Doctrine of Colourable Legislation

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DOCTRINE OF COLOURABLE LEGISLATION AND THE

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF CENTRAL INVESTIGATIVE


AGENCIES

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................................2
RESEARCH QUESTION...............................................................................................................2
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY....................................................................................................3
DOCTRINE OF COLOURABLE LEGISLATION: AN ANALYSIS...........................................3
DOCTRINE OF COLOURABLE LEGISLATION IN INDIAN COURTS...................................5
APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE IN SEVERAL OTHER COUNTRIES.......................10
DOCTRINE OF COLOURABLE LEGISLATION AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES ESTABLISHED BY THE UNION...........................................12
ARGUMENT AGAINST INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES BY UNION.....................................14
CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................17
INTRODUCTION

Federalism is an essential feature of the Indian Constitution. It has been envisaged in Article 1 of
the Constitution as follows-

“(1) India that is Bharat shall be a union of States.1”

Federalism refers to a system where there is division of power among the Union and the States.

Article 246 of the Constitution lays down the division between the Centre and State as to law
making powers. Further the seventh schedule of the Constitution demarcates the different
legislative subjects that the States and the Centre can legislate upon. It clearly divides the law
making powers of the Centre and State into three lists namely Union in List I, State under List II
and Concurrent list under List III. .

The doctrine of separation of powers further divides power in the polity into the three organs of
state, namely- legislative, executive and judiciary. Often the three organs trespass into each
other’s domains. Sometimes the legislature can interfere into the other components where its
jurisdiction does not belong. This attracts the ‘Doctrine of Colourable legislation.’ It has been
evolved to aid the Courts in interpreting constitutional norms and provisions.

The interpretation of statutes gains huge significance because of the role that the doctrine of
colourable legislation has to play. It is because of this that the legislature does not need to
interfere in matters which are beyond their competence and ambit. This particular paper is an
analysis of how the doctrine is of great significance both in Indian and foreign jurisprudence as
well as this particular paper is an attempt at a wholesome take on the doctrine. This paper also is
an attempt to analyze the justifiability of the centralization of investigative powers by the Union.

RESEARCH QUESTION

 How Is the Doctrine of Colourable Legislation practically applicable through judicial


precedents?
 How is the application of the Doctrine of Colourable Legislation in India, different from
foreign jurisdictions?

1
Art. 1(1), INDIA CONST.
 How is the doctrine applicable on the increasing centralization of investigative powers in
India?

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Doctrinal method was opted in order to conduct the research for the topic. Several books and
online sources were referred while making this paper.
DOCTRINE OF COLOURABLE LEGISLATION: AN ANALYSIS

SCHEME OF DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS

India, in its Constitution envisages a federal structure. Article 1 of the Constitution clearly
declares that India is a federation of States. The Federation has clear cut division of powers and
functions. This Federation is however not like the American federation, there is no concept of
dual citizenship and States do not draft separate Constitutions. There are three part organs
namely- Legislative, Executive and Judiciary.

Under the Indian Constitution, there is a two-fold distribution of legislative powers, i.e in regards
to territory and in regards to subject matter.

As far as subject matter is considered, there has been a three-fold distribution of legislative
powers. There has been three lists, namely, Union List, State List and Concurrent List. In the
Constitution, Article 245-254 describes the distribution of powers between Centre and State.
Article 2462, more importantly, lays down this division of legislative extent.

It is in context of broad interpretation of Article 246 of the Constitution that when legislative
exercise of power and its competence comes into question, the doctrine of colourable legislation
is applied by the Courts.3

LIMITATIONS ON LEGISLATION VIS A VIS COLOURABLE LEGISLATION

Although the Indian Constitution envisages a separation of powers between the three organs, it is
not as rigid as it is in the American Constitution. Still there exists a provision of limitation on the

2
Art. 246, INDIA CONST.
3
Id.
power of Legislation if it exceed its jurisdiction and powers. For the doctrine of colourable
legislation to be applied, there can be four situations where it can be attracted-

