EN BANC

[G.R. No. 130144. May 24, 2001.]

MELECIA PAÑA and EMMANUEL TIGUMAN, Petitioners, v. JUDGE

FLORIPINAS C. BUYSER, Presiding Judge, Branch 30, RTC, Surigao del
Norte and Surigao City, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the
HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR. and JOSE JUANITE, JR., Respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 130502-03. May 24, 2001.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EMMANUEL

TIGUMAN, MELECIA PAÑA, ROBERT BAYAN, JOHN DOE, and EFREN
PAÑA (Acquitted), Accused.

EMMANUEL TIGUMAN and MELECIA PAÑA, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

BUENA, J.:

For a simple land dispute, father and son were sprayed with bullets right in their
own house by some goons for hire. The culprits were Jose Bilboro Pomoy, Jr.,
alias "Robert Bayan," accused-appellants Emmanuel Tiguman, a.k.a. "Manny," and
Melecia Paña, alias "Meling," and a certain John Doe. Pomoy pleaded guilty to a
lesser offense of homicide. Appellants Tiguman and Paña, who were convicted of
murder and sentenced to death by the trial court, filed with this Court a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as G.R. No. 130144, imputing grave abuse
of discretion to the lower court in convicting them. Since their conviction is on
automatic review due to the penalty imposed, docketed as G.R. Nos. 130502-03,
this Court treated their petition for certiorari as an appeal. 1

On December 10, 1993, Jose Juanite, Sr. and his son Jose Juanite, Jr. were in their
residence in San Pedro, Alegria, Surigao del Norte conversing with members of
their family. When someone knocked on the door, ten-year old Teotimo Questo, Jr.
opened it. Upon opening the door, a man suddenly burst in and fired at Jose
Juanite, Sr. His son, Jose Juanite, Jr., rushed towards the door to close it but he was
shot from the window by another man. The gunshot wounds sustained by both
father and son caused their instantaneous deaths.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

This incident led to the filing of two (2) criminal informations for murder against
appellant Tiguman, Accused Pomoy, Jr. and one John Doe. Subsequently, the
informations were amended to include spouses Efren and appellant Paña, as
principals by inducement.

Upon arraignment appellants Tiguman and the spouses Paña pleaded not guilty to
the charge. Thereafter, trial ensued.

Pomoy, Jr. was arrested only after the prosecution has rested its case. When he was
arraigned, he initially pleaded not guilty to the separate charges of murder. Later
however, his motion to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide was granted
for which he was convicted. The trial court issued an order sentencing Pomoy, Jr.
to suffer for each case the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.

After trial, judgment was rendered by the lower court convicting appellant
Tiguman, as principal by direct participation, and appellant Paña, as principal
by inducement, for the crime of murder and sentenced each of them to death.
However, the trial court acquitted appellant Paña’s husband Efren Paña for
insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion of the court a quo’s decision
reads: 4

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused Emmanuel (Manny) Tiguman and Melecia

Paña GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in both cases as principals [Emmanuel
(Manny) Tiguman, by direct participation; Melecia Paña, by inducement] in the
crimes of MURDER qualified by treachery, defined and penalized in Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659,
and after considering against them the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, dwelling and price or reward, this Court hereby imposes upon each
one of the said accused the penalty of DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION in each
of these cases; and, to pay the costs.

"The accused Emmanuel (Manny) Tiguman and Melecia Paña are hereby ordered,
jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite,
Jr., respectively in the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, for the death of
each of the aforenamed deceased; actual damages in the sum of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand (P150,000.00) pesos; and, moral damages of One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos, for both deceased.

"Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 2-92, dated January 20,
1992, the bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused Melecia Paña
is hereby ordered CANCELLED and said accused shall be placed in confinement,
pending resolution of her automatic appeal.

"Let the records of these cases be transmitted to the Supreme Court for automatic
review.

"Relative to the accused Efren Paña, he is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of

Murder, charged in each of the herein informations, for insufficiency of evidence.
The bail bond, therefore, posted for his provisional liberty is hereby ordered
RELEASED.

"In regard to the accused John Doe, let Criminal Case No. 4232 be ARCHIVED,
subject to be revived as soon as said accused is identified and apprehended.

