06 Manantan V CA

4/15/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 350
VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001 387

Manantan vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 107125. January 29, 2001.
GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF

APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and
MARIA NICO-LAS, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Double Jeopardy; Elements; Appeals;

There is no double jeopardy where, from a judgment of acquittal,
an appeal was brought to the Court of Appeals by the private
complainant, elevating the civil aspect of the criminal case.—
Preliminarily, petitioner’s claim that the decision of the appellate
court awarding indemnity placed him in double jeopardy is
misplaced. The constitution provides that “no person shall be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If an act is punished by
a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
388
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
bar to another prosecution for the same act." When a person is

charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by
acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the
consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with
the same or identical offense. This is double jeopardy. For double
jeopardy to exist, the following elements must be established: (a)
a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the
first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a1dff1c5e7d5eb992003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/17
must be for the same offense as the first. In the instant case,
petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of
Criminal Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his
discharge. The judgment of acquittal became immediately final.
Note, however, that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals by
private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066.
Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a
second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records
clearly show that no second criminal offense was being imputed to
petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower court’s judgment, the
appellate court did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did
it order the filing of a second criminal case against petitioner for
the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second
jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner’s claim of having been placed in
double jeopardy is incorrect.
Same; Civil Liability; Damages; Our law recognizes two kinds
of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused—(a) first is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is
not the author of the act or omission complained of and this
instance closes the door to civil liability, and, (b) second is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused, in
which case even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.—Our law
recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil
liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that
the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of.
This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot
and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being
no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the
civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on
grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second
instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of
the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not
been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is
the, situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where
the civil action for damages is “for the same act or omission.” Al-
389
VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001 389
through the two actions have different purposes, the matters

discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the
criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding
cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact
there determined, even though both actions involve the same act
or omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the
same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable.
Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner’s acquittal, the Court of
Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not
precluded from looking into the question of petitioner’s negligence
or reckless imprudence.
Same; Same; Same; Judgments; A finding in the trial court’s
judgment that “a hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the
accused presented itself before the Court” and since said
“hypothesis is consistent with the record . . . the Court’s mind
cannot rest on a verdict of conviction” clearly shows that the
acquittal of the accused was predicated on the conclusion that his
guilt had not been established with moral certainty, an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt.—Our scrutiny of the lower court’s
decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of the
appellate court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt;
hence, petitioner’s civil liability was not extinguished by his
discharge. We note the trial court’s declaration that did not
discount the possibility that “the accused was really negligent.”
However, it found that “a hypothesis inconsistent with the
negligence of the accused presented itself before the Court” and
since said “hypothesis is consistent with the record . . . the Court’s
mind cannot rest on a verdict of conviction.” The foregoing clearly
shows that petitioner’s acquittal was predicated on the conclusion
that his guilt had not been established with moral certainty.
Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt
and a suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission
lies.
Same; Same; Same; Filing Fees; Before the adoption of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the amendment of Rule
111, Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure by a
resolution of the Supreme Court dated July 7, 1988, it was not
required that the damages sought by the offended party be stated
in the complaint or information; The amendment, being in the
nature of a curative statute, applies retroactively and affects
pending actions.—At the time of the filing of the information in
1983, the implied institution of civil actions with criminal actions
was governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
As correctly pointed out by private respondents, under said rule,
it was not required that the damages sought by the offended party
be stated in the complaint or information. With the adoption of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the
390
amendment of Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal

Procedure by a resolution of this Court dated July 7, 1988, it is
now required that: When the offended party seeks to enforce civil
liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate
or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as
provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment except in an award for actual damages. In cases
wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in
the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall
be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for
trial. The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure at the time private respondents appealed the
civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to the court a quo in 1989.
Being in the nature of a curative statute, the amendment applies
retroactively and affects pending actions as in this case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the civil action is impliedly
instituted together with the criminal action, the actual damages
claimed by the offended parties are not included in the
computation of the filing fees—filing fees are to be paid only if
other items of damages such as moral, nominal, temperate, or
exemplary damages are alleged in the complaint or information, or
if they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.—Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted
together with the criminal action, the actual damages claimed by
the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the
computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid only if
other items of damages such as moral, nominal, temperate, or
exemplary damages are alleged in the complaint or information,
or if they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment. Recall that the information in Criminal Case No. 066
contained no specific allegations of damages. Considering that the
Rules of Criminal Procedure effectively guarantee that the filing
fees for the award of damages are a first lien on the judgment, the
effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact to the
institution of the criminal action. The filing fees are deemed paid
from the Sling of the criminal complaint or information. We
therefore find no basis for petitioner’s allegations that the filing
fees were not paid or improperly paid and that the appellate court
acquired no jurisdiction.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Conrado P. Aoanan for petitioner.
391
VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001 391

