Doctrine: Family

  “A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent
any clear repudiation of the co- ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-
owner, the following requisites must concur:(1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners;(2) such positive acts of repudiation
have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and
convincing.”
Case title: Antipolo Ining vs. Leonardo R. Vega, GR. No. 174727; (Del Castillo) August
12, 2013

FACTS:

Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a 3,120-square
meter parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon and Rafaela died without issue.

Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining
(Gregoria), who are now both deceased. ROMANA: Romana was survived by her daughter
Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both
deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega,
Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena VegaRestituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.
GREGORIA: Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children.

Parts of the land were also sold by some of the Gregoria children to Tresvalles and
Tajonera. In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto
Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregoria’s heirs).
Tresvalles and Tajonera are transferees of the said property. In 1997, Leonardo (ROMANA
SIDE) filed a case for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, against
GREGORIA’s heirs. Leonardo mentioned that he kept asking for partition, but this was
unheeded.

It was in 1979, Lucimo Sr (Antipolo, who is a kid of Gregoria was survived by this man
and others) claimed absolute ownership and deprived Leonardo of the benefits of the land.
Lucimo’s defense: A certain Enriquez had bought the property from Leon (GREGORIA’S
FATHER) and they had bought the property from Enriquez, and Leonardo was aware of this
fact; that they were in continuous, actual, adverse, notorious and exclusive possession of the
property with a just title; that they have been paying the taxes on the property; that Leonardo’s
claim is barred by estoppel and laches; and that they have suffered damages as well.

RTC decided: There was never any sale to an Enriquez but GREGORIA HEIRS won
because of adverse possession for 30 years.
 CA decided: NO PRESCRIPTION! Prescription began to run not from Leon’s death in
1962, but from Lucimo Sr.’s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979, which
amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth
paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[n]o prescription shall run in
favor of a coowner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership,”

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there was repudiation of the coownership only during the execution of
the affidavit – in 1979?

2. Whether or not there was prescription?

HELD:

1. YES. Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.
Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property. No prescription shall run
in favor of one of the co-heirs against the others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership. The act of making the affidavit equated to a repudiation. Lucimo Sr. is not a
co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-
law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora. One who is merely related by affinity to the
decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s
property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was
formed among the decedent’s heirs.

2. NO. For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner. The CA
held that prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 – or even in 1980 – when it
has been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-ownership and has
claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA thus concluded that the filing of Civil Case
No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years counted from 1979, is clearly within the period
prescribed under Article 1141. THEREFORE, THERE IS COOWNERSHIP AND LEONARDO
CAN ASK FOR PARTITION.
Doctrine: Family

The indefeasibility of the Torrens title cannot be used to validate a forgery or to cure a
void sale. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstanding the long-standing
rule that registration is a constructive notice of title binding upon the whole world.

Case title: Consolacion D. Romero vs. Engracia D. Singson, GR. No. 200969; (Del
Castillo) August 03, 2015

Facts:
Petitioners Consolacion Domingo Romero and Rosario S.D. Domingo and respondent
Engracia Domingo Singson - are siblings. Their parents, Macario and Felicidad Domingo, own a
223-square meter piece of property (the subject property) located at 127 F. Sevilla Street, San
Juan City, Metro Manila which was issued in 1953.
It appears that petitioners and other siblings, Rafael and Ramon Domingo, are the actual
occupants of the subject property, having stayed there with their parents since birth.
On the other hand, respondent took up residence in Mandaluyong City after getting
married.
On February 22, 1981, Macario passed away, while Felicidad died on September 14,
1997.
On June 7, 2006, a new certificate of title was issued in respondent's name, by virtue of a
notarized "Absolute Deed of Sale" ostensibly executed on June 6, 2006 by and between Macario
and Felicidad - as sellers, and respondent - as buyer. And this despite the fact that Macario and
Felicidad were then already deceased.
Soon thereafter, respondent sent letters to her siblings demanding that they vacate the
subject property, under pain of litigation.
Petitioners and their other siblings just as soon filed a Complaint against respondent and
the Register of Deeds of San Juan City for annulment and cancellation of TCT 12575 and the
June 6, 2006 deed of sale, reconveyance, and damages, on the claim that the deed of sale is a
forgery and that as heirs of Macario and Felicidad, the true owners of the subject property, they
were entitled to a reconveyance of the same.
Petitioners prayed for dismissal, claiming that the June 6, 2006 deed of sale was a
forgery, and no certificate of title in her name could be issued; that they thus remained co-owners
of the subject property, and respondent had no right to evict them; and that the pendency of Civil
Case No. 70898-SJ bars the ejectment suit against them.
Issues:
Whether or not plaintiff may validly eject the defendants.
Ruling:
The Court grants the Petition.
The procedural issue of lack of attempts at compromise should be resolved in
respondent's favor. True, no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made. However, the failure of a party to comply with this condition precedent is not a
jurisdictional defect. If the opposing party fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such
defect is deemed waived. The fact that respondent has in her favor a certificate of title is of no
moment; her title cannot be used to validate the forgery or cure the void sale.
Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, the registration of
the property in said person's name would not be sufficient to vest in him or her the title to the
property. A certificate of title merely confirms or records title already existing and vested. The
indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the
rightful owner of real property.
Since respondent acquired no right over the subject property, the same remained in the
name of the original registered owners, Macario and Felicidad. Being heirs of the owners,
petitioners and respondent thus became, and remain co-owners - by succession - of the subject...
property. As such, petitioners may exercise all attributes of ownership over the same, including
possession - whether de facto or de jure; respondent thus has no right to exclude them from this
right through an action for ejectment.
This Court has always recognized the general rule that in appellate proceedings, the
reversal of the judgment on appeal is binding only on the parties in the appealed case and does
not affect or inure to the benefit of those who did not join or were not made... parties to the
appeal. An exception to the rule exists, however, where a judgment cannot be reversed as to the
party appealing without affecting the rights of his co-debtor, or where the rights and liabilities of
the parties are so interwoven and dependent on each other as to be inseparable, in which case a
reversal as to one operates as a reversal as to all. This exception, which is based on a
communality of interest of said parties, is recognized in this jurisdiction.
Doctrine: Family

Once a stranger becomes a party to such suit, the earnest effort requirement is no longer
a condition precedent before the action can prosper.

Case title: Jose Z. Moreno vs. Rene M. Kahn, (J. Perlas-Bernabe) GR. No. 217744; July
30, 2018

FACTS:

Jose alleged that since May 1998 and in their capacity as lessees, he and his family have
been occupying two parcels of land co-owned by his full-blooded sister, respondent Consuelo
Moreno Kahn-Haire and his nephews and nieces (Consuelo's children), respondents Rene M.
Kahn, Rene Luis Pierre Kahn, Philippe Kahn, and Ma. Claudine Kahn-McMahon. Respondents
offered to sell to Jose the subject lands.

Over the next few years, Jose made partial payments to respondents by paying off the
shares of Rene, Luis, Philippe and Claudine, leaving a remaining balance of US$120,000.00
payable to Consuelo. However, Consuelo decided to cancel their agreement, and thereafter,
informed Jose of her intent to convert the earlier partial payments as rental payments instead.
Without his consent, Consuelo, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine sold their shares over the subject
lands to Rene, thereby consolidating full ownership of the subject lands to him. Upon learning of
such sale, Jose sent a demand letter asserting his right to the subject lands under the previous sale
agreed upon.

As his demands went unheeded, Jose brought the matter to the barangay lupon for
conciliation proceedings between him and Rene only, since Consuelo, Luis, Philippe, and
Claudine are all living abroad. As no settlement was agreed upon, Jose was constrained to file
the subject complaint for specific performance and cancellation of titles with damages.

The RTC motu proprio ordered the dismissal of Jose's complaint for failure to allege
compliance with the provision of Article 151 of the Family Code. The CA affirmed the RTC
ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC which motu proprio
dismissed the cased on the ground that Article 151 has not been complied with?

RULING:
 The Court held in Heirs of Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales that non-compliance with the earnest
effort requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is not a jurisdictional defect which
would authorize the courts to dismiss suits filed before them motu proprio.

Rather, it merely partakes of a condition precedent such that the non-compliance

therewith constitutes a ground for dismissal of a suit should the same be invoked by the opposing
party at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. Otherwise, such
ground is deemed waived. In this case, a plain reading of the records shows that the RTC ordered
the dismissal of Jose's complaint against respondents for his alleged failure to comply with
Article 151 of the Family Code – even before respondents have filed a motion or a responsive
pleading invoking such non-compliance. As such ground is not a jurisdictional defect but is a
mere condition precedent, the courts a quo clearly erred in finding that a motu proprio dismissal
was warranted under the given circumstances.

Even assuming arguendo that respondents invoked the foregoing ground at the earliest
opportunity, the Court nevertheless finds Article 151 of the Family Code inapplicable to this
case. For Article 151 of the Family Code to apply, the suit must be exclusively between or
among "members of the same family." Art. 150. Family relations include those: (1) Between
husband and wife; (2) Between parents and children; (3) Among other ascendants and
descendants: and (4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. In this light,
case law states that Article 151 of the Family Code must be construed strictly, it being an
exception to the general rule. Hence, any person having a collateral familial relation with the
plaintiff other than what is enumerated in Article 150 of the Family Code is considered a stranger
who, if included in a suit between and among family members, would render unnecessary the
earnest efforts requirement under Article 151.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. In this instance, it is undisputed that: (a) Jose and Consuelo are
full-blooded siblings; and (b) Consuelo is the mother of Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine,
which make them nephews and niece of their uncle, Jose. It then follows that Rene, Luis,
Philippe, and Claudine are considered "strangers'' to Jose insofar as Article 151 of the Family
Code is concerned. In this relation, it is apt to clarify that while it was the disagreement between
Jose and Consuelo that directly resulted in the filing of the suit, the fact remains that Rene, Luis,
Philippe, and Claudine were rightfully impleaded as co-defendants Jose’s complaint as they are
co-owners of the subject lands in dispute. In view of the inclusion “strangers" to the suit between
Jose and Consuelo who are full blooded siblings, the Court concludes that the suit is beyond the
ambit of Article 151 of the Family Code. Perforce, the courts a quo gravely erred in dismissing
Jose's complaint due to non-compliance with the earnest effort requirement therein.
Doctrine: The Family

Case title: Felicitas L.Salazar vs. Remedios Felias, GR. No. 213972, (J. Reyes, Jr)
February 05, 2018

The movant's claim that his/her property is exempt from execution for being the family
home is not a magic wand that will freeze the court's hand and forestall the execution of a final
and executory ruling. It is imperative that the claim for exemption must be set up and proven.

