THE PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION, BY APOLINARIO MABINI

Translated into English by Leon Ma. Guerrero

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE
This Englishing of Apolinario Mabini’s “La Revolucion Filipina”, commissioned by
the National Historical Commission, was done in a little more than a week following
May Day 1969 under great pressure of time and official business, and may have
suffered in consequence. As in my other translations I have tried to replace Spanish
idioms and expressions with their nearest English equivalents whenever possible,
instead of undertaking a strictly literal rendering.
The Spanish text used was that published in “La Revolucion Filipina”, II, pp. 261-
325, Bureau of Printing, Manila, 1931. Its editor, Teodoro M. Kalaw, then director of
the National Library, said the text “is a word for word transcript of the original,
written in pencil, which is in the National Library. Mabini made a number of copies
of it in his own handwriting, making slight changes in some of them.” The variants
noted by Mr Kalaw in his footnotes to the Library’s published text are inserted in
italics in the present translation. A number of copying or proof-reading errors have
been corrected; for instance, “Bonifacio y sus secretarios” in Chapter VIII should
obviously read “Bonifacio y sus sectarios”.
I have kept Mabini’s paragraphing and emphasis.
Mr. Kalaw notes that Mabini Englished his own work. I have not seen this translation,
which of course would be authoritative, nor have I seen any others.
It is a pity that a biography of Mabini, however brief, should not be available with his
“exemplary history” of the Revolution to whose spirit and substance he gave such
significant shape. To make some small amends, perhaps the following notes made by
himself in his Guam memoirs will be of interest:
“I was born in 1864 in Tanawan, Batangas.
“I went to school in Manila in 1881.
“I spent 1882-83 in Bawan.
“I returned to Manila to take a course in philosophy in 1884-85.
“I spent 1886-87 in Lipa. During this time I obtained the degrees of bachelor of arts
and high-school teacher.
“I studied law in 1888 and was graduated in 1894.
“I was paralyzed in January 1896. I was imprisoned by the Spaniards in October of
that year, and released in June the following year.
“I was with Aguinaldo from June 1898 until May 1899. In December 1899 I was
captured by the Americans, and deported to Guam in January 1901.”
It remains only to add that he was prime minister and foreign minister of the first
Republic of the Philippines, and that he died in poverty and neglect in 1903.
Righteous, perceptive and farsighted beyond the measure of his contemporaries and
successors, the very embodiment of the intellectual in a revolution, he was not so
intransigent as he was thought to be, as the following pages will show. Among the
Filipinos he was one of the few who knew what it was all about.
L. Ma. G.
9th May 1969
Embassy of the Philippines
New Delhi

DEDICATION
TO MY MOTHER:
When, still a child, I told you that I wanted to acquire learning, you were overjoyed
because your heart’s desire was that a son of yours should be a priest; to be a minister
of God was for you the greatest honour that a man could aspire to in this world.
Realizing that you were too poor to meet the expenses of my education, you worked
as hard as you could, heedless of sun and rain, until you caught the illness that took
you to your grave.
But I was not fated to be a priest. I am, however, convinced that the true minister of
God is not one who wears a cassock, but everyone who proclaims His glory by good
works, of service to the greatest possible number of His creatures, and I shall
endeavour to be faithful to your desires as long as I have the strength to do so.
Now, wishing to place on your grave a wreath woven by my own hands, I dedicate
this humble work to your memory; it is a poor thing, unworthy of you, yet the best so
far woven by the artless hands of your son,
THE AUTHOR

INTRODUCTORY MANIFESTO
Although from May 1899 until the following December, when I was captured by the
American forces, I not only held no official position but did not even reside near the
seat of the Philippine Government, nevertheless, having felt obliged to take up the
people’s cause, I believe it also to be my duty to give my countrymen an accounting
of my activities now that I think it time to consider them at an end.
From my capture until my banishment to Guam I had the honour to discuss at length
the termination of the war and the pacification of the islands with Generals
MacArthur and J. F. Bell. A glance at the results of those discussions will give an idea
of my conduct.
The said generals began by expressing to me their eagerness that I should contribute
to the pacification of the islands for only by these means would the Filipinos attain
their welfare. I replied that I ardently desired the same thing and asked them to tell me
in what form my cooperation would be of value. They then told me that they would
have confidence in me and accept my services only when I had unconditionally
recognized American sovereignty in the Philippines, especially if I also helped them
in the establishment of the government they judged most conducive to the happiness
of the Filipino people. Again I demurred, saying that as soon as I did what they
required, my countrymen, in their state of mind at that time, would forthwith
withdraw their confidence from me, and, having- thus lost my influence over the
Filipinos, I would be useless for the purposes of pacification or any other
advantageous objective.
The aforesaid generals thought my reply was only a pretext to remain in a position
which they considered to be one of systematic opposition to the Americans’ plans. For
this reason, they told me, they were convinced that my intransigent attitude and that of
Mr. Aguinaldo were the only obstacles in the way of the sought-for peace, and, since
they were determined to achieve it for the good of the Filipinos themselves, they
might find it necessary to remove these obstacles by deporting the irreconcilable. I
stated that in my judgment the Revolution had been caused, not by mere personal
ambition, but by the ungratified aspirations of the people, and I was fully convinced
that, if Mr. Aguinaldo and I acted in open disagreement with public opinion, we
would be discredited and by the same token unable to prevent the resumption of
hostilities, sooner or later, by new leaders. True peace, I said, could be attained only if
the Americans should come to know how to win the confidence of the Filipinos, and
arbitrary and violent processes would never arouse such confidence; the experience of
the Spanish regime had shown that deportations only served to excite hatred and
hostility since it was cruel and unjust to impose the double penalty of imprisonment
and indefinite exile on persons whose offenses had not been proven in court. I said
finally that, far from opposing the plans of the Americans, I had tried to make known
in all sincerity the true sentiments of the Filipinos in general and the revolutionists in
particular, so that ignorance of these sentiments might not lead to the formulation of a
mistaken policy prejudicial to the cause of peace, and that I wanted to preserve my
good repute at all costs to be useful not only to the Filipinos but also to the
Americans. The latter might err in their estimates; it might happen that despite my
banishment and the capture or surrender of Aguinaldo the islands were not pacified;
and in that case the help of those Filipinos who had not forfeited the trust of the
revolutionists would be indispensable for the achievement of peace, for which end I
wanted to keep myself in reserve in default of others better qualified, or at the very
least to help these and be of some use to them if need be.
Reflecting now on subsequent events, I find no evidence that my banishment to Guam
contributed in any way toward the capture of Aguinaldo and Lukban or the surrender
of Malvar and other Filipino leaders; on the contrary, there is reason to believe that
this error had more than a little to do with the prolongation of hostilities and loss of
lives. Diplomacy having been despised as a weapon fit only for the weak, the struggle
could cease only when the revolutionists no longer had the means to continue it. It is
not in the ordinary and natural course of events that the weak should overcome the
strong. We fought in the conviction that our dignity and sense of duty required the
sacrifice of defending our freedoms as long as we could, since without them social
equality between the dominant class and the native population would be impossible in
practice and perfect justice among us could not have been achieved. Yet we knew it
would not be long before our scant resources were exhausted, and our defeat
inevitable. The struggle thus became unjustified and indefensible from the moment
that the vast majority of the population chose submission to the conqueror, and many
of the revolutionists themselves joined his ranks, since, unable to enjoy their natural
freedoms — being prevented from doing so by the American forces — and lacking
means to remove this obstacle, they deemed it prudent to yield and put their hopes on
the promises made in the name of the people of the United States. The surrender of
the last partisan bands was followed by an amnesty proclamation, and on 24th August
1902 those banished to Guam were told that they could return to their country should
they freely swear to recognize and accept the supreme authority of the United States
in the Philippines, and to observe sincere loyalty and obedience to the same, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. To satisfy a scrupulous conscience — it did
not seem to me reasonable or correct to pledge my word without first making sure I
should do so — I asked to be taken prisoner to Manila in conformity with the
proclamation which provided that “the oath be taken before any authority in the
Philippine Archipelago authorized to administer such oaths.” The governor of Guam
promised to transmit my petition to the competent authorities, without, however,
advising me that he would not know the decision until toward the end of the following
December. Nonetheless, I preferred to wait. Then, on the 9th February 1903 the
commanding officer of the prison camp handed me a letter from the governor,
advising me that I was free to go anywhere except the Philippines, whither I could not
return without taking the oath of allegiance.
I asked for time to think it over since it was not so easy for me to come to a decision
as it seemed at first sight. In the first place, like any other man, I hold to certain truths
which rule and guide my conscience and which constitute my articles of faith. They
enjoin me to believe that all authority over the people resides, by natural law, in the
people themselves; whence, faced with the idea of taking the oath of allegiance to the
authority of the United States in the Philippines, it seemed to me that I would be
asking God to sanction an act Contrary to the law or order which He had himself
imposed on the world from the beginning of time. My conscience told me it was
blasphemy to ask God’s help in doing something He himself abhorred. Furthermore,
if freedom of thought and speech was one of the privileges of every citizen of the
Philippines, would it be lawful to require me to forswear my beliefs at the very
moment that I was promising to lead a peaceful and honourable life? If the practices
observed by all civilized nations extended this freedom to include all doctrines which
did not promote the subversion of social order and the depravation of customs, could
an oath, imposed by the executive power contrary to the spirit of American
institutions and a fair interpretation of the laws in force in the Philippines, be
considered valid? Having taken an unconditional oath of allegiance to the authority of
the United States in the Philippines, would it be lawful for me, without betraying my
sworn allegiance, to advocate afterwards the diminution of that authority, asking for
the people the self-government publicly promised to the Filipinos for such time as
they were fit for it? If any obligation contrary to natural law is essentially null and
void, would it not be more practical and salutary to seek another formula which would
reconcile the respect due to the law and to the fulfillment of the state’s obligations,
with the sanctity of an oath and the promises of the government, so that the Filipinos
might not grow to look on perjury as legitimate?
It is true that whoever attempts to govern on the basis of theories alone is bound to
fail because the science of government is essentially practical; but it is also true that
all practices contrary to theory, that is to say, contrary to reason and science, can
fittingly be termed abuses, that is to say, corrupt practices, since they corrupt society.
The ruler’s success is always to be found in the adjustment of his practical measures
to the natural and immutable order of things and to the special needs of the locality,
an adjustment that can be made with the help of theoretical knowledge and
experience. The source of all failures in government can therefore be found, not in
(mistaken) theories but in unprincipled practices arising from base passions or
ignorance. If the Government of the United States has been able to lead the Union
along the paths of prosperity and greatness, it is because its practices have not
diverged from the theories contained in the Declarations of Independence and of the
Rights of Man, which constitute an exposition of the principles of natural law
implanted by the scientific revolutions in the political field. If truth is to be found in
the synchronization of reason and experience, rectitude lies in the synchronization of
theory and practice.
Nevertheless, after many vacillations and soul-searching anxiety, I attained at last the
tranquillity produced by a firm conviction. My conscience is clear that it was licit for
me to take the oath because it was unavoidable, the reason being that a need more
imperious than the love of truth demanded my return to the islands. The more we read
the history of humankind, the more must we observe that, in the frequent wars which
have inflamed the peoples of the earth from the remotest times to our own days, just
as fortresses and cities always had to surrender to the victor, so also reason and
justice, many times if not always, had perforce to yield to the exigencies of power.
Conquered peoples have submitted to the impositions of the conqueror in order to
survive, survival being indispensable for the preservation of the human race, nature’s
paramount need or law. Now that the Filipino people have submitted themselves to
the authority of the United States to escape their ruin, my continued stay in Guam
could have been interpreted as contravening the will of the people, as persisting in a
desperate prolongation of the strife. When the people went to war, I thought it my
duty to be at their side and help them endure it to the end; now that they feel they lack
the strength to continue fighting for their rights, I believe I should likewise be at their
side, to tell them not to despair but to have greater confidence in themselves, in
justice, and in the future.
The truth is that I never had the courage to rouse up my countrymen when they
preferred to live undisturbed. I worked enthusiastically with Rizal, Marcelo del Pilar
and others who, after exposing the evils inflicted on the Filipinos by a willful or
arbitrary regime, once asked the Spanish Government for the political assimilation of
the Philippines as a Spanish province just so that many Filipinos should not seek the
remedy for those evils in separatism by organizing a society like the Katipunan or an
uprising like that of 1896. Conscious of the calamities and miseries that arise from the
subversion of public order, 1 was not a member of the first nor did I join the second.
But when in 1898 I saw on all sides the vexation and indignation caused by the blind
obstinacy of the Spanish Government, and the cruelties with which it rewarded the
services of those who had shown it the dangers of its maladministration in the
Philippines and suggested the remedies to avert them, I saw clearly the avowed will of
the people and my manifest duty to abide by it and to influence the Revolution so that,
destroying only what was outworn and useless in the old regime, it should establish a
new one more suitable to the true needs of the Filipinos and more adaptable to the
changes or reforms demanded by its advancing civilization. I joined the struggle in the
belief that I was following the voice of the people; I quit it now for the same reason.
My past sets the standard for my actions m the future. Instead of organizing fresh
uprisings I shall seek the means to avoid them, for that, it seems to me, is the duty in
times of peace of every honest citizen who truly loves his country. The same tenacity
with which I defended our natural rights during the war is now called for by the
conviction that the recognition of those rights by the United States constitutes the
surest guarantee of peace and the most trustworthy safeguard against future
insurrections. Fighting to the limits of our strength and of reasonableness, all we have
accomplished has been to show our love of freedom; now that the United States have
seen fit to recognize we are entitled to a measure of that freedom, guaranteeing to
each citizen the exercise of certain rights which make our communal life less
constricted, it is incumbent upon us to show that all we want are those rights, that all
we desire is freedom of action to increase our treasury of culture and welfare, thus
accrediting the capacity which justifies our claim to the promised recognition of the
remainder of our freedom.
I can avow that the United States will very probably try to fulfill their pledges
inasmuch as they know: (1) that their sovereignty has not been sought by the Filipinos
but rather has been imposed upon them; (2) that whether the present cessation of
hostilities is to become a true peace or a simple truce, more or less extended, will
depend on their treatment of the Filipinos; (3) that Spain, in prohibiting in the
Philippines the organization of associations or political parties to prevent their
becoming spokesmen of the desires of the people, fomented the organization of
partisan bands, and, in proscribing the Liga Filipina,opened the way for
the Katipunan; and (4) lastly, that any colonial regime, which does not know how to
adjust itself to the needs aroused by the ever increasing culture of the colonized and
by their ever easier and more intimate intercourse with civilized countries, encourages
the separation of the colony and, at the same time, political corruption and decadence
in the metropolis. If we should add to these counsels of reason and lessons of history
the pride of a people that knows its own power and greatness and thinks it knows the
way of the world, we could well affirm that there is no reason for mistrust at this time
when we should forget past grievances and sacrifice them for the sake of the
reconciliation and brotherly union of Americans and Filipinos. Not only have the
United States assured us that this union is the most certain guarantee of our, happiness
but, by making themselves the arbiter of our fate, they have compelled us perforce to
think it so. So be it, then, but meantime let us labour to make our minds and hearts fit
for whatever is worthy and honourable in life in the expectation that time will lift the
veil of the future to show us the true way of our progress and happiness.
Now, since my illness requires a less strenuous life, I return, driven by circumstance,
to the obscurity from whence I came in order to hide my shame and sorrow, not at
having acted dishonourably, but at not having rendered better service. It is not for me,
of course, to say whether I have acted well or badly, correctly or mistakenly.
However, I cannot close without saying that I have no other balm to sweeten the
bitterness of a harsh and melancholy life than the satisfaction given by the conviction
of having always done what I believed to be my duty. God grant that I can say the
same at the hour of my death.
Ap. Mabini

