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5th assignment Mandatory Reading

COLONIALISM AND TRADITION

The kind of colonial system Spain established in the Philippines following the successful takeover of Manila
from the Muslim depended on the broad aims of Spanish colonialism. These may be summarized under the
headings, God, Glory, and Gold. The aims which were not necessarily mutually exclusive were clearly
expressed in the written instruction to the expedition from Magellan to Legazpi as well as from the
numerous reports, memorials, and correspondence of the religious orders -to and from the Philippines. It is
now essential to deal briefly with these aims.

COLONIAL AIMS

The portrait of Spain as a colonial power would be incomplete without the religious color given to its march
of empire. Equally emphasized by the crown was the need to spread Christianity throughout the Spanish
dominions. This in the New World or Latin America and North America as well as in the Philippines. The
expedition from 1565 was accompanied by religious missionaries who were as much prepared to preach
the Christian faith as they were to explore and exploit the material resources of the colonies. In particular,
when Magellan landed on Limasawa or Butuan, the first significant act taken beside the procurement of
needed provisions was the celebration of Mass, and upon landing in Cebu, the conversion of Rajah
Humabon and his people were effected.

But perhaps, more explicit was the religious aspects of Legazpi's expedition from 1565. Five Augustinian
friars "labored in harmony with Legazpi" and won converts. Their religious zeal and tireless efforts were
moved by almost obsessive desire to check the "slowly advancing - tide of Mohammedanism." The process
of Christianization in Cebu started with the conversion of King Tupas' niece. This was followed by the
conversion of a Muslim interpreter, King Tupas, and his son. The effect of such a breakthrough in the ruling
level of native society was to hasten the process of Christianization among the people for "the example of
Tupas had great weight." Thus, with the aid of Christianized Cebuanos, the Muslim stronghold of Manila
was taken by the Spanish troops and Christianity planted in the city. The subsequent work of evangelism
by the different religious orders from the Manila to the outlying areas and islands, including the hinterland,
received such attention and priority that logical to realties to the more important takeoff pacification

SPANISH MORO POLICY

Moro-Christian confrontation began in the 16th century when Spain established her sovereignty in the
Visayas and Luzon and sought to extend it to Mindanao and Sulu as well. The stiffest opposition met by
Legazpi, and his fellow conquistadors in the late 1560's and early's came from the Moros of Mindoro Island
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and around the town of Manila. Manila and nearby Tondo were ruled respectively by Rajah Sulayman and
his uncle, Lakandula, who were relatives of the Sultan of Brunei. Islamization was in its early stages in the
Manila area when the Spaniards conquered the town first in 1570 and permanently in 1571.

It is interesting to note that the very nation which had set the Western limit of Islam's spread in the
Mediterranean world (with -the fall of Grenada in 1492 the last of the Moors were driven from Spain), also
halted the eastern advance of Islam clear around the world in Asia. The Spaniards drove Islam out of
Luzon and the Visayas, and for over three centuries contained it in Mindanao and Sulu. It is conceivable
that Islam would have spread to Taiwan, Okinawa, Japan and possibly to Southern China (where there
were already small Muslim trading communities) and Korea, had not Spain gained control of the
Philippines.

What was to be for 300 years the basic policy of Spain towards the Moros was fully spelled out in the
instructions of Gov. Gen. Francisco de Sande to Capt. Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa in May of 1578.
Rodriguez was commissioned to subdue the Moro sultanates of Sulu and Mindanao. From the instruction
given to him, it is clear that Spain sought to accomplish four things with respect to the Moros.

1.Get them to acknowledge Spanish sovereignty over their territory.

2.Promote trade with them, limiting their trade to the Philippines islands and exploring natural resources of
Moroland with a view to their commercial exploitation.

3. Bring an end to Moro "piracy" against Spanish Shipping and an end to Moro raids on the Christianized
settlements of the Visayas and southern Luzon.
4. Hispanize and Christianize the Moros, along the same lines followed with respect to other lowland
Filipino (Indio) groups.

It was this last element in Spain's which was at the root of the Moro's fierce resistance to the Spaniards and
their Christianized Filipino allies. Captain Rodriguez was instructed to order the Moro chief not to admit any
more "preachers of the doctrine of Mahoman (Muhammad), since it is evil and false, and that of the
Christians alone is good." The Captain was to address himself to the "Lord of Mindanao":

In the words of Edward Gaylord Bourne, "The Philippine Islands in situation and inhabitants belong to the
Asiatic world, but for the first three centuries of their recorded history, they were in a sense a dependency
of American, and now the whirling of time has restored them in their political relations to the Western
Hemisphere. As the dependency of New Spain, they constituted the extreme verge of the Spanish
dominions and were commonly known as the Western Island (Las Islas del Poniente)? Their discovery and
conquest rounded out an empire which in geographical extent far surpassed anything that the world had
then seen..."
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Consequently, King Phillip said that the sun never set in his empire because while the sun rose in Madrid, it
was still early afternoon in Manila on a preceding day. In this regard, the Philippines was a link of Spanish
imperial sway which, in a sense, would trigger the move to extend Spanish conquest not only to the islands
south of the archipelago but also north to Japan and China. This dream of an "Oriental Empire" placed the
Philippines strategically in the heart of the Spanish imperial design.

