Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion For A Temporary Restraining Order
Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion For A Temporary Restraining Order
Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion For A Temporary Restraining Order
Plaintiffs,
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
v. MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
City of Minneapolis et al.,
Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining
order. (Dkt. 94.) Plaintiffs seek an order enjoining Defendants Minnesota Department of
Public Safety Commissioner John Harrington, in his individual and official capacity;
Minnesota State Patrol Colonel Matthew Langer, in his individual and official capacity;
and their agents, servants, employees, and representatives (collectively, State Defendants).
For the reasons addressed below, Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order is
granted.
BACKGROUND
The individual Plaintiffs are journalists, photographers, and other members of the
press who bring this lawsuit on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated
union that represents news media workers. Defendant John Harrington is the Minnesota
Commissioner of Public Safety who has supervisory responsibility over the Minnesota
On May 25, 2020, George Floyd died as a result of an encounter with four officers
commenced this lawsuit in June 2020 alleging that the State Defendants engaged in a
pattern and practice of infringing the constitutional rights of members of the press who
were documenting the protests that followed George Floyd’s death. In response to the
and Saint Paul, with an exemption for members of the press. The State Defendants
allegedly disregarded the press exemption and targeted the press. According to Plaintiffs,
the State Defendants threatened, harassed, assaulted and arrested members of the press in
multiple incidents over several days after the death of George Floyd. Goyette moved for a
temporary restraining order to prevent the State Defendants from further violating the
constitutional rights of the press. The Court denied the motion without prejudice because
the protests had quelled and Goyette failed to demonstrate an imminent threat of harm.
now-ongoing trial of Derek Chauvin. On April 11, 2021, a Brooklyn Center police officer
shot and killed Daunte Wright, which led to additional ongoing protests. Plaintiffs allege
that the State Defendants continue to violate the constitutional rights of the members of the
Plaintiffs allege several examples, including the police firing rubber bullets at a
videographer who was a safe distance from other protestors, orders directing the press to
disperse despite the curfew orders expressly exempting the press, and various other acts
2
CASE 0:20-cv-01302-WMW-DTS Doc. 105 Filed 04/16/21 Page 3 of 22
impeding the press’s ability to observe and report about the protests and law enforcement’s
Plaintiffs seek a temporary restraining order enjoining the State Defendants from
taking certain actions against “any person whom [the State Defendants] know or
reasonably should know is a Journalist.” In particular, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the State
Defendants from taking the following actions against such individuals: (1) the use of any
physical force, including but not limited to non-lethal projectiles; (2) the use of chemical
agents, including but not limited to mace, pepper spray, and tear gas; and (3) seizing any
individuals. The temporary restraining order that Plaintiffs seek would not apply to
ANALYSIS
relief in the form of a temporary restraining order. When determining whether a temporary
restraining order is warranted, a district court considers the four Dataphase factors: (1) the
probability that the movant will succeed on the merits, (2) the threat of irreparable harm to
the movant, (3) the balance between this harm and the injury that an injunction would
inflict on other parties, and (4) the public interest. Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc.,
640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy,”
and the party seeking injunctive relief bears the burden of establishing that each factor
favors granting such relief. Roudachevski v. All-Am. Care Ctrs., Inc., 648 F.3d 701, 705
3
CASE 0:20-cv-01302-WMW-DTS Doc. 105 Filed 04/16/21 Page 4 of 22
(8th Cir. 2011). The core question in this analysis “is whether the balance of equities so
favors the movant that justice requires the court to intervene to preserve the status quo until
Plaintiffs contend that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims
alleging violations of the First Amendment and Fourth Amendment to the United States
success on the merits is most significant.” S & M Constructors, Inc. v. Foley Co., 959 F.2d
97, 98 (8th Cir. 1992). The moving party need not “prove a greater than fifty per cent
likelihood that [it] will prevail on the merits.” Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 113. Rather, the
moving party must demonstrate a “fair chance of prevailing.” Planned Parenthood Minn.,
N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 732 (8th Cir. 2008). Here, Plaintiffs’ likelihood of
success on the merits as to their First Amendment and Fourth Amendment claims are
addressed in turn. 2
1
“The Court takes a short detour before analyzing these factors to stand with many
of its sister courts in recognizing the following underlying principles: demonstrators have
a right to protest the actions of the police and other members of the government without
fear of government retaliation; police officers, especially in their duty to protect person and
property, have difficult and often dangerous jobs that require them to make split-second
decisions; and just as not all protestors seek destruction, not all officers seek violence. The
Court must thus balance the need to protect the sacred rights of speech and assembly from
interference and retaliation with that of police to respond appropriately when the safety of
the officers and the City’s citizens are threatened.” Breathe v. City of Detroit, 484 F. Supp.