Facts:
Private respondent Remedios Felias, representing the heirs of Catalino Nivera (Heirs of
Nivera) filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages against the
Spouses Romualdo Lastimosa (Romualdo) and Felisa Lastimosa (Felisa).
The former sought to recover from the latter four parcels of land located in Baruan,
Agno, Pangasinan (subject property).
On March 16, 2004, the RTC Branch 55 rendered a Decision declaring the Heirs of
Nivera as the absolute owners of the parcels of land in question, and thereby ordering the Heirs
of Lastimosa to vacate the lands and to surrender possession thereof.
Issues:
WON the execution may proceed as the subject property is her family home and is
therefore exempt from execution.
Ruling:
The movant's claim that his/her property is exempt from execution for being the family
home is not a magic wand that will freeze the court's hand and forestall the execution of a final
and executory ruling. It is imperative that the claim for exemption must be set up and proven.
Indeed, the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated. It confers
upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties.[34] It cannot be seized by creditors
except in certain special cases.
However, the claim that the property is exempt from execution for being the movant's
family home is not a magic wand that will freeze the court's hand and forestall the execution of a
final and executory ruling. It must be noted that it is not sufficient for the claimant to merely
allege that such property is a family home. Whether the claim is premised under the Old Civil
Code or the Family Code, the claim for exemption must be set up and proved.
In addition, residence in the family home must be actual. The law explicitly mandates
that the occupancy of the family home, either by the owner thereof, or by any of its beneficiaries
must be actual. This occupancy must be real, or actually existing, as opposed to something
merely possible, or that which is merely presumptive or constructive.
It becomes all too apparent that Felicitas cannot conveniently claim that the subject
property is her family home, sans sufficient evidence proving her allegation. It bears emphasis
that it is imperative that her claim must be backed with evidence showing that the home was
indeed (i) duly constituted as a family home, (ii) constituted jointly by the husband and wife or
by an unmarried head of a family, (iii) resided in by the family (or any of the family home's
beneficiaries), (iv) forms part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent, or property of
the unmarried head of the family, and (v) has an actual value of Php 300,000.00 in urban areas,
and Php 200,000.00 in rural areas.
Felicitas adduced no proof to substantiate her claim that the property sought to be
executed is indeed her family home.
Interestingly, Felicitas admitted in her Motion for Reconsideration dated December 23,
2013, and her Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated June 22, 2006, that she is, and has
always been a resident of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija.[41] Similarly, the address indicated in Felicitas'
petition for review on certiorari is Muñoz, Nueva Ecija... the Court takes judicial notice of the
final ruling of the RTC Branch 55 in the case for recovery of ownership, that the subject property
has belonged to the Heirs of Nivera since the 1950s.
This automatically negates Felicitas' claim that the property is her family home.
Felicitas' argument that the property subject of the writ of execution is a family home, is
an unsubstantiated allegation that cannot defeat the binding nature of a final and executory
judgment. Thus, the Writ of Execution and Demolition issued by the RTC Branch 55 must
perforce be given effect.
Doctrine: The Family

Case title: Florante Vitug vs. Evangeline A. Abuda, GR. No. 201264, (J. Leonen)
January 11, 2016

FACTS:

Abuda loaned P250,000.00 to Vitug and his wife, Narcisa Vitug. As security for the loan,
Vitug mortgaged to Abuda his property. The property was then subject of a conditional Contract
to Sell between the National Housing Authority and Vitug. That, upon consummation and
completion of the sale by the NHA of said property, the title-award thereof, shall be received by
the Mortgagee by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney, executed by Mortgagor in her favor.
The parties executed a "restructured" mortgage contract on the property to secure the amount of
P600,000.00 representing the original P250,000.00 loan, additional loans, and subsequent credit
accommodations given by Abuda to Vitug with an interest of five (5) percent per month. By
then, the property was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title under Vitug's name. Spouses
Vitug failed to pay their loans despite Abuda's demands. Abuda filed a Complaint for
Foreclosure of Property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. On December 19, 2008, the
Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision in favor of Abuda. On appeal, the RTC ruled in
favor of Abuda and ordered Vitug to pay the principal sum with interest and upon default of the
defendant to fully pay the aforesaid sums, the subject mortgaged property shall be sold at public
auction to pay off the mortgage debt. The judgement was affirmed with the modification as to
the payment of interest. Petitioner argues that not all the requisites of a valid mortgage are
present. He contends that a mortgagor must have free disposal of the mortgaged property. That
the existence of a restriction clause in his title means that he does not have free disposal of his
property.

ISSUE:

Whether the restriction clause in petitioner's title rendered invalid the real estate mortgage
he and respondent Evangeline Abuda executed.

RULING:

No. Petitioner may dispose or encumber his property. The restrictions are mere burden or
limitations on petitioner’s jus disponendi. All the elements of a valid mortgage contract were
present. For a mortgage contract to be valid, the absolute owner of a property must have free
disposal of the property. That property must be used to secure the fulfillment of an obligation.
Article 2085 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 2085. The following requisites are essential to
contracts of pledge and mortgage: (1) That they be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a
principal obligation; (2) That the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing
pledged or mortgaged; (3) That the persons constituting the pledge or mortgage have the free
disposal of their property, and in the absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for the
purpose. Petitioner's undisputed title to and ownership of the property is sufficient to give him
free disposal of it.
As owner of the property, he has the right to enjoy all attributes of ownership including
jus disponendi or the right to encumber, alienate, or dispose his property "without other
limitations than those established by law." Petitioner's claim that he lacks free disposal of the
property stems from the existence of the restrictions imposed on his title by the National Housing
Authority. These restrictions do not divest petitioner of his ownership rights. They are mere
burdens or limitations on petitioner's jus disponendi.

Thus, petitioner may dispose or encumber his property. However, the disposition or
encumbrance of his property is subject to the limitations and to the rights that may accrue to the
National Housing Authority. When annotated to the title, these restrictions serve as notice to the
whole world that the National Housing Authority has claims over the property, which it may
enforce against others. Contracts entered into in violation of restrictions on a property owner's
rights do not always have the effect of making them void ab initio. Contracts that contain
provisions in favor of one party may be void ab initio or voidable.

Contracts that lack consideration, those that are against public order or public policy, and
those that are attended by illegality or immorality are void ab initio. Contracts that only subject a
property owner's property rights to conditions or limitations but otherwise contain all the
elements of a valid contract are merely voidable by the person in whose favor the conditions or
limitations are made. The mortgage contract entered into by petitioner and respondent contains
all the elements of a valid contract of mortgage. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found
no irregularity in its execution. There was no showing that it was attended by fraud, illegality,
immorality, force or intimidation, and lack of consideration. At most, therefore, the restrictions
made the contract entered into by the parties voidable by the person in whose favor they were
made—in this case, by the National Housing Authority. Petitioner has no actionable right or
cause of action based on those restrictions.
Doctrine: Paternity and Filiation

Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation to natural children as defined
thereunder. There was, therefore, from the outset, an intent to exclude children conceived or
born out of illicit relations from the purview of the law.

In the case at bar, there is no question that all the children born to private respondent
and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when the latter's valid marriage to
petitioner's mother was still subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent were married
abroad after the latter obtained in Nevada, U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife
does not change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this jurisdiction at
the time. Although natural children can be legitimized, and natural children by legal fiction
enjoy the rights of acknowledged natural children, this does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that natural children by legal fiction can likewise be legitimized.

Case Title: Ma. Rosario De Santos vs. Hon. Adoracion G. Angeles, (J. Romero) GR. No.
105619; December 12, 1995

Facts:

Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a daughter,
herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, Antonio fell in love and married
Conchita Talag de Santos, herein private respondent in another country. This union produced
eleven children. Less than a month later, after the death of Sophia, Antonio and private
respondent contracted another marriage celebrated under Philippine laws. After the death of
Antonio, private respondent went to court asking for the issuance of letters of administration in
her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate.

After six years, petitioner Santos decided to intervene. She argued that private
respondent's children were illegitimate. The RTC declared private respondent's ten children
legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and private
respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this was
denied. Hence, she filed the instant petition contending that since only natural children can be
legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers and sisters.

Issue:

Whether or not natural children by legal fiction can be legitimized.

Held:
 Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly states: "Art. 269. Only natural children can be
legitimized. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural." The Civil
Code provides three rights which, in varying degrees, are enjoyed by children, depending on
their filiation: use of surname, succession and support. Legitimate children and legitimated
children are entitled to all three. Thus they "shall principally use the surname of the father," and
shall be entitled to support from their legitimate ascendants and descendants, as well as to a
legitime consisting of one-half of the hereditary estate of both parents, and to other successional
rights, such as the right of representation. "These rights as effects of legitimacy cannot be
renounced."

