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THIRD DIVISION

SKUNAC CORPORATION and G.R. No. 205879

ALFONSO F. ENRIQUEZ,
Petitioners,
Present:

VELASCO, JR., J, Chairperson,

- PERALTA,
versus- ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
LEONEN,JJ.

ROBERTO S. SYLIANTENG and

CAESARS. SYLIANTENG, Promulgated:
Respondents.
April 23, 20
X--------------------------------------------------------------------------

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This treats of the petition for review on certiorari assailing the

1 2
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August
10, 2012 and February 18, 2013, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 92022.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as narrated by the

CA, are as follows:

The civil cases before the [Regional Trial Court of Pasig City)
involved two (2) parcels of land identified as Lot 1, with an area of 1,250
square meters (Civil Case No. 63987) and Lot 2, with an area of 990
square meters (Civil Case No. 63988), both found in Block 2 of the Pujalte

Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon with Associate Justices Samuel H. Gaerlan and
Abraham B. Borreta concurring; Annex "A" to Petition, rolla pp. 42-63.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon with Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid
and Samuel H. Gaerlan concurring; Annex "8" to Petition, id. at 64-67.
Decision 1 G.R. No.
205879

Subdivision situated along Wilson Street, Greenhills, San Juan City

which are portions of a parcel of land previously registered in the name
of Luis
A. Pujalte on October 29, 1945 and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (“TCT”) No. (-78865) (-2668) -93165 (“Mother Title”) of the
Register of Deeds for the City of Manila.

Plaintiffs-appellants Roberto S. Sylianteng and Caesar S.

Sylianteng (“appellants”) base their claim of ownership over the subject
lots a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in their favor by their mother,
Emerenciana Sylianteng (“Emerenciana”), on June 27, 1983. Appellants
further allege that Emerenciana acquired the lots from the late Luis Pujalte
[Luis] through a Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1958 as reflected in Entry
No. P.E. 4023, annotated on the covering TCT, by virtue of which she
was issued TCT No. 42369. Then, when she sold the lots to appellants,
TCT No. 39488, covering the same, was issued in their names.

[Herein petitioners] Skunac Corporation (“Skunac”) and Alfonso

F. Enriquez (“Enriquez”), on the other hand, claim that a certain
Romeo Pujalte who was declared by the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151
in Special Proceedings No. 3366 as the sole heir of Luis Pujalte, caused
the reconstitution of the Mother Title resulting to its cancellation and the
issuance of TCT No. 5760-R in his favor. Romeo Pujalte then
allegedly sold the lots to Skunac and Enriquez in 1992. Thus, from TCT
No. 5760- R, TCT No. 5888-R, for Lot 1 was issued in the name of
Skunac, while TCT No. 5889-R for Lot 2 was issued in the name of
Enriquez.

[Respondents] contend that they have a better right to the lots in

question because the transactions conveying the same to them preceded
those claimed by [petitioners] as source of the latter's titles. [Respondents]
further assert that [petitioners] could not be considered as innocent
purchasers in good faith and for value because they had prior notice of
the previous transactions as stated in the memorandum of encumbrances
annotated on the titles covering the subject lots. [Petitioners], for their
part, maintain that [respondents] acquired the lots under questionable
circumstances it appearing that there was no copy of the Deed of Sale,
between Emerenciana and Luis Pujalte, on file with the Office of the
Register of Deeds.3

On November 16, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig (RTC)

rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioners. The dispositive portion of
the RTC Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs:

3 Rollo, pp. 43-45.

 1. Declaring as null and void TCT No. 42369 in the name
of Emerciana (sic) Sylianteng and TCT No. 39488 in the
name of plaintiffs herein and ordering the cancellation
thereof;

2. Declaring the herein defendants as buyers in good faith

and for value; and

3. Declaring TCT No. 5888-R in the name of SKUNAC

Corporation and TCT No. 5889-R in the name of Alfonso
Enriquez as valid.

The complaint-in-intervention is ordered dismissed.

With costs against the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.4

Herein respondents then filed an appeal with the CA.

