386

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dabuet vs. Roche Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

No. L-45402, April 30, 1987.*

ROMEO DABUET, GAMIK BARTOLOME, SALVADOR ABESAMIS and MARIANO MALONZO, and ROCHE
PRODUCTS LABOR UNION, petitioners, vs. ROCHE PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., ERIC MENTHA, REYNALDO
FORMELOZA, and the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, respondents.

Labor, Illegal Dismissal; Unfair Labor Practice; Letter written by and for the union addressed to
management referring to employee grievances and/or labor-management issues and the employees
being officers of the union then seeking a renegotiation of the collective bargaining agreement should
be recognized as an act of protection and benefit of the employees concerned.—Where, as in this case,
the letter written by and f or the union addressed to management referred to employee grievances
and/or labor-management issues and the employees concerned were all officers of the union, then
seeking a renegotiation of the collective bargaining agreement, a fact which respondent company does
not deny, there should, all the more, be a recognition of such letter as an act for the mutual aid,
protection and benefit of the employees concerned. This recognition, in turn, should extend to
petitioners' execution of an affidavit in support of the charge of slander against private respondent, Eric
Mentha, for calling the union's lawyer, who prepared the letter, and the contents thereof as " stupid.''

Same; Same; Same; Breach of trust and confidence, as a ground for employees' dismissal, must not be
indiscriminately used as a shield to dismiss employee arbitrarily.—Breach of trust and confidence, the
grounds alleged for herein petitioners' dismissal, "must not be indiscriminately used as a shield to
dismiss an employee arbitrarily. For who can stop the employer from filing all the charges in the books
for the simple exercise of it, and then hide behind the pretext of loss of confidence which can be proved
by mere preponderance of evidence." Besides, there is nothing in the record to show that the charge of
perjury filed by private respondents against the petitioners has prospered in any conclusive manner.

Same; Same; Same; Dismissal of petitioners, the remaining members of the union, constitutes an unfair
labor practice, and amounted to interference with and restraint or coercion of petitioners in the exercise
of their right to engage in concerted activities.—We, thus, hold that respondent company's act in
dismissing the petitioners, who then constituted the remaining and entire officialdom of the Roche
Products Labor Union, after the union's president and vice-president had been earlier dismissed, and
when the collective bargaining agreement in the company was about to be renegotiated, was an unfair
labor practice under Sec. 4(a) (1) of the Industrial Peace Act. Their dismissal, under the circumstances,
amounted to interference with, and restraint or coercion of, the petitioners in the exercise of their right
to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid and protection.

Same; Same; Same; Reinstatement with full backwages; As the company is guilty of unfair labor practice,
dismissed employees are entitled to reinstatement with full backwages not exceeding three years.—As
the respondent company was guilty of unfair labor practice, reinstatement of the dismissed employees
should follow as a matter of right. It is an established rule that an employer who commits an unfair labor
practice may be required to reinstate, with full back wages, the workers affected by such act, the
amount not to exceed back wages for three (3) years.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Supreme Court; Power of judicial review; Supreme Court may
review decisions of the Office of the President on questions of law and jurisdiction when properly raised.
—Accordingly, we restate that this Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, may review
decisions of the Office of the President on questions of law and jurisdiction, when properly raised. This
does not mean judicial supremacy over the Office of the President but the performance by this Court of
a duty specifically enjoined upon it by the Constitution, as part of a system of checks and balances.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Two varying rul-ings by different officials in the Office of
the President, within a short period of time, is also a ground for review by the Supreme Court on a
question of law.—The checkered circumstances under which the decisions in this case were made,
notably, that two varying rulings were rendered by different officials of the Office of the President,
within a short period of time, also constrained us to review the case on a question of law.

PETITION for review of the decision of the Office of the President.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Office of the President in NLRC Case No. C-5190,
ordering the respondent Roche Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to pay the individual petitioners separation pay, in
lieu of reinstatement with back wages.

The facts of the case which led to the filing of this petition are, as follows:

On 1 March 1973, herein individual petitioners who were all officers of the Roche Products Labor Union,
the labor organization existing in the firm, and with whom the respondent company had a collective
bargaining agreement which was due for re-negotiation that month, wrote the respondent company
expressing the grievances of the union and seeking a formal conference with management regarding the
previous dismissal of the union's president and vice-president.

