Page |1

Contents:
1. INTRODUCTION.
2. Objective of the study.
3. Methodology.
4. South Korea’s economic history.
5. Industrial Policies and Economic plans of South Korea’s state.
6. South Korea's Industrial Sector.
7. Robotics industry and the state.
8. South Korean Automobile Industry Development and Role of state.
9. THE SOUTH KOREAN STATE AND DEVELOPMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR THE
GENERATIVE SECTORS AS SHIPBUILDING.
10.Mining industry and role of state.
11.Construction and the state of south korea.

12.The role of the state as an inter scalar mediator in globalizing liquid crystal
display industry development in South Korea.

13.THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY IN SOUTH KOREA.

14.Government Policies for Industrialization .
15.south Koreas defence industry and rule of government.
16.South koreas IT industry and rule of government.
17.Contributions of south koreas industry in countries economy.
18.The overall Role of Government in Economic Development as industrial
development.
19.Conclusion.
20.References.
 Page |2

 INTRODUCTION:

South Korea is one of the most highly regarded countries in the world when it comes to sustained
growth and development. It was transformed into an industrial powerhouse with a highly skilled
labor force. In the late 20th century, however, economic growth slowed, and in 1997 South
Korea was forced to accept a $57 billion bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—
then the largest such rescue in IMF history. The country also wrestled with reforming the
chaebŏl and liberalizing its economy. Nevertheless, its economy enjoyed a recovery in
subsequent years, and the country entered the 21st century on a relatively firm economic footing.
We know that, Industrializing is perceived as the engine to economic growth. Hence, most
developing economies aspire to industrialize. In recent years a growing awareness has emerged
in the field of modern Korean studies of the role that the state has played in the dramatic
economic growth and social transformation of South Korea. In East Asia the government of each
country has played a decisive role in state development by engineering economic miracle. South
Korea has dramatically been transforming its economy and managing development of the most
important public and private enterprises since 1960s. South Korean government provided a
favorable institutional framework by prioritizing industrial growth, within which the private
sector could flourish. All these unique features are obviously the basis of Asian version of
capitalism. The unique Asian variety of capitalism is mostly linked with the industrial policy
debate where the government plays an active and paternal role in guiding the economy and
society. This paper tries to explore the development strategies and economic policies adopted by
the government of South Korea to ignite change in industrial sector. The unique Asian variety of
capitalism, particularly in East Asia, is mostly linked with the industrial policy debate where
governments are called to pay a supportive and paternal role in guiding the economy and society
in general.

South Korean state’s contributions in industrial sector is seen everywhere of the countries
development .

KEYWORDS: Economy ,GDP, Industry, Government ,Role, Development Etc.

 Page |3

 Objective of the study:

There are various objectives of report, so some important objectives are as follows:

1. To understand what was the strategy of Korean government for development.

2. To know the role of bureaucracy in planning and implementing development policy
3. To obtain more knowledge about the development sector in south korea.
4. To find out the Government activities to implementing industrial sector
5. To find out the lackings of the Governmental process how to developed in the
industrial sector.

The main objective of this study is to analysis industrial development sectors ,policies ,their
workshops and find out the problems in those sector which doesn’t develop. According to
this study ,it also identifying where more or less investment require.

 Methodology:

Books, Journals, Newsletters, Research, Report, Budget of fiscal year etc.

Various report on industrial development topics in south Korea.
South Korea’s various journal
Websites.
 Page |4

 South Korea’s economic history:

South Korea is a state which was founded in 1945 by the imposition of an American military
administration in tandem with a national division seen as illegitimate by the Korean people. In
the midst of this, it has squared off against a rival regime in the North competing for the same
territory and jurisdiction, which led to an invasion and also a constant fear of infiltration.

By creating favorable policy directive for economic development as preceded by Japanese

economic recovery as the logistic supplying bastion for American troops in the Korean peninsula
during and after the Korean War, South Korea's rigorous education system and the establishment
of a highly motivated and educated populace is largely responsible for spurring the country's
high technology boom and rapid economic development. Having almost no natural resources and
always suffering from overpopulation in its small territory, which deterred continued population
growth and the formation of a large internal consumer market, South Korea adapted an export-
oriented economic strategy to fuel its economy, and in 2014, South Korea was the seventh
largest exporter and seventh largest importer in the world. Bank of Korea and Korea
Development Institute periodically release major economic indicators and economic trends of the
economy of South Korea.

The economy of South Korea is the global leader of Consumer electronics, Mobile Broadband
and Smartphone. South Korea's LCD TV global market share also jumped to 37 percent in 2009,
from 27 percent at the end of 2007, and it will soon replace Japan as the world's number-one
LCD-TV supplier. The economy of South Korea ranks No.1 in the world in ICT Development
Index 2015 and 2015 Bloomberg Innovation Index.

Despite the South Korean economy's high growth potential and apparent structural stability,
South Korea suffers perpetual damage to its credit rating in the stock market due to the
belligerence of North Korea in times of deep military crises, which has an adverse effect on the
financial markets of the South Korean economy. South Korea was one of the few developed
countries that was able to avoid a recession during the global financial crisis, and its economic
growth rate will reach 6.1% in 2010, a sharp recovery from economic growth rates of 2.3% in
2008 and 0.2% in 2009 when the global financial crisis hit. The South Korean economy again
recovered with the record-surplus of US$70.7 billion mark of the current account in the end of
2013, up 47 percent growth from 2012, amid uncertainties of the global economic turmoil, with
major economic output being the technology products exports.
 Page |5

 Industrial Policies and Economic plans of South Korea’s state:

The major issue facing the Park regime in the early 1960s was the grinding poverty of the nation
and the need for economic policies to overcome this poverty. A critical problem was raising
funds to foster needed industrial development. Domestic savings were very low, and there was
little available domestic capital. This obstacle was overcome by introducing foreign loans and
inaugurating attractive domestic interest rates that enticed local capital into production. Of South
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, only South Korea financed its economic
development with a dramatic build-up of foreign debt, debt that totaled US$46.8 billion in 1985,
making it the fourth largest Third World debtor. Foreign corporate investments were primarily of
Japanese origin.