1. The Constitution envisages the doctrine of separation in its structure. There are various
provisions in the Constitution that mandate the separation of powers, eg Article 246. Therefore,
hen in the guise of legislative functions, the Legislature seeks to exercise judicial functions, the
same shall be struck down attracting the doctrine of colourable legislations.
2. Many a times, the Constitution may impose a limitation on Legislature by way of a Bill or
Charter of Fundamental Rights. When the Legislature encroaches upon these rights under the
garb of exercising its functions, it shall be addressed by the doctrine of colourable legislation.
3. In case of federal division of powers and function, if one organ, in a covert/secretive manner
attempts to encroach upon the “subject whose exclusive legislative competence” belongs to
other, in those cases, the doctrine is attracted.
4. In addition, when the Legislature attempts to overstep its functions in the garb of ancillary
powers, such cases can attract the provisions of the colourable legislation4.

DOCTRINE OF COLOURABLE LEGISLATION IN INDIAN COURTS

The doctrine of colourable legislation has evolved in the Indian landscape with the help of
different interpretations in case-laws. The origin of the doctrine in India can be traced to its
colonial history. The provincial units were given powers of limited self-governance, however
they were kept on the strict watch of the powerful Centre. Whenever the conflict of legislative
power arose, the Courts adopted the doctrine of colourable legislation was put to application.5.

Post-independence, the Judiciary has taken inspiration from Canadian and Australian
legislations to deal with the topic. These two jurisdictions do not envisage a Bill of Rights in
their respective Constitutions, hence the Courts have time and again interpreted the exercise of
legislative powers under this doctrine.

In Article 245, clear demarcation and extent of powers and functions of the State and Union
Legislature6. It mentions that the powers of Parliament and the State Legislatures are “subject to

4
Id.
5
The Wire, Article 370: What the SC Will Have to Consider While Examining the Centre's Move, THEWIRE,(Feb, 5,
2021) , https://thewire.in/law/supreme-court-article-370-doctrine-of-colourable-legislation.
6
Art. 245 INDIA CONST.
the provision of the Constitution.7” The same applies to Article 246, the laws made by the state
and Union Parliament are subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Limitation on the powers,
thus is imposed by the Constitution and not by any other contractual obligation undertaken by
the Government or devolving on the Government thereof8.

The doctrine of colourable legislation is only concerned with the question of legislative
competence. The simple fact that a legislation adopts an indirect method to achieve certain
objects, does not make the legislative exercise futile. As long as the legislative exercise falls
within the ambit of its competence, it does not attract the doctrine. The legislative intent is
immaterial to the application of the doctrine.

The doctrine has been employed on various counts by the Courts to solve the menace created by
the Zamindari Abolition Acts that were adopted by various States.For examples, two provision
of the Bihar land Reforms Act, 1950 in the name of colourable legislation9.

CASE LAWS

 Ameerunnissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum10

An appeal was filed before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutional validity of the
Walioudowlah Succession Act, 1950. The legislation was enacted to deal with the succession of
the personal estate of the Nawab of Hyderabad. Succession of property was to be made with
respect to his three wives: Mehboob Begum, Kadrian Begum and AmeerunnissaBegum. Under
the succession act only two of the windows were successful heirs to his property whereas
Mehboob Begum did not get any part of the Nawab's property. Later when the Constitution of
India came into force the act was challenged in the Supreme Court on grounds of article 14 of the
Constitution. The Honourable Supreme Court had to decide whether there was any legally
binding relation between the respondents and the Late Nawab. “The Supreme Court also had to
look into the matter whether the Succession Act came with direct conflict with the Fundamental
Rights” guaranteed under part III of the constitution of India.

7
AIR 1955 SC 540 (547).
8
AIR 1995 SC 540 (548).
9
State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, 1952 1 SCR 889.
10
Ameerunnissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum AIR 1953 SC 91.
“The respondents drew attention to the private Acts of the British parliament which allowed for
succession of property” and other subjects that were legislatable in the British Parliament. The
Apex Court in this regard held that:

“The analogy of Private Acts of the British Parliament...is not at all helpful. The British
Parliament enjoys legislative omnipotence and there are no constitutional limitations on its
authority or power11”

In this case, the Supreme Court clearly laid down that legislative pieces having the effect of
judicial powers were inoperative in India.