A meeting was, accordingly, arranged and set for 12 March 1973. At said meeting, however, instead of
discussing the problems affecting the labor union and management, Mr. Eric Mentha, the company's
general manager, allegedly berated the petitioners for writing said letter and called the letter and the
person who prepared it as "stupid."

Feeling that he was the one alluded to, since he had prepared the letter, counsel for the labor union
filed a case for grave slander against Mr. Mentha. The charge was based on the affidavit executed by the
petitioners. The company and Mentha, in turn, filed a complaint for perjury against petitioners alleging
that their affidavit contained false statements.

The respondent company. furthermore. construed the execution by petitioners of the affidavit as an act
of breach of trust and confidence and inimical to the interest of the company, for which they were
suspended.

Subsequently, the respondent company filed with the NLRC a petition for clearance to terminate their
employment The petitioners filed an opposition thereto and, at the same time, filed charges of unfair
labor practice, union busting, and harassment against the company, Eric Mentha, and Reynaldo
Formeloza, the company's Finance/Administrative Manager.

After due proceedings, the compulsory arbitrator found that the petitioners' dismissal was without
justifiable cause, but that there was no unfair labor practice committed and directed that petitioners be
paid separation pay.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal to the NLRC which agreed with the findings
of the arbitrator that the petitioners' dismissal was without just and valid cause. However, it disagreed
with the arbitrator on the relief granted. The NLRC ordered the reinstatement of the petitioners with
two (2) months salary as back wages.

Both parties appealed to the Secretary of Labor who set aside the decision of the NLRC and entered
another one ordering the payment of severance pay only.

The petitioners appealed to the Office of the President, and on 27 April 1976, the latter rendered a
decision finding the respondents guilty of unfair labor practice and directing the reinstatement of the
petitioners with back wages from the time of their suspension until actually reinstated, without loss of
seniority rights.

The respondent company was, likewise, ordered to extend to the petitioners all fringe benefits to which
they are entitled had they not been dismissed, The respondent company filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision, and on 16 November 1976, the Office of the President granted the
motion and reversed its previous decision of 27 April 1976. It ruled that, while the petitioners' dismissal
was not for just and valid cause, no unfair labor practice had been committed. Consequently, it directed
that petitioners be paid only separation pay in an amount double those awarded by the compulsory
arbitrator and Secretary of Labor.

Hence, the present recourse to this Court.

The determinative issue raised in the petition is whether or not the respondent company, in
terminating the employment of the petitioners without just and lawful cause, committed an unfair labor
practice.

We have carefully examined the records of the case and we are convinced that the respondent
company had committed unfair labor practice in dismissing the petitioners without just and valid cause.

In Republic Savings Bank vs. CIR, where the dismissed employees had written a letter decried by the
Bank as patently libelous for alleging immorality, nepotism and favoritism on the part of the Bank
president, thus amounting to behavior necessitating their dismissal, the Court declared:

x x x Assuming that the workers acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge
they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their
right to self-organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, interference
with which constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 4(a) (1). This is the view of some members
of this Court. For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of
employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial
Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be
contemplated."

Where, as in this case, the letter written by and for the union addressed to management referred to
employee grievances and/or labor-management issues and the employees concerned were all officers of
the union, then seeking a renegotiation of the collective bargaining agreement, a fact which respondent
company does not deny, there should, all the more, be a recognition of such letter as an act for the
mutual aid, protection and benefit of the employees concerned. This recognition, in turn, should extend
to petitioners' execution of an affidavit in support of the charge of slander against private respondent,
Eric Mentha, for calling the union's lawyer, who prepared the letter, and the contents thereof as
"stupid."

Breach of trust and confidence, the grounds alleged for herein petitioners' dismissal, "must not be
indiscriminately used as a shield to dismiss an employee arbitrarily. For who can stop the employer from
filing all the charges in the books for the simple exercise of it, and then hide behind the pretext of loss of
confidence which can be proved by mere preponderance of evidence." Besides, there is nothing in the
record to show that the charge of perjury filed by private respondents against the petitioners has
prospered in any conclusive manner.