As noted by consultant David I. Steinberg, Seoul administered a series of economic development

plans. The government mobilized domestic capital by encouraging savings, determined what
kinds of plants could be constructed with these funds, and reviewed the potential of the products
for export. In this sense, the will of the government to undertake economic development played a
crucial role; the role of the government, however, was not limited to such measures as
mobilizing capital and allocating investments.

Steinberg also pointed out that Park's government restructured industries, such as defense and
construction, sometimes to stimulate competition and other times to reduce or eliminate it. The
Economic Planning Board established export targets that, if met, yielded additional government-
subsidized credit and further access to the growing domestic market. Failure to meet such targets
led to Seoul's withdrawal of credit.

Economic programs were based on a series of five-year plans that began in 1962. The First Five-
Year Economic Development Plan (1962-66) consisted of initial steps toward the building of a
self-sufficient industrial structure that was neither consumption oriented nor overdependent on
oil. Such areas as electrification, fertilizers, oil refining, synthetic fibers, and cement were
emphasized. The Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1967- 71) stressed
modernizing the industrial structure and rapidly building import-substitution industries, including
steel, machinery, and chemical industries. The Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan
(1972-76) achieved rapid progress in building an export-oriented structure by promoting heavy
and chemical industries. Industries receiving particular attention included iron and steel,
transport machinery, household electronics, shipbuilding, and petrochemicals. The developers of
heavy and chemical industries sought to supply new industries with raw materials and capital
goods and to reduce or even eliminate dependence on foreign capital. New (and critical)
industries were to be constructed in the southern part of the peninsula, far from the border with
North Korea, thus encouraging economic development and industrialization outside the Seoul
area and providing new employment opportunities for residents of the less developed areas.
 Page |6

The Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1977-81) fostered the development of
industries designed to compete effectively in the world's industrial export markets. These major
strategic industries consisted of technology-intensive and skilled labor-intensive industries such
as machinery, electronics, and shipbuilding. The plan stressed large heavy and chemical
industries, such as iron and steel, petrochemicals, and nonferrous metal. As a result, heavy and
chemical industries grew by an impressive 51.8 percent in 1981; their exports increased to 45.3
percent of total output. These developments can be ascribed to a favorable turn in the export
performance of iron, steel, and shipbuilding, which occurred because high-quality, low-cost
products could be produced in South Korea. By contrast, the heavy and chemical industries of
advanced countries slumped during the late 1970s. In the machinery industries, investments were
doubled in electric power generation, integrated machinery, diesel engines, and heavy
construction equipment; the increase clearly showed that the industries benefited from the
government's generous financial assistance program.

The late 1970s, however, witnessed worldwide recession, rising fuel costs, and growing
inflation. South Korea's industrial structure became somewhat imbalanced, and the economy
suffered from acute inflation because of an overemphasis on investment in heavy industry at a
time when many potential customers were not in a position to buy heavy industrial goods.

The Fifth Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (1982-86) sought to shift the
emphasis away from heavy and chemical industries, to technology-intensive industries, such as
precision machinery, electronics (televisions, videocassette recorders, and semiconductor-related
products), and information. More attention was to be devoted to building high-technology
products in greater demand on the world market.

The Sixth Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (1987-91) to a large extent
continued to emphasize the goals of the previous plan. The government intended to accelerate
import liberalization and to remove various types of restrictions and nontariff barriers on
imports. These moves were designed to mitigate adverse effects, such as monetary expansion
and delays in industrial structural adjustment, which can arise because of a large surplus of
funds. Seoul pledged to continue phasing out direct assistance to specific industries and instead
to expand manpower training and research and development in all industries, especially the small
and medium-sized firms that had not received much government attention previously. Seoul
hoped to accelerate the development of science and technology by raising the ratio of research
and development investment from 2.4 percent of the GNP to over 3 percent by 1991.

The goal of the Seventh Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (1992-96),
formulated in 1989, was to develop high-technology fields, such as microelectronics, new
materials, fine chemicals, bioengineering, optics, and aerospace. Government and industry would
work together to build high-technology facilities in seven provincial cities to better balance the
geographic distribution of industry throughout South Korea.
 Page |7

 South Korea's Industrial Sector:

South Korea's agriculture contributes only 3 percent of the nation's total GDP in 2010, and
employs 7.3 percent of the country's workforce. The agriculture in South Korea has shrunk
significantly as the nation moves towards the urbanization and industrialization of the economy.
Back in 1987, agricultural made up 12.3 percent of the nation's total GDP, and employs 21
percent of the workforce .Rice is the most important agriculture crop of South Korea. It made up
90 percent of the total grain production, and supplies over 40 percent of the farmers' income.
However, rising farmers' wages and land values have made rice costly to produce. With 16.58
percent o arable land, South Korea's agriculture is also responsible for the production of crops
such as barley, vegetables, fruits and production of cattle, pigs, chicken, milk, eggs and fish. The
industry of South Korea contributes 39.4 percent of the country's GDP in 2010. The industry and
manufacturing industries are the major growth engine for South Korea during its economic
progress in the 1980s. South Korea's largest industries are electronics, automobiles,
telecommunication and shipbuilding. Electronics boosted the South Korean economy in the
1980s, by becoming the world's sixth largest manufacturer of electronic goods such as color
televisions, microwave ovens, radio, watches and personal computers. . South Korea is also a
major manufacturer of semiconductors, with Samsung Electronics and Hynix Semiconductor the
global leaders in the production of memory chips. The automotive industry also plays a major
role in the South Korean economy today. It has grown into one of world's largest automobile
producers, coming in 5th after the United States and Germany, with an estimate of 4.27 million
automobile produced a year. Some of South Korea's international automobile brands include
Hyundai, Kia and Renault. From a slow start of two million subscribers to a current high of 40
million, mobile telephone is the fastest growing area in telecom, going beyond the 20 million
fixed lines serving a 40 million-strong population. Today, South Korea also has the highest
number of broadband users in the world. The presence of one of the fastest broadband networks
in the world also permits e-commerce to grow. South Korea is a global player in the production
of ships, with a 50.6 percent share of the global shipbuilding market in 2008. Four of the world's
largest shipbuilding companies are from South Korea: Hyundai Heavy Industries, Samsung
Heavy Industries, Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering and STX Offshore &
Shipbuilding. Europe's largest shipbuilder, STX Europe, is also owned by South Korea. Services
in South Korea contribute 57.6 percent of the nation's total GDP, and employs 68.4 percent of
the workforce. The government shifts its focus from manufacturing to services in 2009, and
experts predict that the services will be the driving force of South Korea's economy for the next
few years, as current productivity level is just at 58 percent of that in manufacturing.
 Page |8

 Robotics industry and the state:

The South Korean government has decided to invest significant resources into expanding the
country’s production of industrial robotics and automation systems so that it’s worth $6.15
billion by 2022.This is according to BusinessKorea.com, which says the plan is intended to
increase the number of small and mid-size robot makers with sales of more than $46 million to
25.A Report says government-backed organizations, academic and research institutions, as well
as private enterprise will take part in the new initiative. In particular, the group will
“aggressively promote” collaborative robots because such machines are increasingly being used
in a wide variety of industrial businesses. As well as finding a place in industrial operations
which have always used robots, cobots are proving popular with smaller manufacturers who may
never have used robots before.

