Understanding The Contractual Arrangements in The Mango Value Chain
Understanding The Contractual Arrangements in The Mango Value Chain
Understanding The Contractual Arrangements in The Mango Value Chain
Abstract
This paper identifies factors affecting design and management of contract arrangements in mango value
chain using data from survey of 83 contractors involved in mango production and marketing in Uttar
Pradesh, India. Contract partners’ responses on various aspects of contractual arrangements such as
contract structure and negotiation process were recorded with the help of a structured questionnaire
administered personally. Descriptive statistics and factor and correlation analysis has been used to
identify and understand the important aspects of mango contract. Various aspects of contractual
arrangement can broadly be categorized into three parts - orchard owners’ characteristics, orchard
characteristics and contract management attributes, which can further be sub-divided into 9 factors.
Correlations between contractors’ demographic profiles and various contract factors provide practical
insights about critical aspects of contract design and management in agricultural production.
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Understanding the Contractual Arrangements in the Mango Value Chain
Executive Summary
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Understanding the Contractual Arrangements in the Mango Value Chain
Introduction
Contractual arrangements are becoming increasingly important for improving the effectiveness
and efficiencies of agricultural supply-chains (Tsoulouhas and Vukina, 1999; Sykuta and Parcell,
2003; Vavra, 2009). Forward contracts in agriculture are very common, wherein one party
reallocates the risks of farming and other is involved to earn profits (Knoeber, 1999). A contract
is simply an institutional construct that outlines the mutually agreed upon rules (and
expectations) of how the fundamental elements, such as the allocation of value (or the
distribution of gains from trade), the allocation of risk (when value is subject to uncertainty), and
the allocation of decision rights, will be addressed in the transaction relationships among the
contractors and contractees (Sykuta and Parcell, 2003; Sykuta and Cook, 2001; Paulson et al.,
2010).
Cheung (1970) defines a contract as partial transfer of rights, such as leasing or hiring and
embodies a structure comprising stipulated terms and conditions. A contract refers to any type of
agreement between two or more people, explicit with little or no role for implicit understandings,
or entirely implicit (Hueth et al., 1999). Forward contracts are important in the developing world,
including India, because they minimize the risks of the smallholder farmers regarding what to
grow and to whom to sell it. At the same time, they help minimize risks for the buyer too who
wants a guaranteed supply of an agriculture product for a specific demand in a known market.
Agricultural contractual arrangements have been widely researched from conceptual and
theoretical perspectives (Allen and Lueck, 1992; Knoeber, 1999). Contract theory indentifies
various contracting issues of potential importance and provides solutions for handling the
complexity of real-world contracting in a systematic manner (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2002).
Contracting is a complex process and therefore design, acceptance and adherence to a contractual
arrangement is a multi-criterion decision problem (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2002; Guo and Jolly,
2008). Economists have primarily used two approaches for analysis of the contracting process -
transaction cost theory and agency theory (Vavra, 2009). Transaction cost theory is concerned
with the relative costs and benefits of entering into and fulfilling a contract; while agency theory
is concerned with the design of incentive schemes when one person (the agent) acts on behalf of
another person (the principal).
Previous studies have categorized the contract in various ways. Mighell and Jones (1963)
classified contracts based on the activities being performed by the contractors: (1) market-
specification contracts, (2) production-management contracts, and (3) resource providing
contracts. In market-specification contracts, producers transfer only market related risk and
management functions to the contractor and they continue to make production related decisions,
and thereby assume the uncertainties of the production process (Drescher, 2000). In case of
production-management contracts all activities starting from production planning to marketing of
the produce are performed by the contractors. Drescher (2000) is of the view that the highest
intensity of influence is found in the resource-providing contract, where besides a risk and
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management takeover, the contractor provides the producer with important inputs. McNeil
(1978) differentiates between or among contracts based on economic rationality and legality
issues. He categorizes various contracts as (1) classical contracts, (2) neoclassical contracts, and
(3) relational contracts. Classical contracts, according to McNeil, are legally and formally rigid
and are not open to further negotiations. Neoclassical contracts are characterized as flexible and
the contract’s structure enables the contract partners to make a swift adaptation at any time if
major economic conditions change, such as a dramatic rise in the farm-gate or market price or a
dramatic fall in market prices. Relation contracting includes an adjustment process of a more
thoroughly transaction-specific and ongoing-administrative kind.
In practice, agricultural contracts vary significantly in terms of written or oral (Guo and
Jolly, 2008), type of contractual arrangement such as fixed wage, fixed rental, or sharecropping
(Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985; Douglas and Dean, 1992), duration of contract, time of entry into
contract, and so on. The economic literature on contract enforcement identifies two mechanisms
to redress the contract disputes: public or legal enforcement and private enforcement or self-
enforcement (Beckmann and Boger, 2004; Guo and Jolly, 2008). Due to ineffective and
inefficient legal system in most developing countries, particularly for agricultural contracts,
economic agents often have to rely on informal mechanisms to resolve contract disputes.