CHAPTER I
POLITICAL REVOLUTION AND EVOLUTION
By political revolution I understand a people’s movement aimed at producing a
violent change in the organization and operation of the three public powers: the
executive, the legislative and the judicial. If the movement is slow, gradual or
progressive, it is called evolution. I say people’s movement because I consider it
essential that the proposed change answer a need felt by the citizens in general. Any
agitation promoted by a particular class for the benefit of its special interests does not
deserve the name (of political revolution or evolution).
The inclination toward betterment or progress is a common need or law for all beings,
whether individually or collectively considered. So it is that political revolution is
generally attempted by a people for whom the desire to improve their condition has
become an irresistible need. But against this law there is another, known as the
instinct of self-preservation, which restrains the impetuosities of the people by
showing them the desolation and misery caused by the use of violence, and by
reminding them of the possibility that an influential and unscrupulous class,
exploiting the ignorance or corruption of its fellow citizens, may deceive them for the
benefit of their special designs, in which case the revolution would worsen rather than
improve conditions.
This conflict is resolved by prudence, which counsels evolution. Along this channel
improvement is slow, but gentle and without painful convulsions, somewhat like the
spontaneous and almost imperceptible growth of a human being. As a general rule
citizens prefer to wait because it serves their own convenience and because those
turbulent souls who seek in rebellions their personal advancement do not dare raise
their heads until the people are frustrated in their aspirations.
But evolution is not possible where the social organization is not adjusted to it, just as
a plant grows and flourishes only in suitable soil. When the government takes
measures for the stagnation of the people, whether for its own profit or that of a
particular class, or for any other purpose, revolution is inevitable. A people that have
not yet reached the fullness of life must grow and develop because otherwise their
existence would be paralyzed, and paralyzation is equivalent to death. Since it is
unnatural for a being to submit to its own destruction, the people must exert all their
efforts to destroy the government which prevents their development. If the
government is composed of the very sons of the people, it must necessarily fall.
A powerful foreign government determined to impose its authority by force, without
regard for the aspirations of the conquered people, can, of course, subjugate them, but
such a government will be able to escape uprisings only after utterly extinguishing all
the energies of the people in the course of long and sanguinary struggles. However, if
the conqueror does not seek room for its excess population but rather a market for its
products, strife and slaughter would cause it great injury for it would have to spend
much blood and treasure only in order to exterminate the consumers of its products.
Consider further the habits of tyranny and despotism and the political corruption that
frequent wars and the ambition to dominate foreign lands and peoples necessarily
engender in the conquering classes, developments which may increase the discontent
of their opposition and produce disintegrating forces in a nation eminently liberal in
its customs and heterogeneous in its population; and, starting from the most
unfavourable assumptions for the conquered people, it may well be that, due to
circumstances that cannot be humanly foreseen, such a people may emerge
triumphant from the struggle.
The very same prudence that counsels the citizens to patience, counsels reflexion to
the conqueror. It is useless, true enough, to ask that it look after the interests of the
conquered country in preference to its own, for its vaunted humanitarian sentiments
are as a rule only a mask to hide its real intentions, but, since it is fatuous to go
against the laws of nature, it would be a measure of the highest political wisdom for
the conqueror to conciliate instead of antagonizing the conquered. Pride, which is
always engendered by the consciousness of power, often considers the concessions
suggested by prudence as signs of weakness, but it is necessary to keep in mind that,
while pride sometimes instills courage and perseverance. in the pursuit of hazardous
enterprises, it is always an evil counsellor in determining whether a proposed
objective is expedient or not.
The study of the Philippine political revolution should determine whether or not the
considerations I have set forth are worthwhile.

CHAPTER II
SPANISH RULE IN THE PHILIPPINES BEFORE THE OPENING OF
THE SUEZ CANAL
The Philippine political revolution is of recent origin, to be found, so to speak, as late
as the opening of the Suez Canal in November 1869. Previous uprisings had been
provoked by affronts offered to particular regions or persons, and were not motivated
by a generally felt need for political reforms; thus they were no better than mere riots.
Even the insurrection which broke out in the Cavite Arsenal in 1872 had this
character. Fathers Burgos, Gomez and Zamora, who were made to appear as
instigators of this movement and as such were executed on the 17th February that
year, were only asking for the restitution of the parishes which the friars had seized
from the Philippine secular clergy, and for the recognition of the preferential right,
which canon law recognized in the latter, to the administration of the archipelago’s
parishes.
It could not be otherwise for when the Spaniards established their rule in the islands,
toward the middle of the 16th century, the social organization of the Filipinos was still
in a rudimentary stage. Where the inhabitants spoke the same dialect and observed the
same usages and customs, there was an independent leader who governed his subjects
in the manner of a patriarch or tribal chieftain: in Manila, which had a sizeable
population, there were two leaders entitled rajahs, one to the north and the other to the
south of the Pasig river. Since none of these leaders or chieftains had attempted to
unite everyone under one rule, whether by permanent alliances or by force of arms,
there did not exist a consciousness of national unity or solidarity. Thus the Spaniards,
by dint of pledges of friendship and protection sealed in blood, were enabled to win
over peace-loving chieftains, and with their help subjugated the more bellicose by
force of arms. Discontent having thereafter grown because the pledged friendship and
protection quickly turned into onerous lordship, the Spaniards, justifying whatever
means might be used to this purpose, found excuses to rid themselves of those who,
suspect because of their position and influence, could lead an uprising. They then
prohibited the carrying of arms, leaving the conquered Filipinos so weakened and
unarmed that the Mindanao Muslims could sack the coastal towns of Luzon and the
Bisayas, often unresisted when the Spaniards still did not have steamships at their
disposal.
The Spanish conquest’s ostensible purpose was the propagation of the Catholic faith;
it was to snatch infidels from the jaws of the barbarian and the Devil, and enable them
to share the benefits of civilization and eternal life — nothing could have been more
disinterested and generous. But the conquis-tadores had to run the risks of uncharted
seas and struggle against savage peoples and unaccustomed climes, and the goal of
doing good to unknown people, by itself, was not and is not sufficient incentive to
drive the average man to undertake such enterprises. A more positive incentive was
needed, an objective concealed but more realistic, such as to make one’s fortune.
America’s gold had roused the cupidity of adventurous spirits. Then again, the
conquest of new lands has always meant more possessions, more money. By teaching
the natives their own religion and customs the conquistadores could rule their bodies
and souls, taming them the better to exploit them. Whether soldiers, priests or
merchants, the conquerors went and will go after money, and, whatever their
pretensions of humanitarian sentiments, will not put them into practice except as a
means to attain their original objective.
Having completed the domination of Luzon and the Bisayas, the Spaniards divided
the conquered country into districts which they termed encomiendas.Those who had
distinguished themselves during the conquest were given each his
own encomienda. with the right of succession. Since the encomenderos, to enrich
themselves faster, required their serfs to pay tribute in land according to the industry
of each, and since a serf had little left to meet his needs after having paid tribute, he
had to give up the crafts he had learned from his forefathers or from the Chinese,
Japanese, and other races which had traded with the Filipinos before the conquest, and
make his living only from the natural fruits of the soil which were still sufficient for
his needs, thanks to the low density of the population. So much for all that humbug
about the indolence of the Filipinos. On the other hand, the friars, driven by the zeal
and intolerance made famous by the Inquisition in its time, proscribed as heretical and
superstitious the religious usages and popular chants which might perhaps preserve
the traditions regarding the origin, settlement and culture of the native population of
the islands, and in their stead imposed beliefs and practices contrary to the native
manner and way of life. This apprenticeship must have been painful for such a radical
and violent change of life could not have been accomplished without great cruelties
on the part of the conquerors, and unspeakable sufferings and utter exhaustion on the
part of the conquered.
This explains how a society that was already beginning to learn the art of living
should return to its infancy and to live without consciousness of itself for three
centuries. If the Spaniards were to perpetuate their rule, they should perpetuate the
ignorance and weakness of the native. Science and wealth meant strength; only the
poor and the ignorant are weak. Since it was unavoidable to give the native a measure
of religious teaching that he might not revert to his old superstitions, this education
should train him to keep his eyes on the skies that he might neglect the bounties of the
earth. The native should learn how to read the prayer-books and hagiographies
translated into the country’s dialects, but he must not know Spanish because then he
would understand the laws and the decrees issued by higher authorities and cease to
heed the advice of his parish priest, the friar. He must not read subversive books, and
so those coming from abroad or locally published had to be subjected to the strict
censorship of the ecclesiastical authorities. Trade with neighbouring Muslim countries
was prohibited; Japanese immigration was likewise forbidden and Chinese
immigration, restricted. It was sought to stifle the echoes, already much weakened by
distance and the difficulty of communications, of the revolutions in the United
Colonies of America against England, in France, and in the Spanish American
colonies, that they might not awaken the Filipinos from their long sleep, already
shaken by frightening nightmares. In short, the Spanish government, working hand in
hand with the friar, tried to isolate the Filipinos, intellectually and physically, from the
outside world that they might not be subject to influences other than those both judged
it convenient to allow.