 South Korean Automobile Industry Development and

Role of state:
The South Korea automotive industry has experienced dramatic expansion in the past three
decades. Currently, South Korea is the 6th largest automobile manufacturing country in the
world, following China, U.S., Japan, Mexico, and Germany. Among all the vehicles produced in
Korea, 68.3% of the production is exported, making it one of the world’s largest automotive
exporting country as well. The total value of automotive exports has surpassed US$74.7 billion,
representing a 13.4% share of total national exports, making automotive the top exported
products in South Korea. Automobiles account for a significant share of global output and trade.
Since automobile manufacturing is widely considered to be an engine of economic development,
a number of countries, including Turkey and South Korea, have pursued industrial policies in the
automobile sector, with mixed success. While the two countries started from similar initial
conditions and both devised and implemented automobile industrial policies, the outcomes were
very different. The Korean automobile sector has far outperformed its Turkish counterpart. The
difference in policy outcomes begs an obvious question of why that happened. This paper’s
central objective is to find answers to that question by analyzing and comparing industrial
policies in the automobile sector. To do so, we develop a list of qualitative and quantitative
criteria in order to assess and explain the different outcomes. We base our analysis on a review
of the historical development of the automobile sector and policies in both countries. Our
analysis suggests that differences in state capacity and hence quality of industrial policies help
explain the differential performance of the automobile industry in the two countries .The role of
the state as an inter-scalar mediator in globalizing liquid crystal display industry development in
South Korea.
 Page |9

 THE SOUTH KOREAN STATE AND DEVELOPMENTAL

STRATEGIES FOR THE GENERATIVE SECTORS AS
SHIPBUILDING:
Many stress the ‘primacy of the state’ and focus on the role of Korean government during the
whole process of planning and executing rapid economic growth policies over the past four
decades. the Korean state invested financial resources in heavy and chemical industries during
the 1970s (Amsden 1989; Woo 1991; Sakong 1993; Song 2003; Kohli 2004).The key role of the
South Korean state was to guide the direction and pace of growth by large private firms, the
chaebols of Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo, and others. In return, these conglomerates had to
work hard to maintain their financial benefits from the government. Amsden (1989) described
South Korean development as ‘late industrialization’ focusing on the steel and shipbuilding
industries: “the government played the part of visionary in the case of Korea’s first colossal
shipyard, and it was responsible for the Big Push into heavy machinery and chemicals in the late
1970s” (Amsden 1989:81). The government made subsidized credit and long-term capital with
low interest rates available selectively to exporting companies.4 As industrial development
proceeded, Park’s regime used coercive means and its finance channeling power to oversee the
firms in every detail of their planning and operations, rewarding good performers and penalizing
poor ones. Two main factors drove the Korean government to initiate HCI. First, Korea’s
light manufacturing industries faced rising protectionist barriers in the world market.
Therefore, shifting Korea’s export strategy toward high value-added products in the world
market could help to maintain economic growth. The transition of the Korean economy
from light industry to chemical and heavy industry in the 1970s meant that Korea as a
latecomer to industrialization had to compete against firms from high wage countries, not against
firms from low-wage countries. As a non-economic factor, secondly, the government promoted
the defense industry as part of national-security strategy (Sakong 1993:35-36; Rhyu 2001).
This national-security strategy resulted from the uncertain geopolitical environment
surrounding the Korean peninsula after Nixon’s visit to China as an effort to end “the Cold
War,” which convinced many Koreans of the importance of self-defense (Koo and Kim 1992).
Korean government disciplinary interventions such as total control over commercial banking,
limiting the number of firms entering a new industry, and controls on prices, capital
flight, and commodities shaped aggregate economic concentration and income inequality
during the industrialization process (Amsden 1989:15-18). As had been the case during Japan’s
rapid economic ascent, the pattern of South Korean state-sector-firm relations established in
the generative sectors brought together the large firms, the state, and a coalition of elites, the
middle class, and sectors of the working class in support of this model of development
(proposition number two). The intensive policy of subsidy and growth for HCI led by the Korean
state created tight relationships between the state, the generative sectors of steel and
shipbuilding, and POSCO and HHI. State funding, protection, and regulation and changing
 P a g e | 10

conditions in the world economy provided the opportunities for Korean firms to invest in and
profit from heavy industrialization, led by steel and shipbuilding.

 Mining industry and role of state :

Most of the mineral deposits in the Korean Peninsula are located in North Korea, with the South
only possessing an abundance of tungsten and graphite. Coal, iron ore, and molybdenum are
found in South Korea, but not in large quantities and mining operations are on a small scale.
Much of South Korea's minerals and ore are imported from other countries. Most South Korean
coal is low-grade anthracite that is only used for heating homes and boilers.Here the state play an
important role to implementing mining industry.

 Construction and the state of south korea:

Construction has been an important South Korean export industry since the early 1960s and
remains a critical source of foreign currency and invisible export earnings. By 1981 overseas
construction projects, most of them in the Middle East, accounted for 60 percent of the work
undertaken by South Korean construction companies. Contracts that year were valued at
US$13.7 billion. In 1988, however, overseas construction contracts totaled only US$2.6 billion
(orders from the Middle East were US$1.2 billion), a 1 percent increase over the previous year,
while new orders for domestic construction projects totalled US$13.8 billion, an 8.8 percent
increase over 1987. orea's largest construction companies include Samsung C&T Corporation,
which built some of the highest building's and most noteworthy skyscrapers such as Petronas
Towers, Taipei 101, and Burj Khalifa. Government of south Korea investing more funds on their
construction .

