SCRA 201 (2001).
57 Sanlakas ng Barangay Julo, San Antonio, Inc. v. Empaynado, Jr.,
351 SCRA 201 (2001).
353
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 353

Heck vs. Santos
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is

found GUILTY of notarizing documents without the
requisite notarial commission therefor. He is hereby
ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), I join Mr. Justice J. C. Vitug in
his separate opinion.
Vitug, J., Please see Separate Opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION
(Concurring in the Result)
VITUG, J.:
Allow me to express, very briefly, my views on the various

scenarios appurtenant to the subject of inquiry.
In A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, respondent Judge, now
retired, has been charged on 21 March 2001, while still an
incumbent judge, with having transgressed, prior to his
appointment to the judiciary, the Notarial Law.
A. Exceptionally, a judge may be held

administratively accountable for acts
committed before his appointment to the
Judiciary.
Generally, a judge is not made to account administratively

for acts 1committed prior to his appointment. In Sevilla v.
Salubre, respondent judge was charged with
misappropriating for his own benefit money entrusted to
him by his client while he was still a practicing lawyer. He,
however, continued to ignore, even after his appointment in
the judiciary, his previous client’s demand for restitution.
The Court explained: “Being the visible representation of
law, and more importantly, of justice, the people see in the
respondent the intermediary of justice between two
conflicting interests. If while still in active litigation
practice lawyers do not know how
_______________
1 Adm. Matter No. MTJ-00-1336, 19 December 2000, 348 SCRA 592.
354

Heck vs. Santos
to (so) uphold this kind of justice to their clients previous to

their appointment as Judges, how then could people expect
them to render judgments in the cases2
before them?” In the
earlier case of Alfonso v. Juanson where respondent judge
was simply admonished for “appearance of impropriety,”
the Court said that he could not be disciplined for immoral
acts committed prior to his appointment in the judiciary
absent showing that he continued to engage in these acts
after his appointment.
B. The retirement or resignation of a judge could

preclude the filing thereafter of an
administrative charge against him for an
infraction committed during his incumbency.
The filing of an administrative proceeding against a judge

is predicated on the holding of his office or position in the
judiciary; thus, his resignation or
3
retirement from office
could bar an administrative case from being initiated. An
administrative charge already pending upon resignation or
retirement is not necessarily rendered moot since the
penalty that can still be imposed, if the respondent is found
guilty, goes beyond just dismissal from the service.
Noteworthy is A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC which provides that if
a complaint against a judge is filed within six months
before his compulsory retirement for an alleged infraction
occurring at least a year before such filing, and shown
prima facie to be intended to harass the judge, the
complaint must forthwith be recommended for dismissal.
C. A judge, already retired, may, but only under

certain conditions, be subject to disciplinary
action for acts committed prior to his
appointment to the judiciary.
A judge, already retired, may yet be subject to disciplinary

sanction for an act committed prior to his appointment in
the judiciary if (a) the judge has persisted, even after his
appointment to the judiciary, in his assailed act, and (b) the
administrative charge is filed while still an incumbent in
the judiciary.
_______________
2 Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92-904, 7 December 1993, 228 SCRA 239.

3 See Diamalon v. Quintillan, Adm. Case No. 116, 29 August 1969, 29
SCRA 347; Absalud v. Ramos, Adm. Case No. 57, 30 October 1962, 6
SCRA 268; Reyes v. Arca, No. L-28234, 30 September 1970, 35 SCRA 247.
355
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 355

Heck vs. Santos
D. If, such as in the instant administrative case,

the two conditions, above, are not shown,
respondent judge may still be disciplinarily
dealt with for his misconduct not as a judge
but as a lawyer.
A disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer is sui generis;

neither purely civil nor purely criminal. It is not–and it
does not involve– a trial of an action or a suit; it is rather
an investigation into the conduct of an officer of the court.
Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor. Interest in the service of the
profession is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney may still be 4
a
fit person to continue enjoying his privileges as such. It
may thus be concluded that the administrative complaint
can still be pursued.
While the cause of action does not prescribe, it is to be
assumed, however, that the complaint must be filed within
a reasonable time. What may or may not be a reasonable
time is determined
5
by circumstances peculiar and pertinent
to the case. The administrative charge for alleged violation
of the Notarial Law in this instance is said to have been
committed more than twenty years ago by respondent judge
prior to his appointment in the judiciary, filed several years
after that appointment and just about a year prior to his
retirement. No specific injury or damage has been shown for
the alleged violation. The circumstances are enough, in my
view, to warrant the dismissal of the complaint, and I so
vote.
Respondent meted a P5,000 fine for notarizing
documents without notarial commission.
Notes.–Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court

mandates that no investigation shall be terminated by
reason of the desistance of the complainant, the rationale
being that the case may proceed regardless of interest or
lack of interest of the complainant, if the facts proven so
warrant. (Sattar vs. Lopez, 271 SCRA 290 [1997])
_______________
4 In re Almacen, No. L-27654, 18 February 1970, 31 SCRA 562.

5 See Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions prepared by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
356

Ching vs. Court of Appeals
Whatever has been decided in a disbarment case cannot be

a source of right that may be enforced in another action,
like an action for reconveyance and damages. (Esquivias vs.
Court of Appeals, 272 SCRA 803 [1997])
––o0o––
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2/17/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 423

VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 329

HEINZ R. HECK, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTHONY E.

Attorneys; Disbarment; Courts; Judges; Resolution A.M. No.

Rules of Court, and shall apply to administrative cases already

330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heck vs. Santos

the judiciary, he is still considered as a member of the bar and as

veracity of the allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its

VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 331

Heck vs. Santos

upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the Court

332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heck vs. Santos

and duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to

over attorneys, which authority is not only a right but a bounden

VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 333

Heck vs. Santos

the documents so notarized, and as such was not prejudiced

are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is

334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heck vs. Santos

as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the

cannot, escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical

VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 335

Heck vs. Santos

possess the qualifications required by law for the conferment of

accomplish the desired end.– The supreme penalty of disbarment

VITUG, J., Separate Opinion (Concurring in the Result):

Attorneys; Disbarment; The circumstances that the

336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heck vs. Santos

have been committed more than twenty years ago by respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents

“Judge Santos, based on ANNEX “A,” was not duly commissioned

a) Judge Santos was commissioned further January 16th

2 Rollo, pp. 5-6.

VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 337

1. To disbar Judge Anthony E. Santos and to prohibit him

3. To prohibit Judge Santos from future practice of Law.

and prays for other relief3 in accordance with equity and

The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk of

THIS CERTIFIES that upon verification from the records found

a. Januarys 1984 to December 31, 1985

2. Based on the records of transmittals of notarial reports,

a. January 1980 report–was submitted on Feb. 6, 1980

338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

h. January to December 1982–submitted but no date of

4. Records fail to show any entry of transmittal of notarial

In his Answer dated June 13, 2001, the respondent judge

That the complainant has never been privy to the documents

Pursuant to the report of the Office, of the Court

4 Annex “A,” Rollo, p. 22.

VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 339

case to Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the Court of

It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired on May 22,