Jose M. De Vera for private respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January

31, 1992 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240,
modifying the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Santiago, Isabela, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 066.
Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the trial
court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a
ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect
of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the appellate
court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered
him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas
and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 representing loss of
support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and moral
damages of P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the
death of their son, Ruben Nicolas.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an
information charging petitioner Manantan with reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the

municipality of Santiago, province of Isabela, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile
bearing Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and unlawfully drove and
operated the same while along the Daang Maharlika at Barangay
Malvar, in said municipality, in a negligent, careless and
imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws, regulations
and ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to
prevent accident to person and damage to property, causing by
such negligence, carelessness and imprudence said automobile
driven and operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing
plate No. 918-7F driven by Charles Codamon, thereby causing the
said automobile to turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben

Nicolas a passenger of said
1
automobile.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the

charge. Trial on the merits ensued.
_________________
1 Records, p. 1.
392

The prosecution’s evidence, as summarized by the trial

court and adopted by the appellate court, showed that:
[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio

. . . decided to catch shrimps at the irrigation canal at his farm.
He invited the deceased who told him that they (should) borrow
the Ford Fiera of the accused George Manantan who is also from
Cordon. The deceased went to borrow the Ford Fiera but. . . said
that the accused also wanted to (come) along. So Fiscal Ambrocio
and the deceased dropped by the accused at the Manantan
Technical School. They drank beer there before they proceeded to
the farm using the Toyota Starlet of the accused. At the farm they
consumed one (more) case of beer. At about 12:00 o’clock noon
they went home. Then at about 2:00 or 3:00 o’clock that afternoon,
(defense witness Miguel) Tabangin and (Ruben) Nicolas and the
accused returned to the house of Fiscal Ambrocio with a duck.
They cooked the duck and ate the same with one more case of
beer. They ate and drank until about 8:30 in the evening when
the accused invited them to go bowling. They went to Santiago,
Isabela on board the Toyota Starlet of the accused who drove the
same. They went to the Vicap Bowling Lanes at Mabini, Santiago,
Isabela but unfortunately there was no vacant alley. While
waiting for a vacant alley they drank one beer each. After waiting
for about 40 minutes and still no alley became vacant the accused
invited his companions to go to the LBC Night Club. They had
drinks and took some lady partners at the LBC. After one hour,
they left the LBC and proceeded to a nearby store where they ate
arroz caldo . . . and then they decided to go home. Again the
accused drove the car. Miguel Tabangin sat with the accused in
the front seat while the deceased and Fiscal Ambrocio sat at the
back seat with the deceased immediately behind the accused. The
accused was driving at a speed of about 40 kilometers per hour
along the Maharlika Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, at the

middle portion of the highway (although according to Charles
Cudamon, the car was running at a speed of 80 to 90 kilometers
per hours on [thel wrong lane of the highway because the car was
overtaking a tricycle) when they met a passenger jeepney with
bright lights on. The accused immediately tried to swerve the car
to the right and move his body away from the steering wheel but
he was not able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two
vehicles collided with each other at the center of the road.
xxx
As a result of the collision the car turned turtle twice and
landed on its top at the side of the highway immediately at the
approach of the street going to the Flores Clinic while the jeep
swerved across the road so that one half front portion landed on
the lane of the car while the back
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VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001 393

half portion was at its right lane five meters away from the point
of impact as shown by a sketch (Exhibit “A”) prepared by
Cudamon the following morning at the Police Headquarters at the
instance of his lawyer. Fiscal Ambrocio lost consciousness. When
he regained consciousness he was still inside the car (lying) on his
belly with the deceased on top of him. Ambrocio pushed (away)
the deceased and then he was pulled out of the car by Tabangin.
Afterwards, the deceased who was still unconscious was pulled
out from the car. Both Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased were
brought to the Flores Clinic. The deceased died that night
(Exhibit “B”) while
2
Ambrocio suffered only minor injuries to his
head and legs.
The defense version as to the events prior to the incident

was essentially the same as that of the prosecution, except
that defense witness Miguel Tabangin declared that
Manantan did not drink beer that night. As to the accident,
the defense claimed that:
. . . The accused was driving slowly at the right lane [at] about 20
inches from the center of the road at about 30 kilometers per hour
at the National Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, when
suddenly a passenger jeepney with bright lights which was
coming from the opposite direction and running very fast
suddenly swerve(d) to the car’s lane and bumped the car which
turned turtle twice and rested on its top at the right edge of the
road while the jeep stopped across the center of the road as shown
by a picture taken after the incident (Exhibit “1”) and a sketch
(Exhibit “3”) drawn by the accused during his rebuttal testimony.