CHAPTER III
CAUSE AND EFFECT OF THE EXECUTION OF FATHERS BURGOS,
GOMEZ AND ZAMORA
But such isolation was practicable only so long as the Europeans had to go by the
Cape of Good Hope or the Straits of Magellan in order to reach the Far East, and
before steam and electric power had shortened distances. With the opening of the
Suez Canal, the Philippines too was opened to the commerce of the civilized world.
As a free and civilized nation, Spain was ashamed to imitate China by forbidding the
islands to foreigners; besides, it did not have sufficient strength to compel the great
powers, if the heed should arise, to abide by such a decision. Thanks to the increasing
ease of communications, events in Europe were already echoing in the cars of the
Filipinos who, excited by these novelties, were beginning to think anew. Their
awakening became even more thorough when the Filipino secular clergy, led by
Father Burgos, appealed to the Spanish throne and Rome for the recovery of the
parishes which the Spanish government had taken from them and given to the friars,
and, as well, to establish that the friars, confining themselves to missionary work,
should turn over all parishes to the Spanish and Filipino secular clergy in accordance
with canon law. Since the friars were bound to lose the case because the petition was
just and lawful, they put it about that the claimants were really agitators whose aim
was to seize the parishes in order to organize an insurrection against the Spanish
regime in the Philippines. The religous Orders claimed to be the sole support of
Spanish rule and that, if they were removed from the parishes, the whole regime
would come tumbling down, citing the precedent of the Mexican revolution which
had been started by secular parish priests.
At this stage of the controversy, the garrison of the Cavite Arsenal mutinied. The
ringleaders of the clerical dispute, offended because their claims had not been fairly
met, were beyond any doubt, said their enemies, also the ringleaders of the
insurrection and, as such, they were condemned to death. The trial was held amid
great mystery and secrecy; the sentence was hastily carried out; afterward it was
forbidden to speak of the affair; and for these reasons no Filipino believed, or now
believes, in the guilt of the executed priests.
Although Burgos and his companions, Gomez and Zamora, had worked for the rights
of a particular class and not of the people as a whole, yet had they asked for justice,
and died for having asked. True, already on the scaffold, Burgos still could not
understand why he should die, being innocent, which proves that he had not before
then thought it possible that he should have to sacrifice his life for the cause he
defended. But these were Christian priests, and they died like Christ, slandered by the
friar-scribes, because they had sought to take away from the friars the administration
of the parishes, the seat of their power and influence over the masses and the principal
source of their wealth. So it is that the Filipinos keep them in grateful and
imperishable memory, and the people venerate them as martyrs to justice.
The Spanish government did not know and did not want to know anything about the
friars in the Philippines or about the Filipinos. The first, in possession of the parishes,
were in continuous contact with the latter, and informed against their personal
enemies as enemies of Spain, handing them over to the constabulary to be tortured,
and to the authorities to be banished. Those in authority who refused to do what the
friars wished lost their jobs, and the most liberal minister in Spain, when in power, did
whatever the friars wanted. The friars wanted to make an example of Burgos and his
companions so that the Filipinos should be afraid to go against them from then on.
But that patent injustice, that official crime, aroused not fear but hatred of the friars
and of the regime that supported them, and a profound sympathy and sorrow for the
victims. This sorrow worked a miracle: it made the Filipinos realize their condition
for the first time. Conscious of pain, and thus conscious of life, they asked themselves
what kind of a life they lived. The awakening was painful, and working to stay alive
more painful still, but one must live. How? They did not know, and the desire to
know, the anxiety to learn, overwhelmed and took possession of the youth of the
Philippines. The curtain of ignorance woven diligently for centuries was rent at
last: fiat lux, let there be light, would not be long in coming, the dawn of a new day
was nearing.

CHAPTER IV
THE SPANISH REGIME IN THE PHILIPPINES BEFORE THE
REVOLUTION
There were formerly in Manila Latinity schools where that language was taught
together with a little Spanish, the only mandatory requirements for the study of
philosophy, theology and jurisprudence in the University of Santo Tomas, run by the
Dominicans. The Philippine priests and lawyers who were Burgos’s contemporaries,
with the exception of sons of Spaniards, knew Latin perfectly well but hardly any
Spanish because the educational system was wholly religious. Of those few Filipinos
who had enough financial resources to study in Manila, the majority studied for the
priesthood because the friars looked askance at lawyers while priests were held in
high esteem by the natives. Later, in order to discourage young Filipinos from going
to Spain or elsewhere abroad for studies not available in Manila, there to pick up
liberal and irreligious ideas, the friars amended the educational structure and opened
medical and pharmaceutical schools, believing that they could thus at least choose the
textbooks and teachers most suitable to their purposes: between two unavoidable
evils, the lesser was to be preferred. However, such was the thirst for knowledge and
learning that many scions of wealthy families preferred to study in Spain and travel
about Europe. Among those who went abroad for the express purpose of working for
the improvement of the political situation of the Filipinos, Don Jose Rizal, a medical
student, and Don Marcelo H. del Pilar, a Bulacan lawyer persecuted byhis town’s
parish priest, deserve special mention.
From the political point of view the Philippines was then in a deplorable state. As a
mere Spanish possession it did not enjoy constitutional guarantees, so that the King,
through the Minister of the Colonies, the member of his government responsible for
these matters, had in his hands the whole of the legislative and executive power. In so
far as he also appointed and transferred justices and judges at his discretion, he was
also the absolute head of the judicial branch. He was represented in the archipelago by
the governor general of the Philippines, who was always a military man with the rank
of lieutenant-general or captain-general in the army, and who exercised dictatorial
authority to suspend at his discretion the enforcement of the decrees issued by the
Colonial Ministry when in his judgment they were prejudicial to peace and order in
the islands; to banish any citizen or compel him to change his place of residence
without being heard in his own defence; to prohibit the publication or importation into
the archipelago of books, pamphlets and articles not approved by the official censors;
to search domiciles and correspondence without judicial warrant; to prohibit
associations and assemblies for political purposes, as well as the exercise of any
religion except the Roman Catholic: in brief, to prohibit the exercise of all those
natural rights, older than any human law, which are due to any citizen. Thus the
country was in effect in a permanent state of war, although peace had reigned
everywhere for three centuries.
The governor general was also commander-in-chief of the army in the Philippines. As
viceregal patron he appointed all parish priests and other ecclesiastical employees. He
was assisted in his multiple functions, although with more independence and greater
powers than ordinary secretaries, by the director general of the public treasury, in
affairs pertaining to this field; the director general of civil administration, in affairs
pertaining to police, public works, communications, agriculture, industry, commerce,
mines, forests, public instruction and others; and by the deputy commander-in-chief in
military matters.
The governor himself, assisted by the executive secretary, handled official business
outside the jurisdiction of the said officials. An Administrative Council had been
established to advise him on matters of great weight and importance, and he could
also convoke the Council of State, composed, in addition to the high officials already
mentioned, of the chief commandant of the naval station and squadron, the archbishop
of Manila, and the president of the Manila high court.
All the departments and provincial governments were staffed with peninsular
Spaniards, personnel unfamiliar with the country and relieved every time there was a
cabinet change (in Madrid). Very few Filipinos secured employment as army officers,
as officials in the civil administration, or as judges and prosecuting attorneys. A few
Filipinos, more outstanding for their wealth than for their learning, just recently
served as members of the Administrative Council, but these positions were unpaid
and besides the body was purely advisory in nature. Every government employee tried
to make the most of the short time he usually had in office so that dismissal should
not catch him unprovided for. In every government centre or branch office the
employees covered up for one another because if any of them were to be brought to
book their whole class and race would be dishonoured. Any Filipino who denounced
the abuses of the Spanish officials and friars was persecuted as a subversive. The
archipelago was not represented in the Spanish parliament.
There was no representative municipal government except only in the city of Manila.
Town mayors merely collected taxes and enforced the orders of the provincial
authorities. They could repair highways with forced labour, but otherwise had neither
funds nor authority to undertake other public works. A mayor was not the leader of
his community but only the servant of the town’s parish priest and constabulary
commanding officer.

