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Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects

1989

The Korean Student Movement: The Mobilization Process

Byeong Chul Ben Park
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

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Park, Byeong Chul Ben, "The Korean Student Movement: The Mobilization Process" (1989). Dissertations,
Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539625551.
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-d2jp-yw16

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 THE KOREAN STUDENT MOVEMENT:

THE MOBILIZATION PROCESS

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Sociology

The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

by

Byeong-chul Park

1989
 APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

fey&tynf CA^/f'7)'.
' / / Author K

Approved, June 1989

Edwin H. Rhyne

John H . Stanfield Yf

ii
 To those who are struggling
for the welfare of Korean community.

iii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements...........................................v

Abstract........... vi

Chapter One
Introduction........................................... 2

Chapter Two
Review of Literature..................................13
Social Change as a Source of Discontent ....... 23

Chapter Three
A Brief Historical Background.........................33

Chapter Four
Structure of Mobilization.............................39
The Selected Groups in Social Organization......... 39
The Mobilization Process of the Students........... 44

Chapter Five
Role of Idea, Ideology, and Myth .....................69

Chapter Six
Conclusion............................................ 87

Appendix 1 ................................................ 93

Appendix II............................................... 99

Bibliography............................................. 102
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To those who have contributed to the process of my intellectual

maturation I am very grateful. Among those who deserve individual
recognition are Edwin H. Rhyne, Satoshi Ito, and John H. Stanfield. With
your vast knowledge, kindness, stimulation, caring, and confidence you
guided me successfully in completing this challenging work. Especially
to EdwinH. Rhyne who encouraged me to undertake this study, my
immeasurable gratitude is given freely.
I must express many thanks for untold contributions of the
supporters: John N. Somerville, George Rainsford, James H. Price, Nils
Bateman and many others. My appreciation goes beyond their concerns to
encompass the learning which is no small part of this thesis. I also
would like to express thanks to my colleagues, Jennifer Mooney and John
White for proofreading this, going out with me often to grab a beer, and
arguing on the various contemporary issues.
Finally, I would like to thank tomy parents for their patience,
and to my dear friends who helped me tocollect data for this research.

v
 ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine the mobilization processes

of the Korean student movement. In order to address the question of how
the Korean students have been politically so active during the last three
decades, my focus will be to elucidate the facilitating factors of the
movement rather than to identify causal variables.

The analysis suggests that it is the organizational structures

within the superimposed-segmented collectivity that have made it easy for
the Korean students to engage in mobilizing and sustaining the movement.
Particularly, cohesive, informal small group organizations on campuses
have enhanced the chances of facilitating the mobilization processes.

Cultural and historical factors also help to understand the

movement. A shared sense of beliefs, such as the consciousness of the
Korean community and the legendary role of students in history, underlie
the movement groups and make the movement symbolically meaningful to the
participants.

Ideas are combined with moral and mythical qualities in the culture
and become a facilitating factor of the movement. Ideas are important for
the organized protest movement. They provide the direction, a clear
target, and hopes, without which sustained violent confrontation would not
be possible. Although ideas in themselves do not cause the violent
movement, the way in which actors translate them into a plan of action
becomes important in understanding confrontations. This is what Sorel
calls a "myth." Therefore, we find the coexistence of both extreme
characteristics in the ideological rhetoric of the radical Korean
students: moral virtue and leftist absolutism.
THE KOREAN STUDENT MOVEMENT
THE MOBILIZATION PROCESS
 I . INTRODUCTION

This thesis investigates the mobilization processes of

the Korean student movement during the past thirty years. It

is designed to describe and explain the Korean student

activism and its accompanying forms of political violence.

College campuses in South Korea have been turbulent with

frequent student unrest during these three decades. This

continuing student movement has become one of the most

structurally cohesive and tactically operative forces of

political opposition in the country. The students of South

Korea, unlike those in most other third world countries, have

played a major role in political and social change. This has

been a notable phenomenon in the political development of

South Korea. For example, Korean students took an active part

in overthrowing the Syngman Rhee government in April 1960 and

intimidating the Park Chung Hee government. They were also

leading actors in forcing the Chun Doo Hwan regime to make

major changes in June 1987. Although the specific functional

role they perform in the process of political

institutionalization in Korea is hard to assess, the students

are a politically active group particularly in the dynamics

of political opposition. They continue pressing the present

2
 3

Roh Tae Woo government toward greater "democratization” and

toward regaining their "national identity" - i.e., the

reunification of the country. At the same time, they strive

to organize laborers, farmers, and poor urban groups.

It may puzzle many Westerners that so many competent

Korean students have continuously risked promising careers by

committing themselves to the student movement. That Korean

students have become such a politically powerful group in

their country may also be a peculiar phenomenon. How could

Korean students become so active politically, and why do they

oppose the governments so violently? What are the roles of

political and interest groups in Korea? To answer these

questions, it is essential to view the process of historical

construction of the Korean student movement? that is, to

examine historically how the student activism has been

structured, and is presently structuring.

There are two extreme paradigmatic views in studying

revolutions: the "pressure cooker theory" and the "conspiracy

theory." The pressure cooker theory, which has a widely

accepted set of explanations, refers to the image of a

pressure cooker under which the heat has been turned up while

the lid has been tightly clamped down. Unless the heat is

turned down or a safety valve is opened to release some of the

steam, sooner or later there is bound to be an explosion. In

the simplest form of this theory, if the objective structural

conditions oppress the people within a society, then a

 4

revolutionary event spontaneously occurs. In other words,

given such circumstances under which people are constantly

pressured, a rebellion naturally follows by "the frustrated

and angry masses" (Gurr, 1970). Skocpol (1979:17) expresses

this view through Wendell Phillips' statement that

"revolutions are not made; they come."

The opposing view implies the purposive image; it is

called the conspiracy theory. From this outlook, revolution

is the product of dangerous radicalism driven by a minority

group. Proponents of conspiracy theory believe that there are

outside agitators or others who are few in number, and the

focus is exclusively on certain limited types of political

activities. This theory assumes that a small number of

people, who are enormously influential, sow the seeds of, and

make, revolution to take over political power.

This portrayal of two extreme theoretical approaches is

meant to highlight radical contrasts about the presuppositions

of human social action. The pressure cooker theory

presupposes action which is mechanically determined; people

are simply driven to rise when certain conditions are present.

On the other hand, the conspiracy theory presupposes

voluntaristic action; people freely choose what they do.

Thus, in their extreme forms, the former tends to focus

exclusively on the social structural side; the latter solely

on the social action side.

It is self-evident that both theories are one sided; they

 5

reduce one to the other. But in reality, society is an

historical construction and an interplay of two sides. By two

sides, I mean the ways in which social action becomes social

structure, action in turn is shaped by structure, and

structure is, in time, transformed by action. Thus, we must

recognize both sides simultaneously: the process is a

dialectical relationship between action and structure.

"Social action and social structure create and contain one

another" (Abrams, 1982:108). So, it is fundamental for social

scientists to recognize that voluntaristic action has to be

preserved even while structural constraints are explained

(Alexander, 1982).

Therefore, neither theory is an adequate tool to approach

an understanding of revolution. Crane Brinton (1968:86) puts

it as follows:

Actually, we must reject both extremes, for they are

nonsense, and hold that revolutions do grow from
seeds sown by men who want change, and that these
men do a lot of skillful gardening; but that the
gardeners are not working against nature, but rather
in soil and in a climate propitious to their work;
and that the final fruits represent a collaboration
between men and nature.

The major analytical problem of both theories, it seems to me,

is derived from the fact that revolution is understood as a

specific t h i ng . It is, in my view, rather to be understood

as historical events and processes. An event is not a

structure or an object but a sequence of human actions

compressed in time. A process is not a static state but

 6

dynamic interplay of action and structure. Thus, revolution

is to be understood essentially as a relationship, more

specifically as an historical relationship. Huijian institution

is not a fixed object. It is endlessly moving processes

interweaving fact and meaning that construct, deconstruct, and

reconstruct social experience. Regarding social action, the

main agent of social change is the actor. One's action, then,

— whether one throws bombs or goes on a peace march, whether

one protests about inequality or thrives on it — depends

largely upon "a matter of what previous experience has made

possible and meaningful” (Abrams, 1982:3) for the actor.

Recently, there has been a significant amount of effort

to examine revolutions in the historical context. For

example, such works as those of Barrington Moore (1966), Eric

Wolf (1971), and Theda Skocpol (1979) have contributed to this

research in historical sociology. However, despite relative

differences between these theorists, they have all focused

primarily on structural conditions and the institutional

consequences of revolutionary processes. For them, it appears

that social action is elusive and remains a residual category.

They treat the actual relational intentions of the parties as

a factor of quite minor explanatory importance. For example,

I doubt that one can explain thoroughly the French Revolution

of 1789 without consideration of Louis XVI's actions with

respect to the Third Estate, or the relationship between Louis

XIV and his nobility a century earlier. As Abrams (1982: 190-

226) points out, what is needed is a "practical explanation"

which gives more consolidation of "the general and particular"

and also discreet consideration to colligating action and

structure. This can be achieved, I believe, by leveling down

their analytical focus to a middle ground.

The need for this "practical explanation" which can link

the abstract and the specific makes it useful to begin at the

ground level. The study of the process of a social movement

is the first step in capturing the dynamic relationship of

social action and social structure. To locate that general

concern in concrete time and place, I chose the Korean student

movement as the object of my analysis.

