OVERSEAS FILIPINO WORKERS

DAGASDAS VS GRAND PLACEMENT & SERVICES AGENCY

The Supreme Court ruled that the subsequent contract signed by Dagasdas in Saudi Arabia was void. Such
contract was not shown to have been processed through the POEA. The Court states that, under the Labor
Code, employers hiring OFWs may only do so through entities authorized by the Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment. Unless the employment contract of an OFW is processed through
the POEA, the same does not bind the concerned OFW because if the contract is not reviewed by the POEA,
certainly the State has no means of determining the suitability of foreign laws to our overseas workers.
Furthermore, the new contract breached the original contract signed by Dagasdas, as it was entered into
before the expiration of the original contract which was approved by the POEA. Hence, it cannot supersede
the original contract. Consequently, its terms and conditions are void.

DE LA CRUZ VS MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING INC.

The Court decided in favor of the petitioner stating Section 17 of the POEA Revised Standard Employment
Terms and Conditions:

The Master shall comply with the following disciplinary procedures against an erring seafarer:

A. The Master shall furnish the seafarer with a written notice containing the following:

1. Grounds for the charges as listed in Section 31 of this Contract.

2. Date, time and place for a formal investigation of the charges against the seafarer concerned.

B. The Master or his authorized representative shall conduct the investigation or hearing, giving the
seafarer the opportunity to explain or defend himself against the charges. An entry on the
investigation shall be entered into the ship's logbook.
C. If, after the investigation or hearing, the Master is convinced that imposition of a penalty is justified,
the Master shall issue a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it to the seafarer, with copies
furnished to the Philippine agent.

In this case, respondents failed to state the acts or omissions for which petitioner’s dismissal is being sought.
Therefore, the logbook entries and the notice of dismissal were indeed lacking information as even the
Court could not determine what could have transpired the said dismissal. There was also no formal
investigation as admitted by herein respondents themselves, which, in turn, did not allow herein petitioner
the opportunity to explain himself. Since the logbook entries were too vague and general, it failed to prove
that petitioner’s dismissal was indeed for a cause. Thus, the decision of the CA is reversed and set aside
and the decision of the NLRC is reinstated.
IPAMS VS DE VERA

Arriola was illegally dismissed. As a general rule, Philippine laws apply even to overseas employment
contracts. This rule is rooted in the constitutional provision of Section 3, Article XIII that the State shall
afford full protection to labor, whether local or overseas. Hence, even if the OFW has his employment
abroad, it does not strip him of his rights to security of tenure, humane conditions of work and a living
wage under our Constitution.

As an exception to this, the parties may agree that a foreign law shall govern the employment contract
subject to the following requisites:

1. That it is expressly stipulated in the overseas employment contract that a specific foreign law shall
govern;
2. That the foreign law invoked must be proven before the courts pursuant to the Philippine rules on
evidence;
3. That the foreign law stipulated in the overseas employment contract must not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy of the Philippines; and
4. That the overseas employment contract must be processed through the POEA.

In this case, petitioners were able to observe only the second and fourth requisites. They were able to
present the ESA (foreign law) duly authenticated by the Canadian Authorities and certified by the
Philippine Embassy. Arriola’s contract was also processed though the POEA. However, they failed to
adhere to the other two.

The foreign law was not expressly specified in the employment contract. In its pleadings, the petitioners
did not directly cite any specific provision or stipulation in the said labor contract which indicated the
applicability of the Canadian labor laws or the ESA. They failed to show on the face of the contract that a
foreign law was agreed upon by the parties. Considering that no foreign law was specified in the contract
and the same was executed in the Philippines, the doctrine of lex loci celebrationis applies and the
Philippine laws shall govern the overseas employment of Arriola.