CHAPTER V
REFORMS SOUGHT BY LA SOLIDARIDAD
Faced with this state of affairs, all those Filipinos concerned with the future of their
country could not remain indifferent. They foresaw that easier and faster contact with
civilized nations would before long awaken in the hearts of the Filipinos their inborn
love of the freedoms enjoyed by those others, and that such aspirations, if they were
not assuaged by suitable and opportune reforms, would irremediably sweep the people
away into insurrection, as had been shown in Europe and America. The abuses being
committed in the Philippines found no echo in Spain, nor did the complaints of the
Filipinos, because the latter had no representatives in the parliament, and because the
friars and the officials of the insular government both had reason to conceal abuses
and complaints and to lead the Spanish nation to believe that the natives were content
with the existing regime and would rebel if it were changed. On the other hand any
political demonstrations in the islands were suppressed and rigorously punished so
that neither the statesmen nor the other sectors of the Spanish nation had any idea of
the real and true needs and desires of the Filipinos. Since a periodical published in the
peninsula as the spokesman of their aspirations might perhaps supply the deficiency,
certain Manila residents took it upon themselves to solicit subscriptions and
contributions to meet the necessary expenses, and the fortnightly La Solidaridad was
published, first with Don Graciano Lopez Jaena as editor, and shortly afterward, Don
Marcelo H. del Pilar.
This periodical, after giving a more detailed account of the political condition and
sufferings of the Filipinos, made it clear, among other things, that the Filipinos, far
from being satisfied with their fate, longed and hoped for from the Spanish
government those changes and reforms which would gradually allow them the
progressive enjoyment of the benefits of civilization; that the few Filipinos then living
in Spain were compelled to give public expression to the desires of their countrymen
because statements of this nature were punished in the islands with tortures, forcible
changes of residence, and exile; that these desires, derived as they were from needs
arising in the natural course of things, far from being diminished by repression, would
instead grow until they became irresistible, just as air acquires greater power to
expand the more it is confined; that the Spanish government should not let these
suppressed desires explode into an insurrection since it should forestall the Filipinos
from seeking the cure for their ills in separation ; and that the love and gratitude of the
Filipinos toward Spain were the only support capable in the course of time of
maintaining Spanish rule in the Philippines inasmuch as only they would not fail in its
times of grave danger and distress.
Going on from there to the reforms or improvements which might assuage the
people’s anxieties. the periodical asked, among other things, that the insular
government cease to be military in nature and become civil; that the powers of the
governor general be limited and fixed by law; that the individual liberties sheltered
under the Spanish constitution be given to the Filipinos; that the friars be expelled or
that at least the parishes be entrusted to the secular clergy; that, except for the posts of
governor general and heads of department, which should always be reserved for
Spaniards, public offices in the insular government be filled by competitive
examinations, such examinations to be held in Spain for half of the vacancies and in
the Philippines for the other half; that tenure of such offices be secure; that the
constabulary should be reformed or suppressed, etc.
As was to be expected, the friars published another periodical to oppose these claims;
their main argument was the incapacity of the native due to his ignorance and inborn
laziness. They alleged that the sought for reforms, incompatible with his primitive
state, would spoil the native, accustomed as he was to work under threat of the whip
— the reforms would, so to speak, be too strong a food for his unsophisticated
stomach; that, if their petitions were granted, the Filipinos would ask for more,
turning more and more demanding and vexatious, and never satisfied; that really the
masses in the country were happy with their lot and paid no heed to La
Solidaridad which was edited by a handful of subversives. They were told in reply
that the native was ignorant because he was badly instructed, principally because the
friars, who were the inspectors of the government primary schools and the private
secondary schools, did not want him to be instructed; that notwithstanding official
statistics in the Philippines the proportion of persons who could read and write to the
total population was, if not equal to, greater than, in the peninsula; that the indolence
of the native was largely due to the lack of cheap and easy transport facilities for his
products; that reforms were sought precisely so that the native might rise from the
primitive state in which he was being kept and so that the government, better
informed of his needs, might meet them accordingly; that the number of
representatives of the Filipinos in parliament might be fixed in proportion to those
who could read and write; and lastly that to clarify and dispel all manner of doubts it
would be convenient, by way ofexperiment, to implant some reforms and permit the
Filipinos freely and peacefully to express what they felt.
Since these arguments were unanswerable, the organ of the friars had the impudence
to declare more than once, with heavy emphasis, that the freedoms enjoyed in the
peninsula had been won with blood, not ink. Such provocation was, of course,
childish but, for that very reason, rash in the extreme. While all this was taking place
the Spanish government remained silent, but its actions showed in a way that left no
room for doubt that it was on the side of the friars, abandoning the people who bore
all the burdens of the state. Once in a while an outstanding liberal, weary of waiting
for his party’s turn in power, would raise the kite of vague promises which, once he
had in his hands the cabinet portfolio he coveted, he tried to forget.

CHAPTER VI
RIZAL’S NOVELS
Articles published in a fortnightly were obviously not enough to attract the attention
of the Spanish government. Seeing that Marcelo del Pilar was editing the paper with
rare ability, assisted by a sufficient number of competent contributors, Rizal left its
staff to give his work a more fit and forceful vehicle. It was necessary to picture the
miseries of the Filipinos more movingly, so that the abuses, and the afflictions they
caused, might be publicly revealed in the most vivid colours of reality. Only a novel
could combine all these attractions, and Rizal set himself to writing novels. The
preface of the ”Noli me tangere” states the purpose of its author, which was no other
than to expose the sufferings of the Filipino people to the public gaze, as the ancients
did with their sick, so that the merciful and generous might suggest and apply a
suitable cure. The principal character of the novel was the only scion of a wealthy
family of mixed Spanish and Filipino blood. Ibarra, for that was the name he bore,
had been enrolled at a very early age in the Ateneo, the Manila municipal school run
by the Jesuits; afterward his father had sent him to Europe to complete his studies.
Having had little to do there with his countrymen, it was not to be wondered at that
upon his return to the islands Ibarra should know so little about his own country that
when Elias approached him in the name of the persecuted and oppressed, appealing to
him to work for the reforms that could mitigate their fate, he should answer that he
was convinced it was not yet time to change the existing regime in the islands because
it was the most suitable for the present state of development of the Filipinos. It could
not be doubted that Ibarra really loved his country, and yet, in all faith, he believed
what he said because he was happy, because he loved with all his heart a childhood
friend, the daughter of the friar who was the parish priest of his hometown, and his
love was tenderly returned. In one of those poetic outbursts proper to those in love, he
promised his sweetheart, the personification of his native land, that he would
undertake at his own cost the construction of public works much needed in the town,
such as a good building for a public school.
For his part the parish priest could not allow, and felt it his obligation to prevent, the
union of his daughter with Ibarra because the Filipinos and their families were
subjected to a thousand persecutions and it were better for her to marry a Spaniard
that she might live peacefully in the company of her children. Besides, Ibarra was a
subversive who did not even kiss his hand and whose attitude, although polite, was far
from the servile submission required from natives. His anger knew no bounds when
the town mayor informed him of Ibarra’s plan to build a school-house, and he
exploded into such terrible fulminations of reprisal against any who might collaborate
in the project that the young man had to have recourse to the provincial governor, the
director general of civil administration, and the governor general himself. These
authorities lent him their support, but, at the laying of the cornerstone of the school,
only Elias saved him by a miracle from certain death.
The young man’s situation became more crucial when another friar fell hopelessly in
love with his sweetheart. No Filipino in those times could doubt that the enemy of one
friar was the enemy of his Order, and that the enemy of two friars was that of all the
religious Orders put together. So it came to pass that, when least expected, a riot
broke out to murder the parish priest who, oddly enough, was not to be found in the
parish-house, while the constabulary, on the other hand, was able to surprise and
capture a number of the rioters. Whoever among the latter refused to point to Ibarra as
the leader and instigator of the insurrection was tortured to death; the stronger ones
preferred to die rather than to lie, but many gave in to the severity of their sufferings
and in the face of death. Ibarra, warned in time by Elias, was able to escape from the
torture and fled to Manila, turning himself in to the higher authorities, who had him
shut up in Fort Santiago. Elias saved him anew and, once outside the fortress, told
Ibarra that he had buried the latter’s money and treasure in a place he described,
adding that with these resources Ibarra could live abroad and work from there for the
deliverance of his countrymen. Ibarra, because of his wealth and greater learning,
would be more useful than Elias, and for this reason Elias, in an effort to save Ibarra
from a constabulary pursuit party that was almost upon him, drew them off the track
and was killed.
The book contains various other scenes from Philippine life as it actually was which
are arranged artistically in the novel to give unity of time and place and heighten the
interest of the reader. The work’s second volume, entitled “El
Filibusterismo”, continues the story: Ibarra had escaped abroad where he had grown
wealthy from trade; moving on to Cuba, as a jeweller, he had won the friendship of
the governor general of the island with expensive gifts, and lent him the money
needed to secure from the Ministry a transfer to the Philippines, where the
governorship was more lucrative. Thus, under another name andwith the security
afforded by his position as the new governor general’s intimate friend and confidante,
his eyes always covered by enormous dark glasses to avoid his being recognized,
Ibarra was able to return to the Philippines and dedicate himself, heart and soul, to his
campaign of subversion.
This consisted in deepening the blindness and inciting the base passions of the
authorities so that, by carrying to an extreme the abuses and oppressions inflicted on
the natives, they should drive the latter from exasperation to rage and thus to
revolution. The lamentations of the oppressed reached up to heaven, and, if they did
not move the oppressors to compassion, it was because their hearts were harder than
stone. But in spite of all the people did not rise, their patience was greater than
Ibarra’s, whose heart burnt with the desire to avenge his ruined future and lost
happiness. Unable to wait any longer, he prepared a great banquet to be attended by
the higher authorities and principal families of Manila, and planted a dynamite mine
under the house which would explode before the end of the feast. Then, taking
advantage of the confusion such a disaster would cause, Ibarra, at the head of a gang
of outlaws who were at his orders, would force his way into Intramuros, take his
sweetheart away from the Santa Clara nunnery, and escape with her. A Filipino, to
whom Ibarra confided his plans, was so horrified by the proposed crime that he
frustrated it, and this led to the discovery of the plot. Ibarra, pursued and mortally
wounded, took refuge in the house of Father Florentino, who made him see the error
of his ways. Shortly thereafter, overcome by sorrow and remorse because he had not
spent his time on useful benefactions, Ibarra died. Father Florentino, to whom Ibarra
had left a chest filled with jewels, threw into the sea all the wealth which had been the
cause and origin of untold sufferings so that it mightcease to work evil, calling instead
on the virtuous youths ready to offer the sacrifice of their pure and stainless blood to
obtain from heaven the salvation of the native land.
The foregoing extract from his works shows that Rizal made it his purpose to give, in
particular, two pieces of advice which might serve as warnings not only to the
Spaniards but also to the Filipinos. By the first, he served notice on the Spaniards that,
if the Spanish government in order to please the friar remained deaf to the demands of
the Filipino people, the latter would have recourse in desperation to violent means and
seek in independence relief for its sorrows; and by the second, he warned the Filipinos
that, if they should take up their country’s cause motivated by personal hatred and
ambition, they would, far from helping it, only make it suffer all the more. He wanted
to say that only those actions would benefit the Filipinos which were dictated by true
patriotism, which not only demands the sacrifice to the common good of personal
revenges and ambitions, but also requires, when necessary, the disinterestedness and
abnegation of Elias. Did the Spaniards know how to profit by this advice to them? Or
the Filipinos by that given to them? If the reader has the patience to follow me in this
brief study, which I shall try to make impartial so it may be the more enlightening, I
hope that at its conclusion he may answer these questions for himself. For the time
being let him be content with the observation that very few Spaniards read Rizal’s
novels because they had been written by a subversive, and that not many Filipinos
read them either because their publication and reading in the islands were prohibited.
Sin, says the proverb, is its own expiation.