The examination of the Korean student movement could have

led me to highlight a number of different issues. Questions

of the dynamics of mobilization and its relation to political

violence are of central importance. Equally fascinating is

the issue concerning conflicts and resource mobilization among

various groups arising within the context of political I

processes - particularly the role of the government and its I

[

related context within the international system. I consider _J

the latter focus necessary and useful for a comparative

historical generalization. For example, Brinton (1965),

Skocpol (1979), Tilly (1978), even Marx and Engels (1982:287-

323) have recognized and stressed the fact that a weak,

confused, incompetent government invites or facilitates

radical opposition to it. The ineptness of a government

should be understood in terms of not only the inability to

mobilize historical resources but also what people perceive ^

to be inefficiency or illegitimacy. However, it is desirable

to sharpen the focus of the research to avoid a superficial,

often times disqualifying presentation. One way of doing this

is to concentrate solely on the facilitating factors of

mobilization of the Korean students and its accompanying forms

of violence in their activism. I have particularly

concentrated on the organizational structure and the role of

ideology in the Korean student movement.

In undertaking this study, I am not espoused to a single

school of sociological thought. Instead of bringing along a

hypothetical point of view for testing, I am interested in

some specific sociological questions concerning collective

action and various forms of political violence. For instance: \

I
How does collective action develop? Is violence a necessary

ingredient in political conflict?

Much of the theoretical context of my investigation is

taken from the resource mobilization models depicted by k

Oberschall(1973), Zald & McCar th y(1979), and Tilly(1979). At

the same time, I have drawn on Georges Sorel's assertion about

myth and violence. The work of many others, such as

Dahrendorf's conflict theory, Braungart's theory of

generational politics, and Berger and Luckmannfs theory on

ideology also have provided useful insights.

However, some limitations of the resource mobilization

 9

model need to be recognized: that is, it is less concerned

with the revolutionary (or movement) potential. Thus, it

seems that the matter of how people's shared grievances,

interests, or aspirations develop and change is not adequately

explained. Its concern for the straight-forward assumption

of individual action seems simply instrumental in relation to

the collectivity. What Olson (1965) calls in his economic

model a rational action is purely motivated by "selective

incentives." According to this model, the balance of risk- ^

reward is the only motivational aspect in the mobilization of /

collective action. In the situation of the Korean student

movement, most ordinary students do not seem to be motivated

solely by such incentives. It seems to me that the model

minimizes the significance of the other aspect of human

action, that is, nonrationality (of course, as opposed to

irrationality). By nonrationality, I mean the subjective^

aspect of action which does not necessarily presuppose

selective rewards, such as concern for freedom, equality,

personal loyalty to the collectivity, sense of common [

identity, ideological awareness, etc.

Fireman and Gamson (1979) seem to capture this aspect

with their attention to "solidarity," and they saw this as

created and maintained as an organizational tactic in an

attempt to preserve a collective good. However, having

analyzed the data, I have come to the conclusion that

solidarity is more than an organizational tactic by the

movement leaders. The elements have already prevailed in the

culture. To put it differently, the leaders of a movement

develop and extensively utilize those already existing

elements within a culture in order to facilitate the movement

process. For this reason, it is appropriate to examine this

aspect in a broader cultural and ideological context.

Thus, the core of my discussion will revolve around some

aspects of the student movement organization and its ideology |

within the context of the political culture of South Korea.

To make it clear, my major concern is to identify facilitating

factors that help to mobilize the groups of students. In sum, I

the purpose of this study is not intended to answer the

question of "why" Korean students revolt. Instead, I focus

on the "how" of the movement. j

The following chapter foreshadows the outline of the

theoretical argument itself. Explanations that the

development of the Korean student movement derives from any

single variable such as anger, frustration, unemployment,

etc. , are singly inadequate. It is the superimposed and

vertically segmented structure of the student body, as well

as a dense network of organization within it, that have easily

facilitated the movement. Cultural factors such as shared^

identity and consciousness of community which enhance

solidarity are equally important in facilitating the student

movement, and serve to sustain the movement. Such cultural

elements are likely to be perceived by members as being

 11

challenged in a changing society.

Before moving into the analytical dimension of my thesis,

I have highlighted in Chapter Three the history of the Korean

student movement for readers who are not familiar with the

Korean student movement. Readers who are familiar with it may

skip this section.

In the first section of Chapter Four, I have introduced

the importance of segmented informal group organization which

applies to much of Korean life. An overview of confrontation

of the military and the student is also proposed. Particular

attention has to be paid to the student cohort group formation

in the following section. The rest of the Chapter presents

a detailed examination of the internal mobilization process

of the Korean student movement. The movement has found iw

easier to mobilize the student body because of the preexisting

networks of intermediate, internal organizational structures^

The informal small groups, which are a dynamic part of

cultural life in Korean society, have also helped greatly in

facilitating the student movement. Particularly, when

confronting the government control over the campus

organizations, the Korean students develop clandestine small

group "study-circle" cells to sustain their movement. It is

with this primary group network in which each member is linked

by means of strong, interpersonal bonds that Korean students

are allowed to explore social issues and radical ideologies.

As Henderson (1988:14) describes it, within this unit of cell

network all "plots against the authorities [are] cooked and

hatched." The central aim of the discussion in this Chapter

A . . . .
is to present the importance of intermediate organizational

structure in mobilizing the protest movement.7 This discussion

also revolves around other factors concerning the cultural

patterns and historical role of the students.

Chapter Five deals with ideological aspects of the

movement. My argument is that: First, ideas are an important

facilitating factor which give "focus and direction to any

frustrations or concerns a collectivity may have, thereby

bringing some unity of perception" (Rhyne, 1988:10). Second,

they dichotomize the world into "us" and "them," so that the

movement group is able to see clearly who stands athwart its

path. Third, by being a believable call to action, what Sorel

calls a "myth," it can provide hopes that through concerted

action something real can be achieved. This discussion

illuminates the idea that the Korean student movement is born

out of hopes as well as frustration or anger. The essential

point in this chapter is that the presence of ideas makes the

Korean students able to create a more or less organized

protest group, without which sustained violent confrontation

would not have been possible. In the concluding chapter, a

summarization of findings is presented with a brief comparison

to the Indonesian and Chinese student movements.

 II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Quee-young Kim in his book, The Fall of Svnoman Rhee

(198 3) argues that it was discontent that drove the people to

rise against the Syngman Rhee government in April 1960. Many

segments of the Korean people in general during that period

supported the cause of the student movement against the

government because they were frustrated and angered by the

corrupt and unjust Syngman Rhee government. According to Kim,

the April revolutionary movement was "a natural and inevitable

event" growing out of the objective structural conditions of

an inherently conflict-ridden Korean society. As he puts it:

The Sa-il-qu [the April uprising] was indeed a

socially creative act, neither accident nor miracle
but a logical conclusion of conflict between social
forces and political power. It evolved from certain
structural conditions in which fundamental sets of
social arrangement and power relations came into
sharp contradiction and conflict with each other.
(p. 209)

As evidence for his argument, Kim suggests that the

mobilization was for the most part spontaneous, when

unemployed and free-floating people in cities, brought there

by rapid urbanization, gave support to the opposition and

participated in the protest demonstration, by which they

ultimately transformed the movement into a violent revolt.

13
 14

According to Kim, the government created discontent among many

people because it "failed to deliver economic development and

employment" (p. 212).

Rapid urbanization congregated large numbers of

aimless people in the cities. ... For those who had
nothing, and even less to look forward to, a moral
protest against the government seemed to represent
their feelings. ... The concentration of the
educated, the students, and the unemployed in the
cities helped to transform the protest demonstration
into a violent revolt. (Kim, 1983:211)

It seems that Q. Y. Kim's explanation is similar to mass

society theory (Kornhauser, 1959), which posits that rapid

economic change causes "social dislocation" that creates

alienation and discontent in a large portion of the population

and ultimately a predisposition to revolt. From this point

of view, as Kornhauser (1959:39) characterizes it, mass

society is seen as "a social system in which elites are

readily accessible to influence by non-elites, and non-elites

are readily available for mobilization by elites." In this

mass society context, the intermediate structures become thin;

on the other hand, the centralized bureaucratic organizations

grow, so that "members of the society lack attachments to

independent groups, the local community, voluntary

associations, and occupational groups" (Kornhauser, 1959:90),

which means they are alienated. As a result, it establishes

the grounds of greater potential for political radicalism.

By "a natural and inevitable event," Q. Y. Kim evidently means

that from the point of view of mass society theory it was a

 15

few oppositional elites who directly mobilized the

discontented and already available masses against the

incumbent government. According to him:

Opposition leaders championed the challenge against \

the ruling elites, the intellectuals fermented it,
the students acted out, and the masses followed.
(Q.Y. Kim, 1983:213)

Assuming Kim is correct in his contention that certain

structural conditions drive people to rise, I then select, at

least, an analytical problem when attempting to apply his

theory to other times in Korea, not to apply it to other

places. For example, if discontent is seen to be a sufficient

factor in leading South Korea in 1960 into revolution, then

should not that same rate of discontent, or a more magnified

rate, lead her into revolution in other times? The problem

can be seen in temporal terms. If it is argued that the rate

of discontent is spread over a time, the question arises of

how much of that factor must be present for the expected

result to occur. Besides the temporal problem, the question

must be asked of why particularly today and why not yesterday?

