2 Colegio de San Juan de Letran v. Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran

4/8/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 340
VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 18, 2000 587

Colegio De San Juan De Letran vs. Association of
Employees and Faculty of Letran
*
G.R. No. 141471. September 18, 2000.
COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, petitioner, vs.

ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES AND FACULTY OF
LETRAN and ELEONOR AMBAS, respondents.
Appeals; It is axiomatic that the findings of fact of the Court of

Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court and
will not be reviewed or disturbed on appeal.—After a thorough
review of the records of the case, this Court finds that petitioner
has not shown any compelling reason sufficient to overturn the
ruling of the Court of Appeals affirming
_______________
*FIRST DIVISION.
588
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Colegio De San Juan De Letran vs. Association of Employees and

Faculty of Letran
the findings of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. It is

axiomatic that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court and will not be
reviewed or disturbed on appeal. In this case, the petitioner failed
to show any extraordinary circumstance justifying a departure
from this established doctrine.
Labor Law; Collective Bargaining; Words and Phrases; “Duty

to Bargain Collectively,” Defined.—As regards the first issue,
Article 252 of the Labor Code defines the meaning of the phrase
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000178ad24dae22760a9b2003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/15
“duty to bargain collectively,” as follows: Art. 252. Meaning of

duty to bargain collectively.—The duty to bargain collectively
means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and
convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose
of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work
and all other terms and conditions of employment including
proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under
such agreement and executing a contract incorporating such
agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not
compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any
concession.
Same; Same; An employer’s utter lack of interest in

bargaining with the union is a clear violation of Article 250 of the
Labor Code governing the procedure in collective bargaining, and
a company’s refusal to make counter-proposal to the union’s
proposed CBA is an indication of its bad faith.—Petitioner’s utter
lack of interest in bargaining with the union is obvious in its
failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the
latter. More than a month after the proposals were submitted by
the union, petitioner still had not made any counter-proposals.
This inaction on the part of petitioner prompted the union to file
its second notice of strike on March 13, 1996. Petitioner could only
offer a feeble explanation that the Board of Trustees had not yet
convened to discuss the matter as its excuse for failing to file its
reply. This is a clear violation of Article 250 of the Labor Code
governing the procedure in collective bargaining, x x x As we have
held in the case of Kiok Loy vs. NLRC, the company’s refusal to
make counter-proposal to the union’s proposed CBA is an
indication of its bad faith. Where the employer did not even
bother to submit an answer to the bargaining proposals of the
union, there is a clear evasion of the duty to bargain collectively.
In the case at bar, petitioner’s actuation show a lack of sincere
desire to negotiate rendering it guilty of unfair labor practice.
Same; Same; Certification Elections; In order to allow the

employer to validly suspend the bargaining process there must be a
valid petition for certification election raising a legitimate
representation issue.—In order to
589
VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 18, 2000 589

Faculty of Letran
allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process

there must be a valid petition for certification election raising a
legitimate representation issue. Hence, the mere filing of a
petition for certification election does not ipso facto justify the
suspension of negotiation by the employer. The petition must first
comply with the provisions of the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules. Foremost is that a petition for certification
election must be filed during the sixty-day freedom period.
Same; Same; Same; Contract Bar Rule; Under the “Contract

Bar Rule,” if a collective bargaining agreement has been duly
registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Labor Code, a
petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can
only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date
of such agreement; The rule is that despite the lapse of the formal
effectivity of the CBA the law still considers the same as
continuing in force and effect until a new CBA shall have been
validly executed.—The “Contract Bar Rule” under Section 3, Rule
XI, Book V, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code,
provides that: “. . . . If a collective bargaining agreement has been
duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a
petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can
only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date
of such agreement.” The rule is based on Article 232, in relation to
Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of the Labor Code. No petition for
certification election for any representation issue may be filed
after the lapse of the sixty-day freedom period. The old CBA is
extended until a new one is signed. The rule is that despite the
lapse of the formal effectivity of the CBA the law still considers
the same as continuing in force and effect until a new CBA shall
have been validly executed. Hence, the contract bar rule still
applies. The purpose is to ensure stability in the relationship of
the workers and the company by preventing frequent
modifications of any CBA earlier entered into by them in good
faith and for the stipulated original period.
Same; Same; Same; Unfair Labor Practices; An employer who