However, inherently involved in the idea of imperial conquest and expansion was the aim to obtain
materials benefits from resources and people. This was quite explicit in the Spanish effort to acquire the
Philippines notwithstanding the fact that the islands had become a part of Portuguese territorial rights
following the signing of the Treaty of Zaragosa in 1529. In this treaty, King Charles of Spain relinquished
claims to the Philippines in exchange for 350,000 gold ducats. The preparation of an expedition under Ruy
Lopez de Villalobos from Mexico in 1542 clearly confirmed the determination of Spain to lay hands on the
islands. The reason for the Spanish brushing aside from Portugal's rights under the Zaragosa Treaty. He
believed that for Spain to contravene such treaty agreement some "legitimate or pious reason for the
expedition should be assigned, such as the rescue of sailors who had been lost in the islands in a previous
expedition or the determination of the longitude of the Demarcation. What the real motive for ignoring
Portugal's rights clearly surfaced in King Phillip's own proposal to ignore all provisions of the treaty
regarding islands other than the Moluccas where expeditions were prohibited from going. But to islands like
the Philippines, the ventures must go because of the spices. In fact, the reason for the search for spices
was already stressed earlier by King Charles to Magellan "In as much as you bind yourself to discover in
the dominions which belong to us and ours in the Ocean Sea within the limits of our demarcation, island,
and mainland and rich spiceries, etc.

Thus, the system of colonial rule Spain established in the Philippines was determined by various colonial
aims. To help realize such aims the political, economic, social and cultural aspect of administration had to
be effectively designed to ensure that power, wealth and status in the colony were conveniently and
exclusively enjoyed by the Spaniard as a matter of birthright.

“You shall tell him that our object is that he be converted to Christianity, and that he must allow is freely to
preach the law of the Christians, and the natives must be allowed to go and hear the preaching and to be
converted, without receiving any harm from the chiefs. Furthermore, Rodriguez was to ascertain who the
preachers of Islam were, arrest them and bring them before the governor-general. He was also to destroy
any mosque he found “where that accursed doctrine has been preached, and you shall order that it be not
rebuilt. Rodriguez was instructed to meet force and 'to punish the Moros as he deemed best," taking
special care not trust them.”

The Moros responded to such designs with violence and warfare. Moro buccaneers harassed Spanish
shipping, and so were dubbed "pirates." Moro expeditions carried jihad (holy war) to the coasts of the
Visayas and Luzon where their war vessels periodically raided, killed and plundered Christian settlements.
It was a bloody war. The Spaniards were able to establish a string of fortified settlements on the north and
east coast of Mindanao and at Zamboanga. They sent punitive expedition (made up of Spanish-led
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Christian Filipino forces) against the Moros and sometimes succeeded in building forts in the heart of
Moroland - at Cotabato and Jolo. In the middle of the 18111 century, there was even a Jesuit mission in
Jolo which actually achieved the conversion of Sultan Alimud Din l. But Spanish successes in the Moro
Wars were never followed by effected and permanent occupation of Moroland, and even the conversion of
Alimud Din I was so mishandled, (he was imprisoned in Manila for ten years on unsubstantiated charges of
treason) that he reverted to Islam and the fury of the Sulus escalated The Moros fought for home and
country for freedom to pursue their religion and way of life and for liberty to rove the seas with over they
would.

Spain's Moro Policy. Expert guerilla fighters, the Muslims exacted a heavy toll of casualties, and when
entrenched in their cottas (forts of earth, rock, and bamboo) they simply could not be rooted out. When the
situation demanded they readily killed their wounded and gave no quarter to the Spanish and Christian
Filipino foe. They fought ferociously, and their usual tactic was to wear down the attackers, obliging them
eventually to withdraw.

Only the Spanish importation of vastly superior weapon notably steam gunboats after 1848- served to blunt
the edge of the Moro Kris. By 1860, the Mindanao (Maguindanao) Sultanate had so deteriorated that the
Spaniards were able to impose their own politico-military "Government" of Mindanao" which, among other
things; provided for the expansion of Jesuit mission work on the island so as to "secure" the conversion of
the races which have not yet been subjected. In 1876, Jolo fell; it had been attacked 16 times between
1570 and 1876. Two years later, the Sultan was obliged to sign a treaty which, while providing that Sulu
retain its customs, laws and religious, also provided that Catholic missionaries were free to visit any place
in the Sultanate and if they met certain conditions under the Sultan's protection. The Spaniards placed
garrisons at Jolo town, Siasi, and Bongao, but their control was nominal at best. It was so effective in the
daylight hours within their fortified compounds, but practically non-existent at night except inside their
barracks and blockhouses.

Spanish effort, at the subjugation of the Maranao in the Lake Lanao region, were not successful, though, by
1876, they had achieved setting up a garrison at Marawi and putting two as all gunboats on the lake. But
two years later, at the outbreak of the Spanish -American War, the garrison had to be withdrawn and the
gunboats scuttled.

With the capitulation of the Moro sultanates to Spanish authority, there arose the curious phenomenon of
the Juramentado, the Muslim devotee "two swore an oath, as an individual, to offer his life in slaying infidels
and defending dar-al-Islam, Juramentados were the terror of Spanish camps in Moroland until the end of
the Spanish regime.

The major legacy of three centuries of Moro-Spanish warfare in the Philippines was the "Moro image" the
picture of the Moro as a cunning, cruel treacherous savage, a pirate a raider, a slaver. That image to this
very day is operative in the minds of many if not most Christian Filipinos whose forebears after all bore the
brunt of the Moro jihad. There is also an equally negative "Christian image" in the minds of the Moros. The
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Christian is a coward, a land-grabber when if he could, would destroy Islam. As will be shown, this inherited
psychological mind-set was to be (as they continue to be even for the republic of the Philippines) a serious
obstacle to the achievement of the America goal's regarding the Moros.

