Protection & Automation Application Guide

• unit testing
• integration testing
• functional qualification testing

The purpose of unit testing is to determine if an individual

function or procedure implemented using software, or small
group of closely related functions, is free of data, logic, or
standards errors. It is much easier to detect these types of
errors in individual units or small groups of units than it is in
an integrated software architecture and/or system. Unit testing
is typically performed against the software detailed design and
by the developer of the unit(s).
Figure 21.10: Relay undergoing seismic test Integration testing typically focuses on these interfaces and
1.2A also issues such as performance, timings and synchronisation
A
0.8A that are not applicable in unit testing. Integration testing also
Pulse shape (half sine)
focuses on ‘stressing’ the software and related interfaces.
+0.2A
Integration testing is ‘black box’ in nature, i.e. it does not take
0
-0.2A into account the structure of individual units. It is typically
0.4D D D performed against the software architectural and detailed
2.5D 2.5D design. The unit developer normally performs the tests, unless
2.4D = T1 high-integrity and/or safety critical software is involved, when
6D = T2 the tester must be independent of the developer. The specified
D - duration of nominal pulse software requirements would typically also be used as a source
A - peak acceleration of nominal pulse
for some of the test cases.
T2 - as T1 when a vibration generator is used
Figure 21.11: Shock/Bump Impulse waveform 21.6.1 Static Unit Testing
The test levels for shock and bump tests are: Static Unit Testing (or static analysis as it is often called)
Shock response (energised): analyses the unit(s) source code for complexity, precision
tracking, initialisation checking, value tracking, strong type
• 3 pulses, each 10g, 11ms duration checking, macro analysis etc. While static unit testing can be
Shock withstand (de-energised): performed manually, it is a laborious and error prone process
and is best performed using a proprietary automated static unit
• 3 pulses, 15g, 11ms duration
analysis tool. It is important to ensure that any such tool is
Bump (de-energised): configured correctly and used consistently during development.
• 1000 pulses, 10g, 16ms duration
21.6.2 Dynamic Testing
21.6 SOFTWARE TYPE TESTS Dynamic Testing is concerned with the runtime behaviour of
Digital and numerical relays contain software to implement the the unit(s) being tested and so therefore, the unit(s) must be
protection and measurement functions of a relay. This executed. Dynamic unit testing can be sub-divided into ‘black
software must be thoroughly tested, to ensure that the relay box’ testing and ‘white box’ testing. ‘Black box’ testing verifies
complies with all specifications and that disturbances of the implementation of the requirement(s) allocated to the
various kinds do not result in unexpected results. Software is unit(s). It takes no account of the internal structure of the
tested in various stages: unit(s) being tested. It is only concerned with providing known
inputs and determining if the outputs from the unit(s) are

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correct for those inputs. ‘White box’ testing is concerned with using the target environment. In ideal circumstances, someone
testing the internal structure of the unit(s) and measuring the independent of the software development performs the tests.
test coverage, i.e. how much of the code within the unit(s) has In the case of high-integrity and/or safety critical software, this
been executed during the tests. The objective of the unit testing independence is vital. Validation Testing is ‘black box’ in
may, for example, be to achieve 100% statement coverage, in nature, i.e. it does not take into account the internal structure
which every line of the code is executed at least once, or to of the software. For relays, the non-protection functions
execute every possible path through the unit(s) at least once. included in the software are considered to be as important as
the protection functions, and hence tested in the same
21.6.3 Unit Testing Environment manner.
Both Dynamic and Static Unit Testing are performed in the
Each validation test should have predefined evaluation criteria,
host environment rather than the target environment.
to be used to decide if the test has passed or failed. The
Dynamic Unit Testing uses a test harness to execute the
evaluation criteria should be explicit with no room for
unit(s) concerned. The test harness is designed such that it
interpretation or ambiguity.
simulates the interfaces of the unit(s) being tested - both
software-software interfaces and software-hardware interfaces 21.6.7 Traceability of Validation Tests
- using what are known as stubs. The test harness provides
Traceability of validation tests to software requirements is vital.
the test data to those units being tested and outputs the test
Each software requirement documented in the software
results in a form understandable to a developer. There are
requirements specification should have at least one validation
many commercially available testing tools to automate test
test, and it is important to be able to prove this.
harness production and the execution of tests.
21.6.8 Software Modifications - Regression Testing
21.6.4 Software/Software Integration Testing
Regression Testing is not a type test in its’ own right. It is the
Software/Software Integration Testing is performed in the host
overall name given to the testing performed when an existing
environment. It uses a test harness to simulate inputs and
software product is changed. The purpose of Regression
outputs, hardware calls and system calls (e.g. the target
Testing is to show that unintended changes to the functionality
environment operating system).
(i.e. errors and defects) have not been introduced.

21.6.5 Software/Hardware Integration Testing Each change to an existing software product must be
Software/Hardware Integration Testing is performed in the considered in its’ own right. It is impossible to specify a
target environment, i.e. it uses the actual target hardware, standard set of regression tests that can be applied as a
operating system, drivers etc. It is usually performed after ‘catch-all’ for introduced errors and defects. Each change to
Software/Software Integration Testing. Testing the interfaces the software must be analysed to determine what risk there
to the hardware is an important feature of Software/Hardware might be of unintentional changes to the functionality being
Integration Testing. introduced. Those areas of highest risk will need to be
regression tested. The ultimate regression test is to perform the
Test cases for Integration Testing are typically based on those
complete Validation Testing programme again, updated to take
defined for Validation Testing. However the emphasis should
account of the changes made.
be on finding errors and problems. Performing a dry run of the
validation testing often completes Integration Testing. Regression Testing is extremely important. If it is not
performed, there is a high risk of errors being found in the field.
21.6.6 Validation Testing Performing it will not reduce to zero the chance of an error or
The purpose of Validation Testing (also known as Software defect remaining in the software, but it will reduce it.
Acceptance Testing) is to verify that the software meets its Determining the Regression Testing that is required is made
specified functional requirements. Validation Testing is much easier if there is traceability from properly documented
performed against the software requirements specification, software requirements through design (again properly

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

documented and up to date), coding and testing. equipment can be used either for type testing of individual
relay designs or of a complete protection scheme designed for
21.7 DYNAMIC VALIDATION TYPE TESTING a specific application. In recognition of this, a new generation
There are two possible methods of dynamically proving the of power system simulators has been developed, which is
satisfactory performance of protection relays or schemes; the capable of providing a far more accurate simulation of power
first method is by actually applying faults on the power system system conditions than has been possible in the past. The
and the second is to carry out comprehensive testing on a simulator enables relays to be tested under a wide range of
power system simulator. system conditions, representing the equivalent of many years
The former method is extremely unlikely to be used – lead of site experience.
times are lengthy and the risk of damage occurring makes the
21.7.2.1 Simulation hardware
tests very expensive. It is therefore only used on a very limited
basis and the faults applied are restricted in number and type. Equipment is now available to provide high-speed, highly
Because of this, a proving period for new protection equipment accurate modelling of a power system. The equipment is based
under service conditions has usually been required. As faults on distributed digital hardware under the control of real-time
may occur on the power system at infrequent intervals, it can software models, and is shown in Figure 21.12. The modules
take a number of years before any possible shortcomings are have outputs linked to current and voltage sources that have a
discovered, during which time further installations may have similar transient capability and have suitable output levels for
occurred. direct connection to the inputs of relays –i.e. 110V for voltage
and 1A/5A for current. Inputs are also provided to monitor the
Power system simulators can be divided into two types: response of relays under test (contact closures for tripping,
• those which use analogue models of a power system etc.) and these inputs can be used as part of the model of the
• those which model the power system mathematically power system. The software is also capable of modelling the
using digital simulation techniques dynamic response of CTs and VTs accurately.

The digital simulator can also be connected digitally to the

21.7.1 Use of Power System Analogue Models
relay(s) under test using IEC61850-8-1 for station bus, and
For many years, relays have been tested on analogue models IEC 61850-9-2 for process bus signals.
of power systems such as artificial transmission lines, or test
plant capable of supplying significant amounts of current.
However, these approaches have significant limitations in the
current and voltage waveforms that can be generated, and are
not suitable for automated, unattended, testing programmes.
While still used on a limited basis for testing electromechanical
and static relays, a radically different approach is required for
dynamic testing of numerical relays.

21.7.2 Use of Microprocessor Based Simulation Equipment

The complexity of numerical relays, reliant on software for
implementation of the functions included, dictates some kind
of automated test equipment. The functions of even a simple
Figure 21.12: Digital power system simulator for relay/protection
numerical overcurrent relay (including all auxiliary functions) scheme testing
can take several months of automated, 24 hours/day testing to This equipment shows many advantages over traditional test
test completely. If such test equipment was able to apply equipment:
realistic current and voltage waveforms that closely match
those found on power systems during fault conditions, the

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• the power system model is capable of reproducing high can be any combination of phase to phase or phase to earth,
frequency transients such as travelling waves resistive, or non-linear phase to earth arcing faults. For series
• tests involving very long time constants can be carried compensated lines, flashover across a series capacitor
out following a short circuit fault can be simulated.
• it is not affected by the harmonic content, noise and
The frequency domain model is not suitable for developing
frequency variations in the a.c. supply
faults and switching sequences, therefore the widely used
• it is capable of representing the variation in the current
Electromagnetic Transient Program (EMTP), working in the
associated with generator faults and power swings
time domain, is employed in such cases.
• saturation effects in CTs and VTs can be modelled
• a set of test routines can be specified in software and In addition to these two programs, a simulation program
then left to run unattended (or with only occasional based on lumped resistance and inductance parameters is
monitoring) to completion, with a detailed record of test used. This simulation is used to represent systems with long
results being available on completion time constants and slow system changes due, for example, to
• the IEC61850 interface capabilities allow relays power swings.
intended for applications in digital substations to be
tested.

A block schematic of the equipment is shown in Figure 21.13.

It is based around a computer which calculates and stores the

Figure 21.13: Block diagram of real-time digital relay test system

digital data representing the system voltages and currents. The
computer controls conversion of the digital data into analogue
signals, and it monitors and controls the relays being tested.

21.7.2.2 Simulation software

Unlike most traditional software used for power systems
analysis, the software used is suitable for the modelling the
fast transients that occur in the first few milliseconds after
fault inception. Two very accurate simulation programs are
used, one based on time domain and the other on frequency
domain techniques. In both programs, single and double
circuit transmission lines are represented by fully distributed
parameter models. The line parameters are calculated from the
physical construction of the line (symmetrical, asymmetrical,
transposed or non-transposed), taking into account the effect
of conductor geometry, conductor internal impedance and the
earth return path. It also includes, where appropriate, the
frequency dependence of the line parameters in the frequency
domain program. The frequency dependent variable effects are
calculated using Fast Fourier Transforms and the results are
converted to the time domain. Conventional current
transformers and capacitor voltage transformers can be
simulated.

The fault can be applied at any one point in the system and

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

IA

IB Linear
D/A CT Current
interpolation
conversion model amplifier
circuits

IC

VDU VA
Equipment
under
I/O test
Computer VB Linear
Keyboard Sub- D/A CVT Voltage
interpolation
system conversion model amplifier
circuits

VDU VC

Contact
status
monitor
Keyboard
Storage Key :
CT - Current transformer
CVT - Capacitor voltage transformer Signalling
VDU - Visual display unit Channel
Simulation

Communications (When required) To second RTDS

link to second
RTDS

• automatic testing removes the likelihood of

21.7.2.3 Simulator applications
measurement and setting errors
The simulator is used for checking the accuracy of calibration
• two such equipments can be linked together to
and performing type tests on a wide range of protection relays
simulate a system model with two relaying points
during their development. It has the following advantages over
existing test methods: The simulator is also used for the production testing of relays,
in which most of the advantages listed above apply. As the
• 'state of the art' power system modelling data can be
tests and measurements are made automatically, the quality of
used to test relays
testing is also greatly enhanced. Further, in cases of suspected
• freedom from frequency variations and noise or
malfunction of a relay in the field under known fault
harmonic content of the laboratory's own domestic
conditions, the simulator can be used to replicate the power
supply
system and fault conditions, and conduct a detailed
• the relay under test does not burden the power system
simulation investigation into the performance of the relay. Finally,
complex protection schemes can be modelled, using both the
• all tests are accurately repeatable
relays intended for use and software models of them as
• wide bandwidth signals can be produced
appropriate, to check the suitability of the proposed scheme
• a wide range of frequencies can be reproduced
under a wide variety of conditions.
• selected harmonics may be superimposed on the power
frequency Figure 21.14(a) shows a section of a particular power system
• the use of direct coupled current amplifiers allows time modelled. The waveforms of Figure 21.14(b) show the three
constants of any length phase voltages and currents at the primaries of VT1 and CT1
• capable of simulating slow system changes for the fault condition indicated in Figure 21.14(a).

• reproduces fault currents whose peak amplitude varies

with time
• transducer models can be included

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 Chapter 21 ⋅ Relay Testing and Commissioning

N produced if required.
~ 3G L

4G Infinite bus
~ CB3 CT3 F3 F4 CT4 CB4 ~
Line 2
~ 8G

~ 9G LR3 LR4

CB1 CT1 F1 F2 CT2 CB2 11G

~
Load 1 Line 1
Load 2
Load 3
LR1 LR2
Relay 1 Relay 2

(a) Example power system

Figure 21.15: Modern computer-controlled test bench

Because software is extensively tested at the type-testing

stage, there is normally no need to check the correct
functioning of the software. Checks are limited to determining
that the analogue and digital I/O is functioning correctly. This
is achieved for inputs by applying known voltage and current
inputs to the relay under test and checking that the software
has captured the correct values. Similarly, digital outputs are
exercised by using test software to actuate each output and
checking that the correct output is energised. Provided that
appropriate procedures are in place to ensure that only type-
0 0.08 0.16 0.24 0.32 0.4 0.48 0.56 tested software is downloaded, there is no need to check the
correct functioning of the software in the relay. The final step is
(b) Voltages and currents at VT1/CT1 power system
Figure 21.14: Example of application study to download the software appropriate to the relay and store it
in the relay's non-volatile memory.
21.8 PRODUCTION TESTING
Production testing of protection relays is becoming far more 21.9 COMMISSIONING TESTS
demanding as the accuracy and complexity of the products Installation of a protection scheme at site creates a number of
increase. Electronic power amplifiers are used to supply possibilities for errors in the implementation of the scheme to
accurate voltages and currents of high stability to the relay occur. Even if the scheme has been thoroughly tested in the
under test. The inclusion of a computer in the test system factory, wiring to the CTs and VTs on site may be incorrectly
allows more complex testing to be performed at an economical carried out, or the CTs/VTs may have been incorrectly
cost, with the advantage of speed and repeatability of tests installed. The impact of such errors may range from simply
from one relay to another. being a nuisance (tripping occurs repeatedly on energisation,
requiring investigation to locate and correct the error(s))
Figure 21.15 shows a modern computer-controlled test bench.
through to failure to trip under fault conditions, leading to
The hardware is mounted in a special rack. Each unit of the
major equipment damage, disruption to supplies and potential
test system is connected to the computer via an interface bus.
hazards to personnel. The strategies available to remove these
Individual test programs for each type of relay are required, but
risks are many, but all involve some kind of testing at site.
the interface used is standard for all relay types. Control of
input waveforms and analogue measurements, the monitoring Commissioning tests at site are therefore invariably performed
of output signals and the analysis of test data are performed by before protection equipment is set to work. The aims of
the computer. A printout of the test results can also be commissioning tests are:

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• to ensure that the equipment has not been damaged 21.10. Section 21.11 details the secondary injection that may
during transit or installation be carried out. Section 21.12 covers primary injection testing
• to ensure that the installation work has been carried and Section 21.13 details the checks required on any logic
out correctly involved in the protection scheme. Finally section 21.14 details
• to prove the correct functioning of the protection the tests required on alarm/tripping circuits tripping/alarm
scheme as a whole circuits.

The tests carried out will normally vary according to the

21.9.1 Insulation Tests
protection scheme involved, the relay technology used, and the
All the deliberate earth connections on the wiring to be tested
policy of the client. In many cases, the tests actually conducted
should first be removed, for example earthing links on current
are determined at the time of commissioning by mutual
transformers, voltage transformers and d.c. supplies. Some
agreement between the client’s representative and the
insulation testers generate impulses with peak voltages
commissioning team. Hence, it is not possible to provide a
exceeding 5kV. In these instances any electronic equipment
definitive list of tests that are required during commissioning.
should be disconnected while the external wiring insulation is
This section therefore describes the tests commonly carried out
checked.
during commissioning.
The insulation resistance should be measured to earth and
The following tests are invariably carried out, since the
between electrically separate circuits. The readings are
protection scheme will not function correctly if faults exist.
recorded and compared with subsequent routine tests to check
• wiring diagram check, using circuit diagrams showing for any deterioration of the insulation.
all the reference numbers of the interconnecting wiring
The insulation resistance measured depends on the amount of
• general inspection of the equipment, checking all
connections, wires on relays terminals, labels on wiring involved, its grade, and the site humidity. Generally, if
terminal boards, etc. the test is restricted to one cubicle, a reading of several
• insulation resistance measurement of all circuits hundred megohms should be obtained. If long lengths of site
• perform relay self-test procedure and external wiring are involved, the reading could be only a few megohms.
communications checks on digital/numerical relays
21.9.2 Relay Self-Test Procedure
• test main current transformers
Digital and numerical relays will have a self-test procedure
• test main voltage transformers
that is detailed in the appropriate relay manual. These tests
• check that protection relay alarm/trip settings have
been entered correctly should be followed to determine if the relay is operating
correctly. This will normally involve checking of the relay
• tripping and alarm circuit checks to prove correct
watchdog circuit, exercising all digital inputs and outputs and
functioning
checking that the relay analogue inputs are within calibration
In addition, the following checks may be carried out, by applying a test current or voltage. For these tests, the relay
depending on the factors noted earlier. outputs are normally disconnected from the remainder of the
• secondary injection test on each relay to prove protection scheme, as it is a test carried out to prove correct
operation at one or more setting values relay, rather than scheme, operation.
• primary injection tests on each relay to prove stability Unit protection schemes involve relays that need to
for external faults and to determine the effective current communicate with each other. This leads to additional testing
setting for internal faults (essential for some types of
requirements. The communications path between the relays is
electromechanical relays)
tested using suitable equipment to ensure that the path is
• testing of protection scheme logic
complete and that the received signal strength is within
This section details the tests required to cover the above items. specification. Numerical relays may be fitted with loopback test
Secondary injection test equipment is covered in Section facilities that enable either part of or the entire

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 Chapter 21 ⋅ Relay Testing and Commissioning

communications link to be tested from one end. voltage. This indicates the approximate knee-point or
saturation flux level of the current transformer. The
After completion of these tests, it is usual to enter the relay
magnetising current should then be recorded at similar voltage
settings required. This can be done manually via the relay front
intervals as it is reduced to zero.
panel controls, or using a portable PC and suitable software.
Whichever, method is used, a check by a second person that Care must be taken that the test equipment is suitably rated.
the correct settings have been used is desirable, and the The short-time current rating must be in excess of the CT
settings recorded. Programmable scheme logic that is required secondary current rating, to allow for measurement of the
is also entered at this stage. saturation current. This will be in excess of the CT secondary
current rating. As the magnetising current will not be
21.9.3 Current Transformer Tests sinusoidal, a moving iron or dynamometer type ammeter
The following tests are normally carried out prior to should be used.
energisation of the main circuits.
It is often found that current transformers with secondary
ratings of 1A or less have a knee-point voltage higher than the
21.9.3.1 Polarity check
local mains supply. In these cases, a step-up interposing
Each current transformer should be individually tested to verify
transformer must be used to obtain the necessary voltage to
that the primary and secondary polarity markings are correct;
check the magnetisation curve.
see Figure 21.16. The ammeter connected to the secondary of
the current transformer should be a robust moving coil, Test plug isolating
current transformers Variable transformer
from relay coils 250V 8A
permanent magnet, centre-zero type. A low voltage battery is A B C

used, via a single-pole push-button switch, to energise the

A
primary winding. On closing the push-button, the d.c.
250V
ammeter, A, should give a positive flick and on opening, a P1
To relay
V
a.c. supply
coils
negative flick. S1

P2 P1 Step-up transformer
P2 S2
_ S2 S1 + if required

Main circuit
breaker open

Figure 21.17: Testing current transformer magnetising curve

21.9.4 Voltage Transformer Tests

_ Voltage transformers require testing for polarity and phasing.

+
A
21.9.4.1 Polarity check
The voltage transformer polarity can be checked using the
Figure 21.16: Current transformer polarity check method for CT polarity tests. Care must be taken to connect
the battery supply to the primary winding, with the polarity
21.9.3.2 Magnetisation Curve ammeter connected to the secondary winding. If the voltage
Several points should be checked on each current transformer transformer is of the capacitor type, then the polarity of the
magnetisation curve. This can be done by energising the transformer at the bottom of the capacitor stack should be
secondary winding from the local mains supply through a checked.
variable auto-transformer while the primary circuit remains
open; see Figure 21.17. The characteristic is measured at 21.9.4.2 Ratio check
suitable intervals of applied voltage, until the magnetising This check can be carried out when the main circuit is first
current is seen to rise very rapidly for a small increase in made live. The voltage transformer secondary voltage is

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

compared with the secondary voltage shown on the A

nameplate. B
C
21.9.4.3 Phasing check A

The secondary connections for a three-phase voltage

transformer or a bank of three single-phase voltage V1

transformers must be carefully checked for phasing. With the C B

main circuit alive, the phase rotation is checked using a phase V2

rotation meter connected across the three phases, as shown in
Figure 21.18. Provided an existing proven VT is available on
VN
the same primary system, and that secondary earthing is
employed, all that is now necessary to prove correct phasing is V

a voltage check between, say, both ‘A’ phase secondary VL

outputs. There should be nominally little or no voltage if the
V2
phasing is correct. However, this test does not detect if the
phase sequence is correct, but the phases are displaced by
120o from their correct position, i.e. phase A occupies the
V1
position of phase C or phase B in Figure 21.18. This can be
checked by removing the fuses from phases B and C (say) and
measuring the phase-earth voltages on the secondary of the A B C
Phase rotation
meter
VT. If the phasing is correct, only phase A should be healthy,
phases B and C should have only a small residual voltage.
Figure 21.18: Voltage transformer phasing check
Correct phasing should be further substantiated when carrying
out ‘on load’ tests on any phase-angle sensitive relays, at the
21.9.5 Protection Relay Setting Checks
relay terminals. Load current in a known phase CT secondary At some point during commissioning, the alarm and trip
should be compared with the associated phase to neutral VT settings of the relay elements involved will require to be
secondary voltage. The phase angle between them should be entered and/or checked. Where the complete scheme is
measured, and should relate to the power factor of the system engineered and supplied by a single contractor, the settings
load. may already have been entered prior to despatch from the
factory, and hence this need not be repeated. The method of
If the three-phase voltage transformer has a broken-delta
entering settings varies according to the relay technology used.
tertiary winding, then a check should be made of the voltage
For electromechanical and static relays, manual entry of the
across the two connections from the broken delta VN and VL,
settings for each relay element is required. This method can
as shown in Figure 21.18. With the rated balanced three-
also be used for digital/numerical relays. However, the amount
phase supply voltage applied to the voltage transformer
of data to be entered is much greater, and therefore it is usual
primary windings, the broken-delta voltage should be below
to use appropriate software, normally supplied by the
5V with the rated burden connected.
manufacturer, for this purpose. The software also makes the
essential task of making a record of the data entered much
easier.

Once the data has been entered, it should be checked for

compliance with the recommended settings as calculated from
the protection setting study. Where appropriate software is
used for data entry, the checks can be considered complete if
the data is checked prior to download of the settings to the

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 Chapter 21 ⋅ Relay Testing and Commissioning

relay. Otherwise, a check may required subsequent to data scheme is not in service, and may also disconnect any d.c.
entry by inspection and recording of the relay settings, or it auxiliary supplies used for powering relay tripping outputs.
may be considered adequate to do this at the time of data
Withdrawing the test plug immediately restores the
entry. The recorded settings form an essential part of the
connections to the main current transformers and voltage
commissioning documentation provided to the client.
transformers and removes the test connections. Replacement
of the test block cover then removes the short circuits that had
21.10 SECONDARY INJECTION TEST
been applied to the main CT secondary circuits. Where several
EQUIPMENT
relays are used in a protection scheme, one or more test blocks
Secondary injection tests are always done prior to primary
may be fitted on the relay panel enabling the whole scheme to
injection tests. The purpose of secondary injection testing is to
be tested, rather than just one relay at a time.
prove the correct operation of the protection scheme that is
downstream from the inputs to the protection relay(s). Test blocks usually offer facilities for the monitoring and
Secondary injection tests are always done prior to primary secondary injection testing of any power system protection
injection tests. This is because the risks during initial testing to scheme. The test block may be used either with a multi-
the LV side of the equipment under test are minimised. The fingered test plug to allow isolation and monitoring of all the
primary (HV) side of the equipment is disconnected, so that no selected conductor paths, or with a single finger test plug that
damage can occur. These tests and the equipment necessary allows the currents on individual conductors to be monitored.
to perform them are generally described in the manufacturer's A modern test block and test plugs are illustrated in Figure
manuals for the relays, but brief details are given below for the 21.19.
main types of protection relays.

21.10.1 Test Blocks/Plugs for Secondary Injection

Equipment
It is common practice to provide test blocks or test sockets in
the relay circuits so that connections can readily be made to
the test equipment without disturbing wiring. Test plugs of
either multi-finger or single-finger design (for monitoring the
current in one CT secondary circuit) are used to connect test
equipment to the relay under test.

The top and bottom contact of each test plug finger is

separated by an insulating strip, so that the relay circuits can
be completely isolated from the switchgear wiring when the
test plug is inserted. To avoid open-circuiting CT secondary
terminals, it is therefore essential that CT shorting jumper links Figure 21.19: Modern test block/plugs
are fitted across all appropriate ‘live side’ terminals of the test
21.10.2 Secondary Injection Test Sets
plug BEFORE it is inserted. With the test plug inserted in
position, all the test circuitry can now be connected to the The type of the relay to be tested determines the type of
isolated ‘relay side’ test plug terminals. Some modern test equipment used to provide the secondary injection currents
blocks incorporate the live-side jumper links within the block and voltages. Many electromechanical relays have a non-linear
and these can be set to the ‘closed’ or ‘open’ position as current coil impedance when the relay operates and this can
appropriate, either manually prior to removing the cover and cause the test current waveform to be distorted if the injection
inserting the test plug, or automatically upon removal of the supply voltage is fed directly to the coil. The presence of
cover. Removal of the cover also exposes the colour-coded harmonics in the current waveform may affect the torque of
face-plate of the block, clearly indicating that the protection electromechanical relays and give unreliable test results, so

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

some injection test sets use an adjustable series reactance to

control the current. This keeps the power dissipation small and V relay/source
the equipment light and compact. Saturation level of
magnetic circuit
Many test sets are portable and include precision ammeters (current) limited only by
DC resistance of
relay coil
and voltmeters and timing equipment. Test sets may have Time

both voltage and current outputs. The former are high-voltage, Relay with saturation
of CDG magnetic circuit
(phase shift from CDG
low current outputs for use with relay elements that require inductive load shown).

signal inputs from a VT as well as a CT. The current outputs

are high-current, low voltage to connect to relay CT inputs. It a) Relay current coil waveform distorted due to use of voltage source

is important, however, to ensure that the test set current

outputs are true current sources, and hence are not affected by Sinusoidal CURRENT
when changing
the load impedance of a relay element current coil. Use of a impedance of relay is
swamped out by high
test set with a current output that is essentially a voltage source impedance

source can give rise to serious problems when testing

electromechanical relays. Any significant impedance mismatch Time

between the output of the test set and the relay current coil
during relay operation will give rise to a variation in current Typical VOLTAGE waveform
appearing across relay current
from that desired and possible error in the test results. The coils with sinusoidal I above
the relay setting (10 x shown).
relay operation time may be greater than expected (never less b) Undistorted relay current coil current distorted due to use of current source
than expected) or relay ‘chatter’ may occur. It is quite common Figure 21.20: Relay current coil waveforms
for such errors to only be found much later, after a fault has Modern test sets are computer based. They comprise a PC
caused major damage to equipment through failure of the (usually a standard laptop PC with suitable software) and a
primary protection to operate. Failure investigation then shows power amplifier that takes the low-level outputs from the PC
that the reason for the primary protection to operate is an and amplifies them into voltage and current signals suitable for
incorrectly set relay, due in turn to use of a test set with a application to the VT and CT inputs of the relay. The phase
current output consisting of a voltage-source when the relay angle between voltage and current outputs will be adjustable,
was last tested. Figure 21.20 shows typical waveforms as also will the phase angles between the individual voltages
resulting from use of test set current output that is a voltage or currents making up a 3-phase output set. Much greater
source – the distorted relay coil current waveform gives rise to precision in the setting of the magnitudes and phase angles is
an extended operation time compared to the expected value. possible, compared to traditional test sets. Digital signals to
exercise the internal logic elements of the relays may also be
provided. The alarm and trip outputs of the relay are connected
to digital inputs on the PC so that correct operation of the
relay, including accuracy of the relay tripping characteristic can
be monitored and displayed on-screen, saved for inclusion in
reports generated later, or printed for an immediate record to
present to the client. Optional features may include GPS time
synchronising equipment and remote-located amplifiers to
facilitate testing of unit protection schemes, and digital I/O for
exercising the programmable scheme logic of modern relays.
Some test sets offer a digital interface for IEC61850 GOOSE
I/O monitoring, and for virtual "injection" of IEC 61850-9-2
sampled values.

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 Chapter 21 ⋅ Relay Testing and Commissioning

The software for modern test sets is capable of testing the 440V
Supply switch 3 phase
functionality of a wide variety of relays, and conducting a set of A
4 wire supply

tests automatically. Such sets ease the task of the B

C
commissioning engineer. The software will normally offer N

options for testing, ranging from a test carried out at a Choke

Variable
particular point on the characteristic to complete transformer
Relay
for current I>
determination of the tripping characteristic automatically. This control current element

feature can be helpful if there is any reason to doubt that the Range
adjusting CT
relay is operating correctly with the tripping characteristic 440/110V
phase shifting
A PA
specified. Figure 21.21 illustrates a modern PC-based test set. transformer

Relay
PA V V>
voltage element

Variable
transformer
for current
control

To other voltage elements V Voltmeter

of relay under test A Ammeter
(if required) PA Phase angle meter

Figure 21.22: Circuit diagram for traditional test set for

directional/distance relays

21.11 SECONDARY INJECTION TESTING

The purpose of secondary injection testing is to check that the
protection scheme from the relay input terminals onwards is
Figure 21.21: Modern PC-based secondary injection test set
functioning correctly with the settings specified. This is
Traditional test sets use an arrangement of adjustable achieved by applying suitable inputs from a test set to the
transformers and reactors to provide control of current and inputs of the relays and checking if the appropriate alarm/trip
voltage without incurring high power dissipation. Some relays signals occur at the relay/control room/CB locations. The
require adjustment of the phase between the injected voltages extent of testing will be largely determined by the client
and currents, and so phase shifting transformers may be used. specification and relay technology used, and may range from a
simple check of the relay characteristic at a single point to a
complete verification of the tripping characteristics of the
scheme, including the response to transient waveforms and
harmonics and checking of relay bias characteristics. This may
be important when the protection scheme includes
transformers and/or generators.

The testing should include any scheme logic. If the logic is

implemented using the programmable scheme logic facilities
available with most digital or numerical relays, appropriate
digital inputs may need to be applied and outputs monitored
(see Section 21.13). It is clear that a modern test set can
facilitate such tests, leading to a reduced time required for
testing.

21.11.1 Schemes using Digital or Numerical Relay

Technology
The policy for secondary injection testing varies widely. In

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

some cases, manufacturers recommend, and clients accept, • the minimum current that gives operation at each
that if a digital or numerical relay passes its’ self-test, it can be current setting
relied upon to operate at the settings used and that testing can • the maximum current at which resetting takes place
therefore be confined to those parts of the scheme external to • the operating time at suitable values of current
the relay. In such cases, secondary injection testing is not • the time/current curve at two or three points with the
required at all. More often, it is required that one element of time multiplier setting TMS at 1
each relay (usually the simplest) is exercised, using a • the resetting time at zero current with the TMS at 1
secondary injection test set, to check that relay operation
Similar considerations apply to distance and unit protection
occurs at the conditions expected, based on the setting of the
relays of these technologies.
relay element concerned. Another alternative is for the
complete functionality of each relay to be exercised. This is
21.11.3 Test Circuits for Secondary Injection Testing
rarely required with a digital or numerical relay, probably only
The test circuits used will depend on the type of relay and test
being carried out in the event of a suspected relay malfunction.
set being used. Unless the test circuits are simple and obvious,
To illustrate the results that can be obtained, Figure 21.23 the relay commissioning manual will give details of the circuits
shows the results obtained by a modern test set when to be used. When using the circuits in this reference, suitable
determining the reach settings of a distance relay using a simplifications can easily be made if digital or numerical relays
search technique. are being tested, to allow for their built-in measurement
Fault A-N capabilities – external ammeters and voltmeters may not be
X(Ω)
required.
22.5

20.0 All results should be carefully noted and filed for record
17.5
purposes. Departures from the expected results must be
15.0
thoroughly investigated and the cause determined. After
12.5

10.0
rectification of errors, all tests whose results may have been
7.5 affected (even those that may have given correct results)
5.0 should be repeated to ensure that the protection scheme has
2.5
been implemented according to specification.
0.0

-2.5

-5.0
21.12 PRIMARY INJECTION TESTS
-7.5 This type of test involves the entire circuit; current transformer
-10.0 primary and secondary windings, relay coils, trip and alarm
-15.0 -10.0 -5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 R(Ω)
circuits, and all intervening wiring are checked. There is no
Figure 21.23: Distance relay zone checking using search technique and
tolerance bands need to disturb wiring, which obviates the hazard of open-
circuiting current transformers, and there is generally no need
21.11.2 Schemes using Electromechanical/Static Relay for any switching in the current transformer or relay circuits.
Technology The drawback of such tests is that they are time consuming
Schemes using single function electromechanical or static and expensive to organise. Increasingly, reliance is placed on
relays will usually require each relay to be exercised. Thus a all wiring and installation diagrams being correct and the
scheme with distance and back-up overcurrent elements will installation being carried out as per drawings, and secondary
require a test on each of these functions, thereby taking up injection testing being completed satisfactorily. Under these
more time than if a digital or numerical relay is used. Similarly, circumstances, the primary injection tests may be omitted.
it may be important to check the relay characteristic over a However, wiring errors between VTs/CTs and relays, or
range of input currents to confirm parameters for an incorrect polarity of VTs/CTs may not then be discovered until
overcurrent relay such as: either spurious tripping occurs in service, or more seriously,

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 Chapter 21 ⋅ Relay Testing and Commissioning

failure to trip on a fault. This hazard is much reduced where If the main current transformers are fitted with test windings,
digital/numerical relays are used, since the current and voltage these can be used for primary injection instead of the primary
measurement/display facilities that exist in such relays enable winding. The current required for primary injection is then
checking of relay input values against those from other proven greatly reduced and can usually be obtained using secondary
sources. Many connection/wiring errors can be found in this injection test equipment. Unfortunately, test windings are not
way, and by isolating temporarily the relay trip outputs, often provided, because of space limitations in the main
unwanted trips can be avoided. current transformer housings or the cost of the windings.