sternly refuses to bargain in good faith with the employee union is
guilty of unfair labor practice.—In the case at bar, the lifetime of
the previous CBA was from 1989-1994. The petition for
certification election by ACEC, allegedly a legitimate labor
organization, was filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) only on May 26, 1996. Clearly, the petition
was filed outside the sixty-day freedom period. Hence, the filing
thereof was barred by the existence of a valid and existing
collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, there is no
legitimate (representation issue and, as such, the filing of the
petition for certification election did not constitute a bar to the

ongoing negotiation. Reliance, therefore, by peti-
590

Faculty of Letran
tioner of the ruling in Lakas Ng Manggagawang Makabayan v.

Marcelo Enterprises is misplaced since that case involved a
legitimate representation issue which is not present in the case at
bar. Significantly, the same petition for certification election was
dismissed by the Secretary of Labor on October 25, 1996. The
dismissal was upheld by this Court in a Resolution, dated April
21, 1997. In view of the above, there is no doubt that petitioner is
guilty of unfair labor practice by its stern refusal to bargain in
good faith with respondent union.
Same; Same;Management Prerogatives; Illegal Dismissals;

While the right of an employer to terminate the services of an
employee for a just or authorized cause is recognized, nevertheless,
the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of
law and pursuant to the tenets of equity and fair play.—To justify
the dismissal, petitioner asserts that the union president was
terminated for cause, allegedly for insubordination for her failure
to comply with the new working schedule assigned to her, and
pursuant to its managerial prerogative to discipline and/or
dismiss its employees. While we recognize the right of the
employer to terminate the services of an employee for a just or
authorized cause, nevertheless, the dismissal of employees must
be made within the parameters of law and pursuant to the tenets
of equity and fair play. The employer’s right to terminate the
services of an employee for just or authorized cause must be
exercised in good faith. More importantly, it must not amount to
interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise
of their right to self-organization because it would amount to, as
in this case, unlawful labor practice under Article 248 of the
Labor Code.
Same; Same; Same; Right to Self-organization; The right to

self-organization of employees must not be interfered with by the
employer on the pretext of exercising management prerogative of
disciplining its employees.—In this regard, we find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings of the Court of Appeals affirming
the findings of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The right
to self-organization of employees must not be interfered with by

the employer on the pretext of exercising management
prerogative of disciplining its employees. In this case, the totality
of conduct of the employer shows an evident attempt to restrain
the employees from fully exercising their rights under the law.
This cannot be done under the Labor Code.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
591
VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 18, 2000 591

Julieto R. Marco for petitioner.
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the

reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 9 August 1999, dismissing the petition
filed by Colegio de San Juan de Letran (hereinafter,
“petitioner”) and affirming the Order of the Secretary of
Labor, dated December 2, 1996, finding the petitioner
guilty of unfair labor practice on two (2) counts.
The facts, as found by the Secretary of Labor and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
“On December 1992, Salvador Abtria, then President of

respondent union, Association of Employees and Faculty of
Letran, initiated the renegotiation of its Collective Bargaining
Agreement with petitioner Colegio de San Juan de Letran for the
last two (2) years of the CBA’s five (5) year lifetime from 1989-
1994. On the same year, the union elected a new set of officers
wherein private respondent Eleanor Ambas emerged as the newly
elected President (Secretary of Labor and Employment’s Order
dated December 2, 1996, p. 12).
Ambas wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but
petitioner, through Fr. Edwin Lao, claimed that the CBA was
already prepared for signing by the parties. The parties submitted
the disputed CBA to a referendum by the union members, who
eventually rejected the said CBA (Ibid., p. 2).
Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Labor
Arbiter Edgardo M. Madriaga decided in favor of petitioner.
However, the Labor Arbiter’s decision was reversed on appeal

before the NLRC (Ibid., p. 2).
On January 1996, the union notified the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB) of its intention to strike on the
grounds (sic) of petitioner’s: non-compliance with the NLRC (1)
order to delete the name of Atty. Federico Leynes as the union’s
legal counsel; and (2) refusal to bargain (Ibid., p. 1).
On January 18, 1996, the parties agreed to disregard the
unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on anew five-year CBA
starting 1994-1999. On February 7, 1996, the union submitted its
proposals to petitioner, which notified the union six days later or
on February 13, 1996 that the same had been submitted to its
Board of Trustees. In the meantime, Ambas was informed
through a letter dated February 15, 1996 from her
592