The car was hit on the driver’s side. As a result of the collision,
the accused and Miguel Tabangin and Fiscal Ambrocio were
injured while Ruben Nicolas died
3
at the Flores Clinic where they
were all brought for treatment.
In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August

4, 1988, the trial court decided Criminal Case No. 066 in
petitioner’s favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the

Court finds the accused NOT GUILTY of the crime charged and
hereby acquits him.
4
SO ORDERED.
__________________
2 CA Rollo, pp. 53-55.

3 Id. at 56-57.
4 Records, p. 429.
394

On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their notice of

appeal on the civil aspect of the trial court’s judgment. In
their appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, the
Nicolas spouses prayed that the decision appealed from be
modified and that appellee be ordered to pay indemnity
and damages.
On January 31, 1992, the appellate court decided CA-
G.R. CV No. 19240 in favor of the Nicolas spouses, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that

defendant-appellee is hereby held civilly liable for his negligent
and reckless act of driving his car which was the proximate cause
of the vehicular accident, and sentenced to indemnify plaintiffs-
appellants in the amount of P174,400.00 for the death of Ruben
Nicolas. 5
SO ORDERED.
In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted

that at the time the accident occurred, Manantan was in a
state of intoxication, due to his having consumed “all in all,
a total of at least 6twelve (12) bottles of beer. . . between 9
a.m. and 11 p.m.” It found that petitioner’s act of driving
while intoxicated was a clear violation of Section 53 of the
7
7
Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. No.8
4136) and
pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a statutory
presumption of negligence existed. It held that petitioner’s
act of violating the Traffic Code is negligence in itself
“because the mishap, which occurred, was the 9
precise
injury sought to be prevented by the regulation.”
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate
court in its resolution of August 24, 1992 denied the
motion.
___________________
5 CA Rollo, p. 60.
6 Id. at 57.
7 SEC. 53. Driving while under the influence of liquor or narcotic drug.
—No person shall drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor
or narcotic drug.
8 CIVIL CODE, ART. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
9 Supra note 6, at 58.
395
VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001 395

Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his memorandum,

submits the following issues for our consideration:
FIRST—THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING

THE PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE FORECLOSED
ANY FURTHER INQUIRY ON THE ACCUSED’S
(PETITIONER’S) NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE BECAUSE BY THEN HE WILL BE PLACED IN
“DOUBLE JEOPARDY” AND THEREFORE THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN PASSING UPON THE SAME ISSUE
AGAIN.
SECOND—THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION TO AWARD DAMAGES AND INDEMNITY TO
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT THE
NON-DECLARATION OF ANY INDEMNITY OR AWARD OF
DAMAGES BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ISABELA,
BRANCH XXI, WAS ITSELF CONSISTENT WITH THE
PETITIONER’S ACQUITTAL FOR THE REASON THAT THE
CIVIL ACTION WAS IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED WITH THE
CRIMINAL ACTION AND THERE WAS NO EXPRESS WAIVER
OF THE CIVIL ACTION OR RESERVATION TO INSTITUTE IT

SEPARATELY BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE
TRIAL COURT.
THIRD—THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE CA-
G.R. CV No. 19240 ENTITLED: SPOUSES MARCELINO
NICOLAS AND MARIA NICOLAS v. GEORGE MANANTAN,
AND RENDER THE DECISION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED
WHEN THE SAME WAS PROSECUTED BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND
THE FILING FEES NOT HAVING BEEN PAID, THUS
VIOLATING THE MANCHESTER DOCTRINE.
In brief, the issues for our resolution are:
(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further

inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his negligence
or reckless imprudence?
(2) Bid the court a qua err in finding that petitioner’s
acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability?
(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in
failing to apply the Manchester doctrine to CA-G.R.
CV No. 19240?
396

On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of

Appeals should not have disturbed the findings of the trial
court on the lack of negligence or reckless imprudence
under the guise of determining his civil liability. He argues
that the trial court’s finding that he was neither imprudent
nor negligent was the basis for his acquittal, and not
reasonable doubt. He submits that in finding him liable for
indemnity and damages, the appellate court not only
placed his acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in
“double jeopardy.”
Private respondents contend that while the trial court
found that petitioner’s guilt had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal
terms that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or
negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial court acquitted him on
reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in
criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review the findings of
the trial court to determine if there was a basis for

awarding indemnity and damages.
Preliminarily, petitioner’s claim that the decision of the
appellate court awarding indemnity placed him in double
jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides that “no
person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either shall10 constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.” When a person is charged
with an offense and the case is terminated either by
acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the
consent of the accused, the latter cannot 11
again be charged
with the same or identical offense. This is double
jeopardy. For double jeopardy to exist, the following
elements must be established: (a) a first jeopardy must
have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy
must have terminated; and (3) the second
12
jeopardy must be
for the same offense as the first. In the instant case,
petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of
Criminal Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by
his discharge. The judgment of
__________________
10 CONST., Art. III, Sec. 21.