 The role of the state as an inter scalar mediator in globalizing

liquid crystal display industry development in South Korea:

Within the global trend towards the development of knowledge-based economies, liquid crystal
display (LCD) has emerged as the dominant information technology of the twenty-first century,
with the industry based predominantly in East Asia, particularly Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and
China. Korean big businesses such as Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics have most notably
made strategic investments in the LCD sector, which consists of almost 90 per cent of the total
display industry. Accordingly,this industry has grown rapidly in SouthKorea.SamsungElectronics
and LG Display, as global LCD panel players, ranked first and second, respectively,interms of
LCD display market share. The global production network (GPN) perspective can provide an
 P a g e | 11

extensive alternative view on globalizing regional development in East Asia by serving as a

corrective to the new regionalism approach, which
placesexcessiveemphasisonlocalinstitutionalstructures(Coeetal.,2004; Henderson et al., 2002;
Yeung, 2009a; Yang et al., 2009; Yang, 2009; Wei, Lu and Chen, 2009). The GPN perspective
stresses the multi-scalarity of the forces and processes underlying cluster development by
considering both economies internal to the cluster and non-cluster economies that are linked
through external networks. The GPN perspective, therefore, does not only demonstrate how
clusters are economically integrated, but further clarifies the asymmetries of socio-economic
development among clusters (Henderson et al., 2002). In exploring the asymmetries of regional
development, the GPN perspective pays close attention to the power relations among actors
and institutions connected to GPNs (Coe et al.,
2004;Coe,DickenandHess,2008).Inparticular,itfocusesonthe‘strategic coupling’ of GPNs and
regional assets (Coe et al., 2004: 469). In other words, the dynamic connections between
‘globalizing processes’ that are
ledbytransnationalcorporations,andregionaldevelopmentthatinvolves local actors and the state,
are better assessed using the GPN perspective.).As such, they place less emphasis on the role of
the national state in regional development due to an analytical disjuncture from
statecentricassumptionsandanalyses.Hence,theymaydisregardthecomplex scale politics and the
potential role of the national state in coordinating
localizedgrowthfactorswithglobalizingexternalfactorsunderthelegacy of the developmental
state and its top-down implementation of policy.1 In this paper, we focus on analysing the
proactive role of the state ,based on the legacy of the developmental state period, in the
dynamic strategicly. In the following section, we critically review the existing literature, which
explores regional development in Asia through the GPN perspective, and present a multi-scalar
framework that acknowledges the role of thestateasaninter-
scalarmediatorandhighlightsitsrelationswithother multiple actors in determining the globalizing
of LCD industry development. In section three, we provide profiles of both South Korean LCD
industrydevelopmentandoftheemergingLCDagglomeratedareas,Paju, Asan-
TangjungandtheLCDsupplierclusterinGyeonggi.Insectionfour, we examine the complex multi-
scalar processes of strategic coupling between the state and other actors in regional
development and the role of
thestateincoordinatinglocalizedgrowthfactorswithglobalizingexternal factors in the South
Korean LCD cluster development. We then conclude
bysuggestingthetheoreticalandpolicyimplicationsthatarisefromSouth Korean LCD industry
development.
 P a g e | 12

 THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY IN

SOUTH KOREA:
Government support for prime agriculture producers plays an important role in
agricultural development. Since the early 1960s, when Korea's economic and
social condition was much worse off that in Ukraine in the 1990s and 2000s, the
Korean government started developing various state programs and strategies to tackle
the urgent poverty problem of farmers. Number of public agencies which have played
important roles in the country's economic and social development were
established under the Ministry of Agriculture (Kim, 2009). Founded in 1961, the
National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF) was established to enhance the
social and economic status of its members and to promote balanced development of
the national economy. From the midst of 1970s, the government has started providing
farmers with grants and affordable loans for the purchase of agricultural equipment to
promote agricultural mechanization. In general, Korea's small farmers considered
investment in agricultural machinery to not make much economic sense from a
microeconomic perspective. However, policymakers believed that mechanization
was an urgent task for the development of agriculture and food security.
Therefore, the mechanization of agriculture in the country was carried out under a
strong government intervention. Strong financial support for grants and low-cost
loans were provided to farmers as well as for machine manufacturing,
suppliers, repair services, training, vehicle driving and maintenance, and subsidies (or
tax exemptions) for agricultural machinery fuel, among others (Im andJeong, 2014). As
a result of diverse efforts of the government and the integrated value chain finance
model of the NACF/member cooperatives, the number of farm machines has
increased sharply in the last several decades.
Share of different types of farms in agricultural production, %
Individual farms
Indicator Corporate farms Peasant farms Households
2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010
Gross agriculture output (value) 32.3 39.9 1.7 5.0 66.0 55.1
Production (quantity)
Grain and leguminous crops 76.5 63.8 5.1 12.0 18.4 24.2
Sunflower seed 77.5 64.7 10.0 17.8 12.5 17.5
Rapeseed 96.0 85.0 4.0 15.0 – –
Sugar beet (for processing) 82.1 83.7 5.7 8.4 12.2 7.9
Potatoes 1.1 1.7 0.3 0.9 98.6 97.4
Vegetables 15.5 9.3 1.4 2.6 83.1 88.1
Fruits and berries 18.2 16.4 - - 81.8 83.6
All types of meat 25.8 52.8 0.5 2.3 73.7 44.9
All types of milk 28.5 18.7 0.5 1.0 71.0 80.3
Eggs 33.7 59.6 0.1 0.5 66.2 39.9
Honey 6.6 2.0 0.2 0.3 93.2 97.7
Wool 38.3 13.8 0.3 3.1 61.4 83.1
 P a g e | 13

 Government Policies for Industrialization

Export Promotion

From the beginning of the first Five-Year Economic Development Plan in 1962, the Korean
government has adopted an export promotion strategy rather than an import substitution
p01icy.~ The government strongly supported ex- porting firms with various incentive
measures, including favorable treatment in the allocation of credit and in the taxation
system. The system of export financing played a critical role in supporting export industries
until the mid-1980s when the Korean current account recorded a surplus. The essence of
the system was the Bank of Korea’s (BOK’s) automatic rediscounting policy, which supplied
credit via commercial banks to exporting firms who received letters of credit (L/C). The
central bank‘s discount loans.
Export Loans by Domestic Money Banks (' •)