Faculty of Letran
superior that her work schedule was being changeAd from

Monday to Friday to Tuesday to Saturday. Ambas protested and
requested management to submit the issue to a grievance
machinery under the old CBA (Ibid., pp. 2-3).
Due to petitioner’s inaction, the union filed a notice of strike on
March 13, 1996. The parties met on March 27, 1996 before the
NCMB to discuss the ground rules for the negotiation. On March
29, 1996, the union received petitioner’s letter dismissing Ambas
for alleged insubordination. Hence, the union amended its notice
of strike to include Ambas’ dismissal. (Ibid., pp. 2-3).
On April 20, 1996, both parties again discussed the ground
rules for the CBA renegotiation. However, petitioner stopped the
negotiations after it purportedly received information that a new
group of employees had filed a petition for certification election
(Ibid., p. 3).
On June 18, 1996, the union finally struck. On July 2, 1996,
public respondent the Secretary of Labor and Employment
assumed jurisdiction and ordered all striking employees including
the union president to return to work and for petitioner to accept
them back under the same terms and conditions before the actual
strike. Petitioner readmitted the striking members except Ambas.
The parties then submitted their pleadings including their
position papers which were filed on July 17, 1996 (Ibid., pp. 2-3).
On December 2, 1996, public respondent issued an order
declaring petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice on two counts
and directing the reinstatement of private respondent Ambas
with backwages. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which
1
was denied in an Order dated May 29, 1997 (Petition, pp. 8-
9).”
Having been denied its motion for reconsideration,

petitioner sought a review of the order of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment before the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court dismissed the petition and affirmed the
findings of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of
Appeals sets forth:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this Petition is

DISMISSED, for being without merit in fact and in law.
_______________
1Rollo, pp. 32-34.
593
VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 18, 2000 593

Faculty of Letran
With cost to petitioner.

2
SO ORDERED.
Hence, petitioner comes to this Court for redress.

Petitioner ascribes the following errors to the Court of
Appeals:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED

WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE
RULING OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT WHICH DECLARES PETITIONER LETRAN
GUILTY OF REFUSAL TO BARGAIN (UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE) FOR SUSPENDING THE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS WITH RESPONDENT AEFL,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SUSPENSION OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS WAS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE FILING OF
A PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION BY A RIVAL
UNION WHO CLAIMED TO COMMAND THE MAJORITY OF
THE EMPLOYEES WITHIN THE BARGAINING UNIT.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND

ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR

AND EMPLOYMENT WHICH DECLARES PETITIONER
LETRAN GUILTY OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE FOR
DISMISSING RESPONDENT AMBAS, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT HER DISMISSAL WAS CAUSED BY HER
INSUBORDINATE ATTITUDE, SPECIFICALLY, HER
REFUSAL 3TO FOLLOW THE PRESCRIBED WORK
SCHEDULE.
The twin questions of law before this Court are the

following: (1) whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor
practice by refusing to bargain with the union when it
unilaterally suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) upon mere
information that a petition for certification has been filed
by another legitimate labor organization? (2) whether the
termination of the union president amounts to an
interference of the employees’ right to self-organization? op
_______________
2Id., at 37-38.
3Id., at 16.
594

The petition is without merit.

After a thorough review of the records of the case, this
Court finds that petitioner has not shown any compelling
reason sufficient to overturn the ruling of the Court of
Appeals affirming the findings of the Secretary of Labor
and Employment. It is axiomatic that the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the
Supreme Court and will not be reviewed or disturbed on
appeal. In this case, the petitioner failed to show any
extraordinary circumstance justifying a departure from
this established doctrine.
As regards the first issue, Article 252 of the Labor Code
defines the meaning of the phrase “duty to bargain
collectively,” as follows:
Art. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively.—The duty to

bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation
to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for
the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages,

hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment
including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions
arising under such agreement and executing a contract
incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but
such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to
make any concession.
Noteworthy in the above definition is the requirement on