If discontent is the causal factor, its objective rate might i

be greater in a feudal society than in an industrial one.

This is the sociological problem that is left unexplained by

Quee Young Kim's theory on the April uprising.

More importantly, what mass society theory and Q.Y. Kim's

explanation inadequately overlooked was the mobilizing

potential and mobilizing effects of intermediate st

(Oberschall, 1973:104-13). Q.Y. Kim did not deny the major

role performed by the students in mobilizing the April

uprising. So then, we have to ask: Why students? According

to Oberschall (1973), given the political conditions, the pre­

existent networks of intermediate groups enhance the greater

chances of mobilization of protest groups especially when

those groups are superimposed and vertically segmented. It

seems that Kim ignores the importance of the^ superimposed

segmented structure of the student body, both compatible with

a dense network of intermediate relations and high rates of

students participation in them.^/ It was not aimlessly free-

floating nonparticipants in intermediate groups who made the

uprising possible but the students who already had

organizational structures and high rates of participation in

them.

All too often in their attempts to find causal factors

for revolutions, all too often, sociologists tend to focus on

a specific kind of variable that is considered necessary for

\■ iy
people or a group of people to react through violent

confrontation. It seems that many theories, in order to

explain revolutionary activity, have placed emphasis on some

conditions which literally drive or push some identifiable,

usually predictable group to act violently. No such

variables, however, whether social, economic, political,

psychological, structural, or processual, can sufficiently

explain the phenomena in and of themselves. As I pointed

 17

out earlier, it seems Kim's study on the April revolutionary

/
movement ignores factors that facilitate the process of the
1 1
movement. My question is why and how the Korean students have

effectively mobilized to protest and have played a major role

in the revolutionary movement? To answer it, in part, wej

should not neglect the fact that the student group is among

the few segmented collectivities (Oberschall, 1973) who

already have a dense and viable organization (Zald and

McCarthy, 1977) that can be easily mobilized to protest. It

is thus necessary to identify and elucidate fthose factors^ that

r
V
help to mobilize a group of people within the movement

organization. In other words, we need, as the first step, to

focus on the factors which can facilitate the student movement

or similar protests rather than cause them.

There is an ample body of research about revolutions and

various forms of political violence dealing with each on its

own terms. Given the diversity of general theories

(Zimmermann, 1983), it appears that the basic approach to an

intellectual problem is necessary for theoretical

clarification. ^Rhyne (1988) attempts to collapse all this

diversity into roughly two categories of theories which

capture the basic approach to this intellectual problem, and

presents them under two headings - "push" theories and "pull"

theories. According to Rhyne (1988:2):

By "push" theory, we mean the basing of an

explanation on one or more conditions or factors
which are seen as forcing, driving, or pushing some
people or some social category toward revolution.
 18

. . .By "pull” theory, we mean an explanation or model

that emphasizes conditions or factors which
facilitate the process of revolution.

The dichotomy of ”push" - "pull," as Rhyne pointed out,

may oversimplify many approaches to an intellectual problem.

This oversimplification may twist the nature of many existing

theories since very few are seen "purely as one type of theory

with no trace of the other" (Rhyne, 1988:2). However, it is

essential to make a distinction in an effort to seek more

comprehensive analysis of social and political movement.

Although the push factor may be relatively meritorious

in explaining certain revolutionary potentials, the primary

analytical problem of "push" theories is that they are

oblivious to cases which do not produce the expected results.

It is important to note that "extremely revolutionary

situations do not produce extremely revolutionary outcome"

(Tilly, 1978:198) /Then one must ask: How and why have South

Korean students played such a critical role in the political

opposition of the country while others have not? Why not

other organizations, such as trade unions, parties, peasant

groups, etc.? Are Korean students supposed to have more

grievances or be more discontented than other groups of

people? What do Korean students want to achieve?/ These

questions are why it is crucial to shift our attention to

elucidating the facilitating factors rather than identifying

causing variables. Rhyne thus contrasts these two approaches:

Just as the typical push theory takes for granted

that a revolutionary process will necessarily follow
 from the existence of the "cause" and, therefore,
the process is itself not theoretically problematic,
the typical pull theory takes for granted the
structural or other conditions which fuel
revolutionary frustration. What it sees as
analytically problematic are not the angers and
frustrations but those things which make it easier
or even possible for any particular group of people
to mount a revolutionary challenge to the existing
regime. At the risk of oversimplification, J>ull')
theory focuses on the how of revolution and ^pusli/ ^
theory on the why. (1988:2) "

Karl Marx is one major intellectual who developed a push

theory. Marx saw revolution arising from the inevitable class

conflict in any society with private property. The class

conflict fundamentally grows out of the condition of economic

exploitation. It is thus predictable ultimately to bring a

revolutionary confrontation of the classes because the

exploited and oppressed under capitalism are "pushed" into

violent struggle with their oppressors (Karl Marx, Manifesto

of the Communist Party) .

By contrast the currently most popular example of a pull

theory of revolution, the resources-mobilization theory, seems

not entirely content with exclusively facilitating factors.

Of course, this pull theory has its own problems, such as the

weak "explanatory power" and the unclear "critical variable"

(Goldstone, 1980:43 0-34). However, it gives its emphasis to

the segmentation or integration of a group and its concern

with the organizational density of movement groups in which

movements are engaged in the struggle for power within the

broader political process (Oberschall, 1973? Gamson, 1975;

 20

McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Tilly 1979). Oberschall (1973)

points out, stressing the lack of vertical integration into

the larger society that any collectivity segmented from the

larger society, has the potential to become a protest group.

It makes it easier for potential protest-group members to

express hostility to the rest of the society and thereby

increases the ability of that collectivity to organize

protest. Group superimposition has the same effect on the

organizing potential of a collectivity. As Dahrendorf

(1959:213—23) discussed, group superimposition lessens cross­

cutting memberships and thereby weakens ties of interest or

loyalty to a more varied pool of people. Therefore, the

members of a superimposed group are easier to mobilize; or,

in Dahrendorf1s t e rm s, the superimposed group or groups can

move more easily from "latent" to "interest" group.

At comparable levels of segmentation and superimpositior .

McCarthy and Zald (1977) emphasize the organizational

coordination of resources which refers to a collectivity that

already has a dense, viable organizational structure that can

transform itself more quickly into a protest group. Tilly

(1978) also stresses, by suggesting the mobilization model,

^the degrees of organization^ within a collectivity as an

important factor in mobilizing collective action. According

to T i l l y (1978:62-84), solidary organization consists of

"catness" and "netness," called "catnet" for short, which

refers to both a shared identity in a group and the density

of networks that link each member by means of interpersonal

b o n d s .1
p u 1
Given the facts above it seems to me that "pull" theories ^

are more efficient in explaining the historical process of the

Korean student movement. Nonetheless, I use the work of

"push" theorists when pertinent. Although my general

theoretical conceptions have been shaped largely by pull

theories, it should not be concluded that all push theories

are wrong. Both dimensions of "push11 and "pull" are aspects

of the same reality; society always has two faces. It is

"Janus-faced." It is my intention with this pull approach to

capture the multi-dimensional aspect of the Korean student

movement. My basic assumption here implies that the pull

approach would be more reflective and meritorious in revealing J

the actual process of the movement. This is the essential

1 One area of debate within the resource mobilization

model has to do with how external resources should be focused
on. External resources can refer to outside factors such as
the favorable attention of media, socio-economic backgrounds
of the participants, degree of support from the intellectual
circles, and merger of other organizations and parties, etc.
Both internal and external resources tend to closely relate
to each other in the mobilization process. This study is
focused primarily on the internal mobilization of resources,
but the external factor, particularly the socio-economic
background of activists have become moot points in debate.
Some argue that the student activists in Korea come mostly
from disadvantaged families (Henderson, 1988:18). On the
contrary, in fact, some student activists come from the very
affluent families. According to survey research (H.S. Lee,
1987:190-196), a large number of activists come from middle
class family backgrounds. These external resources are also
assumed to influence the mobilization process of the Korean
student movement.
 22

step for a scientific study and eventually inclusive of push

factors. To put it differently, elucidating the process of

the Korean student movement is more appropriate than simply_

identifying causal variables of it.

In this respect, it should be noted that Marx (1948) also

- - ~ ~ N

paid some attention to \pull factors jsuch as enough urban

concentration and sufficient unionization experience that

would provide the basis for organized class action. As a

recent example, Skocpol(1979) points out the importance of

this idea. In analysis of agrarian structure and peasanl

insurrections, she shows that collectivities which already

have a dense, viable organizational structure transforms

easily and quickly into a protest groups, much more than do

those with little or no internal organizational structure.

According to Skocpol, the peasantry of France and Russia

played crucial roles in their respective early involvement in

the revolutions of 1789 and 1917 due to the pre-existence jaf

independent village organizations. By contrast, the Chinese

peasants got involved later in their revolution due to their

relatively weak village community organizations. As Skocpol

(1979: 114) puts it:

In France and Russia, peasants mobilized for action

through traditional village community organizations.
In China, peasants first participated as traditional
"social bandits" and then finally were directly
(re)organized by the Chinese Communist Party.

Recognizing this importance of organizational structures,

what I wish to accomplish is to focus on some dimensions which

 23

can facilitate the Korean student movement. The goal of the

present investigation is the same as that described by Rhyne

(1988). Rhyne specifies three principal theoretical sources

for identifying and elucidating pull factors, the first two

of which will be used in this study. Those are: 1) resource

mobilization theory which elucidates ”the interrelated idea

of the segmentation-integrating dimension of groups and

V
density and nature of pre-existing organizational structures" ?