 Ram Prasad v. State of Bihar12-

In this case the validity of the Bihar Sathi land Restoration Act of 1950 was questioned. The Act
was passed by the Working Committee of the Congress. A piece of legislation cancelled all the
settlements made in favour of a person who was involved in the legislation and was held by the
State to be under the administration of the Court of Wards. One of the judge questioned the
competence of the Act and held it was more in the nature of a decree rather than a legislative
piece.

One of the judges opined that the art was in the nature of a dispute between two private parties
and the matter of determination of settlement had to be within the jurisdiction of the courts. The
Bihar Sathi Settlement Act took away the right of the people to approach the court and it also
took away their right to legal remedy. Such an encroachment of legislative activities upon
judicial functions was held as invalid.

The Supreme Court struck down the Act as it was discriminatory in nature and violated Article
14 of the Constitution of India.

 Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills v. Broach Borough Municipality13

The Court had to decide whether the legislative action to declare a thing/action as legal which
was earlier declared by the Courts as illegal was just or not, In this case, the court opined that if

11
Id.
12
Ram.Prasad v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1952 SC 215.
13
AIR 1970 SC 192.
the grounds on which the decision was made illegal are successfully resolved then such a
legislative action would be a fair exercise of legislative power.

 Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad v. New Shrock Spinning and Weaving Co Limited14

In this Act, the Supreme Court struck down certain provisions of the Gujarat (Amendment and
Validating Provisions) Ordinance, 1969. The concerned section authorized the Corporation to
dispose-off the refund of illegally collected tax “until the reassessment and determination of tax
notwithstanding any Court judgment.”

The provision was struck down as it mandated blatant disregard to the judicial setup of the
country.

Excerpts from the judgment-

“Prima facie, the provision appears to order the Company to refuse, notwithstanding the orders
of this Court and the High Court, to refund the sum unlawfully obtained. In implementing this
provision, the state of Gujarat was not well informed. The provision aims to explicitly penetrate
the judicial forces of the State. Under our Constitution, legislatures have the right, under the
specified limits, to make laws both prospectively and retrospectively. The legislature can, by
exercising certain powers, delete the foundation of a decision made by a competent judge,
making that decision ineffective. Yet no government in this country has the authority to ask the
State to disobey or ignore the judgment of the judiciary. 15".

Here the important point to be noted is that it is not the exercise of legislative function alone
which made the Act/provisions ultra-vires, but rather the inability and the short-sightedness of
the law-makers to amend the mistakes in the previous impugned judgement. If the contention
that arose in the case law had been solved, then the legislation was binding. However, simply
passing a judgement to over-rule a judgement is blatant disregard of the Judiciary and Article
141 of the Constitution. Such trespass to judicial sphere was an example of colourable legislation
made.

14
Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad v. New Shrock Spinning and Weaving Co Limited, A.I.R. 1970 SC 1292.
15
Id.
APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE IN SEVERAL OTHER COUNTRIES

AUSTRALIA

Whenever there is a place for constitutional prohibition, this particular doctrine finds its way in.
In R v. Barger,16 it was used when the Parliament was ordered to follow the policy of not being
discriminatory while laying down monetary assistance and the same has been given in their
Constitution.

USA

Because of the federal structure, the legislature of USA can only pass laws as per their own
prescribed limits and cannot encroach upon subjects which are not within its ambit.17

CANADA

It is prohibited for the Canadian Parliament to join any of the groups listed under S. 92 under the
pretence of any criminal law being enacted contrary to S.  91 (27).18 The common law systems
give rise to this particular doctrine and vice versa. Under Canadian federalism, the doctrine of
colourability is the principle that when the government wishes to do something that it cannot do
under the limits of the constitution, it paints the legislation with replacement intent that will also
allows it to fulfil its original aim. In some legal rulings, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled an act
colourably constitutional in this way.19

Australia and Canada are both different in their ways of analysing the doctrine. The
jurisprudence of Australia states that a law can be invalid due to the underlying effect that it
deems to render. The courts in the process have taken into account the powers and duties that the
parliament exerts. Consequently, a law in the Australia would be deemed fit and upheld
irrespective of the consequence it holds in gravity in regards to its effect on the subject matter. 20
16
R. v Barger, (1908) 6 CLR41 ¶ ¶ 75, 118.
17
M’Culloch v Maryland, 1819 4 Wh. 316 (423).
18
A.G. for Ontario v Reciprocal Insurers, 1924 AC 328 (343).
19
Id.
20
Fairfax v Commissioner of Taxation, (1965) 114 CLR 1.
While on the other hand, the Indian and Canadian jurisprudence can be considered to be
analogous in nature.21