The foreign law invoked is contrary to the Constitution and the Labor Code. First, the ESA does not require
any ground for the early termination of employment. Second, the ESA allows the employer to dispense
with the prior notice of termination to an employee. Not only do these provisions collide with the right to
security of tenure, but they also deprive the employee of his constitutional right to due process by denying
him of any notice of termination and the opportunity to be heard. Thus, the Court concurs with the CA that
the ESA is not applicable in this case as it is against our fundamental and statutory laws. In fine, as the
petitioners failed to meet all the four (4) requisites on the applicability of a foreign law, then the Philippine
labor laws must govern the overseas employment contract of Arriola.

Applying Philippine laws, the court ruled that Arriola was illegally dismissed. Article 279 of our Labor
Code has construed security of tenure to mean that the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by law that must be proven by the employer with
substantial evidence before a dismissal may be considered valid.

Here, the petitioners simply argued that they were suffering from financial losses and Arriola had to be
dismissed. The petitioners did not even present a single credible evidence to support their claim of financial
loss. They simply offered an unreliable news article which deserves scant consideration as it is undoubtedly
hearsay.
PEOPLE VS CHOWDURY

The Court ruled that Chowdury is not liable for the illegal recruitment in large scale.

The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are:(1) The accused undertook any recruitment activity
defined under Article 13 (b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2)
He did not have the license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers;
and (3) He committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.

The last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act (RA) 8042, also known as Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995 states who shall be held liable for the offense, thus: “The persons criminally liable for
the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers
having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable.”

An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal,
together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal
recruitment. It has been held that the existence of the corporate entity does not shield from prosecution the
corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally causes the corporation to commit a crime. The
corporation obviously acts, and can act, only by and through its human agents, and it is their conduct which
the law must deter.

In this case, Chowdury merely performed his tasks under the supervision of its President and Managing
Director. The prosecution failed to show that the accused-appellant is conscious and has an active
participation in the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. Moreover, accused-appellant was not
aware of Craftrade’ s failure to register his name with the POEA and the prosecution failed to prove that
he actively engaged in the recruitment despite this knowledge.

STOLT-NIELSEN TRANSPORTATION VS MEDEQUILLO

In labor law, it is equally settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have
acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even
finality by the courts when supported by substantial evidence. But these findings are not infallible. When
there is a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may
be examined by the courts. In this case, there was no showing of any arbitrariness on the part of the lower
courts in their findings of facts. Hence, we follow the settled rule.

The POEA Standard Employment Contract provides that employment shall commence upon the actual
departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport in the port of hire.We adhere to the terms and
conditions of the contract so as to credit the valid prior stipulations of the parties before the controversy
started. Else, the obligatory force of every contract will be useless. Parties are bound not only to the
fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their
nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.

The Supreme Court ruled that distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment
contract and the commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract,
which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent
agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. The
commencement of the employer-employee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place had
petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-
employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of
certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring
party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed
upon, he would be liable for damages.

MILLARES V. NLRC

OFWs are necessarily fixed-term employees.

The Court departed from the general rule under article 280 and clarified that the employment of seafarers
is governed by Standard Employment Contract governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen on
Board Ocean – Going Vessels. Clarifying further that it is in consonance with jurisprudence which ruled
that seafarers’ employment is a contractual in nature albeit the general rule that when the service rendered
by the employee is necessary and desirable in the nature of business of the employer, the employees therein
may be promoted to a regular employment.

The justification by the Court is based on the civil law concept of contract as limited only by the spirit of
article 280 of the labor code which protects the security of tenure of an employee, such that there can be no
violation of article 280 when there is a fair deal between the parties. The Court also considered the fact that
seamen cannot stay for a long and an indefinite period of time at sea because of humanitarian concern. In
view of the foregoing, the employment of seamen is a contractual in nature classifying further that
seafarers’ employment is quite peculiar and unique in itself.

Thus, Millares and Lagda were not illegally dismissed because their employment is validly terminated
upon the expiration of their contract of employment. They cannot attain regular employment in view of
the special nature of their employment as seafarers. However, they are entitled to the optional early
retirement under the CEIP as provided and part of their contract of employment.