3d 511, 516 (E.D. Mich. 2020).
2
The State Defendants, without any factual or legal analysis, assert that Plaintiffs’
claims fail on the basis of qualified immunity and lack of standing. The State Defendants
solely reference their prior briefing for these assertions. It is not the Court’s task to
4
CASE 0:20-cv-01302-WMW-DTS Doc. 105 Filed 04/16/21 Page 5 of 22
A. First Amendment
Plaintiffs argue that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their First
individual to retaliatory actions.” Peterson v. Kopp, 754 F.3d 594, 602 (8th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006)). A First Amendment retaliation
claim requires a plaintiff to show that “(1) [the plaintiff] engaged in a protected activity,
(2) the government official took adverse action against [the plaintiff] that would chill a
person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity, and (3) the adverse action was
motivated at least in part by the exercise of the protected activity.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted); accord Quraishi v. St. Charles County, 986 F.3d 831, 837 (8th Cir. 2021).
The Court addresses whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
1. Protected Activity
Plaintiffs argue that they have a clearly established constitutional right to document
protest activities, including law enforcement responses and behavior. The State
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs were exposed to chemical agents, less-lethal projectiles,
and dispersal orders because they remained in an active dispersal area, in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 607.705.
determine which of the State Defendants’ prior arguments might be relevant to the pending
motion, particularly in light of evolving facts and circumstances.
5
CASE 0:20-cv-01302-WMW-DTS Doc. 105 Filed 04/16/21 Page 6 of 22
Any law “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press” is prohibited under the
First Amendment. U.S. Const., amend. I. The Supreme Court of the United States has
recognized that “without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press
could be eviscerated.” Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). Moreover, “the
First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and self-expression of individuals to
prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the
public may draw.” Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 597 (7th Cir.
2012) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)). “Reporting
is a First Amendment activity.” Quraishi, 986 F.3d at 838 (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at
681).
Here, Plaintiffs’ declarations detail the treatment that members of the press,
Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 595, 597 (“The act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is
necessarily included within the First Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press rights as
a corollary of the right to disseminate the resulting recording” because these news-
The State Defendants argue that the press had no right to “remain in an active
dispersal area.” The State Defendants appear to contend that a dispersal order can curtail
the right of the press to report on government actions or otherwise limit the press’s access,
6
CASE 0:20-cv-01302-WMW-DTS Doc. 105 Filed 04/16/21 Page 7 of 22
When reporting on government conduct, the press serves as “surrogates for the
public.” Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980). The Supreme
Court has established a two-part test for evaluating alleged violations of the press’s right
of access. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1986). First,
the court must determine “whether the place and process have historically been open to the
press and general public and whether public access plays a significant positive role in the
function of the particular process in question.” Index Newspapers LLC v. City of Portland,
480 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1147 (D. Or. 2020) (citing Press Enter., 478 U.S. at 8–9). “Second,
if the court determines that a qualified right applies, the government may overcome that
right only by demonstrating ‘an overriding interest based on findings that closure is
essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.’ ” Id.
