FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 118584. October 24, 1995.]

AURELIA S. GOMEZ, petitioner, v s . HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC,

Branch 15, Ozamis City; COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Go, Cojuangco, Mendoza & Ligon for petitioner. prLL

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; FINALITY OF JUDGMENT; PUBLIC POLICY DEMANDS

JUDGMENT TO BECOME FINAL AT SOME DEFINITE DATE. — Litigations must end and
terminate sometime and somewhere, it being essential to the effective administration of
justice that once a judgment has become nal, the winning party be not, through a mere
subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Hence, courts must guard themselves
against any scheme to bring about that result, for constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, they should frown upon any attempt to prolong it (Lim Kim Tho vs. Go Siu
Kao, 82 Phil. 776 [1949]). Public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts should become nal and irrevocable at some
de nite date xed by law. Interes rei publicae ut nis sit litium (Tolentino vs . Ongsiako, 7
SCRA 1001 [1963]; Villaflor vs. Reyes, 22 SCRA 385 [1968]).
2. LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYERS; SHOULD NOT MISUSE THE RULES OF PROCEDURE TO
DEFEAT THE ENDS OF JUSTICE. — While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of
their clients, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights, and the exertion of
their utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing be taken away or be withheld from
them, save by the rules of law legally applied (Canon 15, Canons of Professional Ethics),
they should not forget that they are o cers of the court, bound to exert every effort and
placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and e cient administration of justice (Canon 12,
Canons of Professional Responsibility). They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of
procedure to defeat the ends of justice (Rule 10.03, Canon 10, Id.) or unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04, Canon 12, Id.).

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR. , J : p

In our resolution of 31 May 1995 dismissing this petition for "utter lack of merit," we
required attorneys for petitioner to show cause "why they should not be disciplinarily dealt
with for impeding the execution of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 85-49 and for
misusing the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice in violation of Rule 10.03,
Canon 10 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility." The
backdrop of our order is summarized in the resolution in this wise:
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 The petitioner seeks the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari
and mandamus to annul and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Ozamis City, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 85-49, the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals of 5 September 1990 in CA-G.R. CR No. 07482, and the
Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 108331; and to order the Court of Appeals to
give due course to the petitioner's appeal upon the filing of appellant's brief.

The Comment of the O ce of the Solicitor General reveals the following

procedural antecedents, some of which are suppressed in the petition.

In spite of its resolution of 5 September 1990 in CA-G.R. CR No. 07482

dismissing the petitioner's appeal from the RTC decision in Criminal Case No. 85-
49 for failure to le the appellant's brief, the Court of Appeals accepted her
Memorandum of 28 September 1990 wherein she raised the errors allegedly
committed by the trial court. On 8 April 1991, the O ce of the Solicitor General
led the Appellee's Brief refuting all the assigned errors. Since no reply brief was
led by the petitioner, the Court of Appeals, in its resolution of 21 June 1991,
resolved to consider the case submitted for decision without the said brief.

On 9 June 1992, the Court of Appeals a rmed with modi cation the
decision of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court nds the accused Aurelia Gomez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Libel, de ned and penalized under Article
355, in relation to Article 355 (sic) and 354 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances present, she is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, to pay
a ne of P2,000.00 to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to pay the offended
party Marieto M. Tan, Sr. the amount of P70,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and to
pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
Her motion to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals having been
denied, the petitioner elevated the case to this Court on a petition for review on
certiorari which was docketed as G.R. No. 108331. This petition was, however,
denied for non-compliance with Circular Nos. 1-88 and 28-91.

Acting on the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, this Court, in the

resolution of 31 March 1993, reinstated the petition but denied it nonetheless "for
being factual and for failure of the petitioner to su ciently show that respondent
court had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment." Petitioner's
motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of the resolution of 31
March 1993 were denied with finality.
On 28 June 1993, this Court noted without action the petitioner's letter
requesting that the issues raised in the supplemental motion for reconsideration
be given due reconsideration.
In the resolution of 23 August 1993, this Court denied the petitioner's
motion to admit second motion for reconsideration and the second motion for
reconsideration. Entry of judgment in G.R. No. 108331 was accordingly made on
8 September 1993.
The petition further discloses that this Court denied the petitioner's petition
(G.R. No. 116398) to set aside the RTC's denial of her application for probation.
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 The motion for reconsideration met the same fate. Upon the prosecution's motion
for execution of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 85-49, the trial court issued a
warrant of arrest.
In the nal analysis then, the instant petition is to annul and set aside this
Court's nal resolution in G.R. No. 108331. The attorneys for the petitioner know,
or ought to know, that the special civil action for certiorari will not lie against a
nal judgment of this Court. Even granting for the sake of argument that it could,
this petition must fail for being led one (1) year, four (4) months, and nineteen
(19) days after the entry of judgment in G.R. No. 108331 or long after the
jurisprudentially established "reasonable time" prescribed for the remedy under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
As this Court sees it, the instant petition is a clever ploy to further delay the
execution of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 85-49.