On August 10, 2012, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision,

disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appeal is

GRANTED. The decision dated November 16, 2007 of Branch 160,
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Case No. 63987 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs-appellants

Roberto S. Sylianteng and Caesar S. Sylianteng and against
defendants- appellees Skunac Corporation and Alfonso F. Enriquez,
and intervenor- appellee Romeo N. Pujalte:

1. Declaring as null and void Transfer Certificate

of Title No. 5760-R in the name of Romeo N. Pujalte,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5888-R in the name
of Skunac Corporation, and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 5889-R in the name of Alfonso F. Enriquez;

2. Upholding the validity of Transfer Certificate of

Title No. 42369 in the name of Emerenciana
Sylianteng, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 39488 in
the names of Roberto S. Sylianteng and Caesar S.
Sylianteng; and

3. Ordering defendants-appellees Skunac

Corporation and Alfonso F. Enriquez, and intervenor-
appellee Romeo N. Pujalte, jointly and severally, to
pay plaintiffs-appellants Roberto S. Sylianteng and
Caesar S. Sylianteng:

4 Records, Vol. V, p. 156.

 a. Moral damages in the amount of
P500,000.00,
b. Exemplary damages in the amount
of P500,000.00,
c. Attorney's fees in the amount of
P250,000.00, and
d. The costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.5

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in

its Resolution dated February 18, 2013.

Hence, the instant petition with the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

APPLYING IN THE CASE THE PROVISION OF THE CIVIL CODE
ON DOUBLE SALE OF A REGISTERED LAND.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE THE
EXISTENCE OF SALE BETWEEN LUIS PUJALTE AND THEIR
PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST, EMERENCIANA SYLIANTENG.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

DECLARING NULL AND VOID TCT NO. 42369 PURPORTED TO
HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO EMERENCIANA SYLIANTENG BY
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY.

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE THE LAWFUL OWNERS OF
THE SUBJECT LOTS SINCE THEY HAVE VALIDLY ACQUIRED
THE SAME FROM ROMEO PUJALTE, THE SOLE HEIR OF LUIS
PUJALTE.

V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COST OF SUIT TO RESPONDENTS
CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONERS WERE NOT IN BAD FAITH
IN PURCHASING THE SUBJECT LOTS.6

The petition lacks merit.

5 Rollo, pp. 62-63. (Emphasis in the original)

6 Id. at 21.
 At the outset, the Court observes that the main issues raised in the
instant petition are essentially questions of fact. It is settled that, as a rule, in
petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be put in issue.7 Questions of fact cannot be
entertained. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule, to wit:

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant
and the appellee;
(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial
court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.8

In the instant case, the findings of the CA and the RTC are conflicting.
It, thus, behooves this Court to entertain the questions of fact raised by
petitioners and review the records of this case to resolve these conflicting
findings. Thus, this Court held in the case of Manongsong v. Estimo9 that:

We review the factual and legal issues of this case in light of

the general rules of evidence and the burden of proof in civil cases, as
explained by this Court in Jison v. Court of Appeals:

x x x Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue

has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case,
the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial
in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case
in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to
defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case,
otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff.
Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of
proof must produce a

7 Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Banas, G.R. No. 184116, June 19, 2013, 699 SCRA 157, 165.
8 Andrada v. Pilhino Sales Corporation, G.R. No. 156448, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 1,
10. (Emphasis ours)
9
452 Phil. 862 (2003).
 preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the defendant’s. The concept of “preponderance
of evidence” refers to evidence which is of greater weight,
or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it;
at bottom, it means probability of truth.10

Coming to the merits of the case, the abovementioned assignment of

errors boils down to two basic questions: (1) whether or not respondents'
predecessor-in-interest, Emerenciana, validly acquired the subject lots from
Luis, and (2) whether or not respondents, in turn, validly acquired the same
lots from Emerenciana.

The Court rules in the affirmative, but takes exception to the CA's and
RTC's application of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.