For their part, the Spanish carried to the Philippines a fanatical hatred of Islam which was born of hundred
years of struggling for the independence from Morish rule. They never abandoned that hatred. In January
of 1893, Luis de la Torre, a Spanish officer, wrote the Governor-General of the Philippines "The Moro race
completely antithetic-to the Spanish... And will ever be our eternal enemy." Mt is well," he continued, "that
they should know we are the stronger, that our friendship suits their interest because we are backed by
force - which is the only argument they can understand; that this friendship is of no moment to us, and that
the instant they antagonize us they will be promptly and severely punished.

Nor was this view of soldiers only. We shall have a discussion in chapter three to examine the view on
Mindanao of Fr. Pio Pi, a Spanish Jesuit missionary whose negative attitudes toward the Moros were set
forth for the information and guidance of the American successors to Spanish efforts to govern Morolands.
Suffice it to say here that the Americans, while not motivated by a general hatred of Islam or any particular
zeal to convert (or annihilate) the Moros — which motivations clearly characterized Spanish Moro policy
never did came to adopt a Moro policy strikingly similar to that of their Spanish predecessors.

Source: Muslims in the Philippines by Cesar Majul, Manila: Saint Mary's Publishing, 1973.
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SPANISH MORO WARS

It was a war described by the Spanish colonizers as "guerras piraticas" or a fight against Moro pirates. By
using piracy a reason, the colonizer gave their military depredations the color of a domestic affair, a fight
against evil forces justifiable even within Christian doctrine, thereby effectively concealing that it was a war
against the free sultanates; hence, a colonial war of aggression. It was a war directed against the Muslim
sultanates but affected other native people of Mindanao. It was a war that made use of thousands of
converted colonial subjects, those misinformed Indios from whose ranks would rise the Filipino nation.

It was a war that made effective use of the Catholic Church and churchmen against people who refused to
be their subjects. There is no space for a detailed account of that event. But for those who are interested,
there is no substitute to the book written by Dr. Cesar Majul, Muslim in the Philippines. What follows in the
summary by Dr. Majul himself and published in Filipino heritage, Volume 4, pp. 1080-1086, he divided that
war into six phases:

PHASE ONE: BRUNEI CUT-OFF

The first phase of the conflict between the Muslims and the Spaniard in the archipelago began around the
time of Legazpi's arrival in 1565 and ended with the Spanish invasions of Bornei in 1578 and 1581. The
first act of war was committed by the Spaniards, when in March 1565, they captured a Bornean trading
vessel in the vicinity of Bohol. In 1569, nine Spanish tradings successfully engaged 20 vessels owned by
Borneans and Sulu. This incident symbolized the commercial rivalry. What concerned the Spaniards after
their capture of Manila was that the disgruntled Bornean aristocracy in it might anytime seek the aid of
Brunei, which it did in fact also, the Brunei and the Sulu were still exacting tribute in Mindoro and the
Calamianes, an action considered by the Spaniards as an infringement of their sovereignty over these
islands. Moreover, the Brunei Sultan was encouraging and supporting the preaching of Islam. It was
deemed essential to have a tributary Brunei if the Spanish hold in its recently acquired territories in the
Philippines were to be more secure and or legitimized. Thus, the Spaniards took the opportunity to interfere
in a dynastic dispute in Brunei by supporting a person who was willing to accept Spanish sovereignty. To
put their man on their throne, they invaded Brunei in 1578 and forced Sultan Seifur-Rijal to flee. This Sultan
was, later on, able to recover his throne, with the consequence that the Spaniards had to return in 1581.
This venture was unsuccessful and was the last time the Spaniards directly interfered in Brunei's affairs.
However, they succeeded in finally eliminating Bornean pretension in the Philippines. Significant in this
phase was that people of Brunei and Sulu were allies - their Sultans were also brothers-in-law. The
Spaniards believed that with Brunei out of the picture, it would be only a matter before Sulu, Maguindanao,
and Buayan would be to accept Spanish missionaries and sovereignty.
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PHASE TWO: STRONGHOLDS

The second phase of the conflict started with the Spaniards trying to establish forts and colonies in Muslim
lands, to exact tribute from the Muslim and to wean them from their alliance Ternate. It ended around 1599.
In this phase, the Sulu Sultan paid a modest tribute, so did some of the chieftains in the Pulangi. Here also
the 1587 conspiracy of Tondo chieftains led by Magat Salamat failed. Salamat tried to contact the Brunei
Sultan for help against the Spaniards but failed in his endeavor.

In 1591, the Spanish government decided to colonize Mindanao and incorporate it into its Philippine colony.
It was planned to use Mindanao as a base for the eventual conquest of the Moluccas and the intimidation
of Borneo and Java. In April 1596, the newly-designated governor of Mindanao, Esteban Rodriguez de
Figueroa, landed in Cotabato, where he failed to contact the Maguindanao Sultan. In the interior, Rodriguez
was struck on the head with a Kampilan. He remained alive only for a few hours. Nevertheless, the
Spaniards were able to build a fort around Sampakan (Tampakan), which was midway between the
Maguindanao and Buayan settlements. The Maguindanao and Buayan Sultanates tried to dislodge the
Spaniard. Eight hundred warriors from Ternate, under the leadership of an uncle of the Ternate sultan,
came to help the Muslims, to no avail. Eventually, lack of supplies and difficulty in communication led the
Spaniards to abandon their fort. They retreated to the area of Zamboanga, where they built a fort in La
Caldera. Continuous harassment, however, made them abandon this strong fort in 1597. The second
phase... thus ended in defeat for the Spanish invaders. Something to note in this phase is that the Ternatan
aid came not only on account of kinship relations between the leading families of Mindanao and the
Moluccas and religious ties but also because the Ternatans realized that the loss of Mindanao would mean
that it could serve as a base for Spanish operations against them. At least a strong Maguindanao and
Buayan meant a strong defense line for ternate.

