CCDP - Working - Paper - 4-1 A
CCDP - Working - Paper - 4-1 A
CCDP - Working - Paper - 4-1 A
Contents
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Acknowledgements ................................................................................... 4
I. Introduction ...................................................................................... 5
V. Background Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
The project’s methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Summary of main findings along functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Summary of main findings according to context variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Further Readings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6
Executive Summary
The project began by developing a comprehensive framework through which the relevance
and effectiveness of the role of civil society in peacebuilding could be more fully analyzed.
This framework, derived from democracy, development and peacebuilding theory, outlined
seven possible functions to be played by civil society within various stages of conflict. These
functions are: protection, monitoring, advocacy, socialization, social cohesion, facilitation,
and service delivery.
Through the comparative study of thirteen case studies, this project analyzed the
performance of civil society in regards to the above functions within situations of both
war and armed conflict. It also looked at the potential and actual role of civil society when
a window of opportunity appears for peace negotiations, and when large-scale violence
has ended.
The project found that civil society can play an important supportive role, though the
impetus for peacebuilding comes in most cases from political actors and the conflict parties
themselves. The findings of the research project demonstrate that the relevance of the
seven civil society functions varied tremendously during different phases of conflict.
However, activities of high relevance, such as protection during wars, were not necessarily
equally implemented by civil society organizations. The effectiveness of activities also
varied substantially. Overall, protection, monitoring, advocacy and facilitation related
activities were of higher effectiveness, whereas socialization and social cohesion related
activities were of low effectiveness across all cases. This finding stands in stark contrast
to the actual implementation and funding level of these activities.
The project also found that there is a significant importance in recognizing other contextual
factors that may limit or strengthen civil society’s ability to fulfil a peacebuilding role.
Important contextual factors include: the behaviour of the state, the level of violence, the
role of the media, the composition of civil society, and the involvement of external political
actors and donors.
From a policy perspective, this research distils three main implications: for every country
of engagement, it is crucial to pay attention to the relevant functions for peacebuilding
during the respective phase of conflict, to strengthen their effectiveness, and to also address
important context factors.
The findings presented in this paper represent a first step in creating a more substantive
knowledge base of how civil society can most effectively work for peacebuilding and be
supported in order to increase its contribution. The project hopes to further stimulate
reflection on civil society and peacebuilding amongst both academics and practitioners.
Keith Krause
Director, CCDP
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the following people for their very helpful comments: Günther
Bächler, Trond Botnen, Gilles Carbonnier, Esra Cuhadar Gürkaynak, Veronique
Dudouet, Ivar Evensmo, Martina Fischer, Jon Hanssen-Bauer, Ulrike Hopp, Stein Erik
Horjen, Cristina Hoyos, Darren Kew, Jost Pachaly and Roland Salvisberg. Special thanks to
Christoph Spurk for his in-depth comments and fruitful discussions. I would also like to
thank John Darby and Siegmar Schmidt for their overall advice, Oliver Jütersonke for his
support, and Mariya Nikolova, Meghan Pritchard, and Daniel Paffenholz for their assistance
with the project. Sincere thanks go as well to all involved researchers and partner
institutions, and to the following organizations for their financial support: the Norwegian
Foreign Ministry, the Swiss Development Cooperation, the World Bank’s Social
Development Department, the German Ministry of Development and Cooperation and
the German Technical Cooperation, the Scientific and Technological Research Council
of Turkey, and the International Studies Association.
I. Introduction
With the proliferation of armed conflicts in the 1990s, and the rising complexity of
peacebuilding efforts confronting the international community, the attention of donors and
peacebuilding practitioners has increasingly turned to the potential role to be played by civil
society. Although there has been a massive rise in peacebuilding initiatives aimed at
strengthening civil society, these initiatives have not been accompanied by a systematic
research agenda. As a result, we have known little about the role of civil society in
peacebuilding, including its potential contribution to reducing violence, ending armed
conflict and building a sustainable peace thereafter.
To address this knowledge gap, a three-year comparative research project entitled “Civil
Society and Peacebuilding” has analyzed these pertinent questions. The project developed
a comprehensive framework to analyze the relevance and effectiveness of the role of civil
society in peacebuilding within different phases of conflict. Research was undertaken across
thirteen countries. The framework is largely structured around seven potential functions
of civil society in peacebuilding as presented in figure 1 below.
6. Facilitation of dialogue on the local and national level between all sorts of actors;
7. Service delivery to create entry points for peacebuilding, i.e. for the
six above functions.
The following paper presents the main results and discusses the three most pertinent
policy implications to be distilled from this project. Additional information about the
project is presented in the background section of this report. The complete results,
including the theoretical and empirical background of this project, are presented in a book:
Thania Paffenholz (ed.), Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment. Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009.