In their Explanation dated 21 June 1995 submitted in compliance with the above
show-cause order, attorneys for petitioner, namely: Alvin C. Go, Fernando C. Cojuangco,
Vigor D. Mendoza, II, and Antonio A. Ligon, averred:
Counsel for petitioner beg the indulgence of this Honorable Court in asking
for the extraordinary relief of seeking a declaration of mistrial of the libel case
tried in the lower court through the special civil action for certiorari as they were
impelled by their conviction that petitioner performed a moral and legal obligation
in writing the letter which was the basis for libel, as she did, which disclosed the
price xing and price rigging of oil products by the private complainant, Mr.
Marieto Tan, for his private benefit (in Criminal Case No. 85-49, RTC-Ozamis City).

While counsel for petitioner are aware that their rst bounden duty as
o cers of the Court is to honor and follow Court rules issued for the orderly and
e cient administration of justice ( Banogon vs. Zerna, 154 SCRA 593; Toledo vs .
Burgos, 168 SCRA 513), they are equally burdened by their foremost obligation to
prevent any miscarriage of justice in accordance with their convictions. Herein
counsel had perused the available pleadings and court processes in the libel
against petitioner, and were fully convinced thereof and impelled by their desire to
legally assist the latter to substantiate her innocence for the crime of libel. If they
had overstretched the parameters of the conduct required of lawyers in trying to
protect their client's liberty by resorting to this judicial process of certiorari, herein
counsel had acted in good faith and beg the kind indulgence of this Honorable
Court for such action.
Contrary to the representations of the O ce of the Solicitor General, herein
counsel were candid in the presentation of the factual and procedural
antecedents based on pleadings given to them by their client. Counsel disclosed
in the petition in page 10 thereof that there is already an Entry of Judgment in
Criminal Case No. 85-49.
Herein counsel similarly disclosed that —

"Moreover, up to this date, Atty. Pactolin refused to surrender the records of the
aforementioned case, so that accused-petitioner experienced extreme di culties in ling
the instant petition. And consequently, accused-petitioner stands helpless in determining
the material dates of receipt of all orders, judgments, and other processes of the trial
court, Court of Appeals, and that of this Honorable Court, all of which were addressed to
Atty. Rodolfo Pactolin. . . ."
Hence, it could not be stated that herein counsel misrepresented on the
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 procedural antecedents in this case. LexLib

Rather, when counsel did institute the present petition, they were invoking
the equity jurisdiction of this Honorable Court such that procedural rules be set
aside to serve the ends of justice, as the liberty of a person is at stake.
Herein counsel comprehend the di culty in questioning procedural
parameters for the e cient and orderly administration of justice in strictly
following Court orders and jurisprudence implementing thereof, but equally
compelling is their sworn duty to protect a client who has been innocently
charged and stands to suffer deprivation of liberty should counsel omit to resort
to the extraordinary relief they sought in this petition.

In the resolution of 9 August 1995, we then required the aforenamed lawyers to

inform the Court if they were willing to submit the disciplinary matter for resolution on
the basis of their Explanation. In compliance therewith, on 8 September 1995, they led
a Manifestation wherein they expressed that it had not been their intention to violate the
Code of Professional Responsibility and likewise apologized to the Court "for whatever
inconvenience the filing of the instant petition may have entailed."
We find the explanation preferred unsatisfactory and the justification set forth for
their action flimsy.
As to the charge of suppression of factual and procedural antecedents, we
cannot lend credence to the gossamer claim of petitioner's counsel that they were
"candid" in their presentation of these antecedents as evidenced by their disclosure, on
page 10 of the petition, that there already was an entry of judgment in Criminal Case
No. 85-49. Neither can we nd tenable the allegation that up to the date the petition
was led, Atty. Pactolin refused to surrender the records of the case, for which reason,
petitioner stood "helpless in determining the material dates of receipt of all orders,
judgments, and other processes of the trial court, Court of Appeals and that of this
Honorable Court, all of which were addressed to Atty. Rodolfo Pactolin."
In the rst place, attorneys for petitioner do not even claim that Atty. Pactolin
unreasonably refused to turn over the records to petitioner; ex hypothesi, he could have
legitimately retained them pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court until
petitioner paid him his lawful fees. In any event, Attorneys Go, Cojuangco, Mendoza, and
Ligon were fully aware of the existence of their client's (petitioner's) case with the trial
court, Court of Appeals, and this Court, and had unhampered access to the records
thereof, especially those of the Court of Appeals and this Court since their o ce is
located near said Courts. In less than half a day, any one of them or their authorized
representatives could have personally sought the information they wanted from said
Courts. Anent the records of the criminal case in Ozamis City, if for whatever reason
petitioner could not personally secure photocopies of pertinent pleadings, orders,
decisions, and other processes therein, counsel could have merely requested the Clerk
of Court thereof for the necessary information. As a matter of fact, the annexes
attached to the petition showed beyond cavil that counsel could have, without exerting
undue effort, obtained the requisite information with respect to the cases before the
trial court, the Court of Appeals, and this Court. LLcd