1961 1966—72 1973 1982— 1987—91

—65 —81 86
Export loans by BOK (as a
share
of export loans by DMBs) na. 75.4 90.1 65.8 45.3
Export loans by DMBs (as a
share of total loans by 4.5 7.6 13.3 10.2 3.1
DMBs)
Export loans by DMBs (as a
share of total policy
loans• by
DMBs) n.a. n.a. 20.4 16.5 4.5
Export loan interest rate (A) 9.3 6.1 9.7 10.0 10—11.0
General loan interest rate (B) 18.2 23.2 17.3 10— 10—11.5
11.5
B—A 8.9 17.1 7.6 0—1.5 0—0.5
Financial subsidy ratio for
exports‘ n.a. 1.6 0.6 0.5 0.2
Annual export growth rate' 40.3 37.7 35.1 10.5 16.4
Export/GNP 3.5 9.9 26.2 32.5 30.7

Above table shows that most of the export credit extended by domestic money banks
(DMBs) were supported by the central bank. Between 1966 and 1986, the annual average
ratio of BOK export credits to DMB export loans was 79.4 percent. In particular, the
ratio reached 90.1 percent in the 1973—81 period. Table 7. l also shows DMB export
loans as a share of total DMB loans. Be- tween 1961 and 1965, the annual average share
was only 4.5 percent. The share increased to 7.6 percent in the 1966—72 period and further,
to 13.3 percent, in the 1973—81 period. The share, however, has decreased significantly since
the mid-1980s, when the current account surplus began accumulating.
The interest rate on export loans was also heavily subsidized. Until 198 l, export loans were
provided at rates of 6—10 percent even though general loan rates were 17—23 percent. After
1982, the differential disappeared. It is interesting to see in the above table that there is
some positive correlation between export growth and export loan support, in terms of its
availability and the extent of preferential treatment. Between 1961 and 1981, exports
 P a g e | 14

grew about 35—40 percent per annum and their share in GNP increased by
more than seven times. However, the growth rate has dropped to the 10 percent
level since 1982.
Such fast export growth in the 1960s and 1970s was not due solely to these
export credit programs. The government also provided substantial tax incen- tives
to exporting firms by reducing business and corporate taxes on export income
by 50 percent and exempting tariffs on materials or intermediate goods imported
as export content. Furthermore, exporters were exempted from tax
investigations, which motivated business firms to restlessly participate in ex-
porting.
In addition to these incentives, there was also a long list of governmental
measures for export activity promotion at the microlevel. Since export market- ing
has substantial fixed costs in the beginning stages, the government estab-
lished the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) mainly to explore
foreign markets. To assist Korean exporters in effectively filling foreign orders,
the government also subsidized projects to improve the wrapping and design
of products, the expansion of inspection facilities for export goods, the opening of
foreign-language training centers, and traveling expenses for delegations to
overseas expositions and trade shows.’
The government also initiated close consultation with the export industries and
monitored the performance of supported firms through “monthly export
promotion expansion meetings,’ chaired by the president. Ministers with trade-
related duties, representatives from business, banking institutions, and ship-
ping companies, and labor-union leaders participated in these meetings to re-
view export performance broken down according to product and destination, and
to discuss international market trends and emerging problems. For in- stance,
if export performance was weak, the president urged relevant govern- ment
officials and bankers to provide enhanced support to achieve a target volume
of exports as planned. Through the process of consensus building in these
meetings, export promotion policies were systemized (Kim 1990).6
Another salient feature of Korean export promotion policies was that the
government’s support to exporting firms was based on export
performance. Ex- porters eligible to receive support were limited to those
whose past year’s ex- ports exceeded a target amount.’ To get more
privileges, exporters had to work hard to compete with each other and
foreign businesses. In this way, the Korean government maintained an
efficient allocating device for picking winners and was able to reduce the
risk of an “interventionist approach” (Cho and Kim 1993). Furthermore,
this strategy compelled Korean firms to compete with for- eign firms and
brought tremendous externalities of accelerated learning on the job and,
thus, a shortened learning curve. There seems to be little controversy over
the fact that these comprehensive export promotion policies contributed to
the remarkable expansion of the Ko- rean export sector by stimulating
learning by doing. But one may remain doubtful whether the full extent of
 P a g e | 15

government subsidies used by Korean poli- cymakers was necessary to

kick off export growth.

Promotion of the Heavy and Chemical Industries

From the beginning of economic development, the south Korean military govern- ment made
deliberate efforts to upgrade the industrial structure by promoting the heavy and chemical
industries (HCIs). It believed that the build up of the HCIs would lead to a “wealthy country and
a strong army.” The promotion of the HCIs was carried out despite many critical obstacles: (1)
Korea lacked capital and Korea’s market was very small, while the HCIs require huge capital
investments with long gestation periods and they are sensitive to scale. (2) Technical skills
necessary to efficiently produce HCI products were absent in Korea. The Korean government
designated the steel industry, along with the petrochemical industry, strategic industries to be
given top priority in the sec- ond Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1967—71).'
In the early 1970s, the promotion of the HCIs was further pushed to sustain export growth. The
Korean industrial structure had rapidly transformed during the 1960s from an agrarian economy
to a light manufacturing sector— dominated economy. But the government suspected that
export-led growth would not be sustained when the light industries’ production reached the “ef-
fective minimum scale” and their position of comparative advantage in the international market
deteriorated.
The HCI drive was also largely motivated by national security concerns, magnified by the Carter
administration’s plan to completely withdraw U.S. ground forces from Korea and by the fall of
South Vietnam to communist rule. In response, the Korean government announced in 1973 that it
would promote the HCIs simultaneously with the defense industry. The government’s key
strategy for developing the HCIs was raising factory sizes to international standards, in order to
promote their competitive edge. Since the domestic market was too small for these large
factories, the govern- ment decided that the HCIs were to be promoted as strategic export
industries to solve marketing problems and to practice economies of scale (Kim 1990).’ The HCI
policy was implemented through subsidized credit and special tax policies, selective protection,
entry restrictions, and direct government involve- ment in industrial decision making. The
government picked chaebols (con-glomerates) or firms to enter specific industries.
Among various government supports, financing was the most critical factor since the HCIs
required huge amounts of capital. With limited domestic sav- ing, the government had to actively
seek foreign capital. At that time, the abil- ity of Korean entrepreneurs to attract foreign capital
was very limited due to the low creditworthiness of domestic firms. The government, in
response, took two big steps. It began to guarantee the reimbursement of all foreign loans,
whether they were initiated by public companies or by private companies. Much more important,
the government normalized relations with Japan, de-
spite very strong anti-Japan sentiment and popular protest.' o These measures facilitated large
inflows of foreign capital and technology, especially from
From 1959 to 1982, commercial loans were mostly allocated to the manufacturing industries,
especially to the HCIs, while public loans went mainly to the service industry (mostly for
infrastructure). During this period, 59 percent of all commercial loans were distributed to
manufacturing industries, of which 73.8 percent were allocated to HCI-related projects,
indicating that, without easy access to inter- national commercial lending, the HCI plan which
required mammoth invest- ment could not have been implemented.
The government also established a special system called the National Invest- ment Fund (NIF) in
1973 to facilitate the financing of long-term investment in plants and equipment for the HCIs.
The sources of the NIF were a combination of domestic funds from private financial
intermediaries such as commercial.
 P a g e | 16