7. Context matters
The context of each case strongly influences the space for civil society to act and thus
strengthens or limits its overall effectiveness. The main contextual factors to be considered
are: the behavior of the state; the level of violence; the role of the media; the behavior and
composition of civil society itself (including diaspora organizations); and the influence of
external political actors and donors.
1. The focus of attention and support should be directed towards the most relevant
functions of civil society, given the respective phase of conflict;
2. The effectiveness of these relevant functions should be strengthened;
3. Equal attention should also be paid to the contextual dynamics that can impact the role
played by civil society.
Given the general results, the first policy implication is to implement and support those
functions that are particularly relevant to a specific phase of a conflict. The next four figures
below show the changing relevance of the functions in reference to the four analyzed
phases of conflict.
a. During phases of war, the space for civil society to act is reduced drastically. The main
goal during this phase is to lessen violence. Civil society can monitor human rights
violations, advocate and facilitate a dialogue for the protection of civilians, and ultimately
protect people from suffering due to the war. As such, the functions of protection,
monitoring, advocacy and facilitation are of particular relevance within this phase. Service
delivery can also be of high relevance, when used as an entry point for the functions
mentioned above. Thus, aid projects can also use their presence in a conflict zone to protect
people by performing monitoring functions and informing other organizations about the
situation, or else by engaging in direct protection measures.
Phase of Conflict
War
Activity
Level
High
Facilitation
Advocacy
tion
tr ibu
l dis
Medium
ti ma
op
Protection
Socialization
Monitoring
Social
Cohesion
Service
Low Delivery
Relevance
b. During phases of armed conflict, (understood as generally having a lower level of violence
compared to phases of war), the relevance of certain functions over others is much the
same as during phases of war. The difference between the two phases is mainly seen with
the increased relevance of the socialization and social cohesion functions. Initiatives to
socialize people towards peace values – such as peace education or reconciliation and
dialogue efforts – are not relevant during war. They cannot contribute to violence reduction
at this stage because their long-term goal of changing certain behaviors does not work in a
climate of hatred and violence. However, these initiatives may become slightly more
relevant during armed conflict, if they are accompanied by a low level of violence and
facilitated by the general situation in the country. Thus, in certain cases of armed conflict,
the relevance of these two functions can be slightly higher than during war.
Phase of Conflict
Armed Conflict
Activity
Level
High
Facilitation
Advocacy
tion
tr ibu
l dis
Medium
ti ma
op
Socialization Protection
Social
Cohesion Monitoring
Service
Low Delivery
Relevance
Interestingly, in the thirteen cases we have studied, we found that the actual level of civil
society activity did not match their respective relevance. Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate this:
while protection, monitoring, and service delivery were of high relevance, they were not
adequately taking place in the analyzed case studies. The situation was slightly better for
facilitation and advocacy, whereas many social cohesion and socialization activities were
often conducted by civil society, despite their lower relevance in most situations of armed
conflict and war.
During war and armed conflict, there should be more initiatives developed that aim
at providing protection, i.e. direct protection, monitoring of human rights violations,
advocacy for and facilitation of protection initiatives. Aid projects in war zones should
also systematically integrate this goal.
c. During a window of opportunity for peace negotiation, civil society can take up very
important – and in some instances – crucial roles in facilitating the onset of negotiations, or
in advocating for the inclusion of pertinent issues into a peace agreement. While the
relevance of all other functions remains similar to the phases of conflict previously
outlined, the relevance of advocacy is higher in this particular phase.
W Mass mobilization in support for the agreement or for system change, often in the form
of large-scale street agitations, such as can be seen in the cases of Nepal, Northern
Ireland and Cyprus.
W Agenda setting through targeted advocacy campaigns for the inclusion of relevant issues
into the peace agreement as seen in Guatemala, Northern Ireland and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
The high relevance of advocacy often corresponds with the actual activity level within this
function, particularly in the cases mentioned above. Sometimes, however, this was not the
case. In Sri Lanka, for example, pro-negotiation peace groups were by far outnumbered by
pro-war groups.
In general, long-term social cohesion and socialization initiatives reached the highest
activity level during this phase. This spike in initiatives occurred especially in well-known
conflicts such as Israel/Palestine, Sri Lanka, Cyprus and Northern Ireland. The quantity of
activities, however, was often not matched with their actual relevance.
During a window of opportunity for peace negotiations, both mass mobilization and
targeted advocacy campaigns are important; facilitation is also quite relevant during
this period, whereas the functions of socialization and social cohesion are of less utility.