CHAPTER VII
THE LIGA FILIPINA AND THE KATIPUNAN
It is undeniable that in the Philippines the desire for improvement was great and
widespread; it is not possible to explain otherwise the mistrust and hatred that the
Filipinos, from the most ignorant to the most cultured, were beginning to feel toward
the friars in the measure that they realized that the latter tenaciously opposed all
reform. Time there was when the friars were wont to defend the natives against the
rapacity of the encomenderos for in those days, the friars being in want and the
Catholic religion not deeply rooted, they had great need of the confidence and love of
their parishioners, whose trust and candour once exploited, they then became rich and
arrogant. How was it that they forgot those sweet and gentle accents that had worked
such miracles? It was because whoever acts in bad faith corrupts himself, and the
corrupt hearkens not to the voice of reason but to that of passion.
The love and respect that everyone professed for Rizal, Marcelo, del Pilar and all the
other patriots who collaborated with them in the great work of national regeneration
manifested clearly and openly the political aspirations of the Filipinos. That La
Solidaridad had faithfully interpreted those aspirations was likewise shown by the
fact that its expenses were met by Filipinos residing in the islands, who were thus
risking their personal safety and interests. From the start of the periodical’s
publication a number of Manila residents, calling themselves propagandists,
distributed the issues which were smuggled into the city, and collected the
subscriptions and contributions given by patriots in Manila and neighbouring
provinces. At such times as they had occasion to visit the capital, well-to-do and
educated persons from distant provinces were also wont to give their help. If the rich
men of Manila contributed very little it was because they mistrusted the persons in
charge of the funds, and feared for their own interests.
When he realized that these disorderly and ill-coordinated efforts yielded little, Rizal
thought of organizing a society called Liga Filipiiia, which was inaugurated a few
days before his rustication to Dapitan in Mindanao. The statute of this association was
limited to the establishment by the votes of its members of people’s councils in the
towns, a provincial council in every province, and a supreme council for the whole
archipelago, but did not define the objectives of the association. I do not know if these
objectives were defined in the inaugural meeting over which Rizal himself personally
presided because I was not present and because I never had close relations with the
illustrious doctor. I can only say that the society was dissolved a few days after its
inauguration because of the banishment of its founder, and that, when it was
reorganized later on the initiative of Don Domingo Franco, Andres Bonifacio, and
others, they gave me the post of secretary of the supreme council. We then fixed the
objectives of the society in a short program couched in the following or equivalent
language: to contribute to the support of La Solidaridad and the reforms it asked; to
raise funds to meet the expenses not only of the periodical but also of the public
meetings organized to support such reforms and of the (Spanish) parliamentarians
who would advocate them; in brief, to have recourse to all peaceful and legal means,
thus transforming the society into a political party.
The association did not have a better fate this time for it had to be dissolved after a
few months of life. However, it had promising beginnings: the majority of the
members of the supreme council were persons known for their learning; patriotism
and social status; thanks to the efforts of Andres Bonifacio and others, people’s
councils were soon organized in Tondo and Trozo, and others were being organized in
Santa Cruz, Ermita, Malate, Sampaloc, Pandacan, etc. Subsequently a small monthly
contribution was required from every member, the proceeds of which were applied to
the expenses of La Solidaridad, which were the most urgently to be met. The
members paid their dues at first; later they stopped doing so on the pretext that they
did not agree with the society’s objectives because the Spanish government paid no
attention to the periodical nor in fact would do so to any lawful activity. Upon
investigation it then transpired that those commissioned to organize the people’s
councils had not required previous assent to the society’s program as a condition for
membership in the society; and that, on the contrary, Andres Bonifacio, who had
recruited more members for the society with his tireless activity, was firmly
convinced of the uselessness of peaceful means. The supreme council, which was
more of an organizing committee because its members had not been elected by vote,
saw clearly that, as soon as the rank and file elected their leaders according to the by-
laws, the program would be changed. The council understood for the first time that
the masses, whom the Spaniards believed to be brutish or at best indifferent, were in
the vanguard where political aspirations were concerned. Realizing that the work of
conciliation and compromise was bringing no results, the council declared the
dissolution of the society so that the disagreements among its members should not
lead to its discovery by the authorities. Those who were in favour of keeping up the
fortnightly publication formed one group, called the Compromisarios, because each
one engaged to pay a monthly contribution of five pesos to meet its expenses. Andres
Bonifacio, for his part, reorganized the society under the name of Katipunan ng
manga Anak ng Bayan (Association of the Sons of the People), already with
independence as its objective.
The Katipunan grew very rapidly because the insolent and provocative way in which
the friars carried out their campaign (against reforms) had exasperated the masses.
But if the organization of political associations had been permitted in the archipelago,
and if the middle class, which was the most educated and influential, had been able to
move freely, it could have undoubtedly calmed the people’s anger and obstructed the
growth of the Katipunan since that class was resolutely in favour of
the Liga’s program, even after having endured most cruel sufferings, and even more
after the Pact of Biak-na-Bato.

CHAPTER VIII
FIRST STAGE OF THE REVOLUTION
Less than a year afterward I heard that the Katipunan had spread all over the province
of Manila and was beginning to branch out into Cavite and Bu-lacan. I foresaw the
horrors which would follow its discovery by the authorities, but, having been unable
to obstruct (its activities) before, much less could I do so now when I was already ill
and was, besides, considered by the society’s leaders as a very lukewarm patriot. In
August 1896 the head of the printing press of theDiario de Manila, having discovered
that some of his employees belonged to a secret society, handed them over to the
constabulary for the corresponding investigation. Recourse was had to the usual
methods of torture, and not only the Katipunan but also the Masonic brotherhood and
other societies already dis-solved* like the Liga and the Cuerpo de
Compromisarios, were discovered. Warned in time, Bonifacio and his followers were
able to flee to the mountains, and from there ordered the people’s councils to rise or
join them so as not to fall in the hands of the constabulary. The Spanish authorities,
following the advice of the friars, decided to teach a terrible exemplary lesson and for
this purpose seized not only the katipuneros but the Masons as well and all those who
had belonged to the dissolved societies. Convinced that the insurrection could not be
the work of the unlettered but rather of the country’s educated class, they also ordered
the arrest of all the prominent Filipinos in every province. The fate of the captured
was cruel and horrible. The katipuneros had managed to put themselves beyond reach
of the persecution in time, and only those who were not, were arrested. Since the latter
were tortured to compel them to admit their complicity in the insurrection, and they
knew nothing about it, they could not escape these sufferings. Many died as a result;
many were executed under sentence of courts-martial; many others, shot without any
trial at all; and still others, suffocated in grim dungeons. Those who suffered only
imprisonment and deportation were lucky. Rizal was shot on the 30th December 1896
as the principal instigator of the movement, and those really guilty of giving cause for
the Filipinos to hate the very name of Spaniard were praised for their patriotism.
Shortly before the outbreak of the insurrection Rizal, in order to put an end to an
indefinite exile, had offered his medical services to the Spanish army campaigning in
Cuba. The government having agreed to his proposal, he was taken from Dapitan and
kept aboard a warship anchored in Manila Bay, awaiting transport to Spain. It was
during this time that the insurrection happened to break out. Nonetheless the governor
general sent Rizal on to Spain, whence he had to be sent back soon after because the
judge advocate of the continuing court-martial demanded custody of Rizal to answer
the charges against him that might appear from the evidence. Although Rizal’s
banishment to Dapitan eliminated all possibility of his active participation in the
movement, he was found guilty of having been its chief instigator because, had it not
been for the articles he had published in La Solidaridad and for his novels, the people
would never have taken to politics. This judgment was totally incorrect because
political activities in the Philippines antedated Rizal, because Rizal was only a
personality created by the needs of these activities: if Rizal had not existed, somebody
else would have played his role. The movement was by nature slow and gentle, it had
become violent because obstructed. Rizal had not started the resistance, yet he was
condemned to death: were he not innocent, he would not be a martyr.
In contrast to Burgos who wept because he died guiltless, Rizal went to the execution
ground calm and even cheerful, to show that he was happy to sacrifice his life, which
he had dedicated to the good ‘ of all the Filipinos, confident that in love and gratitude
they would always remember him and follow his example and teaching. In truth the
merit of Rizal’s sacrifice consists precisely in that it was voluntary and conscious. He
had known perfectly well that, if he denounced the abuses which the Spaniards were
committing in the Philippines, they would not sleep in peace until they had
encompassed his ruin; yet he did so because, if the abuses were not exposed, they
would never be remedied. From the day Rizal understood the misfortunes of his
native land and decided to work to redress them, his vivid imagination never ceased to
picture to him at every moment of his life the terrors of the death that awaited him;
thus he learned not to fear it, and had no fear when it came to take him away; the life
of Rizal, from the time he dedicated it to the service of his native land, was therefore a
continuing death, bravely endured until the end for love of his countrymen. God grant
that they will know how to render to him the only tribute worthy of his memory: the
imitation of his virtues.
Such cruelties could do no less than arouse general indignation, and, rather than suffer
them, the rebels preferred to die fighting even though armed only with bolos. Besides,
the movement had more success in Cavite because the government forces there
consisted only of small constabulary detachments scattered in different towns of the
province, except for the port and arsenal which the rebels were unable to take. At that
time the Katipunan had two people’s councils in the province, one called Magdalo in
Kawit led by Don Baldomero Aguinaldo, and the other, the Magdiwang in Noveleta
under the orders of Mariano Alvarez. There were also a number of katipuneros in San
Francisco de Malabon who obeyed the latter. Upon receiving Andres Bonifacio’s
order to rise, the katipuneros,helped by their friends, were able to surprise the
constabulary barracks and kill the Spanish officers and sergeants in command. With
the handful of arms thus captured, the citizens of Noveleta, under the command of
Don Artemio Ricarte, threw back the forces of General Blanco on the 9th November
1896, while those of Kawit, under the orders of Don Emilio Aguinaldo, the town
mayor, and of Don Candido Tirona, who died in the encounter, were able to retake, on
the 11th of the same month, the powder-magazine of Binacayan, which had fallen to
the Spaniards a few days before.
On the basis of these gains, the two people’s councils took provincial jurisdiction, the
towns of Kawit, Imus, Bacoor, Perez Dasmarinas, Silang, Mendez Nunez, and
Amadeo falling under Magdalo, and the remaining towns in the province
under Magdiwang. Invited by some friends, Andres Bonifacio went to Cavite to unify
the endeavours of the two, but Magdalo already paid little heed to his authority and
orders. Fortunately, Don Edilberto Evangelista, a Manilan who was a civil engineer
graduated from the University of Ghent in Belgium, put his services at the disposal of
the insurrection and directed all the entrenchment and defence woi’ks which would
give the Spanish forces so much trouble. General Polavieja, at the head of a
considerable force, boldly decided to overrun the province of Cavite, and Edilberto,
who was conducting the defence of the Sapote river, died fighting heroically on the
17th February 1897. From then on the Spanish forces were able to take one after the
other the towns within the jurisdiction of the Magdalo council, whose members were
finally compelled to withdraw to San Francisco de Malabon, there to meet with
the Magdiwang and arrive at an agreement with the latter on the most appropriate
measures for the defence of the province. For that purpose the members of both
councils, together with the principal military leaders, gathered in the estate-house of
Tejeros on the 12th March 1897. The assembly, presided over by Bonifacio, agreed
on the election of a central government which would take charge of the general
business of the insurrection. Don Emilio Aguinaldo was elected president, and Don
Mariano Trias, vice-president. Bonifacio was elected director of the department of the
interior, but, affronted when some of those present opposed his appointment because
he was not educationally qualified, he walked out of the meeting, declaring that, as
head of the Katipunan, he did not recognize the validity of the decisions reached.
Nevertheless those elected took possession of their offices and, in high dudgeon,
Bonifacio went off with his two brothers to the mountains of San Mateo; but (Mr
Aguinaldo sent after him) two companies of soldiers were sent after him with orders
to arrest him. Bonifacio resisted, and as a result he was wounded thrice, and one of his
brothers and three of the soldiers were killed. The soldiers were able to take Bonifacio
and his other brother to Naic, thence to Maragondon, and afterward to Mount Buntis
where the two brothers were shot.
The general opinion finds no justification, not even mitigation, for such a manner of
proceeding (on the part of Mr Aguinaldo). Andres Bonifacio had no less schooling
than any of those elected in the aforesaid assembly, and he had shown an uncommon
sagacity in organizing the Katipunan. All the electors were friends of Don Emilio
Aguinaldo and Don Mariano Trias, who were united, while Bonifacio, although he
had established his integrity, was looked upon with distrust only because he was not a
native of the province: this explains his resentment. However, he did not show it by
any act of turbulent defiance, for, seeing that no one was working for reconciliation,
he was content with quitting the province for San Mateo in the company of his
brothers. When it is considered that Mr Aguinaldo (the elected leader) was primarily
answerable for insubordination against the head of the Katipunan of which he was a
member; when it is appreciated that reconciliation was the only solution proper in the
critical state of the Revolution, the motive for the assassination cannot be ascribed
except to feelings and judgments which deeply dishonour the former; in any case,
such a crime was the first victory of personal ambition over true patriotism.
This tragedy smothered the enthusiasm for the revolutionary cause, and hastened the
failure of the insurrection in Cavite, because many from Manila, Laguna and
Batangas, who were fighting for the province (of Cavite), were demoralized and quit,
and soon the so-called central government had to withdraw to the mountains of Biak-
na-Bato in Bulacan. It could afford to remain there because the Spaniards ceased to
attack it to cut down their casualties. Besides, Don Pedro A. Paterno offered himself
to General Primo de Rivera as a negotiator with the leaders of the insurrection for
what they called an honourable peace. Mr Paterno was a purely volunteer mediator,
that is to say, he had no official standing. The general’s purpose was to keep the
revolutionary chieftains abroad because, once there, watched constantly by the
operatives of the Spanis.h consulates, it would be very difficult for them to arm an
expedition and return to the islands, and with this in mind he offered them money,
safe-conduct and free passage. Reflecting that they would be compelled by lack of
arms to surrender later under worse conditions, the chieftains accepted the offer,
encouraged by a design to spend the money on the purchase of arms with which they
would return to the archipelago at the first favourable opportunity. It was agreed that
the government would give P400,000 to Mr Aguinaldo and his companions in
Hongkong, P200,000 to the chieftains remaining in the islands, and P200,000 more
some time after, perhaps in the light of the subsequent conduct of the chieftains who
surrendered. For this part Mr Aguinaldo promised to order all the people in arms to
surrender and turn over their weapons to the Spanish authorities.
To all appearances the pact of Biak-na-Bato gave the leaders of the Revolution an
advantageous way out of an indefensible position. Since both parties were acting in
bad faith, one of them could not complain if the other broke its pledges. But such a
solution was far from enough to quench the general state of excitement because there
was no public announcement of any specific covenant on the political reforms hoped
for by the people. The Spanish government believed that, with the voluntary
expatriation of some leaders and the unconditional surrender of some others, peace
would soon be restored, but it was wholly mistaken. Only the grant of the reforms
sought by La Solidaridad could have restored a spirit of peace, but, precisely to avoid
such concessions, the Spanish government was using all the means suggested by
diplomatic guile and skill. And so it came about that many of the discontented
remained afield with forebodings of grave and unpredictable events.