 south Koreas defence industry and rule of government:

The ROK government has supported the creation of an indigenous South Korean defense
industry since the early 1970s. Three government decrees put Seoul's policy into motion: A
1973 Law on the Defense Industry, a 1974 Force Improvement Plan for the buildup of ROK
armed forces, and a 1975 Defense Tax Law that was designed to finance the development of
the defense industry. This support of the defense industry was also largely based on the
Government's general policy during the 1970s of nurturing investment in the shipbuilding,
steel, and the electronics industries. The growth of these sectors helped established links to
defense production as the production of armaments became interwoven into the manufacture
of ships and heavy machinery.In 1990 South Korean industries provided about 70 percent of the
weapons, ammunition, communications and other types of equipment, vehicles, clothing, and
other supplies needed by the military. The Defense Procurement Agency (DPA) of the Ministry
of National Defense (MND) is responsible for more than 95 percent of all defense procurement
activities in Korea. The DPA handles everything from the initial specification work to payments
to contractors. Its major functions include: procurement of defense materials for the Korean
military forces; construction of military facilities; sources of supply management; acquisition of
price information and cost management; offset negotiation and management; military
specification and standardization management.Korea depended completely upon military aid
and equipment from the United States until the mid-1960's. In 1971, the Ministry of Defense
set up the DPA as an integrated procurement agency. The DPA has since contributed to the
modernization of military equipment used by the country's armed forces and strengthened the
nation's war potential by streamlining the process of acquiring war materiel. The DPA currently
manages a four trillion won defense budget.Weapons production for the army began in 1971
when the Ministry of National Defense constructed a plant to assemble United States-designed
Colt M-16 rifles. The memorandum of agreement between the United States and the Republic
of Korea authorized production of enough rifles to supply South Korean army units. However,
the agreement prohibited the production of additional M-16s without the permission of Colt
Industries and the United States government. In the mid-1970s, South Korea signed agreements
to begin licensed production of many types of United States-designed weapons, including
grenades, mortars, mines, and recoilless rifles, with the same stipulations as those for the M-16
rifle. South Korea also began to manufacture ammunition for the weapons it produced for the
army.By 1990 South Korean companies had army contracts to produce tanks, self-propelled and
towed field guns, two types of armored vehicles, and two types of helicopters. A division of
 P a g e | 17

Hyundai produced the 88 Tank (commonly called the K-1 tank) at Ch'angwon. The K-1 was the
result of a joint United States-South Korean design. The K-1 Tank's 105mm gun was an
improved version of the same caliber gun that was standard on South Korea's M-48A5 tanks.
Although a few components of the tanks' fire control and transmission systems were imported,
Hyundai and South Korean subcontractors manufactured most of the systems. One of the
Samsung Group's businesses produced 155mm M-109 self-propelled howitzers. KIA Machine
Tool was the manufacturer for the KH-178 105mm and the KH-179 155mm towed field guns.
The KH-178 and KH179 guns were derived from United States-designed artillery but were
considered indigenously designed. Daewoo Industries and Asia Motors had a coproduction
agreement for an Italian-designed wheeled, armored personnel vehicle.During the 1970s and
1980s, South Korea became a leading producer of ships, including oil supertankers, and oil-
drilling platforms. The country's major shipbuilder was Hyundai, which built a 1-million-ton
capacity drydock at Ulsan in the mid-1970s. Daewoo joined the shipbuilding industry in 1980
and finished a 1.2-million-ton facility at Okp'o on Koje Island, south of Pusan, in mid-1981. The
industry declined in the mid-1980s because of the oil glut and because of a worldwide
recession. There was a sharp decrease in new orders in the late 1980s; new orders for 1988
totaled 3 million gross tons valued at US$1.9 billion, decreases from the previous year of 17.8
percent and 4.4 percent, respectively. These declines were caused by labor unrest, Seoul's
unwillingness to provide financial assistance, and Tokyo's new low-interest export financing in
support of Japanese shipbuilders.In 1990 South Korean shipbuilders were building two
indigenously designed naval vessels, and they had coproduction agreements with United States,
Italian, and German companies for several other types of ships. During the 1980s, Korea
Tacoma, a South Korean-owned subsidiary of the United States Tacoma Boatbuilding Company,
produced one class of patrol gunboat and one class of landing ship for the navy. In the late
1980s, production of submarines designed by the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
was initiated. Three 150-ton submarines designed by the Howaldswerke Shipbuilding
Corporation were in service with the navy in 1990. In the late 1980s Howaldswerke had plans to
provide technical assistance for the construction of three Type 209 submarines, about 1,400
tons each. South Korean military planners were interested in using submarines to protect
critical shipping lanes from North Korean submarines in wartime. By the late 1990s South Korea
possessed one of the largest domestic defense industries in the world, spending more than $14
billion per year on defense-related activities. A handful of large corporations in the ROK
manufactured the majority of South Korea's weapons systems. These companies continued to
lead in both the research and development, and production of new systems. Many of the
smaller companies in the South Korean defense industry continued their role as subcontractors
to these chaebols.The success of Korea's financial and corporate-sector restructuring was
essential to encourage a high pace of productive domestic and foreign investment. Under the
terms of the 1998 IMF agreement, Korea largely opened its financial and corporate sectors to
 P a g e | 18