Phase of Conflict
Windows of Opportunity
Activity
Level
High
Socialization
Advocacy
Social
Cohesion Facilitation
tion
tr ibu
l dis
Medium
ti ma
op
Protection
Monitoring
Service
Low Delivery
Relevance
d. After large-scale violence comes to an end, the need for protection generally declines. It is
still important to account for context, however, because high levels of violence can continue
past the formal termination of hostilities, albeit often in other forms (such as increases in
crime or household violence). The role of civil society in monitoring continues to be
relevant, as does facilitation and service delivery. Once the war is over, social cohesion and
socialization increase in relevance as people are able to focus on issues other than their
immediate survival. At this point, it is most useful to begin initiatives that aim at rebuilding
After large scale violence has ended, monitoring, social cohesion and socialization are
needed. Facilitation continues to be relevant. Creating entry points for social cohesion
through aid programmes is of particularly high relevance.
Phase of Conflict
After large-scale Violence
Activity
Level
High
Socialization
on
uti Social
trib Cohesion
dis
Medium al
tim
op
Service
Delivery
Facilitation
Advocacy
Protection Monitoring
Low
Relevance
A sound assessment of conflict phases and the corresponding relevance of functions for civil
society is the starting point of any decision regarding the types of initiatives that should be
implemented or supported in peacebuilding. Thus, a systematic analysis is always required.
When used systematically as entry points for protection during armed conflicts and wars,
and when building social cohesion following large-scale violence, aid projects can also be
effective. These findings are especially true when compared to social cohesion projects with
direct peace or reconciliation goals. The activity level of service delivery projects aiming to
create entry points for other peacebuilding functions was, in fact, very low. Thus, a proper
assessment of the effectiveness of these activities was not possible. Figure 6 below outlines
these results and shows an estimate based on our existing samples.
Effectiveness Level
High
Advocacy
Protection Facilitation
Monitoring
Service
Delivery
Social
Low Cohesion
Socialization
When analyzing effectiveness, we found that the more successful initiatives within each
function showed common patterns. Hence, we could identify a number of factors important
for enhancing effectiveness overall. Below is a short presentation of our findings along
each function.
Protection: The effectiveness of protection initiatives can be enhanced when they are
systematically combined with monitoring activities and advocacy campaigns; equally
needed for effective protection is an integrated media outreach strategy and cooperation
with international networks.
Monitoring: The effectiveness of monitoring can be enhanced when activities are designed
to reinforce protection and advocacy initiatives. In addition, outreach to national and
international networks can also foster effectiveness. Monitoring should take place during all
phases of conflict, and additional monitoring activities should be organized around the
implementation of peace agreements.
Social cohesion: The precondition for the effectiveness of social cohesion initiatives is again
a low level, or an absence of, violence. The effectiveness of social cohesion increases when
initiatives aim at bringing people together for a common cause. Effective initiatives thereby
aim at behavioural, instead of attitudinal, change. Long-term systematic initiatives are more
effective than short-term sporadic events, especially when they focus on all cleavages and
also attempt to bridge difficult groups in society.
Facilitation: Local facilitation is performed at all times and does not necessarily need special
attention or support. This also seems to hold true for national facilitation by eminent civil
society groups. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of existing initiatives can be enhanced when
targeted – rather than general – training is provided. For example, targeted community
mediation training for refugee return in Bosnia was very effective, while general mediation
training given to a variety of groups proved to be ineffective. In general, people did not
know what do with the acquired knowledge.
Service delivery: Service delivery is only effective for peacebuilding when it creates entry
points for other functions. During war and armed conflict, aid projects often take place in
conflict-affected areas. The systematic use of such projects for additional protection
purposes can enhance their peacebuilding effectiveness. After large-scale violence ends or
during period of low levels of violence, aid projects can be very effective in creating
common platforms of cooperation and dialogue for adversarial groups.
The third policy implication to be distilled from this project is the importance of accounting
for the social, economic and political context in which civil society operates. Because
context potentially can severely limit the effectiveness of civil society activities, it is thus
important to counterbalance these factors in the following ways:
Reduce violence: Violence is the most important factor limiting the ability for civil society to
play a meaningful role in peacebuilding. The correlation is simple: the higher the level of
violence, the more that the space is reduced for civil society to act. As a consequence,
coherent policy and operational measures to reduce violence independently from civil
society initiatives need to be systematically explored.
Address the behavior of the state: Next to violence, the behavior of the state is also significant
to limiting the potential capacity of civil society. First, the behaviour of the state – and the
government in particular – can be a source of armed conflict. Second, the more repressive a
state is towards civil society actors, the more limited the space is for civil society to act;
third, the more that governance is democratic, the broader the space will be for civil society
to act; fourth, the more state institutions fulfil their traditional functions like protection and
service delivery, the more civil society can concentrate on other functions. Addressing the
state as an important actor through both policy dialogue and pressure should therefore be
part of a coherent strategy to facilitate the role of civil society in peacebuilding.
Work with the media: The mass media are among the opinion leaders within society.