2) Georges Sorel's idea that "revolutionary action is

facilitated by the presence of what he calls a( m y t h " ; and 3)

Crane Brinton's theme "that weak governments in trouble are

the likely targets of revolution" (Rhyne, 1988:7).

\

SOCIAL CHANGE AS A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF DISCONTENT

Concerning the structural conditions or factors that

might push people, such as economic condition, political

oppression, discontent, frustration, angers, etc., one might

vehemently argue that "a rebellion [revolution] cannot start

from a situation of complete impotence" (Wolf, 1969:290).

True enough, revolutionary organizations and ideologies are

not produced from thin air. However, it is fundamental to

note that, in a society as rapidly changing as Korea, and as

subject to economic transformations (i.e., from agricultural

to industrial), there is necessarily an enormous number of

 24

discontented people in all classes - this societal change

ultimately 11implies a society with some movement, instability,

even volatility about it" (Rhyne, 1988:11).

/?M
When a society goes through a significant change such as

urbanization and industrialization, it is very likely to

experience a loosely co-ordinated social structure, which may

erode the old structure, bringing a new one, for instance, a

sudden increase in number of laborers or the urban poor. This

societal transformation inevitably provides a susceptibility

to emerging new forms of social groups, such as trade unions

and a variety of other organizations that are able to mobilize

various kinds of political pressure and influence. A

confrontation among interest groups (for instance, the old

elites vs. the new middle class or a set of groups) is likely

to emerge, too. While each group may attempt to mobilize

their resources to protect or enhance their interests, the

state machines may become weaker in the process.2 Some may

wish to topple the government, particularly when the

government inefficiently and unfairly resolves the increasing

conflicts. For example, with a sudden structural shift in

2 It is important to note that, unlike the traditional

Marxist conception, the state is relatively autonomous from
the control of the dominant class of a society. Skocpol
(1979:2 4-33) portrays the state as an autonomous actor that
has its own functions to perform. Thus, using state power to
protect dominant class interests is not always inevitable.
As she (1979:27) puts it: "states are potentially autonomous
not only over against dominant classes but also vis-a-vis
entire class structures or modes of production."
 25

Korea in 1945, after the independence from Japan, various

newly emerging political groups (approximately 50 different

factions) were competing to dominate political power.3 In the

new Korean environment, society experienced a fierce struggle

among these groups, and it grew worse with the rapid

urbanization of the country. It is thus plausible to infer

that after the collision is over the rest of the groups who

were defeated in the struggle may feel discontented or

possibly resentment toward the winner, especially when the

game is perceived to be unfair. The rate of those feelings

might be magnified if the winning group keeps suppressing

them.

Actually, some historians tend to view the present

political problem as primarily a result of the unfair

resolution of the conflict among those groups by outside

intervention in the first place. I am not arguing here that

the 1960 uprising was the product of kinds of psychological

deprivation or accumulated conflicts in large portions of the

population.4 I simply point out that it may be possible to

3 Actually, it is most correct to say that there were

three major powerful political groups which had collided to
compete for power. These were landlords, nationalists, and
communists. Syngman Rhee allied with the first group and
succeeded in taking over political domination in 1948.

4 However, Cumings argues in his book, The Origin of the

Korean War; Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes
(1979) , that the Korean War (1950) was the product of this
kind of struggle. More accurately, the conflicts were already
built up during the colonial era. So the struggle was
necessary to achieve a political reunification and reintegrate
the divided nation. But the United States Military Government
infer this precipitating condition in the context of rapid

urbanization and a sudden structural shift. In any case, we

must be careful when to argue on "an aggregate-psychological

state" of population unless we find direct historical data

"interviewed individually at the outbreak of, and recurrently

during," (Skocpol, 1979:115) the uprising. Nevertheless, it

may be safe to say that the structural condition of the

changing society provides the most likelihood of conflicts

among different groups.

South Korea for the last several decades has experienced

an enormous change in almost every aspect of life, both in

materials and values, most strikingly in the economy. For

example, the GNP per capita, which was less than $100 in 1960,

has increased to $2,870 in 1987. The rapid economic growth

brought increased numbers into the working and middle classes,

but the new classes were unable to have their own autonomous

organizations.

According to Chirot (1986: 96-130), in the twentieth

century, unlike the time of early Western industrialization,

an underdeveloped nation must have a strong state machine if

from 1945 to 1948 played the major role in tipping the balance
against the Marxist left. He continues to argue that the
battle was an effort for national unity, not another case of
Soviet* s national expansionism. It seems to me that he is
primarily concerned with being morally putative towards the
U.S. interventionism into the Korean affairs, which condition
is believed to cause revolution. Therefore, presupposing the
revolutionary condition, Cumings tends to mythify the mass as
a left counterforce against the right wing class and its
supporter, the U.S. interventionist.
 27

it wants to have any chance for catching up with the advanced

industrial nations. Chirot argues that the effort of

industrialization commanded by a centralized bureaucracy

inevitably brings the outcome of political repression (for

example, the Soviet Union under Stalin). Therefore, the

state's new despotic rule confronts "not only internal dangers

but grave external dangers as well" (Chirot, 1986:124). In

this regard, the Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan governments

- with a strong centralized power during the last couple of

decades - have successfully attained the economic growth. On

the other hand, however, their economic achievements are

exactly comparable to the result of serious political

suppression. The government has implemented a policy of

keeping the wages down and labor organizations weak, and in

some cases allowed an exploitation of workers by unscrupulous

employers. While the independent labor unions and political

opposition groups were repressed, harassed and outlawed by the

governments, only the student group could have maintained

their relatively autonomous organizational structures./ This

autonomous structural factor, in my opinion, made the students

gain relatively important and rigorous status in political

opposition in South Korea.

The industrialization of Korea has been achieved at the

expense of political repression of civil rights, and has

brought the perception of an ever widening gap between the

poor and the rich. This has, in itself, provided more serious
issues for the student movement beginning in the 1970s.5 What

the students have been most concerned about is, among other
// ^
issues, the unequal distribution of wealth. As they put it:

The challenge and task the people of this land in

our time must embrace is the overcoming of the
economical inequalities, political oppression, and
cultural alienation, and the realization of
reunification of the nation/people and democracy,
by people who, as the subjects of history, work to
achieve liberation.6

One may have to ask how bad the situation of income

equality is presently in South Korea. According to a study

on the growth of the Korean economy done by the Harvard

Council on East Asian Studies (Mason, Kim, et al., 1980:444),

income distribution among Koreans is fairly stable except in

areas of business, high level managers, and professionals.

Their conclusion is that overall the level of income

inequality is relatively modest and equality of opportunity

is high compared to other developing countries. In other'

words, the performance of distribution of wealth in general

is relatively good when compared to other countries, even to

the industrialized nations (The World Bank, 1988:273). Then,

In 1970, failing to organize a trade union, an

industrial worker, Chun Tae-il committed suicide by fire
crying "Observe the Labor Standard L a w " ; "We are not
machines"; "Let us rest on Sundays"; and "Do not sweat the
laborers." Since then, some student movement leaders began
to pay attention to the deplorable working conditions and
relatively low wages of the laborers resulting from the
industrialization of the country.

6 Source comes from an anonymous leaflet in reaction to

the public prosecutor's report on the investigation of the
Sammintu student organization in 1985.
 29

one might wonder why the Korean students negatively view the

fact and latch onto the relativity issue by using such an

absolute term as inequality. To this question, it is

important to note that most Korean people (probably all

Koreans) had long been equally poor in history. They have

tended to share wealth collectively beyond class boundaries.

The perceived gap of wealth and the better opportunity to

upward social mobility for common people that a sudden

industrialization brought have generated relative perception

of poverty on an unprecedented scale. For example, the stark

contrast of rapidly increased numbers of the urban poor and

ever expanding high-income industrial sectors are truly

apparent. This may have disrupted the historically enduring

sense of economic egalitarianism.

Culturally, Korean's attitude towards poverty was not

negative at all? in reverse, the selfish accumulation of

wealth was viewed very negatively. Thus, the pauper was

somewhat regarded as virtuous. For example, many scholars and

some national leaders historically used to put themselves

voluntarily in the state of the pauper as a self-discipline,

and symbolically identify it as a moral uprighteousness. This

means, in other words, that the ideal of the poor gentry is

the respectable man of integrity. This value of economic

prosperity as less important than morality functioned to

lessen the psychological gap of social inequality and

ritualistically enhance the sense of collective homogeneity.

 30

Because of this historical precedent, the inequality issue in

the student movement has more to do with cultural factors than

objective structural conditions. It is also necessary to give

attention to a more or less strong egalitarian subculture on

campus. Therefore, it is inadequate to understand the student

movement in terms solely of a structural condition or of an

organizational tactic of the movement group.

But, more importantly, this societal transformation has

created "a structurally-induced collective biographical

ambivalence” (Stanfield, 1988:class) which refers to a J

situation in which their old cultural ways are breaking down

yet the new ways of culture are still indistinct and

ambiguous. This implies some degree of uncertainty or

unpredictability, as the speed of change is too fast to grasp

the new meaning of their changing cultural ways. In this

ambivalent situation people are unsure as to where to be and

how to act and more likely to define who they are in an effort

to make value consensus - they may feel that their normal,

routine, stable, old life is disrupted by newness or

foreignness. The effort in search for new order may imply

that it is itself a social movement or an incipient pre­

condition of one.