Natural children recognized by both parents and natural children by legal fiction shall
principally use the surname of the father. If a natural child is recognized by only one parent, the
child shall follow the surname of recognizing parent. Both types of children are entitled to
receive support from the parent recognizing them. They also cannot be deprived of their legitime
equivalent to one-half of that pertaining to each of the legitimate children or descendants of the
recognizing parent, to be taken from the free disposable portion of the latter's estate.

Recognized illegitimate children other than natural, or spurious issues, are, in their
minority, under the parental authority of their mothers and, naturally, take the latter's surname.
The only support which they are entitled to is from the recognizing parent, and their legitime,
also to be taken from the free portion, consists of four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged
natural child or two-fifths that of each legitimate child. Unrecognized illegitimate children are
not entitled to any of the rights above mentioned.

Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation to natural children as defined
thereunder. There was, therefore, from the outset, an intent to exclude children conceived or born
out of illicit relations from the purview of the law. In the case at bar, there is no question that all
the children born to private respondent and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born
when the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother was still subsisting. That private
respondent and the decedent were married abroad after the latter obtained in Nevada, U.S.A. a
decree of divorce from his legitimate wife does not change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad
was not recognized in this jurisdiction at the time.

Another point to be considered is that although natural children can be legitimized, and
natural children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged natural children, this does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that natural children by legal fiction can likewise be
legitimized.

As has been pointed out, much more is involved here than the mere privilege to be
legitimized. The rights of other children, like the petitioner in the case at bench, may be
adversely affected as her testamentary share may well be reduced in the event that her ten
surviving half siblings should be placed on par with her, when each of them is rightfully entitled
to only half of her share. Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been
decided under the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes only
two classes of children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are
nothing if not pure fiction.

Doctrine: Paternity and Filiation

” There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that
there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300
days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are
living separately in such way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of
the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which
took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child would no longer
be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.”

Case Title: Social Security System vs. Rosanna H. Aguas, (J. Callejo Sr.) GR. No.
165546; February 27, 2006

Facts:

Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a pensioner, died on
December 8, 1996. Pablo’s surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for
death benefits on December 13, 1996. Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise
survived by his minor child, Jeylnn, who was born on October 29, 1991.

Her claim for monthly pension was settled on February 13, 1997. However, Pablo’s sister
contested Rosanna’s claim alleging that Rosanna abandoned the family abode more than six
years before Pablo’s death and lived with another man, Romeo. She also presented a marriage
certificate between Romeo and Rosanna showing that the two were married in 1990. As a result,
the SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnn’s monthly pension. SSS denied
Rosanna’s request to resume the payment of their pensions. She was advised to refund to the SSS
within 30 days the amount of P10,350 representing the total death benefits released to her and
Jenelyn from December 1996 to August 1997 at P1,150.00 per month.

The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary, it appearing
that she had contracted marriage with Romeo dela Peña during the subsistence of her marriage to
Pablo. The SSC concluded that Rosanna was no longer entitled to support from Pablo prior to his
death because of her act of adultery.
 As for Jeylnn, the SSC ruled that, even if her birth certificate was signed by Pablo as her
father, there was more compelling evidence that Jeylnn was not his legitimate child. The SSC
deduced from the records that Jeylnn was the daughter of Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña. On
appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the SSS.
The CA relied on the birth certificate of Jeylnn showing that she was the child of the
deceased. According to the appellate court, for judicial purposes, this record was binding upon
the parties, including the SSS. The entries made in public documents may only be challenged
through adversarial proceedings in courts of law and may not be altered by mere testimonies of
witnesses to the contrary.

As for Rosanna, the CA found no evidence to show that she ceased to receive support
from Pablo before he died. Rosanna’s alleged affair with Romeo dela Peña was not properly
proven. In any case, even if Rosanna married Romeo dela Peña during her marriage to Pablo, the
same would have been a void marriage; it would not have ipso facto made her not dependent for
support upon Pablo and negate the presumption that, as the surviving spouse, she is entitled to
support from her husband.

Issue:

W/N Rosanna and Jeylnn are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death
of Pablo

Held:

Only the child, Jeylnn, is entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of
Pablo. Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the
signature of Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry
showing that she was born on October 29, 1991.

The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4, 1977 and
the marriage subsisted until the latter’s death on December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident that
Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage.

It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing
that for her to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must prove that she was "the legitimate
spouse dependent for support from the employee."

The claimant-spouse must therefore establish two qualifying factors: (1) that she is the
legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the member for support.

In this case, Rosanna presented proof to show that she is the legitimate spouse of Pablo,
that is, a copy of their marriage certificate which was verified with the civil register by petitioner.
But whether or not Rosanna has sufficiently established that she was still dependent on Pablo at
the time of his death remains to be resolved. Indeed, a husband and wife are obliged to support
each other, but whether one is actually dependent for support upon the other is something that
has to be shown; it cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone.
The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto from her
husband cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any showing to
the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living together at the
time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband for support,
unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself.

Finally, while Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a
primary beneficiary since she failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she
was still dependent on him for support even if they were already living separately. Dependents
and primary beneficiaries of an SSS member defined:

Dependent. – The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted child who is unmarried, not
gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one years of age provided that he is congenitally
incapacitated and incapable of self-support physically or mentally; the legitimate spouse
dependent for support upon the employee; and the legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the
covered employee for regular support.

Beneficiaries. – The dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who
shall be the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and, subject to the
restrictions imposed on dependent children, the legitimate descendants and illegitimate children
who shall be the secondary beneficiaries. In the absence of any of the foregoing, any other
person designated by the covered employee as secondary beneficiary.
Doctrine: Paternity and Filiation

“The legitimacy and filiation of children cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for
correction of entries in the certificate of live birth.”

Case title: Glenn M. Miller vs. Joan Miller and the Local Civil Registrar of Gubat,
Sorsogon, GR. No. 200344; (J. Leonen) August 28, 2019

Facts:

Petitioner Glenn is one of the legitimate children of John (deceased) and Beatriz. 
Respondent Joan, on the other hand, claims to be an illegitimate daughter of John, and after
John’s death, filed a petition for partition and accounting of John’s estate.

Glenn, on the other hand, filed a petition for cancellation of Joan’s certificate of live birth
under Rule 108, praying also that Joan’s surname be changed from Miller to Espineda in all her
official documents.

Glenn alleged that as his father John did not affix his signature on Joan’s birth certificate,
he did not acknowledge Joan as his illegitimate child.

In her defense, Joan insisted that John continuously and openly recognized her as his
daughter, by supporting her education, and mentioned her in John’s letter to her mother Lennie. 
He also gave Joan 1/8 of his estate in his holographic will.

After trial, the RTC dismissed Glenn’s petition, which the CA affirmed, thus Glenn filed
the instant petition before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not a Rule 108 petition is proper to compel Joan to change her surname from
Miller to Espenida.

Ruling:

This Court stresses that Glenn’s initiatory pleading before the Regional Trial Court of
Masbate City is a Petition for Correction of Entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Joan Miller
y Espenida.

This type of petition is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court:

 SECTION 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Court of First Instance of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

SECTION 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid

grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; G) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

SECTION 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is

sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SECTION 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by
an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof
to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province.

SECTION 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition
thereto.

SECTION 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceeding is brought

may make orders expediting the proceedings and may also grant preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.

SECTION 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his
record.

In In re: Barretto v. The Local Registrar of Manila, this Court explained that:

. . . the summary procedure for correction of entries in the civil registry under article 412 of the
Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is confined to “innocuous or clerical errors, such
as misspellings and the like, errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding” or
corrections that are not controversial and are supported by indubitable evidence.[60]

Here, petitioners sought the correction of private respondent’s surname in her birth
certificate registered as Local Civil Registrar No. 825. They want her to use her mother’s
surname, Espenida, instead of Miller, claiming that she was not an acknowledged illegitimate
child of John.
What petitioners seek is not a mere clerical change. It is not a simple matter of correcting a
single letter in private respondent’s surname due to a misspelling. Rather, private respondent’s
filiation will be gravely affected, as changing her surname from Miller to Espenida will also
change her status. This will affect not only her identity, but her successional rights as well.
Certainly, this change is substantial. Petition dismissed.
Doctrine: Paternity and Filiation

“In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiations.”

Case title: Ma. Cristina Torres Braza vs. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental, GR. No. 181174; (J. Carpio-Morales) December 4, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo Braza Jr. were married. In 2002, Pablo died in a
vehicular accident. During the wake, respondent Lucille Titular and her son, Patrick Alvin
Titutar showed up and introduced themselves as the wife and son, respectively, of
Pablo. Cristina made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick’s birth certificate from
the Local Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental which stated that: (1) Pablo is the father of
Patrick having acknowledged by the father on January 13, 1997; and, (2) Patrick was legitimated
by virtue of the subsequent marriage of his parents; hence, his name was changed to Patrick
Alvin Titular Braza. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo
and Lucille were married in 1998.

Cristina and her co-petitioner (her three legitimate children with Pablo) filed before the
RTC of Negros a petition to correct the entries in the birth certificate record of Patrick in the
Local Civil Registry. They contended that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the
supposed subsequent marriage between Lucille and Pablo because said marriage is bigamous on
account of a valid and subsisting marriage between her (Cristina) and Pablo. Petitioner prayed
for the:

1. Correction of the entries in Patrick’s birth record with respect to his legitimation, the
name of the father and his acknowledgment and the use of the last name “BRAZA”;
2. A directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the
minor Patrick, to submit Patrick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation;
3. The declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate
and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage between Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.

The trial court dismissed the petition holding that in a special proceeding for correction of
entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction
over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and
order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, and that the controversy should be ventilated in an
ordinary adversarial action.

Issue:

May the court pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy in an action
to correct entries in the civil registrar?

Held:

No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiations.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the
procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding
contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and
other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or
writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a
misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be
allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due
process is properly observed.