Hence, they can tremendously strengthen or limit the role of civil society in peacebuilding.
Without positive media coverage, many civil society initiatives will receive significantly
lower public attention, and experience diminished chances of success. This is especially
true for protection, monitoring, advocacy and socialization functions. The media can
often play a destructive role due to biased reporting, leading some donors to only support
so-called “peace media”. Yet these outlets often have little impact, as their audience can
be very limited. Thus, it is important to include the mass media as part of any civil society
support strategy.
Pay attention to the composition of civil society: The composition and characteristics of civil
society also influence its effectiveness; the more civil society is polarized and dominated by
radical tendencies, the more difficult it becomes for civil society to contribute positively to
peacebuilding. A solid analysis of civil society groups, including diaspora organizations, is
therefore recommended prior to formulating a support strategy.
Provide sensitive funding: Funding enhances many initiatives and can contribute to the
professionalization of peacebuilding activities. Yet, funding has also contributed to the
“NGOization” of peace work, the reduction in voluntarism, and the shift of accountability
from local and national constituencies to international NGOs and donors. A sensitive
funding strategy is thus required, which enables peacebuilding initiatives, and limits any
negative consequences.
Because changing practice does not happen easily, the writing of this project report is meant
only an initial step. A more targeted and systematic initiative is needed in order to facilitate
an effective research-policy transfer for the benefit of civil society peacebuilding efforts.
Moreover, the findings of this research project has provided answers to many pertinent
questions but has also raised many new ones. Therefore, we see a need for further research
in the following areas:
V. Background Information
The project’s methodology
Understanding of key terms
Civil society is understood as including a wide range of actors from professional associations,
clubs, unions, faith-based organizations (such as churches or Islamic charities), non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as traditional and clan groups. Excluded groups
include the media, businesses, and political parties, with the exception of their associations.
Hence, we have applied a much broader understanding of civil society than is often used in
peacebuilding and development discourse, where civil society is mainly equated with NGOs.
The focus of analysis within the project is on local and national civil society groups. The
project has neither explicitly looked at global civil society campaigns, nor at international
NGOs or other civil society groups that are not part of the national or local arena. However,
it has explored the links between national civil society and its international partners.
Civil society peacebuilding is understood in the logic of the functional approach used by this
project. It is important to note that the analysis undertaken by this project was not limited
only to those civil society activities that were labeled “peacebuilding”; rather, a variety of
activities undertaken by civil society actors were explored that contributed directly or
indirectly to the overall goals of peacebuilding.
Process
In 2006, the first phase of the project developed an analytical framework of seven civil
society functions derived from democracy, development and peacebuilding theory and
practice, as well as from existing case study knowledge (for more information, see
Paffenholz & Spurk, Civil Society, Civic Engagement and Peacebuilding, the World Bank Social
Development Paper No. 100/2006 and Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction paper
No. 36/2006).
From 2007-2008, the second phase of the project began testing the framework in regards to
five cases: Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Cyprus, Nigeria, and Israel/Palestine. It looked
specifically at particular aspects of civil society and peacebuilding, including the media,
networks, gender, and youth. The framework was then enlarged and subjected to in-depth
country case study research in thirteen case studies. These case studies were: Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Northern Ireland, Nigeria, Somalia, DR Congo, Afghanistan, Israel/Palestine,
the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, Cyprus, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Guatemala and Tadzhikistan. The
final cases were selected on the basis of the availability of pre-existing substantive data sets.
If needed, the project provided a travel fund for additional field trips to collect missing data.
The cases represent a wide range of different types of conflict settings.
W The overall context of each case study, and the understanding of peacebuilding;
W The status and composition of civil society in each case;
W Other relevant factors such as the state, the media, and gender issues;
W The seven core functions of civil society in peacebuilding;
W The main supporting and limiting factors for civil society to fulfill these roles in each of
the case studies.
A number of workshops were also organized for all involved researchers and external
experts to discuss the analytical framework, the case studies and the conclusions. The entire
project was comprised of 30 researchers from 16 universities and research institutes,
4 external advisors/experts, and 22 external reviewers, as well as support staff. The project
was coordinated by Thania Paffenholz.
The results of the project are presented in the form of a book and this paper. They are
additionally being discussed within the community of peacebuilding practitioners during
events and workshops in donor countries, as well as in most of the case study countries.
For more information on upcoming events related to this project, please see:
http://www.graduateinstitute.ch/ccdp
Methodology
The project applied a comparative theory and empirical research approach, using both
quantitative and qualitative methodologies. While all case studies identified a number of
context-specific phases of both conflict and peacebuilding, overall we distinguished between
four main phases. These phases are (1) war (higher level of violence with more than
1000 battle related death), (2) armed conflict (with lower number of casualties), (3) windows
of opportunity for peace negotiations, and (4) the phase after large-scale violence has ended
(it is worth mentioning that the third phase tends to overlap with the first and second
phases in terms of timing).