PHASE THREE: COUNTER ATTACKS

The third phase of the conflict began in 1599-1600 when the Maguindanaon launched an offensive against
the Spanish forces in the Bisayas to the extent of competing with Spain for the collection of tribute there. A
few initial Spanish counteroffensives utterly failed. However, the Spaniards later on succeeded in
conquering Ternate and in 1635, they established a strong fort in Zamboanga. Significant about this phase
was that the Sulu, Maguindanao, and Buayan had Ternatan aids. The Dutch too had appeared in the area,
if not helping the Muslims, at least encouraging them to create more difficulties for their Spanish rivals. In -
1599-1600, the rajahs of Maguindanao and Buayan made two devastating raids on the Bisayas. This
expedition each involved about 3,000 warriors. The 1602 raid of these rajahs had the help of the Sulu,
principally from Basilan. It reached as far as the coastal towns of southern Luzon. About 1, 400 captives
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were netted. A Spanish retaliatory attack in Jolo did not accomplish much except that the Sulu were
prevented from cooperating fully with the Muslims of Mindanao in succeeding raids. The 1603 attempted
Spanish invasion of Ternate also failed. In this same year, Buisan the Rajah of Maguindanao attacked
Bisayas towns. In Dulag, Leyte he burned the church, captured a few hundred inhabitants and destroyed
the town. The Leyte datus were so intimidated that they made a blood compact with him pledging not to
cooperate with the Spaniards. Datu Buisan returned some captives and gold and exhorted the datus to
support and sweep the Spaniards of the islands. In these raids, the piratical inhabitants of the area of Kuran
(called Camucones by the Spaniards) usually followed in the wake of the Muslim raids, taking advantage of
the situation to pick up a few things for -themselves. They often complicated the methodical plans of the
Maguindanao and Sulu.

In 1606, one of the biggest fleets fitted out the Spaniards went to Ternate, where after a series of fierce
battles, the Ternatans lost, and their Sultan was captured. The Rajahs of the Pulangi feared that the
returning victorious meet would attack them. They decided to make peace with the Spaniards. Two years
after, when they decided to fit a fleet against the Bisayas, they were dissuaded from doing so by the
Spaniards, who were prepared for with another fleet. For some time, the Spaniards were to get some
respite from the Maguindanao and Buayanun, but trouble came from another quarter... the Sulu.

The presence of Dutch ships in Philippine waters in 1616 encouraged the Sulu to attack settlement as far
as Cavite and Camarines. They burned the Cavite shipyard and captured some Spaniards for ransom.
There is evidence of Brunei aid in the above ventures. Certainly there was the inevitable Dutch
encouragement. In 1627 in revenge for the humiliation of the Sulu Ambassador, Datu Ache by the
Spaniards who put him in a cell and confiscated his pearls, the Sulu in about 30 caracoas and with about
2,000 warriors, attacked the shipyard in Camarines. The fleet was led by the Sulu Sultan, Rajah Bongsu.
Much artillery, guns, ammunition, iron, and rice were captured. The Spanish retaliation, the next year ended
in the complete burning of Jolo and the destruction of the Sultan's fleet. Another Spanish expedition in 1630
failed; however, the Sulu this time were prepared. Lorenzo de Olazo, the commander, was wounded, and
many of his men killed. The Spaniards and their native allies retreated terror-stricken.

While the Spaniards were busy with the Sulu, another element arose in Maguindanao, which was to give
them great difficulties for the next 50 years. This was the rise of Katchil Kudarat as a leader of the Iranun
and Maguindanao. This redoubtable leader became a chieftain around 1619 and kept the peace with the
Spaniards until-he was able to consolidate his realm, build a war machine, and accumulate more territory.
He was allied with the Dutch, who helped him with ammunition and enabled him -to keep up with his
commercial activities. In 1634, Kudarat was strong enough to attack the Visayas. His main intention was to
weaken the Spaniards, who were slowly encroaching on Mindanao by establishing a mission and fortified
outposts. He resented the presence of the Spaniards in areas in the north and east of the Mindanao which
he considered Iranun spheres of influence. On Jesuit advice, in 1635 the Spaniards built a fort in
Zamboanga. For this purpose, the 3000 Spaniards and 1000 Visayan allies came to Zamboanga. The fort
served various purposes. It was to protect the mission in Mindanao. It served as an outpost where the
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movement of Muslim fleets could be watched. Soldiers quartered in it could at any notice attack nearby
Muslim settlement.

Noteworthy in the first three-phase... was that the Muslim captured Spaniards for ransom purpose. The
Spaniards did the same when they captured Muslim leaders. The Muslim also enslaved the natives from
the Spaniards - held territories in order to have them row their boats, thus allowed the warriors to
concentrate on fighting. Aside from using them as household enslaved natives. Were utilized in the
plantations to do a kind of work that was generally looked down upon by the warriors. Capturing natives
also weakened the war machine of the Spaniards, who recruited thousands of them to fight the Muslim.
The sale of slaves to the Dutch was generally found later on in the last few years of the third stage where
they were in demand in Dutch plantations. Slaves who had become Muslim were not normally sold they
would sometimes be freed but made to fight together with the Muslim.