It is apparently true in Korea that there is a serious

generational conflict (Hyo Sun Lee, 1987). Braungart (1984)

contends that this generational gap may arise from ambivalent

beliefs stemming from different historical experiences. The

 31

new values created by the active student body are not

compatible with the ones of the old generation. Their new

paradigm of world views of radical students create a sharp

conflict with the conventional one. The recent endeavor for

a new identity, which was materialized into "anti-Americanism"

emerged also as a unifying issue in the Korean student

movement, and is a good example of this changing paradigmatic

world view of the new generation.

The United States should not make Korea its

subordinate country, but leave this land. ...The
United States has supported the military regime
which refuses democratization, social revolution and
development and unification. In fact, the United
States has brought about the permanent national
division. We must resolve this problem for
ourselves. Let us stage the anti-U.S. struggle to
eliminate U.S. culture. (Recitation from Wonmo
Dong, 1986:238. A leaflet distributed by a group
of seminary students when they set the United States
Information Service building in Pusan afire on March
1982.)

Compared to the perception of the preceding generation

toward the United States - such as a liberator, a peace

keeper, a bloody ally, a democratic sponsor, etc. - the new

generation’s perception is radically different. The new

perception of the world of many students in the movement

circle - whether it is wrong or right - is seriously

challenging the traditional world views. However, the new

outlook seems to have gained more sympathizers from the

student population. In an endeavour to promote solidarity of

the student body, various and diverse cultural programs were

planned and undertaken by on-campus movement organizations in

 •
the 1980s. The vigorous cultural activity on campus in turn

reinforces the grounds for a unified and active student j

/
community and attracts the general student body into a
■

movement circle.
 III. A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The origin of the Korean student movement dates back to

Confucian times (Yi dvnastv: from 1392 to 1910). During this

period, students in the National Confucian Academy, which

trained talented members of the gentry (yangban), commonly

joined scholars in protesting to insist on a just government.

The Confucian ideal of moral purity strongly abides with

remonstrance obligations and reforming zeal. Thus, in 1450,

student demonstrations protested against the Great King

Sejong's alleged "soft-on-Buddhism" policies. In 1875,

students joined scholars in their protest and remonstration

against the dominant Prince Regent which led to his downfall

(Henderson, 1988:7).

Under the Japanese colonialism, from 1910 to 1945,

students were the chief activists for the Korean Independence

Movement. For example, from the beginning of the Independence

Movement in 1919 and onward, students not only played the

activist role to mount nationwide demonstrations but also

suffered the brunt of ruthless Japanese retaliation. (In

average, 55 strikes of students occurred annually)

The liberation from Japan in 1945 brought active student

33
demonstrations against Korean collaborators with the Japanese,

and against many policies of the American and Soviet

occupation. This specific period (1945-47) can be said to be

an era of right-vs-left confrontation among intellectuals,

students, and nationalists that was soon quelled by the

emergence of the dominant post-war political paradigm, anti­

communism in South Korea.

During the 1950s, Korean students were largely mobilized

for anti-communist rallies by the Syngman Rhee government.

The students were organized and often mobilized by Rhee regime

under the name of Anti-Communist Youth League in an attempt

to counter-balance the challenges from the oppositional

political parties in post-Armistice Korea.

The period of the student movement discussed above is not

the direct concern of this research. However I present this

to assist the reader in better understanding the historical

role of the students in Korea (for detail, see Appendix I,

Chronology of Student Movement in South K o re a).

The 1960s brought great unrest and direct challenge to

the ruling regime. The most famous student demonstrations

occurred in April 1960 in Masan and Seoul in reaction to the

ruling party*s rigging of the election of March 15 and the use

of police violence to repress student protest. The discovery

of the dead body of a young student in Masan harbour -

apparently killed by police torture - inspired students in

 35

Seoul to protest the fraudulent presidential election. This

student uprising in Seoul unexpectedly succeeded in toppling

the confused and incompetent Syngman Rhee regime - Rhee

resigned on April 29 - and eventually brought in the

parliamentary democratic regime of Dr. Chang Myon. However,

the continuing student demonstrations advocating punishment

of Rhee profiteers and demanding national unification under

the Chang Myon government invited Park Chung Hee's military

coup in May 1961.

The reemergence of student uprising against the

establishment of relations with Japan in 1964-65 almost

succeeded in ending the military regime of Park much in part

because of the large number of participants; but Park

immediately took a drastic measure against student

demonstrations by stationing army troops on campuses and

closing high schools and colleges. The student movement was

confronted with an effective armed force of Park and was

forced to go underground. Since the extreme "Yushin" 7

measures, in 1972, banning virtually all opposition including

student organizations and demonstrations, stringent campus

controls and arrest and torture of student leaders by the

Korean CIA, police, and even the military intelligence agency,

7 It is a major constitutional reform by Park Chung Hee

regime; direct presidential vote has been replaced by indirect
elections and made Park in effect "president-for-life." More
detailed discussion will be presented in the following
section.
 36

reinforced a cycle of violent hostility between Park Chung Hee

and the students that lasted until his assassination in

October 1979 at the hands of the director of the KCIA, Kim Jae

Gyu.

During the post-Park era, demonstrations for

constitutional revision, direct democratic elections, removal

of martial law and the remnants of the Yushin system,

intensified as students poured off the campuses into the

streets of Seoul and many other cities. On May 17, 1980,

Martial Law was extended throughout the country. This measure

closed universities, prohibited demonstrations, reimposed

prior censorship, and outlawed criticism and "rumors." All

chief opposition leaders, including student leaders, were

arrested as a result.

Students in Kwangju responded to the news of martial

law by protesting in the streets. In response to this, "Chun

Doo Hwan, head of the Defense Security Command, acting

director of the KCIA, and new authoritarian leader,"

(Henderson, 1988:9) sent Special Forces (paratroopers) who put

them down with brutality. The brutality brought about a

general reaction of protest from the public, and the

protesters succeeded in driving the paratroopers from the

city. The demonstrators occupied the city of Kwangju for

several days as a free zone until the 20th Division of the

ROK-US Combined Forces, which was under the Command of the

United Nations Forces, was sent to restore control of

 37

Kwangju.8 The 20 Division was removed by the Chun regime

presumably without permission from the Commander (the United

States Army General). This incident brought about a

controversial argument among many intellectuals and students

about the U.S. role in Kwangju. Student movement leaders,

believing that the U.S. supported the Chun regime, have

latched onto this incident and vigorously pursued it as a

means of stirring anti-American sentiments.

The Chun regime maintained even harsher measures against

the student movement. According to Cumings(198 6:159), "Some

15.000 protesters were arrested and placed in the reeducation

camp" (so-called "Samchung Kyoyuk Dae") after the Kwangju

insurrection. Under his brutal repression, student activists

went completely underground to avoid governmental and

professorial control and eventually formed well-organized

secret networks, which has been effectively operated for

recruiting and inculcating new members as well as for

mobilizing demonstrations. In addition, their opposition

goals marked a shift from democratic ideals to a revolutionary

leftist stance. Unlike the previous movement, in the 198 0s

leadership of the student movement has become organizationally

clandestine, tactically subversive, and small group oriented,

similar to a revolutionary vanguard party.

8 Religious and citizens groups concluded that as many as

2.000 persons had been killed during the ten day uprising.
However, the government figure indicates less than 200. This
is now under investigation by the National Assembly.
 38

In 1987, the federation of these underground small groups

with inter-campus cooperatives successfully led the major

demonstrations, under less radical agitation, by gaining great

support from middle class citizens. These in turn led to the

major constitutional changes of the ruling party's platform

in June 29, 1987, of which the direct presidential election

was a central issue. In the December election of 1987, Roh

was elected with a 3 6 percent popular vote against a divided

opposition.

Presently, student demonstrations against the Roh

government continue with a new political issue, under which

various movement organizations are united, that is, the

"reunification of the Korean peninsula," a movement, they call

for gaining "national identity."

 IV. STRUCTURE OF MOBILIZATION

The Selected Groups in Social Organization

Before elaborating the specific mobilization of the

students, it is appropriate to highlight the importance of

group organizations which run through much of Korean life.

This theme is broader than the student movement. However, it

is essential to a certain extent to understand the internal

cohesive groups of the student cohort with which the networks

are the dynamic facilitator in the movement.

There are three major social groups presently in South

Korea: the first is the military which has profoundly

influenced the present social and political system; the second

is comprised of the intelligentsia and students, and the third

is the business community. Since the business community is

not yet directly competing for political power, conflicts with

the other two social groups have not been seriously

manifested.

It is the student group that has been active and

determined in opposing the military involvement in national

politics (all governments since 1961 have been led by former

39
 40

generals) .9 It is said that primarily the intellectuals, who

are anti-military and who have been alienated from the

military governments, tend to instigate students to protest

against governments. But there has been little attempt to

prove this contention empirically.