The effectiveness and relevance of the role played by civil society in peacebuilding was
assessed against the ability of different civil society actors to contribute to the peacebuilding
goals in each of the four phases of conflict/peacebuilding. Specifically, the project looked at
the contribution of different civil society initiatives to the reduction in violence, to reaching
a negotiated agreement, to sustaining a peace agreement over the medium to long term, as
well as to the improvement of conditions for society at large.
For each function, a variety of methodologies have been applied to assess effectiveness.
Content analysis of particular peace agreements was used to verify whether the themes that
were discussed by civil society groups have been taken into account. The project used
evaluation studies or the results from public opinion polls to assess attitude change of
groups at particular times of an initiative or process. Interviews were also conducted by
researchers specifically for our project.
The results of all cases were then subjected to comparative quantitative and qualitative
analysis to identify and analyze common patterns throughout cases. The project also
applied an intensive quality control process through an internal and external review
process.
Interestingly, the theoretical relevance of the function during violent phases of conflict is
not matched with the actual level of performed activities. Only in one-third of the cases
analyzed was protection conducted, either by local (often traditional and religious) actors, or
by professional protection NGOs. When combined with monitoring and advocacy campaigns
– some of which were picked up by the media and international networks – protection can
be effective not only in saving lives, but can also contribute to accelerating peace
agreements.
A special form of protection chosen by some civil society actors was related to the issue of
migration. When the space for civil society activities diminished in size, activists and
civilians tended to leave the country in question. However, many civil society activists
continued their work from outside the country, often partnering up with international
NGOs or other organizations.
Protection also becomes a key precondition for civil society to act and perform other
functions. The case of Somalia demonstrates this well: even under difficult circumstances
during phases of armed conflict, civil society actors could still fulfill many functions.
However, when war broke out again after the Ethiopian intervention in December 2006,
and the conflict parties became increasingly aggressive towards civil society actors, the
space to act for civil society almost vanished.
The main limiting factors for protection are hence a high level of violence, but also a
coercive state with dysfunctional rule of law institutions, and a lack of funding for
professional initiatives.
(2) Monitoring is always relevant, but the issues to be monitored change according to the
phases and context of a conflict situation. The main focus of monitoring during armed
conflicts and wars is on human rights violations. The central actors involved are local and
national professional organizations and research institutions that are often linked to
international human rights organizations. The monitoring of specific issues was also
successful in many cases. In Northern Ireland, the monitoring of the treatment of war
prisoners, combined with advocacy, brought this situation to public attention and later into
the peace agreement.
The high relevance of monitoring again did not correlate with the actual level of activities.
Monitoring was either not performed in all cases or only performed to a limited extent. The
effectiveness of monitoring, when performed, was fairly high in most cases, albeit never as
a stand-alone function. Monitoring became the precondition for protection and advocacy. In
the case of protection, its effectiveness was higher when the activities of civil society were
picked up by the media. In contrast, when media freedom was extremely restricted,
monitoring activities were less reported and thus less effective. Still, once international
attention was created, monitoring organizations already linked to international
organizations could act more effectively.
The main limiting factors for effective monitoring are, as with protection, the state
restrictions put on the space for civil society action or restrictions imposed by other conflict
parties, as well as the extreme levels of violence.
(3) Advocacy is not only highly relevant for peacebuilding, but was also conducted in many
instances by civil society with a high level of effectiveness throughout all phases of conflict.
Next to advocacy for protection-related issues, civil society groups advocated for the
inclusion of relevant issues into peace agreements, such as land reform in Guatemala,
human rights provisions in Northern Ireland, or legal issues aimed at the recognition or
implementation of rights of marginalized groups such as the Mayas in Guatemala, Kurdish
minorities in Turkey, and Muslims in Sri Lanka. Civil society also advocated for issues
related to the implementation of peace agreements such as the return of refugees in Bosnia,
or the establishment of truth and reconciliation commissions. Women’s groups are often
successful in bringing minority and gender issues onto the agenda. In general, if targeted
advocacy campaigns are combined with monitoring, media attention, and the support of
international networks, their effectiveness is at its highest. An example can be seen with
advocacy for protection initiatives, when they combine the initiatives of community
groups, local NGOs or traditional leaders. In Afghanistan during the Taliban rule, a NGO
anti-landmine campaign led Mullah Omar to issue a fatwa banning the use of mines.
The most effective form of advocacy, according to our studies, is mass mobilization for
large-scale change, such as the end of war or authoritarian rule. Civil society organizations
were also in many cases very effective in bringing issues to the negotiation agenda. The
most visible and successful case was the systematic advocacy of civil society groups
organized in the Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil, which operated parallel to the two-year
official peace negotiations in Guatemala. Here civil society organizations successfully
managed to put important topics onto the negotiation agenda; two thirds of the proposals
found their way into the peace agreement.