The difference in the federal structure is what makes the difference in the applicability of the
doctrine in several countries quite evident. India and Canada are countries which follow a double
enumeration of the powers of the federation and its constituent units. Countries with single
enumeration power structure like Australia, on the other hand have a very subjective approach
which is certainly not needed.22 The exogenous response to the intent and impact review means
that the operation of forces from one list does not invade the latter list, which would make the
difference unnecessary. The Indian jurist and scholar, D.D., Basu, varies from the above view. It
is incomprehensible, according to him, as to why the extrinsic method cannot be used in a single
enumeration model in a nation. In such a structure, this standard would be that the legislature can
not infringe on the notionally reserved powers of the legislatures of the units with a collection of
powers specified. Since the judicial conceptions are different in several countries, the disparity
continues to grow and subsequently increase.23

DOCTRINE OF COLOURABLE LEGISLATION AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF


THE INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES ESTABLISHED BY THE UNION

A number of constitutional issues, involving considerable significance to the federal structure of


India has been raised because of the increase in the investigative agencies at the central level.
This includes the likes of Narcotic Control Bureau (NCB), Central Bureau of Investigation
(CBI), National Investigative Agency (NIA). The above sated question owes its credit to the
judgement of the division bench24 of Guwahati High Court in 2013 where the constitutionality of
the Central Bureau of Investigation was discussed.

The High Court declared CBI as unconstitutional in this judgement which has some serious
consequences like the CBI can no more arrest people anymore and the cases which are on trails
in the CBI courts will not have any legal standing, further to this on being declared

21
K.T. Moopil Nayar v State of Kerala, AIR 1961 SC 552.
22
D.D. BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA,( Lexis Nexis, Vol. XI, 9th Edition, 2014, page 8682).
23
Id.
24
Narendra Kumar v. Union of India &Ors. W.P (C) No. 6877 of 2005.
unconstitutional, a number of accused persons also filed for acquittal and disposal of their case
because of which in order to get a stay government hurried to the Supreme Court.

However, on the other hand, another fact which is of significant importance is also
acknowledged by the SC on number of instances. Special police establishment and CBI are also
used interchangeably by the SC on various occasions. In State of West Bengal v. committee for
protection of democratic rights25 the very issue framed by the court was the acknowledgement of
this simple fact that the CBI is created in compliance of an Act.

Further, the court used the terms CBI and special police establishment interchangeably in
Kazilhendhup Dorji v. Central Bureau of Investigation 26 on a number of occasions, which clearly
indicates towards the fact that there is no distinction between the CBI and special police
establishment. Also, the case of Vineet Narain and ors v. Union of India27, should also be taken
into consideration as the SC explicitly said in the case that CBI is established under the Special
police establishment act and also used both interchangeably.

Another important thing to note here is that, taking the objective of the said Act into
consideration, that to extend it to other areas, and therefore by the 80 of the Union List, it is
again quite qualified to extend the functioning of the police to the specific region into
consideration to any other jurisdiction, if prior consent of the state is already been obtained.

Further, the use of the term state does not only mean State but the Union territories as well,
which is stated in the case of Management of Advance Insurance Co Ltd v Shri
Gurudasmal&Ors28, where the special police establishment act was held constitutionally valid by
the SC.

Therefore, from the above-mentioned it can be said conclusively that by virtue of the entry 80 of
the Union list of the seventh schedule police force established by the central government in
pursuant to Article 245 r/w 246(4) can be extended to differed states as well after the consent is
obtained from the concerned state.