Based on the theoretical literature and classifications explained above, mango contracting
in Uttar Pradesh may be categorized as relational, production and management based. Most
contracts are oral and, therefore, informal in nature with no legal framework of support. These
contracts are performed under mutually convenient terms and conditions by orchard owners and
mango contractors.
Objectives
Despite rapid adoption of contractual arrangements in agricultural production and considerable
theoretical efforts to understand agricultural contracts, there exist limited empirical studies to
understand the factors affecting contract design and enforcement. As contracting in mango
production process is very common in India (significant amount of production takes place
under contractual arrangements), a study which analyses the process and performance of
contractual arrangements becomes imperative. The purpose of this paper is to identify and
analyze the basic features of contract structure in terms of level, type, stage, period,
documentation and pricing. Further, we also examine various factors affecting contract design
and performance for mango production. The study is based on a survey of 83 mango contractors
in Uttar Pradesh and the results provide a systematic framework for different stakeholders
involved in mango contracting. Specifically, the results have implications for contract terms,
contract efficiency and effectiveness, and overall performance. Finally, we provide suggestions
for a future research agenda to analyze mango production contracts.
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respondents for the study. A plan was made to survey at least 25 mango contractors from each
selected block. Trained interviewers visited the mango contractors at random and requested them
to participate in the survey.
The data collected on first two parts of the mango contractor’s questionnaire i.e. socio-
demographic profile of consumers and various aspects of contract negotiation & management
have been used in this study. Mango contract attributes have been recorded on a 5-point Likert-
type scale where 1=not at all important, 2=some what important, 3=important, 4=very important
and 5=extremely important.
Data Analysis
The data on structure and attributes of mango contracting has been analysed with the help of
SPSS 15.0. Factor analysis was used to categorise the contractors’ responses on various
attributes of the mango contract and to understand the underlying important factors affecting
contract negotiations. Further, the relationship among socio-demographics, mango production
and mango contract attributes, was analysed using Spearman’s rank correlation to understand the
important determinants of mango contracting. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient is
defined as:
ρ = 1 − ∑2
6 d2
n(n − 1)
where d is the difference in statistical rank of corresponding variables.
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contractors belong to socially backward and disadvantaged groups of the society. Most
respondents are either illiterate or having up to primary level of education. Though most of the
mango contractors have agriculture as primary occupation, however, fairly good numbers of
contractors are from non-agricultural occupation too.
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Basic characteristics of mango contracting
Of the 83 mango contractors surveyed, most (77) have contracted for only one mango orchard
while only 6 contractors have agreements with more than one orchard ( one contractor works
with 4 orchards, three contractors work with 3 orchards and two contractors work with 2
orchards). The average orchard area is 2 hectares and the average number of mango trees per
contractor is 271. The density of mango trees at contracted orchards is 131 mango trees per
hectare, on an average. The average contract price per hectare of mango orchard is Rs. 46,365,
while per tree it is Rs. 355 for a production season, which is primarily decided on the basis of
area of orchard, number of trees, age of trees and variety of mango trees.
The pre-harvest contractors are dominant players in the mango market chain across the
country (Sudha and Kruijssen, 2008). Mango farmers usually avoid taking risk in mango
production and marketing and contract-out their orchards either at pre-flowering or post-
flowering stages. As the risk of mango production at the pre-flowering stage is comparatively
higher than at the post-flowering stage, the majority of contractors take orchards on contract after
the mango flowering. Most contracts are relational in nature and are being executed based on a
relationship of trust between the contractors and farmers. Therefore, more than 90 percent of the
contracts were reported to be verbal in nature.
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The duration of pre-harvest contracts is mostly decided on the basis of mutual
understanding between a tree owner (producer) and a contractor. Generally, the contracts are
done for short duration, usually for only one production season. In general, the pre-harvest
contractor contacts the growers three to four months before the harvest season and sets up a
contract, based on the flowering of the orchard. Most orchards in the survey area have more than
one variety of mangoes, which enables the contractors to realize the benefit of extended
harvesting period. A minimum lump-sum amount of the total pre-decided contract value is paid
at the time of contracting, in cash. The remaining amount is paid in cash normally without
interest as per mutual agreement, either after the harvest is complete or during harvesting period
in instalments.
Based on factor analysis, six aspects of orchard owners’ characteristics have two sets of
underlying factors with an Eigen value greater than 1, which explains about 62% of variance
(Table 3). The total variance explained by factor 1 is 33.148%, primarily comprising the
attributes of orchard owners’ entrepreneurial ability, goodwill and reputation as indicated by
factor loading values. Factor 2 explains 28.718% variation and loads high on factors related to
the orchard owners’ technical knowledge on mango cultivation. Similarly, nine aspects of
orchard characteristics have 4 underlying factors, explaining about 74% variance. Under orchard
characteristics, first factor relates to the status of mango trees in the orchard, which explains
21.067% variation followed by orchard area and condition (19.753%), availability of minimum
infrastructure like road connectivity and irrigation facility (17.955%) and variety of mango trees
and yield history (15.340%). Further, after factor analysis of seven aspects of contract
management, three factors have emerged, which explain about 64% variance. The total variance
explained by factor 1 of contract management is 21.920%, primarily comprising the attributes
related to terms of contract payment & documentation as indicated by factor loading values.