The main limiting factors for advocacy are again linked to the shrinking space for civil
society to act. Other possible limiting factors include a highly restricted media, the lack
of specialized knowledge, or the lack of capacity for managing successful campaigns.
(4) Socialization of the population at large with general democratic and peace values
is mainly relevant in phases with low levels of violence (or no violence). High levels of
violence and the radicalization in society during armed conflict and war works against these
initiatives. We found that in all cases, the existing socialization institutions in society are
the most influential factors towards how people learn democratic and conflict behavior.
These institutions of socialization are schools, religious and secular associations, clubs,
work, and families, which tend to re-enforce existing divides, and thus often foster
radicalization. This finding holds for conflicts with a small number of defined adversary
groups as Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka or Israel/Palestine. It is also highly relevant in
conflicts with more differentiated divides like Guatemala, Nepal, Afghanistan, Congo
or Nigeria. In Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Nepal or Guatemala schools are representing
the divides in society.
We also find radical movements within civil society that openly foster an enemy image
against the other group, such as settler movement in Israel or veteran associations in
Bosnia, ethnic community associations in Nigeria, Sinhala nationalist organizations in Sri
Lanka or the Orange Order in Northern Ireland. Interestingly, peace agreements in
adversarial multi-group settings often perpetuate war-time divides through the inclusion of
power-sharing mechanisms. Thus, there should be an understanding as to when such
arrangements will come to an end and society and politics can be based on values over
group identity.
These findings stand in stark contrast to the actual activities performed by civil society
organizations. We found that most NGO peace education initiatives are haphazardly
organized in the form of workshops, training, public seminars or peace media, often taking
place outside available socialization institutions within society. It is therefore not
astonishing that these activities overall tend to not be effective.
The specific in-group socialization of particular groups in a conflict situation has proven to be
effective in many instances, as a generation of civic leaders have been empowered through
training and capacity building (such as Maya activists in Guatemala or Dalith organizations
in Nepal). However, the strengthening of group identity has also had negative effects;
it can reinforcing existing conflict lines, and sometimes even facilitate radicalization,
as demonstrated by some ethnic groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
(5) Social cohesion: The relevance of activities that bring people from adversarial groups
together depends largely on the context in which these activities take place. At first glance,
these initiatives always seem relevant in group conflicts like Northern Ireland, Bosnia or
Sri Lanka. Here the focus is on bridging divides between the main groups, such as
Protestants/Catholics, or Singhalese/Tamils. However, in societies like Guatemala or
Afghanistan, where there are less clear divides, there seems to be a limited need for this
function. A deeper analysis reveals that all conflict societies are facing divides between
different groups that go beyond the main adversarial groups. In Israel, there are divides
between the religious orthodox and secular Israelis; in Afghanistan, the cleavages exist
strongly between religious and secular groups, between different religious schools and
doctrines, between tribal and modern parts of society, and between various ethnic
identities. Once a destructive approach to dealing with conflict has penetrated a society,
there is a high risk that other conflict lines will also transform into violence. It thus becomes
a matter of violence prevention to address these cleavages as well. The uprising of violence
in the Terrai region of Nepal immediately after the signature of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement in 2006 is a case in point. The focus on the main conflict line between the
Maoist movement and the government obviously neglected other tensions, and may have
even reinforced ethnic divides.
These findings do not correspond with the actual activities performed by civil society
groups within the social cohesion function. Aside from a few exceptions, activities have
focused primarily on the main visible conflict lines, as well as on the well-known inter-
group conflicts like Israel/Palestine, Cyprus, Bosnia or Sri Lanka. Social cohesion initiatives
are quantitatively the most performed civil society initiatives (beyond general service
delivery). Such activities reached their peak in the mentioned cases often immediately after
a peace or ceasefire agreement, and as a result of high level of external funding.
W Many initiatives aim at changing attitudes, yet even over the long-term, this seems
ineffective. Existing evidence from Bosnia, Cyprus and Israel/Palestine demonstrate that
attitude change might not be necessary for behavior change. Instead, work-related
activities, which brought people from different groups together, proved to be more
successful than peace-related work. Here people expressed positive experiences from
working with the other group, often producing concrete outcomes or common work
initiatives.
However, it was noted that participation in such initiatives was an act of empowerment in
most cases for the marginalized groups.