PERT/CPM MANPOWER EXPONENT CO VS VINUYA

The Supreme Court declared both the foreign principal and the local recruitment agency to be guilty of
illegal recruitment through substitution of the POEA-approved contract with an inferior contract done
when the OFW was already in Saudi Arabia.

POWERHOUSE STAFF BUILDERS INTERNATIONAL VS REY

The terms of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 clearly states the solidary liability of the principal and the
recruitment agency to the employees and this liability shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment
or modification for the entire duration of the employment contract.

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under
this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas
employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all monetary claims or
damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the
corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarity
liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall
not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the
said contract.

In this case, even if there was transfer of accreditation by Catcher from Powerhouse to JEJ, Powerhouse's
liability to respondent employees remained intact because respondent employees are not privy to such
contract, and in their overseas employment contract approved by POEA, Powerhouse is the recruitment
agency of Catcher. To relieve Powerhouse from liability arising from the approved overseas employment
contract is to change the contract without the consent from the other contracting party, respondent
employees in this case.

The transfer of the principal's accreditation to another agency during the filing of the complaint does not
affect that of the original local agency's.

PRINCESS TALENT CENTER PRODUCTION VS MASAGCA

The Supreme Court found the petition partly meritorious. As for the first issue on whether or not
petitioners are liable for the money claims of Masagca, the Court ruled on the affirmative, saying that her
monetary claims against petitioners and SAENCO is governed by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042,
otherwise known as The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. The provision states that,
“The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims
under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for
overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be
filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all monetary
claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a
juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be
jointly and solidarity liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.”

However, the Court found that respondent had been paid her salaries for the nine months she worked in
Ulsan, South Korea, so she is no longer entitled to an award of the same. It makes no sense to the Court
that respondent would agree to an extension of her Employment Contract for another six months if she had
not been receiving her salaries for the original six-month period. From her own actuations, respondent does
not appear to be totally helpless and gullible.

Nonetheless, pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, respondent is entitled to an award of her
salaries for the unexpired three months of her extended Employment Contract, i.e., July to September
2004. In an attempt to escape any liability to respondent, petitioners assert that only SAENCO should be
answerable for respondent's illegal dismissal because petitioners were not privy to the extension of
respondent's Employment Contract beyond the original six-month period. Petitioner Moldes additionally
argues that she should not be held personally liable as a corporate officer of PTCPI without evidence that
she had acted with malice or bad faith.

The joint and several liability of the principal/employer, recruitment/placement agency, and the
corporate officers of the latter, for the money claims and damages of an overseas Filipino worker is
absolute and without qualification. It is intended to give utmost protection to the overseas Filipino
worker, who may not have the resources to pursue her money claims and damages against the foreign
principal/employer in another country. The overseas Filipino worker is given the right to seek recourse
against the only link in the country to the foreign principal/employer, i.e., the recruitment/placement
agency and its corporate officers. As a result, the liability of SAENCO, as principal/employer, and
petitioner PTCPI, as recruitment/placement agency, for the monetary awards in favor of respondent, an
illegally dismissed employee, is joint and several. In turn, since petitioner PTCPI is a juridical entity,
petitioner Moldes, as its corporate officer, is herself jointly and solidarily liable with petitioner PTCPI
for respondent’s monetary awards, regardless of whether she acted with malice or bad faith in dealing
with respondent.

PCL SHIPPING VS NLRC

The Court ruled that respondent was entitled to his money claims with modifications. Respondent’s
entitlement to living allowance, vacation pay, overtime pay, and special allowance was clearly provided in
his employment contract. Anent his overtime pay, however, the Court held that he was not entitled to it
because he failed to prove that he rendered service in excess of the regular eight working hours per day.