CHAPTER IX
DEVELOPMENT OF THE REVOLUTION
Because I had been a member of the Liga Filipina and one of the compromisarios, I
too was indicted and imprisoned as one of the instigators of the rebellion. However, I
had suffered a paralytic stroke six months before the uprising and I attribute to this
circumstance my not having been beaten up and shot together with Don Domingo
Franco and others. In the event I was covered by General Primo de Rivera’s amnesty
proclamation and set free by virtue thereof after having been confined for almost nine
months in the prisoners’ section of the San Juan de Dios hospital in Manila. Months
afterwards I moved to the town of Los Banos, and thence to Bay, in the province of
La Laguna, where I drafted a scheme for the organization of a general uprising, which
I judged to be imminent in view of the general restlessness. This transpired two
months before the declaration of war between the United States and Spain, which was
soon followed by the annihilation of the Spanish fleet in the Philippines by Admiral
Dewey on the 1st May 1898, and Mr Aguinaldo’s return to the islands. When the
latter, upon arrival, proclaimed to the people the readiness of the United States to help
the Filipinos regain their natural rights, everyone thought that the government of that
country, recognizing Mr Aguinaldo as the representative of the Filipino people, had
entered into a formal agreement with him, and so each province, acknowledging his
indisputable leadership, went into action to fight the Spanish forces within its
boundaries. This impression was confirmed by the vague and equivocal statements of
the American commanders.
One of the copies of the scheme which I had drafted reached Mr Aguinaldo’s hands
by chance, and he thereupon wrote, although he did not know me, asking me to help
him. Although I was just as unacquainted with him, I wanted to help in the common
endeavour as far as I was able, and I called on him at Cavite port on the 12th June
1898, the very day on which the independence of the Philippines was being
proclaimed in the town of Kawit. I immediately asked him about the agreement he
had concluded with the United States Government, and to my great surprise learned
that there was none, and that the (American) consul in Singapore, Pratt, and Admiral
Dewey had only given him verbal assurances that the United Sates Government did
not want any part of the islands and that it designed only to help the natives destroy
the Spanish tyranny so that all the Filipinos could enjoy the blessings of an
independent government. I realized then that the American representatives had limited
themselves to ambiguous verbal promises, which Mr Aguinalclo had accepted
because he ardently desired to return to the islands, fearful that other influential
Filipinos should (rob him of glory and) reach an understanding with the Americans in
the name of the people. I realized also that the proclamation of independence which
was being made that day was premature and imprudent because the Americans were
concealing their true designs while we were making ours manifest. I foresaw, of
course, that because of this want of caution the American commanders and forces
would be on guard against the revolutionists, and the United States consuls on the
China coast would sabotage the purchase of arms for the revolution. However, unable
to prevent the proclamation because I had arrived too late to do so, I kept my peace
and set myself to studying in detail the measures most urgently called for in the
existing situation.
The sudden general uprising had at one blow destroyed the structure established by
the Spanish administration in the provinces and towns of the archipelago, and it was
therefore urgently necessary to found a new structure so that anarchy might not lead
to fatal consequences. I proposed a scheme reorganizing the provinces and towns in
the most democratic form possible in the circumstances and, with Mr Aguinaldo’s
approval, it was carried out without loss of time. I followed this up with another
proposal for the creation of the (government) departments needed for the orderly
working of the central administration, as well as of an assembly or congress
composed of two prominent residents of each province to advise Mr Aguinaldo and
propose measures for the common welfare and the attainment of the longed for rights.
This congress would not have legislative functions because the state of war required a
concentration of powers necessary for swift action, but I considered its creation
indispensable so that the provinces should not distrust the dictatorial authority of Mr
Aguinaldo. He approved my proposal and offered to make me the head of one of the
new departments. I was not sure I was fit for the job because of my illness, and
declined the offer, but for the time being I handled the limited amount of business
regarding foreign relations until such time as Mr Arellano, who had been offered this
portfolio because of his recognized competence, should take over. By this time
General Anderson’s brigade had already landed in Cavite, and the remaining forces
commanded by General Merritt were beginning to arrive, making relations with the
Americans more troublesome. On the other hand, the siege of Manila by the Filipino
forces was stalled because of the lack of coordination in the activities of the columns
operating in the different zones, and Aguinaldo, who, by virtue of his prestige, could
alone impose such unity, could not make up his mind to take personal command of
the operation. If the Filipinos had been able to take Manila before the arrival of
General Merritt’s forces, relations with the Americans would have been cleared up
from the start. But it did not turn out that way. The Americans landed in Parañaque
and attacked Manila, ignoring the Filipino besieging forces. Many Filipino military
commanders were of the opinion that this behaviour was sufficient cause for the
opening of hostilities against the Americans, but I advised Mr Aguinaldo to try to
avoid the conflict at all costs because otherwise we would be facing two enemies, and
the most likely result would be the partition of the islands between them.
After the capitulation of Manila, the Philippine Government moved from Bacoor,
Cavite, to Malolos, Bulacan, where the newly created Congress held its first session.
The first results of this assembly’s deliberations were the ratification of the
proclamation of independence prematurely made in Kawit, and the decision to draft a
constitution for the establishment of a Philippine Republic. I should note that,
although Mr Arellano had not yet assumed office as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, his
deputy, Don Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, had taken over the business of the
department, so that I was then simply Mr Aguinaldo’s private adviser. As such I
advised him to address a message to Congress, reminding it that Congress should not
draft a constitution because it was not a constitutional convention; that neither could
Congress enact laws because it had no legislative functions; and that its principal and
urgent duty was to determine the best system for the organization of our armed forces
and the raising of the funds needed for their maintenance, the plans agreed upon to be
submitted to him. He was to add further that it was not the opportune time for the
drafting of a constitution since the independence of the Philippines was not yet
officially recognized; that, once independence had been embodied in a constitution,
the Philippine Government would be unable to negotiate any agreement with any
other government except on the basis of recognition of such independence, since
otherwise the Government would be violating the fundamental law of the State; and
that, in those arduous circumstances, I was of the opinion that the Government should
have freedom of action to negotiate an agreement which would prevent the horrors of
war with the United States, on condition that such an agreement should bring positive
benefits to the country and recognize the natural rights of the citizens. Mr Aguinaldo
submitted my opinion to the consideration of the members of his cabinet, I do not
know in what terms; what I certainly know is that not only Avas my advice rejected
but I was also bitterly criticized for holding tyrannical ideas and inculcating them in
the head of the government. On account of these unfortunate services political
scandal-mongers nicknamed me “Devil’s Advocate to the President”. Seeing that my
advice was not only useless but even resented by the cabinet members, and fearing
that they would blame me for their own failures, I tried to disassociate myself from
Mr Aguinaldo, moving to another house against his wishes, but he immediately
ordered the installation of a telephone connexion between his house and my new
residence, so that, to my discomfiture, I continued to play the part of devil’s advocate.
I limited this to giving my opinion on matters of great gravity and importance, and
suggesting to Mr Aguinaldo that it was his duty to lend his support to the actuations of
his secretaries so long as they did not give evidence of unfitness or sufficient motive
to believe they were abusing his confidence.
After a long wait, Mr Arellano finally stated that he could not discharge the office of
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, in view of which Mr Aguinaldo insisted that I should
take charge of the department. I accepted for the purpose of seeking an understanding
with the United States Government before the proposed constitution was voted upon
by the Philippine Congress, and assumed office on the 2nd January 1899. All my
efforts failed because the Treaty of Paris, concluded on the 10th December the
previous year, had vested in the Congress of the United States the authority to
determine the civil rights and the political status of the Filipinos, and Congress —
according to the emphatic assurances of General Otis — would not exercise that
authority so long as the Filipinos were up in arms. Since the administration in
Washington had a majority in Congress, it was very likely that the latter would take a
decision in accordance with the wishes of the administration; but if we surrendered
unconditionally, leaving our political fate at its mercy, the Americans would no longer
have any doubts about our unfitness because, by not defending our freedom, we
would be showing our little understanding and love for it. We had therefore to choose
between war and the charge of unfitness. Amid this crisis, the Constitution of the
Philippine Republic, already definitely voted upon and approved, was sent to the
government for promulgation. I was still trying to delay it because of the gravity of
the situation, but seeing that, on the one hand, the representatives were obdurate and
threatened a scandal, and that, on the other hand, an understanding with the American
Government was impossible because of its refusal to recognize our juridical existence
and its insistence on unconditional surrender, I had to give in especially since Mr
Aguinaldo too was in favour of the promulgation. I did not yet have reason to even
suspect that the most determined advocates of the promulgation of the Constitution
would be the least ready to defend it at the least sign of danger to their persons and
interests. Apprehending that war was inevitable, I limited my efforts to preventing the
aggression from coming from our side, convinced that our weakness could not justify
any provocation.
Meantime, on the other side of the sea, in the capital of the Republic of the United
States, things were happening which merit all possible attention. The ratification of
the Treaty of Paris was being postponed and delayed in the Senate by the stubborn
opposition of the Democrats, and this persuaded President McKinley to stage what is
called a coup d’etat. In the night of the 4th February 1899 the American forces started
an action that led to the outbreak of hostilities, and the news was immediately
communicated to Washington. The likelihood of new complications with Spain, and
perhaps with other powers, put an end to all opposition, and the treaty was ratified by
the Senate on the 6th February. The amount of $20,000,000 stipulated for the cession
of the Philippines was appropriated by Congress on the 2nd March. The instruments
of ratification having been exchanged on the 11th April, the price for the cession was
paid on the 1st May, thus consummating the purchase and sale.
Elsewhere Senator McEnery, explaining the administration’s objectives, proposed in
the Senate that the United States declare it did not intend to annex the islands
permanently, but rather to prepare the inhabitants for an autonomous government
which would promote American and Filipino interests. For his part, Senator Bacon,
expressing the wishes of the opposition, proposed an amendment asking the United
States to declare that it renounced all purpose of exercising sovereignty, jurisdiction
and control over the islands, since its intention was to hand over their government and
administration to the Filipinos when the latter should have established a stable
government worthy of recognition. This amendment was put to a vote, and 29
senators voted in favour, and another 29 against. The Vice-President of the United
States, Hobart, as President of the Senate, broke the tie by giving his casting vote to
those against, thus leading to the approval of the McEnery proposal, that is to say, the
administration’s policy. Under this proposal the Philippines can be neither a territory
nor a state because it should not be permanently annexed to the United States, but, as
property bought by the United States, the latter can dispose of the Philippines at its
discretion, that is to say, without the limitations of its Constitution. If the United
States is the absolute owner of the islands, Congress has absolute power to legislate
on them, and hence can fix at its discretion the political status and civil rights of the
inhabitants. If the latter enjoy life and liberty, it is not because they have an inborn
right to them, by virtue of natural law, but because the United States Congress so
wishes. Undoubtedly President McKinley destroyed the Spanish tyranny, but,
apparently, only in order to replace it with another in the American manner. It is
interesting to observe that the Republican Party, led by a Lincoln in its beginnings,
freed many millions of slaves in the United States, while, led by a McKinley in its
greatest period of vigour and prosperity, it made the United States the absolute owner
of many millions of Filipinos. The immortal Washington, speaking of the Constitution
of the United States, said that so long as the civic virtues did not wholly vanish among
the classes of North-American society, the distribution of powers made in that
Constitution would not permit an unjust policy to become permanent. God grant that
the Americans do not forget the father of their country, or defraud his fond hopes!