Nevertheless, these intellectuals, along with educated

and ambitious young students, are likely to be dissatisfied

by the military run governments. Much of the dissatisfaction

results because a highly selective military elite occupies

many influential positions in the governmental bureaucracy,

in semi-public corporations, and in the government affiliated

parties. According "more than

percent of cabinet-level officials were former career military

officers11 during 1961-63, "42 percent in 1963-72," "32

percent in 1972-79," and "33 percent in 1979-88." From 1963

to 1986 former military officers comprised 15.8 percent of all ^

National Assembly members. However 42 percent of committee

chairman posts in the assembly were occupied by former

military officers. Steinberg(1988:8-9) continues:

Equally important, 39 percent of board directors

(equivalent to vice ministers) of the central
government ministries were from the military during
the 1963-86 period. Also, mid-level officers were
brought into the bureaucracy each year; by 1986 they
totalled 686. The elimination of elected local
government officials under Park Chung Hee in 1961
allowed the appointment of military figures in
critical local posts. For a number of years, most

9 There is a popular saying that goes: "If you want to

see your son become the President, send him to the Korean
Military Academy."
 41

provincial governors were from the military.

In this regard, it is plausible to infer that the favoritism

toward military backgrounds in filling government posts has

hindered social and political mobility opportunities for many

intellectuals and enterprising young students. It can be

inferred that such favoritism breeds alienation or discontent

among many intellectuals and rising students.

Therefore, a major source of conflict between the

military and students can be seen in the struggle for avenues

• • • • 10
to rise to positions of great authority, that is, competing

for power, both materially and ideally.11 Park Chung Hee used

to vehemently attack student activists and intellectuals12 who

criticized his government, implying they are at the root of

political instability. On the other hand, students and those

politicking intellectuals used to denounce the military

regimes as morally disrespectful governments.

10 • • • •
It can be argued that it is no coincidence that
demonstrations are more frequent and active in the most
prestigious universities in Seoul, such as Seoul National
University, Yonse University, Korea University, Sunggyun Kwan
University, etc., and that they have taken leading roles in
the Korean student movement.

11 Quee Young Kim (1983:217) presents the ironic fact that

"so many of the leading figures of the movement later became
spokesman for a very extreme form of authoritarianism.11

12 In 1975, Park Chung Hee expelled en masse the

politically active professors on campus who frequently
criticized the government and those sympathetic toward the
student movement.
 42

This is not to say, of course, that every member of each

group engages in conflict. Membership of both groups are

somewhat cross-cutting because every male Korean one way or

the other directly associates with the military (military

service is compulsory for all Korean m e n ) . For example, it

is not an unusual scene in a demonstration to witness students

throwing rocks and molotov cocktails, even as their friends,

classmates, and even some of their brothers enlisted by the

riot police try to subdue and disperse them. But such

diffused loyalty is not common in South Korea's elite society,

for Koreans tend to develop loyalties to their collectivity

(particularly school loyalties) with close personal ties that

have a strong bonding effect on elite society. For example,

Park Chung Hee was from the second class of the Korean

Military Academy (KMA); one of his prime ministers, Chung II

Kwon, and the Director of KCIA, Kim Jae Kyu (who assassinated

Park), were his classmates. Park's colleagues in the 1961

coup (such as Kim Jong Pil) were from class eight. Chun Doo

Hwan was from class eleven; Roh Tae Woo, the present Korean

President was Chun's classmate.

Nevertheless, it is incorrect to assume that the power

of the entire military is centered on a single elite group.

There are several other fragmented factional groups within the

military having to do with different social and geographical

backgrounds. But they are less powerful than the particular

group, that is, the exclusive fraternal group of Korean

 43

Military Academy graduates. The Korean pattern of interaction

is still largely operated by primary and intimate relations

rather than secondary.13 Groups are generally formed on the

basis of family relations among those of similar educational

and geographical backgrounds. These groups are seldom formal

or institutionalized. They function rather informally with

emphasis on mutual help and obligation among members by

creating an abiding sense of allegiance. The members of these

informal groups meet together often and exercise a great deal

of power and influence on each other. Regarding this,

Steinberg (1988:5) states: "Because nearly all officials went

through the KMA, the military elite is probably the single

most effective and cohesive organization in contemporary/7

Korean society." Thus, Korean Military Academy graduates are

closely bound to each other and play a critical role in

shaping government authority.

In a similar fashion for students, school loyalties and

small factional groups create close personal bonds among

themselves (study circles comprised from those from high

school classes and between university upper classmen and

incoming freshmen) form an important student subculture on

campus and become critical elements in mobilizing protest

13 For more detail on the Korean pattern of interaction,

see a case study done by Vincent S. R. Brandt, A Korean \
Village (1971). The author provides an excellent presentation
of Korean factionalism, regionalism, and interpersonal/
interaction.
 44

groups. By and large, it is the peculiar characteristic of

Korean people to build loyalties to their own internal group

with strong emotional ties among members. These various small

factional groups are also competing for hegemony within each

social collectivity. Thus, in short, it is important to note\ ^

that complying with collective norms and subordinating)

individual interests to the group one belongs to are peculiar!

cultural and behavioral patterns among most Koreans.

The Mobilization Process of the Students

As previously discussed, resource mobilization theory

assumes that people cannot simply engage in sustained

political action unless they are part of at least minimally °

organized groups. Thus, the theory argues that any

collectivity might become a carrier of a protest group,

especially when it exists segmented from the larger society.

According to Oberschall(1973:ch.4), the lack of vertical

integration into the larger society has the organizing

potential of a collectivity. In other words, "anything which

isolates a collectivity from the larger society, or the larger

society from it, helps create conditions which make easier the

task of changing of the collectivity (or portion thereof) from

an aggregate of like-minded people to a mobilized movement"

(Rhyne, 1988:7). Also, as developed by Dahrendorf (1959: ch.

V I ) , if a group is superimposed, it reduces the likelihood of

cross-cutting memberships and thereby weakens ties of interest

or loyalty to a more diverse group of people. As a result,

it is "likely to increase the violence of class [group]14

conflict" (Dahrendorf, 1959:217). As Rhyne (1988:8) describes

it:

. . . two groups are superimposed when the boundary

of one is coterminous with that of another, when all
members of Group Alpha are also members of Group
Beta, and vice-versa. Such superimposition reduces
the likelihood that members of any group would have
different combinations of ties to other groups,
thereby diffusing potential loyalties in many
directions. In contrast, since the members of a
superimposed collectivity have fewer conflicting
loyalties, they are easier to mobilize?...

In this respect Korean students are seen as a s t r ik in g^

example of what the resource mobilization model proposes as

a collectivity easily mobilized because of the isolation from

or the lack of close integration into the larger society. The

large student collectivity, which is a product of modern

Korean education, contributes not to only group

superimposition but also segmentation, by which students are

given their own social status and distinctive social roles..

In other words, the modern school setting provides a segmented j

demographic aggregation of young people who are under lessons, I

14 Dahrendorf explains the concept "class" in terms of

"the differential distribution of authority." Here I would
like to use the term "group" instead of class, which is a more
specific and appropriate term for this study.
 46

separated from the rest of the world, learning the ideals of

justice and democracy and being expected to always uphold

these principles. Moreover, the concept of the youth of

modern Korea is not the same as the youth in the Confucian era

during which the age of fifteen was considered the age of

entering adulthood. The period of youth has been greatly

extended in the modern era.15 So, unlike their previous

generation, they have been barred from taking over adult

responsibility which means that they are, in general,

relatively free from the usual obligations of life and social -

responsibility.

But the most important thing in the structural

characteristics of the student body is the ease with which \

they can influence each other, including a shared identity,

thus providing a potential resource base for a movement. In

other words, their perception of the world can be easily

affected by their peers' cultural and political orientation.16

That is, students are a congregation of a large number of

cohorts who share some common characteristics and collective

15 There are somewhat conflicting expectations toward the

youth in Korean society and family. Socially they are
considered in a collective sense to be a protege, yet, at
home, in many cases, they are expected to behave as an adult.

16 For a reference, we need to give attention to Newcomb's

famous Bennington study (1943) which refers to how the college
life can be an important cognitive changing experience. His
study reveals that the freshmen from Republican family
backgrounds exposed to the liberal culture of Bennington
College tended to change their political views.
 47

sentiments created by their own subculture./ Thus, according

to Braungart (1984:350), given a particular set of historical

circumstances, an age cohort can be "transformed into a

generation when its members are aware of their uniqueness,

feel a sense of solidarity, and join together to become an

active force for social and political change."

Unlike American college students, Korean students are

rarely allowed to transfer from one school to another; once

they get into a school, they have to remain at the same school

for four or more years. If one wanted to transfer, one could

retake the entrance exam and start as a freshman again at

another school.17 This structural fact facilitates the

process of creating a sense of belonging and of enhancing the

collective consciousness of the students. It provides the

subjective anchoring point of where they belong, what they are

and who they are. Since they are both structurally and

culturally homogeneous, it can be assumed that they cling

together on campus by the presence of what Khaldun (1967) calls

a "group feeling" which refers to moral and cultural^

superiority over another.

In addition, the student population^was rapidly growing

during the most turbulent period. For example, college-level

17 The Far Eastern Economic Review (Paul Ensor, 15, Jan.

1987:34) reports that in 1986 "besides the 700,000 high school
students...," "another 100,000 were retaking the exam either
after attending two-year colleges or after completing
correspondence courses."
 48

institutions in Korea from 1948 to 19 60 doubled, "rising from

31 to 62" and the college student enrollment increased "from

24,000 to 97,819." Secondary schools similarly increased from

97 in 1945 to 357 in 1960. "By 1962, there were almost four

times as many high school students as in 1945" (Henderson,

1968:170). In 1987, college institutions reached 115, and

the number of Korean college students "reached 1.3 million,

almost a fivefold increased over 1978" (Wonmo Dong, 1988:B2).