The petitioners’ cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s
marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action
are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15,
2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively; hence, the petition should be filed in a
Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally,
validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed
before the court a quo.
Doctrine: Paternity and Filiation

“For a claim of filiation to succeed, it must be made within the period allowed, and
supported by the evidence required under the Family Code.”
Case title: Romeo F. Ara vs. Dra. Fely S. Pizarro, GR. No. 187273; (J. Leonen) February
15, 2017

Facts:

Romeo F. Ara and William A. Garcia (petitioners), and Dra. Fely S. Pizarro and Henry
A. Rossi (respondents) all claimed to be children of the late Josefa A. Ara, who died on
November 18, 2002. Petitioners assert that Fely S. Pizarro was born to Josefa and her then
husband, Vicente Salgado, who died during World War II. At some point toward the end of the
war, Josefa met and lived with an American soldier by the name of Darwin Gray. Romeo F. Ara
was born from this relationship. Josefa later met a certain Alfredo Garcia, and, from this
relationship, gave birth to sons Ramon Garcia and William A. Garcia. Josefa and Alfredo
married on January 24, 1952.8 After Alfredo passed away, Josefa met an Italian missionary
named Frank Rossi, who allegedly fathered Henry Rossi.

Respondent Pizarro claims that, to her knowledge, she is the only child of Josefa. Further,
petitioner Garcia is recorded as a son of a certain Carmen Bucarin and Pedro Garcia, as
evidenced by a Certificate of Live Birth dated July 19, 1950; and petitioner Ara is recorded as a
son of spouses Jose Ara and Maria Flores, evidenced by his Certificate of Live Birth.

Petitioners, together with Ramon and herein respondent Rossi, verbally sought partition
of the properties left by the deceased Josefa, which were in the possession of respondent Pizarr.
Plaintiffs a quo filed a Complaint for judicial partition of properties left by the deceased Josefa,
before the Regional Trial Court. In her Answer, respondent Pizarro averred that, to her
knowledge, she was the only legitimate and only child of Josefa. She denied that any of the
plaintiffs a quo were her siblings, for lack of knowledge or information to form a belief on that
matter. Further, the late Josefa left other properties mostly in the possession of plaintiffs a quo,
which were omitted in the properties to be partitioned by the trial court in Special Civil Action
No. 337-03, enumerated in her counterclaim.
 RTC issued decision finding petititoners Ara and Garcia to be children of Josefa, and
including them in the partition of properties.

On appeal, CA held that only respondents Pizarro and Rossi, as well as plaintiff a
quo Ramon, were the children of the late Josefa, entitled to shares in Josefa's estate.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondents can be considered legitimate children of Josefa A. Ara
and are entitled of partition of the properties left by the deceased Josefa

Held:

No. The law is very clear. If filiation is sought to be proved under the second paragraph
of Article 172 of the Family Code, the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent. It is evident that appellants Romeo F. Ara and William Garcia can no longer be allowed
at this time to introduce evidence of their open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child or prove their alleged filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules
of Court or special laws. The simple reason is that Josefa Ara is already dead and can no longer
be heard on the claim of her alleged sons' illegitimate filiation
Doctrine:

“The mother must sign and agree to the information entered in the birth
certificate because she has the parental authority and custody of the illegitimate child.”

Case title: In the Matter of Petition for Cancellation of Certificates of Live Birth of
Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan vs. Republic of the Philippines, GR. No. 222095; (J.
Carpio) August 7, 2017

Facts:

On 24 June 2008, Jonna Karla Baguio Barcelote (Barcelote) alleged that she bore a child
out of wedlock with a married man named Ricky 0. Tinitigan in her relative’s residence in
Sibulan, Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur. She was not able to register the birth of their child, whom
she named Yohan Grace Barcelote, because she did not give birth in a hospital.

To hide her relationship with Tinitigan, she remained in Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur while
Tinitigan lived with his legitimate family in Davao City and would only visit her.

On 24 August 2011, she bore another child with Tinitigan, whom she named as Joshua
Miguel Barcelote. Again, she did not register his birth to avoid humiliation, ridicule, and possible
criminal charges. Thereafter, she lost contact with Tinitigan and she returned to Davao City.

When her first child needed a certificate of live birth for school admission, Barcelote
finally decided to register the births of both children. She, then, returned to Santa Cruz, Davao
del Sur to register their births. The Local Civil Registrar of Santa Cruz approved the
late registration of the births of Yohan Grace Barcelote and Joshua Miguel Barcelote after
submitting proof that the National Statistics Office (NSO) has no record of both births on file.

However, upon submission of the copies of the late registration of the births to the NSO,
Barcelote was informed that there were two certificates of live birth (subject birth certificates)
with the same name of the mother and the years of birth of the children in their office.

The subject birth certificates registered by the Local Civil Registrar of Davao City state
the names “Avee Kyna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan” and “Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan”.
Ricky Tinitigan was the listed Informant in both birth certificates.
 Thus, petitioner Barcelote filed a petition with the RTC for the cancellation of the
subject birth certificates registered by Tinitigan without her knowledge and participation, and for
containing erroneous entries.

The RTC ruled in favor of Barcelote and ordered the cancellation of the birth certificates,
ruling that the certificates were legally infirm because they were registered unilaterally by
Tinitigan without the knowledge and signature of Barcelote in violation of Sec. 5, Act No. 3753.
The RTC also held that the subject birth certificates contain void and illegal entries, because the
children use the surname of Tinitigan, contrary to the mandate of Article 176 of the Family Code
stating that illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother. Moreover, the RTC found
that it is not for the best interest of the children to use the surname of their father, for there is
always a possibility that the legitimate children or wife may ask the illegitimate children to
refrain from using the surname of their father. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC, and ruled that the birth certificates registered by Tinitigan were valid and
such did not require the consent of Barcelote.

The CA further ruled that the children can legally and validly use the surname of
Tinitigan, since Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, amending Article 176, allows illegitimate children
to use the surname of their father if the latter had expressly recognized them through the record
of birth appearing in the civil register, such as in this case where Barcelote admitted that
Tinitigan personally registered the children's births and a fixed his surname on the subject birth
certificates.

Issue:

Whether or not the certificates of live birth of the two illegitimate children registered by
their father Tinitigan, which were not duly signed by their mother Barcelote, were void.

Held:

Yes, the birth certificate is void.

The Court held that since the undisputed facts show that the children were born outside a
valid marriage, then they are the illegitimate children of Tinitigan and Barcelote.

The children shall use the surname of their mother, Barcelote. The entry in the subject birth
certificates as to the surname of the children is therefore incorrect; their surname should have
been “Barcelote” and not “Tinitigan.”

The Court did not agree with the CA that the subject birth certificates were the express
recognition of the children’s filiation by Tinitigan, because they were not duly registered in
accordance with law i.e. the subject birth certificates of the illegitimate children were not signed
by their mother.

Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Civil Registry Law, states:

 Section 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. -The declaration of the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the
newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such
declaration shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil
registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician, or midwife in attendance at
the birth or by either parent of the newly born child. (first paragraph)

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly

by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses. (fourth paragraph)

The first paragraph of Section 5 of Act No. 3753 assumes that the newborn child is
legitimate since our law accords a strong presumption in favor of legitimacy of children. On the
other hand, the fourth paragraph of Section 5 specifically provides that in case of an illegitimate
child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only
the mother if the father refuses. The fourth paragraph of Section 5 specifically applies to an
illegitimate child and likewise underscores its mandatory character with the use of the word
“shall.”

Mother must sign the birth certificate of her illegitimate child; otherwise, the same is void

Thus, it is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth certificate of

her child in all cases, irrespective of whether the father recognizes the child as his or not. The
only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the
child who conclusively carries the blood of the mother. Thus, this provision ensures that
individuals are not falsely named as parents. The mother must sign and agree to the information
entered in the birth certificate because she has the parental authority and custody of the
illegitimate child.

Since it appears on the face of the subject birth certificates that the mother did not sign
the documents, the local civil registrar had no authority to register the subject birth certificates.

Clearly, the subject birth certificates were not executed consistent with the provisions of
the law respecting the registration of birth of illegitimate children. Aside from the fact that the
entry in the subject birth certificates as to the surname of the children is incorrect since it should
have been that of the mother, the subject birth certificates are also incomplete as they lacked the
signature of the mother.

Accordingly, the Court declared the subject birth certificates void and order their
cancellation for being registered against the mandatory provisions of the Family Code requiring
the use of the mother’s surname for her illegitimate children and Act No. 3753 requiring the
signature of the mother in her children’s birth certificates.
Doctrine:

To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned, and such due recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated
act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required.

Case title: GR.No.200169; (J. Castillo) January 28, 2015

Facts:

Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses) died,
intestate and without debts, on August 26, 1983 and February 8, 1994, respectively. Included in
their estate are two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certifcates of Title issued by the
Registries of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod.

In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar fled with the RTC of Bacolod City a civil
case for mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat. The Complaint
alleged that petitioner is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he
discovered that the subject titles were missing, and thus he suspected that someone from the
Siasat clan could have stolen the same; that he executed affdavits of loss of the subject titles and
fled the same with the Registries of Deeds of Bacolod and Bago; that on June 22, 1996, he fled
before the Bacolod RTC a Petition for the issuance of second owner's copy of the Certificate of
Title, which respondent opposed.

Petitioner prayed that respondent be ordered to surrender to him the owner's duplicate
copies of the subject titles in her possession; and that damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit
be awarded to him.

In her Answer, respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole surviving heir of
the Aguilar spouses, that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that
since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited the
conjugal share of the former; that upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers and
sisters inherited her estate as she had no issue; and that the subject titles were not stolen, but
entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt.