CHAPTER X
END AND FALL OF THE REVOLUTION
As I had foreseen, our improvised militia could not withstand the first blow struck by
the disciplined American troops. Moreover, it must be admitted that the Filipino
forces stationed around Manila were not prepared for an attack that night: General
Ricarte, in command of the detachments in the south, and General San Miguel,
commander of the eastern zone where the attack began, were then in Malolos. Little
accustomed to war, the Filipino commanders and officers hardly appreciated the value
of military instruction and discipline so that the emplacements were not served with
anything approaching order and precision. The Filipino general staff had not studied
or laid down any plans for offensive or withdrawal movements in case of an outbreak
of hostilities. Mr Aguinaldo, who had scant appreciation of the advantages of a
unified command and coordinated tactics, had made no provision for the prompt
restoration of communications among the various army units should a sudden retreat
interrupt the telegraphic system. Mr Aguinaldo wanted to keep the forces around
Manila under his direct orders, commanding them from his residence in Malolos,
although he could not devote himself completely to the proper discharge of the duties
of this command because of his preoccupations as head of the government and the
conceit of personally deciding many matters which should have been channelled
through the departments of the central administration. Only after the outbreak of
hostilities, when the telegraph lines had already been cut, did he name General Luna
commander of the forces operating around Manila, but by that time the various army
units had already evacuated their old emplacements, and communications among
them had become slow and hazardous. Furthermore, Luna resigned his command
shortly afterward because the War Minister had disapproved one of his dispositions.
However, he resumed command of the defensive operations north of Manila when the
Philippine Government was compelled to leave Malolos for San Isidro in the province
of Nueva Ecija. Luna was able to raise fresh forces in Calumpit, forming a number of
companies composed of veteran soldiers of the former native army organized by the
Spanish Government, and with these troops as a core he imposed a stern disciplinary
system to stop the demoralization of our troops. But many commanders, jealous of
their authority, withheld from him the effective cooperation that was necessary. This
led to the cashiering by brute force of commanders who did not recognize his
authority, or the court-martialling of those who abandoned their posts in the face of
the enemy, or the disarming of troops that disobeyed his orders.
In spite of all these obstacles, Luna would have succeeded in imposing and
maintaining discipline if Aguinaldo had supported him with all the power of his
prestige and authority, but the latter was also beginning to grow jealous, seeing Luna
slowly gain ascendancy by his bravery, audacity, and military skill. All those
affronted by his actuations were inducing Aguinaldo to believe that Luna was plotting
to wrest from him the supreme authority. After the Calumpit bridge had fallen to the
American forces, due mainly to the scarcity of ammunition, Luna came to see me in
San Isidro and entreated me to help him convince Mr Aguinaldo that the time had
come to adopt guerrilla warfare. I promised to do what he wanted, while making it
clear to him that I doubted I would get anywhere because myadvice was hardly
heeded in military matters inasmuch as, not being a military man but a man of letters,
my military knowledgeability must be scant, if not non-existent. I could not keep my
promise because after our meeting I did not get to see Mr Aguinaldo until after some
time when he came expressly to seek my advice on whether or not it would be
expedient to reorganize the cabinet. Unable to overcome my sense of propriety even
in those circumstances, I answered in the affirmative, and, having relinquished office
to mysuccessor, Don Pedro A. Paterno, in the first days of May 1899, I left for the
town of Rosales near Bayambang. Some weeks later Mr Aguinaldo sent a telegram
asking Luna to see him in Cabanatuan for an exchange of views, but when Luna
arrived in Cabanatuan he met not Aguinaldo but death by treachery plotted by the
very same soldiers whom he had disarmed and court-martialled for abandonment of
their post and disobedience to his orders (he did not find Aguinaldo at home and was
treacherously murdered by the soldiers who were on sentry duty there). Colonel
Francisco Roman, who accompanied Luna, died with him. While Luna was being
murdered. Mr Aguinaldo was in Tarlac taking over command of the forces which the
deceased had organized. Before his death Luna had his headquarters in Bayambang,
and had reconnoitred Bangued to determine if it met the conditions for an efficacious
defence in case of a retreat; what is more, he was already beginning to transport there
the heavier pieces of ordnance. Nothwithstanding, Aguinaldo established his
government in Tarlac, wasting his time on political and literary activites, a negligence
which General Otis exploited by landing his infantry in San Fabian while his cavalry,
wheeling through San Jose and Umingan, took San Quintin and Tayug, thus cutting
all of Mr Aguinaldo’s lines of retreat and giving the death-blow to the Revolution.
Until now I cannot believe that Luna was plotting to wrest from Mr Aguinaldo the
high office he held although Luna certainly aspired to be prime minister instead of Mr
Paterno, with whom Luna disagreed because the former’s autonomy program was a
violation of the fundamental law of the State and as such was a punishable crime. This
is shown by a report in the newspaper La Independencia, inspired by Luna and
published a few days before his death, which stated that the Paterno-Buencamino
cabinet would be replaced by another in which Luna would be prime minister as well
as war minister. When a few days afterward Luna received Mr Aguinaldo’s telegram
calling him to Cabanatuan, Luna thought perhaps that the subject of their meeting-
would be the new cabinet; he did not expect an attempt to assassinate him precisely at
the critical juncture when the Revolution most needed his strong and skilled right
arm; nor could he believe that a licit and correct ambition should inspire fear in Mr
Aguinaldo who had named him commanding general of the Philippine army. Luna
had certainly allowed himself to say on occasion that Aguinaldo had a weak character
and was unfit to be a leader, but such language was only an explosive outlet for a fiery
and ebullient temperament which saw its plans frustrated by the lack of necessary
support. All of Luna’s acts revealed integrity and patriotism combined with a zealous
activity that measured up to the situation. If he was sometimes hasty and even cruel in
his decisions, it was because the army was in a desperate position due to the
demoralization of the troops and the lack of munitions; only acts of daring and
extraordinary energy could prevent its disintegration.
The death of Andres Bonifacio had plainly shown in Mr Aguinalclo a boundless
appetite for power, and Luna’s personal enemies exploited this weakness of
Aguinaldo with skillful intrigues in order to encompass Luna’s ruin.
To say that if Aguinaldo, instead of killing Luna (allowing Luna to be killed), had
supported him with all his power, the Revolution would have triumphed, would be
presumption indeed, but I have not the least doubt that the Americans would have had
a higher regard for the courage and military abilities of the Filipinos. Had Luna been
alive, I am sure that Otis’s mortal blow would have been parried or at least timely
prevented, and Mr Aguinaldo’s unfitness for military command would not have been
exposed so clearly. Furthermore, to rid himself of Luna, Aguinaldo had recourse to
the very soldiers whom Luna had punished for breaches of discipline; by doing so
Aguinaldo destroyed that discipline, and with it his own army. With Luna, its most
firm support fell the Revolution, and, the ignominy of that fall bearing wholly on
Aguinaldo, brought about in turn his own moral death, a thousand times more bitter
than physical death. Aguinaldo therefore ruined himself, damned by his own deeds.
Thus are great crimes punished by Providence.
To sum it up, the Revolution failed because it was badly led; because its leader won
his post by reprehensible rather than meritorious acts; because instead of supporting
the men most useful to the people, he made them useless out of jealousy. Identifying
the aggrandizement of the people with his own, he judged the worth of men not by
their ability, character and patriotism but rather by their degree of friendship and
kinship with him; and, anxious to secure the readiness of his favourites to sacrifice
themselves for him, he was tolerant even of their transgressions. Because he thus
neglected the people, the people forsook him; and forsaken by the people, he was
bound to fall like a waxen idol melting in the heat of adversity. God grant we do not
forget such a terrible lesson, learnt at the cost of untold suffering.
CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSION
I am sorry that the logic of events should take me to such painful conclusions, but I
aspire to be a critic and I must tell the truth. Having written these memoirs only to
seek in the past the most useful lessons for the present and the future, I have tried to
be impartial. I have also tried to render judgment on events and not on particular
individuals, but, in adjudging the Revolution, I could do no less than pass judgment
on the man who did not recoil from crime in order to embody the Revolution in
himself from beginning to end. I am sure that I have chronicled events as I saw them
happen or heard about them, and that I have passed judgment on them as
dispassionately as possible, but, if I have been mistaken or unjust by involuntary
omission or because of wrong information, I am ready to correct my mistakes or make
such amends as may be proper. If in the course of my narrative I have often made
reference to myself, it has not been from a desire to single myself out to others’
disadvantage but only to indicate my personal participation in the great drama of the
Revolution, sometimes as a mere spectator, at other times as a member of the cast,
and thus to provide a gauge for the trustworthiness of my account. I do not see
anything wrong in examining our past in order to draw up a balance-sheet of our
failures, mistakes and weaknesses; whoever voluntarily confesses his sins shows at
least a praiseworthy and honourable purpose of amendment and correction. The evil
would lie in concealing them, and in their discovery and exposure by a stranger, not to
put us right but to sully our name. Their concealment, moreover, would encourage
evil-doers, while their exposure teaches us useful lessons. I should have liked to make
this essay something of an exemplary history of the Philippines, displaying side by
side the vices and the virtues of each individual, and the disadvantages and
advantages of each institution, in the conviction that in this world the most perfect
being has his imperfections, and the most imperfect his perfections. But such a task is
beyond my abilities. Also, the collection of the material necessary for this kind of
work requires a long period of laborious study and research for which I lack the time.
I am content, therefore, within the measure of my ability and means, to prepare the
way for others better qualified.
Going back to Mr Aguinaldo, I hope and pray that my observations, made without