The resource-mobilization model calls attention to the

degree of organizational density found within a collectivity

(McCarthy and Zald, 1977). As comparable to superimposed

segmentation, "that collectivity which already has a dense,

viable organizational structure will transform itself more,

quickly into a protest group or revolutionary protagonist than

will one with little or no internal organizational structure"

(Rhyne, 1988:8). j^Given the resource base and given the dense V
and viable organization within the student body, it is not j

difficult to infer that the Korean students, as a superimposed I

segmented group, have a relatively easy chance to mobilize the

already existing organizations within their school structureTj

It is very important to recognize that the very organizational

structure of the student body, mobilized frequently by the

Syngman Rhee regime for anti-communist rallies during the

1950s, ironically turned against that regime at a particular

historical and political event, the unfair presidential

election of March 15, 1960.

 49

Quee-young K i m fs study about the 1960 student uprising

clearly implies that these organizational structures had

helped enormously in facilitating the movement. ^/^The

demographically isolated and physically mobile student body

was already available at any time for political and social

mobilization by any factions. ^ T h e only things that it needed

were the right cause and the leader for them to mobilize their

resources.^) For example, the small number of students in Taegu

protesting the unjust election in 1960 captured the attention

of the mass media and were portrayed "as a source of moral

purity and national consciousness" (Kim, 1983:211),

particularly when their actions were viewed against the

historical tradition of the heroic action of students against

Japan. It seems that this mass media focus accelerated the

process of mobilization, winning support from other student

majorities of other parts of the country.

However, given the latent cause to mobilize, the elected

student chairman of the College of Political Economy at Korea

University in Seoul, Yi Se-ki was not personally interested

in mobilizing the students for demonstrations? he was rather

afraid of the potential risk of his involvement in it. But

he and his officers of the student association felt a great

deal of pressure from a student body that was indeed

concerned. The following questions were asked of Yi Se-ki by

some students: "Don't you think that we should do something?

Otherwise, we will be nothing. How can we face the people?

 50

The fate of our nation is at stake" (Recitation from Q.Y. Kim,

1983:77). Yi wrote later reflecting upon the situation prior

to the demonstration on April 18, 1960.

Everytime I ran into these guys, I was forced into

a corner to answer these questions. I would mumble
a bit and avoid the situation as best I could. But
they were persistent and even threatening. I was
afraid that they would rough me up if I didn't do
something very soon. (Recitation from Quee-young
Kim, 1983:77)

One might possibly wonder: What do other organizations,

such as labor unions, political parties, peasant

collectivities, other independent interest groups do in that

situation of political crisis? As I mentioned earlier, when

we look at the political processes of South Korea

historically, union activity and other kinds of organizational

political activities were severely suppressed, and, under the

powerful dogma anti-communism. all too often were viewed as

pro-Soviet (Henderson, 1968 and Cumings, 1986). South Korean

governments have not been inclined to tolerate any independent

organizations, particularly those groups such as farmers,

laborers, teachers, etc. that are likely to oppose government

policies on behalf of their occupational interests. An

enduring pattern of repression was thus established, and it

served to weaken political opposition. The result is that

society has experienced a relative lack of organized interest

groups, except in the commercial and industrial sectors.

Since the labor unions and political groups were repressed,

harassed, and outlawed, student groups have gained a

relatively more important political role since then.

Due to the continuing historical role in political

opposition, the Korean students have obtained a recognized

identity, that is as the "nation's conscience." This label

has assigned to them as the patriotic voice of the country.

This kind of fame has traditionally ridden on their role as

the morally upright in the Confucian era; as the heroes of the

struggle under Japanese rule; and as the advocates of

democratic ideals in domestic politics. This historical

symbolic definition of moral purity18 has given the students

the privilege of providing support or criticism of the central

government.

Furthermore, this shared identity as bearers of the

"nation's conscience," acquired through the historical

processes, continually imposes upon the individual a self­

definition that coincides with the symbolic and historical

experiences. And the students are, in the eyes of others,

expected to maintain the identity and to reconstruct the

historical meanings creatively in the communal context by

assembling potential resources. This labeling effect, in my

opinion, greatly works to facilitate the movement. One

protester at Seoul National University responded to an

18 Henderson (1988:5) contends that the traditional-ridden

elitism (Confucian origin) among students is one of the
important abiding themes of the student movement in Korea
along with two other themes. Those are "nationalism" and
"equity."
American reporter: "Because we're students, we have the

privilege of being involved in politics." "We must do our duty

to reform society." Most Korean students like himself believe

that they have "a responsibility to push government and

society" (Recitation from Gittelsohn, June 24, 1987:33-34;

underlines are mine to emphasize his taken-for-granted

assumption of "weness"). They see themselves as carrying on

a long tradition of dissent to the spoils of power. This

shared sense of identity, formed by historical processes and

culturally rooted into the structure, in turn, motivates

individuals to participate in the movement.

^Because of this shared sense of cultural identity,

attempts to mobilize the student movement have been relatively

easy for the leaders, albeit it was loosely organized. The

mobilization efforts have been made mostly through the formal

student organizations. During the 1960s and most of the

1970s, there were no standing movement organizations separate

from the formal body of student associations. Most

demonstrations were organized by the duly elected student

leaders, and the causes were based on the contemporary

political issues. Thus, the characteristic of the student

movement was more or less temporary and somewhat transitory;

their ideology was not yet distinctively articulated. Their

zeal was fundamentally oriented toward reform rather than

revolution, but it was throughout a basically anti-government

movement. In other words, when facing the government's

 53

repressive measures and the issue became out of date, the

movement weakened and soon disappeared. The student l e a d e r ^

who was often duly elected with strong support from his

friendship circles, could easily pull resources and facilitate

the demonstration movement without extensive brooding over t

long term tactical and effective planning. Viewed as a

representative of the student body, the elected student

president has been ascribed a symbolic status to be a leader

of the student movement as well, one who should be able to

carry on the tradition of historical identity. He then, armed

with moral ideas, simply mobilizes the existing formal student

organizations, manufacturing the cause to rise according to

the issue that was perceived to be important. Once a person

succeeded in successfully mobilizing a number of student

followers, he tended to receive attention from both the

government and the opposition group. In some cases, the

government, often through either coaxing or threatening by the

KCIA, allegedly used to offer the student leader a job or

bribe in an attempt to nullify the movement circle. Few

actually took the offer, and some refused it and chose a path

in pursuance of a career in an opposition political party.19

Returning to the dynamics of group life, informal small

19 This is a moot point to debate. However, it can be

developed into a hypothesis that the motivation of the student
leader is to establish the basis of his political career after
graduation. The source of data comes from interviews and the
personal experiences of observing a circle of movement group
when I was in Korea before 1985.
groups, fraternal friendship circles, are pervasive in a

peculiar way within any collectivity of Korean society. There

are undoubtedly several small factions on campus who are

competing with each other to put their own member in the

presidential post of the student government in order to take

over hegemony of power on campus. At the least, they try to

gain influence upon it by federating their groups and by

attracting the normative support from the mass student body.

Meanwhile, they can effectively mobilize the resources

whenever they need and want to. All too often, out of

friendship circles and social networks, a student leader duly

elected with the support of his members to be a representative

of the student government becomes the leader of the movement

as well. Kim (1983:2 07) shows how these small groups ofTl
l
\

friendship networks in 1960 facilitated the movement and ,

succeeded unexpectedly in toppling the Syngman Rhee

government.

However, there were times of serious trials for the

formal student organizations in Korea when the government put

campuses under systematic surveillance by the secret police

and banned all autonomous student organizations. The harsher

control over the student movement began at the so-called

 55
• 20 * •
Yushm reform measure of 1972, which banned virtually all

opposition including student organizations and demonstrations.

Since then, the "Student Defence Corps" which the government!

set up had become the only legally recognized campus student

organization. The repressive measure had continued and

intensified until Park's assassination in October 1979. For

example, one unit of underground students in 1974 issued a

"Declaration on the People, Nation, and Democracy," and were

arrested with other intellectuals and clergy who were

supposedly connected to those students. Surprisingly, among

those, several students received a death sentence (however,

they were released later).

During the early 1980s, except the spring of 1980 (a

short while after Park's death), the student movement was

again put under repressive measures of the Chun Doo Hwan

government. The autonomous campus student organizations were

disbanded to be replaced by ones controlled by the government

and administration. Moreover, "college presidents and

administrators were required to suppress student activism -

through suspension, expulsion, and otherwise - and were

discharged if they failed to do so" (MacDonald, 1988:92).

Even the officially approved social activities on campus were

2A • • • •
The human rights report issued by Asia Watch describes
the Yushin system as "the style of traditional monarchy."
Park Chung Hee "ignored the legislative process and the
National assembly altogether and adopted the tactic of issuing
decrees" (Asia Watch, January 1986:16).
 56

severely restricted and regulated. The Asia Watch (1986: 93-

4) reported on its control that the government used:

...spies and informers in the guise of students and

maintained a police presence on campus with both
uniformed and plainclothes men stationed outside
administrative and other offices on campus. The
government set up its own controlled campus student
organization, the student corps for National Defence
(Hakto hoguktan^ right after the Kwangju incident
in 1980 and forbade the free organization of any
other independent student associations. All
decisions of the Hoguktan including budget were
controlled by the Student Guidance Committee (Hakkvo
Chido Wiwonhoe) , a branch of the all-university
central Guidance Committee. No student with any
record of participation in a demonstration or
disciplinary action could be elected head of the
Hoguktan.