Significant in the first three-phase is that the Muslim in the Philippines were helped by neighboring
principalities. These alliances did not only reflect marriage ties between ruling families, they represented a
concerted effort against the intrusion of Western imperialism, colonialism, and Christianity in the island of
Southeast Asia.

PHASE FOUR: FORTRESS WAR

The fourth phase... beginning with the fortification of Zamboanga in 1635 up to its abandonment in 1663,
represented the Spanish determination to conquer Sulu and the Sultanates in Mindanao once and for all
and establish missions among them. The task of Governor Corcuera was threefold, to conquer and capture
Kudarat and put Spanish puppet in the Maguindanao Sultanate; to capture the main cotta of the Sulu sultan
and establish colonies in Sulu; and to invade Brunei once again and put it securely under Spanish
sovereignty. Kudarat's capital, Lamitan, was captured in 1637, but his major cotta in the nearby Ilihan
heights offered a quite strong defense. However, even these fell to the invaders. The wounded Muslim
leader went to the interior, where he raised an army of Iranun to harass the Spaniards. The triumphant
Corcuera was given a hero's welcome in Manila, and his battles were enacted in the play's celebrating his
victory. These were the first moro-moro plays in the country. The next year, 600 Spaniards and 1000 native
allies laid siege to the Sulu sultan's cotta in Jolo. The defense was superb and many ofthe invaders were
killed, but an epidemic in the cotta forced the sultan to surrender after three months. After a brief truce with
Corcuera, the sultan went to the interior to continue the struggle

The subsequent Spanish attempt to subject the Mranao was shortlived since Kudarat was able to galvanize
their opposition. The Spaniards, found, too great difficulty trying to pacify the Buayanons. The guerilla
warfare of the Sulu was taking its toll. The Spanish reaction to all these was to pursue a policy of destroying
all Muslim orchards, plantations, and seacrafts. They also adopted a plan of depopulating Muslim
settlement while enslaving as many Muslims as possible. But Qudarat's gaining strength forced the
Spaniards to make a treaty with them in 1645. The next year, they concluded a treaty with Sulu pledging to
abandon all their forts in Sulu. A factor which led to this peace treaty was the Dutch threat.
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The peace with Kudarat was broken in 1655 when the Spanish ambassador was assassinated on account
of his insistence to convert the Sultan. To prevent Spanish retaliation, the sultan formally declared jihad the
next year and asked the aid of the Sultan of Makassar, Sulu, Ternate, and Brunei on the principle of the
protection of Islam. Spanish initial successes against Maguindanao were nullified by later events. With the
eventual absence to additional Spanish provocations, relative peace ensued. In 1663, due to the Koxinga
threat, Zamboanga was abandoned. There would be an interlude of peace between the Muslim and the
Spaniards for the next 50 years.

Left to themselves, the Sultanates tried to recapture their former commercial prosperity. Plantations were
once again flourishing and new vessels built. Sulu came to possess the North Borneo territory of Brunei
and began to fill part of the power vacuum in Borneo. Tributary relations were resumed with China and
commercial relation renewed with the Dutch.

PHASE FIVE

The Spanish King, on account of Jesuit insistence, issued various royal order for the occupation and
refortification of Zamboanga. In 1718, the royal order was complied with the soon the fort was garrisoned
and made stronger than before. The fifth phase... was to commence soon.

The 1720-1721 attack of the Sulu and Iranun to dislodge the Spaniards from the fort failed in spite of the
use of hundreds of war vessels and thousands of warriors. The Sulu then tried to have peace treaties with
their enemies while dealing with the Dutch as a source of arms and ammunition. It was then that the
Spaniards changed their techniques in their program of evangelization. In exchange for commercial relation
and treaties of alliance, they requested the Sultanates to accept the preaching of Christianity. Their
sovereignty was assured, and no priest was to enter their territories without the permission of the Sultans.
To this phase belong the visit of Sulu Sultan Azim-ud-Din to Manila for his baptism, imprisonment and
eventual return to Sutu. On the pretext of the restoring the Sultan to Jolo, the Spaniards at various times
tried to conquer Jolo, to no avail. The Sulu Sultan Mu'izz ud -Din, had the fierce loyalty of the datus and the
resistance was strong. He went as far as to seek aid from China and the Ottoman Empire, but it was more
through the British that he was able to strengthen his realm. The wars during this phase reached a
considerable proportion in terms of human lives lost and property destroyed. Hundreds of Muslim were
carried into captivity, while hundreds of Christian natives were captured and sold as slaves in Makassar
and Java. So fierce were the Muslim raids in the Visayas that in some settlements the collection of tribute
by the Spaniards went below 50%. The British invasion of Manila in 1762 created a full in the fighting. The
Muslim remained unconquered. They again began to accelerate their commercial activities-this time
concentrating on the British trade.