rancour and only in the performance of a painful duty, will not increase the bitterness
in his heart but will rather awaken in him an ardent desire to make up for his past and
recapture the general esteem with noteworthy acts of unselfishness and abnegation.
When I was already a prisoner in Manila, in the hands of the American authorities, I
hinted to Mr Aguinaldo, writing in El Comercio to correct an item in the Manila
Times, that his only salvation was a glorious death on the battlefield. Shortly
afterward, in another article published in La Fraternidad, I repeated this hint more
explicitly and clearly, comparing him with Mr Kruger. I knew that these articles
would not please the American authorities, but I was convinced that, with Aguinaldo
meeting death in a supreme effort to defend our national freedom, such an heroic act
would restore his reputation and at the same time honour the Filipinos. However, my
suggestions were not followed. I have no complaint because, even if Mr Aguinaldo
had proposed to act in accordance with them, I understand that it is not always
possible to do what one wants. Moreover, it might be that his crimes were so grave
that Providence would not judge him worthy of immortality, or that it would be for his
own good to hear the judgment of public opinion so that repentance might touch the
sensitive fibres of his heart. The frustrated Andres Bonifacio was wont to say when he
was still alive that we should fear no one except History, and indeed History is
implacable in doing justice, and its judgment is terrible against the offender.
Be that as it may, Mr Aguinaldo should not despair. As I have just indicated, he can
still make up for his past and recapture the general esteem with worthy deeds. He is
still young and has shown a natural sagacity in making the most of circumstances for
his own ends, questionable as they were because he lacked the culture and virtue
demanded by his office. Mr Aguinaldo believed that one can serve his country with
honour and glory only from high office, and this is an error which is very dangerous
to the common welfare; it is the principal cause of the civil wars which impoverish
and exhaust many states and contributed greatly to the failure of the Revolution. Only
he is truly a patriot who, whatever his post, high or low, tries to do the greatest
possible good to his countrymen. A little good done in an humble position is a title to
honour and glory, while it is a sign of negligence or incompetence when done in high
office. True honour can be discerned in the simple manifestations of an upright and
honest soul, not in brilliant pomp and ornament which scarcely serve to mask the
deformities of the body. True honour is attained by teaching our minds to recognize
truth, and training our hearts to love it. The recognition of truth shall lead us to the
recognition of our duties and of justice, and by performing our duties and doing
justice we shall be respected and honoured, whatever our station in life. Let us never
forget that we are on the first rung of our national life, and that we are called upon to
rise, and can go upward only on the ladder of virtue and heroism. Above all let us not
forget that, if we do not grow, we shall have died without ever having been great,
unable to reach maturity, which is proper of a degenerate race.
I shall not end these remarks to my countrymen without putting on record the
boundless disgust I felt whenever I heard of the rape of Filipinas by Filipino soldiers.
I admit these were isolated cases, very difficult to prevent in times of general disorder
and the uncontrolled outbreak of passions, but I am sure that the first instances would
not have been repeated if the commanders concerned had punished such outrages
energetically and without hesitation. How shall we get foreigners to respect our
women when we ourselves set the example of offending them? Can we Filipino men
expect to be respected when our women are not? In the chivalrous tradition of ancient
times the principal virtue of the knight without fear and without reproach was respect
for womanhood because the custom of protecting the honour and life of the weak and
defenceless surely showed greatness of soul and nobility of heart. It should be realized
that this virtue was not merely necessary in the legendary age of romance but one of
the great imperatives in the life of peoples since, if woman finds simple respect and
consideration within her customary ambit, she quickly acquires that sense of dignity
which protects her from many frailties, a dignity which, passed on to her sons, instils
in them courage and fortitude for great enterprises and heroic deeds.
Lastly, I hope that this succinct narrative will give a clearer and more correct
appreciation of the political needs of the Filipinos and of their fitness for democratic
government. The Spaniards as well as the Americans have looked upon the Filipinos
as half-savages unfit for such a government because they have always confused lack
of experience with personal aptitude. One who is unfit for civilized life does not want
it because he does not need it, and for this reason the Igorots and Aetas and other
really half-savage tribes in the archipelago are happier living in the mountains and
forests than in the towns. The Spanish Government claimed that political aspirations
were to be found only in the hearts of a few educated Filipinos but not among the
masses of the country, yet the latter, unable to prove the Government wrong otherwise
because they were forbidden to petition, rose in rebellion led by Andres Bonifacio and
Emilio Aguinaldo, both men of little learning. The United States Government shares
the same belief, and I hope that this essay, by showing it the past, will help to lead it
out of error and prevent the horrors of a new revolution.
Of the reforms previously sought from the Spanish Government, the United States
Congress has to this date granted only that referring to certain individual rights, whose
exercise is still restricted by the authority of the Insular Government, a government
which continues to be absolute insofar as the members of the executive branch also
make the laws and appoint at their discretion the members of the judiciary. Moreover,
the irritating inequality in pay among those who hold the same positions is more
general, an inequality which in Spanish times existed only in the armed forces, and
which makes impossible an identity of interests among Americans and Filipinos. The
constabulary, for its part, is following in the footsteps of its hated counterpart under
the former regime. Before my deportation to Guam, when Governor Taft was still
only Chairman of the Philippine Commission, I solicited an interview to ask him the
extent and limits of the sovereignty which the United States sought to impose on the
Philippines. Mr Taft told me very frankly that the United States wanted to exercise the
same sovereignty that Russia or Turkey would if they had acquired the islands with
the same title, the only difference being- that the Americans, having been reared
under a regime of freedom, would try to exercise sovereignty more liberally. I
allowed myself to remark that it was more prudent for a government not openly to
oppose the wishes of the governed, but I could not continue because he gave me to
understand that his explicit instructions did not allow him to discuss such matters with
me. The reason was obvious since, in the last analysis, Governor Taft’s instructions
were in accordance with the McEnery proposal and the plans of the Washington
administration. For that reason I think it is useless to discuss them now. I shall allow
myself only the observation that, if the Americans have not been reared under the
governmental system which they are now introducing in the Philippines, they cannot
consider themselves more experienced and capable than the Filipinos. If the
Americans in general are relatively better schooled, the Filipinos, reared under an
absolute government during the Spanish regime, have more experience of it and, what
is more, know their own needs better. I admit that the Americans have proved their
competence and capacity for democratic government, but an absolutist regime is
totally different and cannot be practised in the United States because it is contrary to
the character and customs of the American people. By temperament and education the
citizens of the United States are the least competent and fit for absolute government
because the two governmental systems are like two machines with different
mechanisms that call for operators with different specialized training to make them
work. If the Americans really want to teach the Filipinos the arts of civilization and
good government they should establish in the Philippines the kind of government they
know, under which they have been reared, and which the inhabitants want to learn.
Otherwise, if the Americans persist in maintaining a governmental system which they
have not practised and which the islanders reject, they must place at its head men of
extraordinary ability, and they are not common in the United States or elsewhere.
I shall end with a question. Would the grant of the reforms formerly sought from the
Spanish Government satisfy the Filipinos now? I am very much afraid not, because
the aspiration for independence, almost unknown before, now beats strongly at the
bottom of all hearts. Its denial, and the threats and violent acts of the Government,
only serve to affirm this feeling and to keep it alive; we did not fight and suffer for it
for nothing. The denial of independence will doubtless content those who accomodate
themselves to any situation in order to enjoy its advantages, but they are very few, and
they are despised if not hated by the masses, because they claim the masses are not
yet fit for independence when it is they who are giving evidence of unfitness by
making it plain they have no political ideal other than their personal convenience.
Before my deportation to Guam, those who had unconditionally taken the
Government’s side in order to win the official title of friends of peace tried to
organize a political party. Since the Government could not promise more than a future
autonomy, which did not and does not satisfy the people, it did not suit them to adopt
this objective since very few would join them. They therefore asked for annexation as
a territory for the time being, and subsequently as a state. The truth is not only that
such an objective found and finds no support in any political party in the United
States, but also that no American statesman believes in the possibility that the islands
may someday become a state of the Union. But this objective was less objectionable
to the people, which they considered too ignorant to grow aware of any political
game. I had the imprudence to remark that their aspiration was chimerical; that if they
wanted something positive, they should work on the Government to give in a little
and promise independence in the future; and that I would help them to convince the
people that it should also compromise and give up immediate independence. Although
I was counselling accomodation to both sides so as to arrive at a compromise, the only
foundation of a true peace, I was pronounced intransigent and as such was deported to
Guam, where I was held prisoner incommunicado for more than two years. I am ready
to forget this personal injury, although injustices never beget peace but rather distrust
and the perturbation of minds. Nonetheless, in the belief that it is my duty, I shall be
imprudent once more and recommend for the second time the mutual reconciliation of
Americans and Filipinos.

This is published with the permission of Mr. David Guerrero.