Reliance by the trial and appellate courts on Article 1544 of the Civil
Code is misplaced. The requisites that must concur for Article 1544 to apply
are:

(a) The two (or more sales) transactions must constitute valid
sales;
(b) The two (or more) sales transactions must pertain to exactly the
same subject matter;
(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership
of the subject matter must each represent conflicting interests; and
(d) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful
ownership of the subject matter must each have bought from the very
same seller.11

Obviously, said provision has no application in cases where the sales

involved were initiated not by just one but two vendors.12 In the present
case, the subject lots were sold to petitioners and respondents by two
different vendors – Emerenciana and Romeo Pujalte (Romeo). Hence,
Article 1544 of the Civil Code is not applicable.

Nonetheless, the Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the
CA that Emerenciana's acquisition of the subject lots from Luis and her
subsequent sale of the same to respondents are valid and lawful. Petitioners
dispute such finding. To prove their contention, they assail the authenticity
and due execution of the deed of sale between Luis and Emerenciana.

10 Id. at 876-877. (Emphasis in the original)

11 Cano Vda. de Viray v. Usi, G.R. No. 192486, November 21, 2012, 686 SCRA 211, 237-238;
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Tirol, 606 Phil. 641, 650 (2009). (Emphasis in the original)
12 Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Tirol, supra note 11; Consolidated Rural
Bank (Cagayan Valley) v. Court of Appeals, 489 Phil. 320, 331 (2005).
 Petitioners contend that respondents' presentation of the
“duplicate/carbon” original of the Deed of Sale13 dated June 20, 1958 is in
violation of the best evidence rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.14 The Court does not agree.

The best evidence rule is inapplicable to the present case. The said
rule applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the
inquiry.15 Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually
executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible.16 Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible
without need to account for the original.17 In the instant case, what is being
questioned is the authenticity and due execution of the subject deed of sale.
There is no real issue as to its contents.

In any case, going to the matter of authenticity and due execution of

the assailed document, petitioners do not dispute that the copy of the deed of
sale that respondents submitted as part of their evidence is a duplicate of the
original deed of sale dated June 20, 1958. It is settled that a signed carbon
copy or duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the original is
known as a duplicate original and maybe introduced in evidence without
accounting for the non-production of the original.18

Moreover, Section 4 (b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that
“[w]hen a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same
time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as
originals.”

In addition, evidence of the authenticity and due execution of the

subject deed is the fact that it was notarized. The notarization of a private
document converts it into a public document.19 Moreover, a notarized
instrument is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due
execution, is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents, and has in its
favor the presumption of regularity.20 This presumption is affirmed if it is
beyond dispute that the notarization was regular.21 To assail the authenticity

13 Exhibit “B-1-C,” folder of exhibits, Vol. 2, pp. 43-

46.
14 Under the best evidence rule, as applied to documentary evidence and subject to exceptions as
provided under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original itself when the subject of inquiry is its contents.
15
Gaw v. Chua, 574 Phil. 640, 655-656
(2008).
16 Id. at 656.
17 Id
.
18 Vallarta v. Court of Appeals, 256 Phil. 596, 602-603
(1988).
19 Gaw v. Chua, supra note 15, at
655.
20 Chua v. Westmont Bank, G.R. No. 182650, February 27, 2012, 667 SCRA 56, 65-
 66.
21 Meneses v. Venturozo, G.R. No. 172196, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 577,
586.
and due execution of a notarized document, the evidence must be clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant.22

In the present case, petitioners failed to present convincing evidence

to prove that the notarization of the subject deed was irregular as to strip it of
its public character. On the contrary, a certified copy of page 26 of the
notarial register of the notary public who notarized the subject deed of sale,
which was issued by the Records Management and Archives Office of
Manila, shows that the sale of the subject lots by Luis to Emerenciana was
indeed regularly notarized.23

Petitioners further argue that the deed of sale between Emerenciana

and Luis was not registered with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The
Court, however, agrees with the CA that the said deed was, in fact,
registered as evidenced by official receipts24 issued to this effect. Petitioners,
again, did not present any evidence to assail the authenticity of these
documents.