(quoting Press Enter., 478 U.S. at 9); see also Index Newspapers LLC v. U.S. Marshals
Serv., 977 F.3d 817, 834 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding that the law enforcement defendants failed
to establish that general dispersal orders were essential or narrowly tailored and observing
that “[t]he many peaceful protesters, journalists, and members of the general public cannot
and sidewalks, giving the press a qualified right of access. See U.S. Marshals Serv., 977
F.3d at 830 (recognizing that streets and sidewalks historically have been open to the
public). Indeed, the State Defendants do not dispute that public streets and sidewalks
7
CASE 0:20-cv-01302-WMW-DTS Doc. 105 Filed 04/16/21 Page 8 of 22
typically are open to the press and public. Accordingly, in order for the State Defendants’
general dispersal orders limiting the press’s access to be constitutional, the State
Defendants must demonstrate that general dispersal orders are “essential to preserve higher
values and [are] narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Id. at 831. The State Defendants
fail to do so here. 3
The general dispersal orders lack narrow tailoring for at least two reasons. First,
both parties acknowledge that the curfew orders exempt the press, which demonstrates that
the state and local governments have concluded that press access to these events is both
important and workable. Cf. Index Newspapers, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 1147–48 (concluding
that, because the defendant city previously stipulated to a preliminary injunction exempting
journalists from dispersal orders, the federal law enforcement defendants’ “blanket
assertion that federal officers must disperse everyone is rejected”). Second, preliminary
injunctions issued by other courts in similar circumstances have required members of the
press to adequately identify themselves, refrain from impeding law enforcement activities,
and comply with all laws other than general dispersal orders; and those injunctions have
maintained law enforcement officers’ authority to, among other things, “arrest or otherwise
engage with persons who commit unlawful acts.” See, e.g., id. at 1148; see also U.S.
Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d at 838 (affirming district court’s preliminary injunction). These
facts indicate that similar narrow tailoring is possible here, and the State Defendants offer
3
Indeed, although the State Defendants argue that their general dispersal orders were
“necessary for obvious safety reasons,” they make no attempt to demonstrate that the
general dispersal orders were narrowly tailored to address those safety concerns.
8
CASE 0:20-cv-01302-WMW-DTS Doc. 105 Filed 04/16/21 Page 9 of 22
unworkable. 4
The State Defendants argue that the dispersal orders are intended to protect the news
media, citing reports that one CNN reporter was hit in the head by a water bottle and chased
supported by declarations, that members of the press have sustained severe injuries at the
hands of law enforcement in recent days. These severe injuries include bruising and at
least one injury requiring surgery. The State Defendants also argue that their actions were
undertaken in good faith. But the State Defendants cite no law establishing that good-faith
2. Chill
Plaintiffs argue that the State Defendants’ actions toward the press, including
dispersal orders, harassment, use of chemical agents and less-lethal weapons, threats,
4
Although the State Defendants argue that law enforcement identified a location from
which the press could safely report, it is unclear whether the State Defendants always
offered such a location, whether the location was consistent and provided adequate access
for meaningful news-gathering, or whether offering a designated press location otherwise
satisfies the narrow-tailoring requirements of the First Amendment.
5
The State Defendants cite several cases relating to individuals not following
dispersal orders. Only one of those cases involved the press. See Burbridge v. City of St.
Louis, 430 F. Supp. 3d 595 (E.D. Mo. 2019) (concluding officers had “at least arguable
probable cause for the arrests”). Moreover, as the State Defendants acknowledge, the relief
Plaintiffs request allows for probable-cause arrests. As such, the State Defendants’ reliance
on these cases is unavailing.
9
CASE 0:20-cv-01302-WMW-DTS Doc. 105 Filed 04/16/21 Page 10 of 22
detention, and arrests, would chill a person of ordinary firmness from documenting protests
and law enforcement’s conduct in response. The State Defendants argue that, because
Goyette asserts that he intends to continue to report on the unrest, his speech has not been
chilled.
The second element of a First Amendment retaliation claim is that the adverse action
against the plaintiff would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the
protected First Amendment activity. See Peterson, 754 F.3d at 602. Because there is no
justification for harassing people for exercising their constitutional rights, the chilling
effect on speech need not be great to be actionable. Garcia v. City of Trenton, 348 F.3d
Here, Plaintiffs’ declarations detail the treatment that members of the press
experienced while covering protests on April 11–14, 2021. The declarations reflect that
these individuals were directed by law enforcement to vacate the protest area, physically
grabbed, struck by less-lethal projectiles and rubber bullets, and pepper sprayed. A person
754 F.3d at 602 (recognizing that “pepper spraying someone in the face would chill a
person of ordinary firmness” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Index
Newspapers, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 1142 (concluding that similar enforcement tactics to those
alleged here would chill First Amendment activities). Goyette’s declaration provides that
he intends to continue covering the protests but fears for his safety and the safety of his
colleagues. Goyette’s declaration also indicates that he had to retreat while observing and
reporting about the protests after law enforcement officials carrying batons ran toward him.
