Republic v. Estenzo, G.R. L 35376, Sept. 11, 1980

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3/27/2021 G.R. No.

L-35512

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Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-35512 February 29, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners,


vs.
HON. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch V, Ormoc City,
FELIPE ADOLFO and FRANCISCA PADILLA, spouses, respondents.

CORTES, J.:
The parties in this case contest the ownership of a parcel of land situated in Barrio Valencia, Ormoc City. Herein petitioners maintain that the land is public land by
virtue of a 1940 cadastral court decision. Private respondents meanwhile take the opposite view claiming the land as their own based on their purchase thereof
from the original claimant, Apolonia Parrilla, and its subsequent adjudication in their favor in 1972.

The facts are undisputed.

On October 31, 1940, a decision was rendered by the Cadastral Court declaring Lot No. 8423 of the Ormoc
Cadastre as public land.

Thirty-two years later, more specifically on January 12,1972, Felipe Adolfo and Francisca Padilla, hereinafter
referred to as the SPOUSES, filed a petition docketed as Cadastral Case No. 34, GLRO Rec. No. 1789 seeking to
"re-open the October 31, 1940 decision of the Cadastral Court under Rep. Act No. 931, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 2061 and further amended by Rep. Act No. 6236" [Petition, Annex "B," Rollo, p. 9]. The SPOUSES, claiming to
be the owners of Lot No. 8423 by virtue of having purchased the same in 1948 as evidenced by a Deed of Quitclaim
and Confirmation dated August 28, 1969, likewise allege that due to the excusable negligence, accident or mistake
of the previous claimant and her counsel, the land was declared public land; that they and their predecessor-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the land and have declared the same
for purposes of taxation in their name(s); that Lot No. 8423 has not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted or
otherwise disposed of either provisionally or permanently by the government or its entity; and that up to the filing of
the petition, they and their predecessor-in-interest have not applied for any homestead, free patent, lease or sale,
over the parcel of land under Public Land Act No. 141. Despite the opposition of the Director of Lands respondent
Judge granted the SPOUSES' petition on May 9, 1972. Hence, Lot No. 8423 was adjudicated in their favor.

The Republic and the Director of Lands now assail that decision by way of appeal by certiorari.

The petitioners' stance that the lower court is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition to re-open the
cadastral proceedings is premised on their argument that SPOUSES' petition is barred by the expiration of the
period for re-opening of cadastral proceedings under Rep. Act No. 931. They argue that said period expired on
December 31, 1968 and was never extended.

The argument of the petitioners is impressed with merit. Rep. Act No. 931 1 section 1 provides:

All persons claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings, who at
the time of the survey were in actual possession of the same, but for some justifiable reason had been
unable to file their claim in the proper court during the time limit established by law, in case such
parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or are about to be declared
land of the public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty year next preceding
the approval of this Act, are hereby granted the right within five years after the date on which this Act
shall take effect, to petition for a re-opening of the judicial proceedings under the provisions of act
Numbered Twenty-two hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, only with respect to such parcels of land as
have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed
of by the Government . . . .[Emphasis supplied.]

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This law took effect on June 20, 1953, hence, the period for reopening cadastral proceedings expired on June 20,
1958. However, Rep. Act No. 20612 section 2 extended this period until December 31, 1968, after which there had
been no further extension. [Republic v. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-35780, January 27, 1983,120 SCRA 220].

In the case at bar, the SPOUSES filed their petition more than three years after the lapse of the reglementary period
required by the law. The period having expired, respondent judge was without jurisdiction when he entertained
SPOUSES' petition to re-open the decision of the cadastral court.

The private respondent-SPOUSES would however insist that even assuming that the lower court has no jurisdiction
to re-open the cadastral proceedings their petition may be taken as one for confirmation of imperfect title
considering the allegations mentioned therein.

Well-recognized is the rule in this jurisdiction that "[T]he nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts
alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action." [De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc., G.R.
No. L-48928, February 25, 1982, 112 SCRA 243, reiterated in Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of appeals, G.R. No. L-
34298, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 37.]

A close look at SPOUSES' petition to re-open the cadastral proceedings of 1940 would show that their cause of
action is premised on Rep. Act No. 931 and not on confirmation of imperfect title. The allegations in their petition
conform to the conditions to be met before one could avail of the provisions of Rep. Act No. 931.

The SPOUSES further rely on Rep. Act No. 6236. 3 Said law, approved on June 19,1971, extended the time limit for
the filing of applications for free patents and for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles until
December 31, 1976 (extended until December 31,1987 by Pres. Decree 1073). The law makes no reference to re-
opening of cadastral cases. As held by this Court:

. . . If Rep. Act 6236 had intended that the extension it provided for applies also to reopening of
cadastral cases, it would have so provided in the same way that it provided the extension of time to file
applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. The intention to
exclude the re-opening of cadastral proceedings or certain lands which were declared public land in
Rep. Act 6236 is made clearer by reference to Rep. Act 2061 which includes the reopening of cadastral
cases, but not so included in Rep. Act 6236. [Republic v. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-35376, September 11,
1980,99 SCRA 651.].

And, as further clarified by the Supreme Court in Republic v. Reyes (G.R. No. L-37050, March 17, 1982, 112 SCRA
635):

... The Act [referring to Rep. Act 6236] cannot be any clearer. What was extended then was the time
limit for the filing of applications for free patents and for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles ....

Anent the last point raised by the SPOUSES, viz., the petition was filed out of time, suffice it to state that "the
requirements of our Rules of Court relative to the perfection of an appeal in an ordinary case apply in the same
manner and with equal force and effect to appeals from a decision of a court of first instance in registration and
cadastral proceedings." [Singbengco v. Arellano, 99 Phil. 952 (1956).] And under the provisions of the Rules of
Court then obtaining the period within which to appeal the decision of the Court of First Instance (now, Regional Trial
Court) to the Supreme Court was thirty days (Rule 42 section 1 and Rule 41 section 3.). Hence, from August 28,
1972 when the assailed decision was received by herein petitioners until September 15, 1972 when the petition was
filed, the thirty-day period had not yet elapsed.

WHEREFORE, the May 9, 1972 decision of the respondent judge is hereby SET ASIDE and that of the Cadastral
Court dated October 31, 1940 is REITERATED. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS,
OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC
BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE
APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.

2 AN ACT SETTING A NEW TIME LIMIT FOR THE FILING OF APPLICATIONS FOR FREE PATENT,
FOR THE JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT OR INCOMPLETE TITLES, AND FOR THE
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REOPENING OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ON CERTAIN LANDS WHICH WERE DECLARED


PUBLIC LANDS (1958).

3 AN ACT EXTENDING THE TIME LIMIT FOR THE FILING OF APPLICATIONS FOR FREE PATENT
AND FOR THE JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT OR INCOMPLETE TITLES (1971).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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