Obviously then, the suppression of vital facts by counsel for petitioner, exposed
by the O ce of the Solicitor General, was not due to the unavailability of such facts to
counsel nor the di culty of obtaining them; in legal contemplation, excusable
negligence was not present in the instant case. Plainly, the concealment resorted to
was nothing but a stratagem to give the petition a semblance of a valid grievance or a
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 viable cause of action. Petitioner's counsel knew, or were reasonably expected to know,
the hopelessness of their client's cause since the petition was led, it bears repeating,
one year, four months, and nineteen days after the entry of judgment in G.R. No. 108331
— long after the lapse of the jurisprudentially established measure of "reasonable time"
prescribed for the remedy under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Howsoever viewed, the ling of the instant petition was nothing but a scheme to
frustrate and further delay the execution of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 85-49.
Neither could a claim of denial of due process save the day for petitioner as the
judgment of the trial court was a rmed only after due proceedings by the Court of
Appeals which, parenthetically, even extended the utmost liberality to petitioner who
failed to le her Brief. Said judgment was ultimately sustained by us in the resolution of
31 March 1993 in G.R. No. 108331, which had long become nal, with the entry of
judgment made on 8 September 1993 yet. Thus, no depth of honest belief as to the
innocence of the accused could alter the nal verdict. Petitioner's counsel, if they are so
minded, can only seek to relieve their client from the effects of the judgment from
another forum, e.g., they may consider executive clemency.
Counsel's gambit is condemnable for it clearly disregards a lawyer's duty to
maintain absolute candor, fairness, and good faith to the Court (Canon 10, Code of
Professional Responsibility). In Santos vs. Paguio (227 SCRA 770, 779 [1993]), we
declared, in no uncertain terms, that this Court can neither condone nor tolerate
attempts to mislead it through suppression of important facts which would have a
bearing on its initial action.
We stress once again what we said before, that litigations must end and
terminate sometime and somewhere, it being essential to the effective administration
of justice that once a judgment has become nal, the winning party be not, through a
mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Hence, courts must guard
themselves against any scheme to bring about that result, for constituted as they are to
put an end to controversies, they should frown upon any attempt to prolong it (Lim Kim
Tho vs. Go Siu Kao, 82 Phil. 776 [1949]). Public policy and sound practice demand that
at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become nal and
irrevocable at some de nite date xed by law. Interes rei publicae ut nis sit litium
(Tolentino vs. Ongsiako, 7 SCRA 1001 [1963]; Villa or vs. Reyes, 22 SCRA 385 [1968]).
And for lawyers who disregard these postulates, we stated in Banogon vs. Zerna (154
SCRA 593 [1987]), reiterated in Chua Huat vs. Court of Appeals (199 SCRA 1, 15
[1991]), that:
As o cers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper
administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by ling pointless
petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court,
which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and law should
advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be led to
merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the
cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit
do not deserve the attention of the courts.

While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of their rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and
ability, to the end that nothing be taken away or be withheld from them, save by the rules of
law legally applied (Canon 15, Canons of Professional Ethics), they should not forget that
they are officers of the court, bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in
the speedy and e cient administration of justice (Canon 12, Canons of Professional
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 Responsibility). They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the
ends of justice (Rule 10.03, Canon 10, Id.) or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04, Canon 12, Id.).
As a nal point, we wish to state that the apology contained in the Explanation is
misplaced. Counsel ought to know that they were not required to show cause for the
inconvenience the ling of the petition caused this Court. The apology insinuates, rather
smartly, that we required them to show cause out of our whims or caprice, which, of
course, is baseless, as demonstrated by our observations in the resolution of 31 May
1995, particularly on the suppression of vital facts by the attorneys for petitioner.
We do not then hesitate to declare that counsel for petitioner, Attorneys Alvin C.
Go, Fernando C. Cojuangco, Vigor D. Mendoza, II, and Antonio A. Ligon have breached
the foregoing Canons and Rules. LLjur

WHEREFORE, Attorneys ALVIN C. GO, FERNANDO C. COJUANGCO, VIGOR D.

MENDOZA, II, and ANTONIO A. LIGON are hereby CENSURED and warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

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