(6) Facilitation. Local facilitation by civil society groups is highly relevant during all phases
of conflict/peacebuilding. We find that facilitation often takes place on the local level and is
performed by community leaders (such as traditional or religious leaders) or by local NGOs
and associations. They facilitate dialogue between the conflict parties and the community,
between aid agencies and the conflict parties or between communities and returning
refugees. The effectiveness of facilitation is naturally contingent upon the context but our
research still observed many successful initiatives. In Afghanistan during the Taliban
regime, traditional mediation was the only resource for facilitating communication between
the Taliban and various local communities. During the armed conflict in Nepal, local groups
successfully facilitated the release of prisoners in villages. Their success was greatly helped
in many cases by the monitoring and advocacy work of Nepali NGOs.
In general, a high level of violence or intimidation from the conflict parties is the main
limiting factor for civil society activities. On the flipside, cooperation between traditional
and “modern” forces has in many instances enhanced effectiveness.
National Facilitation between the main conflict parties is less of a civil society task. On the
whole, this function concerns political actors and some business people. However, eminent
civil society persons (often religious or other community leaders) can be very effective in
paving the way to official negotiations and supporting the official mediators in times of
deadlocks. Religious leaders have been involved in facilitation in Guatemala, Northern
Ireland, and Sri Lanka. These initiatives have been particularly important during a window
of opportunity for peace agreements or in the breakdown of official negotiations when no
other channels of communication were available.
(7) Service delivery proved to be only a function of peacebuilding when used as an entry
point for other civil society peacebuilding functions. While NGO aid projects received most
of the external funds, few projects created entry points for peacebuilding. This comes as a
surprise after years of conflict sensitive aid and “do no harm” awareness.
Our research shows that where aid initiatives were systematically used for peacebuilding,
they often created important entry points for protection, monitoring and social cohesion.
The relevance of the function seems to depend on two main factors: the number of entry
points it can create for other civil society peacebuilding functions; and the state’s ability to
provide services for the population. The cases of Cyprus and Somalia are illustrative of this
point. In Cyprus, civil society provided almost no service delivery due to the presence of a
functioning state and the absence of violence. Therefore service delivery was not a function
for peacebuilding in this context. In Somalia, on the contrary, the total absence of a state for
almost two decades induced civil society to perform service delivery as a main activity.
Islamic charities and local NGOs were in many instances successful in creating entry points
for peacebuilding by expanding their network across clan and regional lines. On the
negative side, service delivery – especially when heavily funded – can divert energy and
resources from other civil society activities.
The media
The media can influence the effectiveness of civil society protection, monitoring and
advocacy. It can do so directly and in a positive manner during armed conflict, war, and
immediately after long-term violence. First, the media can support and strengthen civil
society efforts via positive media coverage. This finding also holds true for advocacy, even
long after peace agreements have been reached, or major violence has halted. Without
positive media coverage, civil society initiatives show a significantly lower success rate.
Secondly, the media can play an important role in socialization (and partly in social
cohesion) by strengthening particular images and stereotypes in society. Our case studies
showed, however, that the media has often contributed to reinforcing enemy images and
enhancing radicalization.
The participation in civil society is an act of building social capital. Thus, the norms and
values permeated into members of important civil society organizations determine to a
large extent the behavior of these members. In some of our case studies, we observed that civil
society groups promote norms, values and interests that are undemocratic, repressive and
intolerant. This often comes as a response to a persisting situation of political, economic
and social crisis. The emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan is an extreme example of the
transformation of a civil society force into a political, highly repressive, undemocratic,
and violent regime. In deeply divided societies we often find civil society membership
organizations representing only one group. Though often democratically organized, the
majority of these organizations reinforce radical tendencies within societies. In the cases
of Nigeria and the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, however, some of these membership
organizations – those which are democratically organized – contributed considerably more
to developing peace and democracy values than did non-democratically organized groups.
This is a very interesting finding, for which we do not have sufficient evidence across our
case studies to come to firm conclusions. More systematic research is needed here.
Donors
Donor resources are a key element that enables civil society initiatives. Different civil
society actors, however, depend on donor support in very different ways. Mass-based
membership organizations, as well as movements, hardly depend on external funding. Still
their resources also decrease in times of armed conflicts, when members are less capable to
pay their dues. Modern NGOs are the most dependent on external funding. Although many
NGOs work with volunteers, many activities would simply not take place without additional
funding. This development has contributed to a professionalization of peace work.
Originally seen as voluntary work performed by traditional civil society entities, peace work
has witnessed the exponential growth of civil society initiatives since the 1990s. This growth
has enabled organizations to make use of both voluntary and professional staff. It has also
contributed to an enhanced capacity for organized campaigns and a generally higher level
of professional performance.
These developments, however, have come at the expense of building social capital for
peacebuilding in societies. The professionalization and formalization of activist networks
may be viewed as the “taming of social movements” through the “NGOization of social
protest,” as all our case studies reveal. One consequence of this has been the decline in
voluntarism. In Guatemala, broader social movements have formed into NGOs in order to
access funds from international donors. This has undoubtedly enhanced their professional
performance, but has also increased competition between organizations and shifted
accountability from the societies concerned to the donors themselves.