foreign investment, and reduced or removed controls on overseas capital transactions. Since
1998, President Kim's government was instrumental in reforming and opening Korea's economy
to foreign investment and reducing trade barriers. Wide-ranging reforms have accelerated the
evolution of Korea's financial and corporate sectors away from the previous state-led economic
model toward a commercial free-market model. In corporate restructuring, about half of the
top 30 business groups ("chaebol" or conglomerates), including Hanbo, Daewoo, Dong-A,
Haitai, and Sammi, were removed from the market.The Republic of Korea Ministry of National
Defense (MND) reformed its acquisition process in early 2001 and implemented many of these
changes in 2002 in its pursuit of new major defense acquisitions. In addition to effectively
demonstrating the benefits of its streamlining of the process, MND has shown a willingness to
explore new acquisition options that incorporate the best aspects of both the direct
commercial contracting and United States Foreign Military Sales methods of acquisition. New
hybrid acquisition approaches such as the one being considered for the SAM-X program permit
greater cost transparency and benefits for the Republic of Korea while providing increased
flexibility by the United States Government and industry to work more effectively together in
responding to Korea's defense and industrial offset needs. Opportunities continue to exist to
improve the decision making process and make it less susceptible to the influence of Korean
representatives and political forces inherent in multinational competitions although much
progress has been realized this past year in this difficult area.

Under the new provision the foreign contractor is required to provide assurances in advance
that the proposed technologies will be approved for transfer to Korea prior to the approval of
the offset contract. US technology transfer is subject to approval of the US Government, and US
industry has no legal basis to provide those assurances. The has been a trend of changing offset
requirements in the middle of competitions. The AH-X and F-X competitions started at 30% and
were raised to 50% and 70% respectively in the middle of the competitions.

The Republic of Korea (ROK) is seeking to modernize its armed forces to a level commensurate
with its economic strength. The ROK is in need of significant materiel modernization and
replacements that will involve major investments. Although U.S. defense companies have been
very successful in selling their products to Korea, future sales could be influenced by European
competitors who are becoming increasingly significant in the market. Nevertheless, Korea
should continue to be a good market for U.S. defense companies especially when competitive
products and services and good offset packages are offered.
 P a g e | 19

South Koreas Government Plays an important role to implement defence industry in South
Korea.

 South koreas IT industry and rule of government:

underlying Korea’s remarkable post-1961 economic development has been the
development of a strong science and technology capacity. During the authoritarian
regimes (1961-1988), the state created a rudimentary research capacity, primarily focused
on creation of government-run research institutions, a technical university, and a central
research park, as the private sector gradually began to muster its own applied research
capacity. The late 1980s to late-1990s saw a change of direction, as Korea’s
chaebolconglomerates became the lead actors in R&D. The well-funded National S&T
Technology Program became the focus of state efforts, later superseded by the 21st
Century Frontier Program and specified research funds. By the turn of the century, Korea had
achieved strong aggregate performance in terms of numbers of researchers and funds spent on
R&D, and has continued to build on that for the past decade.The IT industry and, to a lesser
extent, biotech have become the major drivers of technological development. The shift
from the old industrial to new high tech economy facilitated a recasting of national
efforts. A refocused state helped midwife the nascent IT sector, through a combination
of privatization of the national telephone service provider,creation of infrastructure, and
dispute moderation. Even so, recent doubts about Korea’soverall IT competitiveness have
arisen. Meanwhile, since the mid-1990s, Korean policymakers have been captivated by
the possibilities of “Big Science,” i.e., basic or foundational science. Korea participates in
various international basic science programs, and has created another big state funding effort
(the 577 program) to support basic science. The government has spent much policy effort
on drafting “visions” of future technological development, but its technological future
may depend on maintenance of economic competitiveness. Building an IT Economy: South
Korean Science and Technology Policy2 The fast post-war development of South Korea is
one of the most remarkable economic stories of the twentieth century. The small Asian
nation in 1960 was one of the world’s poorest countries, with a Gross Domestic Product roughly
equal to that of Ghana. By 1995, it rose to become the twelfth largest economy, and Asia’s
fourth largest. How Korea was able to accomplish this remarkable feat is a much
analyzed story in international political economy, but at its heart was a largely autonomous
state that employed a combination of state-directed bank financing, light and then heavy
industrial export promotion, fostering of large industrial conglomerates (the fabled chaebol),
and suppression of labor unions to create workplace peace. A hard-line military regime
gave way to democracy from the late 1980s onward, and the state committed to
 P a g e | 20

thoroughgoing economic liberalization as a result of the calamitous 1997-1998 Asian

Financial Crisis. Since the late 1990s, Korea has generally been accepted as an addition to the
developed world and, as a mature economy, has seen economic growth slow and population
size plateau. Koreans have become intense users of electronic media, with broadband
computer connectivity and cell phone service achieving nearly universal penetration.
Underlying Korea’s strong economic development has been a consistent effort to create a
robust science and technology (S&T) capacity. From the beginning of Korea’s export-oriented
drive in the 1960s, this has followed two parallel tracks: creation of a state-led research
and educational capacity, centered on state-run research institutes, and in-house research
and development efforts by the chaebol and some medium-sized firms. Universities were
a relatively weak S&T player, at least until the late 1990s. After the mid-1990s, the
focus of state S&T policy shifted from industrial technology to promotion of the
information technology (IT) industry.To get a better understanding of Korea’s technological
development, this article examines the post-1961 history of technology development, and
the transition to an IT-dominated economy in the 1990s. It then examines state policy and
institutional changes, and promotion of the technologies of the twenty-first century. It
considers state policy in global science and technology, what Korean technology writers call
“Big Science,” and Korea’s future as a technology power. The Korean state began a serious
effort to develop science and technology policy soon after a military coup d’état led to the
presidency of Park Chung Hee. Technology policymaking changed greatly in the years of
military rule. During the Third Republic (1963-1972), the president made most major policy
decisions, in consultation with a few key advisors. The state focused on development of basic
institutions to support the adaptation of foreign technology. These included the Ministry of
Science and Technology (MOST), one of the first government organs in the developing world
dedicated to technological development, and the Korean Institute of Science and
Technology (KIST), a government R&D facility dedicated to applied technology. The U.S.
government provided seed money and an administrative consultation team to help with
the institute’s set-up, as well as continuing assistance. For the first five years, KIST
established operations and hired staff, and only began to do research work in the 1970s. The
state also established the Korean Advanced Institute of Science (KAIS), intended as one of the
first science and engineering universities in the developing world. KAIS was later renamed
KAIST, and today is Korea’s leading technical university. The early years of the Sixth Republic
(1987-present) witnessed a transition to democracy.The chaebol took the lead in technology
development, while the government focused onprestige programs, such as the G-7 Project,
designed to catapult the country to the rank among the richest countries by the twenty-first
century. It concentrated on several large-scale efforts, such as electric cars and HDTV, but
attained only marginal results.
 P a g e | 21