10
CASE 0:20-cv-01302-WMW-DTS Doc. 105 Filed 04/16/21 Page 11 of 22
And a second declaration indicates that at least one member of the press is likely physically
unable to continue reporting for up to six weeks because of injuries he sustained as a result
3. Motivation
Defendants to members of the press. According to Plaintiffs, this pattern demonstrates that
the State Defendants were motivated, at least in part, by the press’s First Amendment
activities, which is the third element of a First Amendment retaliation claim. See Peterson,
The State Defendants argue that their dispersal orders were lawful. But the State
Defendants do not specifically address Plaintiffs’ arguments that the State Defendants’
conduct was motivated, at least in part, by the press’s First Amendment activities.
Plaintiffs’ declarations reflect that, although Goyette and other members of the press were
clearly identifiable as reporters and press photographers, the State Defendants singled them
out in a variety of ways. The State Defendants advised the press that they needed to vacate
the protest areas, pepper sprayed them, and hit them with less-lethal projectiles. Law
enforcement officers targeted the press, threatening to “arrest anyone who does not disperse
in 10 minutes including journalists” and repeatedly ordering the press to leave, shouting
messages such as: “Media you need to disperse. Leave the area.” Plaintiffs’ declarations
reflect that a Star Tribune photojournalist, who had a camera and press credentials in clear
11
CASE 0:20-cv-01302-WMW-DTS Doc. 105 Filed 04/16/21 Page 12 of 22
view, was pepper sprayed in the eye while photographing a scene. According to another
journalist, “[o]ne officer just shot our ground reporter in the leg with some kind of impact
round – it appeared to be deliberate and not accidental.” These facts suggest that the State
(concluding that journalists were targeted when forced to disperse based on similar
allegations).
In summary, Plaintiffs have a fair chance of prevailing on the merits of their First
B. Fourth Amendment
Plaintiffs maintain that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their Fourth
Amendment claim, arguing that the State Defendants have restrained them from moving
6
The State Defendants do not address Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment arguments
directly, instead referencing their motion-to-dismiss briefing. Because the State
Defendants do not address the merits of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment unlawful-seizure
and excessive-force claims in their motion-to-dismiss briefing, this reference is not helpful
to the Court.
12
CASE 0:20-cv-01302-WMW-DTS Doc. 105 Filed 04/16/21 Page 13 of 22
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from seizure through the use of
excessive force by a law enforcement officer. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–
95 (1989). “A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when an officer restrains the liberty of
an individual through physical force or show of authority.” Quraishi, 986 F.3d at 839
actions is determined objectively based on the facts and circumstances confronting the
officers, including “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether [the suspect] is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Brown v. City of Golden Valley,
574 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
participating in any crime. Nor did they present a threat to the safety of the police or others,
Plaintiffs maintain. Nonetheless, the State Defendants ordered members of the press to
disperse, threatened them, and subjected them to injury-inflicting force. The State
throughout the protests in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiffs argue, supporting
this contention with declarations that detail examples of law enforcement limiting the
press’s movements and using physical force and other unreasonable demonstrations of
authority. The tactics described include the use of less-lethal projectiles, pepper spray, tear
Amendment claim.
13
CASE 0:20-cv-01302-WMW-DTS Doc. 105 Filed 04/16/21 Page 14 of 22
rights are immediate and ongoing. The State Defendants counter that Plaintiffs fail to
Irreparable harm occurs when a party has no adequate remedy at law, typically
because its injuries cannot be fully compensated through an award of damages. Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown’s, LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 319 (8th Cir. 2009). “The loss of
First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). But to establish the need
for injunctive relief to avoid irreparable harm, the movant “must show that the harm is
certain and great and of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable
relief.” Novus Franchising, Inc. v. Dawson, 725 F.3d 885, 895 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal
“ordinarily warrants a finding of irreparable harm.” A.H. ex rel. Hester v. French, 985 F.3d
Previously, the Court denied Goyette’s motion for a temporary restraining order
because Goyette failed to establish irreparable harm. At that time, the Court concluded
that Goyette did not demonstrate that the alleged harm was “certain and of such imminence
that there [was] a clear and present need for equitable relief.” Goyette v. City of
2020). The harm is no longer speculative or a mere possibility. Rather, the protests have
14
CASE 0:20-cv-01302-WMW-DTS Doc. 105 Filed 04/16/21 Page 15 of 22
continued and the harm exists. Moreover, the threat of imminent future interactions
Several factors demonstrate the clear and present need for equitable relief: (1) the
the ongoing protests in connection with the Derek Chauvin trial and the recent death of
Daunte Wright; and (3) Plaintiffs’ intention to continue its press coverage of the protests.