During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the Aguilar spouses as
their son. To prove filiation, he presented his school records showing Alfred as his father, his
ITR which indicated Candelaria as his mother, Alfredo’s SSS form E-1 with signature and thumb
mark showing petitioner as his son and dependent, Alfredo’s information sheet of employment
indicating petitioner as his son, petitioner’s certificate of marriage indicating Aguilar Spouses as
his parents, a letter from BMMC introducing petitioner as Alfredo’s husband, and a certification
indicating petitioner’s birth certificate could not be found as they were destroyed by nature.
Petitioner also offered testimonies from his wife and aunt (Alfredo’s sister) that he is indeed the
only son of the Aguilar Spouses.

Respondent testified that she does not know the petitioner and doesn’t know him to be
the son of the Aguilar Spouses, that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar executed an affidavit to the effect
that she had no issue and that she is the sole heir to her husband Alfredo Aguilar's estate; that she
did not steal the subject titles, but that the same were entrusted to her by Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar. She also offered the testimony of Candelaria’s sister claiming that petitioner is not the
son of the Aguilar Spouses.

RTC ruled in favor of respondent Siasat stating that the evidence presented by petitioner
was not solid enough to attest to fact that Alfredo is either a biological son or a legally adopted
one. Neither was a certificate of live birth of plaintiff ever introduced confirming his biological
relationship as a son to the deceased spouses Alfredo and Candelaria S. Aguilar.

On appeal, petitioner argued that he cannot present his Certificate of Live Birth as all the
records covering the period 1945-194616 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were
destroyed, for this reason, he presented the foregoing documentary evidence to prove his
relationship to the Aguilar spouses. Petitioner made particular reference to Alfredo Aguilar’s
SSS Form E-1 arguing that the same was made under oath and thus sufficient under Article 172
of the Family Code to establish that he is a child and heir of the Aguilar spouses.

CA later affirmed ruling of RTC stating that the documents presented were not strong
evidence to prove filiation with the Aguilar Spouses, sighting Reyes vs CA that student records
or other writing not signed by the father do not constitute evidence of filiation, and Labagala vs
Santiago that "A baptismal certificate, a private document is not conclusive proof of filiation.
More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that income tax has been
paid and the amount thereof.

Issue:
Whether or not Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof of
filiation and relationship to the Aguilar Spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code?
Held:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Petitioner Rodolfo Aguilar.

Sighting De Jesus vs. Estate of Dizon, the filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate
children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall
be proved by:(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2)
any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Thus, it must be concluded that petitioner — who was born on March 5, 1945, or during
the marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar and before their respective deaths
— has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses.

As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar's SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement
for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family
Code; by itself, said document constitutes an "admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.

 Doctrine:

In the absence of the record of birth and admission of legitimate filiation, Article 172 of
the Family Code (Code) provides that filiation shall be proved by any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws. Such other proof of one's filiation may be a baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other
kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Rules). Article 175 of the same
Code also allows illegitimate children to establish their filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as that of legitimate children.

However, it is jurisprudentially settled that a baptismal certificate has evidentiary value

to prove filiation only if considered alongside other evidence of filiation. Because the putative
parent has no hand in the preparation of a baptismal certificate, the same has scant evidentiary
value if taken in isolation; while it may be considered a public document, "it can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified, but not the veracity of the
entries with respect to the child's paternity." As such, a baptismal certificate alone is not
sufficient to resolve a disputed filiation, and the courts must peruse other pieces of evidence
instead of relying only on a canonical record.

Case title: Heirs of Paula C. Fabillar vs. Miguel M. Paller, GR. No. 231459, ( J. Perlas-
Bernabe) January 21, 2019

Facts:
The instant case stemmed from an Amended Complaint for Recovery of Ownership,
Possession, and Damages filed by respondents against Spouses Custodio and Paula (collectively,
the Custodios), before the 9th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Giporlos-Quinapondan, Eastern
Samar (MCTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 273, involving a 3.1003-hectare parcel of
agricultural coconut land situated in Sitio Cabotjoan, Brgy. Parina, Giporlos, Eastern Samar,
with an assessed value of P950.00 (subject land).
 Respondents claimed that the subject land was a portion of a bigger parcel of land
originally owned by their grandfather, Marcelino Paller (Marcelino). After the latter's death, or
sometime in 1929 or 1932, his children, Ambrosio Paller (Ambrosio), Isidra Paller (Isidra), and
Ignacia Paller (Ignacia), along several others, orally partitioned his properties and took
possession of their respective shares.

From Marcelino's estate, respondents' father, Ambrosio, was given about one (1) hectare
of the subject land, in addition to a smaller property situated in Sitio Dungon, Brgy. 07; while
Isidra was given two (2) hectares as her rightful share. After Isidra's death, her son, Juan Duevo
(Juan), sold the two (2)-hectare land to Ambrosio's wife and respondents' mother, Sabina
Macawile (Sabina). Through succession upon their parents' death, respondents alleged that the
subject land was passed on to them. On the other hand, the Custodios' predecessor-in-interest and
petitioners' grandmother, Ignacia, was assigned two (2) parcels of land situated in Sitio Dungon,
Brgy. 07 and Sitio Bangalog, Brgy. Parina as her share.

In 1995, respondent Demetria, daughter of Ambrosio, mortgaged the subject land to Felix
R. Alde with right to repurchase. Upon her return from Manila in 2000, she redeemed the same
but discovered that the Custodios took possession of the land and refused to vacate therefrom
despite demands; hence, the complaint.

In their Answer, the Custodios claimed to be legitimate and compulsory heirs of

Marcelino who can validly and legally possess the subject land which has not been partitioned,
and thus, commonly owned by his heirs. They further averred that Ambrosio is not a child of
Marcelino and, as such, has no right to claim the subject land.

To support respondents' claim that Ambrosio is a child of Marcelino and Susana Paller,
they presented before the MCTC a copy of Ambrosio's baptismal certificate indicating that his
father was Marcelino; however, his mother was reflected therein as "Talampona Duevo"
(Talampona). On the other hand, to establish their acquisition of the two (2)-hectare portion, they
adduced a copy of the unnotarized deed of sale dated May 3, 1959 in waray dialect denominated
as "Documento Hin Pag Guibotongan Hin Cadayunan" (unnotarized deed of sale) purportedly
covering the sale of the said portion by Juan to respondents' mother, Sabina, who, however, was
described therein as married to "Marcos Paller" (Marcos), not to Ambrosio. To explain the
discrepancies in the names reflected in the above documents, Miguel explained that "Ambrosio"
and "Talampona" are the real names, and that "Marcos" and "Susana" were mere aliases.

Subsequently, the Custodios filed a Demurrer to Evidence 21 dated July 20, 2008,
averring that respondents failed to establish their claim that Ambrosio is a son of Marcelino,
pointing out: (a) the discrepancies in the names indicated in their pleadings and the documentary
evidence they presented; and (b) the lack of documents/evidence other than Ambrosio's
baptismal certificate to prove his Cliation to Marcelino. Thus, they contended that respondents
cannot claim to have lawfully and validly acquired the subject land by right of representation
from Ambrosio. They further pointed out that respondents' evidence failed to prove not only their
ownership of the subject land, but likewise the identity of the land they seek to recover,
considering the different boundaries reflected in the unnotarized deed of sale and the tax
declarations (TD) they presented. However, the Demurrer to Evidence was denied in an Order 24
dated October 24, 2008, and the Custodios were allowed to present their evidence.

MCTC declared respondents as the lawful owners of the subject land, and ordered the
Custodios to surrender the ownership and physical possession of the subject land, and to pay
actual damages, attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.
It gave weight to the baptismal certificate as sufficient and competent proof of
Ambrosio's filiation with Marcelino which the Custodios failed to successfully overthrow. It
further ruled that: (a) respondents' claim of oral partition was effectively admitted by Paula, who
testified that her mother received her share of Marcelino's properties; and (b) respondents had
duly established that they are the prior possessors of the subject land who had exercised acts of
dominion over the same, and had paid the corresponding realty taxes therefor.

RTC: Affirmed the decision of the MCTC.

CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not Ambrosio baptismal certificate can be considered as a competent proof of
the claimed filiation as a child of Marcelino.

Held:
Ambrosio's baptismal certificate cannot be considered as competent proof of the claimed
filiation with Marcelino.

In the absence of the record of birth and admission of legitimate filiation, Article 172 of
the Family Code (Code) provides that filiation shall be proved by any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws. Such other proof of one's filiation may be a baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other
kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Rules). Article 175 of the same
Code also allows illegitimate children to establish their filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as that of legitimate children.

However, it is jurisprudentially settled that a baptismal certificate has evidentiary value to

prove filiation only if considered alongside other evidence of filiation. Because the putative
parent has no hand in the preparation of a baptismal certificate, the same has scant evidentiary
value if taken in isolation; while it may be considered a public document, "it can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified, but not the veracity of the
entries with respect to the child's paternity." 55 As such, a baptismal certificate alone is not
sufficient to resolve a disputed filiation, and the courts must peruse other pieces of evidence
instead of relying only on a canonical record.

In this case, the MCTC, the RTC, and the CA did not appreciate any other material proof
related to the baptismal certificate of Ambrosio that would establish his filiation with Marcelino,
whether as a legitimate or an illegitimate son. Contrary to the ruling of the said courts, the
burden of proof is on respondents to establish their affirmative allegation that Marcelino is
Ambrosio's father, and not for petitioners to disprove the same, because a baptismal certificate is
neither conclusive proof of filiation if parentage nor of the status of legitimacy or illegitimacy of
the person baptized. Consequently, while petitioners have admitted that Marcelino's heirs had
partitioned Marcelino's properties among them, the Court finds respondents' evidence to be
inadequate to prove the claimed filiation with the property owner, Marcelino, as to entitle
Ambrosio and his successors-in-interest, herein respondents, to share in the properties left by
Marcelino. However, it is well to point out that the portion of the property supposedly inherited
by Ambrosio from Marcelino involved only a one (1)- hectare portion of the subject land.