"SO ORDERED." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Sought for before us is the reversal of the foregoing decision on the grounds that
the trial court committed errors —5

"1. when it convicted the appellants in the absence of evidence that would prove
guilt beyond reasonable doubt;

"2. when it admitted the testimony of accused Jose Bilboro Pomoy, Jr. alias Robert
Bayan as evidence in chief during the rebuttal stage of the trial;

"3. when it ignored the evidence for the defense which has clearly wrecked that of
the prosecution’s, just like the Walls of Jericho;

"4. when it imposed the death penalty without authority of law.

After a careful and thorough perusal of the evidence on record, the court is
convinced that the prosecution had discharged its burden by proving appellants’
guilt with the requisite quantum of evidence in criminal cases which is proof
beyond reasonable doubt. 6

There is no doubt as to appellant Tiguman’s direct participation. He was the

principal triggerman who shot Jose Juanite, Sr. to death since he was
positively identified by Maria Elena Juanite who was present at the scene when the
shooting happened. According to Maria Elena, who is the daughter and sister of the
victims, at around 6:30 in the evening of December 10, 1993, when knocks on the
door were heard, her brother Juanite, Jr. requested the young Questo, Jr. to open
the door. Upon opening the door, appellant Tiguman went inside and shot Juanite,
Sr. without warning. When her brother Jose Juanite, Jr. rushed to close the door,
Pomoy, Jr., who was positioned outside the house of the Juanites, fired at Jose, Jr.
from the window.

Moreover, appellant Tiguman’s participation in the killing was affirmed in open

court by no less than his co-accused Pomoy, Jr. who pleaded guilty to a lesser
offense of homicide. According to the latter, he was an informer of appellant
Tiguman. He also testified how appellant Paña solicited appellant Tiguman, a
scout ranger of the Philippine Army, 7 to kill the Juanites for some monetary
consideration. The plan to kill was hatched in the house of the Paña spouses in
their presence. Pomoy, Jr. described in detail that the plan to kill the victims was
on account of a land dispute and that money was paid by appellant Paña to
appellant Tiguman to accomplish the task. The killing was facilitated with the aid
of two (2) other men unknown to him but were known to appellant Tiguman. After
killing the victims, Pomoy, Jr. left the place and settled in Parañaque, Metro
Manila upon the advice of appellant Tiguman. Pomoy, Jr. narrated their evil design
to the minutest detail, facts which could not have been known except only to the
parties and their co-conspirators. All the more this lends credence to the truth that
appellants were indeed the culprits behind the fatal shooting.

Appellants, however, assail the admission of the testimony of Pomoy, Jr. as

rebuttal witness on the ground that the prosecution had already rested its case. This
is misleading, because in the order of trial set by the rules, the parties may present
rebuttal evidence. It is settled that the right to present evidence is reserved to the
State no less than to the accused. The rules of evidence permit the use of
considerable discretion by the trial courts in the admission of rebuttal evidence. It
cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in this respect, where the
defendant is not taken by surprise and is not prevented from introducing evidence
in sur-rebuttal.

In any case, assuming that the testimonies of prosecution witness Maria Elena
Juanite and rebuttal witness Pomoy, Jr., are inadmissible in evidence, the
culpability of appellant Tiguman was clearly established by the positive
identification of other prosecution witnesses.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Testifying for the prosecution, the 10-year old Questo, Jr., was actually present
with the Juanites at the time the shooting happened. He testified that prior to the
shooting, he saw appellants Tiguman, Pomoy, Jr. and an unidentified person on
December 10, 1993, between 6:00 to 6:30 in the evening, in the waiting shed of
Purok 5, Barangay San Pedro, Alegria, Surigao del Norte, carrying a sack from
where the muzzles of firearms were protruding. The young boy, on the witness
stand declared and positively identified appellant Tiguman as the person who
suddenly shot Juanite, Sr. in the latter’s house. Another prosecution witness,
Arturo Balesteros, testified that moments after he heard gunshots coming from the
residence of the Juanites, he saw Manny Tiguman pass by, coming from the
direction of the Juanite house.