both parties of the performance of the mutual obligation to
meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith
for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. Undoubtedly,
respondent Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran
(AEFL) (hereinafter, “union”) lived up to this requisite
when it presented its proposals for the CBA to petitioner on
February 7, 1996. On the other hand, petitioner devised
ways and means in order to prevent the negotiation.
Petitioner’s utter lack of interest in bargaining with the
union is obvious in its failure to make a timely reply to the
proposals presented by the latter. More than a month after
the proposals were submitted by the union, petitioner still
had not made any counter-proposals. This inaction on the
part of petitioner prompted the union to file its second
notice of strike on March 13, 1996. Petitioner could only
offer a feeble explanation that the Board of Trustees had
not yet convened to discuss the matter as its excuse for
595
VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 18, 2000 595

failing to file its reply. This is a clear violation of Article

250 of the Labor Code governing the procedure in collective
bargaining, to wit:
Art. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining.—The following

procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining:
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall
serve a written notice upon the other party with a statement of its
proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto 4
not later
than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice.
xxx
5
As we have held in the case of Kiok Loy vs. NLRC, the
company’s refusal to make counter-proposal to the union’s
proposed CBA is an indication of its bad faith. Where the
employer did not even bother to submit an answer to the
bargaining proposals of the union, there

6
is a clear evasion
of the duty to bargain collectively. In the case at bar,
petitioner’s actuation show a lack of sincere desire to
negotiate rendering it guilty of unfair labor practice.
Moreover, the series of events that transpired after the
filing of the first notice of strike in January 1996 show
petitioner’s resort to delaying tactics to ensure that
negotiation would not push through. Thus, on February 15,
1996, or barely a few days after the union proposals for the
new CBA were submitted, the union president was
informed by her superior that her work schedule was being
changed from Mondays to Fridays to Tuesdays to
Saturdays. A request from the union president that the
issue be submitted to a grievance machinery was
subsequently denied. Thereafter, the petitioner and the
union met on March 27, 1996 to discuss the ground rules
for negotiation. However, just two days later, or on March
29, 1996, petitioner dismissed the union president for
alleged insubordination. In its final attempt to thwart the
bargaining process, petitioner suspended the negotiation on
the ground that it allegedly received information that a
new group of employees
_______________
4Italics supplied.
5141 SCRA 179, 186 (1986).
6The Bradman Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 78 SCRA 10,
15 (1977).
596

called the Association of Concerned Employees of Colegio

(ACEC) had filed a petition for certification election.
Clearly, petitioner tried to evade its duty to bargain
collectively.
Petitioner, however, argues that since it has already
submitted the union’s proposals to the Board of Trustees
and that a series of conferences had already been
undertaken to discuss the ground rules for negotiation such
should already be considered as acts indicative of its
intention to bargain. As pointed out earlier, the evidence on
record belie the assertions of petitioner.
Petitioner, likewise, claims that the suspension of

negotiation was proper since by the filing of the petition for
certification election the issue on majority representation of
the employees has arose. According to petitioner, the
authority of the union to negotiate on behalf of the
employees was challenged when a rival union filed a
petition for certification election. Citing the case of Lakas7
Ng Manggagawang Makabayan v. Marcelo Enterprises,
petitioner asserts that in view of the pendency of the
petition for certification election, it had no duty to bargain
collectively with the union.
We disagree. In order to allow the employer to validly
suspend the bargaining process there must be a valid
petition for certification election raising a legitimate
representation issue. Hence, the mere filing of a petition for
certification election does not ipso facto justify the
suspension of negotiation by the employer. The petition
must first comply with the provisions of the Labor Code
and its Implementing Rules. Foremost is that a petition for
certification election must be filed during the sixty-day
freedom period. The “Contract Bar Rule” under Section 3,
Rule XI, Book V, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, provides that: “. . . . If a collective bargaining
agreement has been duly registered in accordance with
Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election
or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within
sixty (60) days prior to the expiry8
date of such agreement.”
The rule is based on Article 232, in relation to Articles 253,
253-A and
_______________
7118 SCRA 422 (1982).