Respondents failed to prove the identity of the land they are seeking to recover.
Doctrine:

A prior settlement of estate is not essential before the heirs can commence any action
originally pertaining to the deceased.

Case title: Heirs of Ignacio Conti vs. Court of Appeals, (J. Bellosillo) GR. No. 118464,
December 21, 1998

Facts:

Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti were the co-owners of property located in Lucena
City. Lourdes died intestate without issue. Subsequently, private respondents, all claiming to be
correlative relatives of the deceased Lourdes, filed an action for partition and damages before the
RTC-Lucena City.

Ignacio Conti refused the partition on the ground that private respondents failed to
produce any document to prove that they were the rightful heirs of Lourdes. Ignacio died and
was substituted as party-defendants by his children. To prove their filiation to Lourdes, private
respondents presented Lydia Sampayo-Reyes and Adelaida Sampayo. Lydia testified that she
was one of the nieces of Lourdes, being the daughter of Josefina Sanpayo, the only living sibling
of Lourdes.

They presented her original copy of certificate of live birth showing that her parents are
Inocentes Reyes and Josefina Sampayo. Lydia also testified that the other siblings of Lourdes
who were already dead were Remedios, Luis, and Manuel.

To prove that Josefina, Remedios, Manuel, and Luis were siblings of Lourdes, their
baptismal certificate together with a photocopy of the birth certificate of Manuel were offered as
evidence to show that their parents, like Lourdes, were Antonio Sampayo and Brigida Jaraza.

The baptismal certificates were presented in lieu of the birth certificates because the
office of the civil registrar were burned on two separate occasions, thus all civil registration
records were totally burned. Adelaida Sampayo testified that she was the spouse of Manuel, the
brother of the deceased Lourdes.
 To rebut the claim of the private respondents, petitioner claimed that the late Ignacio
Conti paid for the real taxes of the subject property and spent for the necessary repairs and
improvements thereon because by agreement Lourdes would leave her share of the property
them.

However, the trial court found no will, either testamentary or holographic, was presented
to substantiate their claim. So it declared that the private respondents are the rightful heirs of
Lourdes.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA also declared that a prior and separate
judicial declaration of heirship was not necessary and that private respondents became the co-
owners of the portions of the property owned and registered in the name of Lourdes upon her
death and, consequently, entitled to the immediate possession thereof and all other incidents/right
of ownership as provided by law including the right to demand partition under Art. 777 of the
civil code.

Hence, petitioner pursued the case arguing that a complaint for partition to claim a
supposed share of the deceased co-owner cannot prosper without prior settlement of the latter’s
estate and compliance with the legal requirements, especially publication, and private
respondents failed to prove by competent evidence their relationship with the deceased.

Issue:

Whether or not the argument of the petitioner is correct?

Ruling:

The Petitioner is wrong. A prior settlement of estate is not essential before the heirs can
commence any action originally pertaining to the deceased. Conformably with Articles 777 and
494 of the civil code, from the death of Lourdes her rights as co-owner, incidental to which is the
right to ask for partition at any time or to terminate the co-ownership, were transmitted to her
rightful heirs. So, in demanding partition, private respondent merely exercised the right
originally pertaining to the decedent, their predecessor-in-interest. Petitioners theory of
publication is also wrong because the action is not for the partition of the state of Lourdes but
only for the segregation of Lourdes one-half share to the subject property which they inherited
from her through intestate succession. This is a simple case of ordinary partition between co-
owners over which publication is not required.
Doctrine:

A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right; a proper and reasonable cause
must exist before a person may be authorized to change his name.

Case title: Richelle P. Abella vs. Policarpio Cabañero, (J. Carpio) GR. No. 206647,
August 9, 2017

Facts:

Alleging that she is the daughter out of wedlock of her father who is a Chinese national
(Pia Gan) and her mother, Consolacion Basiio, Emelita Basilio Gan filed a petition for correction
of entry in her birth certificate from “Emilita Basilio” to “Emilita Basilio Gan” to reflect the
name which she alleged she had been using since her school days.  The RTC ordered her to
amend the petition as it sought to correct her name, thus it should be a petition for change of
name; Emelita complied, and it was this amended petition which became the basis for the RTC
to grant her petition for change of name.

The Republic of the Philippines thru the Office of the Solicitor General appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing that since there is no proof that Pia Gan, Emelita’s
father, recognized her as his daughter, there is no basis which would allow her to change her
name from Basilio to Gan.

The Court of Appeals sided with the Republic.   It held that pursuant to Article 176 of the
Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, the petitioner, as an illegitimate child, may
only use the surname of her mother; she may only use the surname of her father if their filiation
has been expressly recognized by her father. The CA pointed out that the petitioner has not
adduced any evidence showing that her father had recognized her as his illegitimate child and,
thus, she may not use the surname of her father.

Issue:

Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of the father in the absence of
proof that the father recognized the filiation of the illegitimate child.

Held:
 The petition is denied.

A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right; a proper and reasonable cause
must exist before a person may be authorized to change his name. ”In granting or denying
petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound
discretion of the court. What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the
request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced
in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole
prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts.”
After a judicious review of the records of this case, the Court agrees with the CA that the
reason cited by the petitioner in support of her petition for change of name, i.e. that she has been
using the name “Emelita Basilio Gan” in all of her records, is not a sufficient or proper
justification to allow her petition. When the petitioner was born in 1956, prior to the enactment
and effectivity of the Family Code, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code then regarding the
petitioner’s use of surname provide:

Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the
surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the
surname of the recognizing parent.

Article 368. Illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 shall bear the surname of the
mother.

In her amended petition for change of name, the petitioner merely stated that she was
born out of wedlock; she did not state whether her parents, at the time of her birth, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, which would make her a natural child
pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code. If, at the time of the petitioner’s·birth, either of her
parents had an impediment to marry the other, she may only bear the surname of her mother
pursuant to Article 368 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, she may use the surname of her father
provided that she was acknowledged by her father.

However, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence that would show that she indeed
was duly acknowledged by his father. The petitioner’s evidence consisted only of her birth
certificate signed by her mother, school records, employment records, marriage contract,
certificate of baptism, and other government records. Thus, assuming that she is a natural child
pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code, she could still not insist on using her father’s surname.
It was, thus, a blatant error on the part of the RTC to have allowed the petitioner to change her
name from “Emelita Basilio” to “Emelita Basilio Gan.”

The petitioner’s reliance on the cases of Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines,Republic of

the Philippines v. Coseteng-Magpayo,[25] and Republic of the Philippines v. Lim to support her
position is misplaced.

In Alfon, the name of the petitioner therein which appeared in her birth certificate was
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte; she was a legitimate child of her father and mother.
She filed a petition for change of name, seeking that she be allowed to use the surname “Alfon,”
her mother’s surname, instead of “Duterte.” The trial court denied the petition, ratiocinating that
under Article 364 of the Civil Code, legitimate children shall principally use the surname of the
father. The Court allowed the petitioner therein to use the surname of her mother since Article
364 of the Civil Code used the word “principally” and not “exclusively” and, hence, there is no
legal obstacle if a legitimate child should choose to use the mother’s surname to which he or she
is legally entitled.

In contrast, Articles 366 and 368 of the Civil Code do not give to an illegitimate child or a
natural child not acknowledged by the father the option to use the surname of the father. Thus,
the petitioner cannot insist that she is allowed to use the surname of her father.
In Coseteng-Magpayo, the issue was the proper procedure to be followed when the
change sought to be effected in the birth certificate affects the civil status of the respondent
therein from legitimate to illegitimate. The respondent therein claimed that his parents were
never legally married; he filed a petition to change his name from “Julian Edward Emerson
Coseteng Magpayo,” the name appearing in his birth certificate, to “Julian Edward Emerson
Marquez-Lim Coseteng.”

The notice setting the petition for hearing was published and, since there was no
opposition thereto, the trial court; issued an order of general default and eventually granted the
petition of the respondent therein by, inter alia, deleting the entry on the date and place of
marriage of his parents and correcting his surname from “Magpayo” to “Coseteng.”

The Court reversed the trial court’s decision since the proper remedy would have been to
file a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The Court ruled that the change sought by
the respondent therein involves his civil status as a legitimate child; it may only be given due
course through an adversarial proceedings under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The Court’s
pronouncement in Coseteng-Magpayo finds no application in this case.

Finally, Lim likewise finds no application in this case. In Lim, the petition that was filed
was for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; the petition sought, among
others, is the correction of the surname of the respondent therein from “Yo” to “Yu.” Further, the
respondent therein, although an illegitimate child, had long been using the surname of her father.
It bears stressing that the birth certificate of the respondent therein indicated that her surname
was the same as her father albeit misspelled. Thus, a correction of entry in her birth certificate is
appropriate.[29]
Here, the petitioner filed a petition for change of name under Rule 103 and not a petition for
correction of entries under Rule 108. Unlike in Lim, herein petitioner’s birth certificate indicated
that she bears the surname of her mother and not of her father.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED.

Doctrine: Adoption

The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2)

the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual
at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is
that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The
given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the
child is entitled is fixed by law.

Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate
the use of surname[10]     of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may
be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married
woman, or a widow, thus:

"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the  surname  of the adopter.

Case title: In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, (J.
Sandoval-Gutierrez) GR No. 148311, March 31, 2005

FACTS:

Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate
child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.

He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her
mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother‘s middle name and
surname; and that he is now a widower, and qualified to be her adopting parent.

Catindig prayed of the Court that Stephanie‘s middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia,
her mother‘s surname, and that her surname ―Garcia‖ be changed to Catindig, his surname.