 Contributions of south koreas industry in countries economy:

South Korea's agriculture contributes only 3 percent of the nation's total GDP in 2010, and
employs 7.3 percent of the country's workforce. The agriculture in South Korea has shrunk
significantly as the nation moves towards the urbanization and industrialization of the economy.
Back in 1987, agricultural made up 12.3 percent of the nation's total GDP, and employs 21
percent of the workforce.

The industry of South Korea contributes 39.4 percent of the country's GDP in 2010. The
industry and manufacturing industries are the major growth engine for South Korea during its
economic progress in the 1980s. South Korea's largest industries are electronics, automobiles,
telecommunication and shipbuilding.

Electronics boosted the South Korean economy in the 1980s, by becoming the world's sixth
largest manufacturer of electronic goods such as color televisions, microwave ovens, radio,
watches and personal computers. . South Korea is also a major manufacturer of semiconductors,
with Samsung Electronics and Hynix Semiconductor the global leaders in the production of
memory chips.

The automotive industry also plays a major role in the South Korean economy today. It has
grown into one of world's largest automobile producers, coming in 5th after the United States
and Germany, with an estimate of 4.27 million automobile produced a year. Some of South
Korea's international automobile brands include Hyundai, Kia and Renault.

From a slow start of two million subscribers to a current high of 40 million, mobile telephone is
the fastest growing area in telecom, going beyond the 20 million fixed lines serving a 40 million-
strong population.

Today, South Korea also has the highest number of broadband users in the world. The
presence of one of the fastest broadband networks in the world also permits e-commerce to grow.

South Korea is a global player in the production of ships, with a 50.6 percent share of the
global shipbuilding market in 2008. Four of the world's largest shipbuilding companies are from
South Korea: Hyundai Heavy Industries, Samsung Heavy Industries, Daewoo Shipbuilding &
Marine Engineering and STX Offshore & Shipbuilding. Europe's largest shipbuilder, STX
Europe, is also owned by South Korea.
 
Services in South Korea contributes 57.6 percent of the nation's total GDP, and employs
68.4 percent of the workforce. The government shifts its focus from manufacturing to services in
2009, and experts predict that the services will be the driving force of South Korea's economy for
the next few years, as current productivity level is just at 58 percent of that in manufacturing.
 P a g e | 22

 The overall Role of Government in Economic Development

as industrial development:
The main mechanism for economic development was government-led industrialization.
Realizing the fact that south Korea is a country of rare natural resources and abundant
educated manpower, the newly-installed military government, led by President Park
Chung-hee, pursued a labour-intensive and export-oriented industrialization. For this,
the government allowed labour exploitation by banning labour unions, encouraged
production of consumer goods, and built infrastructure, such as highways. Despite
strong oppositions, President Park dictated an industrial policy to strategically develop
heavy and chemical industries in the1970s (Ha 2006, 35).The type of authoritarian
leadership is often acknowledged as a key driving factor in Korea’s economic
development. President Park not only quelled opposition voices, he also successfully
mobilized public support for the drive of export strategy or economic growth. In recent
years, many comparative studies on East Asian development list the Confucian tradition
as one of the key elements in the economic miracle. It includes various factors i.e.
centralized authoritarian bureaucracy, Emphasis on worldly success, High valuation of
learning, A universal principle in recruiting government officials, These cultural elements
still prevail in Korean Society and guide the behaviour of Korean people.

Chaebols played a key role in the building of heavy industries such as car
manufacturing and shipbuilding, in export promotion, and in the creation of jobs. On the
other hand, their expansionist, nepotistic, and monopolistic management stifled the
nurturing of professional managers, the growth of small- and medium-sized enterprises,
and the equitable distributionof wealth. The military government in the 1960s was
strongly driven by growth target. The government set the goal of attaining 7.1 percent of
annual growth rate for the First Five-Year Plan (hereafter the First Plan). When the
military government, therefore, set the goal of 7.1percent, with minus growth for 1961
anticipated, it was to show its strong willingness to development .

In light industry, the most important task was to secure a market to sell goods .The early
military government tried to solve the problem of limited market by expanding the
domestic market and accordingly put great emphasis on agricultural development. That
is, it planned the growth of light industry in the cycle of "growth of agricultural
productivity. It also increased farmers' income-and expanded the domestic market as
well as the growth of light industry"(EPB 1962, p. 15). However, it was the growth policy
of heavy chemical industry that the military government valued most. The military
 P a g e | 23

government based the growth of light industry on "the principles of free companies to
respect the freedom and creativity of private companies" and "directly intervened in
heavy chemical industry or indirectly induced it". These are those role.

 Conclusion:
In South Korea there is a high level of credibility and trust in government. The
relationship between the public sector and the large Korean enterprises is very close.
The unique Asian variety of capitalism is mostly linked with the industrial policy debate
where the government plays an active and paternal role in guiding the economy and
society. This paper tries to explore the development strategies and economic policies
adopted by the government of South Korea to ignite change in industrial sector. The
unique Asian variety of capitalism, particularly in East Asia, is mostly linked with the
industrial policy debate where governments are called to pay a supportive and paternal
role in guiding the economy and society in general.

South Korean state’s contributions in industrial sector is seen everywhere of the

countries development .
 P a g e | 24

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