The Court likewise held that respondent was entitled to attorney’s fees as he was indeed compelled to file
suit since he was illegally terminated, and his wages and other benefits were withheld from him without
any valid and legal basis pursuant to Art. 111 of the Labor Code.

Finally, with regard to respondent’s three months’ salary, pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042,
only the employee’s salaries are included in the computation of the amount due. Allowances are excluded.
Thus, the Court found no basis in the NLRC’s inclusion of respondent’s living allowance ($140.00 * 3= $420)
in the computation of his three months’ salary totaling $1,620.00. Since respondent received a basic monthly
salary of $400.00, he was only entitled, therefore, to a sum of $1,200.00 representing his three months’ salary.

JOINT SHIPPING VS SSS

The petition has no merit. Petitioners failed to prove that the assailed provision is unconstitutional for
violating substantive due process and equal protection under the Constitution.

The SC ruled that the treatment of manning agencies as employers and that they are jointly and severally
liable with principal employers with regard to SSS contributions of sea based OFWs is constitutional.

There is substantial distinction between sea-based and land-based OFWs thereby it did not violate equal
protection. As seafarers constitute a unique classification of OFWs, their essential difference against land
based OFWs is that all seafarers have only 1 standard contract, which the 2016 POEA Rules provide the
rights and obligations of the foreign ship owner, the seafarer and the manning agencies. Whereas land
based OFWs do not have singular or uniform employment contracts because of the variety of work they
perform. Their contracts depend on the nature of their employment and their place of work.

With regard to the solidary liability of manning agencies with the principal foreign ship owners, it has
been established by law, particularly, RA 8042, as amended, and implemented by the 2016 POEA Rules.
The law also applied the joint and solidary liability of manning agencies to attain the statutory purpose of
the mandatory coverage of seafarers under the SSS. Seafarers are completely covered by the SSS, and all
the manning agencies, without any prior conditions, shall have a solidary liability with the principal
foreign ship owners for the SSS contributions. Likewise,the mandatory coverage of SSS applies to all
kinds of seafarers, regardless of position or designation on their respective vessels.

With regard to the criminal liability imposed to manning agency’s managers, officers, owners, or
directors to substantive due process for the crimes that the principal foreign employer might commit
against OFWs, the SC held that the officers shall only incur criminal liability under the law for their
organization's own acts. There is no automatic criminal liability against officers of manning agencies.
As to the burden of imposition of the new rates under RA 11199, it is subject to the proper exercise of the
police power by the State. Herein, the contracts referred to are labor contracts. Under the Civil Code,
labor contracts are impressed with public interest and must yield to the common good.

BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER VS CUARESMA

Evidence dictates that Jasmin’s death is not work-connected. At the time of her death, she was not on
duty. Neither was she within hospital premises at the time. Instead, she was at her dormitory room on
personal time when she died. Neither has it been shown, that at the time she died, Jasmin was
performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental to her employment as nurse, because she was at her
dormitory room. According to the Court, it is not fair to require employers to answer even for their
employees’ personal time away from work, which the latter are free to spend of their own choosing. What
an employee does on free time is beyond the employer’s sphere of inquiry. The Court also stated that it
cannot subscribe to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide. It is beyond human comprehension that a 25-
year-old Filipina, in the prime of her life, would simply commit suicide for no compelling reason. The
report of the Health Officer and the exhumation report of the NBI shows that Jasmin was manhandled,
and possibly raped, prior to her death. Thus, the Court opined that Jasmin was a victim of murderous
aggression.

Becmen and White Falcon miserably failed to abide by the provisions of the Migrant Workers Act, which
states that the State shall, at all times, uphold the dignity of its citizens whether in the country or
overseas, in general, and the Filipino migrant workers, in particular. Recruitment agencies are expected to
extend assistance to their deployed OFW’s, especially those in distress. Instead, they abandoned Jasmin’s
case. Thus, the Cuaresma’s are entitled to moral damages, which Becmen and White Falcon are jointly
and solidarily liable to pay, together with exemplary damages.