11 Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766, 768 (1950).
12 People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166, 171 (1985).
397
VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001 397

acquittal became immediately final. Note, however, that

what was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private
respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066.
Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240
with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense.
The records clearly show that no second criminal offense
was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying
the lower court’s judgment, the appellate court did not
modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing
of a second criminal case against petitioner for the same
offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy
to speak of. Petitioner’s claim of having been placed in
double jeopardy is incorrect.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different
effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an
acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author

of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes
the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found
to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot
13
and
can never be held liable for such act or omission. There
being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may be
instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation
14
contemplated in Rule
111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has
not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from
civil
____________________
13 Almeida, et al v. Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178, 181 (1907).; See also Almeida

Chantangco and Lete v. Abaroa, 40 Phil. 1056 (1910), 218 US 476, 54 L.
Ed. 1116 (1910); Wise & Co. v. Larion, 45 Phil. 314 (1923); Francisco v.
Onrubia, 46 Phil. 327 (1924). Article 29 of the Civil Code serves only to
limit and qualify the application of the Almeida doctrine.
14 RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 2. Institution of separate civil
action.—
xxx
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist, (stress supplied)
398

Manahtan vs. Court of Appeals
liability
15
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence
only. This is the
16
situation contemplated in Article 29 of
the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is “for
the same act or omission.” Although the two actions have
different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case
are similar to those discussed in the criminal case.
However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot
be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact
there determined, even 17
though both actions involve the
same act or omission. The reason for this rule is that the
parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of
evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein
petitioner’s acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining
whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking

into the question of petitioner’s negligence or reckless
imprudence.
On the second issue, petitioner insists that he was
acquitted on a finding that he was neither criminally
negligent nor recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as his civil
liability is predicated on the criminal offense, he argues
that when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be
demanded. He concludes that his acquittal bars any civil
action.
Private respondents counter that a closer look at the
trial court’s judgment shows that the judgment of acquittal
did not clearly and categorically declare the non-existence
of petitioner’s negligence or imprudence. Hence, they argue
that his acquittal must be deemed
_________________
15 Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 202, 214 (1996), citing
Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 (1984).
16 CIVIL CODE, Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission
may be instituted (stress supplied). Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may
require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case, the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision
whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
17 Almeida Chantangco and Lete v. Abaroa, supra note 13, at 1061.
399
VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001 399

based on reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29 of the Civil

Code to come into play.
Our scrutiny of the lower court’s decision in Criminal
Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of the appellate court
that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence,
petitioner’s civil liability was not extinguished by his
discharge. We note the trial court’s declaration that did not
discount the possibility that “the accused was really
negligent.” However, it found that “a hypothesis
inconsistent with the negligence of the accused presented
itself before the Court” and since said “hypothesis is

consistent with the record . .18 . the Court’s mind cannot rest
on a verdict of conviction.” The foregoing clearly shows
that petitioner’s acquittal was predicated on the conclusion
that his guilt had not been established with moral
certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for the
same act or omission lies.
On the third issue, petitioner argues that the Court of
Appeals erred in awarding damages and indemnity, since
private respondents did not pay the corresponding filing
fees for their claims for damages when the civil case was
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Petitioner
submits that the non-payment of filing fees on the amount
of the claim for damages violated the doctrine in
Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
149 SCRA 562 (1987) and 19
Supreme Court Circular No. 7
dated March 24, 1988. He avers that since Manchester
held that “The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees,” the
appellate court was without jurisdiction to hear and try
CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, much less award indemnity and
damages.
__________________
18 Supra note 4.
19 The subject of which reads: ALL COMPLAINTS MUST SPECIFY
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SOUGHT NOT ONLY IN THE BODY OF
THE PLEADINGS, BUT ALSO IN THE PRAYER IN ORDER TO BE
ACCEPTED AND ADMITTED FOR FILING. THE AMOUNT OF
DAMAGES SO SPECIFIED IN THE COMPLAINT SHALL BE THE
BASIS FOR ASSESSING THE AMOUNT OF THE FILING FEES.
400