The trial court denied petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration and held that there is no law
or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his
middle name.
 Petitioner avers that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a
consequence of adoption because:

First, there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case
there is only one adopting parent;

Second, it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the
mother;

Third, the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; Fourth, adoption is for
the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should
not be violated;
Fifth, permitting the child to use the middle name ― Garcia (her mother‘s surname) avoids the
stigma of her illegitimacy; and Sixth, Stephanie's continued use of ―Garcia as her middle name
is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.

The OSG, for its part, submits that it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie‘s
filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to
be an intestate heir of the latter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name.

RULING:

Yes.

Under Art. 375 of NCC, the law states that "in case of identity of names and surnames
between ascendants and descendants, the word Junior‘ can be used only by a son. Grandsons and
other direct male descendants shall either: (1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname, (2)
Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on."

As correctly pointed out by the parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle
name.

Thus, to allow Stephanie to use her mother‘s surname as her middle name will not only
sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of
her illegitimacy. Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother‘s surname, we find no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.
Doctrine: Adoption

Case title: Rosario Mata Castro vs. Jose Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio, (J. Leonen) GR.
No. 188801, October 15, 2014

Facts:

“The use of the word “shall” under Art III, Sec 7 of RA No. 8552 means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of
joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly.
The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. The law provides for several exceptions to
the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born
out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to
adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.”

FACTS:

Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they
separated later on due to their incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual tendencies. Their
marriage bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to death after nine days from birth
due to congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta Charissima Castro (Petitioner).

On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria
Regina Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed and
Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosario’s housekeeper). After a
Home Study Report conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was granted.

A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by Rosario. She alleged that Jose
had been remiss in providing support to his daughter Joanne for the past 36 year; that she single-
handedly raised and provided financial support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to
his driver and allege lover, Larry, and even went to the extent of adopting Larry’s two children,
Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne knowledge and consent. Atty. Castro denied the
allegation that he had remiss his fatherly duties to Joanne. He alleged that he always offered help
but it was often declined. He also alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children
that’s why he adopted them.  Later on Atty. Castro died.
 Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the
decision of the TC approving Jed and Regina’s adoption.

Petitioner allege that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and the document purporting as
Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent. P also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth
certificates shows disparity. One set shows that the father to is Jose, while another set of NSO
certificates shows the father to be Larry.  P further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually
Jose’s illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at
the time of their birth. CA denied the petition.

CA held that while no notice was given by the TC to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption,
it ruled that there is “no explicit provision in the rules that spouses and legitimate child of the
adopter. . . should be personally notified of the hearing.”

CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets of
birth certificates required the determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and
was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud
could not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of
judgment.
ISSUES:

Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children ten years or over of the adopter is
required?

RULING:

RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain
not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children. (Art. III, Sec. 7,
RA 8552)
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however,
provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt
his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary.
But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.

In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained
legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina,
Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose
was ineligible to adopt.

The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old
or older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).

For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552.
Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children
to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice
as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over
substantive statutory rights.

Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the
proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.

Doctrine: Adoption

In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents
and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.

Case title: Bernardina P. Bartolome vs. Social Security System, GR. No. 192531, (J.
Velasco Jr); November 12, 2014

FACTS: 

John Colcol died in a work-related accident while he was employed as an electrician by

Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the government’s
Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP).

Since John was childless and unmarried, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s
biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits with
the SSS.

However, SSS denied the claim, stating that the petitioner is not considered as the parent
of John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol, the victim’s great grandfather, therefore
Bernardina cannot be considered as John’s beneficiary because she is not the deceased’s
legitimate parent. Cornelio Colcol, however, already died on October 26, 1987, less than three
years since the decree of John’s adoption became final.

ISSUE: 

Do the biological parents of the covered qualify as the deceased’s dependent parent and,
thus, entitled to the death benefits.

HELD: 

YES. when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s
parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC
missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3)
years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
 John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar.
Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the
biological parents.

Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is
severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not
entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, in some instances, are able to inherit
from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be
governed by the following rules:

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the
adopted concur with the adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe
inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;

(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary
rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.

Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil
Code, which provides:

Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or

descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his
legal heirs.

From the provisions, it is clear that the biological parents retain their rights of succession
to the estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the
death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the
pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the
biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted.
In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should
certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the
untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.

Thus, the Court rules that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority resulted
in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.
Doctrine: Adoption

“The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral

issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly
impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which
provides: The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by
proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void. This
principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view,
because they refer to the action to impugn the legitimacy. This action can be brought only by the
husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.”

Case title: Eugenio R. Reyes vs. Librada F. Mauricio, GR. No. 175080; (J. Perez)
November 24, 2010

Facts:
This case stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan by
Respondents (Librada Mauricio, and her alleged daughter Leonida) for annulment of contract
between Librada and Eugenio parties.

Eugenio Reyes was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Turo, Bocaue,
Bulacan. Subject land herein.
Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio, who
was the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the
subject land; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the
preparation of a document to eject Respondents from the subject property, and had the same
notarized in Pasig; that Librada never appeared before the Notary Public; that Librada was
illiterate and the contents of the said contract (Kasunduan) were not read nor explained to her;
that Eugenio took undue advantages of the weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and
other handicaps of Librada in the execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void for lack of
consent.
 Based on the evidence submitted by both parties, DARAB ruled in favor of Respondents.
On appeal with the CA, Petitioner assailed the status of Leonida as a legal heir and her capacity
to substitute Librada who died during the pendency of the case. Petitioner averred that Leonida is
merely a ward of Librada.

Issue:

Whether Leonida’s filiation may be attacked collaterally.

Ruling:

No. It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.

Citing Dr. Tolentino’s book, Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence, Dr. Tolentino explained thus:

“The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral

issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly
impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which
provides: The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by
proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void. This
principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view,
because they refer to the action to impugn the legitimacy. This action can be brought only by the
husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.”

It also cannot be made subject to collateral attack.

Doctrine: Adoption
Section 19 of Article VI, Domestic Adoption Act 1998: Grounds for Rescission of
Adoption — Upon petition of the adoptee, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following
grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the
adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c)
sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.

Case title:  Isabelita S. Lahom vs. Jose Melvin Sibulo, GR. No. 143989, (J. Vitug) July
14, 2003

FACTS:

A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972,
the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the
name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind
the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite her pleas and that of her husband, their
adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and
activities.  Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new
statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of
Article VI).

These turns of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care
and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree
of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said petition there
was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic
Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the
interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s)
may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s action
prescribed.

RULING:
 Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law
governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA
8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the
new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the
family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having
been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject
to the five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the
right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within
a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right
entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present
interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested
right" is a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present
fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action.
While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed
by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the
child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify
the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a
statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.

But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid
reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like
denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a
share in the disposable portion of his estate.
Doctrine: Support

“The obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of
the parents but also for the latters inability to provide sufficient support. This inability of
Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to
the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines,
following the ordering in Article 199.”

Case title: Spouses Prudencio and Filomena Lim vs. Ma. Cheryl S. Lim, GR. No. 163209;
(J. Carpio)October 30, 2009

FACTS:

In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of
petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and
Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park,
Makati City, together with Edwards. Edwards family business, which provided him with a
monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of
income.

In 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her
(then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house
midwife of his grandmother in what the trial court described a very compromising situation.
Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano
(defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The
trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.

In 1996, the trial court rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to jointly
provide P40,000 monthly support to respondents, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and
petitioners the balance of P34,000 subject to Chua Giaks subsidiary liability. The defendants
sought reconsideration, questioning their liability. The trial court, while denying reconsideration,
clarified that petitioners and Chua Giak were held jointly liable with Edward because of the
latters inability x x x to give sufficient support x x x. Petitioners appealed to the Court of
Appeals assailing, among others, their liability to support respondents. Petitioners argued that
while Edwards income is insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects by providing that legal
support should be in keeping with the financial capacity of the family under Article 194 of the
Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the Philippines).
In 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court ordering petitioners Prudencio and
Filomena Lim (petitioners) to provide legal support to respondents Cheryl, Lester Edward,
Candice Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim (respondents).

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to

respondents.

HELD:

YES.

By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal

support to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much they limit
their petition to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable.
Relying on provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority,
petitioners theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority,
conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the children’s minority. Because at the
time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their
children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latter’s offspring ends with them.

Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide
sufficient legal support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the
amount of support Edward is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet
respondent’s basic needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their
children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the
paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following the ordering in Article 199. To hold
otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioner’s theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of
tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of parental inability to give adequate
support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void.

However, petitioner’s partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as

this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As
petitioner’s grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and
Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim
family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond. Unfortunately,
Cheryl’s share from the amount of monthly support the trial court awarded cannot be determined
from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the case to the trial court for this limited
purpose.
Doctrine: Support

The pertinent provision of the Family Code on this subject states:

ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the
liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.

Case title: Ma. Belen B. Mangonon vs. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 125041; (J. Chico-
Nazario) June 30, 2006

Facts:
On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, on behalf of her then minor
children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application
for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16
February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City
Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years
old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without
the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by
the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage,
petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of
her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had
totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to
enter college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her
daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the
University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University
and Western New England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina
were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education.

Petitioner likewise averred that demands were made upon Federico and the latter’s father,
Francisco, for general support and for the payment of the required college education of Rica and
Rina. The twin sisters even exerted efforts to work out a settlement concerning these matters
with respondent Federico and respondent Francisco, the latter being generally known to be
financially well-off. These demands, however, remained unheeded. Considering the impending
deadline for admission to college and the opening of classes, petitioner and her then minor
children had no choice but to file the petition before the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether the grandfather be held liable for support pendent lite

RULING:

The pertinent provision of the Family Code on this subject state:

ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the
liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.