Primary injection testing is, however, the only way to prove

21.12.2 CT Ratio Check
correct installation and operation of the whole of a protection
Current is passed through the primary conductors and
scheme. As noted in the previous section, primary injection
measured on the test set ammeter, A1 in Figure 21.25. The
tests are always carried out after secondary injection tests, to
secondary current is measured on the ammeter A2 or relay
ensure that problems are limited to the VTs and CTs involved,
display, and the ratio of the value on A1 to that on A2 should
plus associated wiring, all other equipment in the protection
closely approximate to the ratio marked on the current
scheme having been proven satisfactory from the secondary
transformer nameplate.
injection tests.
A B C
Test plug
21.12.1 Test Facilities insulation

An alternator is the most useful source of power for providing

the heavy current necessary for primary injection. Temporary
short circuit
Unfortunately, it is rarely available, since it requires not only a
spare alternator, but also spare busbars capable of being A2

connected to the alternator and circuit under test. Therefore, Optional ammeter

primary injection is usually carried out by means of a portable

Relay
injection transformer (Figure 21.24), arranged to operate from P1

S1
the local mains supply and having several low voltage, heavy
current windings. These can be connected in series or parallel
according to the current required and the resistance of the
primary circuit. Outputs of 10V and 1000A can be obtained.
S2
Alternatively, modern PC-controlled test sets have power P2

amplifiers capable of injecting currents up to about 200A for a Relay or test block

single unit, with higher current ratings being possible by using contact fingers

multiple units in parallel. A1

Primary injection
test set
A

250V a.c. 250V

a.c. supply
supply
Figure 21.25: Current transformer ratio check

21.12.3 CT Polarity Check

Variable transformer Injection transformer If the equipment includes directional, differential or earth fault
40A 250/10 + 10 + 10 + 10V relays, the polarity of the main current transformers must be
10kVA
checked. It is not necessary to conduct the test if only
Figure 21.24: Traditional primary injection test set
overcurrent relays are used.

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

The circuit for checking the polarity with a single-phase test set digital and numerical relays normally include programmable
is shown in Figure 21.26. A short circuit is placed across the logic as part of the software within the relay, together with
phases of the primary circuit on one side of the current associated digital I/O. This facility (commonly referred to as
transformers while single-phase injection is carried out on the Programmable Scheme Logic, or PSL) offers important
other side. The ammeter connected in the residual circuit, or advantages to the user, by saving space and permitting
relay display, will give a reading of a few milliamperes with modifications to the protection scheme logic through software
rated current injected if the current transformers are of correct if the protection scheme requirements change with time.
polarity. A reading proportional to twice the primary current Changes to the logic are carried out using software hosted on
will be obtained if they are of wrong polarity. Because of this, a a PC (or similar computer) and downloaded to the relay. Use
high-range ammeter should be used initially, for example one of languages defined in IEC 61131, such as ladder logic or
giving full-scale deflection for twice the rated secondary Boolean algebra is common for such software, and is readily
current. If an electromechanical earth-fault relay with a low understood by Protection Engineers. Further, there are several
setting is also connected in the residual circuit, it is advisable commonly encountered protection functions that
to temporarily short-circuit its operating coil during the test, to manufacturers may supply with relays as one or more ‘default’
prevent possible overheating. The single-phase injection should logic schemes.
be carried out for each pair of phases.
Because software is used, it is essential to carefully test the
Temporary logic during commissioning to ensure correct operation. The
three-phase
short circuit only exception to this may be if the relevant ‘default’ scheme is
used. Such logic schemes will have been proven during relay
A
250V a.c. Primary injection
type testing, and so there is no need for proving tests during
supply test set commissioning. However, where a customer generates the
B
scheme logic, it is necessary to ensure that the commissioning
Relay
C tests conducted are adequate to prove the functionality of the
scheme in all respects. A specific test procedure should be
A
prepared, and this procedure should include:

Figure 21.26: Polarity check on main current transformers • checking of the scheme logic specification and
diagrams to ensure that the objectives of the logic are
21.12.4 Primary Injection Testing of Relay Elements achieved
As with secondary injection testing, the tests to be carried out • testing of the logic to ensure that the functionality of
will be those specified by the client, and/or those detailed in the scheme is proven
the relay commissioning manual. Digital and numerical relays • testing of the logic, as required, to ensure that no
usually require far fewer tests to prove correct operation, and output occurs for the relevant input signal combinations
these may be restricted to observations of current and voltage
The degree of testing of the logic will largely depend on the
on the relay display under normal load conditions.
criticality of the application and complexity of the logic. The
responsibility for ensuring that a suitable test procedure is
21.13 TESTING OF PROTECTION SCHEME
produced for logic schemes other than the ‘default’ one(s)
LOGIC
supplied lies with the specifier of the logic. Relay
Protection schemes often involve the use of logic to determine
manufacturers cannot be expected to take responsibility for the
the conditions under which designated circuit breakers should
correct operation of logic schemes that they have not designed
be tripped. Simple examples of such logic can be found in
and supplied.
Chapters 9-14. Traditionally, this logic was implemented by
means of discrete relays, separate from the relays used for
protection. Such implementations would occur where
electromechanical or static relay technology is used. However,

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 Chapter 21 ⋅ Relay Testing and Commissioning

21.14 TRIPPING AND ALARM ANNUNCIATION • known application shortcomings accepted as

TESTS improbable occurrences
If primary and/or secondary injection tests are not carried out, • pilot wire faults due to previous unrevealed damage to
the tripping and alarm circuits will not have been checked. a pilot cable
Even where such checks have been carried out, CB trip coils • various other causes, such as switching errors, testing
and/or Control Room alarm circuits may have been isolated. In errors, and relay operation due to mechanical shock
such cases, it is essential that all of the tripping and alarm The self-checking facilities of numerical relays assist in
circuits are checked. minimising failures due to faulty relays. Defects in secondary
This is done by closing the protection relay contacts manually wiring and incorrect connections are virtually eliminated if
and checking that: proper commissioning after scheme installation/alteration is
carried out. The possibility of incorrect settings is minimised by
• the correct circuit breakers are tripped
regular reviews of relay settings. Network fault levels change
• the alarm circuits are energised over time, and hence setting calculations may need to be
• the correct flag indications are given revised. Switching and testing errors are minimised by
• there is no maloperation of other apparatus that may adequate training of personnel, use of proven software, and
be connected to the same master trip relay or circuit well-designed systematic working procedures. All of these can
breaker be said to be within the control of the user.
Many designs of withdrawable circuit breaker can be operated The remaining three causes are not controllable, while two of
while in the maintenance position, so that substation operation these three are unavoidable – engineering is not science and
can continue unaffected except for the circuit controlled by the there will always be situations that a protection relay cannot
circuit breaker involved. In other cases, isolators can be used to reasonably be expected to cover at an affordable cost.
avoid the need for busbar de-energisation if the circuit involved
is not ready for energisation. 21.15.1 Frequency of Inspection and Testing
Although protection equipment should be in sound condition
21.15 PERIODIC MAINTENANCE TESTS when first put into service, problems can develop unchecked
Periodic testing is necessary to ensure that a protection and unrevealed because of its infrequent operation. With
scheme continues to provide satisfactory performance for digital and numerical relays, the in-built self-testing routines
many years after installation. All equipment is subject to can be expected to reveal and annunciate most faults, but this
gradual degradation with time, and regular testing is intended does not cover any other components that, together, comprise
to identify the equipment concerned so that remedial action the protection scheme. Regular inspection and testing of a
can be taken before scheme maloperation occurs. However, protection scheme is therefore required. In practice, the
due care should be taken in this task, otherwise faults may be frequency of testing may be limited by lack of staff or by the
introduced as a direct result of the remedial work. operating conditions on the power system.
The clearance of a fault on the system is correct only if the It is desirable to carry out maintenance on protection
number of circuit breakers opened is the minimum necessary equipment at times when the associated power apparatus is
to remove the fault. A small proportion of faults are incorrectly out of service. This is facilitated by co-operation between the
cleared, the main reasons being: maintenance staff concerned and the network operations
• limitations in protection scheme design control centre. Maintenance tests may sometimes have to be
made when the protected circuit is on load. The particular
• faulty relays
equipment to be tested should be taken out of commission and
• defects in the secondary wiring
adequate back-up protection provided for the duration of the
• incorrect connections
tests. Such back-up protection may not be fully discriminative,
• incorrect settings but should be sufficient to clear any fault on the apparatus

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

whose main protection is temporarily out of service. • each group of circuits which is electrically separate from
other circuits should be earthed through an
Maintenance is assisted by the displays of measured quantities
independent earth link
provided on digital and numerical relays. Incorrect display of a
• where a common voltage transformer or d.c. supply is
quantity is a clear indication that something is wrong, either in
used for feeding several circuits, each circuit should be
the relay itself or the input circuits. fed through separate links or fuses. Withdrawal of these
should completely isolate the circuit concerned
21.15.2 Maintenance Tests
• power supplies to protection schemes should be
Primary injection tests are normally only conducted out during segregated from those supplying other equipment and
initial commissioning. If scheme maloperation has occurred provided with fully discriminative circuit protection
and the protection relays involved are suspect, or alterations • a single auxiliary switch should not be used for
have been made involving the wiring to the relays from the interrupting or closing more than one circuit
VTs/CTs, the primary injection tests may have to be repeated. • terminations in relay panels require good access, as
these may have to be altered if extensions are made.
Secondary injection tests may be carried out at suitable
Modern panels are provided with special test facilities,
intervals to check relay performance, and, if possible, the relay so that no connections need be disturbed during routine
should be allowed to trip the circuit breakers involved. The testing
interval between tests will depend upon the criticality of the • junction boxes should be of adequate size and, if
circuit involved, the availability of the circuit for testing and the outdoors, must be made waterproof
technology of the relays used. Secondary injection testing is • all wiring should be ferruled for identification
only necessary on the selected relay setting and the results • electromechanical relays should have high operating
should be checked against those obtained during the initial and restraint torques and high contact pressures; jewel
commissioning of the equipment. bearings should be shrouded to exclude dust and the
use of very thin wire for coils and connections should be
It is better not to interfere with relay contacts at all unless they
avoided. Dust-tight cases with an efficient breather are
are obviously corroded. The performance of the contacts is fully essential on these types of electromechanical element
checked when the relay is actuated. • static, digital and numerical relays should have test
Insulation tests should also be carried out on the relay wiring facilities to assist in fault finding. The relay manual
to earth and between circuits, using a 1000V tester. These should clearly detail the expected results at each test
tests are necessary to detect any deterioration in the insulation point when healthy
resistance.

21.16 PROTECTION SCHEME DESIGN FOR

MAINTENANCE
If the following principles are adhered to as far as possible, the
danger of back-feeds is lessened and fault investigation is
made easier:

• test blocks should be used, to enable a test plug to be

used, and a defective unit to be replaced quickly
without interrupting service
• circuits should be kept as electrically separate as
possible, and the use of common wires should be
avoided, except where these are essential to the correct
functioning of the circuits

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Chapter 21 ⋅ Relay Testing and Commissioning

21-29
POWER SYSTEM
MEASUREMENTS
Chapter 22
POWER SYSTEM MEASUREMENTS

22.1 Introduction 22.1 INTRODUCTION

22.2 General Transducer Characteristics The accurate measurement of the voltage, current or other
22.3 Digital Transducer Technology parameter of a power system is a prerequisite to any form of
control, ranging from automatic closed-loop control to the
22.4 Analogue Transducer Technology recording of data for statistical purposes. Measurement of these
22.5 Transducer Selection parameters can be accomplished in a variety of ways, including
the use of direct-reading instruments as well as electrical
22.6 Measurement Centres measuring transducers.
22.7 Tariff Metering There are a wide range of measurement devices used to collect
22.8 Synchronisers data and convert it into useful information for the operator.
Generally, the devices are classified as to whether the measure-
22.9 Disturbance Recorders ments are to be used locally or remotely.

LOCAL INFORMATION
.. Instruments or meters (may be directly connected, or
via a transducer)
.. Measurement centres

TRANSMITTED DATA
.. Transducers

REMOTE SYSTEMS
.. Measurement centres
.. Disturbance recorders
.. Power quality recorders (see chapter 23)

22.2 GENERAL TRANSDUCER CHARACTERISTICS

Transducers produce an accurate d.c. analogue output, usually
a current, which corresponds to the parameter being measured
(the measurand). They provide electrical isolation by trans-
formers, sometimes referred to as ‘Galvanic Isolation’, between
the input and the output. This is primarily a safety feature,
but also means that the cabling from the output terminals
to any receiving equipment can be lightweight and have a
lower insulation specification. The advantages over discrete
measuring instruments are as follows:
.. mounted close to the source of the measurement,
reducing instrument transformer burdens and
increasing safety through elimination of long wiring
runs
.. ability to mount display equipment remote from the
transducer

GEGridSolutions.com 22-1
Protection & Automation Application Guide

• ability to use multiple display elements per transducer against the possibility of their internal circuitry becoming open
• the burden on CTs/VTs is considerably less circuit. This ensures that a faulty device in the loop does not
cause complete failure of the output loop. The constant-
Outputs from transducers may be used in many ways – from current nature of the transducer output simply raises the
simple presentation of measured values for an operator, to voltage and continues to force the correct output signal round
being utilised by a network automation scheme to determine the loop.
the control strategy.
Transducers may have single or multiple inputs and/or 22.2.3 Transducer Accuracy
outputs. The inputs, outputs and any auxiliary circuits will all Accuracy is usually of prime importance, but in making
be isolated from each other. There may be more than one comparisons, it should be noted that accuracy can be defined
input quantity and the measurand may be a function of one or in several ways and may only apply under very closely defined
more of them. conditions of use. The following attempts to clarify some of the
Whatever measurement transducer is being used, there will more common terms and relate them to practical situations,
usually be a choice between discrete and modular types, the using the terminology given in IEC 60688.
latter being plug-in units to a standard rack. The location and The accuracy of a transducer will be affected, to a greater or
user-preferences will dictate the choice of transducer type. lesser extent, by many factors, known as influence quantities,
over which the user has little, or no, control.
22.2.1 Transducer Inputs
Table 22.1 provides a complete list of influence quantities. The
The input of a transducer is often taken from transformers and accuracy is checked under an agreed set of conditions known
these may be of many different types. Ideally, to obtain the as reference conditions. The reference conditions for each of
best overall accuracy, metering-class instrument transformers the influence quantities can be quoted as a single value (e.g.
should be used since the transformer errors will be added, 20oC) or a range (e.g. 10-40oC).
albeit algebraically, to the transducer errors. However, it is
common to apply transducers to protection-class instrument Input current Input voltage
transformers and that is why transducers are usually Input quantity distortion Input quantity frequency
characterised to be able to withstand significant short-term Power factor Unbalanced currents
overloads on their current inputs. A typical specification for the Continuous operation Output load
current input circuits of a transducer suitable for connection to Interaction between measuring elements Ambient temperature
protection-class instrument transformers is to withstand: Auxiliary supply voltage Auxiliary supply frequency

• 300% of full-load current continuously External magnetic fields Self heating

Series mode interference Common mode interference
• 2500% for three seconds
External heat
• 5000% for one second
Table 22.1: Transducer influence quantities
The input impedance of any current input circuit will be kept as
The error determined under reference conditions is referred to
low as possible, and that for voltage inputs will be kept as high
as the intrinsic error. All transducers having the same intrinsic
as possible. This reduces errors due to impedance mismatch.
error are grouped into a particular accuracy class, denoted by
the class index. The class index is the same as the intrinsic
22.2.2 Transducer Outputs
error expressed as a percentage (e.g. a transducer with an
The output of a transducer is usually a current source. This intrinsic accuracy of 0.1% of full scale has a class index of 0.1).
means that, within the output voltage range (compliance The class index system used in IEC 60688 requires that the
voltage) of the transducer, additional display devices can be variation for each of the influence quantities be strictly related
added without limit and without any need for adjustment of to the intrinsic error. This means that the higher the accuracy
the transducer. The value of the compliance voltage claimed by the manufacturer, the lower must be all of the
determines the maximum loop impedance of the output variations.
circuit, so a high value of compliance voltage facilitates remote
location of an indicating instrument. Because there are many influence quantities, the variations are
assessed individually, whilst maintaining all the other influence
Where the output loop is used for control purposes, quantities at reference conditions.
appropriately rated Zener diodes are sometimes fitted across
the terminals of each of the devices in the series loop to guard The nominal range of use of a transducer is the normal

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 Chapter 22 ⋅ Power System Measurements

operating range of the transducer as specified by the Under changing conditions of the measurand, the output
manufacturer. The nominal range of use will naturally be wider signal does not follow the changes instantaneously but is time-
than the reference value or range. Within the nominal range of delayed. This is due to the filtering required to reduce ripple or,
use of a transducer, additional errors accumulate resulting in in transducers using numerical technology, prevent aliasing.
an additional error. This additional error is limited for any The amount of such a delay is called the response time. To a
individual influence quantity to, at most, the value of the class certain extent, ripple and response time are interrelated. The
index. response time can usually be shortened at the expense of
increased ripple, and vice-versa. Transducers having shorter
Table 22.2 gives performance details of a typical range of
response times than normal can be supplied for those
transducers (accuracy class 0.5) according to the standard.
instances where the power system suffers swings, dips, and
Max. Error- Nominal Max. Error- low frequency oscillations that must be monitored.
Influence Reference
Reference Working Nominal
Quantity Range Transducers having a current output have a maximum output
Range % Range Range
voltage, known as the compliance voltage. If the load
In=1A, 5A
Input current,In 0.5% 0-120% 0.5% resistance is too high and hence the compliance voltage is
20…120%
exceeded, the output of the transducer is no longer accurate.
Vn=50…500V
Input voltage,Vn 0.25% 0-120% 0.5%
80…120% Certain transducers are characterised by the manufacturer for
Input frequency 45…65Hz 0.5% - - use on systems where the waveform is not a pure sinusoid.
Power factor Cos ϕ=0.5…1 0.25% Cos ϕ=0…1 0.5% They are commonly referred to as ‘true r.m.s. sensing’ types.
Unbalanced current 0…100% 0.5% - - For these types, the distortion factor of the waveform is an
Current input
influence quantity. Other transducers are referred to as ‘mean-
Interaction between
measuring elements 0…360°
0.25%° - - sensing’ and are adjusted to respond to the r.m.s. value of a
pure sine wave. If the input waveform becomes distorted,
Continuous
Continuous operation
> 6h
0.5% - - errors will result. For example, the error due to third harmonic
distortion can amount to 1% for every 3% of harmonic.
Self Heating 1…30min 0.5% - -
Output load 10…100% 0.25% - - Once installed, the user expects the accuracy of a transducer
Waveform 1.41 to remain stable over time. The use of high quality components
- 1.2…1.8 0.5%
crest factor (sine wave) and conservative power ratings will help to ensure long-term
Ambient temperature 0°-50° C 0.5% -10°–60° C 1.0% stability, but adverse site conditions can cause performance
Aux. supply d.c. changes which may need to be compensated for during the
24…250V DC 0.25% 19V-300V 0.25%
voltage lifetime of the equipment.
A.C. Aux. Supply
90…110% fn 0.25% - -
frequency, fn 22.3 DIGITAL TRANSDUCER TECHNOLOGY
External magnetic
0…0.4kA/m 0.5% - - Digital power system transducers make use of the same
fields
technology as that described for digital and numerical relays in
Output series mode 1V 50Hz r.m.s. in
interference series with output
0.5% - - Chapter 7. The analogue signals acquired from VTs and CTs
are filtered to avoid aliasing, converted to digital form using
Output common 100V 50Hz r.m.s.
0.5% - - A/D conversion, and then signal processing is carried out to
mode interference output to earth
Table 22.2: Typical transducer performance extract the information required. Basic details are given in
Chapter 7. Sample rates of 64 samples/cycle or greater may be
Confusion also arises in specifying the performance under real
used, and the accuracy class is normally 0.2 or 0.5.
operating conditions. The output signal is often a d.c. analogue
of the measurand, but is obtained from alternating input Outputs may be both digital and analogue. The analogue
quantities and will, inevitably, contain a certain amount of outputs will be affected by the factors influencing accuracy as
alternating component, or ripple. Ripple is defined as the peak- described above. Digital outputs are typically in the form of a
to-peak value of the alternating component of the output communications link, with RS232 or RS485 serial, and RJ45
signal although some manufacturers quote ‘mean-to-peak’ or Ethernet connections commonly available. The response time
‘r.m.s.’ values. To be meaningful, the conditions under which may suffer compared to analogue transducers, depending on
the value of the ripple has been measured must be stated, e.g. the rate at which values are transferred to the communications
0.35% r.m.s. = 1.0% peak-to-peak ripple. link and the delay in processing data at the receiving end. In
fact, all of the influence quantities that affect a traditional

22-3
Protection & Automation Application Guide

analogue transducer also are present in a digital transducer in • a parallel output impedance, Zo. This represents the
some form, but the errors resulting may be much less than in actual output impedance of the current source and
an analogue transducer and it may be more stable over a long shunts a small fraction, I2, of the ideal output
period of time.
• an output current, Io, equal to (I1 - I2)
The advantages of a transducer using numerical technology
These features are shown diagrammatically in Figure 22.1.
are:
• improved long-term stability I1
• more accurate r.m.s measurements
• improved communications facilities I2

• programmability of scaling
Qin Zin Zo Io
• wider range of functions
• reduced size
The improved long term stability reduces costs by extending
the intervals between re-calibration. More accurate r.m.s
measurements provide the user with data of improved Figure 22.1: Schematic of an analogue transducer
accuracy, especially on supplies with significant harmonic
content. The improved communications facilities permit many Output ranges of 0-10mA, 0-20mA, and 4-20mA are
transducers to share the same communications link, and each common. Live zero (e.g. 4-20mA), suppressed zero (e.g. 0-
transducer to provide several measurements. This leads to 10mA for 300-500kV) and linear inverse range (e.g. 10-0mA
economy in interconnecting wiring and number of transducers for 0-15kV) transducers normally require an auxiliary supply.
used. Remote or local programmable scaling of the transducer The dual-slope type has two linear sections to its output
permits scaling of the transducer in the field. The scaling can characteristic, for example, an output of 0-2mA for the first
be changed to reflect changes in the network, or to be re-used part of the input range, 0-8kV, and 2-10mA for the second
elsewhere. Changes can be downloaded via the part, 8-15kV.
communications link, thus removing the need for a site visit. It
also minimises the risk of the user specifying an incorrect 22.5 TRANSDUCER SELECTION
scaling factor and having to return the transducer to the The selection of the correct transducer to perform a
manufacturer for adjustment. Suppliers can keep a wider measurement function depends on many factors. These are
range of transducers suitable for a wide range of applications detailed below.
and inputs in stock, thus reducing delivery times. Transducers
are available with a much wider range of functions in one 22.5.1 Current Transducers
package, thus reducing space requirements in a switchboard. Current transducers are usually connected to the secondary of
Functions available include harmonics up to the 31st, energy, an instrument current transformer with a rated output of 1 or
and maximum demand information. The latter are useful for 5 amps. Mean-sensing and true r.m.s. types are available. If
tariff negotiations. the waveform contains significant amounts of harmonics, a
true r.m.s sensing type must be used for accurate
22.4 ANALOGUE TRANSDUCER TECHNOLOGY measurement of the input. They can be self-powered, except
All analogue transducers have the following essential features: for the true r.m.s. types, or when a live zero output (for
example 4-20mA) is required. They are not directional and,
• an input circuit having impedance Zin
therefore, are unable to distinguish between ‘export’ and
• isolation (no electrical connection) between input and ‘import’ current. To obtain a directional signal, a voltage input
output is also required.
• an ideal current source generating an output current, I1,
which is an accurate and linear function of Qin, the 22.5.2 Voltage Transducers
input quantity Connection is usually to the secondary of an instrument
voltage transformer but may be direct if the measured quantity
is of sufficiently low voltage. The suppressed zero type is
commonly used to provide an output for a specific range of

22-4
 Chapter 22 ⋅ Power System Measurements

input voltage where measurement of zero on the input effective range. Figure 22.2 illustrates the connections to be
quantity is not required. The linear inverse type is often used as used for the various types of measurement.
an aid to synchronising.
Transducer Transducer
22.5.3 Frequency Van Vab
Vca
Accurate measurement of frequency is of vital importance to Ia Ia
transmission system operators but not quite so important, S1 S2 S1 S2
perhaps, for the operator of a diesel generator set. Accuracy A
P1 P2
A
P1 P2

specifications of 0.1% and 0.01% are available, based on B B

percent of centre scale frequency. This means, for example C

N
C

To load
that a device quoted as 0.1% and having a centre scale value of To load
50Hz will have a maximum error of +/- 50mHz under 3 phase, 4 wire balanced load 3 phase, 3 wire balanced load

reference conditions.
Va
Transducer Transducer
Vb
Vab
22.5.4 Phase Angle Ic
Vc Ic
Vca
Ia Ia Ib
Transducers for the measurement of phase angle are
S1 S2
frequently used for the display of power factor. This is achieved A
S1 S2
A
P1 P2 P1 P2
by scaling the indicating instrument in a non-linear fashion, S1 S2
B B
following the cosine law. For digital indicators and SCADA S1 S2
P1 P2
S1 S2
Vab
equipment, it is necessary for the receiving equipment to C
Vca P1 P2
C
P1 P2
N
provide appropriate conversions to achieve the correct display To load
To load
of power factor. Phase angle transducers are available with 3 phase, 3 wire unbalanced load
3 phase, 4 wire unbalanced load
various input ranges. When the scaling is -180o…0o…180°, there
is an ambiguous region, of about +/-2º at the extremes of the Transducer
range. In this region, where the output is expected to be, for Van
Ic
example, –10mA or +10mA, the output may jump sporadically Vcn
Ia Ib
from one of the full-scale values to the other. Transducers are S1 S2
also available for the measurement of the angle between two A
P1 P2
S1 S2
input voltages. Some types of phase angle transducer use the B
P1 P2
zero crossing point of the input waveform to obtain the phase S1 S2
C
information and are thus prone to error if the input contains N
P1 P2

significant amounts of harmonics. To load

3 phase, 4 wire unbalanced (2½ el.) load
Calculating the power factor from the values of the outputs of
a watt and a var transducer will give a true measurement in Figure 22.2: Connections for 3-phase watt/VAr transducers
the presence of harmonics.
22.5.6 Scaling
22.5.5 Power Quantities The relationship of the output current to the value of the
The measurement of active power (watts) and reactive power measurand is of vital importance and needs careful
(vars) is generally not quite as simple as for the other consideration. Any receiving equipment must, of course, be
quantities. More care needs to be taken with the selection of used within its rating but, if possible, some kind of standard
these types because of the variety of configurations. It is should be established.
essential to select the appropriate type for the system to be As an example, examine the measurement of a.c. voltage. The
measured by taking into account factors such as system primary system has a nominal value of 11kV and the
operating conditions (balanced or unbalanced load), the transformer has a ratio of 11kV/110V. To specify the
number of current and voltage connections available and conversion coefficient for the voltage transducer to be
whether the power flow is likely to be ‘import’, ‘export’, or 110V/10mA would not necessarily be the optimum. One of the
both. The range of the measurand will need to encompass all objectives must be to have the capability of monitoring the
required possibilities of over-range under normal conditions so voltage over a range of values so an upper limit must be
that the transducer and its indicating instrument, or other selected – for instance +20%, or 132V. Using the original
receiving equipment, is not used above the upper limit of its conversion coefficient, the maximum output of the transducer

22-5
Protection & Automation Application Guide

is required to be 12mA. This is within the capability of most 0- separate supply, the majority have a biased, or live zero output,
10mA transducers, the majority of which can accommodate such as 4-20mA. This is because a non-zero output cannot be
an over-range of 25%, but it does mean any associated obtained for zero input unless a separate supply is available.
analogue indicating instrument must have a sensitivity of Transducers that require an auxiliary supply are generally
12mA. However, the scale required on this instrument is now provided with a separate pair of terminals for the auxiliary
0-13.2kV, which may lead to difficulty in drawing the scale in circuit so that the user has the flexibility of connecting the
such a way as to make it readable (and conforms to the auxiliary supply input to the measured voltage, or to a separate
relevant standard). In this example, it would be more supply. However, some manufacturers have standardised their
straightforward to establish the full-scale indication as 15kV designs such that they appear to be of the self-powered type,
and to make this equivalent to 10mA, thus making the but the auxiliary supply connection is actually internal. For a.c.
specification of the display instrument much easier. The measuring transducers, the use of a d.c. auxiliary supply
transducer will have to be specified such that an input of 0- enables the transducer to be operated over a wider range of
150V gives an output of 0-10mA. In the case of transducers input.
with a 4-20mA output, great care is required in the output
The range of auxiliary supply voltage over which a transducer
scaling, as there is no over-range capability. The 20mA output
can be operated is specified by the manufacturer. If the
limit is a fixed one from a measurement point of view. Such
auxiliary voltage is derived from an input quantity, the range of
outputs are typically used as inputs to SCADA systems, and the
measurement will be restricted to about +/-20% of the nominal
SCADA system is normally programmed to assume that a
auxiliary supply voltage. This can give rise to problems when
current magnitude in excess of 20mA represents a transducer
attempting to measure low values of the input quantity.
failure. In addition, a reading below 4mA also indicates a
failure, usually an open circuit in the input connection. Thus,
using the above example, the output might be scaled so that
20mA represents 132V and hence the nominal 110V input 22.6 MEASUREMENT CENTRES
results in an output of 16.67mA. A more convenient scaling A Measurement Centre is different from a transducer in three
might be to use 16mA as representing 110V, with 20mA ways.
output being equal to 137.5V (i.e. 25% over-range instead of
• It can measure a large number of instantaneous
the 20% required). It would be incorrect to scale the transducer
parameters, and with an internal clock, calculate time-
so that 110V input was represented by 20mA output, as the
based parameters such as maximum demand
over-range capability required would not be available.
• It has many different forms of communication to
Similar considerations apply to current transducers and, with
transmit the data ranging from simple pulsed contacts
added complexity, to watt transducers, where the ratios of
to multiple digital communication ports
both the voltage and the current transformers must be taken
into account. In this instance, the output will be related to the • It has a local display so that information, system status
primary power of the system. It should be noted that the input and alarms can be displayed to the operator.
current corresponding to full-scale output may not be exactly This is largely impractical if analogue technology for signal
equal to the secondary rating of the current transformer but processing is used, but no such limitation exists if digital or
this does not matter - the manufacturer will take this into numerical technology is adopted. Therefore, Measurement
account. Centres are generally only found implemented using these
Some of these difficulties do not need to be considered if the technologies. As has been already noted in Chapter 7, a
transducer is only feeding, for example, a SCADA outstation. numerical relay can provide many measurements of power
Any receiving equipment that can be programmed to apply a system quantities. Therefore, an alternative way of looking at a
scaling factor to each individual input can accommodate most Measurement Centre that uses numerical technology is that it
input signal ranges. The main consideration will be to ensure is a numerical relay, stripped of its protection functions and
that the transducer is capable of providing a signal right up to incorporating a wide range of power system parameter
the full-scale value of the input, that is, it does not saturate at measurements.
the highest expected value of the measurand. This is rather an oversimplification of the true situation, as
there are some important differences. A protection relay has to
22.5.7 Auxiliary Supplies provide the primary function of protection over a very large
Some transducers do not require any auxiliary supply. These range of input values; from perhaps 5% to 500% or greater of
are termed ‘self-powered’ transducers. Of those that do need a rated values. The accuracy of measurement, whilst important,

22-6
 Chapter 22 ⋅ Power System Measurements

is not required to be as accurate as, for instance, metering for

tariff purposes. Metering does not have to cover quite such a
wide range of input values, and therefore the accuracy of
measurement is often required to be higher than for a
protection relay. Additional functionality over that provided by
the measurement functions of a protection relay is often
required – for a typical set of functions provided by a
measurement centre, see Table 22.3.
On the other hand, the fundamental measurement process in
a measurement centre based on numerical technology is
identical to that of a numerical relay, so need not be repeated
here. The only differences are the ranges of the input quantities
and the functionality. The former is dealt with by suitable
design of the input signal conditioning and A/D conversion, the
latter is dealt with by the software provided. Figure 22.3: Typical transducer

R.M.S. line currents R.M.S. line voltages 22.7 TARIFF METERING

Neutral current R.M.S. phase voltages
Tariff metering is a specialised form of measurement, being
Average current Average voltage concerned with the measurement of electrical power, reactive
Negative sequence voltage Negative sequence current power or energy for the purposes of charging the consumer. As
Power (each phase and total) Reactive Power (each phase and total) such, it must conform to the appropriate national standards for
Apparent Power (each phase and total) Power factor (each phase and total) such matters. Primary tariff metering is used for customer
Phase angle (voltage/current) – each phase Demand time period billing purposes, and may involve a measurement accuracy of
Demand current in period Demand power in period 0.2% of reading, even for readings that are 5% or less of the
Demand reactive power in period Demand VA in period
nominal rated value. Secondary tariff metering is applied
where the user wishes to include his own metering as a check
Maximum demand current (each phase and total)
Demand power factor in period on the primary tariff metering installed by the supplier, or
since reset
Maximum demand (W and var) since reset Energy, Wh within a large plant or building to gain an accurate picture of
Energy, varh Frequency
the consumption of energy in different areas, perhaps for the
purpose of energy audits or internal cost allocation. The
Individual harmonics (to 31st) %THD (voltage) – each phase and total
accuracy of such metering is rather less, an overall accuracy of
%THD (current) – each phase and total Programmable multiple analogue outputs
0.5% over a wide measurement range being typically required.
Table 22.3: Typical function set provided by a Measurement Centre
As this is the overall accuracy required, each element in the
The advantages of a Measurement Centre are that a metering chain (starting with the CTs/VTs) must have an
comprehensive set of functions are provided in a single item of accuracy rather better than this. Careful attention to wiring
equipment, taking up very little extra space compared to a and mounting of the transducer is required to avoid errors due
discrete transducer for a much smaller number of parameters. to interference, and the accuracy may need to be maintained
Therefore, when the requisite CTs and VTs are available, it may over a fairly wide frequency range. Thus a tariff metering
well make sense to use a Measurement Centre even if not all scheme requires careful design of all of the equipment included
of the functionality is immediately required. History shows that in the scheme. Facilities are normally included to provide
more and more data is required as time passes, and measurements over a large number of defined time periods
incorporation of full functionality at the outset may make (e.g. 24 half-hour periods for generator energy tariff metering)
sense. Figure 22.3 illustrates a typical transducer. so that the exporter of the energy can produce an overall
invoice for the user according to the correct rates for each tariff
period. The time intervals that these periods cover may change
according to the time of year (winter, spring, etc.) and
therefore flexibility of programming of the energy metering is
required. Remote communications are invariably required, so
that the data is transferred to the relevant department on a
regular basis for invoicing purposes.

22-7
Protection & Automation Application Guide

For primary tariff metering, security of information is a major and enables CB close circuits when the differences are within
design factor. Meters will also have tamper-proof physical pre-set limits. While CB closure at the instant of perfect
indication. synchronism is the ideal, this is very difficult to obtain in
practice and some mismatch in one or more of the monitored
22.8 SYNCHRONISERS quantities can be tolerated without leading to excessive
Synchronisers are required at points on a power system where current/voltage transients on CB closure. The check
two supplies (either generator and grid, or two grid supplies) synchroniser has programmable error limits to define the limits
may need to be paralleled. They are more than just a of acceptability when making the comparison.
measuring device, as they will provide contact closures to The conditions under which a check synchroniser is required to
permit circuit breaker closing when conditions for paralleling provide an output are varied. Consider the situation of a check
(synchronising) are within limits. However, they are not synchroniser being used as a permissive device in the closing
regarded as protection relays, and so are included in this control circuit of a CB that couples two networks together at a
Chapter for convenience. There are two types of synchronisers substation. It is not sufficient to assume that both networks
- auto-synchronisers and check synchronisers. will be live, situations where either Line A or Busbar B may be
dead may have to be considered, leading to the functionality
22.8.1 Check Synchronisers shown in Table 22.4(a).
The function of a check synchroniser is to determine if two
(a) Check synchroniser functionality
voltages are in synchronism, or nearly so, and provide outputs
Live bus/live line synchronising Live bus/dead line synchronising
under these conditions. The outputs are normally in the form
Network supply voltage #1 deviation from
of volt-free contacts, so that they may be used in CB control Dead bus/live line synchronising
nominal
circuits to permit or block CB closing. When applied to a
Network supply voltage #2 deviation from
power system, the check synchroniser is used to check that it nominal
Voltage difference within limits
is safe to close a CB to connect two independent networks
Frequency difference within limits Phase angle difference within limits
together, or a generator to a network, as in Figure 22.4. In this
CB closing advance time CB closing pulse time
way, the check synchroniser performs a vital function in
Maximum number of synchronising attempts
blocking CB closure when required.
(b) Additional functions for auto-synchroniser
CB Check
close synchroniser Incoming supply frequency deviation from
Incoming supply voltage raise/lower signal
controls nominal
Incoming supply voltage raise/lower mode Incoming supply frequency raise/lower mode
Close (pulse/continuous) (pulse/continuous)
Generator Incoming supply voltage setpoint Incoming supply frequency setpoint

∼ Network
Voltage raise/lower pulse time
Table 22.4: Synchroniser function set
Frequency raise/lower pulse time

Busbar
When the close signal is permitted, it may be given only for a
(a) Application to generator limited period of time, to minimise the chances of a CB close
signal remaining after the conditions have moved outside of
CB close
controls Check limits. Similarly, circuits may also be provided to block closure
synchroniser
if the CB close signal from the CB close controls is present
prior to satisfactory conditions being present – this ensures
Close
that an operator must be monitoring the synchronising
displays and only initiating closure when synchronising
Network Network conditions are correct, and also detects synchronising switch
#2 #1
Line A CB 1
contacts that have become welded together.
Busbar B
A check synchroniser does not initiate any adjustments if
(b) Application to two networks synchronising conditions are not correct, and therefore acts
Figure 22.4: Check synchroniser applications only as a permissive control in the overall CB closing circuit to
Synchronism occurs when two a.c. voltages are of the same provide a check that conditions are satisfactory. In a
frequency and magnitude, and have zero phase difference. The substation, check-synchronisers may be applied individually to
check synchroniser, when active, monitors these quantities all required CBs. Alternatively, a reduced number may be

22-8
 Chapter 22 ⋅ Power System Measurements

installed, together with suitable switching arrangements in the power factor to the network by the generator after CB closure.
signal input/output circuits so that a single device may be The possibility of tripping due to reverse/low forward power
selected to cover several CBs. conditions and/or field failure/under-excitation is avoided. Use
of an auto-synchroniser also helps avoid human error if
22.8.2 Auto-synchroniser manual synchronising were employed – there is potential for
An auto-synchroniser contains additional functionality damage to equipment, primarily the generator, if synchronising
compared to a check synchroniser. When an auto- outside of permitted limits occurs.
synchroniser is placed in service, it measures the frequency To ensure that the CB is closed at the correct instant, the CB
and magnitude of the voltages on both sides of the circuit close time is normally a required data item. The auto-
breaker, and automatically adjusts one of the voltages if synchroniser calculates from a knowledge of this and the slip
conditions are not correct. Application of auto-synchronisers is frequency the correct time in advance of phase co-incidence to
normally restricted to generators – i.e. the situation shown in issue the CB close command. This ensures that the CB closes
Figure 22.4(a), replacing the check synchroniser with an auto- as close to the instant of phase co-incidence as possible. Upon
synchroniser. This is because it is generally not possible to receipt of the signal indicating ‘CB closed’ a further signal to
adjust either of the network voltages by changing the settings raise frequency may be sent to the governor to ensure stable
of one or a very few equipments in a network. When applied to export of power is achieved. Conversely, failure of the CB to
a generator, it is relatively easy to adjust the frequency and close within a set time period will reset the auto-synchroniser,
magnitude of the generated voltage by transmitting signals to ready for another attempt, and if further attempts are still
the Governor and AVR respectively. unsuccessful, the auto-synchroniser will lock out and raise an
The auto-synchroniser will check the voltage of the incoming alarm.
generator against the network voltage for compliance with the Practice in respect of fitting of auto-synchronisers varies widely
following: between Utilities. Where policy is flexible, it is most common
a. slip frequency within limits (i.e. difference in when the time to synchronise is important – i.e. emergency
frequency between the generator and network) standby and peak lopping sets. Many Utilities still relay on
manual synchronising procedures. It is also possible for both
b. phase difference between the voltages within limits
an auto-synchroniser and check-synchroniser to be fitted in
c. voltage magnitude difference within limits series. This provides protection against internal failure of the
auto-synchroniser leading to a CB close command being given
The CB close command is issued automatically when all three incorrectly.
conditions are satisfied. Checks may also be made that the
network frequency and voltage is within pre-set limits, and if 22.9 DISTURBANCE RECORDERS
not the synchronising sequence is locked out. This prevents Power systems suffer from various types of disturbances. In
synchronising under unusual network conditions, when it may post-fault analysis, it is beneficial to have a detailed record of a
not be desirable. This facility should be used with caution, disturbance to enable the initiating event to be distinguished
since under some emergency conditions, it could block the from the subsequent effects. Especially where the disturbance
synchronising of a generator that was urgently required in causes further problems (e.g. single-phase fault develops into
service to help assist in overcoming the condition. 3-phase), a detailed recording of the fault may be required to
distinguish between cause and effect. If the effects of a fault
If (a) above is not within limits, signals are sent automatically
are spread over a wide area, records of the disturbance from a
to the governor of the generating set to adjust the speed
number of locations can assist in determining the location of
setpoint appropriately. In the case of (c) not in limits, similar
the disturbance. The equipment used for this purpose is known
signals are sent to the Automatic Voltage Regulator to raise or
as a disturbance, or fault, recorder.
lower the setpoint. The signals are commonly in the form of
pulses to raise or lower the setpoint, but could be continuous
22.9.1 Disturbance Recorder Features
signals if that is what the particular equipment requires. It is
normal for the speed and voltage of the generator to be slightly A disturbance recorder will normally have the following
higher than that of the network, and this can be capabilities:
accommodated either by initial settings on the Governor/AVR • multi-channel analogue input waveform recording
or by providing setpoint values in the synchroniser. This
• multi-channel digital input recording
ensures stable synchronising and export of power at lagging

22-9
Protection & Automation Application Guide

• storage of several fault records, ready for same event from a different recorder to obtain a complete
download/analysis picture of events.
• recording time of several seconds per disturbance Since most disturbance recorders are fitted in substations that
• triggering from any analogue or digital input channel, are normally unmanned, the provision to download captured
or quantity derived from a combination of inputs, or information is essential. Each fault recording will contain a
manually large amount of data, and it is vital that the data is uniquely
identified in respect of recorder, fault event, channel, etc.
• distance to fault location for one or more feeders
Standards exist in field to facilitate the interchange of data, of
• variable pre/post trigger recording length which perhaps the best known is the IEEE COMTRADE
• time synchronisation (IRIG-B, GPS, etc.) format, now also an international standard (IEC 60255-24).
• programmable sampling rates Once downloaded, the data from a disturbance recorder can
be analysed by various PC software packages. The software
• standard data transfer formats (IEEE COMTRADE (IEC
will often have the ability to perform harmonic and other
60255-24), etc.
analysis.
• communication links to control centre (Ethernet,
modem, etc.)
• self-monitoring/diagnostics
Analogue channels are provided to record the important
currents and voltages at the fault recorder location. High
resolution is required to ensure accurate capture of the
waveforms, with 16 bit A/D conversion being typical. Digital
inputs are provided to capture signals such as CB opening,
protection relay operation, intertrip signals, etc. so that a
complete picture of the sequence of events can be built up. The
information can then be used to check that the sequence of
operations post-fault is correct, or assist in determining the
Figure 22.5a: Distributed digital fault recorder (Reason RPV 311 Digital
cause of an unexpected sequence of operations. To avoid loss Fault Recorder with PMU and TWFL)
of the disturbance data, sufficient memory is provided to
capture and store the data from several faults prior to transfer
of the data for analysis. Flexibility in the triggering
arrangements is extremely important, as it is pointless to
install a disturbance recorder, only for it to miss recording
events due to lack of appropriate triggering facilities. It is
normal for triggering to be available if the relevant threshold is
crossed on any analogue or digital channel, or a quantity
derived from a combination of the inputs.
Power system disturbances may last from periods of a few
seconds to several minutes. To ensure that maximum benefit is
obtained from the investment, a disturbance recorder must be
able to capture events over a wide range of timescales. This
leads to the provision of programmable sampling rates, to
ensure that short-term transients are captured with sufficient Figure 22.5b: Digital Fault Recorder (DFR) peripheral units – standard
resolution while also ensuring that longer-term ones have CT/VT with traveling wave fault location and process bus (Reason
RA333 Remote Acquisition Module)
sufficient of the transient captured to enable a meaningful
analysis to be undertaken. The record for each disturbance is
divided into sections covering pre-fault, fault, and post–fault
periods, and each of these periods may have different sampling
rates. Time synchronisation is also a vital feature, to enable a
recording from one recorder to be aligned with another of the

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Chapter 22 ⋅ Power System Measurements

22-11
POWER QUALITY
Chapter 23
POWER QUALITY

23.1 Introduction 23.1 INTRODUCTION

23.2 Classification of Power System Over the last forty years or so, the amount of equipment
Disturbances containing electronics has increased dramatically. Such
23.3 Causes and Impact of Power equipment can both cause and be affected by electromag-
netic disturbances. A disturbance that affects a process control
Quality Problems
computer in a large industrial complex could easily result in
shutdown of the process. The lost production and product
recycling during start-up represents a large cost to the business.
Similarly, a protection relay affected by a disturbance through
conduction or radiation from nearby conductors could trip a
feeder or substation, causing loss of supply to a large number of
consumers. At the other end of the scale, a domestic user of a
PC has to re-boot the PC due to a transient voltage dip, causing
annoyance to that and other similarly affected users. Therefore,
transporters and users of electrical energy have become much
more interested in the nature and frequency of disturbances in
the power supply. The topic has become known by the title of
Power Quality.

23.2 CLASSIFICATION OF POWER SYSTEM

DISTURBANCES
To make the study of Power Quality problems useful, the various
types of disturbances need to be classified by magnitude and
duration. This is especially important for manufacturers and
users of equipment that may be at risk. Manufacturers need to
know what is expected of their equipment, and users, through
monitoring, can determine if an equipment malfunction is due
to a disturbance or problems within the equipment itself. Not
surprisingly, standards have been introduced to cover this field.
They define the types and sizes of disturbance, and the tolerance
of various types of equipment to the possible disturbances that
may be encountered. The principal standards in this field are
IEC 61000, EN 50160, and IEEE 1159. Standards are essential
for manufacturers and users alike, to define what is reasonable
in terms of disturbances that might occur and what equipment
should withstand.
Table 23.1 provides a broad classification of the disturbances
that may occur on a power system, some typical causes of
them and the potential impact on equipment. From this Table,
it will be evident that the electricity supply waveform, often
thought of as composed of pure sinusoidal quantities, can
suffer a wide variety of disturbances. The following sections of

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this Chapter describe the causes in more detail, along with Limits Other
Type of Voltage Measurement Typical
methods of measurement and possible remedial measures. disturbance Level
from
period duration
applicable
EN50160 standards
Category Causes Impacts
Rapid voltage +/-5% to Short
Local and remote faults Tripping of sensitive equipment 230V Several per day
changes +/-10% duration
Voltage dips Inductive loading Resetting of control systems
Rapid voltage Short
Switch on of large loads Motor stalling/tripping 1kV-35kV <6% Per day IEEE 1159
changes duration
Tripping of sensitive equipment Short
Capacitor switching 230V >99% 20-200 per year Up to 3 mins EN61000-4-11
Damage to insulation and Interruptions
Voltage surges Switch off of large loads windings
Long
Phase faults Damage to power supplies for 230V >99% 10-50 per year >3 mins IEEE 1159
Interruptions
electronic equipment
Transient
Load switching Problems with equipment that 230V Generally <6kV Not specified <1ms IEEE 1159
Overvoltage
Overvoltage Capacitor switching requires constant steady-state
Voltage
System voltage regulation voltage 230V
unbalance
Mal-operation of sensitive Undervoltage 230V <-10% Not specified >1 min IEEE 1159
Industrial furnaces
equipment and relays
Non-linear loads <150% of
Harmonics Capacitor fuse or capacitor
Transformers/generators Voltage surge 230V nominal Not specified >200ms IEEE 1159
failures
Rectifier equipment voltage
Telephone interference
Voltage
Negligible most of time 230V 3% 10 min <200ms IEC 60827
Loss of generation fluctuations
Power frequency variation Motors run slower
Extreme loading conditions Frequency Measured over
De-tuning of harmonic filters +/- 1% 95% of 1 week Not specified
variation 10s
AC motor drives Flicker in:
Frequency Measured over
Voltage fluctuation Inter-harmonic current components Fluorescent lamps +4%, -6% 100% of 1 week Not specified
variation 10s
Welding and arc furnaces Incandescent lamps
THD<8% up to
Harmonics 95% of 1 week Not specified
Motor starting Light flicker 40th
Rapid voltage change
Transformer tap changing Tripping of equipment Table 23.2: Power system disturbance classification to EN 50160
Overheating in
Unbalanced loads motors/generators
For computer equipment, a common standard that
Voltage imbalance manufacturers use is the ITI (Information Technology Industry)
Unbalanced impedances Interruption of 3-phase
operation curve, illustrated in Figure 23.1. Voltage disturbances that lie
Power system faults Loss of supply to customer in the area indicated as ‘safe’ should not cause a malfunction
Short and long voltage Equipment failures equipment in any way. However, some disturbances at LV levels that lie
interruptions Control malfunctions Computer shutdowns within the boundaries defined by EN50160 might cause a
CB tripping Motor tripping malfunction because they do not lie in the safe area of the ITI
Heavy network loading curve. It may be necessary to check carefully which standards
Undervoltage
Loss of generation All equipment without backup are applicable when considering equipment susceptibility.
Poor power factor supply facilities
500
Lack of var support
450
Lightning Control system resetting
Percentage of nominal voltage (RMS)

400
Capacitive switching Damage to sensitive electronic
Transients 350
Non –linear switching loads components
System voltage regulation Damage to insulation 300
Affected by disturbance
250
Table 23.1: Power quality issues
200 Withstand disturbance
Table 23.2 lists the limits given in Standard EN 50160 and 150
notes where other standards have similar limits. 100

Limits Other 50
Affected by disturbance
Type of Voltage Measurement Typical
from applicable 0
disturbance Level period duration 0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 1000 10000 100000
EN50160 standards Duration of disturbance (ms)

Voltage Variation 230V +/- 10% 95% of 1 week - Figure 23.1: ITI curve for equipment susceptibility
Voltage Dips 230V <10%<90% 10-1000/year 10ms –1sec IEEE 1159

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 Chapter 23 ⋅ Power Quality

23.3 CAUSES AND IMPACT OF POWER Vrms

QUALITY PROBLEMS Nom. High

Each of the Power Quality disturbance categories detailed in

Nom. Low
Table 23.1 is now examined in more detail as to the possible Dip duration PQ Standards

causes and the impact on consumers. Dip magnitude: x% of declared

x % below nominal User defined setpoints

23.3.1 Voltage Dips

Retained Voltage
Figure 23.2 shows the profile of a voltage dip, together with Interruption

the associated definitions. The major cause of voltage dips on a Time

supply system is a fault on the system, that is sufficiently Figure 23.3: Multiple voltage dip
remote electrically that a voltage interruption does not occur. The impact on consumers may range from the annoying (non-
Other sources are the starting of large loads (especially periodic light flicker) to the serious (tripping of sensitive loads
common in industrial systems), and, occasionally, the supply and stalling of motors). Where repeated dips occur over a
of large inductive loads. period of several hours, the repeated shutdowns of equipment
can give rise to serious production problems. Figure 23.4
Vrms
shows an actual voltage dip, as captured by a Power Quality
Nom. High
recorder.
Nom. Low 100
Dip magnitude: x% of declared PQ Standards
80
x % below nominal
Dip duration 60
User defined setpoints
Voltage (% of nominal)

40

20
Retained Voltage
0
Interruption Time
-20
Time
-40

Figure 23.2: Voltage dip profile -60

-80
Voltage dips due to the latter are usually due to poor design of -100

the network feeding the consumer. A voltage dip is the most Figure 23.4: Recording of a voltage dip
common supply disturbance causing interruption of production
Typical data for undervoltage disturbances on power systems
in an industrial plant. Faults on a supply network will always
during evolving faults are shown in Figure 23.5. Disturbances that
occur, and in industrial systems, it is often practice to specify
lie in the front right-hand portion of the histogram are the ones
equipment to ride-through voltage dips of up to 0.2s. The most
that cause most problems, but fortunately these are quite rare.
common exception is contactors, which may well drop out if
the voltage dips below 80% of rated voltage for more than 50- Number of undervoltage disturbances recorded

100ms. Motor protection relays that have an undervoltage

16
element setting that is too sensitive is another cause. Since 15

contactors are commonly used in circuits supplying motors, 14

13 Retained voltage

the impact of voltage dips on motor drives, and hence the 12

11
0-10%
41-50%

process concerned, requires consideration. Other network- 10

9
51-60%
61-70%

related fault causes are weather–related (such as snow, ice, Number of 8

incidents/yr 7
81-90%
91-100%

wind, salt spray, dust) causing insulator flashover, collisions 6

5
due to birds, and excavations damaging cables. Multiple 4
3
voltage dips, as illustrated in Figure 23.3, cause more 2
91-100%
71-80%
problems for equipment than a single isolated dip. 1
0
51-60%
<0.5ms

31-40%
0.5-1ms

Retained voltage
1-5ms
5-10ms

10-50ms

11-20%
50-100ms

100-500ms

0.5-1s

1-5s
5-10s

>10s

Duration of disturbance

Figure 23.5: Undervoltage disturbance histogram

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

150

23.3.2 Voltage Surges/Spikes

100

Voltage surges/spikes are the opposite of dips – a rise that

may be nearly instantaneous (spike) or takes place over a
50

longer duration (surge). These are most often caused by 0

Time

lightning strikes and arcing during switching operations on -50

circuit breakers/contactors (fault clearance, circuit switching,

-100
especially switch-off of inductive loads). Figure 23.6 shows the
profile of a voltage surge. -150

Figure 23.7: Supply waveform distorted due to the presence of

Vrms Surge duration
harmonics
User defined setpoints
Nom. High
x% above nominal
Harmonics usually lead to heating in rotating equipment
(generators and motors), and transformers, leading to possible
Nom. Low
PQ Standards shutdown. Capacitors may be similarly affected. If harmonic
levels are sufficiently high enough, protective devices may shut
the equipment down to avoid damage. Some equipment, such
as certain protection devices, may maloperate and cause
Interruption unnecessary shutdowns. Special provision may have to be
Time made to filter harmonics from the measured signals in these
Figure 23.6: Voltage surge profile circumstances. Interference may be caused to communication
Equipment may suffer serious damage from these causes, systems. Overloading of neutral conductors in LV systems has
ranging from insulation damage to destruction of sensitive also occurred (the harmonics in each phase summing in the
electronic devices. The damage may be immediate and obvious neutral conductor, not cancelling) leading to failure due to
by the fact that equipment stops working, through to failure at overheating. This is a particular risk in buildings that have a
a much later date from deterioration initiated from a surge or large number of PCs etc. In such cases a neutral conductor
spike of voltage. These latter failures are very difficult to rated at up to 150% of the phase conductors has been known
distinguish from random failures due to age, minor to be required. Busbar risers in buildings are also at risk, due to
manufacturing defects, etc. harmonic-induced vibration causing joint securing bolts, etc. to
work loose.
23.3.3 Overvoltages
Sustained overvoltages are not common. The most likely
23.3.5 Frequency Variations
causes are maladjusted voltage regulators on generators or Frequency variations that are large enough to cause problems
on-load tap changers, or incorrectly set taps on fixed-tap are most often encountered in small isolated networks, due to
transformers. Equipment failures may immediately result in faulty or maladjusted governors. Other causes are serious
the case of severe overvoltages, but more likely is accelerated overloads on a network, or governor failures, though on an
degradation leading to premature failure without obvious interconnected network, a single governor failure will not
cause. Some equipment that is particularly sensitive to cause widespread disturbances of this nature. Network
overvoltages may have to be shut down by protective devices. overloads are most common in areas with a developing
electrical infrastructure, where a reduction in frequency may
23.3.4 Harmonics be a deliberate policy to alleviate overloading. Serious network
faults leading to islanding of part of an interconnected network
This is a very common problem in the field of Power Quality.
can also lead to frequency problems.
The main causes are Power Electronic Devices, such as
rectifiers, inverters, UPS systems, static var compensators, etc. Few problems are normally caused by this problem. Processes
Other sources are electric discharge lamps, arc furnaces and where product quality depends on motor speed control may be
arc welders. In fact, any non-linear load will be a source of at risk but such processes will normally have closed-loop speed
harmonics. Figure 23.7 illustrates a supply waveform that is controllers. Motor drives will suffer output changes, but
distorted due to the presence of harmonics. process control mechanisms will normally take care of this.
Extreme under- or overfrequency may require the tripping of
generators, leading to the possibility of progressive network
collapse through network overloading/underfrequency causes.

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 Chapter 23 ⋅ Power Quality

23.3.6 Voltage Fluctuations 23.3.9 Undervoltage

These are mainly caused by load variations, especially large Excessive network loading, loss of generation, incorrectly set
rapid ones such as are likely to occur in arc and induction transformer taps and voltage regulator malfunctions cause
heating furnaces, rolling mills, mine winders, and resistance undervoltage. Loads with a poor power factor (see Chapter 18
welders. for Power Factor Correction) or a general lack of reactive
power support on a network also contribute. The location of
Flicker in incandescent lamps is the most usual effect of
power factor correction devices is often important, incorrect
voltage fluctuations. It is a serious problem, with the human
location resulting in little or no improvement.
eye being particularly sensitive to light flicker in the frequency
range of 5-15Hz. Because of the wide use of such lamps, the The symptoms of undervoltage problems are tripping of
effects are widespread and inevitably give rise to a large equipment through undervoltage trips. Lighting will run at
number of complaints. Fluorescent lamps are also affected, reduced output. Undervoltage can also indirectly lead to
though to a lesser extent. overloading problems as equipment takes an increased current
to maintain power output (e.g. motor loads). Such loads may
23.3.7 Voltage Unbalance then trip on overcurrent or thermal protection.
Unbalanced loading of the network normally causes voltage
unbalance. However, parts of the supply network with 23.3.10 Transients
unbalanced impedances (such as untransposed overhead Transients on the supply network are due to faults, control and
transmission lines) will also cause voltage unbalance, though protection malfunctions, lightning strikes, etc.
the effect of this is normally small.
Voltage-sensitive devices and insulation of electrical equipment
Overheating of rotating equipment results from voltage may be damaged, as noted above for voltage surges/spikes.
imbalance. In serious cases, tripping of the equipment occurs Control systems may reset. Semiconductor manufacture can
to protect it from damage, leading to generation/load be seriously affected unless the supplies to critical process
imbalance or loss of production. plant are suitably protected.

23.3.8 Supply Interruptions

Faults on the power system are the most common cause,
irrespective of duration. Other causes are failures in
equipment, and control and protection malfunctions.
Electrical equipment ceases to function under such conditions,
with undervoltage protection devices leading to tripping of
some loads. Short interruptions may be no more than an
inconvenience to some consumers (e.g. domestic consumers),
but for commercial and industrial consumers (e.g.
semiconductor manufacture) may lead to lengthy serious
production losses with large financial impact. Longer Figure 23.8: Example power quality measurement device
(Multilin 9650 & 9450)
interruptions will cause production loss in most industries, as
induction and synchronous motors cannot tolerate more than
1-2 seconds interruption without having to be tripped, if only
to prevent excessive current surges and resulting large voltage
dips on supply restoration. On the other hand, vital computer
systems are often fed via a UPS supply that may be capable of
supplying power from batteries for several hours in the event of
a mains supply failure. More modern devices such as Dynamic
Voltage Restorers can also be used to provide continuity of
supply due to a supply interruption. For interruptions lasting
some time, a standby generator can be provide a limited
supply to essential loads, but cannot be started in time to
prevent an interruption occurring.

23-5
THE DIGITAL SUBSTATION
Chapter 24
THE DIGITAL SUBSTATION

24.1 Introduction 24.1 INTRODUCTION

24.2 Communications The Digital Substation is a term applied to electrical substations
24.3 Cyber Security where operation is managed between distributed intelligent
electronic devices (IEDs) interconnected by communications
24.4 Current and Voltage – Digital networks. It became possible by using computing technology
Transformation in the substation environment. In the third edition of the
24.5 IEC61850 Protective Relays Application Guide, first printed in June 1987,
a new chapter was introduced: “The application of micropro-
24.6 Conclusion cessors to substation control”. Microprocessors were introduced
24.7 References into substation products such as protection devices to improve
the performance of the main product functions. Features such
as improved accuracy and stability were delivered. Communi-
cations ports were also incorporated, but these were more like
a developer’s debug tool than the sophisticated ones we might
recognise today.
Communication facilities developed, however. They were
refined to provide connection to SCADA equipment to reduce
hardwiring. Communications could provide operators with
informative interfaces using software packages running on
personal computers. Significantly they developed to enable the
transmission of data between the different substation devices.
As computing power became greater and cheaper, it became
possible to integrate multiple functionalities into single devices,
resulting in fewer devices being required to implement the same
traditional functionality.
As a result of functional integration and communications,
the traditional divisions between protection, monitoring and
control became blurred. The term ‘substation automation’ was
becoming used by protection engineers. This is reflected in a
later revision to PRAG: In July 2002 PRAG was replaced by the
first edition of NPAG and “The application of microprocessors
to substation control” was removed in favour of new chapters
associated with “Automation”.
Automation offered exciting possibilities, and improvement in
communications and computing resulted in more sophisticated
IEDs for substation automation becoming available.

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Along a similar time line, innovative approaches for The model shows that for the information to transfer from the
instrumentation transformers were being developed, with so- source to the destination, a transmitter (encoder) and a
called merging units converting indicative signals of power receiver (decoder), both connected by a channel are required.
system quantities into data streams for communication to IEDs. It also demonstrates that sources of noise can interfere with
the process. Considering communication between two people,
The technology was now available to communicate current
the source is the brain of the person who wants to get the
and voltage information to the different IEDs within the
message across, the transmitter could be that person’s voice
substation on a so called 'process bus', whilst the IEDs
and the channel is the atmosphere. At the receiving end, the
communicated information between themselves and the
receiver would be the other person’s ears and the destination
control centre on a so called 'station bus'. The digital
that person’s brain. Audible noise could drown out the
substation was close to becoming a reality, but despite
message causing it not to be received and this is a possible
attempts at standardisation, proprietary solutions hampered
cause of communication breakdown, but it is not the only one.
the end goal of "plug-and-play".
If the source is speaking but the destination is not listening (i.e.
The breakthrough came with the introduction and adoption of
they are not synchronised), communication won’t be
IEC61850, an open standard for electrical substation
successful. Similarly, if the two people talking don’t share a
automation. This standard provides detailed modelling of
common language, and/or if certain protocols are not observed
substation protection, control and monitoring functions, and
(e.g. not both speaking at the same time), failure is inevitable.
details communication services for exchanges between the
Successful communication requires common understanding
different products and substatems that make up a substation
between source and destination.
automation system.

The digital substation brings major benefits in terms of design 24.2.1 The OSI Model for Computer Communications
and engineering, installation, and operation. Off-the-shelf In the context of substation automation, communication is the
solutions can be offered, modifications can be easily transfer of information from one computing device to another
accommodated, cabling (and hence costs), are reduced, and but, as with the example above, problems with
embedded diagnostics assure system integrity. synchronisation, language, and protocol can all cause
This chapter takes a tour through the enablers of the digital communication failure.
substation, looking at communications (and how to ensure The substation communication might be in the form of a
that they are sufficiently secure, reliable, and dependable), dedicated link between two devices, or it may be over some
current and voltage transformation coupled with merging form of communications network.
units, and concluding with an introduction to the standard
The International Standards Organisation (ISO) recognised the
IEC61850.
need for a framework for inter-device data communications,
24.2 COMMUNICATIONS and in 1984 introduced the Open Systems Interconnection
Communication is the conveyance of information from a (OSI) model.
source to a destination. In 1949 C E Shannon and W Weaver The OSI model divides the data communication process into
[24.1] produced a mathematical model for communications as seven distinct layers. Each of the seven layers defines how the
shown in Figure 24.1. data is handled during the different stages of transmission.
Each layer provides a service for the layer immediately above
Information Transmitter Receiver
source (Encoder)
Channel
(Decoder)
Destination it.
Message Signal Received Message A model representing the seven layers is shown in Figure 24.2
Signal
with the purpose of the different layers being described below.
Noise
Source

Figure 24.1: The Shannon Weaver model

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 Chapter 24 ⋅ The Digital Substation

Layer
Data Unit Layer Function 1
Type Start 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 Stop
7
Communication application
Application layer
6
Data Encryption and data representation
Host Presentation layer Start b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 Stop
Layers 5
Inter-host communication
Session layer
4
Segment End-to-end connections and reliability
Transport layer
Idle Idle
3
Packet Logical addressing
Network layer
Media 2
Frame Physical addressing Time
Layers Link layer

Bit
1
Media, signal and binary transmission Figure 24.3: Example of a data frame
Physical layer

Figure 24.2: The OSI seven layer model A commonly used Data Link protocol is Ethernet. Examples of
equipment that work at this layer are Ethernet switches and
24.2.1.1 OSI Layer 1 – The Physical Layer bridges.
Every data message is transmitted on some medium. This
medium usually takes the form of cables, wires, or optical 24.2.1.3 OSI Layer 3 – The Network Layer
fibres, but it could just as well be wireless, with the data being The network layer is concerned with packet delivery. Logical
carried on electromagnetic waves. The physical layer specifies paths are established between the sending and receiving
the type of medium to be used between one end of the data equipment by adding information onto the data frame which
exchange and the other, the type of connectors to be used and defines where the packet has come from, and where the
the voltage and current levels, and if applicable, optical packet is going to. This takes the form of a logical source and
characteristics defining the state of the data bits. A very destination address for each packet of information. A
common medium, particularly in Ethernet systems started commonly used Network protocol is IP (Internet Protocol).
with the CAT 5 UTP cable (Category 5 Unshielded Twisted
An example of equipment that operates at the network layer is
Pair), which consists of four colour-coded twisted pairs of
a router.
wires terminated with RJ45 connectors. As the name implies,
this type of cable is not shielded against electromagnetic 24.2.1.4 OSI Layer 4 – The Transport Layer
interference. There is also a version of this cable called CAT 5
The transport layer is the first layer that is not concerned with
STP (Category 5 Shielded Twisted Pair) that has a metallic
the mechanics of the data transfer. It is concerned with
outer sheath, providing electromagnetic shielding. This type of
managing and sequencing the packets once they have arrived.
cable is often used in noisy environments like the substation.
There is an array of transport layer protocols ranging from the
CAT 5, has more recently evolved into new standards such as
very simple, which simply accepts the data as it comes in, not
CAT 6 and CAT 7, which offer even more robust shielding, fire
caring about whether the packets have errors nor even if they
protection etc.
are in the right order, through to quite complex protocols
24.2.1.2 OSI Layer 2 – The Data Link Layer which check the data for errors, send out an acknowledgement
to the sending equipment, order the packets into the correct
The physical layer provides the Data Link layer with bits. The
sequence and present the data to the next layer guaranteed
Data Link layer now provides some intelligence to this
error-free and correctly sequenced.
sequence of bits by defining Data Frames. These Data Frames
are packets of data containing the data to be transmitted and An example of a simple protocol is UDP (User Datagram
some control information governing the transmission. The Protocol). A more sophisticated widely used transport layer
control information comprises flags to indicate the start and protocol used is TCP (Transmission Control Protocol).
end of the message. The standards used at this layer must Layer 4 functionality is achieved by the devices at either end of
ensure that the control flags are not mistaken for data and that the transmission path, which is usually a computer. In the
the data frames are checked for errors. An example is given in context of substation protection, this would be the IED.
Figure 24.3.

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

24.2.1.5 OSI Layer 5 – The Session Layer • EIA 232

The first four layers establish a means of reliable • EIA 485
communication between two IEDs (computers), but they do • Ethernet
not deal with intelligent management of the communication.
EIA (Electronic Industries Association) is a set of standards
This is performed at the session layer. It is the first layer that
defined for connecting electronic devices together. They were
has user interaction. Each communication session is governed
formerly known as the recommended standards (RS) and
by criteria pertinent to the session. One communication
often people will still refer to them as RS 232 and RS 485.
session may be downloading a file from a web site, whilst
another may be working on a file situated on a remote server. Note: Although, traditionally the standards were designed
Session layer software can implement password control, with metallic connections between devices, more recent times
have seen an increase in optical fibre as the medium
monitor system usage, and allow a user interaction with the
connecting networks and devices. Many of the physical layer
communication. and data link layer protocols have now been modified to work
over optical fibre as well.
24.2.1.6 OSI Layer 6 – The Presentation Layer
As the name implies, the presentation layer concerns itself
EIA 232
with how the data is presented. A good example of this is
EIA 232 is an electrical connection allowing full duplex
ASCII (American Standard Code for Information Interchange).
communication between two devices. Prior to the
An ASCII code is an 8-bit binary code, which defines the
development of the USB port, it was the typical serial port
familiar character set used to produce text. For example the
found on most computers and is characterised by Table 24.1
character ‘A’ is defined by the binary code 01000001, which is
41 hexadecimal or 65 decimal. The presentation layer, if Item Details
compliant with the ASCII format, can interpret this. Max. number of transmitters 1
Max. number of receivers 1
24.2.1.7 OSI Layer 7 – The Application Layer Connection type 25 core shielded
Mode of operation DC coupling
The application layer is the layer that interacts with the user.
Maximum distance of transmission 15m
This is in the main software that allows the user to define the
Maximum data rate 20kbits/s
communication. Examples of application level protocols would
Transmitter voltage 5V min, 15V max
be file transfer protocol (FTP), hypertext transfer protocol
Receiver intensity 3V
(HTTP), post-office protocol 3 (POP3), or simple mail transfer
Driver slew rate 30V/µS
protocol (SMTP).
Table 24.1: EIA(RS)232 characteristics

24.2.2 Communications Between IEDs EIA 232 was designed to allow computers to connect using
Modems and is suitable only for point-to-point connection. It
The OSI model outlines the need for compatibility between all
uses switched single-sided 12V (nominal) signals for data
communication layers between computers (which are
transmission as well as handshake signals to control the
generally in the form of IEDs in the substation). This section
communication. Due to Modem limitations, it is not generally
explores the lowest two layers; the physical and data link
used at speeds in excess of 9,600 bits per second. No isolation is
layers.
specified and so it is only suitable for connection over very short
24.2.2.1 Physical Connection to IEDs for Substation distances. For permanent connection in a substation
Control and Automation environment, the use of optical isolating units should be
considered to avoid damage caused by induced transients. If
In substation control and automation systems, connection to
transmission over longer distances is required, some form of EIA
IED communications ports at the physical layer (OSI layer 1) is
232 to fibre-optic converter and a fibre-optic communications
generally to one of three standards:
link should be used. Since EIA 232 provides only point to point

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 Chapter 24 ⋅ The Digital Substation

connectivity it is not used in automation systems, rather it is making it the ideal communication medium for the substation.
limited to relaying information to a SCADA system. Ethernet is discussed in detail, later in the chapter.

EIA 485
24.2.2.2 Network Topologies
EIA 485 is an electrical connection characterised by Table
24.2. When linking multiple products together to form a computer
network, in addition to the physical connection of the device, it
Item Details is also necessary to consider the network topology as well as
Max. number of transmitters 32
the protocol or language by which information is exchanged.
Max. number of receivers 32
Connection type Shielded Twisted Pair For automation systems to be effective, information must be
Mode of operation Differential communicated reliably between different devices in the
Maximum distance of transmission 1200m system. In early centralised systems, a hierarchical series of
Maximum data rate 10Mbits/s connections is required for devices at the acquisition and
Transmitter voltage 1.5V min process levels to communicate data upwards and to receive
Receiver intensity 300mV commands in return. This tree-type structure typifies the kind
Table 24.2: EIA(RS)485 characteristics of connection that the point-to-point EIA 232 communications
EIA 485 provides a two-wire half-duplex connection designed can bring.
for multi-drop connections as shown in Figure 24.4 which
The multi-drop capabilities of EIA 485 do more to encourage
makes it more suitable than EIA 232 for use in automation
distribution of control since the EIA 485 network will have
schemes.
devices connected on the same multi-drop bus, with a master
Terminating resistor connected to many slaves.
Master
Station Systems based on Ethernet technology provide more scope for
different topologies by virtue of equipment such as switches,
IED IED IED IED
hubs, bridges and routers.
Figure 24.4: Multi-drop connection of RS485 devices
24.2.3 Serial Communications
EIA 485 uses differential signalling on twisted pairs and can be
This is a form of communication whereby bits of data are
isolated. The multi-drop connection (sometimes called daisy-
exchanged serially through the signalling channel. With
chaining) generally has a limit of 1km, and although in theory
parallel communications multiple bits of data are exchanged in
the number of devices connected (nodes) is not limited, a
parallel. An example of parallel communication is the LPT
practical limit is normally 32 per bus, with repeaters being
printer port that used to feature on computers, printers, and
used if further expansion is required. Communication speeds of
office equipment before the widespread deployment of
64kbits per second (kbps) can be reliably achieved. EIA 485
Ethernet in the working environment.
allows relatively simple networks to be constructed very
efficiently and cost effectively. EIA 232, EIA 485, and Ethernet are all forms of serial
communication. The much higher speed of Ethernet sets it
Ethernet
Ethernet is a standard, which defines the connection of apart from the others. As a consequence, in the domain of
computing devices to local area networks (LANs). As per IEEE substation automation, communications based on EIA 232
802.3, standard signalling speeds are 10Mbps, 100Mbps or and EIA 485 tend to be referred to as “serial” communications,
1Gbps. It is the most widespread LAN technology. The with Ethernet being singled out for separate attention. This
specification allows connection to be made either electrically chapter adheres to that convention and continues with a
using an RJ45 connector, or by direct fibre-optic connection. discussion on “serial” communications based on EIA 232 and
Ethernet over fibre-optic cables provide a mechanism for EIA 485, later followed by Ethernet communication.
extremely high speed and noise resistant communication,

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

24.2.3.1 Serial Communications Protocols Efforts were made to develop a standard solution and from the
A communications protocol is a set of standard rules for data protocols available, three open standards for IED serial
representation, signalling, authentication and error detection, communications emerged:
which defines the transfer of information over a • MODBUS
communication channel. Put another way, for devices to be • IEC 60870-5-103
able to speak to each other, they need to share a common
• DNP3
language and rules of engagement.
Modbus
When digital communication facilities were first added to Modbus was published in 1979 by Modicon. Originally
computer based protection devices, no standard protocol designed for programmable logic controllers of the
existed for this communication; manufacturers developed their time, it is a master-slave protocol that allows a master
own proprietary solutions to exploit the benefits of the to read or write bits in registers of the slave devices. It
communication interfaces. An example of a proprietary can be implemented on simple serial connections (EIA
485), but has also been migrated to Ethernet.
protocol is the Courier protocol that was developed by the
former GEC Measurements (now Alstom). IEC 60870-5-103
IEC 60870-5-103 was developed by Technical
A substation control system is required to communicate with Committee 57 of the International Electro-technical
all the distributed functionality in the system. If devices from Committee (IEC TC57). It is based on, and is a superset
different vendors are to be included in the system, then the of, the German VDEW communications standard.
different protocols will need to be supported. This increases the Primarily serving European clients, it defines the
system engineering work and consequently the cost. standards for communication between protection
equipment and the devices of the control system. As
Consider a relatively simple system, with a bay controller well as simple electrical connection, the standard also
connected to IEDs from different manufacturers A, B, and C as defines a direct communication interface implemented
depicted in Figure 24.5. over optical fibre.
DNP3
DNP3 was developed by Harris in the 1990s. It drew
on early work of TC57 on the IEC 60870-5 (before it
was standardised) to develop something with a specific
focus on the North American market that could be
Protocol A Protocol C
quickly implemented. Like Modbus, it is also supported
Protocol B
on Ethernet as well as simple serial connection.
Although originally targeted at the North American
market, it has been deployed elsewhere.
IED IED IED
A B C

The use of these open communications standards simplified

Figure 24.5: Multi-protocol system
the system engineering, making future upgrading and
If the three products all contain key elements to implement the
expansion easier, hence reducing overall life-cycle costs.
control system, then either the bay controller would need to
support three communications protocols (as shown in the In general, the open standards of Modbus, IEC60870-5-103
figure), or some form of protocol converter devices would need and DNP3 cover layers 1-4 of the OSI model. They allow
to be included. Either way, it can be seen that the use of automation systems engineers to mix and match IEDs from
different protocols increases the engineering time, and the different manufacturers with the same protocol, satisfying the
component costs associated with implementing the system. clients’ needs for protection and control better than if a mix of
proprietary protocols were used. Each of the protocols has
From the systems' engineering perspective, as well as the
particular advantages, but they all suffer disadvantages too:
utilities' perspective, the adoption of a standard protocol by the
manufacturers brings clear benefits.

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• Although they are standard protocols, all have equipment manufactured.

ambiguities that result in different implementations in
The most commonly used network protocol (layer 3 of the OSI
different IEDs.
model) is the Internet Protocol (IP), and the most commonly
• The IED data model (i.e. the way the data representing
used transport layer mechanism (OSI layer 4) is the
the IED is structured and presented over the
communications link) varies between vendors, and can Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). Often these are put
sometimes vary between different versions of the same together as 'TCP/IP' and are synonymous with Ethernet and
IED from the same vendor. the internet.
• Different functionalities are supported by the different At the network layer, IP is used to transfer packets of data on
protocols, and different IED vendors may support
the network and across network boundaries from the source to
different levels of those functionalities.
the destination. To do this, devices are assigned IP addresses
• The provision of private codes in the IEC 60870-5-103
and these addresses have two purposes: The first is to identify
protocol permits much greater functionality, but at the
the host network (which may be subdivided into sub-
same time hinders interoperability of equipment from
networks), whilst the second is to identify the device on the
different vendors because there is no need for the format
network or sub-network (subnet). The IP address is a 32 bit
of such messages to be made public. In effect, the use of
binary number, which can be written in the form
‘private’ messages by vendors of devices essentially turns
nnn.nnn.nnn.nnn, where nnn represents a binary octet, and is
the standard into several proprietary ones.
an integer value between 0 and 255. A typical IP address is,
Due to continuing developments in the fields of computing and therefore, 192.168.0.2. Each device on the network will have
communications, there is a need for a truly open an IP address that is unique and may be configured by a
communications architecture allowing ‘plug-and-play’ network server, a system administrator, or by an address auto-
connectivity between devices from different manufacturers for configuration. The most significant bits of the address are used
effective, efficient substation automation. The IEC61850, for network identification and are known as the routing prefix.
standard, based on Ethernet satisfies that need. The least significant bits are known as the rest field and
provide unique identification of the device on the local network
24.2.4 Ethernet Communications to which it is connected. Typically the two most significant
Ethernet defines the connection of computing devices to local octets identify the network. The two least significant octets are
area networks (LANs). It is the most widespread LAN used for device identification, but can also be used to create
technology. Standardised in IEEE 802.3, it describes the subnets. A so called subnet mask is then used to identify the
requirements for network connection according to layer 1 (the subnet address. For example if the third octet were used as a
physical layer) and layer 2 (the data link layer) of the OSI subnet identifier, then performing a logical AND between the
model. IP address and 255.255.255.0 (the subnet mask) would
At the physical layer the specification allows connection to be identify that, in the case above, the subnet address is
made either electrically using an RJ45 connector, or by direct 192.168.0.0 and the device is at address 2 on that subnet.
fibre-optic connection using LC or ST (otherwise known as When a packet of data is placed on the IP network, it is sent to
BFOC2.5) type connectors. its destination network by means of routers, switches and
Standard signalling speeds for Ethernet communications are hubs. These devices are discussed in the next section.
10Mbps, 100Mbps, 1Gbps and 10Gbps.
24.2.4.1 Ethernet Hubs, Switches and Routers
At the data link layer (layer 2 of the OSI model), MAC (Media An Ethernet hub is, as the name suggests, a hub for linking
Access Control) addresses take care of the physical addressing multiple Ethernet devices together. Hubs work at the physical
of devices on a network. These physical addresses are set in layer. Devices on the network transmit data packages to the
the manufacturing process. MAC uses a 48 bit addressing hub and the hub passes them to all connected devices. There is
scheme allowing a unique address for every piece of little arbitration and data collision is common. As such, they

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

are not appropriate for use in mission critical applications such Device Device

as substation automation. Device Device

Device Device

Ethernet switches operate at the data link layer. Ethernet

Device Switch Device Device Device
switches are intelligent devices that provide a common
connection point for devices on a network. They store Device Device
Device Device
incoming packages and forward them to the appropriate Device Device

destination on the LAN when the channel is free. Full duplex Star topology Ring topology

operation provides for consistent, reliable operation. Figure Figure 24.7: Simple star and ring network topologies
24.6 shows a typical Ethernet switch outline. In the star topology, a physical connection runs from each
device on the network to a central location, usually an
Message processor
Ethernet switch.
Input and output message queues on each port
In the ring topology, a physical connection is daisy-chained
In Out In Out In Out In Out
around the devices in the form of a ring.
Port 1 Port 2 Port 3 Port 4
Rx Tx Rx Tx Rx Tx Rx Tx
Full duplex Ethernet is inherently a star-based network topology. Initially it
message did not allow ring topology connection due to the risk of traffic
exchange
getting stuck in an endless loop around a ring and the
IED A IED B IED C IED D consequent paralysis of the network as the amount of stuck
Figure 24.6: Ethernet Switch outline (4-port) traffic increased. IEEE 802.1D introduced the Spanning Tree
Protocol (STP) which was developed to overcome this
Ethernet routers are used as gateways between the LAN and
limitation, and allow Ethernet to be used in rings as shown in
wide-area networks (WANs). They are similar to switches, but
Figure 24.8.
they have fewer ports and act at the network layer. The
information is presented to the router in the form of a Root switch
sequence of IP packets. Each packet has a logical source configured with
STP
address and destination address associated with it, and the
Device
router passes the packet on to the next step of the destination.
Packets with the same destination address do not necessarily
follow the same route. If one route gets congested, for
example, the router may decide to send the packet onwards Device Device

via an alternative route (rather like a motorist may choose to

avoid road works). For this reason, packets making up a
message may arrive at their destination out of sequence. In Device Device
many cases, it is critical that the message arrives error-free
and in the correct sequence. Higher level protocols in the Device

computer, such as TCP, ensure that this happens.

Ring topology
Figure 24.8: Ethernet topology with STP
24.2.4.2 Ethernet Topologies
STP was limited in terms of speed, so IEEE 802.1W Rapid
The topology of a network is the way in which devices are
Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP) was developed from STP to
connected together. Figure 24.7 shows the two simplest
provide faster performance and hence more effective Ethernet
topologies which are the star and the ring so-called because
ring topologies.
they resemble stars and rings when drawn.

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24.2.4.3 Principles of Redundancy in Communications Data sent

back in
networks Root switch
other
direction
The term “redundancy” can be open to misinterpretation as it
wrongly implies that something may not be needed. In the
context of communication networks, what it actually means is:
“Redundancy is any resource that would not be needed if there
were no failures”. Redundancy is therefore a provision of Device Device

transparent backup. It is required in applications where

communications failure cannot be tolerated, such as the
Break in
substation automation system in a transmission substation. ring
Data sent
Figure 24.9 shows how redundancy can be incorporated into a back in
Device
other
star network. A connection from each node goes to a different
direction
switch, providing an alternative path. This topology is called Figure 24.10: Redundancy in a ring topology
Dual Homing star topology, and requires each device to have
This inherent redundancy is one of the features that RSTP
two network ports.
offers.
Onward connection Onward connection
In this example, an alternative path is provided in a 'standby'
arrangement. When the primary path fails, this is detected and
the alternative path is switched into action. This type of
Switch Switch
redundancy is known as dynamic redundancy, and it needs a
certain amount of time to operate.

Where an alternative path is provided in a 'workby'

arrangement such as that shown in Figure 24.9, it is called
IED IED IED IED
1 2 3 4
static redundancy. Should one path fail, the alternative paths
are continually working and, should one path fail, no switching
Figure 24.9: Redundant connections in star topology
time is lost because the other path is already operating.
Figure 24.10 shows simple redundancy with a ring topology.
The cable is daisy-chained from device to device in a ring, the 24.2.4.4 Redundancy requirements for substation
idea being that if the link from one direction fails, the link in automation networks
the other direction can be used to effect transactions. In the
Dynamic redundancy is cost-effective, but requires switchover
event that there is a break at one point of the ring, appropriate
time. Static redundancy provides seamless switchover but
redundancy protocols can automatically readjust the ring such
generally costs more.
that the data is sent back in the opposite direction, ensuring it
will get to its destination. The Dual Homing Star, and Rapid Spanning Tree protocols
both offer redundancy, but neither presents an ideal solution
for the needs of substation automation. To overcome the
limitations, the standard IEC 62439-3 (Industrial
communication networks - High availability automation
networks) was developed for substation automation.

Of particular interest is IEC 62439-3 clause 4 which describes

a Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP), and IEC 62439-3
clause 5 which describes High-availability Seamless
Redundancy (HSR).

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

Switchover delays and grace time are critical to the substation attached nodes DANP 1 and DANP 2 have full node
automation system. The switchover delay is dictated by the redundancy, whilst the singly attached nodes SAN 1 and SAN
grace time and is the most constraining factor in fault-tolerant 4 do not have any redundancy. Singly attached nodes can,
systems. The grace time is the time that the plant allows for however, be connected to both LANs, via a device that
recovery before taking emergency actions. converts a singly attached node into a doubly attached node.
These devices are referred to as redundancy boxes or
Some examples of grace times for automation systems are
RedBoxes. Devices with single network cards such as PCs,
given in IEC62439-3 and are shown in Table 24.3.
printers, etc., are singly attached nodes that may be connected
Applications Typical grace time into the PRP network via a RedBox as shown in figure Figure
Uncritical automation applications, e.g. enterprise systems 20s 24.11.
Automation management, e.g. manufacturing 2s
General automation, e.g. process automation, power plants 0.2s LAN A Switch LAN B Switch
Time-critical automation, e.g. synchronised drives 0.02s
Table 24.3: Examples of grace time

Table 24.4 provides examples of recovery times for various

protocols used for implementing redundancy.

Frame Typical DANP 1 RedBox DANP 2

Protocol Description
Loss recovery time
IP IP routing Yes 30 seconds
STP Spanning Tree Protocol Yes 20 seconds
SAN 1 SAN 2 SAN 3 SAN 4
RSTP Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol Yes 2 seconds
Cross-network Redundancy Figure 24.11: Example PRP redundant network
CRP Yes 1 second
Protocol
MRP Media Redundancy Protocol Yes 200 milliseconds Both ports share the same MAC address, so there is no impact
BRP Beacon Redundancy Protocol Yes 8 milliseconds on the functioning of the address resolution protocol. Every
PRP Parallel Redundancy Protocol No 0 seconds data frame is seen by both ports.
HSR High-availability Seamless Ring No 0 seconds
When a node sends a frame of data, the frame is duplicated on
Table 24.4: Typical recovery times for common redundancy protocols
both ports and thus on both LAN segments, providing a
From Table 24.3 and Table 24.4 it can be seen that systems redundant path for the data frame in the event of failure of one
based on PRP and HSR are appropriately suited to the needs of the segments. When both LAN segments are operational, as
of substation automation networks, providing true static is the normal case, each port receives identical frames and these
redundancy. This is also known as 'bumpless' redundancy. identical frames need to be carefully handled. The handling
brings overheads, but bumpless redundancy is assured.
24.2.4.5 IEC 62439-3 PRP
PRP is standardised in IEC62439-3 (clause 4) for use in Dual 24.2.4.6 IEC 62439-3 HSR
Homing Star Topology networks. PRP is capable of providing HSR is standardised in IEC62439-3 (clause 5) for use in Ring
bumpless redundancy for real-time systems, and hence Topology networks. HSR is capable of providing bumpless
becomes the reference standard for star-topology networks in redundancy for real-time systems and becomes the reference
the substation environment. standard for ring-topology networks in the substation
A PRP compatible device has two ports operating in parallel, environment.
each port being connected to a separate LAN segment. HSR works on the premise that each device connected in the
IEC62439-3 assigns the term DANP (Doubly Attached Node ring is a doubly attached node running HSR. IEC62439
running PRP) to such devices. assigns the term DANH (Doubly Attached Node running HSR)
Figure 24.11 shows an example of a PRP network. The doubly to such devices. As per PRP, singly attached nodes are

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 Chapter 24 ⋅ The Digital Substation

connected via a so-called Redbox. Source

DANH DANH Redbox Switch

Figure 24.12 shows a simple HSR network, where a doubly
C frame
attached node is sending a multicast frame (that is a frame A frame B frame

that is intended for multiple recipients on the network). The

frame (C frame) is duplicated, and each duplicate frame is Singly Attached
Nodes

tagged with the destination MAC address and the sequence

number. The frames differ only in their sequence number,
which is used to identify one copy from another. For
convenience, the duplicate frames are labelled the A frame and D frame

B frame. Each frame is sent to the network via a separate port.

DANH DANH DANH
The destination DANH receives two identical frames from each Destination

port, removes the HSR tag of the first frame received and Figure 24.13: HSR for unicast traffic
passes this to its upper layers. This now becomes the D frame. The use of PRP and HSR delivers network reliability, but the
The duplicate frame is discarded. networks also need to be secure. Security within network
The nodes forward frames from one port to another unless the communications comes under the banner 'Cyber Security',
particular node is the node that originally injected it into the ring. which will be discussed in the next section.

Source

DANH DANH Redbox

24.3 CYBER SECURITY
Switch

C frame
When communications were first introduced into the
D frame D frame
A frame B frame substation environment for control and automation, they were
fully contained within the substation and based on proprietary
Singly Attached
Nodes protocols. As a consequence they enjoyed inherent security.
They were “secure by isolation” (if the substation network is
not connected to the outside world, it can’t be accessed from
the outside world), and “secure by obscurity” (if the formats
D frame D frame D frame and protocols are proprietary, it can be very difficult, to
DANH DANH DANH interpret and hack into them).
Figure 24.12: HSR for multicast traffic The increasing sophistication of substation protection, control
With unicast frames (frames that are intended for a single and automation schemes coupled with the advancement of
destination), there is just one destination and the frames are technology and the desire for vendor interoperability has
sent to that destination alone. All non-recipient devices simply resulted in standardisation of networks and data interchange
pass the frames on. They do not process them in any way. In within substations. In wide-area applications, substations can
other words, D frames are produced only for the receiving be interconnected with open networks such as corporate
DANH. This is illustrated in Figure 24.13 networks or the internet, which use open protocols for
communication. Open protocols mean that the security that
obscurity brought cannot be assumed, and interconnection via
open networks means that the security that isolation brought
them cannot be assumed either. This leaves the networks
vulnerable to so-called cyber-attacks.

Cyber-security provides protection against unauthorised

disclosure, transfer, modification, or destruction of information
and/or information systems, whether accidental or intentional.
Factors to be considered in the context of cyber-security

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

include: • Datagrams: Packets of information exchanged between

IEDs.
• Confidentiality (preventing unauthorised access to
information). The OSI 7-layer model enables security measures to be applied
• Integrity (preventing unauthorised modification). at the Transport layer (layer 4) and the Application layer (layer
• Availability / Authentication (preventing denial of 7).
service and assuring authorised access to information).
At the Transport layer the dialog between two devices is
• Non-Repudiation (preventing denial of an action taking
controlled. The connections between the two devices in
place).
question are established, managed, and terminated at this
• Traceability/Detection (monitoring and logging of
layer. Applying security at this layer is known as Transport
activity to detect intrusion and analyse incidents).
Layer Security, and the most common protocol to achieve this
The threats to cyber-security may be unintentional (e.g. is the Transport Layer Security protocol (TLS), otherwise
natural disasters, human error), or intentional (e.g. cyber- known as Secure Socket Layer (SSL).
attacks by hackers).
Security measures applied at the Transport Layer (layer 4)
Cyber-security is attainable with a range of measures such as guarantee confidentiality, integrity and authenticity, but
closing down vulnerability loopholes, assuring availability, because they rely on security provided by the transport layer,
implementing adequate security processes and procedures, this type of secure data exchange is limited to point-to-point
and providing appropriate technology such as firewalls. communication.

Examples of vulnerabilities are: A more flexible solution can be implemented by applying

security at the Application Layer (layer 7), whereby messages
• Indiscretions by personnel (e.g. users keep passwords in
locations visible to others). themselves are secured independently of the transport on
which they are exchanged. Application of security measures at
• Bypassing of controls (e.g. users turn off security
measures). layer 7 produces a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA).

• Bad practice (users do not change default passwords, SOA is based on web services that are message oriented.
or everyone uses the same password to access all Secure messages can be sent between any of the devices in
substation equipment). the network and are not limited to point-to-point
• Inadequate technology (e.g. substation is not communication. SOA solutions are not prescribed to any
firewalled). specific profile, but the Device Profile for Web Services
Examples of availability issues are: (DPWS) protocol provides an appropriate level of security for
• Equipment overload, resulting in reduced or no substation automation. Figure 24.14 depicts layer 4 (TLS) and
performance. layer 7 (DPWS) security application.
• Expiry of a certificate prevents access to equipment.

Processes and procedures are required to assure secure

exchange of the following categories of information:

• Security Context: This defines information that allows

users to have access to devices. It includes passwords,
permissions and user credentials.
• Log and Event Management: This includes security
logs, which are stored in different IEDs.
• Settings: This includes information about the IED, such
as the number of used and unused ports and
performance statistics.

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 Chapter 24 ⋅ The Digital Substation

IED A IED B
Transactions are controlled through RBAC, so that access is
granted only to what, where, and when, and to whom it
SSL SSL
should be granted.

A typical transaction is shown in Figure 24.16, in which an

TLS Approach AAA server stores security-related data such as user credentials
and permissions.
IED A IED B

SOA SOA

Computer
Operator Interface, Authentication Authorisation
IED D IED C IED, or EWS Server Server
IED
Discovery Messages
SOA SOA
DPWS Approach
Discovery Message response

Connection attempt
Figure 24.14: TLS vs DPWS
Authentication required

DPWS enables secure web services on devices with limited Authentication request

resources. This means that DPWS is very applicable to IEDs. Authentication response
Authorisation request
DPWS is widely deployed having been embedded in the
Get authorisation
Windows 7 operating system and the DotNet framework for Authorized
Secure exchanges
previous Windows versions.
Figure 24.16: Message Flow
24.3.1 Role Based Access Control
Note: Authorisation and Authentication functionality is
In order to have a complete cyber-security solution, other
usually contained in one server. This figure shows two servers
criteria must be taken into consideration, such as to illustrate the detailed interactions.
Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting (AAA). Once a device is attached to the network, an automatic device
In Role Based Access Control (RBAC), different classes of user discovery process may be performed. Following that, the user
can be granted different rights of access to different selects the device he/she would like to interact with. The
information in devices on the network. chosen device requests a token from the user to prove that
he/she has been authenticated by the security server. The user
A typical RBAC model is shown in Figure 24.15.
transfers this token to the end device (in this case, the IED).
User Permission The IED then requests the user roles and credentials from the
Assignment Assignment
authorisation server. If the roles and credentials are certified, a
secure exchange of data can occur between the devices'
Users Roles Operations Objects
applications. This secure data exchange includes for example
Permissions log events, messages stored at the IED level, etc., for which
the user has been granted access.
Figure 24.15: RBAC Model

The RBAC model has five basic elements: users, roles, 24.3.2 Cyber Security Standards
permissions, objects and operations.
There are several standards which apply to substation cyber-
• Objects are entities that contain or receive information security some of which are outlined in Table 24.5.
(e.g. files, directories, printers, etc.).
Standard Country Outline
• Operations are executable functions (read, write, insert,
NERC CIP (North American Electric Framework for the protection of the grid
delete, etc.) Reliability Corporation)
USA
critical Cyber Assets
• Permissions can contain objects and operations. BDEW (German Association of Requirements for Secure Control and
Germany
Energy and Water Industries) Telecommunication Systems
• Users acquire permissions through roles.

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

Standard Country Outline CIP-003-1 Security Management Controls

Relevant for electric power utility CIP 003 requires the implementation of a cyber security policy,
completing existing standard and with associated documentation, that demonstrates Management
ANSI ISA 99 USA
identifying new topics such as patch
management commitment and ability to secure its critical cyber-assets. The
International Standard for substation IED standard also requires change control practices whereby all entity
IEEE 1686 International
cyber security capabilities
or vendor-related changes to hardware and software components
Power system data and communication.
IEC 62351 International are documented and maintained.
protocol

ISO/IEC 27002 International

Framework for the protection of the grid CIP-004-1 Personnel and Training
critical Cyber Assets
CIP 004 requires that personnel having authorised cyber-
Complete framework for SCADA SP800-
NIST SP800-53 (National Institute of
USA 82 and Industrial control system cyber
access or authorised physical access to critical cyber-assets,
Standards and Technology)
security (including contractors and service engineers), have an
CPNI Guidelines (Centre for the
UK
Clear and valuable good practices for appropriate level of training to assure security.
Protection of National Infrastructure) Process Control and SCADA security
Table 24.5: Standards applicable to cyber-security CIP-005-1 Electronic Security
The NERC CIP standards, in conjunction with IEEE 1686 are CIP 005 requires the establishment of an Electronic Security
widely applied since they are compulsory in the USA, with Perimeter (ESP), which provides:
compliance auditing having started in 2007. • The disabling of ports and services that are not required
• Permanent monitoring and access to logs
24.3.2.1 NERC Compliance
• Vulnerability assessments (yearly at a minimum)
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) created
• Documentation of network changes
a set of standards for the protection of critical infrastructure. These
are known as the CIP standards (Critical Infrastructure Protection). CIP-006-1 Physical Security
These were introduced to ensure the protection of critical cyber CIP 006 requires that physical security controls, providing
assets, which control or have an influence on the reliability of North perimeter monitoring and logging along with robust access
America’s bulk electric systems. controls, are implemented and documented. All cyber-assets
used for physical security are considered critical and should be
The group of CIP standards are listed below: treated as such.
• CIP-002-1 Critical Cyber Assets CIP-007-1 Systems Security Management
• CIP-003-1 Security Management Controls CIP 007 addresses system security management and covers
• CIP-004-1 Personnel and Training the following points:
• CIP-005-1 Electronic Security • Test procedures
• CIP-006-1 Physical Security • Ports and services
• CIP-007-1 Systems Security Management • Security patch management
• CIP-008-1 Incident Reporting and Response Planning • Antivirus
• CIP-009-1 Recovery Plans • Account management
CIP-002-1 Critical Cyber Assets • Monitoring
CIP 002 is concerned with the identification of critical assets, • Annual vulnerability assessment
such as overhead lines and transformers, as well as critical
These should be defined and documented for all critical cyber
cyber-assets, such as IEDs that use routable protocols to
assets.
communicate outside or inside the Electronic Security
Perimeter, or are accessible by dial-up. Utilities are required to CIP-008-1 Incident Reporting and Response Planning
create and maintain a register of these assets. CIP 008 requires that an incident response plan be developed,
including the definition of an incident response team, their
responsibilities and associated procedures.

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 Chapter 24 ⋅ The Digital Substation

CIP-009-1 Recovery Plans iron cores introduce measurement errors. Due to the wide
CIP 009 requires that a disaster recovery plan should be created dynamic range of current signals on power systems, current
and implemented. It should be tested with annual drills. transformers for protection need large cores to avoid
24.3.2.2 IEEE 1686 saturation under fault conditions. Due to the nature of the
IEEE 1686 is an IEEE Standard for substation IEDs' cyber- magnetic core material, however, these large cores produce
security capabilities. Used in conjunction with the NERC CIP significant errors at nominal current, which renders them
standards, it proposes practical and achievable mechanisms to impractical for metering purposes. Therefore metering-class
achieve secure operations as outlined below: transformers need to be introduced resulting in increasing
costs.
• Passwords are 8 characters long and can contain
upper-case, lower-case, numeric and special The iron core is a source of inaccuracy due to the need to
characters. magentise the core, as well as the effect of flux remanence,
• Passwords are never displayed or transmitted to a user. flux leakage, eddy current heating, etc. Conventional wired
• IED functions and features are assigned to different 1A/5A current transformers (CT) circuits have thermal
password levels. The assignment is fixed. overload constraints, and pose increasing burdens on the core
• Record of an audit trail listing events in the order in as cross-site wire run lengths increase. This can degrade
which they occur, held in a circular buffer. protection performance, potentially leading to the need to
• Records contain all defined fields from the standard and duplicate CTs. Conventional voltage transformer (VT) circuits
record all defined function event types where the may experience ferro-resonance phenomena, with thermal
function is supported. overstress resulting. Capacitor voltage transformers (CVT) can
• No password defeat mechanism exists. Instead a produce high frequency interference signals.
secure recovery password scheme is implemented.
As introduced in chapter 6, techniques that do not require the
• Unused ports (physical and logical) may be disabled.
iron core of conventional transducers can overcome the
Whilst the potential threats from cyber-attack are grave, limitations. The solutions use different sensor technologies
methods for assuring security in the real and cyber worlds are such as optical and Rogowski coils. In practical
constantly evolving and, correctly applied, should help keep the implementations, the techniques require sophisticated
lights on. solutions employing digital signal processors and micro-
processors in numerical products. Since such solutions are
24.4 CURRENT AND VOLTAGE – DIGITAL eminently able to support digital communications, it is a logical
TRANSFORMATION progression to present numerical representations of the
Developments in communication have done much to realise measured quantities to other substation devices via
the digital substation, but to realise a full digital substation it is communication links, rather than reproducing scaled analogue
necessary to have everything in digital form. Whilst much waveforms. This presentation of analogue power system
substation protection, control, and automation technology has quantities in the form of standardised digital communication
always been digital (trip signals, interlocking signals, etc.), the signals is the final element in realising the digital substation.
principal power system inputs of voltage and current have
Solutions providing signal transformation based on technology
traditionally been presented in analogue form.
other than wound transformers are often referred to as non-
It has been traditional to present scaled versions of power conventional instrument transformers (NCIT), and the devices
system currents and voltages to measuring devices, protective that provide the standardised digital communication
relays etc. Scaled versions can easily be produced using equivalents of the power system signals are referred to as
conventional electrical transformers, although capacitor merging units.
dividers may be additionally employed for transforming very
As described in the earlier chapter on transformers, NCIT
high voltages.
technologies may be based on optical techniques, or Rogowski
As is shown in chapter 6, conventional transformers based on coils, and overcome the limitation of iron-cored transformers

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

by delivering: and convert the output to a numerical value adhering to

standardised definitions for communication with substation
• Single devices providing measurement class accuracy
with dynamic ranges also capable of faithfully re- IEDs.
producing fault currents. As well as connecting with NCIT technology such as optical
• Reliable, repeatable accuracy. sensors and Rogowski coils, merging units can also be
• High measurement bandwidth for rated frequency, provided in conjunction with conventional transformer
harmonics, and sub-harmonics. technology such that numerical equivalents of system current
• Low electrical stress insulation – no premature ageing, and voltage can be provided over communication buses.
moisture ingress, or risk of explosion.
Using merging units with conventional current and voltage
As well as having a lower risk of explosion, NCIT devices are
transformers allows the different life-cycle expectations of
also inherently safer since they cannot be ‘open-circuited’.
primary and secondary plant to de de-coupled as per Figure
An NCIT device based on Rogowski coil technology is shown in 24.18.
Figure 24.17.
Secondary plant
Primary plant
(Communications network, IEDs,
(CTs, VTs and CBs)
controller stations etc.)
Driver: Life expiry Driver: Technology Turnover
Life: 25 – 40 years Life: 15 – 20 years

IEDs

Communications
Merging Unit
network

Key
1A/5A CT and 110V VT wired analogue circuits and hard wired binary data
IEC61850 Ethernet communication

Figure 24.18: De-coupling primary and secondary plant with merging

Figure 24.17: Rogowski coil installation in GIS units

Merging units present signals such as power system voltages Key features of merging units are:
and currents to IEDs within the substation, in the form of • They can support signal processing for all transformer
numerical values adhering to standardised definitions. The use types including conventional and NCIT.
of NCIT sensors has made it possible for raw measurement • They provide current and voltage samples synchronised
information to be fed into so-called Merging Units for further to a time sync input such as 1PPS or IEEE 1588
distribution. It is these merging units that are one of the main • They deliver Ethernet multicast transmission of sampled
contributors to the digital substation, and these will be analogue values via process bus.
discussed in the next section. • They can support Ethernet connection to the station
bus; this however, is not a mandatory feature.
24.4.1 Merging Unit
• They feature watchdog self monitoring of the NCIT
The merging unit (MU) is the interface device which takes as
sensors as well as the MU itself.
its inputs connections from the instrument transformer
sensors, and performs signal processing to generate and The connections to the process bus and station bus are in
distribute output sampled value streams. The merging unit is accordance with the IEC61850 standard that is introduced
thus the gateway to the data from the instrument transformer, later in this chapter and is shown in Figure 24.19.
as it has the intelligence to interpret the effects of the specialist
physical characteristics of the instrument transformer sensor,

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 Chapter 24 ⋅ The Digital Substation

Suffix
IEC61850-8.1 Suffix description Suffix Specification
Station Bus
position
Sampled Values A 1000 PPS
Merging Unit IED B 100 PPS
D 1 PPM
First letter Format
E 10 PPS
Process Bus G 10000 PPS
IEC61850-9.2 H 1 PPS
GOOSE 0 DC Level Shift, width coded, no carrier
IED
First digit Modulation Frequency 1 Sine wave carrier, amplitude modulated
2 Manchester Modulated Code
Figure 24.19: Location of MU in the substation 0 No carrier/index count interval
1 100 Hz / 10 milliseconds
Each merging unit module offers signal processing to provide
2 1 kHz / 1 milliseconds
sampled values of phase currents (Ia, Ib, Ic), phase voltages Second digit Frequency/Resolution
3 10 kHz / 100 microseconds
(Va, Vb, Vc), plus residual current and residual voltage. The 4 100 kHz / 10 microseconds
5 1 MHz / 1 microsecond
sampled value frames are multicast via Ethernet, using a fibre
0 BCDTOY, CF, SBS
optic, or copper Ethernet connection.
1 BCDTOY, CF
The outputs of the merging units need to be accurately time 2 BCDTOY
3 BCDTOY, SBS
stamped. This requires the merging units to be accurately Third digit Coded expressions
4 BCDTOY, BCDYEAR, CF, SBS
time-synchronised, and this is discussed in the next section. 5 BCDTOY, BCDYEAR, CF
6 BCDTOY, BCDYEAR,
24.4.1.1 Merging Unit Time Synchronisation 7 BCDTOY, BCDYEAR, SBS
Table 24.6: Serial time code formats
The accurate time synchronisation needed by the merging
units is realised in the same way as for synchronising phasor Abbreviation Meaning
measurement units (PMUs) described in chapter 20. PPS Pulses Per Second
PPM Pulses Per Minute
Synchronisation can be achieved thanks to the global
DCLS DC Level Shift
positioning satellite system. Synchronising signals may either
BCD Binary Coded Decimal, coding of time (HH,MM,SS,DDD)
be delivered over fibre-optic links in the form of one-pulse-per- CF Control Functions depending on the user application
second (1pps) signals or over Ethernet according to IEEE1588. SBS Straight Binary Second of day (0....86400)

In 1956 the American Inter Range Instrumentation Group TOY Time Of Year

standardised the different time code formats. These were Table 24.7: Suffix Descriptions

published in the IRIG Document 104-60. This was revised in There are many subsets of the IRIG-B format. IRIG-B is the
1970 to IRIG Document 104-70, and published later as IRIG standard for time synchronisation using 100 PPS. It was this
Standard 200-70. flavour that was embraced by the utility industry to provide
real-time information exchange between substations. For IED
The name of an IRIG code format consists of a single letter
time synchronisation, IRIG-B12x is typically used for
plus 3 subsequent digits. Each letter or digit reflects an
modulated signals and IRIG-B00x for demodulated signals.
attribute of the corresponding IRIG code. The following tables
contain the meanings of the suffixes and descriptions of the The IRIG-B time code signal is a sequence of one second time
abbreviations used. frames. Each frame is split up into ten 100ms slots as follows:

• Time-slot 1: Seconds
• Time-slot 2: Minutes
• Time-slot 3: Hours
• Time-slot 4: Days
• Time-slot 5 and 6: Control functions

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

• Time-slots 7 to 10: Straight binary time of day need for a common understanding between source and
destination has already been highlighted. The introduction of
The first four time-slots define the time in binary-coded
standard protocols such as Modbus, DNP3 and IEC60870-5-
decimal (BCD). Time-slots 5 and 6 are used for control
103 go some way to opening the doors to common
functions, which control deletion commands and allow
understanding, but it was the introduction of IEC61850 that
different data groupings within the synchronisation strings.
brought true possibilities for interoperability and ‘plug-and-
Time-slots 7-10 define the time in SBS (Straight Binary
play’ opportunities for substation automation.
Second of day).

Each frame starts with a position reference and a position 24.5 IEC61850
identifier. Each time-slot is further separated by an 8mS In the early 1990s the Electric Power Research Institute
position identifier. (EPRI) in the US started work on a Utility Communications
A typical 1 second time frame is illustrated in Figure 24.20. If Architecture (UCA). The goal was to produce industry
the control function or SBS time-slots are not used, the bits consensus regarding substation integrated control, protection,
defined within those fields are set as a string of zeroes. and data acquisition, to allow interoperability of substation
devices from different manufacturers. The work developed to
1 second
100 mS 200 mS 300 mS 400 mS 500 mS 600 mS 700 mS 800 mS 900 mS produce UCA2 which showed that true interoperability was
P0
Seconds
P1
Minutes
P2
Hours
P3
Days
P4
Days
P5
Years
P6
Control
P7
Functions
P8
SBS
P9
SBS
P0
possible. UCA2 was taken forward by IEC TC57 to produce the
standard IEC61850 that revolutionises substation automation.
= 8 mS position identification pulses = 8 mS position reference pulse

Figure 24.20: IRIG-B frame construction

24.5.1 Benefits of IEC61850
The 74-bit time code contains 30 bits of BCD time-of-year
IEC 61850 is the international standard for Ethernet-based
information in days, hours, minutes and seconds, 17 bits of
communication in substations. It enables integration of all
SBS, 9 bits for year information and 18 bits for control
protection, control, measurement and monitoring functions
functions.
within a substation, and additionally provides the means for
The BCD code (seconds sub-word) begins at index count 1 interlocking and inter-tripping.
with binary coded bits occurring between position identifier
IEC 61850 is more than a protocol, or even a collection of
bits P0 and P6: 7 for seconds, 7 for minutes, 6 for hours, 10
protocols. It is a comprehensive standard, which was designed
for days and 9 for year information between position identifiers
from the ground up to operate over modern networking
P5 and P6 to complete the BCD word. An index marker occurs
technologies. It delivers functionality that is not available from
between the decimal digits in each sub-word to provide
legacy communications protocols. These unique characteristics
separation for visual resolution.
of IEC 61850 can significantly reduce costs associated with
The SBS word begins at index count 80 and is between designing, installing, commissioning and operating power
position identifiers P8 and P0 with a position identifier bit, P9 systems.
between the 9th and 10th SBS coded bits. The SBS time code
Some of the key features and capabilities of IEC61850 are as
recycles each 24-hour period.
follows:
The eighteen control bits occur between position identifiers P6
• Use of a virtualised model: In addition to the protocols
and P8 with a position identifier every 10 bits.
that define how the data is transmitted over the
The frame rate is 1.0 second with resolutions of 10ms (dc level network, the virtualised model also allows definition of
shift) and 1ms (modulated 1 kHz carrier). data, services, and device behaviour.
• Use of names for data: Every element of IEC 61850
With IEDs interconnected via Ethernet on the station bus, and
data is named using descriptive strings.
with time synchronised merging units multicasting time
• Object names are standardised: Names are not dictated
stamped analogue sampled values via the process bus, the
by the device vendor nor configured by the user. They
building blocks for the digital substation are all in place. The are defined in the standard and provided in a power

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 Chapter 24 ⋅ The Digital Substation

system context, which allows the engineer to • Lower integration costs. IEC 61850 networks are
immediately identify the meaning of the data. capable of delivering data without separate
• Devices are self-describing: Client applications can communication front-ends or reconfiguring devices.
download the description of all the data, without any This means that the cost associated with integrating
manual configuration of data objects or names. substation data is substantially reduced.
• High-Level Services: IEC61850’s abstract • Implement new capabilities: IEC61850 enables new
communications service interface supports a wide and innovative applications that would be too costly to
variety of services, such as generic object-oriented produce otherwise. This is because all data associated
substation events (GOOSE), sampled measured values with a substation is available on its LAN in a standard
(SMV), logs, etc. format and accessible using standard protocols.
• Standardised substation configuration language (SCL):
24.5.2 Structure of the IEC 61850 standard
SCL enables the configuration of a device and its role in
The IEC 61850 standard consists of ten parts, as summarised
the power system to be precisely defined using
in Table 24.8.
extensible mark-up language (XML) files.
Part Title
The major benefits of the standard are as follows:
Part 1 Introduction and overview
• Eliminates procurement ambiguity: The user Part 2 Glossary
requirements related to the substation automation Part 3 General requirements
system may be precisely defined using SCL. Part 4 System and project management
• Lower installation cost: IEC 61850 enables devices to Part 5 Communication requirements for functions and device models
exchange data - primarily digital, but also analogue if Configuration description language for communication in electrical
Part 6
necessary - using GOOSE over the station LAN without substations related to IEDs
having to wire separate links for each IED. By using the Part 7 Basic communication structure for substation and feeder equipment
station LAN to exchange these signals, this reduces Part 7.1 - Principles and models
infrastructure costs associated with wiring, trenching Part 7.2 - Abstract communication service interface (ACSI)
and ducting.
Part 7.3 - Common data classes
• Lower instrument transformer / sensor costs: A single Part 7.4 - Compatible logical node classes and data classes
merging unit can deliver measurement signals to many Part 8 Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM)
IEDs from a single instrument transformer / sensor.
- Mappings to MMS (ISO 9506-1 and ISO 9506-2) and to ISO/IEC
This reduces costs associated with primary equipment, Part 8.1
8802-3
wiring, calibration and maintenance. Part 9 Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM)
• Lower commissioning costs: IEC 61850-compatible Part 9.1 - Sampled values over serial unidirectional multidrop point to point link
devices do not require much manual configuration. Part 9.2 - Sampled values over ISO/IEC 8802-3
Also, client applications do not need to be manually Part 10 Part 10: Conformance testing
configured for each point they need to access, because Table 24.8: Structure of IEC 61850 standard
they can retrieve this information directly from the
device or import it via an SCL file. Many applications Parts 1 and 2 introduce the standard, provide a summary and
require nothing more than the setting up of a network a glossary of all terms used throughout the standard. Parts 3,
address. Most manual configuration is therefore 4, and 5 of the standard start by identifying the general and
eliminated, drastically reducing errors, rework, and specific functional requirements for communication in a
therefore costs. substation (key requirements stated above). These
• Lower equipment migration costs: The cost associated requirements are then used as forcing functions to aid in the
with equipment migrations is reduced due to the identification of the services and data models needed,
standardised naming conventions and device
application protocol required, and the underlying transport,
behaviour.
network, data link, and physical layers that will meet the
• Lower extension costs: Adding devices and applications
overall requirements.
into an existing IEC 61850-based network can be done
with little impact on existing equipment. Part 6 of the standard defines an XML-based Substation

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

Configuration Language (SCL). SCL allows formal description The data model of any IEC 61850 IED can be viewed as a
of the relations between the substation automation system hierarchy of information, whose nomenclature and
and the substation switchyard. Each device must provide an categorisation is defined and standardised in the IEC 61850
SCL file that describes its own configuration. specification. The IEC61850 data model is represented
conveniently by Figure 24.21.
Part 7 specifies the communication structure for substations. It
consists of 4 sub-sections. IEC 61850 abstracts the definition
Data Attributes
of the data items and the services from the underlying stVal q t PhA PhB PhC
protocols. These abstract definitions allow data objects and
services to be mapped to any protocol that can meet the data Data Objects
Pos A
and service requirements. The definition of the abstract
services is found in part 7.2 of the standard and the Logical Nodes: 1 to n
abstraction of the data objects (referred to as Logical Nodes) is LN1: XCBR LN2: MMXU

found in part 7.4. Many of the data objects belong to common

Logical Device: IEDs 1 to n
categories such as Status, Control, Measurement, and
Substitution. These are known as Common Data Classes Physical Device (network address)
(CDCs). These CDCs, which define common building blocks for Figure 24.21: IEC 61850 device model
creating the larger data objects, are defined in part 7.3.
The device model starts with a physical device that connects to
The abstract definitions of data and services can be mapped the network – typically, the IED. The physical device is defined
onto various suitable protocols. Section 8.1 of the standard by its network IP address. Within each physical device, there
defines the mapping of these onto the Manufacturing may be one or more logical devices. The IEC 61850 logical
Messaging Specification (MMS). Section 9.2 defines the device model allows a single physical device to act as a proxy
mapping of Sample Measured Values onto an Ethernet data or gateway for multiple logical devices.
frame. The 9.2 document defines what has become known as
Each logical device contains one or more logical nodes. A
the process bus.
logical node is a named grouping of data and associated
services that is logically related to some power system
24.5.3 The IEC 61850 data model
function. These logical nodes are categorised into 13 different
A typical communications protocol defines how data is
groups and 86 different classes. Table 24.9 lists these groups
transmitted over a medium, but does not specify how the data
and specifies the group designators of each.
should be organised in terms of the application. This approach
requires power system engineers to manually configure objects Logical node groups Group designator
and map them to power system variables at a low level System logical nodes L

(register numbers, index numbers, I/O modules, etc.). Protection functions P

Protection related functions R
IEC 61850 is different in this respect. In addition to the protocol Supervisory control C
elements, it specifies a comprehensive model for how power Generic function references G
system devices should organise data in a manner that is Interfacing and archiving I
consistent across all types and brands of devices. This eliminates Automatic control A
much of the tedious non-power system configuration effort Metering and measurement M
because the devices can configure themselves. Switchgear X
Instrument transformer T
Some devices use an SCL file to configure the objects. If this is
Power transformer and related functions Y
the case, the engineer needs only to import this SCL file into
Further power system equipment Z
the device. The client application will then extract the object
Sensors S
definitions from the device over the network. This significantly
Table 24.9: Logical node categorisation
reduces the effort needed to configure the device.

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 Chapter 24 ⋅ The Digital Substation

The names of these logical nodes have been standardised in Each CDC has a set of attributes each with a defined name,
IEC61850 and cannot be changed. The naming convention is defined type, and specific purpose. A set of functional
as follows: constraints (FC) groups these attributes into categories. For
example, there is a CDC called SPS (Single Point Status).
<Single letter group designator><three-letter mnemonic
abbreviation of function><instance ID> In the Single Point Status (SPS) CDC there are functional
constraints for status (ST) attributes, substituted value (SV)
For example: PDIR1 belongs to the group “Protection
attributes, description (DC) attributes, and extended definition
functions” and is the “Directional element” for the first stage
(EX) attributes. In this example the status attributes of the SPS
(of overcurrent protection, typically). A complete list of logical
class consist of a status value (stVal), a quality flag (q), and a
node names is provided in the standard, and a selection of
time stamp (t).
those most pertinent to readers is given in appendix C.
Example:
Each logical node contains one or more elements of data.
Suppose that a logical device called Breaker1 consists of a
There are several hundred data elements, which can be
single circuit breaker logical node XCBR1. To determine if the
broadly categorized into seven groups:
breaker is in the remote or local mode of operation, the
• System information following expression would be used:
• Physical device information
• Breaker1/XCBR1$ST$Loc$stVal.
• Measurands
The returned value would indicate the mode of operation.
• Metered values
• Controllable data 24.5.4 Mapping IEC 61850 to a protocol stack
• Status information
The IEC 61850 abstract model needs to work over a real set of
• Settings protocols, which are convenient and practical to implement,
Each data element has a unique purposeful name determined and which can operate within the computing environments
by the standard, along with a set of attributes. These data commonly found in the power industry. The IEC61850
names provide a mnemonic description of its function. For standard takes advantage of existing protocols to achieve each
example, a circuit breaker is modelled as an XCBR logical necessary layer of communication.
node. This contains a variety of data including: Figure 24.22 shows a simplified version of the IEC61850
• Loc for determining if operation is remote or local protocol stack, and how it fits in with the OSI model.
• OpCnt for an operations count 7
MMS (core ACSI services) SV GOOSE SNTP
Application layer
• Pos for the position 6
Presentation layer
Connection-oriented
• BlkOpn block breaker open commands 5
Session layer
• BlkCls block breaker close commands 4
Transport layer
TCP
UDP
TCP
ISO
• CBOpCap for the circuit breaker operating capability 3
Network layer
IP IP

Each element of data conforms to the specification of a 2

Link layer
Ethernet

common data class (CDC), which describes the type and 1

Physical layer
Twisted pair / Fiber

structure of the data within the logical node. There are CDCs for:
Figure 24.22: IEC 61850 protocol stack
• Status information
IEC 61850 part 8.1 maps the abstract objects and services to
• Measured information the Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) protocols
• Controllable status information specified in ISO9506. MMS is the only public ISO-compliant
• Controllable analogue set point information protocol that can easily support the complex naming and
• Status settings service models specified by IEC 61850. MMS is used because
• Analogue settings it supports complex named objects and a rich set of flexible

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

services that supports the mapping to IEC 61850 in a IED capabilities System specification
(LN, DO, …) (Single line, LNs, …)
System
straightforward manner. IED
configurator
Database
ICD Associations,
Part 8.1 also defines profiles for the lower layers of the relation to single line,
SCD preconfigured
communication stack. MMS operates over connection- reports, ...
Engineering IED
oriented ISO, or TCP/IP. SNTP operates over TCP/IP or workplace configurator
Project
UDP/IP. Sampled Values and GOOSE data map directly into engineering
File transfer
environment
Remote
the Ethernet data frame thereby eliminating processing of any CID
Substation
middle layers and providing very fast response. Automation File transfer Substation File transfers and parameterisation
system Local gateway with IEC61850 services

24.5.5 Substation Configuration Language

IEDs
IEC 61850-6-1 specifies an XML-based Substation
Configuration Language (SCL) to describe the configuration of Figure 24.23: IEC 61850 project configuration
IEC 61850 based systems. SCL specifies a hierarchy of
configuration files, which enable the various levels of the 24.5.6 IEC61850-9.2
system to be described. These are: In IEC61850-9.2, the wiring that traditionally connected
instrument transformers and switchgear to protection, control
• System specification description (SSD)
and monitoring devices is replaced by a high speed ethernet
• IED capability description (ICD)
communications network, referred to as the Process Bus.
• Substation configuration description (SCD)
Merging units form the data acquisition layer in the network and
• Configured IED description (CID) files
present sampled measured values to IEDs via the process bus.
These files are constructed in the same method and format,
The interface of the merging unit with the primary plant may
but have different scopes depending on the need. Even though
either be in the form of conventional transformers, or with
an IEC 61850 client can extract the configuration from an IED
non-conventional instrument transformers (NCIT), but the
when it is connected over a network, there are several benefits
output is the same: sampled measured values synchronised to
of having a formal off-line description language for reasons
an accurate time source.
other than configuring IEC 61850 client applications. These
benefits are as follows: The use of the IEC 61850-9.2 process bus introduces a
number of opportunities for lifecycle cost reduction. This
• SCL enables off-line system development tools to
generate the files needed for IED configuration lifecycle cost comprises configuration, installation and
automatically from the power system design. This commissioning costs, plus costs beyond commissioning. These
significantly reduces the cost and effort associated with later-life costs include any need for extension, upgrade or
IED configuration by eliminating most of the manual retrofitting, and also any periodic maintenance.
configuration tasks.
Some key points where the process bus offers distinct
• SCL enables the sharing of IED configuration details
advantage are described in the following paragraphs:
among users and suppliers. This helps to reduce
inconsistencies and misunderstandings in system Mid-life secondary equipment renewal:
configuration requirements. Users can specify and Referring again to Figure 24.18, the primary equipment is of
provide their own SCL files to ensure that IEDs are high capital cost, and cannot be de-energised easily – hence it
configured according to their requirements.
needs to be left in-service as long as is economically viable.
• SCL allows IEC 61850 applications to be configured off- This period of time can be of the order of 40 years. The
line without requiring a network connection to the IED. secondary system's life expectancy is often dependent on
Figure 24.23 illustrates the position and workflow context of advances in technology and increased software-related
the configuration files in an IEC61850 project. functionality being requested, and not due to physical failure or
end-of-life.

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 Chapter 24 ⋅ The Digital Substation

Merging units in a process-bus solution can become a

24.6 CONCLUSION
convenient boundary between the two disparate renewal
IEC61850-9.2, and IEC61850 in general are at the heart of
cycles, such that secondary side retrofits/renewals can be
the digital substation. Together they have revolutionised
undertaken without open-circuiting CTs. This mid-life refit can
substation engineering. This chapter has aimed to equip
be done quicker, and more cheaply.
engineers with an understanding of the terminology and
Substation extensions and upgrades can be undertaken as concepts in order to be able to function in this new world
a software modification: focused on Ethernet communication technology.
There is minimal panel hardwiring, hence upgrading is easier,
as a controlled software procedure. 24.7 REFERENCES
Deploying standard bay solutions capitalises on copycat [24.1] Shannon, C. E., & Weaver, W. (1949). The
scheme roll-out: mathematical theory of communication. Urbana,
As the fundamental scheme performance is defined in Illinois: University of Illinois Press.
software, if this is standardised, it can be rolled-out in multiple [24.2] Reece, I. and Walker, S. (1997) Teaching, Training and
Learning. Sunderland: Business Education Publishers Ltd.
sites and multiple bays. Standardisation allows the investment
cost in developing the solutions to be amortised over multiple
instances.

Current transformer savings:

A protection scheme is entirely dependent on its input transducers
(typically CTs and VTs) to deliver its performance. Thus, any
lowering of the requirement (size, dimensioning, accuracy class,
Figure 24.24: Gigabit precision-time Ethernet switch for digital
number of cores) will mean total scheme cost savings. substations (Reason S20 Ethernet Switch)
In a process bus scheme, there is minimal or zero physical
burden for the transformers to power – hence sizes and
material costs can be reduced. Merging units can also digitise
the outputs of conventional CTs, close to the CT itself. This
reduces the burden, and hence the CT knee-point voltage
requirement, especially in the case of 5A CT installations.

Configurable (digitised) analogue signal sources for IEDs:

In a process bus solution, there is not the need to switch VT or
CT sources with auxiliary contacts – this can be done as a
“soft” function, rather than requiring make-before-break or
other special auxiliary contact arrangements.

Multipurpose IEDs, not dedicated devices:

The lack of an internal CT in the IEDs means they can perform
both protection and measurement applications. In protection
applications the dynamic range to measure fault current
magnitudes is required, and in measurement applications
accuracy is the key.

24-23
SUBSTATION CONTROL
AND AUTOMATION
Chapter 25
SUBSTATION CONTROL AND
AUTOMATION

25.1 Introduction 25.1 INTRODUCTION

25.2 Topology and Functionality The complex interlocking and sequence control require-
25.3 Hardware Implementation ments that prevail in most substations of any significant size
lend themselves naturally to the application of substation
25.4 Substation Automation Functionality automation. These requirements can be readily expressed in
25.5 System Configuration and Testing mathematical logic (such as truth tables and Boolean algebra)
and thus ease the application of computers and associated
software. Hence, computers have been applied to the control
of electrical networks for many years, and examples of them
being applied to substation control/automation were in use in
the early 1970’s. The first applications were naturally in the bulk
power transmission field, as a natural extension of a trend to
centralised control rooms for such systems. The large capital
investment in such systems and the consequences of major
system disruption made the cost of such schemes justifiable. In
the last twenty years or so, continuing cost pressures on utilities
and advances in digital hardware have led to the application
of computers to substation control and automation as a first-
choice solution.

25.2 TOPOLOGY AND FUNCTIONALITY

The topology of a substation control system is the architecture
of the digital system used. The functionality of such a system is
the complete set of functions that can be implemented in the
control system – noting that a particular substation may only
utilise a subset of the functionality available.
All digital control systems utilise one of two basic topologies, the
basic concepts of which are illustrated in Figure 25.1:
.. centralised
.. distributed
Early examples of substation automation used the centralised
concept, due to limitations in technology, both of processor
power and communication techniques. Latest examples use
a distributed architecture, in that a number of Intelligent
Electronic Devices (IEDs), such as numerical relays, may be
linked to a local processor. The local processor may control one
or more bays in a substation. All of the local processors are,
in turn, connected to a Human Machine Interface (or HMI),
and possibly also to a local or remote SCADA system for overall
network monitoring/control.

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

specialised computers are also possible, while normally

Control
Outstation Outstation unmanned substations may dispense with a
Centre
permanently installed HMI and rely on
operations/maintenance staff bringing a laptop
computer equipped with the appropriate software with
Outstation Outstation Outstation them when attendance is required. Sometimes, one or
more printers are linked to the HMI in order to provide
(a) Centralised topology hard-copy event records or other reports.
 A communications bus or busses, linking the various
devices. Where a substation automation system is
Outstation Outstation
being retrofitted to an existing substation, it may be
Control necessary to use existing communications busses to
Centre communicate with some legacy devices. This can lead
Control to a multiplicity of communications busses and
Centre protocols within the automation system
Control  A link to a remote SCADA system. This may be provided
Centre by a dedicated interface unit, be part of the HMI
Outstation
computer or part of an IED. A dedicated gateway is
used to provide a secure means of communicating
outside the substation, encrypting the data and making
it immune from cyber attacks.
Outstation Outstation Outstation

25.2.2 System Requirements

(b) Distributed topology
A substation control/automation scheme will normally be
required to possess the following features:

25.2.1 System Elements  control of all substation electrical equipment from a

central point
The main system elements in a substation control system are:
 monitoring of all substation electrical equipment from a
 IEDs, implementing a specific function or functions on
central point
a circuit or busbar in a substation. The most common
example of an IED is a numerical protection relay, but it  interface to remote SCADA system
could also be a measurement device, interface unit to  control of electrical equipment in a bay locally
older relays, etc.  monitoring of electrical equipment in a bay locally
 Bay Controller. This device will normally contain all of  status monitoring of all connected substation
the software required for the control and interlocking of automation equipment
a single bay in the substation, and sufficient I/O to
 system database management
interface to all of the devices required for monitoring
and control of the bay. The I/O may include digital and  energy management
analogue I/O (for interfacing to discrete devices such as  condition monitoring of substation electrical equipment
breaker tripping and closing circuits, isolator motors, (switchgear, transformers, relays, etc.)
non-digital legacy relays) and communications links to
The system may be required to be fault-tolerant, implying that
IEDs.
redundancy in devices and communications paths is provided.
 RTU (Remote Terminal Unit). This is a centralised The extent of fault-tolerance provided will depend on the size
device for monitoring, control and measurement for the and criticality of the substation to the operator, and the normal
full substation, and transmits this in a suitable format manning status (ie. whether manned or unmanned). Many of
to the remote SCADA master. the functions may be executed from a remote location, such as
 Human Machine Interface (HMI). This is the principal a Regional or National Control Centre, in addition to the
user interface and would normally take the form of a substation itself.
computer. A desktop PC is commonly used, but Certain of the above functions will be required even in the

25-2
 Chapter 25  Substation Control and Automation

most elementary application. However, the selection of the because of a resulting limit to the number of IEDs that can be
complete set of functions required for a particular application is connected. The other important issue is one of reliability and
essentially the responsibility of the end-user Utility. Due to a availability – there is only one computer that can control the
modular, ‘building block’ approach to software design, it is substation and therefore only local manual control will be
normally relatively easy to add functionality at a later stage. possible if the computer fails for any reason. Such a topology is
This often occurs through changing operators’ needs and/or therefore only suited to small MV substations where the
electrical network development. Compatibility of the underlying consequences of computer failure (requiring a visit from a
database of network data must be addressed to ensure repair crew to remedy) are acceptable. Bay Modules are not
historical data can still be accessed. used, the software for control and interlocking of each
substation bay runs as part of the HMI computer software.
25.3 HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION
To form a digital substation control system (DCS), the various 25.3.2 RTU-based Topology
elements described above must be assembled into some form This topology is an enhancement of the HMI topology and is
of topology. Three major hardware topologies can be identified shown in Figure 25.3. A digital RTU is used to host the
as being commonly used, as follows: automation software, freeing the HMI computer for operator
interface duties only. The HMI computer can therefore be less
25.3.1 HMI-based Topology powerful and usually takes the form of a standard PC, or for
This takes the form of Figure 25.2. The software to implement unmanned substations, visiting personnel can use a laptop PC.
the control/automation functions resides in the HMI computer Remote
and this has direct links to IEDs using one or more HMI
communications protocols. The link to a remote SCADA
SCADA
system is normally also provided in the HMI computer, though interface
a separate interface unit may be provided to offload some of HMI Internet
or PSTN
the processor requirements from the HMI computer, especially
if a proprietary communications protocol to the SCADA system
is used. Telecontrol or
Bus interface

Master clock RTU

SCADA (GPS, radio) Remote
interface HMI Bus interface

HMI
Internet
or PSTN Legacy bus
Master clock
Telecontrol or (GPS, radio)
Station bus Bus interface I/O, devices CT, VT
IEDs

Bus interface Bus interface

Computer
Legacy bus IEDs Legacy bus I/O, devices
The RTU, telecontrol interface
CT, VT
and the bus interface could be
separate equipment or
integrated into the same device
Computer IEDs

A greater number of I/O points can be accommodated than in

The HMI, telecontrol interface
and the bus interface could be
the HMI topology, while the possibility exists of hosting a
separate equipment or wider variety of communications protocols for IEDs and the
integrated into the same device remote SCADA connection. Bay Modules are not required, the
associated software for interlocking and control sequences is
part of the RTU software.
For this topology, a powerful HMI computer is clearly required
if large numbers of IEDs are to be accommodated. In practice,
costs usually dictate the use of a standard PC, and hence there
will be limitations on substation size that it can be applied to

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

25.3.3 Decentralised Topology Central

computer
This topology is illustrated in Figure 25.4. In it, each bay of the
substation is controlled by a is controlled by a bay controller.
This device houses the control and interlocking software,
interfaces to the various IEDs required as part of the control
and protection for the bay, and interfaces to the HMI. It is Bay Bay Bay Bay
module module module module
possible to use an HMI computer to take local control of an
individual bay for commissioning/testing and fault finding (a) Star connection of bay modules
purposes. The amount of data from the various substation I/O
points dictates that a separate SCADA interface unit is Bay
provided (often called an RTU or Gateway), while it is possible module
to have more than one HMI computer, the primary one being
dedicated to operations and others for engineering use.
Optionally, a remote HMI computer may be made available via
Bay Bay
a separate link. It is always desirable in such schemes to module module
separate the real-time operations function from engineering
tasks, which do not have the same time-critical importance.
SCADA Master clock
Bay Bay
Remote
interface (GPS, radio) HMI module module

HMI
Internet (b) Ring connection of bay modules
or PSTN

Telecontrol Computer
interface Station bus
Of course, it is possible to overcome the first problem by
Bay Module duplicating links and running the links in physically separate
Bus interface routes.
Bay Module
IED's An alternative is to connect the Bay Controllers, HMI computer
The bay module and bus
and SCADA gateway in a ring, as shown in Figure 25.5(b). By
IED's interface could be separate using a communications architecture such as found in a LAN
equipment or integrated into the
same device network, each device is able to talk to any other device on the
ring without any message conflicts. A single break in the ring
Legacy bus I/O, devices
CT, VT
does not result in loss of any facilities. The detection of ring
breakage and re-configuration required can be made
automatically. Thus, the availability and fault tolerance of the
The connection between the various Bay Controllers and the HMI network is improved. Multiple rings emanating from the HMI
computer is of some interest. Simplest is the star arrangement of computer can be used if the number of devices exceeds the
Figure 25.5(a). This is the least-cost solution but suffers from two limit for a single ring. It can be easier to install on a step-by-
disadvantages. Firstly, a break in the link will result in loss of step basis for retrofit applications, but of course, all these
remote control of the bay affected; only local control via a local advantages have a downside. The cost of such a topology is
HMI computer connected to the bay is then possible. Secondly, higher than that of the other solutions, so this topology is
the number of communications ports available on the HMI reserved for situations where the highest reliability and
computer will limit the number of Bay Modules. availability are required.
It is usual to have more than one operators’ HMI, either for
operational reasons or for fault-tolerance. The system
computer may be duplicated on a ‘hot-standby’ or ‘dual-
redundant’ basis, or tasks may be normally shared between
two or more system computers with each of them having the
capability of taking over the functions of one of the others in
the event of a failure.
The total I/O count in a major substation will become large

25-4
 Chapter 25  Substation Control and Automation

Functional area Functionality

Interlocking CB's Isolators Contactors
Tripping sequences CB failure Intertripping Simultaneous trips
Switching sequences Automatic transformer changeover Automatic busbar changeover Restoration of supply following fault Network re-configuration
Load management Load shedding Load restoration Generator despatch
Transformer supervision OLTC control Load management
Energy monitoring Import/export control Energy management Power factor control
Switchgear monitoring AIS monitoring GIS monitoring
Equipment status Relay status CB status Isolator status
Parameter setting Relays Transformers Switching sequences IED configuration
HMI functionality Access control One-line views System views Event logging
HMI functionality Trend curves Harmonic analysis Remote access Disturbance analysis
HMI functionality Interface to SCADA Alarm processing

and it must be ensured that the computer hardware and normally be done offline on the Engineers’ workstation, if
communications links have sufficient performance to ensure available, or as a background task on the control computer if
prompt processing of incoming data. Overload in this area can not. Careful and extensive checking of the data is required,
lead to one or more of the following: both before and after entry into the database, to ensure that no
errors have been made. Full testing on the new configuration
 undue delay in updating the system status
using a simulator is recommended prior to use of the new
diagrams/events log/alarm log in response to an
database on the main control computer to ensure that there is
incident
minimal possibility of errors.
 corruption of system database, so that the information
presented to the operator is not an accurate The software is written as a set of well-proven, standard
representation of the state of the actual electrical modules, so there is little or no need for new modules to be
system written and tested for a particular substation. The required
data for the calculations performed by the software is held in
 system lockup
the network database. This means that adding functionality
As I/O at the bay level, both digital and analogue will typically later is not difficult, so long as the database design has
be handled by intelligent relays or specialised IEDs, it is considered this possibility. There may be problems if the
therefore important to ensure that these devices have sufficient electrical system configuration is altered or additional
I/O capacity. If additional IEDs have to be provided solely for functionality added, in reading historical data prior to the
ensuring adequate I/O capacity, cost and space requirements change. Training of operations personnel will inevitably be
will increase. There will also be an increase in the number of required in operation of the system, configuration
communications links required. management and automation system maintenance.
Automation system suppliers will be able to provide
25.4 SUBSTATION AUTOMATION configuration management and system maintenance services
FUNCTIONALITY under contract if required, often with defined cost schedules
The hardware implementation provides the physical means to and response times so financial management of the
implement the functionality of the substation automation automation scheme once installed is well-defined.
scheme. The software provided in the various devices is used The issuing of commands to switching devices in the system
to implement the functionality required. The software may be has to be carefully structured, in order to prevent commands
quite simple or extremely complex – Table 25.1 illustrates the that would cause a hazard being issued. A hierarchical
functionality that may be provided in a large scheme. structure is commonly used as shown in Figure 25.6,
The description of the electrical network and the characteristics beginning with the requirement for an operator wishing to
of the various devices associated with the network are held issue a command to switching devices to log-in to the system
within the computer as a database or set of databases. Within using a password, or other means of authentication.
each database, data is organised into tables, usually on a ‘per
device’ basis that reflects the important characteristics of the
device and its interrelationship with other devices on the
network. Electrical system configuration changes require
modification of the database using an appropriate software
tool. The tool is normally a high level, user-friendly interface,
so that modifications to the one-line can be drawn directly on-
screen, with ‘pick-and–place’ facilities. This work would

25-5 D
Protection & Automation Application Guide

checking at the factory test stage. However, since software is

Operator Password modular in nature, substation electrical topology is restricted to
a number of standard configurations and such sequences are
common, the software development is essentially a one-off
Authorised activity for any particular substation control system. The
Password
Person
List of development cost can be spread over the sale of a number of
Select
available such systems, and hence the cost to any individual user is
user
functions
small compared with the potential benefits.
Engineer Password

25.5 SYSTEM CONFIGURATION AND TESTING

These tasks, along with project management, are the most
Administrator Password
time consuming tasks in the process of realising a control and
monitoring system for an electrical network. The strategies
available for dealing with these problems vary between
Different levels of authority, allowing for restrictions on the manufacturers, but typical approaches are as follows.
type and/or location of switching commands capable of being
issued by a particular operator may be implemented at this 25.5.1 System Configuration
stage – this is termed as ‘role-based access’. The next level in Software tools exist that assist in configuring a modern
the hierarchy is to structure the issuing of commands on an substation or network automation system. The extent to which
‘issue/confirm/execute’ basis (Figure 25.7), so that the the task is automated will vary, but all require as a minimum
operator is given an opportunity to check that the command the details of the network to be controlled, extending to the
entered is correct prior to its execution. individual device level (circuit breaker, isolator, disconnector,
etc.). Where communication to an existing SCADA system is
Interlocking
required, data on the logical addresses expected by the SCADA
system and devices controlled remotely from the SCADA
Device List of Action Action Action system will also be part of the data input. Use can also be
select actions select confirm execute
made of existing databases that cover pre-defined network
configurations – for example the interlocking equations for a
Cancel
substation bay.
Software tools will check the data for consistency, prior to
The final level in the hierarchy is implemented in software at creation of:
the bay level and is actioned after the operator confirms that
 the required equipment that forms the automation
the switching action is to be executed. At this stage, prior to
scheme, together with the required interconnections
execution, the operation is checked against:
 the databases for each individual device
 devices locked out - i.e. prevented from operation
 The data will divided into domains, according to the use
 interlocking of devices/switching sequences made of the data:
to ensure that the command issued is safe to carry out. The o process – CB/isolator position, interlocking
action is cancelled and the operator informed if it is not safe to equation, values of current/voltage
proceed, otherwise the action is executed and the operator o system – number of bay computers, hardware
informed when it is complete. configuration of each bay computer, automated
In a number of systems, some routine switching operations sequences
(e.g. transfer of a feeder from one busbar to the other in a o graphical – the links between each mimic display
double-bus substation) are automated in software. The and the data to be displayed
operator need only request the ‘bus-transfer’ action to be o operator – security access levels, alarm texts, etc.
carried out on a particular feeder, and the software is able to
o external constraints – data addresses for external
work out the correct switching sequence required. This database access
minimises the possibility of operator error, but at the expense
Once all the data has been defined, the configurator tools can
of some extra complexity in the software and more extensive
define the hardware configuration to provide the required

25-6
 Chapter 25  Substation Control and Automation

functions at least cost, and the data required for 25.5.3 Test Strategy
implementation of the automation scheme. The strategy adopted for the testing of the automation system
must naturally satisfy client requirements, and generally
25.5.2 System Testing follows on of two approaches:
The degree of testing to be carried will be defined by the
 a single test is carried out when all equipment for the
customer and encapsulated in a specification for system
scheme has been assembled
testing. It is normal for testing of the complete functionality of
the scheme to be required prior to despatch from the  incremental tests are carried out as the automation
manufacturer – termed a ‘factory acceptance test’ (FAT). The system is built up, with simulators used to represent
larger and more complex the automation scheme, the more missing equipment
important for all parties that such FAT testing is carried out. It The former solution is quickest and cheapest, but can give rise
is accepted wisdom that the earlier problems are discovered, to problems where it is not easy to locate problems down to
the cheaper and quicker it is to fix them. Remediation of the device level. It is therefore used principally when an
problems on-site during commissioning is the most expensive upgrade to an existing system is being carried out.
and time-consuming activity. Manual testing of a network
automation scheme is only practical for small networks, due to It is usual for all of the functionality to be tested, including that
the cost of testing. Simulation tools are necessary for all other specified for normal conditions and specified levels of
automation schemes. These tools fall into two categories: degradation within the automation system. This leads to a
large number of tests being required.
 simulator tools that re-create the network to be
controlled by the automation system. 25.5.4 Management of System Tests
 test management tools The large number of tests required to demonstrate the
compliance of an automation system with specification makes
25.5.2.1 Simulator tools manual techniques for management of the tests cumbersome
Simulator tools are dedicated to the network being tested. and time consuming. The end result is increased cost and
They will normally be provided with a simulation language that timescale. Moreover, each test may result in a large amount of
the test team can use to play scenarios, and hence determine data to be analysed. The results of the analysis need to be
how the automation system will react to various stimuli. presented in an easily understood form and stored as quality
Process simulator tools may be hardware and/or software records, for traceability. If changes are made to software for
based and emulate the response of the various devices to be any reason over the lifetime of the equipment, the different
controlled or measured (breakers, isolators, instrument versions must be stored, together with a record of what the
transformers or protection relays). They must be capable of changes between versions were, and why they were made.
closely following the dynamic response of such devices under The management of this becomes very complex, and software
multiple and cascade simulation scenarios. Specific tools and tools are normally used to address the issues of test schedules,
libraries are developed as required, which simulate the test result presentation, software version control, and
response of equipment within the control span of the configuration management.
automation equipment, or that of equipment outside of the
span of control, in order that the response of the automation
system can be tested.
Communications simulator tools are used both to load the
internal communications network within the automation
system to ensure that all devices are communicating correctly
and that performance of the overall automation system is
within specification during periods of high communications
traffic loading. These simulators are standardised and a single
simulator may be able to emulate several items of equipment.
External communications simulators test the communications
with an external system, such as a remote control centre.

25-7 D
APPENDIX
Appendix A
Terminology

The Protection Engineer must be familiar with a range of AC

technical terms in all areas of protection engineering. Below is
Alternating Current
a list of terms and their meanings that are now commonly
encountered in the Protection and Control field.
ACB
Air Circuit Breaker

ACCURACY
The accuracy of a transducer is defined by the limits of intrinsic
error and by the limits of variations.

ACCURACY CLASS

A letter or number or a combination of both which indicates

the measurement accuracy of an instrument transformer,
transducer or metering device

ACTIVE POWER (WATT) TRANSDUCER

A transducer used for the measurement of active electrical
power

ADC
Analogue to Digital Converter

A/D CONVERSION
The process of converting an analogue signal into an
equivalent digital one, involving the use of an analogue to
digital converter

ADJUSTMENT
The operation intended to bring a transducer into a state of
performance suitable for its use

AI
Analogue Input

AIS
Air Insulated Switchgear

ALARM
An alarm is any event (see below) tagged as an alarm during
the configuration phase

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

ALF quantity which is necessary for the correct operation of the

Accuracy Limitation Factor of a current transformer transducer

ALL-OR-NOTHING RELAY AVR

An electrical relay which is intended to be energised by a Automatic Voltage Regulator
quantity, whose value is either higher than that at which it
picks up or lower than that at which it drops out AWG
American Wire Gauge
ANTI-PUMPING DEVICE
A feature incorporated in a Circuit Breaker or reclosing scheme B
to prevent repeated operation where the closing impulse lasts Susceptance
longer than the sum of the relay and CB operating times
BACK-UP PROTECTION
AO A protection system intended to supplement the main
Analogue Output protection in case the latter should be ineffective, or to deal
with faults in those parts of the power system that are not
AR (OR A/R) readily included in the operating zones of the main protection
Auto Reclose:
BAR
A function associated with CB, implemented to carry out
Block Auto-Reclose signal
reclosure automatically to try to clear a transient fault
BAY
ARCING TIME
The switchgear, isolators and other equipment typically
The time between instant of separation of the CB contacts and
associated with a single circuit, bus section, or bus coupler.
the instant of arc extinction
BC
ARIP
Bay Computer (or Bay Controller)
Auto-Reclose In Progress
Computer dedicated to the control of one or several bays
AUTO-TRANSFORMER within a substation
A power transformer that does not provide galvanic isolation
between primary and secondary windings BCD
Binary Coded Decimal
AUX
Auxiliary BCP
Bay Control Point
AUXILIARY CIRCUIT A local keypad at bay level to control the elements of a single
A circuit which is usually energised by the auxiliary supply but bay
is sometimes energised by the measured quantity
BIASED RELAY
AUXILIARY RELAY A relay in which the characteristics are modified by the
An all-or-nothing relay energised via another relay, for example introduction of some quantity other than the actuating
a measuring relay, for the purpose of providing higher rated quantity, and which is usually in opposition to the actuating
contacts, or introducing a time delay, or providing multiple quantity
outputs from a single input.
BIAS CURRENT
AUXILIARY SUPPLY The current used as a bias quantity in a biased relay
An a.c. or d.c. electrical supply other than the measured

A-2
 Appendix A ⋅ Terminology

BIOS the energising quantities

Basic Input/Output System (of a computer or microprocessor)
CHARACTERISTIC IMPEDANCE RATIO (C.I.R.)
BURDEN The maximum value of the System Impedance Ratio up to
The loading imposed by the circuits of the relay on the which the relay performance remains within the prescribed
energising power source or sources, expressed as the product limits of accuracy
of voltage and current (volt-amperes, or watts if d.c.) for a
given condition, which may be either at ‘setting’ or at rated CHARACTERISTIC QUANTITY
current or voltage. A quantity, the value of which characterizes the operation of
the relay, for example, current for an overcurrent relay, voltage
The rated output of measuring transformers, expressed in VA,
for a voltage relay, phase angle for a directional relay, time for
is always at rated current or voltage and it is important, in
an independent time delay relay, impedance for an impedance
assessing the burden imposed by a relay, to ensure that the
relay
value of burden at rated current is used
CHECK PROTECTION SYSTEM
C
An auxiliary protection system intended to prevent tripping due
Capacitance
to inadvertent operation of the main protection system
C/O CHP
Changeover Contacts ('form c')
Combined Heat and Power
CAD CIP
Computer Aided Design
Critical Infrastructure Protection standards, for example
covering cyber security.
CALIBRATION
The set of operations, which establish under specified CIRCUIT INSULATION VOLTAGE
conditions, the relationship between values indicated by a
The highest circuit voltage to earth on which a circuit of a
transducer and the corresponding values of a quantity realised
transducer may be used and which determines its voltage test
by a reference standard.
(This should not be confused with ‘adjustment’) CLASS INDEX
The number which designates the accuracy class
CB
Circuit Breaker CLOSING IMPULSE TIME
The time during which a closing impulse is given to the CB
CBCT
Core Balance Current Transformer CLOSING TIME
The time for a CB to close, from the time of energisation of the
CH closing circuit to making of the CB contacts
Channel. Usually a communication or signalling channel
COMPLIANCE VOLTAGE (ACCURACY LIMITING
CHARACTERISTIC ANGLE OUTPUT VOLTAGE)
The angle between the vectors representing two of the For current output signals only, the output voltage up to which
energising quantities applied to a relay and used for the the transducer meets its accuracy specification
declaration of the performance of the relay
CONJUNCTIVE TEST
CHARACTERISTIC CURVE A test of a protection system including all relevant components
The curve showing the operating value of the characteristic and ancillary equipment appropriately interconnected. The test
quantity corresponding to various values or combinations of may be parametric or specific

A-3
Protection & Automation Application Guide

CONVERSION COEFFICIENT DCP

The relationship of the value of the measurand to the Device Control Point:
corresponding value of the output
local keypad on device level to control the switchgear, often
combined with local/remote switch
CORE BALANCE CURRENT TRANSFORMER
A ring-type Current Transformer in which all primary DCS
conductors are passed through the aperture of the CBCT.
Digital Control System
Hence the secondary current is proportional only to any
imbalance in current. Used for sensitive earth-fault protection
DEAD TIME (AUTO-RECLOSE)
COUNTING RELAY The time between the fault arc being extinguished and the CB
contacts re-making
A relay that counts the number of times it is energised and
actuates an output after a desired count has been reached.
DEF
COURIER Directional Earth Fault protection

A proprietary data protocol for exchanging information

DE-IONISATION TIME (AUTO-RECLOSE)
associated with substation automation.
The time required for dispersion of ionised air after a fault is
CRC cleared so that the arc will not re-strike on re-energisation

Cyclic Redundancy Check

DELAYED AUTO-RECLOSE
CSV An auto-reclosing scheme which has a time delay in excess of
the minimum required for successful operation
Character (or Comma) Separated Values format
A widely used format for the exchange of data between DEPENDABILITY
different software, in which the individual data items a A measure of a protection scheme's ability to operate correctly
separated by a known character – usually a comma when it is called upon

CT DEPENDENT TIME MEASURING RELAY

Current Transformer A measuring relay for which times depend, in a specified
manner, on the value of the characteristic quantity
CURRENT TRANSDUCER
A transducer used for the measurement of a.c. current DFT
Discrete Fourier Transform
CCVT (OR CVT)
Capacitor Coupled Voltage Transformer DG
A voltage transformer that uses capacitors to obtain voltage Distributed Generation
division. These are used at EHV voltages instead of
electromagnetic VTs, for size and cost reasons DI
Digital Input
DAR
Delayed auto-reclose DIGITAL SIGNAL PROCESSOR
A microprocessor optimised in both hardware architecture and
DBMS software instruction set for the processing of analogue signals
Data Base Management system digitally, through use of the DFT and similar techniques

DC DIGITAL SIGNAL PROCESSING

Direct current A technique for the processing of digital signals by various filter

A-4
 Appendix A ⋅ Terminology

algorithms to obtain some desired characteristics in the DSP

output. The input signal to the processing algorithm is usually Digital Signal Processing
the digital representation of an analogue signal, obtained by
A/D conversion DT
DIRECT-ON-LINE (DOL) Definite time

A method of motor starting, in which full line voltage is applied EARTH FAULT PROTECTION SYSTEM
to a stationary motor
A protection system which is designed to respond only to faults
to earth
DIRECTIONAL RELAY
A protection relay in which the tripping decision is dependent EARTHING TRANSFORMER
in part upon the direction in which the measured quantity is
A three-phase transformer intended essentially to provide a
flowing
neutral point to a power system for the purpose of earthing
DISCRIMINATION
EFFECTIVE RANGE
The ability of a protection system to distinguish between power
The range of values of the characteristic quantity or quantities,
system conditions for which it is intended to operate and those
or of the energising quantities to which the relay will respond
for which it is not intended to operate
and satisfy the requirements concerning it, in particular those
DISTORTION FACTOR concerning precision

The ratio of the r.m.s. value of the harmonic content to the EFFECTIVE SETTING
r.m.s. value of the non-sinusoidal quantity
The ‘setting’ of a protection system including the effects of
current transformers. The effective setting can be expressed in
DLR
terms of primary current or secondary current from the current
Dynamic Line Rating. This is a technique to adapt thermal transformers and is so designated as appropriate
protection to include additional line heating and cooling
factors, in addition to the traditional inputs of current and ELECTRICAL RELAY
ambient temperature. Wind speed, wind direction and solar
A device designed to produce sudden predetermined changes in
radiation sensors may be added to the scheme in order to
one or more electrical circuits after the appearance of certain
more accurately simulate the thermal state and allow greater
conditions in the electrical circuit or circuits controlling it
line loadability.
NOTE: The term ‘relay’ includes all the ancillary equipment
DNP calibrated with the device
Distributed Network Protocol. A communication protocol used
on secondary networks between HMI, substation computers or ELECTROMECHANICAL RELAY
Bay Computers and protective devices An electrical relay in which the designed response is developed
by the relative movement of mechanical elements under the
DO action of a current in the input circuit
Digital Output
EMC
DROP-OUT (OR DROP-OFF) Electro-Magnetic Compatibility
A relay drops out when it moves from the energised position to
the un-energised position EMBEDDED GENERATION
Generation that is connected to a distribution system (possibly
DROP-OUT/PICK-UP RATIO at LV instead of HV) and hence poses particular problems in
The ratio of the limiting values of the characteristic quantity at respect of electrical protection
which the relay resets and operates. This value is sometimes
called the differential of the relay E.M.F.
Electro-motive Force ( or voltage)

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

ENERGISING QUANTITY electrical equipment)

The electrical quantity, either current or voltage, which along
or in combination with other energising quantities, must be FPI
applied to the relay to cause it to function Fault Passage Indicator

EPROM FREQUENCY TRANSDUCER

Electrically Programmable Read Only Memory A transducer used for the measurement of the frequency of an
a.c. electrical quantity
ERROR (OF A TRANSDUCER)
The actual value of the output minus the intended value of the FULL DUPLEX COMMUNICATIONS
output, expressed algebraically A communications system in which data can travel
simultaneously in both directions
EUT
Equipment Under Test in certification activities FUZZY LOGIC
A probability-based extension to straight binary logic, whereby
EVENT intermediate fractional values between limits of 0 and 1 are
An event is any information acquired or produced by the digital used
control system
G
FAT Conductance
Factory Acceptance Test. Validation procedures witnessed by
the customer at the factory GATEWAY
The Gateway is a computer which provides interfaces between
FAULT PASSAGE INDICATOR the local computer system and one or several SCADA (or RCC)
A sensor that detects the passage of current in excess of a set systems
value (i.e. current due to a fault) at the location of the sensor.
Hence, it indicates that the fault lies downstream of the sensor GIS
Gas Insulated Switchgear (usually SF6)
FBD
Functional Block Diagram: One of the IEC 61131-3 GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM
programming languages A system used for locating objects on Earth precisely, using a
system of satellites in geostationary orbit in Space. Used by
FFT some numerical relays to obtain accurate UTC time
Fast Fourier Transform information

FIDUCIAL VALUE GMT

A clearly specified value to which reference is made in order to Greenwich Mean Time
specify the accuracy of a transducer
GOOSE
(For transducers, the fiducial value is the span, except for
Generic Object Oriented Substation Event. An IEC61850
transducers having a reversible and symmetrical output when
Ethernet control mechanism in which status and value data is
the fiducial value may be either the span or half the span as
grouped into a data set and transmitted within a set time
specified by the manufacturer. It is still common practice,
period. Typically applied for peer-peer communication between
however, for statements of accuracy for frequency transducers
devices such as relays and other IEDs
to refer to ‘percent of centre-scale frequency’ and, for phase
angle transducers, to an error in electrical degrees.)
GPS
FLC Global Positioning System

Full Load Current (full nominal rated load current for the

A-6
 Appendix A ⋅ Terminology

HALF- DUPLEX COMMUNICATIONS IDMT

A communications system in which data can travel in both Inverse Definite Minimum Time
directions, but only in one direction at a time
IEC
HI-Z International Electrotechnical Commission
Sometimes used to indicate high impedance unit protection,
but sometimes used to indicate downed conductor protection. IED
Intelligent Electronic Device. Equipment containing a
HIGH-SPEED RECLOSING microprocessor and software used to implement one or more
A reclosing scheme where re-closure is carried out without any functions in relation to an item of electrical equipment (e.g. a
time delay other than that required for de-ionisation, etc. bay controller, remote SCADA interface/protocol converter). A
microprocessor-based numerical relay is also an IED. IED is a
HMI generic term used to describe any microprocessor-based
Human Machine Interface. The means by which a human equipment, apart from a computer
inputs data to and receives data from a computer-based
system. This usually takes the form of a Personal Computer IEEE
(PC) (desktop or portable) with keyboard, screen and pointing Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
device. This term is also used to describe the front panel
interface on numerical relays. IGBT
Insulated Gate Bipolar Transistor. These are typically used in
HRC high-speed high-break static output contacts
High Rupturing Capacity (applicable to fuses)
INDEPENDENT TIME MEASURING RELAY
HSR A measuring relay, the specified time for which can be
High Speed Auto-Reclose. Also denotes High-availability considered as being independent, within specified limits, of the
Seamless ring for redundant Ethernet topology as per value of the characteristic quantity
IEC62439
INFLUENCE QUANTITY
HV A quantity which is not the subject of the measurement but
High Voltage which influences the value of the output signal for a constant
value of the measurand
HVDC
High Voltage Direct Current INPUT QUANTITY
The quantity, or one of the quantities, which constitute the
I signals received by the transducer from the measured system
Current
INSTANTANEOUS RELAY
I/O A relay that operates and resets with no intentional time delay.
Input/Output NOTE: All relays require some time to operate; it is possible,
within the above definition, to discuss the operating time
ICCP characteristics of an instantaneous relay

Inter-Control Centre Communications Protocol (IEC 60870-6) INSULATED GATE BIPOLAR TRANSISTOR
A special design of transistor that is suitable for handling high
ICT
voltages and currents (relative to an ordinary transistor).
Interposing Current Transformer Frequently used in static power control equipment (inverters,
controlled rectifiers, etc) due to the flexibility of control of the
output

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

INTRINSIC ERROR LED

An error determined when the transducer is under reference Light Emitting Diode
conditions
LIMITING VALUE OF THE OUTPUT CURRENT
INVERSE TIME DELAY RELAY The upper limit of output current which cannot, by design, be
A dependent time delay relay having an operating time which exceeded under any conditions
is an inverse function of the electrical characteristic quantity
LN
INVERSE TIME RELAY WITH DEFINITE Logical Node. Standardised IEC61850 data model describing
MINIMUM TIME (IDMT) the logical attributes of a protection or control function
An inverse time relay having an operating time that tends
towards a minimum value with increasing values of the LOCAL CONTROL MODE
electrical characteristic quantity When set for a given control point it means that the
commands can be issued from this local point within the
IP substation
Internet Protocol
LOCK-OUT (AUTO-RECLOSE)
IRIG-B Prevention of a CB reclosing after tripping
An international standard for time synchronisation
LOL (LOSS OF LIFE)
ISO Loss of life in the context of transformer asset monitoring
International Standards Organisation
LOW-SPEED AUTO-RECLOSE
K-BUS See Delayed auto-reclose
A proprietary serial communications link used by some of GE
Grid Automation IEDs. LV
Low Voltage
KNEE POINT VOLTAGE
That sinusoidal e.m.f. applied to the secondary terminals of a MAIN PROTECTION
current transformer, which, when increased by 10%, causes The protection system which is normally expected to operate in
the exciting current to increase by 50% response to a fault in the protected zone

L MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE VALUES

Inductance OF THE INPUT CURRENT AND VOLTAGE
Values of current and voltage assigned by the manufacturer
LAN which the transducer will withstand indefinitely without
Local Area Network damage

LCD MCB
Liquid Crystal Display Miniature Circuit Breaker

LD MCCB
Ladder Diagram. One of the IEC 61131-3 programming Moulded Case Circuit Breaker
languages. This can also mean an IEC61850 Logical Device.
MEAN-SENSING TRANSDUCER
LDC A transducer which actually measures the mean (average)
Line drop compensation value of the input waveform but which is adjusted to give an

A-8
 Appendix A ⋅ Terminology

output corresponding to the r.m.s. value of the input when MULTI-ELEMENT TRANSDUCER
that input is sinusoidal A transducer having two or more measuring elements. The
signals from the individual elements are combined to produce
MEASURAND an output signal corresponding to the measurand
A quantity subjected to measurement
MULTI-SECTION TRANSDUCER
MEASUREMENT CENTRE A transducer having two or more independent measuring
A non-protection IED capable of measuring a large number of circuits for one or more functions
electrical system parameters
MULTI-SHOT RECLOSING
MEASURING ELEMENT A reclosing scheme that permits more than one reclosing
A unit or module of a transducer which converts the operation of a CB after a fault occurs before lock-out occurs
measurand, or part of the measurand, into a corresponding
signal MV
Medium Voltage
MEASURING RANGE
That part of the span where the performance complies with N
the accuracy requirements Neutral

MEASURING RELAY N/C

An electrical relay intended to switch when its characteristic Normally Closed
quantity, under specified conditions and with a specified
accuracy attains its operating value N/O
METERING (NON-TARIFF) Normally Open

Values computed depending on the values of digital or NCIT

analogue inputs during variable periods
Non-Conventional Instrument Transformer, or transducer.
METERING (TARIFF) Typically used to describe optical, Rogowski, or other advanced
solutions.
Energy values computed from digital and/or analogue inputs
during variable periods and dedicated to energy measurement NERC
for billing (tariff) purposes
North American Electricity Reliability Corporation
MODBUS
NOMINAL RANGE OF USE
Communication protocol used on secondary networks between
A specified range of values which it is intended that an
HMI, substation computers or Bay Computers and protective
influence quantity can assume without the output signal of the
devices
transducer changing by amounts in excess of those specified
MU
NOTCHING RELAY
Merging Unit. A merging unit connects voltage and current
A relay which switches in response to a specific number of
measured quantities to the protection and control devices,
applied impulses
delivering sampled measured values compliant to IEC 61850-
9-2LE. The main task of the merging unit is to merge current
and voltage data from the three phases, and in some
NPS
applications it must translate the input received from non- Negative Phase Sequence
conventional sensors.
NUMERICAL RELAY
A protection relay which utilises Digital Signal Processing to
execute the protection algorithms in software

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

NV OPGW
Non-volatile. Typically used to describe a secure memory Optical Ground Wire – a ground wire that includes optical
facility in numerical relays. fibres to provide a communications link

NVD OPTO
Neutral Voltage Displacement An optically coupled logic input (also referred to as a binary
input)
OCB
Oil Circuit Breaker OSI 7-LAYER MODEL
The Open Systems Interconnection 7-layer model is a model
OFF-LOAD TAP CHANGER developed by ISO for modelling of a communications network.
A tap changer that is not designed for operation while the
transformer is supplying load OUTPUT COMMON MODE INTERFERENCE
VOLTAGE
OHL An unwanted alternating voltage which exists between each of
Overhead line the output terminals and a reference point

OLTC OUTPUT CURRENT (OF A TRANSDUCER)

On Load Tap Changer. The current produced by the transducer which is an analogue
function of the measurand
ON LOAD TAP CHANGER
A tap changer that can be operated while the transformer is OUTPUT LOAD
supplying load. The total effective resistance of the circuits and apparatus
connected externally across the output terminals
OPENING TIME
The time between energisation of a CB trip coil and the instant OUTPUT POWER (OF A TRANSDUCER)
of contact parting The power available at the transducer output terminals

OPERATING CURRENT (OF A RELAY) OUTPUT SERIES MODE INTERFERENCE

The current at which a relay will pick up VOLTAGE
An unwanted alternating voltage appearing in series between
OPERATING TIME (CB) the output terminals and the load
The time between energisation of a CB trip coil and arc
extinction OUTPUT SIGNAL
An analogue or digital representation of the measurand
OPERATING TIME (RELAY)
With a relay de-energised and in its initial condition, the time OUTPUT SPAN (SPAN)
which elapses between the application of a characteristic The algebraic difference between the lower and upper nominal
quantity and the instant when the relay operates values of the output signal

OPERATING TIME CHARACTERISTIC OVERCURRENT RELAY

The curve depicting the relationship between different values A protection relay whose tripping decision is related to the
of the characteristic quantity applied to a relay and the degree by which the measured current exceeds a set value.
corresponding values of operating time
OVERSHOOT TIME
OPERATING VALUE The overshoot time is the difference between the operating
The limiting value of the characteristic quantity at which the time of the relay at a specified value of the input energising
relay actually operates

A-10
 Appendix A ⋅ Terminology

quantity and the maximum duration of the value of input PLCC

energising quantity which, when suddenly reduced to a specific Power Line Carrier Communications
value below the operating level, is insufficient to cause
operation PMU
PARAMETRIC CONJUNCTIVE TEST See Phasor Measurement Unit

A conjunctive test that ascertains the range of values of each POINT OF COMMON COUPLING
parameter for which the test meets specific performance
The interface between an in-plant network containing
requirements
embedded generation and the utility distribution network to
PCB which the in-plant network is connected

Printed Circuit Board POW

PCC Point-on- Wave

Point of Common Coupling Point-on-wave switching is the process to control moment of

switching to minimise the effects (inrush currents,
PDC overvoltages)
See Phasor Data Concentrator
POWER FACTOR
PHASE ANGLE TRANSDUCER The factor by which it is necessary to multiply the product of
the voltage and current to obtain the active power
A transducer used for the measurement of the phase angle
between two a.c. electrical quantities having the same
POWER QUALITY
frequency
Classification of power system disturbances according to
PHASOR DATA CONCENTRATOR standards such as EN50160
An IED, or software function, able to receive Synchrophasor
POWER LINE CARRIER COMMUNICATIONS
frames from a number of PMUs, archive them in non-volatile
memory, and/or retransmit them to upstream equipment with A means of transmitting information over a power
the data content merged, filtered or at a different resolution transmission line by using a carrier frequency superimposed on
than the incoming data the normal power frequency

PHASOR MEASUREMENT UNIT (PMU) PPS

An IED whose function is to accurately measure time- Positive Phase Sequence. Also Pulse Per Second in time
synchronised current, voltage or other phasor vectors, and synchronising applications
communicate these to other devices in a standard format.
PROTECTED ZONE
PICK-UP The portion of a power system protected by a given protection
A relay is said to ‘pick-up’ when it changes from the de- system or a part of that protection system
energised position to the energised position
PROTECTION EQUIPMENT
PILOT CHANNEL The apparatus, including protection relays, transformers and
A means of interconnection between relaying points for the ancillary equipment, for use in a protection system
purpose of protection
PROTECTION RELAY
PLC A relay designed to initiate disconnection of a part of an
Programmable Logic Controller electrical installation or to operate a warning signal, in the
case of a fault or other abnormal condition in the installation.
A specialised computer for implementing control sequences A protection relay may include more than one electrical
using software element and accessories

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

PROTECTION SCHEME RATING

The co-ordinated arrangements for the protection of one or The nominal value of an energising quantity that appears in
more elements of a power system. A protection scheme may the designation of a relay. The nominal value usually
comprise several protection systems corresponds to the CT and VT secondary ratings

PROTECTION SYSTEM RBAC

A combination of protection equipment designed to secure, Role-Based Access Control
under predetermined conditions, usually abnormal, the
disconnection of an element of a power system, or to give an RCA
alarm signal, or both Relay Characteristic Angle. The centre of the directional
characteristic
PROTOCOL
A set of rules that define the method in which a function is RCD
carried out – commonly used in respect of communications Residual Current Device. A protection device which is
links, where it defines the hardware and software features actuated by the residual current
necessary for successful communication between devices.
RCP
PRP
Remote Control Point
Parallel Redundancy Protocol. A redundant star Ethernet
topology as per IEC62439 The Remote Control Point is a SCADA interface. Several RCP’s
may be managed with different communication protocols.
PSB Physical connections are done at a Gateway or at substation
computers or at a substation HMI
Power Swing Blocking
REACTIVE POWER (VAR) TRANSDUCER
PSM
A transducer used for the measurement of reactive electrical
Plug Setting Multiple – a term used in conjunction with
power
electromechanical relays, denoting the ratio of the fault current
to the current setting of the relay
RECLAIM TIME (AUTO-RECLOSE)
PSTN The time between a successful closing operation, measured
from the time the auto-reclose relay closing contact makes
Public Switched Telephone Network
until a further reclosing sequence is permitted in the event of a
further fault occurring
PT100
Platinum resistance temperature probe REF
Restricted Earth Fault
PTP
Precision time Protocol, typically as per IEEE1588 REFERENCE CONDITIONS
Conditions of use for a transducer or relay prescribed for
R
performance testing, or to ensure valid comparison of results
Resistance of measurement

RATIO CORRECTION REFERENCE RANGE

A feature of digital/numerical relays that enables A specified range of values of an influence quantity within
compensation to be carried out for a CT or VT whose ratio which the transducer complies with the requirements
needs to be matched with a reference CT or VT in the concerning intrinsic errors
protection scheme
REFERENCE VALUE
A specified single value of an influence quantity at which the

A-12
 Appendix A ⋅ Terminology

transducer complies with the requirements concerning intrinsic RS

errors Recommended Standard. Terminology still commonly used
when referring to EIA serial communication
RELAY
See Protection relay RSTP
Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol
RESETTING VALUE
The limiting value of the characteristic quantity at which the RTD
relay returns to its initial position Resistance Temperature Detector

RESIDUAL CURRENT RTOS

The algebraic sum, in a multi-phase system, of all the line Real Time Operating System
currents
RTU
RESIDUAL VOLTAGE
Remote Terminal Unit. An IED used specifically for data
The algebraic sum, in a multi-phase system, of all the line-to- gathering and control within a substation. Sometimes may
earth voltages include control/ monitoring/storage functions
RESPONSE TIME (TRANSDUCER)
SAT
The time from the instant of application of a specified change
Site Acceptance Test
of the measurand until the output signal reaches and remains
at its final steady value or within a specified band centred on Validation procedures for equipment executed with the
this value customer on site

REVERSIBLE OUTPUT CURRENT SCADA

(TRANSDUCER) Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
An output current which reverses polarity in response to a
change of sign or direction of the measurand SCL
Substation Configuration Language
RIPPLE CONTENT OF THE OUTPUT
Normalised configuration language for substation modelling
(TRANSDUCER) (as expected by IEC 61850-6)
With steady-state input conditions, the peak-to-peak value of
the fluctuating component of the output SCP
Substation Control Point
RMS
Root Mean Square HMI computers at substation level allowing the operators to
control the substation
RMS SENSING TRANSDUCER
SCS
A transducer specifically designed to respond to the true r.m.s.
value of the input and which is characterised by the Substation Control System
manufacturer for use on a specified range of waveforms
SECURITY
RMU A measure of a protection scheme's ability to restrain and
prevent spurious operation, when no operation is required
Ring Main Unit

ROCOF SEF
Rate Of Change Of Frequency (protection relay) Sensitive Earth Fault

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

SETTING STABILITY (OF A TRANSDUCER)

The limiting value of a ‘characteristic’ or ‘energising’ quantity The ability of a transducer to keep its performance
at which the relay is designed to operate under specified characteristics unchanged during a specified time, all
conditions. Such values are usually marked on the relay and conditions remaining constant
may be expressed as direct values, percentages of rated values,
or multiples STABILITY (OF A PROTECTION SYSTEM)
The quantity whereby a protection system remains inoperative
SFC under all conditions other than those for which it is specifically
Sequential Function Chart: One of the IEC 61131-3 designed to operate
programming languages
STABILITY LIMITS (OF A PROTECTION SYSTEM)
SIMPLEX COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM The r.m.s. value of the symmetrical component of the through
A communications system in which data can only travel in one fault current up to which the protection system remains stable
direction
STARTING RELAY
SINGLE-SHOT RECLOSING A unit relay which responds to abnormal conditions and
An auto-reclose sequence that provides only one reclosing initiates the operation of other elements of the protection
operation, lock-out of the CB occurring if it subsequently trips system

S.I.R. STATCOM
System Impedance Ratio A particular type of Static Var Compensator, in which Power
Electronic Devices are used to generate the reactive power
SINGLE ELEMENT TRANSDUCER required, rather than capacitors and inductors
A transducer having one measuring element
STATIC RELAY
SIPS An electrical relay in which the designed response is developed
System Integrity Protection Schemes by electronic, magnetic, optical or other components without
mechanical motion. Excludes relays using digital/numeric
SNTP technology
Simple Network Time Protocol
STC
SOE Short Time Current (rating of a CT)
Sequence Of Events
STORAGE CONDITIONS
SOTF The conditions, defined by means of ranges of the influence
quantities, such as temperature, or any special conditions,
Switch On To Fault (protection)
within which the transducer or relay may be stored (non-
operating) without damage
SPECIFIC CONJUNCTIVE TEST
A conjunctive test using specific values of each of the SVC
parameters
Static Var Compensator
SPRING WINDING TIME
SYNCHROPHASOR
For spring-closed CB’s, the time for the spring to be fully
A voltage or current vector synchronised to real time,
charged after a closing operation
accurately defining the magnitude and phase of a power
system quantity. Typically IEEE C37.118 applies
ST
Structured Text: One of the IEC 61131-3 programming
languages

A-14
 Appendix A ⋅ Terminology

SYSTEM DISTURBANCE TIME (AUTO-RECLOSE) IEEE inverse-time curves

The time between fault inception and CB contacts making on
successful re-closure TIME MULTIPLIER SETTING (TMS)
Used to Adapt the speed of operation of inverse-time curves
SYSTEM IMPEDANCE RATIO
The ratio of the power system source impedance to the TPI
impedance of the protected zone Tap Position Indicator (for transformers)

T101 TRANSDUCER (ELECTRICAL MEASURING

Term used for IEC 60870-5-101 protocol TRANSDUCER)
A device that provides a d.c. output quantity having a definite
TAP CHANGER relationship to the a.c. measurand
A mechanism, usually fitted to the primary winding of a
transformer, to alter the turns ratio of the transformer by small TRANSDUCER WITH OFFSET ZERO (LIVE
discrete amounts over a defined range ZERO)
A transducer which gives a predetermined output other than
TCP/IP zero when the measurand is zero
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol. A common
protocol for the transmission of messages over the Internet TRANSDUCER WITH SUPPRESSED ZERO
A transducer whose output is zero when the measurand is less
TCS than a certain value
Trip Circuit Supervision
TVE
TC57 Total Vector Error. A composite percentage error
Technical Committee 57 working for the IEC and responsible measurement, used to describe the accuracy requirement for
for producing standards in the field of Protection (e.g. IEC phasor measurement units.
61850)
UDP
TF User Datagram Protocol.
Transfer Function of a device (usually an element of a control
system. Also Transient Factor (of a CT) UNIT ELECTRICAL RELAY
A single relay that can be used alone or in combinations with
THD others
Total Harmonic Distortion
UNIT PROTECTION
THROUGH FAULT CURRENT A protection system that is designed to operate only for
The current flowing through a protected zone to a fault beyond abnormal conditions within a clearly defined zone of the power
that zone system

TIME DELAY UNRESTRICTED PROTECTION

A delay intentionally introduced into the operation of a relay A protection system which has no clearly defined zone of
system operation and which achieves selective operation only by time
grading
TIME DELAY RELAY
A relay having an intentional delaying device UCA
Utility Communications Architecture. UCA2 was a forerunner
TIME DIAL (TD) of IEC61850
An alternative to the time multiplier setting (TMS), applied to

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

UPS ZONE
Uninterruptible Power Supply The boundary limits, typically for a protected unit in the power
system, within which protection is expected to operate
USB
Universal Serial Bus

UTC
Universal Time Coordinated. The precise internationally
recognised time reference, equivalent to GMT.

V
Voltage

VCB
Vacuum Circuit Breaker

VDEW
Term used for IEC 60870-5-103 protocol. The VDEW protocol
is a subset of the IEC 60870-5-103 protocol

VECTOR GROUP COMPENSATION

A feature of digital and numerical relays that compensates for
the phase angle shift that occurs in transformers (including
VTs) due to use of dissimilar winding connections – e.g.
transformers connected delta/star

VOLTAGE TRANSDUCER
A transducer used for the measurement of a.c. voltage

VT
Voltage Transformer

WAMPAC
Wide-Area Monitoring/Measurement, Protection and Control

WAN
Wide Area Network

X
Reactance

Y
Admittance

Z
Impedance

A-16
Appendix B
ANSI/IEC Symbols FUNCTIONS ANSI IEC 61850
Other Common
Designations
Arc flash Detector AFD SARC
The most common methods for indicating protection device Automatic Tap Change Control ATCC AVR
functions are defined by the IEEE (ANSI) C37-2 and IEC Autoreclose 79 RREC DAR
61850, which both use alphanumeric codes. There are also Blocking (eg. Power Swing
68 RPSB PSB, OST, OOS
other common designations, some of which originate from IEC Blocking) or “out-of-step”

60617. A list of common ANSI device numbers and their Breaker Failure 50BF RBRF BFP

equivalents are given in this appendix. Broken Conductor 46BC PTOC I2/I1>
Busbar Differential 87BB PDIF Idiff>
Circuit Breaker 52 XCBR CB
Circuit Breaker Closed Auxiliary
52a XCBR
Contacts
Circuit Breaker Open Auxiliary
52b XCBR
Contacts
Circuit Switch 89 XSWI
Clock or Timing Source CLK
Closing Coil CC
Cold Load Pick-Up 51CLP CLP
Current Transformer Supervision RVCS CTS
Data Communications Device 16
Digital Fault Recorder DFR RDRE, RADR, RBDR
Delta Directional Comparison ∆I / ∆V
Directional Earth Fault
67N PTOC IN>, t>, DEF
Overcurrent
Directional Over Power 32O PDOP P>
Directional Overcurrent 67P PTOC I>
Directional Under Power 32U PDUP P<
Distance 21 PDIS Z
Distance Aided Schemes 21/85 PSCH
Disturbance Recorder DDR RDRE, RADR, RBDR DR
Dynamic Line Rating 49DLR PTTR DLR
Earth Fault Overcurrent 51N PTOC IN>
Ethernet Switch 16ES
Fault Locator 21FL RFLO DTF
Fuse Fail Overcurrent 51FF PTOC
Generator Differential 87G PDIF Idiff>
High Impedance Earth Fault
HIZ PHIZ Hi-Z
Detection
Human Machine Interface HMI IHMI
Instantaneous Overcurrent 50 PTOC I>
Interlocked Overcurrent Busbar
51BB PTOC
Protection Scheme
Interlocking 3 CILO
Interturn Fault 50 PDIF
Line Differential 87L PDIF Idiff>
Load Restoration 81R PTOF

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

Other Common Other Common

FUNCTIONS ANSI IEC 61850 FUNCTIONS ANSI IEC 61850
Designations Designations
Lockout Relay 86 Rotor Thermal Overload 49R PTTR
Loss of Field / Under Excitation 40 PDUP Router 16ER
Loss of Life LoL MMTR Sensitive Directional Earth Fault
67SEF PTOC Isef>
Overcurrent
Motor Anti-Backspin ABS
Sequence of Events Recorder SER SOE
Motor Differential 87M PDIF Idiff>
Switch on to Fault SOTF PSOF
Motor Emergency Restart 66/86
Stator Earth Fault 64S PTOC
Motor Locked Rotor 51LR PMRI/PMSS
100% Stator Earth Fault - 3rd
Motor Number of Starts 66 PMRI/PMSS
harmonic undervoltage, 3rd 27TN, 59TN,
Motor Reacceleration PTUV/PTOV/PEFI
27LV harmonic overvoltage, low 64S
Authorisation frequency injection
Motor Restart Inhibition 49, 66 PMRI Stator Thermal Overload 49S PTTR
48, 51LR, Stub Bus Protection 50ST PTOC
Motor Starting Time Supervision PMRI/PMSS
49R
Substation Metering MET MMTR, MMXU
Negative Sequence Overvoltage 47 PTOV V2>
Synchronism Check 25 RSYN CS
Negative Phase Sequence
46T PTTR Thermal Device (eg. RTD,
Thermal 26 PTTR RTD
thermistor)
Neutral Admittance YN
Thermal Overload 49 PTTR
Neutral Displacement Voltage
59N PTOV VN> Through Fault Monitoring Thru MMXU TF
(Residual Overvoltage)
Time Delay 2 t>, TD
Out of Step Trip (Pole Slip) 78 PPAM OST, OOS
Time Overcurrent (eg. IDMT) 51 PTOC I>, t>
Overfrequency 81O PTOF f>
Transformer Differential 87T PDIF Idiff>
Overspeed 12 ω>
Transformer Inrush Detection 68 PHAR
Overtemperature 26 PTTR θ>
Transient Earth Fault PTEF TGF
Overvoltage 59 PTOV V>
Trip Circuit Monitor / Supervision TCM TCS
Phase Angle 78 ϕ>
Trip Coil TC
Phase Comparison 87P PDIF
Tripping Relay 94 PTRC
Phase-Balance (eg. Negative
46 PTOC I2> Turbine Abnormal Frequency 81AB PTAF
Sequence) Current
Undercurrent 37 PTUC I<
Phasor Data Concentrator PDC
Underfrequency 81U PTUF f<
Phasor Measurement Unit PMU
Underspeed or Zero Speed Device 14 PZSU ω<
Pilot-Wire or Carrier
85 PSCH
Communications Undervoltage 27 PTUV V<
Point-on-Wave Switching CPOW POW Unintentional Energisation (Dead
50/27 PDMP
Pole Dead (Circuit Breaker Open) PTUV Machine Protection)

Positive Sequence Undervoltage 47 PTUV V1< Voltage Balance 60 PTOV

Voltage Dependent Overcurrent 51V PVOC
Power Factor (Over) 55O POPF PF>, cosϕ>
Volts per Hertz Overfluxing 24 PVPH V/Hz
Power Factor (Under) 55U PUPF PF<, cosϕ<
Voltage Transformer Supervision VTS RVCS
QFVR, QITR, QIUB,
Power Quality Monitor PQM PQ
QVTR, QVUB, QVVR Voltage Vector Shift PVSP ∆V
Push Button PB Wattmetric Earth Fault 64W PSDE PN>
Rate of Change of Frequency 81R PFRC df/dt
Remote Terminal Unit / Data
RTU
Concentrator
Restricted Earth Fault (Biased) 64N PDIF Idiff>, REF
Restricted Earth Fault (High Imp.) 64N PDIF Idiff>, REF
Reverse Power 32R PDOP
Rotor Earth Fault 64R PEFI

B-2
Appendix C There are many different institutions, both international and
national, which issue standards used by manufacturers of
Typical Standards Applicable to protection and control devices. The standards shown here can
Protection and Control Numerical be supplemented by the electrical power system operators'
Devices own particular standards. The most used standards bodies in
the field of power systems engineering are:

C.1 Dielectric, Impulse and Insulation • EU: European Union directives

C.2 DC Auxiliary Supply Tests • IEC: International Electrotechnical Commission
C.3 AC Voltage Dips & Short Interruptions • IEEE: Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
C.4 High Frequency Disturbance Tests
The list of standards shown here is not exhaustive, but serves
C.5 Fast Transient
to demonstrate the diverse nature of this industry, and its
C.6 Conducted Emissions
associated compliancy requirements.
C.7 Radiated Emissions
C.8 Conducted Immunity C.1 DIELECTRIC, IMPULSE AND INSULATION
C.9 Radiated Immunity
Standard Typical Details
C.10 ANSI/IEEE Radiated Immunity
5kV 1.2/50µs impulse, common and differential mode – CT,
C.11 Electrostatic Discharge Impulse, EN 60255-27:2013 VT, opto inputs, relays, power supply, IRIG-B & terminal block
C.12 IEC Surge Immunity communications connections.

C.13 Power Frequency Magnetic Field Immunity 2kV rms. for 1 minute between all terminals connected
together and case earth.
C.14 Pulsed Magnetic field Immunity Dielectric withstand, EN 60255- 2kV rms. for 1 minute between all terminals of independent
C.15 Damped Oscillatory Magnetic Field Immunity 27:2013 circuits with terminals on each independent circuit connected
together.
C.16 Damped Oscillatory Tests
1kV rms. for 1 minute across watchdog contacts.
C.17 Power Frequency Test 1kV rms. for 1 minute across open contacts of the watchdog
C.18 ANSI/IEEE Surge Withstand Capability contacts.
ANSI dielectric withstand, ANSI/IEEE
C.19 Operating and Storage Temperature C37.90. (2005)
1kV rms. for 1 minute across open contacts of changeover
output contacts.
C.20 Six-Day Cyclic Temperature with Humidity 1.5kV rms. for 1 minute across normally open output contacts.
C.21 56-Day Humidity (IEC 60068-2-3) Insulation resistance, EN 60255-
100 MΩ minimum.
C.22 Mechanical Tests 27:2013

C.23 Enclosure Protection Tests

C.24 European Union Directives
C.2 DC AUXILIARY SUPPLY TESTS
Standard Typical Details
50ms with no loss of protection.
DC voltage interruptions, IEC 60255-
100ms, 200ms, 300ms, 0.5s, 1s, 5s with temporary loss of
26:2013
protection.
DC voltage dip, IEC 60255-26:2013 40% @ 200ms, 70% @ 500ms with no loss of protection.
Alternating component (ripple) in DC AC 100Hz ripple superimposed on DC max. and min. auxiliary
supply voltage, IEC 60255-11:2008 supply at 15% of highest rated DC.
Gradual shut down / start up, IEC
60255-26:2013
Reverse polarity, IEC 60255-26:2013

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

C.3 AC VOLTAGE DIPS & SHORT C.9 RADIATED IMMUNITY

INTERRUPTIONS Standard Typical Details
Standard Typical Details Radiated immunity, EN 61000-4-3:
10 V/m 80MHz - 1GHz @ 1kHz 80% am.
2010 Level 3
10ms, 20ms with no loss of protection.
AC voltage interruptions, EN 61000-4- 30 V/m 800MHz – 960MHz and 1.4GHz – 2GHz @ 1kHz
50ms, 100ms, 200ms, 500ms, 5s with temporary loss of Radiated immunity from digital radio
11:2004 and EN60255-26:2013 80% am.
protection. telephones, EN 61000-4-3: 2010
Level 4
AC voltage dip, EN 61000-4-11:2004 60% @ 200ms, 30% @ 500ms, 20% @ 5s with no loss of
and EN60255-26:2013 protection. 10 V/m 80MHz - 1GHz and 1.4GHz – 3.0GHz @ 1kHz 80%
Radiated immunity, am.
EN60255-26:2013 Spot tests at 80MHz, 160MHz, 380MHz, 450MHz,
900MHz, 1850MHz and 2150MHz.
C.4 HIGH FREQUENCY DISTURBANCE TESTS
Standard Typical Details
2.5kV common mode between independent circuits and C.10 ANSI/IEEE RADIATED IMMUNITY
1MHz burst Immunity test, between independent circuits and case earth.
Standard Typical Details
EN60255-26:2013 1kV differential mode across terminals of the same circuit
(except metallic contacts). 35 V/m 80MHz - 1GHz, @ 1kHz 80% am.
ANSI Radiated Immunity/IEEE 35 V/m 80MHz - 1GHz, 100% pulse modulated.
C37.90.2 2004 Spot tests at 80MHz, 160MHz, 450MHz, 900MHz and
900MHz (200Hz rep. freq., pulse modulated).
C.5 FAST TRANSIENT
Standard Typical Details

Fast Transient, EN 61000-4-4:2012

4kV 5kHz, power supply and earth ports. C.11 ELECTROSTATIC DISCHARGE
2kV 5kHz, all other circuits (excluding power supply and earth
Level 4 Feature Details
ports).
4kV 5kHz and 100kHz, applied to all circuits excluding Level 4: 15kV air discharge. Tests carried out both with and
Fast Transient, EN 60255-26:2013 without cover fitted.
communication ports.
Class A. ESD, EN61000-4-2:2009 Level 3 and Level 4: 8kV contact discharge. Tests carried out both with
2kV 5kHz and 100kHz, applied to communication ports.
Level 4 (EN60255-26:2013) and without cover fitted.
Level 4: 15kV indirect discharge. Tests carried out both with
and without cover fitted.
C.6 CONDUCTED EMISSIONS
Standard Typical Details
Power supply, EN55022:2010 and 0.15 - 0.5MHz, 79dBµV (quasi peak) 66dBµV (average). C.12 IEC SURGE IMMUNITY
EN60255-26:2013 0.5 - 30MHz, 73dBµV (quasi peak) 60dBµV (average). Feature Details
Permanently connected 4kV common mode 12Ω source impedance, 2kV differential
0.15 - 0.5MHz, 97dBµV (quasi peak) 84dBµV (average).
communications ports, EN55022:2010 Power supply, EN61000-4-5:2006
0.5 - 30MHz, 87dBµV (quasi peak) 74dBµV (average). mode 2Ω source impedance, level 4.
and EN60255-26:2013 Level 4 (EN60255-26:2013)

CT and VT inputs, opto inputs, output

4kV common mode 42Ω source impedance, 2kV differential
relays, EN61000-4-5:2006 Level 4
mode 42Ω source impedance, Level 4.
C.7 RADIATED EMISSIONS (EN60255-26:2013)
Cable screen, EN61000-4-5:2006
Standard Typical Details 4kV common mode 2Ω source impedance
Level 4 (EN60255-26:2013)
30 - 230MHz, 40dBµV/m at 10m measurement distance.
Radiated emissions, EN55022:2010
230 - 1000MHz, 47dBµV/m at 10m measurement distance.
(EN60255-26:2013)
1 - 2GHz, 76dBmV/m (peak) at 10m measurement distance.

C.8 CONDUCTED IMMUNITY

Standard Typical Details
Conducted immunity, EN 61000-4-6: 10V emf @ 1kHz 80% am, 150kHz to 80MHz.
2014 Level 3 (EN60255-26:2013) Spot tests at 27MHz, 68MHz.

C-2
 Appendix C ⋅ Typical Standards Applicable to Protection and Control Numerical Devices

C.13 POWER FREQUENCY MAGNETIC FIELD C.18 ANSI/IEEE SURGE WITHSTAND

IMMUNITY CAPABILITY
Standard Typical Details Standard Typical Details
100A/m field applied continuously in all planes for the EUT in 2.5kV, 1MHz - common and differential mode – applied to all
Oscillatory SWC Test, ANSI/IEEE
Power Frequency Magnetic Field a quiescent and tripping state (EUT – ‘Equipment Under circuits except for terminal block communications, which are
C37.90.1 2012
Immunity, EN61000-4-8:2010 Test’). tested common mode only.
Level 5. 1000A/m field applied for 3s in all planes for the EUT in a 4kV crest voltage - common and differential mode - applied to
quiescent and tripping state. Fast Transient SWC Tests,
all circuits except for terminal block communications, which
ANSI/IEEE C37.90.1 2012
are tested common mode only.

C.14 PULSED MAGNETIC FIELD IMMUNITY

Standard Typical Details
C.19 OPERATING AND STORAGE
Pulse Magnetic Field Immunity, EN 1000A/m field applied in all planes for the EUT in a
TEMPERATURE
61000-4-9:1993+A1:2001 Level 5 quiescent state
C.19.1 Cold Tests
Typical Details
C.15 DAMPED OSCILLATORY MAGNETIC FIELD Temp. Duration EUT
Standard Type of Test
IMMUNITY °C hr energised

Standard Typical Details Start – up, EN 60068-2-

Functional verification
1:2007 +20 2 Yes
Damped oscillatory Magnetic Field tests
100A/m field applied in all planes at 100kHz / 1MHz with
Immunity, EN61000-4-
burst duration of 2 seconds. Intermediate, EN 60068-2- Functional verification
10:1993+A1:2001 Level 5 0 2 Yes
1:2007 tests
Intermediate, EN 60068-2- Functional verification
-10 2 Yes
1:2007 tests
C.16 DAMPED OSCILLATORY TESTS Low temp claim, EN 60068- Functional verification
-25 96 Yes
Standard Typical Details 2-1:2007 tests

2.5kV common mode. Low temp claim, EN 60068-

-25 Storage 96 No
2-1:2007
Damped oscillatory tests, 100 kHz Power supply, relay contacts, CT, VT, opto input,
and 1 MHz, EN 61000-4-18: communications, IRIG-B. Cold start, EN 60068-2- -25
Operate 2 Yes
2007+A1:2010 1kV differential mode. 1:2007 (typical)
Power supply, relay contacts, CT, VT, opto input. Last test, EN 60068-2- Functional verification
+20 2 Yes
1:2007 tests
Damped oscillatory tests, 3MHz,
Power supply, relay contacts, CT, VT, opto input,
10MHz, 30MHz, EN 61000-4-18:
communications, IRIG-B
2007+A1:2010

C.19.2 Dry Heat Tests

Typical Details

C.17 POWER FREQUENCY TEST Standard Temp. °C Type of Test

Duration EUT
hr energised
Standard Typical Details
Start – up, EN 60068-2- Functional verification
+20 2 Yes
300V rms. common mode. Voltage applied to all non-mains 2:2007 tests
Power frequency test, EN 60255- frequency inputs.
Intermediate, EN 60068-2- Functional verification
26:2013. 150V rms. differential mode. Voltage applied to all non-mains +40 2 Yes
2:2007 tests
frequency inputs.
High temp claim, EN 60068-
+70 (typical) Operate 96 Yes
2-2:2007
High temp claim, EN 60068- +70
Storage 96 No
2-2:2007 (typical)
Hot Start, EN 60068-2-
+55 Operate 2 Yes
2:2007

C-3
Protection & Automation Application Guide

C.19.3 Change of Temperature Tests Standard Typical Details

Sides of case
Typical Details
IP50, EN 60529:2013 Protected against solid foreign objects of 25mm diameter and
greater.

Rate of change of temperature

Connectors of case
Ambient Temperature

Lower Temperature

High Temperature
IP10, EN 60529:2013 Protected against solid foreign objects of 50mm diameter and

Exposure Time
greater
Standard

C.23.2 Corrosive Environment

Standard Typical Details
Change of Temperature,
EN 60068-2-14:2009 +20 °C -25 °C +55 °C 1°C/min 3 hours Industrial environment / poor environment control / mixed
IEC60068-2-60:2015 part 2, test Ke,
(Nb) gas flow test. 21 days exposure to elevated concentrations of
method class 3
H2S, NO2 and SO2 at 75% relative humidity and +30°C

C.20 SIX-DAY CYCLIC TEMPERATURE WITH

C.23.3 Creepage and Clearances
HUMIDITY
Standard Typical Details
Standard Typical Details
Pollution Degree: 3
six (12 + 12 hour cycles) of 55°C ±2°C 93% ±3% RH and
Damp heat cyclic, EN 60068-2-30: IEC60255-27:2013 Overvoltage Category: III
25°C ±3°C 93% ±3% RH.
2005 Impulse Test Voltage: 5kV
(RH – ‘Relative Humidity’)

C.24 EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVES

C.21 56-DAY HUMIDITY (IEC 60068-2-78)
Standard Typical Details
Standard Typical Details
Compliance to the European Commission
Damp heat, steady state, EN 60068- 40° C ± 2° C and 93% relative humidity (RH) +2% -3%, Directive on EMC.
EMC Compliance Per 2012/30/EU:
2-78:2013 duration 56 days.
EN60255-26:2013
Compliance with European Commission
Low Voltage Directive.
C.22 MECHANICAL TESTS Product Safety Per 2014/35/EU:
Compliance is demonstrated by reference
to generic safety standards:
Standard Typical Details EN60255-27:2013
Vibration test per IEC 60255-21- EN61010-1:2010
Response: class 2, Endurance: class 2
1:1996
All products to be free of lead, mercury,
Shock and bump immunity per IEC Shock response: class 2, Shock withstand: class 1, Bump 2011/65/EU (Restriction on Use of Hazardous Substances cadmium, hexavalent chromium,
60255-21-2:1995 withstand: class 2 Directive – ‘RoHS’) polybrominated biphenyls (PBB) and
Seismic test per IEC 60255-21-3: polybrominated diphenyl ether (PBDE).
Class 2
1995

C.23 ENCLOSURE PROTECTION TESTS

C.23.1 Water, Dust and Foreign Object Ingress

Standard Typical Details
Front face
Protected against vertically falling drops of water with the
IP52, EN 60529:2013 product in 4 fixed positions of 15° tilt with a flow rate of
3mm/minute for 2.5 minutes.
Protected against dust, limited ingress permitted.

C-4
  delayed 14.9 14-9
INDEX  high-speed 14.8 14-8

 initiation of 14.10.1 14-10

 lock-out 14.10.7 14-11

Section Page  multi-shot 14.10.9 14-11

 number of shots (attempts) 14.4.3, 14-5,

A 14.6.6 14-8
 on EHV lines 14.5- 14-5,
a operator, complex number 3.3.2 3-3
14.9 14-9
A.C ripple on D.C Supply 21.3.2 21-4  on HV distribution networks 14.3- 14-3,
Acceleration scheme (distance relays) 12.3.3 12-4 14.4 14-3
Accuracy of current transformers 6.4.1 6-7  operating features 14.10 14-10
Additional features of numerical relays 7.6 7-8  reclaim time 14.4.2, 14-5,
Air circuit breakers (ACBs), use in auto-reclose 14.6.3.2 14-7 14.10.6 14-11
schemes  reclosing impulse 14.10.4 14-11
Algebra, vector 3.2 3-2
 reset time 14.4.1.5 14-4
All-optical transducer 6.5.1.3 6-17
Analogue transducers 22.4 22-4  single-phase 14.7 14-8

Analysis, symmetrical component 4.3 4-4  single-shot 14.6.6 14-8

Annunciator testing 21.14 21-27
 system stability and synchronism 14.4.1.1 14-3
ANSI relay numbers Appendix B
Anti-pumping devices, auto-reclose schemes 14.10.5 14-11  three-phase 14.3, 14-3,
14.6, 14-6,
Apparent impedance seen by distance relays, multi- 13.4.1 13-8 14.9 14-9
ended feeders  type of fault; semi/permanent 14.1 14-1
Application of auto-reclosing 14.2 14-3
Application of directional overcurrent relays 9.14.3 9-13  type of fault; transient 14.1 14-1

Application of unit protection systems to mesh corner 10.8.2 10-8  type of load 14.4.1.2 14-4
substations
Application of unit protection to breaker and a half 10.8.2 10-8  use with blocking schemes 14.8.1 14-9
substations
 use with transfer trip protection schemes 14.8.1 14-9
Arc resistance formula 11.7.3 11-8
Armature reaction, of synchronous machines 5.3 5-2  use with zone 1 extension scheme 14.8.2 14-9
Arrangement of busbar protection schemes 15.7 15-7 Auto-reclosing: 14.1- 14-1,
Arrangement of CT connections: 14.12 14-12
Auto-synchroniser 22.8.2 22-9
 in high impedance busbar protection 15.8.5 15-13
Auto-transformer:
 in low impedance busbar protection 15.9.5 15-16
Asset management; transformers 16.19 16-22  equivalent circuits 5.16 5-13

Asymmetry of synchronous machine 5.7 5-6  positive sequence equivalent circuit 5.16.1 5-13

Asynchronous running 17.16 17-18  protection 16.12 16-12

Attracted armature relays 7.2.1 7-2  special conditions of neutral earthing, zero 5.16.3 5-14
sequence reactance
Auto-close circuits 14.11 14-12
 zero sequence equivalent circuit 5.16.2 5-13
Automatic changeover systems for 18.9 18-10
industrial/commercial networks
Auto-reclosing: B
 anti-pumping devices 14.10.5 14-11 Back-up protection 2.9 2-8

 application of 14.2 14-3 Balanced voltage system, unit protection 10.5 10-3

 circuit breaker characteristics 14.4.1.3, 14-4, Balanced voltage unit protection scheme for tee’d 13.3.1 13-6
14.6.3 14-7 feeders
 dead time 14.4.1, 14-3, Bar primary current transformers 6.4.5.2 6-9
14.6.4, 14-7, Basic circuit laws, theorems and network reduction 3.5 3-9
14.9 14-9
 de-ionisation of fault path 14.4.1.4, 14-4, Bay controller, definition of 25.2.1 25-2
14.6.2 14-6

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

Bearing failures on motors 19.1 19-1

Behaviour of distance relays with earth faults 13.2.2.3 13-2 C

Behaviour of distance relays with earth faults on 13.2.2.4 13-4 Cable circuits 5.18 5-16
parallel feeders Cable data: 5.24 5-24
Behaviour of distance relays with single circuit 13.2.2.5 13-4
operation Cable gland insulation in frame-earth protection 15.6.1 15-4
Bias in unit protection systems 10.4.2 10-3 schemes
Calculation of overcurrent relay settings 9.13 9-11
Biased differential relays 10.4.2 10-3
Calculation of series impedance (overhead lines and 5.19 5-16
Blocking schemes, distance protection: cables)
Calculation of shunt impedance (overhead lines and 5.20 5-17
 multi-ended feeders 13.5.3 13-11 cables)
 using zone 1 element 12.4.1.2 12-8 Calculations, fault 4.2, 4-1
4.4-
 using zone 2 element 12.4.1.1 12-7 4.6
Capacitive current compensation (with), unit 10.11.8 10-14
 weak infeed conditions 12.4.2 12-8
protection schemes
Blocking schemes, distance protection: 12.4 12-6 Capacitive current compensation (without), unit 10.11.7 10-14
protection schemes
Boundary characteristic of distance relay 11.2 11-2 Capacitor control 18.11.1 18-12
Branch law 3.5.1 3-9 Capacitor protection 18.11 18-12
Breaker and a half substations, application of unit 10.8.2 10-8
Capacitor voltage transformers:
protection
Breaker fail protection in busbar schemes 15.9.6.6 15-18  ferro-resonance 6.3.3 6-6
Breaker operating times 14.4.1.3 14-4  transient behaviour 6.3.2 6-6
Broken delta connection of voltage transformers 6.2.6 6-4  voltage protection of 6.3.1 6-6
Buchholz protection 16.15.3 16-14 Capacitor voltage transformers: 6.3 6-5
Buchholz relay 16.15.3 16-14 Carrier channels: 8.5.3 8-6
Busbar: Carrier unit protection systems 10.9 10-8

 blocking schemes 15.11 15-20 Cascade voltage transformers 6.2.8 6-5

 differential 15.7- 15-7 CDC (Common Data Classes); IEC61850 24.5.2 24-19
15.11 15-20
 faults 15.2 15-2 CE marking 21.4.5 21-10

 frame-earth (Howard) 15.6 15-4 Characteristic angle of a relay 9.14.2 9-12

 high impedance 15.8 15-9 Characteristic time/current curves of IDMT relays 9.4 9-4

 interlocked overcurrent schemes 15.11 15-20 Characteristics:

 low impedance 15.9 15-15  earth fault protection 9.16 9-14

 mesh corner 15.7.2.1 15-9  of circuit breakers 14.4.1.3 14-4

 numerical 15.10 15-18  of distance relays 11.7 11-6

 principles (Mertz Price) 15.7 15-7  of generators 5.2-5.6 5-1,

5-7
 protection: 15.3- 15-2,  of motors 19.2- 19-1,
15.11 15-20 19.7 19-11
 schemes 15.5 15-3  of overcurrent relays 9.4-9.8, 9-4,
9.14 9-12
 speed 15.3.1 15-2
Check feature for frame-earth busbar protection 15.6.4 15-6
 stability 15.3.2 15-2
Check synchroniser 14.9.2, 14-10,
 types of protection system 15.4 15-3 22.8.1 22-8
Check system:
Bushing current transformers 6.4.5.2 6-9
 for frame-earth protection 15.6.4 15-6

 for high impedance busbar protection 15.8.3 15-12

 for low impedance protection 15.9.3 15-16

I-2
 Index

Choice of dead time, use in auto-reclose schemes 14.6.4 14-7 Condition monitoring (transformers) 16.18, 16-19,
24.5.1 25-5
Choice of harmonic (transformer protection) 16.9.2 16-10 Conditions for direction comparison, unit protection 10.3 10-2
Choice of reclaim time 14.6.5 14-8 Conducted and radiated emissions tests 21.3.9 21-6
CIP (Critical Infrastructure Protection); cyber security 24.3.2.1 24-14 Conducted and radiated immunity tests 21.3.10 21-7
standards
Circuit breakers: 18.5.3 18-5 Configuration; functions within a substation control 25.5.1 25-6
system
 air circuit breakers (ACBs) 18.5.3 18-5 Connections for directional relays 9.14, 9-12,
 closing time 14.4.1.3 14-4 9.17.1 9-18
Considerations with numerical relays 7.7 7-9
 dead time 14.6.4 14-7
Contact systems for relays 2.10.1 2-9
 for auto-reclose schemes 14.4.1.3, 14-4,
14.6.3, 14-7 Convention of direction of current flow, unit protection 10.2 10-2
 interrupting time 9.11.1, 9-9, Co-ordination of earth fault relays in three-phase four 18.7.2 18-8
14.4.1.3 14-4 wire systems
 miniature circuit breakers (MCBs) 18.5.1 18-4 Co-ordination of relays with fuses 9.12.3 9-11
 monitoring in numerical relays 7.6.3 7-8 Co-ordination problems in industrial and commercial 18.7 18-7
 moulded case (MCCB) 18.5.2 18-5 networks
Co-ordination procedure for overcurrent protection 9.2 9-1
 oil circuit breakers (OCBs) 18.5.4 18-6 relays
Core faults:
 opening time 14.4.1.3 14-4
 in generators 17.3 17-3
 SF6 circuit breakers 18.5.6 18-6
 in power transformers 16.2.6 16-3
 Vacuum circuit breakers (VCBs) 18.5.5 18-6 Core-balance current transformers (CBCT) 6.4.5.3 6-10
Circuit laws 3.5.1 3-9 Cross country fault analysis 4.4.6 4-9
Circuit quantities and conventions 3.4 3-4 CT supervision in high impedance busbar schemes 15.8.4 15-12
Circuit theorems 3.5.2 3-9 CT supervision in low impedance busbar schemes 15.9.4 15-16
Circuit variables 3.4.1 3-6 Current differential protection scheme 10.8, 10-6,
Circulating current system, spill current 10.4 10-2 10.10 10-8
Current distribution due to a fault 4.5 4-10
Circulating current system, unit protection 10.4 10-2
Current distribution factors 4.5.1 4-11
Class PX (IEC 60044) current transformers 6.4.4 6-9
Current reversal on double circuit lines, distance 13.2.2.1 13-2
Class X (BS3938) current transformers 6.4.4 6-9 protection
Current setting of a relay 9.10 9-8
Classification of power system disturbances 23.2 23-1
Current transformers:
Closing impulse time 14.10.4 14-11
 accuracy 6.4.1 6-7
Closing time of circuit breakers 14.4.1.3 14-4
 accuracy class 6.4.2 6-8
Combined differential and restricted earth fault 16.10 16-10
protection of  accuracy limit current 6.4.3 6-8
Combined I.D.M.T. and high set instantaneous 9.5 9-6
overcurrent relays  air gap 6.4.5.5 6-10
Commissioning tests 21.9 21-1,  all-optical transducer 6.5.1.3 6-17
21-15
Communication links 8.1, 8-1,  anti-remanence 6.4.6.2 6-10
24.2 24-2
Communications: definition 24.2 24-2  bar primary 6.4.5.2 6-9

Communications: OSI model 24.2.1 24-2  bushing 6.4.5.2 6-9

Comparison of transfer trip and blocking schemes 12.6 12-9  C Class 6.4.13 6-15

Complex quantities 3.3 3-2  class PX (IEC 60044-1) 6.4.4 6-9

Complex transmission circuits, protection of 13.1- 13-1,  class X (BS 3938) 6.4.4 6-9
13.7 13-12  construction 6.4.5 6-9
Complex variables 3.3.1 3-3
 current or ratio error 6.4.1.1 6-8
Composite error of current transformers 6.4.2 6-8

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

 equivalent circuit 6.4 6-7  protection scheme 2.2 2-3

 errors 6.4.1 6-7  protection system 2.2 2-3

 Hall-effect 6.5.2.1 6-19 Definitions of terms used in protection, control and Appendix A
automation
 harmonics in 6.4.11 6-15 De-ionisation of fault path 14.4.1.4, 14-4,
 hybrid 6.5.1.2 6-16 14.6.2 14-7
De-ionisation of fault path, auto-reclose schemes 14.4.1.4 14-4
 IEEE standards 6.4.13 6-15
Delayed auto-reclose scheme 14.9 14-9
 knee-point voltage 6.4.4 6-9
Delta/star transformer overcurrent protection 16.6 16-6
 line current 6.4.6.3 6-10
Delta-connected winding of a transformer 16.3, 16-4,
 linear 6.4.6.3 6-10 16.7 16-7
DeltaP; rate of change of power (SIPS) 20.4.2.1 20-13
 magnetisation curve 6.4.4 6-9
Design for maintenance of protection schemes 21.16 21-28
 non Conventional 6.5 6-15
Determination of sequence currents 4.4 4-6
 open circuit secondary voltage 6.4 6-7
Device numbers, list of ANSI Appendix B
 optical Instrument transducer 6.5.1 6-15,
24-13 Differential protection:
 optical sensor concept 6.5.1.1 6-16
 digital systems 10.8 10-6
 phase error 6.4.1.2 6-8
 electromechanical systems 10.7 10-5
 polarity check 21.9.3.1 21-19
 for sectionalised and duplicate busbars 15.7.1 15-8
 rated short-time current 6.4.9 6-12
 numerical systems 10.8 10-6
 ratio check 21.12.2 21-25
 of busbars 15.7- 15-7
 saturation 6.4.10 6-12 15.11 15-20
 of direct connected generators 17.5 17-4
 secondary current rating 6.4.8 6-11
 of generator-transformers 17.6 17-6
 secondary winding impedance 6.4.7 6-11
 of parallel feeders 13.2.1 13-2
 summation 6.4.5.4 6-10
 of transformer feeders 10.12.2 10-15
 supervision in numerical relays 7.6.2 7-8
 static systems 10.7 10-5
 test windings 6.4.12 6-15
 using analogue techniques 10.10 10-8
 tests 21.9.3, 21-19
21.12 21-24  using high impedance relays 10.5 10-3
 transient response 6.4.10 6-12
 using low impedance relays 10.4 10-2
Cyber security; principles of 24.3 24-11
 using optical fibre signalling 10.8.1 10-6

Digital current differential protection systems 10.8 10-6

D
Digital relays 7.4 7-3
D.C interupt test 21.3.1 21-4
Digital Substation
D.C. ramp tests 21.3.3 21-5
 current and voltage; digital transformation 24.4 24-15
D.C. voltage signalling 8.6.1 8-9
 cyber security; need for 24.3 24-11
DANH (Doubly Attached Node running HSR) 24.2.4.6 24-10
 cyber security; Standards 24.3.2 24-13
DANP (Doubly Attached Node running PRP) 24.2.4.5 24-10
 definition of 24.1 24-1
Dead line charging 14.9.2, 14-10,
22.8.1 22-8  enablers 24.1 24-1
Dead time in auto-reclose schemes 14.4.1, 14-3,
14.6.4, 14-7,  Ethernet devices 24.2.4.1 24-7
14.9 14-9  Ethernet topologies; star and ring 24.2.4.2 24-8
Definite time overcurrent relay 9.9 9-8
 IEC61850 Ethernet based 24.5.1 24-18
Definition of: communications, benefits of
 protection equipment 2.2 2-3  IEC61850-8.1 station bus 24.5.4 24-21

I-4
 Index

 IEC61850-9.2 process bus 24.5.6 24-22  example setting calculation 11.12 11-20

 redundant communications, principles 24.2.4.3 24-9  features of 11.7, 11-6,

11.11 11-19
Digital transducer technology 22.3 22-3  forward reach limitations 11.10.5 11-18

Direct and quadrature axis values of machines 5.8, 5-7,  fully cross-polarised mho 11.7.5 11-10
5.11 5-9
Direct under-reach scheme 12.3.1 12-3  implementation 11.8 11-13

Directional comparison blocking schemes 12.4, 12-6,  lenticular 11.7.4.3 11-9

13.5.5 13-11  lines using high-speed auto-reclose 14.8 14-8
Directional comparison unblocking scheme 12.5 12-8
 minimum length of line 11.10.2 11-17
Directional control of impedance type distance relays 11.7.2 11-6
 minimum voltage at relay terminals 11.10.1 11-17
Directional relays:
 multi-ended feeders 13.4 13-8
 connections 9.17.1 9-18
 multi-ended feeders, application 13.5 13-10
 earth fault 9.17- 9-17,
9.19 9-20  numerical types 11.3.2 11-3
 overcurrent 9.14 9-12
 of multi-ended feeders 13.3 13-6
 phase fault 9.14 9-12
 offset mho 11.7.4 11-9
Discrimination:
 other 11.7.9 11-12
 by current 9.3.2 9-2
 other zones 11.6.4 11-5
 by time 9.3.1 9-2
 over-reach 11.10.4 11-18
 time and current 9.3.3, 9-2,
 parallel feeders 13.2.2 13-2
9.11 9-9
Distance Relay  partially cross-polarised mho 11.7.6 11-11
 acceleration 12.3.3 12-4  percentage over-reach 11.10.4 11-18

 amplitude and phase comparison 11.7.1 11-6  percentage under-reach 11.10.3 11-17
 apparent impedance seen by 13.4.1 13-8  permissive over-reach transfer tripping 12.3.4 12-5

 application example 11.12 11-20  permissive under-reach transfer tripping 12.3.2 12-3

 application of multi-ended feeders 13.5 13-11  permissive under-reaching acceleration 12.3.3 12-4

 application problems 11.10, 11-17,  phase fault impedance measurement 11.9.1 11-15
13.4, 13-8,
14.8 14-8  plain feeders 11.6 11-4
 behaviour with earth faults 13.2.2.3 13-2
 plain impedance 11.7.2 11-6
 behaviour with earth faults on parallel 13.2.2.4 13-4
 power swing blocking 11.10.6 11-19
feeders
 behaviour with single circuit operation 13.2.2.5 13-4  principles of 11.2 11-2

 blocking over-reaching schemes: 12.4 12-6  quadrilateral 11.7.7 11-11

 characteristics: 11.7 11-6  reverse zones 11.6.4 11-5

 comparison of transfer trip and blocking 12.6 12-9  Schemes: 12.1- 12-1,
schemes 12.6 12-9
 current reversal on double circuit lines 13.2.2.1 13-2  self polarised mho 11.7.3 11-7

 digital types 11.3.2 11-3  settings: 11.6 11-4

 direct under-reach transfer tripping 12.3.1 12-3  starters for switched distance protection 11.8.1 11-14
scheme
 static types 11.3.1 11-2
 directional comparison unblocking 12.5 12-8
 switched distance protection relays 11.8.1 11-14
 earth fault impedance measurement 11.9.2 11-15
 transfer trip 12.3 12-3
 effect of earthing method 11.9 11-15
 under-reach 11.10.3 11-18
 effect of source impedance 11.9 11-15
 under-reach on parallel lines 13.2.2.2 13-2
 electromechanical types 11.3.1 11-2

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

 using zone 1 element 12.4.1.2 12-8 Earthing, system, effect of on zero sequence quantities 4.6 4-13

 using zone 2 element 12.4.1.1 12-7 Effect of load current, unit protection schemes 10.11.3 10-12

 voltage supervision in 11.10.7 11-19 Effect of:

 weak infeed conditions 12.3.5, 12-6  cascade type 6.2.8 6-5

12.4.2 12-8
 zone 1 11.6.1 11-5  construction 6.2.5 6-3

 zone 1 extension 12.2 12-2  errors in 6.2.1 6-2

 zone 2 11.6.2 11-5  protection of 6.2.4 6-3

 zone 3 11.6.3 11-5  residual connection of 6.2.6 6-4

 zones of protection 11.6 11-4  transient performance 6.2.7 6-4

Distribution transformer earthing of generators 17.2, 17-2,  voltage factor 6.2.2 6-3
17.8.2.2, 17-10 Effective setting of earth fault relays 9.16.1 9-15
Disturbance recorder 22.9 22-10
Effective setting of electromechanical earth fault relays 9.16.1.2 9-15
Disturbance recorder function in numerical relays 7.6.4 7-8
EIA232, EIA485 standards 24.2.2.1 24-4
DNP3; history 24.2.3.1 24-5
Electrical faults in stator windings 17.3, 17-3,
Double busbar substation, application of auto-reclose 14.12.1 14-12 19.6 19-6
Double circuit lines, current reversal on 13.2.2.1 13-2 Electrical type tests 21.2 21-2

Double frequency or broad band trap 8.5.3 8-5 Electromagnetic compatibility type tests 21.3 21-4

Downed conducer protection, high impedance 9.21 9-31 Electromagnetic voltage transformers:

DPWS (Device Profile for Web Services; applied to 24.3 24-11  cascade type 6.2.8 6-5
OSI model  construction 6.2.5 6-3
Dual fed substations, earth fault protection in 18.7.2 18-8
 errors in 6.2.1 6-2
Dual homing star topology 24.2.4.3 24-9
 protection of 6.2.4 6-3
Dynamic validation type testing 21.7 21-14
 residual connection of 6.2.6 6-4
Earth fault impedance measurement using distance 11.9.2 11-15
relays  transient performance 6.2.7 6-4

 voltage factor 6.2.2 6-3

E
Electromechanical relays 7.2 7-1
Earth fault protection for entire generator stator 17.8.4 17-11
winding Electromechanical unit protection systems 10.7 10-5
Earth fault protection:
Electrostatic discharge test 21.3.8 21-6
 of generators 17.5, 17-4,
Embedded generation 17.21 17-25
17.8 17-11
 of induction motors 19.6 19-6, End zones of a protected feeder (distance protection 12.1 12-1
19-8 schemes)
 of transformers 16.6- 16-6, Energy management suite (SIPS) 20.2 20-3
16.8, 16-8,
16.10 16-11 Energy saving; functions within a substation control 25.4 25-5
 on insulated networks 9.18 9-18 system
Environmental type tests 21.5 21-10
 on Petersen Coil earthed networks 9.19 9-20
EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute); IEC61850, 24.5 24-18
 sensitive 9.16.2, 9-17, development of
9.17 9-17 Equations and network connections for various types 4.4 4-6
 time grading of 9.16.1 9-15 of faults
Equivalent circuits:
 using overcurrent relays 9.16- 9-14,
9.19 9-20  auto-transformer 5.16 5-13
 with residually-connected CTs 18.7.1.1 18-8
 cables 5.23 5-23
Earthing arrangements for frame-earth protection 15.6.1 15-4
 current transformer 6.4 6-7
Earthing of distribution transformers used for 17.8.2.2, 17-10,
generator earthing 17.8.2.3 17-10  induction motor 19.7 19-9
Earthing transformer protection 16.11 16-12

I-6
 Index

 overhead lines 5.22 5-22 Fault current contribution from induction motors 18.8 18-10

 synchronous generator 5.2- 5-1, Fault detection and dtarting, unit protection schemes 10.11.5 10-13
5.10 5-8
 transformer 5.14- 5-10, Fault detector operating quantities, unit protection 10.11.9 10-14
5.15 5-11 schemes
 voltage transformer 6.2 6-2 Ferro-resonance 6.3.3 6-6

Errors: Field suppression of synchronous machine 17.15.5 17-18

 in current transformers 6.4.1 6-7 Fink Carlsen model 20.1.2 20-2

 in relays 9.11.2 9-9 Flags: indication 2.10.2 2-10

 in voltage transformers 6.2.1 6-2 Forward reach limitations of distance relays 11.10.5 11-18

Ethernet standards; IEEE 802.1D ring topology 24.2.4.2 24-8 Four-switch mesh substation, auto-reclosing applied 14.12.3 14-13
to
Ethernet standards; IEEE 802.1W ring topology 24.2.4.2 24-8
Four-wire dual-fed substations 18.7.2 18-8
(replaces 802.1D)
Ethernet standards; IEEE 802.3 24.2.2.1 24-4 Frame-earth protection (Howard protection):
Ethernet; LAN (Local Area Network) 24.2.4 24-7  check system 15.6.4 15-6
Ethernet; MAC (Media Addressing Control) 24.2.4 24-7  scheme for double bus station 15.6.3 15-6
Event recorder 22.9 22-9  single busbar 15.6.1 15-4
Example relay setting calculations:
 with sectioned busbars 15.6.2 15-5
 complex transmission circuits 13.7 13-13
Frequency degradation (SIPS) 20.2 20-3
 distance 11.12 11-20
Frequency shift keyed signals, protection signalling 8.6.3 8-9
 earth fault, overcurrent 9.20.2 9-27 using
Frequency variations ) power quality) 23.3.5 23-4
 generator 17.22 17-27
FSK (Frequency Shift Keying); signalling 10.10.1 10-8
 induction motor 19.14 19-12
Fully cross-polarised mho relay 11.7.5 11-10
 industrial systems 18.12 18-15
Fundamental theory 3.1-3.7 3-1,
 overcurrent 9.20 9-22 3-14
Fundamentals of protection practice 2.1-2.12 2-1
 parallel feeders – distance 13.7.1 13-13
Fuses for use with distribution transformers 16.6.1 16-6
 parallel feeders - overcurrent 9.20.3 9-27
Fusing factor 18.4.3 18-4
 phase fault 9.20.1 9-23
Fuzzy logic multi criteria algorithms 20.4.1 20-13,
 ring main 9.20.4 9-29
20-15
 transformer 16.19 16-22 Fuzzy logic; definition of 20.4.2.3 20-16

 unit protection 10.12 10-14

Examples of auto-reclosing schemes 14.12 14-12 G

Gas and oil surge relay (Buchholz relay) for 16.15.3 16-14
Examples of electromechanical unit protection systems 10.7 10-5
transformers
Examples of static unit protection systems 10.7 10-5 Gas devices for protection of transformers 16.15 16-14

Extremely inverse overcurrent relay 9.7 9-7 Generator:

 differential protection of direct-connected 17.5 17-4

generators
F  differential protection of generator- 17.6 17-6
Factors influencing HV auto-reclose schemes 14.4 14-3 transformer units
 diode failure 17.15.4 17-18
Factory (production) tests on relays 21.8 21-15
 direct axis 5.8, 5-7,
Failure of the prime mover 17.19.1 17-24 5.11 5-9
 earth fault protection for entire stator 17.8.4 17-11
Fast transient test 21.3.5 21-5
winding
Fault calculations 4.2-4.6 4-1  earthing 17.2 17-2

 effect of saturation 5.12 5-9

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Protection & Automation Application Guide

 embedded generation 17.21 17-25 GPS; satellite architecture and antenna (SIPS) 20.3.6 20-10

 examples of protection calculations 17.22 17-27 Grading margins for overcurrent relays:

 failure of prime mover 17.19.1 17-24  earth fault relays 9.16.1 9-15

 for direct-connected generators 17.20.1 17-24  fuse to fuse 9.12.2 9-11

 generator-transformer units 17.20.2 17-25  fuse to relay 9.12.3 9-11

 inadvertent energisation 17.13 17-15  relay to relay 9.12.1 9-10

 loss of excitation 17.16 17-18  sensitive earth fault relays 9.16.2 9-16

 loss of utility supply 17.21.1 17-26 Grading of ring mains 9.15, 9-13,
9.20.4 9-29
 loss of vacuum 17.19.3 17-24

 low forward power 17.11.1 17-13 H

 mechanical faults 17.19 17-24 Hall-effect current transformer 6.5.2.1 6-19

 negative phase sequence 17.12 17-13 Hardware architecture of numerical relays 7.5.1 7-5

 negative sequence 5.9 5-8 Harmonic content of inrush waveform, transformer 16.3.1 16-5

 neutral voltage displacement 17.8.1.3, 17-9, Harmonics (power quality) 23.3.4 23-4
17.8.2.4 17-11
Harmonics in current transformers 6.4.11 6-15
 overcurrent protection 17.7 17-6
Heating of induction motor windings 19.3, 19-2,
 overfluxing 17.14.1 17-15
19.7 19-9
 overfrequency 17.14.2 17-16 High frequency disturbance test 21.3.4 21-5

 overheating 17.18 17-23 High impedance busbar differential protection:

 overspeed 17.19.2 17-24  check feature 15.8.3 15-12

 overvoltage 17.9 17-12  CT supervision 15.8.4 15-12

 pole slipping protection 17.17 17-21  effective setting 15.8.2 15-11

 positive sequence 5.8 5-7  practical details of 15.8.6 15-13

 Protection of 17.1- 7-1,  primary operating current 15.8.2 15-11

17.22 17-27
 stability 15.8.1 15-9
 quadrature axis 5.5, 5-3,
5.8, 5-7 High Impedance differential protection (transformer) 17.5.2 17-5
5.11 5-9
 reverse power 17.11.2 17-13 High impedance relays in busbar protection 15.8 15-9

 rotor earth faults 17.15.1 17-16 High resistance earthing of generators 17.2 17-2

 rotor faults 17.15 17-16 High speed auto-reclosing:

 rotor shorted turn protection 17.15.3 17-17  on EHV systems 14.6- 14-6,
14.8 14-8
 stator earth fault 17.8 17-8  on lines using distance relays 14.8 14-8
 stator winding protection 17.4 17-4 High voltage capacitor of line coupling equipment 8.5.3 8-5
 unbalanced loading 17.12 17-13 Hi-Z high impedance downed conducer protection 9.21 9-31
 underfrequency 17.14.2 17-16 HMI (Human Machine Interface), definition of 25.2 25-1
 undervoltage 17.10 17-12 Howard protection (frame-earth protection) 15.6 15-4
 voltage controlled overcurrent 17.7.2.1 17-7 HRC fuse applications 16.6.1, 16-6,
18.4 18-3
 voltage restrained overcurrent 17.7.2.2 17-7
HRC fuses 18.4 18-3
 zero sequence 5.10 5-8
HSR (High-availability Seamless Redundancy) 24.2.4.6 24-10
Generator-transformer protection 17.6 17-6
Hubs, switches and routers; definition of 24.2.4.1 24-7
GOOSE (Generic Object Oriented Substation Events; 24.5.1, 24-18,
Hybrid transducer 6.5.1.2 6-16
IEC61850) 15.4 15-3
I-8
 Index

Hysteresis effect 6.4.10.2 6-14  examples of 19.14 19-12

 fault current contribution from 18.8 18-10

I  faults in rotor windings 19.8 19-10
IDMT overcurrent relay 9.4 9-4
 locked rotor 19.4.1 19-4
IEC relay symbols Appendix B
 loss of load 19.12 19-11
IEC60870-5-103; history 24.2.3.1 24-6
 modern relay design 19.2 19-1
IEC61850, benefits 24.5.1 24-18
 negative phase sequence 19.7 19-9
IEC61850, data model 24.5.3 24-20
 overcurrent 19.5 19-6
IEC61850, structure 24.5.2 24-19
 stalling 19.4.2 19-5
IEC61850-8.1 mapping to a protocol stack 24.5.4 24-21
 starting 19.4.1 19-4
IEC61850-9.2 benefits 24.5.6 24-22
 thermal 19.2 19-1
IEC61850-9.2 NCIT and process bus 24.5.6 24-22
 undervoltage 19.11 19-10
IEC62439-3 Clause 4; PRP redundant 24.2.4.5 24-10
Industrial and commercial power system protection:
communications
IEC62439-3 Clause 5; HSR redundant 24.2.4.6 24-10  automatic changeover systems 18.9 18-10
communications
IED (Intelligent Electronic Device), definition of 25.2 25-1  busbar arrangement 18.2 18-2

IEEE 1588 time synchronisation standard (SIPS) 20.3, 20-4,  capacitor control 18.11.1 18-12
20.3.6 20-10
 co-ordination problems 18.7 18-8
IEEE 1686; standard for substation IED cyber security 24.3.2.2 24-15
 discrimination 18.4.2 18-4
IEEE standards, as used in current transformer 6.4.13 6-15
 discrimination in 18.3 18-2
Impact of power quality problems 23.3 23-3
 effect of ambient temperature 18.4.4 18-4
Impedance notation 3.6 3-14
 examples of protection 18.12 18-15
Impedances:
 fault current contribution from induction 18.8 18-10
 direct-axis 5.11 5-9
motors
 negative sequence 5.9, 5-8,  fuse characteristics 18.4.1 18-3
19.7 19-9
 fusing factor 18.4.3 18-4
 positive sequence 5.8, 5-7,
5.14, 5-9,  HRC fuses: 18.4 18-3
5.17, 5-14,
19.7 19-10  motor power factor correction 18.11.2 18-13
 quadrature axis 5.5, 5-3,
5.11 5-9  power factor correction 18.11 18-12
 transformer 16.2 16-2
 protection against overvoltage 18.10 18-11
 zero sequence 5.10, 5-8,
 protection against reverse phase sequence 18.10 18-11
5.15, 5-11,
5.17 5-14  protection against undervoltage 18.10 18-11
Implementation of distance relays 11.8 11-13
 protection of cables by 18.4.3 18-4
Incorrect relay operation, reasons for 2.4 2-5
 protection of capacitors 18.11.3 18-13
Indicating LEDs in protection schemes 2.10.2 2-10
 protection of motors by 18.4.5 18-4
Indication or flags 2.10.2 2-10
Industrial circuit breakers 18.5 18-4
Induction motor characteristics 19.3- 19-2,
19.7 19-10 Industrial consumers, auto-reclosing requirements 14.4.1.2 14-4
Induction motor equivalent circuit 19.7 19-9
Initial commissioning tests 21.9 21-17
Induction motor protection:
Injection test equipment, secondary 21.10 21.21
 bearing failures 19.1 19-1
Injection tests, primary 21.12 21-24
 earth fault 19.6 19-6
Injection tests, secondary 21.11 21-23

I-9 D