In light of the events that have occurred over the last year, demonstrations and protests
likely will continue as the criminal trial of Derek Chauvin concludes and an investigation
into the death of Daunte Wright continues. If the press cannot document these ongoing
events of public importance, Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights will be irreparably harmed.
The balance of harms weighs in favor of granting the temporary restraining order,
Plaintiffs contend. The State Defendants disagree, arguing that the lack of precise
hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor. See Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 490
F.3d 1041, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007). A well-tailored injunction that balances the freedom of
the press with the government’s ability to exercise its police power does not irreparably
harm the government. See Index Newspapers, 977 F.3d at 835 (holding that the
15
CASE 0:20-cv-01302-WMW-DTS Doc. 105 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 22
government would not be irreparably harmed by a narrowly tailored injunction that, among
other things, exempts journalists from general dispersal orders; allows officers to arrest
committed; and prevents journalists from interfering with the lawful activities of the
officers).
Plaintiffs’ motion contains specific allegations that are particularized as to the State
Defendants. And, as addressed above, Plaintiffs have demonstrated both irreparable harm
and a likelihood of success on the merits of their First and Fourth Amendment claims. For
these reasons, the balance of harms tips sharply in Plaintiffs’ favor. See, e.g., Cmty. House,
490 F.3d at 1059; see also Kersten v. City of Mandan, 389 F. Supp. 3d 640, 647 (D.N.D.
2019) (finding that the balance of harms “generally favors the constitutionally-protected
restraining order.
Plaintiffs contend that the public interest favors protecting the constitutional rights
of members of the press. The State Defendants disagree, arguing that a temporary
restraining order “is not in the public interest in times of chaotic unrest.”
constitutional rights.” Connection Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1998)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press . . .
impairs those opportunities for public education that are essential to effective exercise of
16
CASE 0:20-cv-01302-WMW-DTS Doc. 105 Filed 04/16/21 Page 17 of 22
the power of correcting error through the processes of popular government.” Thornhill v.
State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940). “By reporting about the government, the media
are ‘surrogates for the public.’ ” Index Newspapers, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 1146 (quoting
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573). As the American public has limited time and
indispensable resource in our constitutional democracy. See id. (citing Cox Broad. Corp.
At stake here are Plaintiffs’ First and Fourth Amendment rights, as well as the
public’s ability to learn about ongoing events of public importance. The potential harm
arising from suppressing press coverage of the protests is great and the public interest
favors protecting these First Amendment principles. See Reno, 154 F.3d at 288.
Constitutional rights are not diminished during a period of “chaotic unrest.” See Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120–21 (1866) (“The Constitution of the United States is a law for
rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection
all classes . . . ., at all times, and under all circumstances.”). “Democracies die behind
closed doors.” Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
order.
Having concluded that a temporary restraining order is warranted, the Court next
considers whether to require Plaintiffs to post a bond as security for the effects of the
17
CASE 0:20-cv-01302-WMW-DTS Doc. 105 Filed 04/16/21 Page 18 of 22
A district court must expressly consider whether to require a bond, but a district
court is not required to impose one. See Rathmann Grp. v. Tanenbaum, 889 F.2d 787, 789
(8th Cir. 1989). The bond requirement to secure injunctive relief “is a security device, not
a limit on the damages the . . . defendants may obtain against [the plaintiff] if the facts
warrant such an award.” Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Rauh Rubber, Inc., 130 F.3d 1305,
1309 (8th Cir. 1997). Rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in
pertinent part:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). While a district court has broad discretion in setting a bond, that
discretion is abused if the district court acts with an improper purpose, fails to require an
adequate bond, or fails to make the necessary findings in support of its decision. See Hill
v. Xyquad, Inc., 939 F.2d 627, 632 (8th Cir. 1991). Courts have concluded that a bond is
not required to obtain preliminary injunctive relief when a plaintiff is seeking to prevent a
government entity from violating the First Amendment. See, e.g., Bukaka, Inc. v. County
The State Defendants have not objected to Plaintiffs’ request for a waiver of Rule
65(c)’s security requirement or otherwise addressed this issue. See, e.g., Fantasysrus 2,
L.L.C. v. City of E. Grand Forks, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1033 (D. Minn. 2012) (waiving
the security requirement when the government did not object to the movant’s request for
waiver); Northshor Experience, Inc. v. Duluth, 442 F. Supp. 2d 713, 723 (D. Minn. 2006)
18
CASE 0:20-cv-01302-WMW-DTS Doc. 105 Filed 04/16/21 Page 19 of 22
(granting a waiver when the defendant had not objected or otherwise “addressed this issue
or attempted to quantify any dollar amount of harm that it may face from a wrongly issued
injunction”).