We, thus, hold that respondent company's act in dismissing the petitioners, who then constituted the
remaining and entire officialdom of the Roche Products Labor Union, after the union's president and
vice-president had been earlier dismissed, and when the collective bargaining agreement in the
company was about to be renegotiated, was an unfair labor practice under Sec. 4(a) (1) of the Industrial
Peace Act. Their dismissal, under the circumstances, amounted to interference with, and restraint or
coercion of, the petitioners in the exercise of their right to engage in concerted activities for their
mutual aid and protection.

As the respondent company was guilty of unfair labor practice, reinstatement of the dismissed
employees should follow as a matter of right. It is an established rule that an employer who commits an
unfair labor practice may be required to reinstate, with full back wages, the workers affected by such
act, the amount not to exceed back wages for three (3) years.9

The respondents claim, however, that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
instant petition. They contend that pursuant to Art. 222, (should be Art. 223) of the Labor Code, the
Office of the President is the final appellate authority within the adjudicative machinery for handling
labor disputes and no law, order or regulation provides for any appeal therefrom to the Supreme Court.

To be sure, Art. 223 of the Labor Code, while providing expressly that decisions of the Secretary of Labor
may be appealed to the Office of the President, does not provide for review of the decisions of the
Office of the President by the Supreme Court, This does not mean, however, that the power of judicial
review does not extend to decisions of the Office of the President.

In San Miguel Corp. vs. Secretary of Labor, where the same issue was raised, the Court categorically
declared that there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of agencies exercising
quasi-judicial or legislative power on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is
given by the statute. The Court therein said:
"Yanglay raised a jurisdictional question which was not brought up by respondent public officials. He
contends that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC and the Secretary of
labor 'under the principle of separation of powers' and that judicial review is not provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 21.

"That contention is a flagrant error. 'lt is generally understood that as to administrative agencies
exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the
acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by
statute' (73 C.J.S. 506, note 56).

'The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect
substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions' (73 C.J.S. 504, Sec, 165), It is part of the system of
checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust
adjudications.

"Judicial review is proper in case of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, error of law, fraud or
collusion (Timbancaya vs. Vicente, 62 O.G. 9424; Macatangay vs. Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, 63 O.G. 11236; Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil. 440)."

In Macailing vs. Androda,11 the Court also ruled that judicial review of administrative decisions is
available even if the statute does not provide for judicial review. The Court said:

"In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some statutes especially provide for such
judicial review; others are silent. Mere silence, however, does not necessarily imply that judicial review
is unavailable. Modes of judicial review vary according to the statutes; appeal, petition for review or a
writ of certiorari. No general rule applies to all the various administrative agencies. Where the law
stands mute, the accepted view is that the extraordinary remedies in the Rules of Court are still
available."

Accordingly, we restate that this Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, may review
decisions of the Office of the President on questions of law and jurisdiction, when properly raised. This
does not mean judicial supremacy over the Office of the President but the performance by this Court of
a duty specifically enjoined upon it by the Constitution, as part of a system of checks and balances.

The checkered circumstances under which the decisions in this case were made, notably, that two
varying rulings were rendered by different officials of the Office of the President, within a short period of
time, also constrained us to review the case on a question of law.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is, hereby reversed and set aside and another
one entered, ordering the respondent company to reinstate the petitioners to their former positions,
with three (3) years back wages and without loss of seniority rights. The respondent company is further
directed to extend to said petitioners fringe benefits they are entitled to had they not been dismissed. In
the event that reinstatement is no longer feasible, the respondent company should pay, in addition,
severance pay of one (1) month for every year of service based upon the highest salary received,

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Bidin and Cortés, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed and set aside.

Notes.—The existence of a valid cause for dismissal negatives the claim that an employee was dismissed
for union activities because the idea of dismissal, as unfair labor practice, is incompatible with dismissal
for just cause. (Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. vs. OSCO Workers' Fraternity Labor Union, 1 SCRA 21.)

Two types of employees involved in unfair labor practices

________________

12 Art. VIII, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution.

395

VOL. 149, APRIL 30, 1987

395

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. British Overseas Airways Corporation

should be distinguished, namely: those who were discriminatorily dismissed for union activities and
those who voluntarily went on strike even if it is in protest of an unfair labor practice. (Cromwell
Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of lndustrial Relations, 12 SCRA 124.)

——o0o—— Dabuet vs. Roche Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 149 SCRA 386, No. L-45402 April 30, 1987