Factor 2 explains 21.269% variation and loads high on contract attributes related to the
settlement of contract disputes. Factor 3 loads high on contract attributes related to terms of
contract pricing & duration which explains 20.533% variance.
This analysis clearly categorizes the mango contract attributes based on contractors’
perspective, which can be used as important criteria for designing agricultural contracts. Based
on the results of factor analysis, extracted factors can broadly be categorized as (i) orchard
owners’ entrepreneurial ability, goodwill and reputation, (ii) orchard owners’ technical
knowledge on mango cultivation, (iii) status of mango trees in the orchard, (iv) orchard area and
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condition, (v) availability of minimum infrastructure, (vi) variety of mango trees and yield
history, (vii) payment terms and documentation, (viii) contract enforcement mechanism, and (ix)
contracting pricing and duration. The results indicate that mango contractors seem to evaluate
both productions as well as contract related factors. However, mean scores of their responses
indicate that they consider number of trees, age of trees and area of mango orchard as very
important factors, while entering into mango contracting, whereas contract related factors are not
rated high by the contractors.
Table 3: Contractors’ response on contract attributes
Contract attributes N Mean* Std. Factor % of Cumulative
Deviation Loading Variance %
Orchard Owners' Characteristics
Entrepreneurial characteristics of the 83 3.28 0.816 0.816 33.148 33.148
owner
Past experience with the orchard 83 3.23 1.262 0.672
owner
Resource endowment 83 3.12 0.916 0.630
Reputation of the owner 83 3.47 0.888 0.614
Experience of the owner in plantation 83 3.35 0.723 0.867 28.718 61.866
and cultivation
Technical knowledge in mango 83 3.14 0.718 0.796
cultivation
Orchard Characteristics
Density of the orchard 83 3.72 0.915 0.868 21.067 21.067
Age of the trees in the orchard 83 4.07 0.808 0.766
Number of trees 83 4.23 0.687 0.654
Total area of the orchard 83 4.02 0.987 0.854 19.753 40.820
Condition of the orchard 83 4.05 0.882 0.808
Distance of the orchard from the 83 3.46 0.967 0.826 17.955 58.775
nearby road
Adequate irrigation facility in the 83 3.80 0.852 0.759
orchard
Variety of mango trees 83 4.18 0.872 0.902 15.340 74.115
Yield history 83 3.57 0.829 0.626
Contract management
Payment made in terms of lump sum 83 2.73 1.159 0.757 21.920 21.920
or instalments
Contract made in terms of cash 83 2.53 1.119 0.744
payment or share-cropping
Written or verbal documentation of 83 1.83 1.135 0.517
contract
Settlement procedures being followed 83 2.11 1.012 0.889 21.269 43.189
Violation of terms and conditions of 83 2.25 0.895 0.758
the contract
Price quotation 83 3.41 1.036 0.862 20.533 63.722
Duration of the contract 83 2.29 0.863 0.697
*1=not at all important, 2=some what important, 3=important, 4=very important and 5=extremely important
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization .
To identify the factors affecting the contractors’ decision, correlations between the factors
affecting contract design and management were computed (Table 4). Empirical evidences
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indicate that agricultural production contracts depend on number of factors related to producer
and contractor characteristics, production characteristics and contract arrangement attributes
(Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002; Guo and Jolly, 2008; Paulson et al., 2010). In correlation
analysis, two sets of variables were used: first-eight variables were related to the socio-
demographics of the contractors and level of contracting in terms of area and payment amount
and remaining variables were related to the responses of the contractors on factors affecting
negotiations while entering into mango contract. As stated earlier, factor Analysis was applied to
reduce the number of 22 variables into 9 factors, which could then be used for further analysis.
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Table 4: Spearman's rho Correlation Coefficient
Variables F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15
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Conclusion and Policy Implications
This paper analyses the contract attributes which significantly influence the performance
of mango contracts and identifies the critical attributes of an optimal contract. The study
finds that mango contracting in the study area is primarily done based on a relational
model. We identify nine aspects of mango contracting which broadly cover orchard
owner, orchard and contract management characteristics. Results of the study indicate
that three aspects of contract management i.e. payment terms and documentation,
contract enforcement mechanism, and contract pricing and duration are influenced by a
number of socio-demographic factors of contractors, orchard owners and orchard related
factors. Orchard owners’ entrepreneurial ability, goodwill and reputation play an
important role in contract design and management and show significantly positive
relationship with numbers of other factors. The results of this study have important
implication for the contract theory, contract design and enforcement in the era of
agricultural transformation and integration. The study also has critical implications for
policy makers in designing effective value chain models based on successful contract
system.
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