PHASE SIX
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Spanish policy in the middle of the 19th century was once more to conquer the Muslim Sultanates,
especially that of Sulu. This time the Christianization was not an overriding motive. The main reason was
that the British and the Dutch were extending in the island of Southeast Asia. British intrigues in Sulu to
secure a base for the China trade had become well-known. While the Dutch were progressively extending
their territories in Borneo, the Spaniards had to secure their southern frontier. In brief, before the British
gained a secure economic and political foothold in Sulu, it was deemed important for the Spaniards to be
there first. The excuse used by the Spaniard's government to resume war was that the Samal subject of the
Sulu sultan as well as the Iranuns living in his land were professional pirates and acting in connivance with
him. Sultan Pulalun at various times protested against this charge, and his reason was that his difficulty in
controlling the pirates was the very same one encountered by the Spaniards. Actually, the sultan and the
chief datu were traders, and the economic prosperity of the realm depended on the safety of sea lanes, but,
the Spaniards utilized the existence of piracy as a reason to launch in 1845 the Balangingi expedition which
led to the depopulation of the Samales island and the transfer or many survivors to Luzon in order to have
them converted there. Thus the sixth phase of the wars commenced. The Spanish expedition to Sulu in
1851 forced the Sultan to a treaty. Although the Spaniards interpreted the treaty as one where the Sultan
accepted Spanish sovereignty, the Sultan simply took it as a friendly treaty between sovereign equals.
Another Spanish campaign in 1876 to capture Jolo was -intended to represent a fait accompli to force
foreign powers to accept Spanish territorial claims in return for recognition of their corresponding claims
elsewhere. The Spanish excuse for the campaign this time was that Sultan Jamal ul-Azam had ignored
previous treaties. The Spanish government in Manila tried to get public opinion on its side by pointing out
that the issue was one of piracy. The Spanish clergy insisted that the war was a "just and holy one" against
the "wicked sons of the Quran." Thousands of pesos were contributed to the campaign by rich Chinese
towns, schoolchildren, and friars. It has been estimated that public subscription reached 250,000 pesetas.

Jolo had to be abandoned by the Sulu, with the Sultan fleeing to the interior. It was during this time that he
leased his Sabah territory to the British company. A treaty among Britain, Germany, and Spain finally
provided that Spanish sovereignty extended to Sulu. Abandoned by all was eventually forced to accede to
the peace treaty of 1878. It was the last treaty entered into between Spaniards and the Sulu. It provides a
sort of Spanish protectorate for Sulu while giving the Sulu a great deal of autonomy. The sultan tried to
abide as much as possible with the treaty, but he could not control those datus and their followers who kept
on harassing the Spaniards to the extent that Jolo became in effect a town under siege. Juramentados
became more frequent.

Meanwhile, the Spaniards tried to consolidate their hold on Mindanao. A few expeditions were sent to the
Maranao areas and Buayan. Cotabato became a Spanish outpost and Spaniards were able to build a
strong fort along the Pulangi. The only real- opposing force against them was Sultan Anwar ud-Din (Datu
Utto). The Maguindanao sultanate had become a shadow of its former self.

By the time the American arrived in the Philippines in 1898, the Spanish force in tradition Muslim lands was
confined to a few well-guarded outposts that were often harassed. The Muslim still remained, in general
unconquered. This was the situation the Americans found in them.
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Source: Muslims in the Philippines by Cesar Adib Majul, Manila: Saint Mary's Publishing, 1973.

THE INSTITUTION OF THE JURAMENTADO

In connection with the wars between the Spaniards and the Muslims in the Philippines, especially
in the second half of the last century, there was an institution which, however, was not fully understood by
the Spaniards. This what they called “juramentado,” literally meaning a person who had taken an oath.
Originally the term was used to refer to (a) Muslim warriors who, after specific religious rites and a night of
prayer with panditas, would on the net day rush at the Christian with the determination to kill as many as
possible and not to expect to return alive. The overriding hope of such dedicated warriors was to merit
paradise as a recompense. The term was also used to refer to (b) Muslim warriors who battled with such
religious ferocity such that they had been judged as fanatical by their enemies. In time, the term came to
be used loosely to refer to (c) any Muslim who killed someone in the heat of passion or (d) any Muslim who
instead of committing suicide, courted death by attacking and trying to kill law enforcement agents who
were presumably Christians. Clearly, in (c) and (d), there are no religious motives involved and the use of
the term juramentado: in them represent a departure from the original meaning. For the purposes of the
following discussion, the term will be more properly applied to.

First of all, it is necessary to make a distinction between an amuck and a juramentado. The high degree of
spontaneity, the indiscriminate choice of victims, and an absence of the religious motive mark the former.
An early account of an amuck given by a foreigner around 1605 is as follows.

If any Javan have committed a fact worthy of death and that he be pursued by any, whereby
think he shall die, he will presently draw his weapon and cry Amucke, which is as much (as) to say: I am
resolved; not sparing to further either man, woman, or children which they can possibly come ordinary
weapon … Which they weare is called a crise.

A later but a more elaborate description is what written by Crawford.

The spirit of revenge, with an impatience of restraint, and a repugnance to submit to insult, more or less felt
by all the Indian islanders, give rise to those acts of desperate excess which are well known in Europe
under the name of mucks. This peculiar form of exacting revenge, unknown to all other people yet
universal in the Indian islands, and recognized throughout by the same name, I strongly incline to suspect
may at first have been an arbitrary institution, and have spread like other general customs by the influence
of one great tribe. A muck generally means as an act of desperation, in which the individual or individuals
devote their lives, with few or no chances of success, for the gratification of their revenge. Sometimes it is
 13

confined to the individuals who has offered the injury; at other times it is indiscriminate, and the enthusiast,
with a total aberration of reason, assails alike the guilty and the innocent.

On other occasions, again the oppressor escapes, and the muck consists in the oppressed parry’s raking
the lives of those dearest to him, and then his own, that they and he be freed from some insupportable
oppression and cruelty…The most frequent mucks, by far, are those in which the desperado assails
indiscriminately friend and foe, and in which disheveled hair and frantic look, he murders or wounds all he
meets without distinction until he is himself killed… One of the most singular circumstances attending these
acts of criminal desperation is the apparently unpremeditated, and always the sudden and unexpected
manner in which they are undertaken.