In sum, civil society support cannot replace political action. Our case studies have shown
that the main enabling and disenabling conditions for civil society come from the possibility
of a coercive state, the level of violence, and the level of influence from strong regional
actors. Thus, the engagement of the international community in initiatives that can reduce
violence and enhance protection, while putting pressure on repressive governments and
seeking support from powerful actors could secure the fundamental preconditions for civil
society to act.
Annex:
Comprehensive framework for the
analysis of the role of civil society
in peacebuilding
IDENTIFYING ASSESSING IDENTIFYING ANALYSING
CIVIL SOCIETY RELEVANCE OF ACTIVITIES BY EFFECTIVENESS
FUNCTIONS IN FUNCTIONS IN ACTORS INCL. OF ACTIVITIES
1. Protection
2. Monitoring
CONCLUSION:
3. Advocacy
4. Socialization
5. Social Cohesion
6. Facilitation
8. Service Delivery
as entry point for
peacebuilding
L
Further Readings
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Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners. Cambridge, MA: The Collaborative
for Development Action.
Bayart, Jean-François. 1986. “Civil Society in Africa.” In Patrick Chabal, ed. Political
Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limit of Power. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp.109-125.
Bendaña, Alejandro. 2003. What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Critical Assessment from
the South. Discussion Paper Prepared on the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary
of ‘An Agenda for Peace’. Ottawa: IDRC.
Chabal, Patrick, and Jean Pascal Daloz. 1999. Africa Works. Disorder as Political Instrument.
Oxford, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Cox, Michaelene, ed. 2008. The Paradox of Social Capital: Fuelling Conflict and Building
Peace through Trust and Networks. London: Routledge.
Debiel, Tobias, and Monika Sticht. 2005. Towards a New Profile? Development, Humanitarian
and Conflict-Resolution NGOs in the Age of Globalization. Institute for Development and
Peace Report No. 79. Duisburg: Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden.
Goodhand, Jonathan. 2006. Aiding Peace. NGOs in Armed Conflict. Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Heathershaw, John. 2008. “Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging
of Peacebuilding Discourses.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies.
Vol. 36, No.3, pp. 597-621.
Kaldor, Mary. 2003. Global Civil Society: An Answer to War. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Lederach, John Paul. 1997. Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies.
Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
Lewis, David. 2002. “Civil Society in African Contexts. Reflections on the Usefulness
of a Concept.” Development and Change. Vol. 33, No.4, pp. 569-586.
Lund, Michael. 2003. What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Stock Taking of Post-Conflict
Peacebuilding and Charting Future Directions. Discussion Paper Prepared on the
Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of ‘An Agenda for Peace’. Ottawa: IDRC.
Paffenholz, Thania, ed. Forthcoming 2009. Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical
Assessment. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Paffenholz, Thania, and Christoph Spurk. 2006. Civil Society, Civic Engagement and
Peacebuilding. Social Development Papers, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction
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Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Richmond, Oliver, and Henry Carey. 2006. Subcontracting Peace. NGOs and Peacebuilding
in a Dangerous World. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers.
Strand, Arne, Hege Toje, Alf Morten Jerve and Ingrid Samset. 2003. Community Driven
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Bank. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute.
UNDESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs). 2004. Partnerships
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Issues Paper for the Session on Partnerships and Civil Society: Roles and Capabilities
in Conflict Prevention and Peace building. New York: UNDESA.
UNSG (United Nations Secretary General). 2003. UN System and Civil Society: An Inventory
and Analysis of Practices. Background Paper for the Secretary-General’s Panel of Eminent
Persons on United Nations Relations with Civil Society. Accessed 30 April, 2009.
<http://www.un.org/reform/civilsociety/practices.shtml>.
World Bank. 2005. Engaging Civil Society Organizations on Conflict-Affected and Fragile States.
Three African Country Case Studies. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Zartman, I. William. 2000. Traditional Curses for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict ‘Medicine’.
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
T hania Paffenholz holds a PhD in International Relations and is lecturer for peace,
conflict and development at the Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies. After having worked as a research fellow at the Peace
Research Institute Frankfurt (1992-1996), she held a position as Peacebuilding Officer within
the Delegation of the European Commission in Kenya (1996-2000). Thereafter, Thania
Paffenholz was Director of the Center for Peacebuilding (KOFF) at Swisspeace in Berne,
Switzerland until 2003. She also works as an advisor to the United Nations, the Development
Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD-DAC), and various governmental and non-governmental organizations, both at
headquarters and in different conflict-affected countries.
Thania Paffenholz has authored and edited numerous articles, book chapters and
monographs on peacebuilding and on the role of development in conflict settings.
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