8Article 232. Prohibition on Certification Election.—The Bureau shall
not entertain any petition for certification election or any other action
which may disturb the administration of duly registered existing
597
VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 18, 2000 597

256 of the Labor Code. No petition for certification election

for any representation issue may be filed after the lapse of
the sixty-day freedom period. The old CBA is extended
until a new one is signed. The rule is that despite the lapse
of the formal effectivity of the CBA the law still considers
the same as continuing in force and 9

effect until a new CBA
shall have been validly
10
executed. Hence, the contract bar
rule still applies. The purpose is to ensure stability in the
relationship of the workers and the company by preventing
frequent modifications of any CBA earlier entered into 11by
them in good faith and for the stipulated original period.
In the case at bar, the lifetime of the previous CBA was
from 1989-1994. The petition for certification election by
ACEC, allegedly a legitimate labor organization, was filed
with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
only on May 26, 1996. Clearly, the petition was filed
outside the sixty-day freedom period. Hence, the filing
thereof was barred by the existence of a valid and existing
collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, there is no
legitimate (representation issue and, as such, the filing of
the petition for certification election did not constitute a
bar to the ongoing negotiation. Reliance, therefore, by
petitioner of the ruling in Lakas 12
Ng Manggagawang
Makabayan v. Marcelo Enterprises is misplaced since that
case involved a legitimate representation issue which is not
present in the case at bar.
Significantly, the same petition for certification election
was dismissed by the Secretary of Labor on October 25,
1996. The dismissal was upheld 13
by this Court in a
Resolution, dated April 21, 1997.
_______________
collective bargaining agreements affecting the parties

except under Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of this Code.
9 Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services,Inc. vs.
Roldan-Confesor, 241 SCRA 294, 307 (1995).
10National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of
the Philippines vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 205 SCRA 478, 485
(1992).
11Ibid.
12Supra, note 6.
13G.R. No. 128483, Association of Concerned Employees
of Colegio (ACEC) vs. Secretary of Labor and
Employment,et al.
598

In view of the above, there is no doubt that petitioner is

guilty of unfair labor practice by its stern refusal to bargain
in good faith with respondent union.
Concerning the issue on the validity of the termination
of the union president, we hold that the dismissal was
effected in violation of the employees’ right to self-
organization.
To justify the dismissal, petitioner asserts that the
union president was terminated for cause, allegedly for
insubordination for her failure to comply with the new
working schedule assigned to her, and pursuant to its
managerial prerogative to discipline and/or dismiss its
employees. While we recognize the right of the employer to
terminate the services of an employee for a just or
authorized cause, nevertheless, the dismissal of employees
must be made within the parameters 14
of law and pursuant
to the tenets of equity and fair play. The employer’s right
to terminate the services of an employee for just 15
or
authorized cause must be exercised in good faith. More
importantly, it must not amount to interfering with,
restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization because it would amount to, as in
this case, unlawful labor practice under Article 248 of the
Labor Code.
The factual backdrop of the termination of Ms. Ambas
leads us to no other conclusion that she was dismissed in
order to strip the union of a leader who would fight for the
right of her co-workers at the bargaining table. Ms. Ambas,
at the time of her dismissal, had been working for the
petitioner for ten (10) years already. In fact, she was a
recipient of a loyalty award. Moreover, for the past ten (10)
years her working schedule was from Monday to Friday.
However, things began to change when she was elected as
union president and when she started negotiating for a
new CBA. Thus, it was when she was the union president
and during the period of tense and difficult negotiations
when her work schedule was altered from Mondays to
Fridays to Tuesdays to Saturdays. When she did not budge,
although her schedule was changed, she was outrightly
_______________
14Philippine Singapore Transport Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, 277 SCRA

506, 512 (1997).
15Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 290, 295
(1997).
599
VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 18, 2000 599

16
dismissed for alleged insubordination. We quote with
approval the following findings of the Secretary of Labor on
this matter, to wit:
“Assuming arguendo that Ms. Ambas was guilty, such