Tom Pires, Ludovico de Varthema, and Ramusio made a few references to amucks but failed to
make a finer distinction between them and those “Javanese knights” who were resolved to risk their lives in
duels or instances involving their pride and honor. The genuine amuck is ultimately a problem for
psychiatry. Instances of him are frequently reported in the Manila newspapers; frequently, disgruntled
soldiers in the Philippine army or enraged jealous husbands have run amuck and killed their loved ones for
real or imagined grievances. Proportionally speaking there is the probability that there are more amucks
among the Christians than among the Muslims in the Philippines.

A few knowledgeable Spanish officers made a distinction between Muslims warriors who fought
bravely in war from those “who had taken a bow” to kill as many Christian invaders as possible until they
themselves got killed. The latter fought individually or in a small group, and they were the ones originally
called “juramentados.” However, Spanish officers did not know the full significance of the motives of the
latter. To know this, a knowledge of some elements of Islamic law and history is essential.

In early Islamic law, the world was conceived as having been divided into two: Darul-Islam (the
abode or territory of Islam) and dar ul-Harb (the abode or territory of war). In Darul-Islam the sovereign
was a Muslim and Islamic Law he sways. Theoretically, it was a duty of Muslims to extend the frontiers of
Darul-Islam to cover the whole world to banish unbelief in it. A function of the Jihad was precisely this.
However, as history demonstrates, a time came when Islamic frontiers could not be extended further. In
some cases, it even receded. In places where Islam retreated, the function of the jihad was to prevent
parts of da ul-Islam from falling into the hands of unbelievers. Islamic jurists made careful distinctions
between those duties required in extending the frontiers of Islam from those defending them or avoiding
their diminution. In the first, it was not necessary to have women fight. But in the second, participations
were a positive induction incumbent on all believers. When Darul-Islam was invaded, its defense as
collective effort normally felt under the leadership of the khalif or sultan. But the jihad here was both an
individual and collective effort. Consequently, should the sultan fails in the organized defense of the realm,
the individual was not to consider himself relieved of the duty to resist the unbelieving invaders. Thus, in
the original and strictest sense of the word, the juramentado was merely performing such and individual
duty.
 14

In Darul-Islam, all non-Muslims were either protected minorities (dhimmis) or under the protection
of a visa (aman); the latter was a development after it became clear that Islam had reached its territorial
limits and at the same time it was also deemed necessary to have diplomatic and economic relations with
other countries. In the 1876-78 war between the Spaniards and the Sulus, the former was able to forcibly
occupy a few points in the Sulu Archipelago including Jolo where they were able to build a fort. In time
many of the soldiers brought their families with them to live in the fortified section of the town. Clearly, such
invaders and their families, from the standpoint of the Muslims, were neither dhimmis nor under the
protection of an aman. At the same time, since the Sulu sultan proved incapable of preventing the
occupation of Jolo, many panditas encouraged Muslims to take it as a matter of individual duty to repel the
invaders. This was to be done by attacking isolated Spanish soldiers or their families. In some way, such
efforts complemented the resistance of the Sultan who was in the interior; but what is important to note
here is that such performance of an individual duty was a recognition of the Sultan’s ineffectual defense.

The premeditated character of the act of performing such an individual duty can clearly be seen in
the rites accompanying it, its recourse to Islamic terminology, the symbolisms involved, and the function of
the ulama in its performance. The person who had vowed to perform the individual duty was technically
called a mujahid (Lit. one who strives, or performs jihad); upon his death, he was called shahid (Arabic
martyr). On the eve of the day set for the performance of the duty, the mujahid was completely shaved off
his hair and eyebrows. He then went through a complete ritual bathing as a symbol of purification followed
by dressing completely in white. Sometimes, he wore a small white turban. The color here is that of
mourning, and the clothing signified the burial shroud. The mujahid would spend the evening in prayer in
the company of panditas who would not only recite Qur’anic verses but probably other local prayers not
entirely devoid of pre-Islamic elements. The work Prang Sail-ulah (Fighting in the way of Allah) with its
exhortations and description of Paradise was read to him in his decision. He would also carry with him a
few amulets, some of which would normally contain inscriptions of a few Qur’anic verses. The reading of
the Prang Sabil-ulah, the use of amulets, and the use of white clothes were also found in similar rituals in
Acheh, Sumatra, during the war against the Dutch. Possible influences from Sumatra on the juramentado
institution in the Philippines might be the subject of closer studies.

The closest relatives of the mujahid would also be present, praying with him. In this connection,
some reports say that the permission of relatives who were dependent on the prospective mujahid was
sometimes needed. It is on the record too that becoming a mujahid was not exclusive to men; some
women also become mujahids.

After all the necessary preparations have been met, the mujahid kept himself out of sight until he
was within reach of his quarry, the Spanish soldiers after whom he went with the intent to kill as many as
possible. Sometimes he loudly announced his sortie to get all to get all Muslims out of the way. Evidently
he had no intention to harm any but Christians. Invariably, he was ultimately killed since he kept going on
looking for Spanish soldiers right up to to die very fort itself. After he was killed, dead mujahid was buried
by the panditas in die usual Muslims manner except that there was no ritual ablution (ghusl) or change of
clothes for the deceased. The absence of these last two requirements followed the traditional burial for
 15

anyone considered a martyr or shahid. The idea here was that die corpse of a martyr who died in die
defense of die faith was legally pure and therefore did not require ablution. That he was buried with his
bloody clothes served as a testimony of his effort. The belief of die panditas and die warriors was that the
recompense for one who had died for die Faith is Paradise. This is in consonance with the following
Qur’anic verses among so many others.