Private respondents argue that the Manchester doctrine is

inapplicable to the instant case. They ask us to note that
the criminal case, with which the civil case was impliedly
instituted, was filed on July 1, 1983, while the Manchester
requirements as to docket and filing fees took effect only
with the promulgation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 on
March 24, 1988. Moreover, the information filed by the
Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela did not allege the amount
of indemnity to be paid. Since it was not then customarily
or legally required that the civil damages sought be stated

in the information, the trial court had no basis in assessing
the filing fees and demanding payment thereof. Moreover,
assuming that the Manchester ruling is applied
retroactively, under the Rules of Court, the filing fees for
the damages awarded are a first lien on the judgment.
Hence, there is no violation of the Manchester doctrine to
speak of.
At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the
implied institution of civil actions with criminal actions
was governed
20
by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of
Court. As correctly pointed out by private respondents,
under said rule, it was not required that the damages
sought by the offended party be stated in the complaint or
information. With the adoption of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and the amendment of Rule 111,
Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure by a
resolution of this Court dated July 7, 1988, it is now
required that:
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the
accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these
Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an
award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is
alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing
fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in
court for trial.
___________________
20 Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.—When a criminal

action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless that offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his
right to institute it separately.
401
VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001 401

The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of

Criminal Procedure at the time private respondents
appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to the
court a quo in 1989. Being in the nature of a curative
statute, the amendment applies retroactively and affects

pending actions as in this case.
Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted
together with the criminal action, the actual damages
claimed by the offended parties, as in this case, are not
included in the computation of the filing fees. Filing fees
are to be paid only if other items of damages such as moral,
nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages are alleged in
the complaint or information, or if they are not21
so alleged,
shall constitute a first lien on the judgment. Recall that
the information in Criminal Case No. 066 contained no
specific allegations of damages. Considering that the Rules
of Criminal Procedure effectively guarantee that the filing
fees for the award of damages are a first lien on the
judgment, the effect of the enforcement of said lien must
retroact to the institution of the criminal action. The filing
fees are deemed paid from the filing of the criminal
complaint or information. We therefore find no basis for
petitioner’s allegations that the filing fees were not paid or
improperly paid and that the appellate court acquired no
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January 31,
1992, as well as its resolution dated August 24, 1992,
denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De

Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—Conviction for the crime of illegal recruitment

under the Labor Code does not preclude punishment under
other statutes if some other crimes or felonies are
committed in the process—a
____________________
21 People v. Escano, Jr., 193 SCRA 662, 665 (1991).
402

People vs. Bagcal
person convicted for illegal recruitment may also be

convicted for the crime for estafa. (People vs. Sanchez, 291
SCRA 333 [1998])
Conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code
does not bar the punishment of the offender for estafa.
(People vs. Saley, 291 SCRA 715 [1998])
Even if several cases arose out of the same scheme, if
the fraudulent acts charged were committed against
different persons, they do not constitute the same offense.
(People vs. Balasa, 295 SCRA 49 [1998])
——o0o——
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4/15/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 350

VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001 387

GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF

Criminal Procedure; Double Jeopardy; Elements; Appeals;

388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manantan vs. Court of Appeals

bar to another prosecution for the same act." When a person is

VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001 389

Manantan vs. Court of Appeals

through the two actions have different purposes, the matters

390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manantan vs. Court of Appeals

amendment of Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001 391

Jose M. De Vera for private respondents.

This is a petition for review of the decision dated January

That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the

said automobile to turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the

392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The prosecution’s evidence, as summarized by the trial

[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio

along the Maharlika Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, at the

VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001 393

The defense version as to the events prior to the incident

(Exhibit “3”) drawn by the accused during his rebuttal testimony.

In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the

2 CA Rollo, pp. 53-55.

394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their notice of

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that

In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted

VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001 395

Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his memorandum,

FIRST—THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING

OF THE CIVIL ACTION OR RESERVATION TO INSTITUTE IT

In brief, the issues for our resolution are:

(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further

396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of

the trial court to determine if there was a basis for

10 CONST., Art. III, Sec. 21.

VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001 397

acquittal became immediately final. Note, however, that

acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author

13 Almeida, et al v. Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178, 181 (1907).; See also Almeida

398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking

VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001 399

based on reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29 of the Civil

itself before the Court” and since said “hypothesis is

400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Private respondents argue that the Manchester doctrine is

or legally required that the civil damages sought be stated

20 Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.—When a criminal

VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001 401