25
State of West Bengal &Ors v Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights [2010] SCC 571 SC.
26
KaziLhendupDorji v Central Bureau of Investigation [1994] SCC 116 SC.
27
Vineet Narain&Ors v Union of India [1997] SCC 226 SC.
28
Management of Advance Insurance Co Ltd v Shri Gurudasmal& Ors [1970] AIR 1126 SC.
On the grounds of Section 5 and 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, and only
since 'the police' is strictly within the statutory domain of the State as per the entry 2 of state list,
this permission is required from the concerned states. If the situation would not been the same
and there is no requirement of prior consent from the concerned state, the Union would definitely
have transgressed and interfered with the right of the state to legislate exclusively upon the
matters of the state list. But the situation is not like this and so the Union cannot expand the
investigation of the CBI without the prior approval of the state.

While enacting the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act due diligence is shown by the
parliament evident from the crucial and essential portion of the consent. It is mandatory under
the section 6 that prior consent from the state government should be given so as to enable the
CBI to investigate into a crime committed under the jurisdiction of that particular state.

Just because of the mere reason that some of the powers and functions of the state police is
overlapped by the CBI it does not mean at all that it is without any sort of competence, further it
also has the clause of consent and therefore by any means it should not in a way encroach upon
the powers of state to legislate upon the matters of the state list.

Further, in Bhavesh Jayanti Lakhani v. State of Maharashtra29, the SC stated that CBI is
established under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act and an officer of CBI serves as an
investigating officer. Further the SC ruled that FIR’s to be lodged necessarily for the purpose
and therefore for the required there is a special person in a police station called an officer in
charge in pursuant to the section 154 of Criminal procedure code. The court also said that the SP,
CBI is an officer which is specifically entitled to carry out the investigation.

And therefore, it can be said conclusively that it does not cross any boundary established and
defined by the seventh schedule of the Constitution, the most important thing is that the CBI
cannot investigate in case until and unless it has obtained a prior approval from the concerned
state as per the Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act.

This sums up some of the best points in support of the CBI. That being said, the writer is of
the humble opinion that the establishment and authority of the investigating agencies have gone

29
Bhavesh Jayanti Lakhani v State of Maharshtra [2009] SCC 551 SC.
beyond the limits which our Constituent Assembly meant to give them, in compliance with entry
8 of the union list of the Constitution. The reasons for such an opinion were given below.

ARGUMENT AGAINST INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES BY UNION

AGAINST ARTICLE 21

Not created by ‘law’

The Indian Constitution forbids and restricts the state from depriving any person his life and
liberty except if the restriction is as per the ‘procedure established in law’. Article 21 of the
Indian Constitution has provision for this. However, what if state undertakes any act not
warranted by the legislature neither in exercise of valid executive power and that act violates and
infringes the provisions of Article 21? This is the issue precisely.

As per Article 21, the description of the term ‘law’ could be understood to be an enactment by
the Parliament or any state legislature or can also include a legislation backed executive order.
Any resolution which could be considered to be an executive act cannot be considered as a
procedure established by law and therefore cannot be considered to be violating the provisions of
Article 21. In the landmark judgements of BishambharDayal Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P.
and State of M.P v. Thakur Bharat Singh, it was held that an executive action without the
backing of a legislation violating the fundamental rights is also unconstitutional,

Cannot be Derived from DSPE Act

The CBI claims that it is a body established under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act,
1946.A simple read to the required resolution implies that it cannot be considered as a delegated
legislation under the statute of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act. It also cannot be
established from the resolution neither it is provided in section 2 of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act. Thus, it can be understood that it is not a statutory body. As per section 2 of
the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, the Delhi Special Police Establishment is a statutory
authority and not the CBI.

Apart from this, it also to be noted that the Union government never stated that the resolution is
issued in regard to the provisions of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act as it does not
mention the source of the backing of the resolution. Several judgements of the Higher courts
have held that any executive action which lacks a statutory backing cannot go against the
provisions of Article 21.

‘INVESTIGATION’ UNDER ENTRY 8 OF SCHEDULE 1

Interpretation in A.P. McDowell

As per the landmark judgement of the State of AP v. McDowell30, if a specific matter is under the
exclusive jurisdiction and competence ofthe state legislature i.e., it falls under the List I of the
Seventh Schedule and therefore the union cannot legislate on these issues. Since, there is no legal
source from which the CBI is derived, at the most it could be considered to be a subject under
Entry 8 of List I under the constitution. However, ‘investigation’ Entry 8 List I is distinct from
the definition of ‘investigation’ under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 under section 2(h).