Against such overwhelming evidence, appellant Tiguman could only offer denial
and alibi as his defenses which are inherently weak and unreliable. He claims that
at the time of the incident on that fatal night, he was in Camp Evangelista, Cagayan
de Oro City, which is a neighboring city of the province of Surigao del Norte.
Appellant Tiguman’s alibi is worthless in the face of his positive identification by
prosecution witnesses who have no motive to wrongly accuse him of such
ignominious crime. His alibi is self-serving and his bare denial is a negative
declaration which deserves no consideration and cannot prevail over the
affirmative testimony which was corroborated by further evidence. Another
prosecution witness, Graciano Madelo, a driver in the ricemill of a certain engineer
in the locality, testified that appellant Tiguman was present in Alegria, Surigao del
Norte on the day the Juanites were killed. In fact, Madelo was tasked by Manny
Tiguman to drive for him to pick up Pomoy, Jr. and their unidentified companion.
These threads of events form a chain of circumstantial evidence which when taken
together, clearly established the presence of appellant Tiguman in the crime scene.
The record is bereft of evidence that these witnesses were motivated by ill
considerations and intent, hence their testimony is given full probative value. 16

The other appellant, "Meling" Paña, was convicted below as principal by

inducement. Prosecution evidence showed that appellant Paña had motive to kill
the Juanites because of a land dispute. It appears that spouses Juanites filed an
agrarian case against Efren Paña, husband of accused-appellant who was acquitted
in said case, together with other people. When judgment was rendered in favor of
spouses Juanite, the spouses Paña harbored a grudge against the Juanites.
Prosecution witness Anita Sanchez, wife of Macario Sanchez, who was one of the
respondents in the DARAB case, testified that appellant Paña went to her house
several times for financial assistance in order to "liquidate" Jose Juanite, Sr.
Sanchez subsequently learned that the Juanites were shot to death.

The domestic helper of the Juanites, Elena Siaboc, testified that appellant Paña
requested from her pictures of the victims which she obliged by giving them to
appellant Paña. This shows that the killing of the Juanites was conceived by
appellant Paña. Since appellant Tiguman could not have known the victims, a
picture was necessary to identify the targets.

Andy Acebedo, neighbor of spouses Paña likewise testified in court that on

December 8, 1993 he saw Pomoy, Jr., Accused-appellant Tiguman, pass by and
proceed to the house of the Pañas. When he followed them, he overheard accused-
appellant Paña telling accused-appellant Tiguman, Pomoy, Jr., and two persons
unknown to him, to kill Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jr.

Prosecution witness Gemma Bacor, whose house is located just across the house of
the Juanites, testified that on that fateful night, while watching television, she heard
gunfire. She opened the door of her house and saw two persons in the street
carrying firearms. Bacor further testified that on January 2, 1994, the Paña spouses
invited her to their residence and asked her to execute an affidavit to the effect that
what she saw on that night were only children and not adults. Such invitation to
execute a misleading statement is an indicia of guilt to silence a living witness to
their horrible deed, and perpetrate an injustice to the poor victims of their greed.

Testimonies of prosecution witnesses are given weight and credence absent proof
of ill will, or motive, to testify against the accused. Prosecution witnesses, Andy
Acebedo, Elena Siaboc, Gemma Bacor are not maliciously motivated to testify
against appellant Paña. The latter herself testified that there exists no
misunderstanding between her and the witnesses mentioned.

In this case, no reason appears for the Court to disregard the trial court’s
assessments, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In summary, insofar as the accused Melecia Paña is concerned, there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt that, as a result of the adverse DARAB decision dated
October 28, 1993, motive exists on the part of said accused to cause the killing of
Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr.; that, on November 25, 1993, the accused
Melecia Paña procured pictures of the said victims from prosecution witness Elena
Siaboc; that, in the evening of December 8, 1993, the accused Melecia Paña,
Emmanuel (Manny) Tiguman, Jose Bilboro Pomoy, Jr. a.k.a. Robert Bayan, and a
certain Glen and Nonoy met in the Paña residence and there, they planned, the
killing of the Juanites, during which occasion the accused Melecia Paña instructed
Manny Tiguman and Robert Bayan, thus: ‘That is all, ha? You will kill Jose
Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr.’; that the accused Melecia Paña handed the money
to Manny Tiguman, saying: ‘Here is the money. This is one-half of the total price,
‘bahala na nimo’ (it is up to you)’; and that, on January 2, 1994, the accused
Melecia Paña and her husband, Efren Paña, invited prosecution witness Gemma
Bacor to the former’s residence and there, the Paña spouses convinced the latter to
execute an affidavit that would declare that the persons, whom Gemma Bacor saw
passing by her residence in the evening of December 10, 1993, after she heard
gunshots, were children and not adults, contrary to what Gemma Bacor had
actually seen.