Count not those who are killed in the way of Allah (filsabil-ullah) as dead but living with their Lord. (Sura III,
v. 163)

Let those then fight in the path of Allah (filsabil-ullah), who exchange this present life for that which is to
come; for whoever fighteth on Allah’s path whether he be slain or conquer, we will, in the end, give him a
great reward. (Sura IV, v. 75)

Some of the Traditions (Hadith) on this point are as follows:

Allah is a sponsor for him who goes forth to fight on the road of Allah (filsabil -ullah)

The fire of Hell shall not touch the legs of him who shall be covered with the dust of battle in the road of
Allah (filsabil-ullah).

In the last day, the wounds of those who have been wounded in the way of Allah (filsabil-ullah) will be
evident and will drip with blood, but their smell will be as the perfume of musk.

Being killed in the road of Allah (filsabil-ullah) covers all sins, but the sin of debt.

He who dies and has not fought for the religion of Islam, nor has even said in his heart. “Would to Allah I
were a champion that could die in the road of Allah (filsabil-ullah), is even as a hypocrite.

Fighting in the road of Allah (filsabil-ullah), or resolved to do so, is a divine duty. When your Imam orders
you to go forth to fight, then obey him.

While such dedicated warriors were called mujahids by the sophisticated among the panditas, they
were more commonly called “fill sabil-ullah” (lit. in the way of Allah) or “sabil” for short. In time, however,
the Spanish term “juramentado” would be used in reference to them even by some Sulus and
Maguindanao.

There is no doubt that the launching of mujahids was conceived of and encouraged by the panditas
who knew enough of Islamic elements to rationalize their actions which represented a combination of
patriotism, Islamic consciousness, and hatred for the Spaniards. Actually, their role in preparing Muslim
warriors for the above task was indispensable. Spanish officers were quite aware of this latter fact which
explains why during the occupation of Jolo, they threatened any panditasyspected of participating in the
 16

rites to prepare such mujahids. Sultan Jamal ul ‘Azam after making peace with the Spaniards in 1878
completely disclaimed any connection with such panditas or mujahids.

It is believed that the biggest percentage of mujahids came from the ranks of the Buranuns. During
the American regime, it became a matter of official policy of the Sukan of Sulu to disown them officially. In
1899, the Sultan sent letters to his panglimas, stating that:

The Americans have come here in exchange for the Spaniards, they are different people from the
Spaniards, and it will not be good to “Juramentado” against them. They did not come to take our lands,
religion, or customs. They leave us our laws, and if you love yourselves and your country avoid coming to
blows with the American, because they are like a matchbox—you strike one, and they all go off.

Haji Buto himself went out of his way to assert that the “juramentado” system did not fall under the
Muslim religion. Actually, what he meant here was that he was willing to accede to the point that the new
concept of religious freedom needs nor include it.

During the Pax American in Sulu, panditas, with a flair for the legality, held that there were no more
real “juramentados” and those so so-called were not genuine ones. The assumption here was that the
traditional concept of Dar-ul-Islam had ceased to be operative in the Philippines. For all practical purposes,
the Sulu sultanate had ceased to exist as a political entity. But the word “juramentado” remained to refer to
any Muslim who died fighting bravely for any cause, personal or otherwise. Some of these desired to be
fortified by proper rituals and made such demands on panditas who would immediately report such persons
to the police or government officials. That the panditas refused to sanction the action of such juramentados
was in consonance with what was happening in other parts of the world where the concept of jihad in
relations with that of dar –ul-Islam had ceased to be operative as was shown in World War I when the
Ottoman Sultan failed to get response to his universal call for a jihad. Actually the forces of nationalism,
secularization, and modernization were at work against the Ottoman Sultan.

In time, many Sulus and Maguindanaos would turn juramentado but not in the sense of original
mujahid. To avenge an insult to his chief or persons, to escape imprisonment, to expiate for once
numerous sins, among other reasons, a few would turn juramentado and believe or act as if there were
religious sanctions for their actions. Actually, the panditas would be the first to report them to the police.
Saleeby himself was not fully aware of the function of the mujahid, the original juramentado, in the struggle
against Spanish invaders, was actually describing a deviation of the system, when he wrote in 1913 as
follows.

Juramentados are not religious fanatics. No one juramentado could say his prayers or know the doctrines
of his creed. There has been no greater misunderstanding by Spaniards and Americans on any one
subject than on this –the juramentado question. The juramentado is not actuated by a religious feeling. It
is a fierce patriotism that excites his harshness and provokes his craziness. A juramentado state of mind
during the execution of his purpose is a condition of frenzy or temporary insanity closely allied in its nature
 17

to that of being amuck. A man who runs amuck in a manner avenges himself and his personal grievances,
but the juramentado avenges his people and his chief. His chief calls for vengeance rings in his ears, and
he immediately comes forward as the hero and avenger of the datuship and gets ready for this treacherous
fray. No one, however, faces death without religious weakening and fear, and the reckless juramentado
cannot advance towards his grave without performing the last rites of his creed. He would not otherwise be
allowed to proceed even if he wanted to. Religion plays a secondary role in this case, and no blame can
attach to the juramentados creed.

Source: Muslims in the Philippines by Cesar Adib Majul, Manila: St. Mary’s Publishing, 1980