Interpretation in Constitutional Assembly Debate

It can be lucidly understood from the debates of the constituent assembly 31 intended that the term
‘investigation’ by any central government agency would mean the gathering of intelligence and
perform enquiry and not include the investigation performed by a police officer which includes
the procedure for FIR, arresting any required suspect, preparing and filing charge sheet, etc.
which is exclusively attributed to the duties of police and are covered under the subjects under
Entry II List II. As stated by Hon’ble Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the term investigation here does not
extend to the extent of investigating crime because that would be covered by the Code of

30
State of Andhra Pradesh vs McDowell, 1996 AIR 1627 SC.
31
Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IX, 29th August 1949.
Criminal Procedure and it provides police to perform such duty and as far as Police is concerned,
it is only under State list.

The term investigation thus, is to be considered to extend to only general enquiry to just
understand about the situation of the matter. The investigation concerned is not related to
investigation for filing charges against the accused as this duty is only provided to a police
officer under the Code of Criminal Procedure32. Therefore, it can be understood that there is a
great distinction between the investigation of CBI under List I Entry 8 and the investigation of
Police under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Executive Actions Cannot Perform Function of Legislative

It is further understood that in the case of Dr.Wadhva v. State of Bihar33, it was stated that the
functions of a legislature cannot be taken away by executive. Thus, a law therefore would be
executive made and not legislature made which would be contrary to provisions of the
constitution. Even in the case of Chief settlement commissioner v. Om Prakash34, it was stated
that the executive needs to exercise power so as to fills gaps in laws and not make laws and work
as a law-making body. If this is allowed, then the people would be governed by the laws of
executive and not legislature which would be against the spirit of democracy and would give rise
to an autocratic rule. So, an executive action without the backing of a statute cannot be regarded
as a law as per Article 13(3) and Article 21 of the constitution.

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

The Constitution holds the Supreme authority. The body and soul of the Constitution have been
written and envisaged by the fore-fathers of a constitution to be active, evolving and liberal. It is
not a static piece. Therefore when the constitution is interpreted by the judges, a liberal
interpretation is expected. To bring in fresh air as well as to maintain authority and supremacy of
the Constitution, various constitutional doctrines have been developed. These doctrines have
time and again have helped the preserve the character of the constitution with the evolving times.

It is vital to determine the scope and limitations of the application of the doctrine of colourable
legislation. The application of this doctrine has certain limitations that is looked at by the
32
Constitution of India, Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Proceedings) – Volume IX.
33
Dr. D.C. Wadhva&Ors. Vs. State of Bihar &Ors., 1987 AIR 579 SC.
34
Chief Settlement Commissioner, Rehabilitation Department of Punjab v. Om Prakash &Ors. 1969 AIR 33 SC.
Judiciary. When the legislation is in pith and substance within the scope of its legislative field,
then the doctrine cannot be applied. Similarly, the intention of the legislation while exercising
law-making function is futile for purposes of application of the doctrine of colourable legislation.
If the legislative power is only in excess in exercise of ancillary and incidental matters, then too,
the doctrine cannot be attracted. The doctrine is only applicable when it is reasonable ascertained
that the legislature attempts to do something which it is not authorised to do.

One such dynamic challenge that has emerged in the midst of the centralizing phenomenon in
India in regards to the doctrine is the flourishing of investigation agencies. Most of these
organisations, especially the CBI, have become profoundly ingrained in the scheme. The bottom
line, though, is that their constitutional legitimacy remains questionable. 'Investigation' is a
power that must come in the exclusive control of state powers and it is important to foil the
Centre's efforts to usurp the same with a colourful exercise of legislative power. It is important
that this invasion be taken down by the Supreme Court with a strong fist. Otherwise, with such
colorful rules, the federal system that is still biased in favor of the Center would just diminish
further.

In order to preserve the federal structure of India, it is imperative that any transgression of
powers and exercise of functions should be clean leave observed and corrected. The doctrine of
colourable legislation plays a key role in this regard. Despite having its limitations as discussed
in the above section, it plays a pivotal role in preserving the democracy of India. It helps in
interpreting an essential quality of the sovereignty of India and preserving its vitality and
essence.

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