Petitioners also question the authenticity of the subject deed of sale

(Exhibit “B-1-C”) by arguing that only one copy of such deed was prepared
as only one document number was assigned by the notary to the said deed.
Petitioners claim that this is contrary to the claim of respondents that the said
deed of sale was prepared, executed and notarized in several copies. The
Court is not persuaded.

It is true that Section 246, Article V, Title IV, Chapter II of the

Revised Administrative Code provides that “[t]he notary shall give to
each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number
corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the
instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is
recorded.” In this regard, the Court agrees with respondents' contention
that the “instrument” being referred to in the abovequoted provision is the
deed or contract which is notarized. It does not pertain to the number of
copies of such deed or contract. Hence, one number is assigned to a deed
or contract regardless of the number of copies prepared and notarized. Each
and every copy of such contract is given the same document number. It
is, thus, wrong for petitioners to argue that only one copy of the June 20,
1958 deed of sale was prepared and notarized, because only one document
number appears on the notarial book of the notary public who notarized
the said deed. On the contrary, evidence shows that at least two copies of
the subject deed of sale was prepared and notarized – one was submitted
for registration with the

22 Manongsong v. Estimo, supra note 9, at 877-878.

23 See Exhibit “B-1-J,” folder of exhibits, Vol. 2, p. 55.
24 Exhibits “B-1-G” and “B-1-H,” folder of exhibits, Vol. 2, pp. 52-53.
Register of Deeds of Quezon City and the other was retained by
Emerenciana, which is the copy presented in evidence by respondents.

As to petitioners' contention that the copy of the deed of sale

presented by respondents in evidence is of dubious origin because it does not
bear the stamp “RECEIVED” by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
suffice it to state that the Court finds no cogent reason to disagree with
respondents' contention that the duplicate original of the subject deed of sale
which they presented as evidence in court could not have been received by
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City because only the original copy, and
not the duplicate original, was submitted to the Register of Deeds for
registration.

Petitioners also question the authenticity of and the entries appearing

on the copy of the title covering the subject properties in the name of Luis.
However, the Court finds no cogent reason to doubt the authenticity of the
document as well as the entries appearing therein, considering that the
parties (herein petitioners and respondents) stipulated25 that the machine
copy of TCT No. 78865 in the name of Luis, marked as Exhibit “DDD” for
respondents, is a faithful reproduction of the original copy of the said title,
including the memorandum of encumbrances annotated therein. Included in
the memorandum of encumbrances is Entry No. P.E. 4023, which states,
thus:

This certificate of title is hereby cancelled (sic) partially with

respect to Lots 1 and 2, Blk. 2 by virtue of a Deed of Sale ratified on June
20, 1958 before Armenio P. Engracia of Notary for the City of Manila
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42369 is issued in the name of
Vendee, Emerenciana A.S. de Sylianteng, filing the aforesaid Deed
under T-No. 42369.26

The same entry appears in Exhibit “11” for petitioners.27

P.E. No. 4023 has been entered on TCT No. 78865 by the then Acting
Register of Deeds of San Juan. Petitioners assail the regularity of such entry.
However, one of the disputable presumptions provided under Section 3 (m),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court is that official duty has been regularly
performed. Under the said Rule, this presumption shall be considered
satisfactory unless contradicted and overcome by other evidence. In the
present case, petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to contradict
the presumption of regularity in the performance of the duties of then Acting
Register of Deeds of San Juan.

25 TSN, September 13, 2001, pp. 19-22.

26 Exhibit “DDD-1-D,” records, Vol. IV, p. 570.
27 See records, Vol. IV, p. 446.
 Petitioners, nonetheless, insist that they have valid title over the
subject properties. They trace their respective titles from that of Romeo.
Romeo, in turn, derives his supposed ownership of and title over the subject
lots from his claim that he is the sole heir of the estate of his alleged
predecessor-in-interest, Luis. Evidence, however, shows that Romeo never
became the owner of the subject properties for two reasons.