disobedience was not, however, a valid ground to terminate her
employment. The disputed management action was directly
connected with Ms. Ambas’ determination to change the
complexion of the CBA. As a matter of fact, Ms. Ambas’
unflinching position in faithfully and truthfully carrying out her
duties and responsibilities to her Union and its members in
getting a fair share of the fruits of their collective endeavors was
the proximate cause for her dismissal, the charge of
insubordination being merely a ploy to give a color of legality to
the contemplated management action to dismiss her. Thus, the
dismissal of Ms. Ambas was heavily tainted with and evidently
done in bad faith. Manifestly, it was designed to interfere with the
members’ right to self-organization.
Admittedly, management has the prerogative to discipline its
employees for insubordination. But when the exercise of such
management right tends to interfere with the employees’ right to
self-organization, it amounts to union-busting and is therefore a
prohibited act. The dismissal of Ms. Ambas was clearly designed
to frustrate the Union in its desire to forge a new CBA with the
College that is reflective of the true wishes and aspirations of the
Union members. Her dismissal was merely a subterfuge to get rid
of her, which smacks of a pre-conceived plan to oust her from the
premises of the College. It has the effect of busting the Union,
stripping it of its strong-willed leadership. When management
refused to treat the charge of insubordination as a grievance
within the scope of the Grievance Machinery, the action of the
College in finally dismissing her from the service became
arbitrary, capricious and whimsical,
17
and therefore violated Ms.
Ambas’ right to due process.”
In this regard, we find no cogent reason to disturb the

findings of the Court of Appeals affirming the findings of
the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The right to self-
organization of employees must not be interfered with by
the employer on the pretext of exercising management
prerogative of disciplining its employees. In this case, the
totality of conduct of the employer shows an evident
attempt to restrain the employees from fully exercising
their rights under the law. This cannot be done under the
Labor Code.
_______________
16Rollo, p. 45.
17Id.,at 46.
600

Afiado vs. Commission on Elections
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,Jr.(C.J., Chairman),Puno and Pardo,JJ.,

concur.
Ynares-Santiago,J., On leave.
Petition denied.
Notes.—A certification election is the sole concern of the

workers, hence, an employer lacks the personality to
dispute the same. (Barbizon Philippines, Inc. vs.
Nagkakaisang Supervisor ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc.,
NAFLU,261 SCRA 738 [1996])
The invalidity of a union’s registration would negate its
legal personality to participate in certification election.
(Progressive Development Corporation-Pizza Hut vs.
Laguesma, 271 SCRA 593 [1997])
A union has no legal right to file a petition for
certification election to represent a bargaining unit
composed of supervisors for so long as it counts rank-and-
file employees among its members. (Dunlop Slazenger
[Phils.], Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment,300
SCRA 120 [1998])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2021 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

2 Colegio de San Juan de Letran v. Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

2 Colegio de San Juan de Letran v. Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

2 Colegio de San Juan de Letran v. Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

4/8/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 340

VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 18, 2000 587

COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, petitioner, vs.

Appeals; It is axiomatic that the findings of fact of the Court of

588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Colegio De San Juan De Letran vs. Association of Employees and

the findings of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. It is

Labor Law; Collective Bargaining; Words and Phrases; “Duty

“duty to bargain collectively,” as follows: Art. 252. Meaning of

Same; Same; An employer’s utter lack of interest in

Same; Same; Certification Elections; In order to allow the

VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 18, 2000 589

Colegio De San Juan De Letran vs. Association of Employees and

allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process

Same; Same; Same; Contract Bar Rule; Under the “Contract

Same; Same; Same; Unfair Labor Practices; An employer who

petition for certification election did not constitute a bar to the

590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Colegio De San Juan De Letran vs. Association of Employees and

tioner of the ruling in Lakas Ng Manggagawang Makabayan v.

Same; Same;Management Prerogatives; Illegal Dismissals;

Same; Same; Same; Right to Self-organization; The right to

to self-organization of employees must not be interfered with by

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 18, 2000 591

Julieto R. Marco for petitioner.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the

“On December 1992, Salvador Abtria, then President of

However, the Labor Arbiter’s decision was reversed on appeal

592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

superior that her work schedule was being changeAd from

Having been denied its motion for reconsideration,

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this Petition is

1Rollo, pp. 32-34.

VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 18, 2000 593

With cost to petitioner.

Hence, petitioner comes to this Court for redress.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND

AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR

The twin questions of law before this Court are the

594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The petition is without merit.

Art. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively.—The duty to

the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages,

Noteworthy in the above definition is the requirement on

VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 18, 2000 595

failing to file its reply. This is a clear violation of Article

Art. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining.—The following

bargaining proposals of the union, there

596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

called the Association of Concerned Employees of Colegio

Petitioner, likewise, claims that the suspension of

7118 SCRA 422 (1982).

VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 18, 2000 597

256 of the Labor Code. No petition for certification election

the same as continuing in force and 9

collective bargaining agreements affecting the parties