Accordingly, the Court, in its discretion, waives the security requirement in this case.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing analysis and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED:
GRANTED.
Harrington, in his individual and official capacity; Minnesota State Patrol Colonel Matthew
Langer, in his individual and official capacity; and their agents, servants, employees and
through use of flash bang grenades, non-lethal projectiles, riot batons, or any
should know is a Journalist (as defined Paragraph 4 below), unless the State
committed a crime. For purposes of this Order, such persons shall not be
persons shall not be subject to arrest for not dispersing following the issuance
19
CASE 0:20-cv-01302-WMW-DTS Doc. 105 Filed 04/16/21 Page 20 of 22
other laws;
b. using chemical agents directed against any person whom they know
skunk, inert smoke, pepper pellets, xylyl bromide, and similar substances,
equipment, or press passes from any person whom the State Defendants
Defendants are lawfully seizing that person consistent with this Order.
must return any seized equipment or press passes immediately upon release
person acting under the State Defendants’ direction seizes property from a Journalist who
is lawfully arrested consistent with this Order, such State Defendant shall, as soon
thereafter as is reasonably possible, make a written list of seized property and shall provide
a copy of that list to the Journalist. If property seized in connection with the lawful arrest
of a Journalist is needed for evidentiary purposes, the State Defendants shall promptly seek
20
CASE 0:20-cv-01302-WMW-DTS Doc. 105 Filed 04/16/21 Page 21 of 22
a search warrant, subpoena, or other court order to authorize the continued seizure of such
property. If such a search warrant, subpoena, or other court order is denied, or if property
seized in connection with an arrest is not needed for evidentiary purposes, the State
Defendants shall immediately return the seized property to its rightful possessor.
under this Order, the following shall be considered indicia of being a Journalist: visual
press pass or wearing a professional or authorized press badge or other official press
credentials or distinctive clothing that identifies the wearer as a member of the press. These
indicia are not exclusive, and a person need not exhibit every indicium to be considered a
Journalist under this Order. The State Defendants shall not be liable for unintentional
violations of this Order in the case of an individual who does not carry or wear a press pass,
badge, or other official press credential or distinctive clothing that identifies the wearer as
5. The State Defendants are not precluded by the Order from issuing otherwise
lawful crowd-dispersal orders. The State Defendants shall not be liable for violating this
in the area where such devices were deployed, in conjunction with the enforcement of an
6. To promote compliance with this Order, the State Defendants are ordered to
provide copies of this Order, in either electronic or paper form, within 24 hours, to: (a) all
employees, officers, and agents of the State Defendants currently deployed in Brooklyn
21
CASE 0:20-cv-01302-WMW-DTS Doc. 105 Filed 04/16/21 Page 22 of 22
Center, Minnesota (or who later become deployed in Brooklyn Center, Minnesota while
this Order is in force); and (b) all employees, officers, and agents of the State Defendants
with any supervisory or command authority over any person in group (a) above.
7. Plaintiffs need not provide any security pursuant to Rule 65(c) of the Federal
8. The Court authorizes mutual expedited discovery so that the parties can be
fully prepared to present all relevant facts and legal issues at a preliminary injunction
hearing. The parties shall confer and propose to the Court a schedule for briefing and a
hearing on whether the Court should issue a preliminary injunction against the State
Defendants.
9. This Order shall expire fourteen (14) days after entry, unless otherwise
22