First, as shown above, the disputed lots were already sold by Luis
during his lifetime. Thus, these parcels of land no longer formed part of his
estate when he died. As a consequence, Romeo's sale of the disputed lots to
petitioners was not affirmed by the estate court, because the subject parcels
of land were not among those included in the said estate at the time that
Romeo was appointed as the administrator thereof. As shown in its October
11, 1993 Order,28 the RTC of Pasig, acting as an estate court, denied
Romeo's motion for approval of the sale of the subject lots, because these
properties were already sold to respondents per report submitted by the
Register of Deeds of San Juan.

In fact, as early as July 14, 1960, prior to Romeo's appointment as

administrator of the estate of Luis, Paz L. Vda. de Pujalte (Paz), the mother
of Luis, who was then appointed administratrix of the estate of the latter, in
her Inventory and Appraisal29 which was submitted to the estate court,
already excluded the subject properties among those which comprise the
estate of Luis. Subsequently, in the Project of Partition30 of the residual
estate of Luis, dated March 22, 1963, Paz again did not include the disputed
lots as part of such residual estate. Hence, Romeo's sale of the subject lots to
petitioners is invalid as it is settled that any unauthorized disposition of
property under administration is null and void and title does not pass to the
purchasers.31

Second, even granting that the subject lots formed part of the estate of
Luis, it was subsequently proven in a separate case that Romeo is not his
heir. In a criminal case for use of falsified documents filed against Romeo, it
was proven that his claim of heirship is spurious. In the said criminal case,
his birth certificate and the marriage certificate of his supposed parents,
which he presented before the estate court, to prove his claim that he is the
sole heir of Luis, were found by the criminal court to be falsified.32 In this
regard, it bears to note the disquisition of the CA as to the legitimacy of

28 Exhibit “P,” folder of exhibits, Vol. 2, p. 129.

29 Exhibit “Q,” folder of exhibits, Vol. 1, p. 130.
30 Exhibi “J-3,” id at 100.
31 Lee v. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85, 467 Phil. 997, 1016 (2004); Dillena v.
Court of Appeals, 246 Phil. 644, 653 (1988).
32 See Exhibit “GGG,” records, Vol. IV, pp. 591-595.
Romeo's claim, and its subsequent effect on petitioners' rights to the
disputed properties, to wit:

Appellees' [herein petitioners'] predicament is further compounded

by Romeo Pujalte's conviction on November 18, 2005 of the offense
of Use of Falsified Documents, for falsifying the documents that
enabled him to deceive the estate court and have himself named as Luis
Pujalte's sole heir. He did not appeal his conviction and, instead, applied
for probation. It goes without saying that the documents purportedly
conveying the lots in question to appellees and which are founded on
Romeo Pujalte's alleged rights over the estate of the late Luis Pujalte do
not deserve any consideration at all. x x x33

Indeed, not being an heir of Luis, Romeo never acquired any right
whatsoever over the subject lots, even if he was able to subsequently obtain
a title in his name. It is a well-settled principle that no one can give what one
does not have, nemo dat quod non habet.34 One can sell only what one owns
or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more right than what
the seller can transfer legally.35 Since Romeo has no right to the subject
lots, petitioners, who simply stepped into the shoes of Romeo, in turn,
acquired no rights to the same.

In addition, and as correctly pointed out by the CA, petitioners'

position is neither helped by the fact that, in the present case, Romeo filed a
Verified Complaint-in-Intervention36 with the RTC, denying that he sold the
subject lots to petitioners and claiming that the same properties still form
part of the estate of Luis.

Stretching petitioners' contention a bit further, granting that both

petitioners and respondents bought the disputed lots in good faith by simply
relying on the certificates of the sellers, and subsequently, acquiring titles in
their own names, respondents' title shall still prevail. It is a settled rule that
when two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the
same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail, and, in case of
successive registrations where more than one certificate is issued over the
land, the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a
person who relies on a subsequent certificate.37 The titles of respondents,
having emanated from an older title, should thus be upheld.

33 Rollo, pp. 57-58.

34
Rufloe v. Burgos, 597 Phil. 261, 270 (2009).
35 Id.
36 Records, Vol. 1, pp. 251-255.
37 Sanchez v. Quinio, 502 Phil. 40, 46 (2005), citing Margolles v. CA, G.R. No. 109490, February 14,
1994, 230 SCRA 97, 114.
 Anent petitioners' bad faith, this Court finds no persuasive reason to
depart from the findings of the CA that petitioners had prior knowledge of
the estate proceedings involving the subject lots and that they have notice of
the defect in the title of Romeo.