"From the facts thus proven, there is no doubt that the accused Melecia Paña
induced her co-accused Emmanuel [Manny] Tiguman and Jose Bilboro Pomoy, Jr.
(Robert Bayan) to kill Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr. in the evening of
December 10, 1993, at San Pedro, Alegria, Surigao del Norte." cralawlibrary : red

The trial court ruled that the crime committed was murder after finding that the
killings were attended by treachery, evident premeditation, dwelling and price or
reward. Only one aggravating circumstance is enough to qualify the killing to
murder, the rest constitute generic aggravating circumstances. We agree with the
trial court that treachery was proven since the "attack was sudden, unexpected,
without warning, and without giving the victims an opportunity to defend
themselves or repel the aggression, as in fact the deceased did not sense any danger
that they would be shot by the assailants as there was no grudge and
misunderstanding between them." Dwelling is also aggravating considering that
the assailants were in the sanctity of their own home — which is perhaps the last
bulwark of their safety. An unsuspecting knock on the door betrayed that trust of
peace in the family who were only conversing. Dwelling, or morada, is aggravating
when crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party and the latter has
not given provocation. Provocation in dwelling must be: (a) given by the offended
party, (b) sufficient, and (c) immediate to the commission of the crime. No such
provocation concurs herein. With respect to evident premeditation, the hiring of
Tiguman to kill the victims for a price, providing the victims’ picture and the
meeting to carry out the killing provide more than sufficient evidence to appreciate
the same. As to the circumstance of price or reward, it can only be appreciated
against appellant Tiguman since it was he who committed the felonious act for
money. The same evidence on price established conspiracy between the appellants.
Consequently the act of one is the act of all.
The fact that the husband of appellant Paña, one of the alleged conspirators or
inducers in the killing, was acquitted of the charges does not put to doubt
appellant’s culpability. Though conspiracy is a joint act, there is nothing irregular
if the supposed co-conspirator is acquitted and others convicted. Generally,
conspiracy is only a means by which a crime is committed as the mere act of
conspiring is not by itself punishable. Hence, it does not follow that one person
alone cannot be convicted when there is conspiracy. As long as the acquittal of a
co-conspirator does not remove the basis of a charge of conspiracy, one
defendant may be found guilty of the offense.

Murder committed in 1993 is penalized with reclusion temporal maximum to

death. Under Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, when only an aggravating
circumstance is present in the commission of the act, the maximum period shall be
imposed, and whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating
circumstances, the courts may not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by
law in its maximum period. Considering however, the proscription in the 1987
Constitution on the imposition of death penalty as well as the non-retroactive
application of the restored death penalty, the trial court erred in imposing on
appellants Tiguman and Paña the death penalty. The crimes in this case were
committed prior to the restoration of the Death Penalty Law on December 31,
1993.

With respect to the monetary awards, the civil indemnity of P50, 000.00 awarded
to each of the heirs of the two victims, as well as the additional P50,000.00 as
moral damages each, are proper. The civil indemnity is automatically granted to
the offended party or his heirs in the case of death, without need of further
evidence other than the fact of the commission of the crime and the accused-
appellants’ culpability therefor. On the actual damages of P150, 000.00 awarded
by the court a quo, the same lack evidentiary basis on the records. No receipt or
any document was presented in support thereof. Nonetheless, the amount of P15,
000.00 as temperate damages would suffice in lieu of the unproven burial
expenses. In addition to such monetary awards, P50, 000.00 as exemplary damages
should have also been granted considering the presence of aggravating
circumstances. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION that each appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of two
counts each of Reclusion Perpetua, and are ordered to SOLIDARILY pay each of
the heirs of the victims the civil indemnity of P50, 000.00, another P50,000.00
each as moral damages, an additional P50,000.00 per victim as exemplary
damages, and P15,000.00 each as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,

Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ.,
concur.

Bellosillo, Melo and Kapunan, JJ., are on leave.