An eminent author on the subject explains that the obligation to give support rests
principally on those more closely related to the recipient. However, the more remote relatives
may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called
upon to provide support do not have the means to do so.
 Respondent Francisco’s assertion that petitioner had the means to support her daughters’
education is belied by the fact that petitioner was even forced by her financial status in the USA
to secure the loan from the federal government. If petitioner were really making enough money
abroad, she certainly would not have felt the need to apply for said loan. The fact that petitioner
was compelled to take out a loan is enough indication that she did not have enough money to
enable her to send her daughters to college by herself. Moreover, even Rica and Rina themselves
were forced by the circumstances they found themselves in to secure loans under their names so
as not to delay their entrance to college.

There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the
parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support
their children’s college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish
said support should be borne by respondent Francisco.

Under Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next immediate
relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their
parents. It bears stressing that respondent Francisco is the majority stockholder and Chairman of
the Board of Directors of Citadel Commercial, Incorporated, which owns and manages twelve
gasoline stations, substantial real estate, and is engaged in shipping, brokerage and freight
forwarding. He is also the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of
Citadel Shipping which does business with Hyundai of Korea.

Apart from these, he also owns the Citadel Corporation which, in turn, owns real
properties in different parts of the country. He is likewise the Chairman of the Board of Directors
of Isla Communication Co. and he owns shares of stocks of Citadel Holdings. In addition, he
owns real properties here and abroad. It having been established that respondent Francisco has
the financial means to support his granddaughters’ education, he, in lieu of petitioner and
respondent Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite.
Doctrine: Adoption

Under Article 195 (4)  of the Family Code, a parent is obliged to support his illegitimate
child and the amount is variable depending on the needs of the child.

Case title: Dolores Montefalcon vs. Ronnie S.Vasquez, GR. No. 165016; (J. Quisimbing)
June 17, 2008

FACTS:

In 1999, petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for acknowledgment and

support against respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez before the RTC of Naga City. Alleging that her
son Laurence (co-petitioner) is the illegitimate child of Vasquez, she prayed that Vasquez be
obliged to give support to their son, whose certificate of live birth he signed as father. According
to petitioners, Vasquez only gave a total of P19,000 as support for Laurence since Laurence was
born in 1993, and allegedly refused to give him regular school allowance despite repeated
demands. Petitioner Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not legally married, and that
Vasquez has his own family.

A sheriff tried to serve the summons and complaint on Vasquez in Aro-aldao, Nabua,
Camarines Sur. Vasquez's grandfather received them as Vasquez was in Manila. Vasquez's
mother returned the documents to the clerk of court, who informed the court of the non-service
of summons. Petitioners then filed a motion to declare Vasquez in default. The court denied it for
lack of proper service of summons.

On petitioners’ motion, the trial court declared Vasquez in default for failure to file an
answer despite the substituted service of summons.  Vasquez was furnished with court orders
and notices of the proceedings at his last known address. Noting that Vasquez is a seafarer and
left the country on January 24, 2000 and came back on October 12, 2000

Vasquez filed a petition on appeal contending that the court never acquired jurisdiction
over his person and the awarding of support as excessive. CA granted his appeal ruling on the
service of summons was defective as there was no proof of impossibility in personal service and
an attempt to effect such.

Vasquez countered that because he was abroad; service of summons should have been
personal or by publication as substituted service is proper only if a defendant is in the
country.  Vasquez also added that the sheriff’s return did not state that he exerted efforts to
personally serve the summons.

In their reply, petitioners insisted that a substituted service is the normal method if one is
temporarily away from the country as personal service abroad or by publication are not ordinary
means of service.

ISSUES:

1) Whether there is a valid substituted service of summons on Vasquez to clothe the trial
court with jurisdiction over his person.
2) Whether he is obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence.

RULING:

1) Yes. To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of summons must be
personal, or if this is not feasible within a reasonable time, then by substituted service.  It
is of judicial notice that overseas Filipino seafarers are contractual employees.  They go
back to the country once their contracts expire, and wait for the signing of another
contract with the same or new manning agency and principal if they wish. In this case,
respondent Vasquez hails from Camarines Sur but he has lived in Taguig City when the
complaint was filed.  Notice may then be taken that he has established a residence in
either place. Residence is a place where the person named in the summons is living at the
time when the service was made, even though he was temporarily abroad at the time.  As
an overseas seafarer, Vasquez was a Filipino resident temporarily out of the country.
Section 16 of Rule 14 of the Civil Procedure is not mandatory in nature, hence, personal
service out of the country was impracticable. The substituted service of summons was
correctly diligently done by the sheriff when he ascertained first the whereabouts of
Vasquez. Adding also that, the person who received the alias summons was of suitable
age and discretion, then residing at Vasquez’s dwelling. However, concluding that
Vasquez had sufficient time to argue and to file a motion for reconsideration, he was
silent.

2) Yes. Laurence Montefalcon is entitled for support as provided in Article 175 of the Civil
Code, provided further in Article 172 of the same code. Laurence’s record of birth is an
authentic, relevant and admissible piece of evidence to prove paternity and
filiation.  Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child with Dolores.  He signed as
father in Laurence’s certificate of live birth, a public document.  He supplied the data
entered in it.  Thus, it is a competent evidence of filiation as he had a hand in its
 preparation.  In fact, if the child had been recognized by any of the modes in the first
paragraph of Article 172, there is no further need to file any action for acknowledgment
because any of said modes is by itself a consummated act. In addition, Under Article 195
(4) of the Family Code, a parent is obliged to support his illegitimate child and the amount is
variable depending on the needs of the child.

Doctrine: Adoption

Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that “illegitimate
children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.” This is the rule regardless of whether
the father admits paternity.

Case title: Joey D. Briones vs. Maricel P. Miguel, GR. No. 156343; (J. Panganiban)
October 18, 2004

FACTS:

The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with
respondent Loreta P. Miguel, who is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing
in Japan.

He alleged that on November 4, 1998 he caused the minor child to be brought to the
Philippines so that he could take care of him and send him to school. In the school year 2000-
2001, the petitioner enrolled him at the nursery school of Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in
Caloocan City, where he finished the nursery course. According to the petitioner, his parents,
who are both retired and receiving monthly pensions, assisted him in taking care of the child.

On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel came to the
house of the petitioner in Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and
requested that they be allowed to bring the said child for recreation at the SM Department store.
They promised him that they will bring him back in the afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed.
However, the respondents did not bring him back as promised by them.

The petitioner went several times to respondent Maricel P. Miguel at Tanza, Tuguegarao
City but he was informed that the child is with the latter’s mother at Batal Heights, Santiago
City. When he went there, respondent Francisca P. Miguel told him that Michael Kevin Pineda is
with her daughter at Tuguegarao City. He sought the assistance of the police and the Department
of Social Welfare to locate his son and to bring him back to him, but all his efforts were futile.

Petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel
Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin
Pineda, and later filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor,
as one of the respondents. “The petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin
Pineda be given to him as his biological father and [as] he has demonstrated his capability to
support and educate him.

Respondent Loreta P. Miguel denies the allegation of the petitioner that he was the one
who brought their child to the Philippines and stated that she was the one who brought him here
pursuant to their agreement. She also denies petitioner’s allegation that respondents Maricel P.
Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel were the ones who took the child from the petitioner or the
latter’s parents. She averred that she was the one who took Michael Kevin Pineda from the
petitioner when she returned to the Philippines and that the latter readily agreed and consented.

“Respondent Loreta P. Miguel alleges that sometime in October 2001, the petitioner was
deported from Japan under the assumed name of Renato Juanzon when he was found to have
violated or committed an infraction of the laws of Japan. She further stated that since the time the
petitioner arrived in the Philippines, he has not been gainfully employed. The custody of the
child, according to respondent Loreta P. Miguel was entrusted to petitioner’s parents while they
were both working in Japan. She added that even before the custody of the child was given to the
petitioner’s parents, she has already been living separately from the petitioner in Japan because
the latter was allegedly maintaining an illicit affair with another woman until his deportation.
She likewise stated in her Comment that her marriage to a Japanese national is for the purpose of
availing of the privileges of staying temporarily in Japan to pursue her work so she could be able
to send money regularly to her son in the Philippines. She further stated that she has no intention
of staying permanently in Japan as she has been returning to the Philippines every six (6) months
or as often as she could.
 Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor child be given to her
and invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
A Writ of Habeas Corpus, however, was issued by this Court ordering the respondents to
produce before this Court the living body of the minor Michael Kevin Pineda.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the natural father may be denied the custody and parental care of his own
child in the absence of the mother who is away.
RULING:

Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of
petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly
provides that “illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.” This is
the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.

Obviously, Michael is a natural (“illegitimate,” under the Family Code) child, as there is
nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry
at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and
pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta,
notwithstanding his father’s recognition of him.

David v. Court of Appeals held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father
could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law
explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that
only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor. Of course, the
putative father may adopt his own illegitimate child; in such a case, the child shall be considered
a legitimate child of the adoptive parent.

There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole
parental authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right to keep
him in her company. She cannot be deprived of that right, and she may not even renounce or
transfer it “except in the cases authorized by law.”
 Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds cause
to order otherwise. Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to
exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award
of custody to someone else. In the past, the following grounds have been considered ample
justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect or
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of
the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable disease.
Bearing in mind the welfare and the best interest of the minor as the controlling
factor, we hold that the CA did not err in awarding care, custody, and control of the child to
Respondent Loreta. There is no showing at all that she is unfit to take charge of him.

We likewise affirm the visitorial right granted by the CA to petitioner. In Silva v. Court
of Appeals, the Court sustained the visitorial right of an illegitimate father over his children in
view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their
children. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, their
attachment to and feeling for their offspring remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts
allow this affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat to the well-being of the
child.