It is true that a person dealing with registered land need not go beyond
the title. However, it is equally true that such person is charged with notice
of the burdens and claims which are annotated on the title.38 In the instant
case, The Torrens Certificate of Title (TCT No. 5760-R) in the name of
Romeo, which was the title relied upon by petitioners, also contained Entry
No. P.E. 4023, quoted above, which essentially informs petitioners that the
lots which they were about to buy and which they in fact bought, were
already sold to Emerenciana.39 This entry should have alerted petitioners and
should have prodded them to conduct further investigation. Simple prudence
would have impelled them as honest persons to make deeper inquiries to
clear the suspiciousness haunting Romeo's title. On the contrary, rather than
taking caution in dealing with Romeo, petitioners, instead, subsequently
executed deeds of sale40 over the same properties but all of which were,
nonetheless, disallowed by the estate court in its Order41 dated October 11,
1993 on the ground that the said lots were already sold, this time, by
Emerenciana to respondents. In this regard, petitioners acted in bad faith.

Thus, as correctly held by the CA, respondents are entitled to moral

damages. Moral damages are treated as compensation to alleviate physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury
resulting from a wrong.42 In the instant case, respondents satisfactorily
established their claim for moral damages. They endured suffering brought
about by Romeo's bad faith in using falsified documents to enable himself to
acquire title to and sell the subject lots to petitioners to the prejudice of
respondents. Respondents also suffered by reason of petitioners' stubborn
insistence in buying the said properties despite their knowledge of the defect
in the title of Romeo.43 Though moral damages are not capable of pecuniary
estimation, the amount should be proportional to and in approximation of the
suffering inflicted.44 Respondents sought the award of P1,000,000.00 as

38 Casimiro Development Corporation v. Mateo, G.R. No. 175485, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 676,
689-690.
39 See note 26.
40 See Exhibits “N-1,” “N-2,” “O-1,” “O-2,” folder of exhibits, Vol. 2, pp. 117-121 and 124-128.
41 Exhibit “P,” folder of exhibits, Vol. 2, p. 129.
42 Spouses Eliseo and Empera Triz C. Bautista v. Spouses Mila and Antonio Jalandoni, et al.,
G.R. No. 171464, November 27, 2013.
43 See also TSN, July 10, 1995, p. 13.
44 Spouses Eliseo and Empera Triz C. Bautista v. Spouses Mila and Antonio Jalandoni, et al., supra
note 42.
 Decision 13 GR. No. 205879

moral damages from each of the petitioners, but the Court agrees with the
CA that the total amount ofP.500,000.00 is sufficient for both respondents.

As to exemplary damages, these are imposed by way of example or

correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
45
compensatory damages. They are imposed not to enrich one party or
impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative
46
incentive to curb socially deleterious actions. While respondents were
again seeking the amount of P.1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages from
each of the petitioners, theCA correctly reduced it to a total ofP.500,000.00.

Respondents are also entitled to attorney's fees, as awarded by theCA,

on the strength of the provisions of Article 2208 of the Civil Code which
provides, among others, that such fees may be recovered when exemplary
damages are awarded, when the defendant's act or omission has compelled
the plaintiff to litigate with third persons, or in any other case where the
court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 10, 2012 and February 18,
2013, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 92022, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

J. VELASCO, JR.
iate Justice
hairperson

45
Civil Code, Art.2229.
46
Spouses E/iseo and Empera Triz C. Bautista v. Spouses Mila and Antonio Jalandoni, et a/., supra
note 42.
Decision 14 G.R. No. 205879

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CAT LM LDOZA

Associate Justice As so ;: %:

-G-- )"iARVIC MARIO CTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had bee reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the pinion of the

Court's Division.

PRESBITE 0 J. VELASCO, JR.

Chair erson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice