ÈṢÙ AND THE LOGIC OF ‘ÈJÌ-Ò’GBẸ̀ TA’ IN TRADITIONAL YORÙBÁ THOUGHT

SYSTEM

By

AKANDE Michael Aina (PhD)

Department of Philosophy,

Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria.

Tel:2348033326922

[email protected]

&

OFUASIA, Emmanuel

Doctoral Student, Department of Philosophy,

Lagos State University, Nigeria.

Tel:2348162831077

[email protected]

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 ÈṢÙ AND THE LOGIC OF ‘ÈJÌ-Ò’GBẸ̀ TA’ IN TRADITIONAL YORÙBÁ THOUGHT

SYSTEM

AKANDE Michael Aina (PhD)

Department of Philosophy,

Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria.

Tel:2348033326922

[email protected]

Èṣù and the Logic of ‘Èjì-Ò’gbẹ̀ta’ in Traditional Yorùbá Thought System

Abstract
Traditional Yoruba culture has been taken largely to be religious and consequently unscientific
and illogical in comparison to Western culture. Prototypes or models of African thought systems
that have been offered to counter this narrative by scholars before now are adequate but not
encompassing enough, especially when they are applied to traditional Yorùbá ritual archives.
Many scholars have not been able to unearth the aspect of this archive that embodies logic in a
scientific manner. This study sets out to disclosing the logic in Yoruba ritual using Esu; a Yoruba
god. This research moves on to consider the traditional Yorùbá concept of Èṣù and how it
encompasses the logic that undergirds thought and theory among the people. Taking Èṣù, a
primordial divinity as the basis of analysis, we espouse three-value logic and three laws of
thought (identity, inclusive middle and non-contradiction) that are cardinal to the traditional
Yorùbá thought system. Deriving inspiration from the emphasis on cross-roads; Y-junction or T-
junctions as signifiers for Èṣù and through the method of analysis and hermeneutics, we propose
Èjì-Ò’gbẹ̀ta as an original three-value logic system that has shaped and guided the traditional
Yorùbá in matters of epistemology and metaphysics.

Keywords: African Logic, Èjì-Ò’gbẹ̀ta, Èṣù, Three-value logic, Yorùbá Philosophy.

Introduction
The onus of this research is to provide an original account of the logic that mediates thought,
theory and method in traditional Yorùbá thought system, using the personality of Èṣù as our

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basis. This is pertinent due to the recently emphasized and widespread acclamation that
traditional African logic has a different approach that meets but requires supplementary laws of
thoughts to Western-Aristotelian logic. This research is motivated by Chimakonam’s (2019)
groundbreaking work, Ezumezu (a prototype African logic). It is on the strength of the belief in a
common African heritage among the Ibos and Yorubas that led our search for a Yoruba version
of traditional logic. The result is alternative three value logic with its three laws of thought that
undergird thoughts and practices within traditional Yorùbá philosophy, using Èṣù, one of the
many primordial divinities whose function and existence is suggestive of an embodiment of the
logic that we seek to analyze. Consequently, this work is not only an attempt to show that
Yorùbá thought system embodies a tripartite logic but also to argue that it is a different type of
tripartite logic from Ezumezu and Karl Max’s.

Part 2: The Question of African Logic

It is instructive to begin with the understanding of Chimakonam (2019: 55) that African scholars
come under three schools of thought concerning the logic question. These are: the polemicists,
the apologists and the system builders. The task is now to examine the crux of each of these
schools of thoughts in order to have a grasp concerning the question of African logic, a
consequent of the philosophy question both of which seek to counter the racial denigration of the
primitive African.

The polemicists indicate that logic is indeed universal as it is applicable irrespective of clime.
What they fail to realize is that there is a wide lacuna between logic being universal and logic
being absolute. A principle may have universal application without taking the garb of finality.
Scholars in this orientation confused universalism with absolutism only to infer that there is no
such thing as African logic. For the sake of caution, these scholars are willing to grant that there
are logic traditions in Africa. And the logic traditions they have in mind is “the wholesale
applicability of Western logic as a universe of discourse” (Chimakonam 2019: 59). Prominent
African scholars that fall within this cadre are: Uduma Oji Uduma (2015), Moses Akin Makinde
(2010); and Kwasi Wiredu (1991). The common denominator among these minds is that the
notion of culture or geography-bound logic is not imprimatur. For Makinde (2010: 43), logic is a
universal affair like mathematics and cannot be relativised. Similarly, Wiredu (1991: 101)
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dismisses the question of African logic as “precipitous” and “blanket” speculations. For Wiredu,
it is wishful thinking to suppose that African logic exists. Similarly, Uduma (2009: 295)
highlights that those who propose the idea of African logic fail to understand that logic is
universal and topic neutral. The logic he claimed to be universal is of course, Western logic.
After these scholars, there exist some apologists who insist on the plausibility of not only African
logic but also logic traditions in Africa.

Chimakonam (2019: 56) grafted three strands of apologists, each with its core representative.
There are logical radicalists (Leopold Senghor (1995), Godwin Sogolo and Peter Winch); the
visionaries (Campbell S. Mommoh (2000) and Udo Etuk (2002)); and Cultural logicians or
ethnologicians (Kazeem Fayemi (2010), Edwin Etieyibo). The place of concord among these
minds is that it is possible to speak of African logic which is unique and applicable for the
Africans. The problem however, with the above scholars is that while they identified factors of
convergence or divergence between African and Western logic they failed to build formal
structure. For instance, Chimakonam contests that Verran did not make attempt to discourse the
substance of African logic, its structures and principles (2019: 69). He bemoans that “Asouzou’s
complementary logic falls short of a complete system on the one hand and rejects relative
systems of any form on the other hand” (Chimakonam 2019: 70). Chris Ijiomah (2014) did not
explicitly formulate the logical rules and principles as well as the laws of thought that undergird
his Harmonious monism. A system of logic comprises three objects: formal system,
methodology and philosophical logic. Ijiomah and others failed to construct a system of logic
that evinces these elements and the laws they conform to. A task this work intends to achieve.
In spite of their shortcomings, credit needs to be attributed to this group of minds as they serve
as the catalyst for a new set of African scholars who are the system builders. Following
Chimakonam, we took further, the gauntlet to produce a unique Yoruba logic.

The system builders, on the authority of Chimakonam (2019: 66) are “primarily interested in
constructing specific systems of logic that could be called African. In spite of the criticisms
leveled against others, Chimakonam’s (2019) improvements too are not without loops, since we
found that combining his three supplementary laws of thought with the classical Aristotelian
laws of thought in Ezumezu logic admits two inconsistent patterns, even when we agree with
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some elements that have to do with the inferential modes in Ezumezu logic. It is remarkable
when Chimakonam writes that:
…different logic traditions operate with a set of laws or
supplementary laws obtained by relaxing or tightening the three
traditional laws of thought. These supplementary laws like the ones
I formulated for African logic are not strictly opposed to the three
traditional (Aristotelian) laws such that may make systems in
different logic traditions irreconcilable. What the additional laws
warrant are nuances to the legal parameters that make statements in
each tradition consistent or inconsistent, contradictory or non-
contradictory, universal or absolute (Chimakonam, 2019: 134).

Chimakonam (2014;156) had reasoned that in interpreting reality one can adequately holds the
Aristotelian law of excluded middle, law of identity and his law of complementarity (q na-abughi
q). While we agree with Chimakonam concerning the innovations of supplementary laws,
through the tightening and relaxation of the traditional laws of thought, we found that accepting
the classical Aristotelian identity law together with a supplementary law of complementation,
marks inconsistency. It is baffling how ‘A’ can be a complement of ‘~A’ when by nature they
are (exclusively) world apart. We shall address this later. Traditional Yorùbá thought system
does not admit exclusive identity where an object or subject is only identical with itself but
thrives on inclusivity. This work identifies the laws of Inclusive Middle, Inclusive Identity and
Non-contradiction; all of which informed what we call the logic of Èjì-Ò’gbẹ̀ta. Interestingly, all
these are tied to the personality and significance of Èṣù.

Part 3: Èṣù and Its T-Junction as the Basis of Yorùbá Traditional Laws of Thought
In the preceding parts, we have implied a research gap which informs the leaning that African
logic is still in the making. It is in this spirit we investigate the traditional indigenous
epistemologies of the Yoruba culture in other to determine the veracity of such claim as
Mommoh (2000: 187) implores. The present research takes up this challenge as it interrogates
the Yorùbá ritual archives to extrapolate the logic that arbitrates thought, theory and practice
among the Yoruba people. And by ritual archives, we mean an “assemblage of words and texts,
symbols, shrines, images, performances and experiences that assist in the comprehension of the
African mind-view as philosophy, literature, history and much more” (Falola 2018: 913). The
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above motivation leads to the character and personality of Èṣù, toward the formulation of the
logic that we call ‘Èjì-Ò’gbẹ̀ta.’

It is the imploration of these minds that led us to the Local Expansion of Thoughts (LET) – the
regurgitation of the positive sides of Africa’s indigenous knowledge systems or ritual archives,
mediated by Africa-inspired logic for intellectual progress and abundance for Africa. LET
connotes the escape or detachment from Western control of power and knowledge which has for
so long consigned African scholarship to the margins of footnotes and gatherer of information
for Western acknowledgments (Falola, 2018: 896). LET encourages direct engagement of
African ritual archive as it frowns at arm-chair scholarship in order to unearth the original ideas
waiting for acknowledgement and pragmatic utility both for Africa and other parts of the world.
LET upon this reading will be antecedent to Global Expansion of Thoughts (GET) proposed by
Chimakonam (2015: 462) as a basis to analyze the journey of ‘reason’ which begins from the
philosophical place to the philosophical space, as a relentless quest toward the universal space
where intercultural engagement – the very hallmark of comparative thought – is unveiled as the
ultimate destination of ‘reason.’

This study considers Chimakonam’s (2015) GET as too ambitious and hasty, especially when it
is noticed that there are only scanty efforts lacking thorough engagement with African ritual
archive, in its original, undiluted form for the sake of extrapolating how traditional Africans
reflected. The diverse logic cultures in Africa need to interrogate one another in other to test their
global appeal and perhaps to arrive at a common denominator that mediates thinking for the
traditional African (Ofuasia, 2019: 78). Aristotle, Bertrand Russell, Alfred N. Whitehead, Jan
Lukasiewicz, engaged in logic because there was such a tradition from ancient Greece not
because it will be useful for other places. We agree with scholars who argued that it is
colonialism and the connection between power and knowledge that has allowed the temptation
that Western episteme are both absolute and universal (Falola, 2018: 896, Ake, 1981: 83).
African scholarship through GET must not fall into this contraption. This is why LET is a crucial
antecedent to GET. Africa’s thirst is the goal of knowledge and not the relentless quest towards
the universal space. Africa should compete with herself perhaps other peoples of the world may
emulate her ideas. The concern of LET however, is the satiation of the continent’s immediate
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problems. These are the loops that our LET seeks to overcome as we venture into African
indigenous episteme to extrapolate original ideas for the sake of Africa, using Èṣù as its fulcrum.

Èṣù is perhaps the most wrongly conceived among the òrìṣàs (divinities) in Yorùbá ontology. He
is known by different names to different people. According to Teresa Washington (2013: 315)
“The Yoruba call him Èṣù, Ẹlẹgbára and Ẹlẹgbà, but he has many names and homes. To the Fon
he is Legba; in African America he is Papa Joe; in the Caribbean he is Papa Labas and Loa
Legba; in Brazil he is Exu. He is the God of duality, multiplicity, duplicity, confusion and
evolution. Ẹlẹgbà is one of the most significant Gods, and his origin texts, manifestations and
contributions are innumerable.” He is the servant or messenger of God and other deities but Èṣù
is closer to Ọ̀rúnmìlà than any other god (Abimbola,1976:9). This is the case since Èṣù is usually
depicted at the top of the divining trays (Ọpọ́n Ifá) of the babaláwo (male Ifá diviner) or ìyanifá
(female Ifá diviner). Èṣù is primarily a special relations officer of Olódùmarè and a messenger of
the gods (Shitta-Bey, 2013: 79). It is noteworthy to know that the word Èṣù is a combination of a
prefix ‘È’ and a verb ‘ṣù’ (i.e. to harmonize or bring together). Hence, Èṣù may be seen as “one
who brings peoples or issues together for harmonious existence” (Adekola, 2013: 58).

Unfortunately, however, the personality of Èṣù among all the Yorùbá gods has suffered the most.
This is because Samuel Johnson (1921: 28), like Ajayi Crowther before him had surrendered that
Èṣù passes as the Biblical Satan, the Evil One, the author of all evils. When one considers the
personality of Èṣu rendered in Odù Òturùpọ̀n Méjì, his appellation as “He who belongs to
opposing camps without shame,” is underscored. Arrays of efforts on conceptual decolonization
have served to show that this is not the case (Ofuasia & Dasaolu, 2017); (Fayemi, 2013) and
(Laguda, 2013).This negative aspect highlighted by Crowther and Johnson are however silent on
the positive aspects of this divinity which gives him a dual nature to the actual world. There are
various submissions and views concerning this personality, aside the misleading equation with
the antagonistic force in the Abrahamic monotheisms.
On the one hand, there are interpretations that portray him as an entity that descended to Ilé-Ifẹ,
present day Osun State in Nigeria, with the Odùs and served as the messenger among them
(Epega, 1904: 26-7). On the other hand, there are reports that he was born at Ilé-Ifẹ by Ọlọ̀jà
(Epega, 1931: 21). There is no consensus regarding the origin of Èṣù. It is also recorded that he
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has special considerations for Benin too (Adekola, 2013: 59). This is evident in one of his praise
names:
King of Kétu land
Alákesi of Ẹmẹ̀rẹ̀
The mighty one of Mògún
Atúnwàṣe of Bíní land
Prosperous man on the throne
He who pleads for the oppressed

Whereas the foregoing hints that Èṣù is affiliated to Kétu (Benin Republic), Ẹmẹ̀rẹ̀ (Kogi state),
Mògún (Osun state) and Bíni (Edo state), it is interesting to note that he enjoys worship in
different cultures including overseas.

For this study however, we submit that Èṣù is not a deity per se rather he is a divinity. It is
pertinent to make it clear here that deification is conferred by human beings on somebody who
had lived an exemplary or uncommon life. The Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary of English
says to deify is to “treat or worship somebody as a god”. This invariably means the person has a
physical existence and human attributes but because of the impacts in the immediate society,
honour of divinity was conferred. The dictionary explains further by giving examples of kings in
the medieval period who were conferred with such honour. However, it is not impossible to have
a figure, who is both a deity and a divinity. In other words, a spiritual being, who possesses a
divine nature could also live on earth in human form. Jesus Christ, Obatala and some Yoruba
primordial gods are good examples of divine beings who came to live on earth but they are
primarily divinities rather than deities. Perhaps this is one of the reasons George Brandon (2014)
asserts that “defining an orisha as a deity does not do justice to the concept in large part…since
some orishas are complex dimensional unity”. In any case a careful study of the personality of
Esu does not show that he had actual historical existence in human form though he appeared to
human beings occasionally on earth. The literature that portrays him as a king in Ketu could not
point to specific exploits of Esu as a king in Ketu as it is common in the eulogies of other gods.

In any case the ambivalence nature of Esu and his attributes of being Eledumare’s and the gods’
messenger is inconsistent with the belief that Esu was human and a person who can be localized
to a place. After all, other gods do not live in the same locality to warrant sending Esu on
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errands. Many descriptions of Esu reveal that he is primarily a spirit being who can appear in
many forms and engages in different tasks. (Scheub, 2000). So, these attributes and functions
portend Esu more as a divinity because divinity means to be “coming from or connected with
God” (Oxford dictionary). Divinity in this wise is a “quality of being a god”. It is not what is
conferred on someone but what someone possesses.

Nevertheless, Èṣù, in our own interpretation is an embodiment of various aspects of Yorùbá

traditional philosophical system. Through the metaphorical significance of Èṣù, we may
understand Yorùbá thought system in its various manifestations and why Èṣù serves as the
magnetic force that conjoin Yoruba gods or Yorùbá logic and its laws of thought. This logic
system we have christened Èjì-Ò’gbẹ̀tá is a three-value logic based on Èṣù’s preferences for
three-crossroad – what some people called T-junction or Y-junction. The Yorùbá however calls
this point orítá-mẹ̀ta. This logic is named Èjì-Kò-gba-mẹ̀tá meaning ‘three parts that eventually
become two’ because the three-road path from the angle of a (strange) traveler eventually
becomes two; the right and the left. The term Eji-ko-gba-meta is a negative rendition of the
phrase Meta-di-meji (three became two). In this vein, it is a three-value that synthesizes and
eventually produced two values: opinion, falsity and the truth. We prefer to use the negative
rendition of meta-di-meji because it is in accordance with the way principles (Odu) are named in
Ifa corpus such as Eji-Ogbe. Eji-ogbe is accidentally the first and encompassing principle (Odu)
of ifa. Nevertheless Eji-o’gbeta is not an ifa principle but a system of logic that can help the
understanding of Ifa corpus.

Orítá-mẹ̀ta is a place where three roads meet, the abode of Èṣù where all the sacrifices are placed
for him to take to the relevant òrìṣà. Physically, Orítá-mẹ̀ta signifies a place of confusion in
Yorùbá narrations. It is a point where strangers or travelers usually get confused regarding the
route to trail. This situation forces strangers or travelers to socialize with indigenes or those who
are members of the community. The stranger is expected to greet, be courteous and then ask
question about the authentic path to a destination. The epistemic impact of this is similar to the
Socratic dialectics where ignorance (confusion) is a step to knowledge if one is ready to learn.

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Metaphysically, the three roads represent three aspects of life: (1) the life of the unborn and (2)
the life of individuals alive and (3) the life of the spirits. The unborn child is the stranger on a
journey to life, but during the process of birth, there are two options before them: (a) become a
living or (b) become a dead (spirit) person. This suggests to us a law of non-contradiction; a
child cannot be in the womb forever. However, if the child grows to be an adult or an old man
and then dies, death is not an end in Yoruba belief system. So, a dead person may become an
ancestor otherwise characterized as a living-dead. The concept of the living-dead in Yorùbá
metaphysics suggests a law of inclusive middle, where one can be dead, that is be a spirit and the
same time a corporeal individual. Even Yoruba people believe that people who died untimely
(akudaaya) may be elevated to the status of living-dead if they are yet to fulfill their destiny.

The concept of living-dead is also predicated on Yorùbá’s idea or notion of identity. When a
child is identical either mentally or physically to a dead person, the child is said to be an
incarnate of the dead person. A child in this sense can only be identical to a member of the same
family with a connection to the ancestors. Many different literatures in African thought system
point to interconnectivity of things in the universe. In African cosmology the material and the
immaterial are interrelated such that there is no separation between the two worlds (Okoro, 2011,
2013, Senghor, 1964). Consequently, there is no ‘exclusive identity’ in traditional Yorùbá laws
of thought as against Aristotelian logic where a thing is only identical with itself. Some
interpretations of this metaphysics termed it harmonious monism, integrative metaphysics or
binary system as against a dualism. This is suggestive of a system that prides in interdependency
of things rather than independency; where lone objects and subjects exist. The notion that ‘A’ is
only identical to ‘A’ portrays a metaphysics where ‘A’ is completely independent in appearance,
purpose and content. In Yorùbá thought system predicated on the Èṣù metaphor of T-junctions,
there is no such ‘stand-alone-atom’ that only resembles itself. In Yoruba metaphysics there is a
confluence of things in spite of any distinction one may make. It is with this understanding that
we propose the law of inclusive identity rather than exclusive identity as a Yorùbá law of
thought.
Inclusive identity states that everything in life is connected to other things and can resemble
other things either in appearance, purpose or content. Though, a thing can be distinguished
among other connectors but it is not possible for it to be isolated. This is what Whitehead in his
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process metaphysics calls ‘nexus’ – “any such particular fact of togetherness among actual
entities…The ultimate facts of immediate actual experience are actual entities, prehensions, and
nexus. All else is, for experience or derivative abstraction” (1978: 20).

This logic we have identified is a logic that accommodates motion unlike Aristotelian logic. It is
a logic of dialectics that accommodates the union of opposites. Dialecticians understand that a
thing is meaningful only in comparison with other things rather than itself, including its opposite.
In this light ‘A’ is meaningful when we compare it to ‘~A’ (not A). It is instructive to say here
that the negation of ‘~A’ will produce not ~A which is identical with A, though not in
appearance but in purpose.
In like manner, Yoruba three valued logic recognises the relation between opposites which can
be the basis of confusion but it is a step to knowing the truth. So, from the point of view of a
stranger, his opinion of the right way has two possible outcomes: truth or falsity. The three roads
eventually become two thereby suggesting the law of non-contradiction in Yorùbá thought
system. Confusion in this context is eventually resolved in a non-contradictory way; because
human opinion aligns either with the truth or with falsity. In essence, in-spite of the connection
of the road parts, a person cannot travel opposite ways at a time.

Part 4: Interpretation of Yoruba Laws of Thought

Thus far, we have identified three laws of thought in traditional Yorùbá philosophy as follows:
(1) The law of inclusive middle (2) The law of inclusive identity and (3) The law of non-
contradiction. The individual laws of thought have names of Yoruba gods: (1) The law of
inclusive middle is Ọ̀rúnmìlà which means “only heaven knows who will survive.” In this
connection a proposition can only be true, false (A v ~A) or ~(A ^ ~A);or remain an opinion
(possibly false or true). A Yoruba proverb that explains this law of inclusive middle says Kijipa
ni aso ole, ofi ni aso agba. Agba ti ko ni ofi ki o r’oju ra kijipa meaning ‘thick cloths are for lazy
people and elegant cloths are for the respected aged people but a respected aged person who has
no elegant cloth should remove shame and buy a thick cloth’. The implication of this proverb is
that though there are two ways of identifying people; those with thick (non-elegant) cloths or
elegant cloths. Thick (non-elegant) cloths signifies laziness (low esteem) while elegant cloth
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signifies respect (high esteem) however, if an elder cannot afford an elegant cloth that will confer
certain respect on them it is better for such to buy thick (non-elegant) cloth that will make people
see you as a lazy person instead of going out naked because the main purpose of both cloths is to
cover nakedness. It is a better low esteem to be seen as lazy rather than to be seen naked since
nakedness portrays one as animalistic or insane which is worse than being seen as lazy. So, one
can still take a middle course of action to be an agba (respected aged) and wear cloth of ole (lazy
people).
(2) The law of non-contradiction is Odùdùwà from the phrase odù tó dá wà meaning a
distinguishing or individualistic principle ~(A and ~A). Odùdùwà is the father of the Yorubas
who founded Ile-Ife, believe to be the cradle of Yoruba race. In Yoruba myth of creation Obatala
was given the task of solidifying the earth but he got drunk and slept off. When the task is being
delayed Oduduwa came in to perform that task. Though this myth is controversial because other
stories fingered Obatala to have descended with a chain just like Oduduwa to perform the actual
act of solidifying the earth, what is sure is that there is link between both divinities. Obatala
worshippers just like Oduduwa’s adherents are forbidden to take alcohol. We interpret this
injunction as a way of avoiding confusion to clear thought since alcohol can impair one’s
thinking process or require task. According to a Yoruba proverb ileke ma ja sile ma ja si ita,
ibikan ni ileke ma ja si meaning if one is preventing a waist bead from cutting/snapping either
within or without, it is sure that one day it will eventually cut in one of the two places. So, no
matter how a thing is connected or bonded to itself or other things, there is a possibility of
disentanglement or distinguishing them.
(3) The law of inclusive identity is Ọbàtálá. Ọbàtálá is the god in charge of creation of human
body. And he creates humans in identical form (A is identical with A 1 or An); where the integers
represent number of individuals in the same family; this informed the Yorùbá saying that “méjì,
méjì ni a dá ènìyàn.” (There is always a twin of every human being created). In other words, ‘A’
can be identical to A1 orA2 even when the first A is different from the others in certain respect
but they are identical in other respect. Yoruba idea of identity is in a way associated with the
principle of resemblance and similarity either of purpose or of appearance. A proverb that
conveys this, says Ti ewe ba pe lara ose a di ose meaning if a leave rub off a soap for a period of
time it will eventually become a soap. The notion of identity expressed here is that of purpose
rather than of appearance. The Yoruba are aware that soaps and leaves do not physically look
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alike but a leave that has rubbed off soap for a long period can be used to wash hands in the
absence of a soap thereby serving the same function; after all something bears the identity of a
soap because it is soapy and not because of its appearance.
The idea we espoused here sheds more light on the relationship that exist among these Yoruba
gods and perhaps why primordial gods like Esu, Ọ̀rúnmìlà, Odùdùwà and Ọbàtálá were the ones
sent by Olódùmarè (God) to create and make the earth habitable for humans. In this wise, they
are the creative spirits behind human thought, as understanding their workings makes the world
intelligible.

The implication is that rationality and skills as dictated by the laws of thought are the principles
to living a meaningful life. It also explains the connection between Èṣù and the pantheon of gods
in Yorùbá traditional religion. It is the case that there is no shrine in Yorùbá land where the
image of Èṣù is absent; as such they infer that Èṣù is an òrìṣà with a very high significance in
Yorùbá spirituality (Adekola, 2013: 57). Èṣù is therefore, an embodiment of thought and by
implication logic since logic is interested in the outcome of human thought process (Copi &
Cohen, 2002: 3).

One should not be surprised by the redefinition of the names of these Yoruba gods because
Robin Horton (1967) has proposed that most of the misconceptions about African traditional
philosophy are a product of the language the ancient people employed to explain their
philosophy. For him, religious language of traditional African people may differ from scientific
language of the West but the theoretical entities described by them have the same characteristics.
Atoms, protons and electrons are invisible entities just like the gods in African thought system.
In this direction what Africans need to do is to employ modern scientific language in explaining
how Africans view their realities for contemporary knowledge based system. This line of
thinking has been proved right by the Èṣù metaphor employed in this research. Martin Ajei,
reiterates this when he opines that:
The principle underlying methods of scientific practice,
interpreted more broadly than that commonly understood in
the West, are embedded in the philosophies of many
traditional African cultures, and that certain African
indigenous concepts become viable scientific postulates for
the explanation of the “paranormal” (2009: 23).
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The tripod of life exemplified in Èṣù metaphor has epistemic, metaphysical, logical and ethical
significances that cannot be exhausted here. For instance, the road the stranger is coming from
represents opinion or idea which is neither true nor false. It is a kind of null value. This opinion
could be a product of innate idea or prior information which is not strong or rooted in experience
and therefore, can be modified when it comes in contact with other information. At the junction
where a stranger becomes confused; the saving grace will be the virtue the person will display
toward other people, especially those who are conversant with the road in question. In this wise,
character becomes an important tool to attaining knowledge or correct information. A good
character towards passersby will determines whether the stranger gets the right information to
the desired destination whereas a bad character can make the stranger to be misled on the wrong
path. This is an indication that virtue is a necessary ingredient to the attainment of knowledge in
Yoruba epistemology (Akande, 2017: 264-266).

The truth table of this logic system in Boolean expression is, 0 = (opinion), 1 = (false) and 11 =
(true). The three values however, only relate in pairs among each other. This is evident from ifa
divination system which is binary in nature and the fact that a confused stranger at a confluence
requires a second information to move ahead. This is the main reason why this logic is named
Eji-o’gbeta, meaning even when there are three values, they do not all relate together at once
only two values do. Consequent to this, there are three values but two inputs are required and one
output will emerge: 0-1, 0-11 or 1-11. The output will depend on the situation under
consideration. In the first input where opinion and falsity meets the output is accepting false
information. In the second input where opinion and truth meet the outcome is accepting the truth
while in the third set where falsity and truth meet, the possible outcome is modification of one’s
opinion or suspension of judgment. This explains the Yoruba saying o se se meaning ‘it is
possible’. The sign of possibility we have adopted here is 0+. Such statement always represents
indecision or an attempt to modify existing position. A change in opinion is possible even when
a previous opinion or the current one has not been decided to be true or false. There are times
when we hold an aspect of a position while still accepting an aspect of a new suggestion
depending on the situation. A representative truth table is presented below:

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Since the variables are three with the possibility of having two inputs then the calculation is 3 2,
which will give us nine (9) spaces.
A B Output
0 1 1
0 1 1
0 11 11
1 11 0+
1 0 1
1 0 1
11 1 0+
11 11 11
11 0 0

One observation from the table above is that there is no box where the combination 0 – 0 exist. It
is so because the strangers travelling to an unknown destination are the ones that are opinionated
rather than inhabitants who have knowledge of their domain or environment. These inhabitants
though know the terrain but any of them may decide to give false information depending on the
personality and the behavior exhibited by the travelers. So, two strangers’ opinions cannot meet.
It is necessary to state at this juncture that motion is the key in dialectical logic of this nature and
as such it is a situational logic unlike Aristotle’s logic that assumes an absolute or constant
situation. With motion time is of essence; the time, an event happened and the virtue of the
personality involved are factors to be considered in dialectical logic. This is why Karl Marx
divided the epochs (time) of history and discussed the outcome of events depending on the
classes (people) and the behaviours they exhibited.

From the explanation so far into the proposal of the personality of Èṣù as a symbol for the
establishment of a logic that is truly African, it is pertinent to disclose that Èjì-Ògbẹ̀tá logic
differs from Chimakonam’s (2019) three valued logic on some levels. First, whereas the latter
admits the Aristotelian classical laws of thought but proposes three other supplementary laws,
our logic does not admit all the three classical laws of thought. This is owing to our
understanding that the retention of the law of exclusive (strict) identity and the emphasis on a
complimentary third value will be both incoherent and inconsistent to traditional Yorùbá way of
thinking. The Aristotelian laws of exclusive identity and excluded middle presupposed that an

15
object ‘A’ cannot flow or dissolve into another object ‘~A’ and vice versa. It is a dual logic with
a monistic metaphysics. It suggests that there is only one reality in existence, which can also go
out of existence. This belief does not envisage existence and non-existence existing side by side.
If this is the case then existence cannot complement non-existence. Whereas in Yoruba
metaphysics reality is dual (spiritual & physical) and they co-exist. This to our mind is situation
that can admit logic of complimentary or supplementary relationship; which African metaphysics
recognizes. The second difference proceeds from the first, in the sense that Yoruba logic as
exposed is shaped by Yoruba metaphysics while Chimakonam had preferred a logic that shaped
Igbo metaphysics. Chimakonam error stems from his attempt to globalise this logic by arguing
that his additional laws of complementarities can co-exist with Aristotelian laws, this to us is
conflating two totally different metaphysics.

Conclusion
The effort in this work, above all has been geared towards making an interpretation of African
indigenous epistemology and attempt to extrapolate the idea as the African progenitors used
them rather than employing contemporary yearnings to distort the originality of their ideas. The
logic we have espoused here may not be the only idea in Yoruba epistemology. Ours is a logic
based on Esu metaphor, it is not impossible to discover any other one based on some other ritual
system in traditional Yoruba culture. It can even be argued that this logic belongs to Esu as a
philosopher in ancient Yoruba Philosophy. In addition to the foregoing, one needs to also
understand that this logic differs from Marx’s in some respect. Marx’s system though a triad, is a
carry-over from Hegel’s two opposing variables that coalesced in a synthesis into a third value.
Eji-o’gbeta logic harbours existing three values combined and mutate into two (disjunction)
within contextual possibilities.

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