The Washington Post (June 4, 1981) reported on the campus

scene in the early 1980s as follows:

At some points on the campus of Seoul National

University, there were more agents than there were
students.

Under these harsh measures, the movement circles went

completely underground to avoid government and professorial

control. They settled into cells - so called underground

"study-circles" which have existed as the unit "in which

social issues, radical and illicit ideologies, interpretations

of Korean society, economy and history are explored and plots

against the authorities cooked and hatched" (Henderson,

1988:14). This unit seems rather natural, as Henderson

(1988:14) points out, to "a small-group-oriented Korean

society." It is also important to note that the various

legally approved circle (club) activities as an extra­

 57

curricular program on campus are part of the student culture

which have persisted throughout much of the history of the

student movement and influenced it greatly. The study circle

- whether underground or legalized - functions as a n e t w ^ ^

of support systems among many students in which they

easily find their own friendship groups.21 Thus, the

campus subculture of circle activity is rigorously maintai

by the majority of students. According to surveys conducted

at Korea University in 1983 and 1985:

Nearly half the students said they spent their free

time at school with fellow course members and
classmates? a third spent it alone, mostly for
study. Only 2 percent spent it with members of the
opposite sex. A little more than a quarter of the
students said they spent their after-school time
with friends and classmates? nearly the same number
studied in the library? about one in eight went
home, and about the same number went to "circle"
(equivalent to club or society) gathering or
activities on campus. (Macdonald, 1988:89)

Those students who went underground were or became

radical and maintained well-organized secret networks, through

which they recruited and indoctrinated new members as well as

organized small-scale but tactical demonstrations. According

21 The campus experience is quite unstable to many young

students, since many of them come from traditional family
backgrounds which are very intimate but at the same time
authoritarian. In the rapidly changing society, many young
people confront a generation gap within the family. This
brings a lack of communication with their authoritarian
father. Also moving into the impersonal and egalitarian,
somewhat freer campus setting, they confront a sudden personal
crisis. As a result, it is rather natural to many students
to join a small group cell in order to gain a support system
from their peers. At the same time the campus setting
provides a good place to meet like-minded people.
 58

to a report in 1981:

Sporadic small-scale protests continue to erupt on

several of S e o ul 's college campuses but the wave of
larger demonstrations that spread over them last
week seems to have subsided under heavy government
pressure and warnings that the universities may be
closed down. (The Washington P o s t . June 4, 1981)

Despite the effort of the Chun government to terminate student

unrest, the new form of small-scale tactical demonstrations

has surfaced instead of a large-scale mobilization. It seems

to me the trend of underground student networking changed the

course of the Korean student movement in the 1980s. The Chun

government apparently failed destroy the small group

communication network of the student body. The students*

protest mobilizations in the 1980s have become far more

effective tactically and better articulated ideologically than

previous ones in the 1960s and 70s.

One might then wonder how new members were recruited into

the underground movement circles in the highly risk-involved I

circumstances under government pressure? Many new members

seem to be recruited through the connection linked to one's

juniors in high school.22 However, the other conventional way

is going through the departmental or legally approved circle

activities. For example, there are various kinds of social

gatherings on campus, particularly the legalized circle

meetings which are operated to stimulate student's extra-

22 This topic needs to have an in-depth interview

research. My description can be an overview of a part of the
recruitment process.
 59

curricular activities. Such circles vary from philosophy to

sports. These are, to name a few: folk song study, Kant

study, mask dance study, classics study, science study,

traditional art study, poets, guitar players, mountain

climbers, theatrical performers, existentialists, soccer

players, etc.

Among those circles, some operate underground systems

that intensively train in a separate course a small group of

members who are politically like-minded. The new members are

normally recruited during the open membership training

sessions or seminar presentations. Often, outstanding

figures who are politically concerned and who have good

friendship circle are likely to be recruited by their senior

members. The new members are accepted into a small

clandestine group raised with a strong sense of obligation and

comradeship. They share the same feelings, study, and discuss

together various topics to build solid ideological orientation

and to acquire organizational tactics as well. The

ideological training for the members is supposed to be toward

praxis rather than metaphysical. When the trained individual

reaches the third year, he normally has to choose one of two

alternatives: whether to go for activism or for training new

members. Supposedly, he goes out to form a new study-circle.

In actuality, he is responsible for nurturing his group to

 60

maintain the tightest membership.23 Each group joins the

special membership training that is carefully conducted with

massive readings of leftist literature, consolidating their

ideology in which each member knows only his own superior and

a few intimate comrades.24 They also participate in the open

membership training for a larger number of students from

departments or legalized circles, which is offered during the

vacations, often occurring in rural areas with the intention

of raising consciousness of farmers and helping them to

organize. The Chun government, however, banned the summer

activity because of their connection to the farmers.

The failure of the Chun government to crush the small

group informal structure of the student movement circle may

i
be attributed to the culturally inherited small-group-oriented \| 7^^-t
— - "— _ — ~~ • - i\ r f 1 ‘T j r p i

nature of Korean society. The police reported in 198 6 that

""i '
there were 72 such underground cells at 22 universities in
bk-iU
Seoul. Yet most of them were only "under the umbrella of 0/<f
if'
Chamintu and Minmintu. two radical underground organizations

which were formed in mid-1986" (McBeth, 1987:31-3).

Nevertheless, the new trend of forming underground cells was

not limited to on-campus. That is, the students formed

23 Among students this cell is called a "family" or a

"team."

24 They also operate a system in which each study-circle

dispatches a member to other group to connect cells in an
effort to improve the solidarity of the movement. The leading
group in mobilizing demonstrations among these study-circles
on campus is often called the "head family."
 61

connections with Christian churches and other religious

organizations in order to avoid repression on campus. This

tie with religious groups allowed students safer places to

gather off campus and somewhat better protection from the

police. In addition, this underground movement was widely

accompanied in the movement circle with the so-called

"conscientization movement" (Uisick-Hwa Undona) which may

refer to a movement to raise the consciousness of

individuals.

When the government relaxed its controls over students ^

i
in 1984 (the so-called "Campus Autonomy Measure"), these,

segmented, dissociated circles banded together to form a

federal group? for each had "a reason to join with the others

to form a federation representing the large group as a whole"

(Olson, 1965:63). For example, on April 17, 1985, the

National Federation of Student Association (Chonhakvonl was

organized out of this study-circle cell network. Under the

federation, the political standing organization, Sammintu was

set up to coordinate the effective demonstration movement

through mobilizing underground and semi-underground small

study-circle cells linked with inter-campus cooperatives. The

revived autonomous student organizations on campus also

brought greater strength and faster and effective

mobilization. Since then, the frequency of demonstration has

been remarkably increased. According to the Ministry of

Culture and Information announcement in Oct. 20, 1985, "419

 62

demonstrations had occurred involving 76,000 students from 71”

universities since March. There also had been "255 labor

disputes from January to October" (NACHRK, Korea 18 8 .

1988:37).

The key student demonstration occurred in May 1985 when

seventy-three students from five universities in Seoul staged

a three-day sit-in at the U.S. Information Service building,

demanding that the U.S. issue an apology for what they called

"U.S. involvement in the Kwangju incident"(NACHRK, 1988:36).

This was a tactically successful protest to draw public and

world attention (through mass media) to the sensitive

political issue of South Korea. Embarrassed by this protest,

the authority of the government responded with a thorough

investigation of the student federation with the intention of

wiping out the leading activists. As a result, Sammintu was

disbanded through the arrests of its leading members.

Even if its leadership is decimated by arrests and the

organization is destroyed by frequent government suppression,

successors survive from the underground study-circle cells.

For example, the Sammintu. destroyed after the three-day

occupation of the United States Information Service building,

was followed by the two new movement organizations, the

Chamintu and the Minmintu.25 They soon engaged in an intensive

ideological argument. Competing to attract the support from

the masses, the two groups became increasingly radicalized.

They also competed to put their members in the presidential

post of student governments. However, because of their

radicalized character, both groups failed to obtain strong

support from the mass body of students. For example, during

the 1987 election at Seoul National University for the student

associations, the candidates with revolutionary slogans were

not able to receive many votes.26 The Chamintu acknowledged

this, and changed to more moderate slogans for direct national

presidential elections and formed the "Patriotic Students'

Pan-National Federation for Struggle against Foreign Powers

and Dictatorship." On the other hand, the Minmintu rigidly

maintained radical agitation advocating to form the "People's

Constitution Assembly." As a result, some member universities

left the Minmintu organization. Under less radical agitation,

the movement by Chamintu successfully led the major

demonstrations by gaining great support from middle class

citizens as well in June, 1987, and these in turn led to the

major change of the ruling party's platform on June 29, 1987.

25 The headquarter of Chamintu was known to exist in Seoul

National University, and the Minmintu was in Sunggyun Kwan
University. Both have member universities, however, individual
members through small groups are scattered around all
campuses.

26 A report from "The Christian Institute for the study

of Justice and development," Seoul, Korea, March 1987.
 64

In the wake of Roh's political relaxation, the student

movement has shifted from the democratization issue to

reunification and anti-Americanism. The Chamintu and the

Minmintu organizations have been succeeded presently by other

different regionally associated groups.27 However, under the

banner of national reunification, the student activists seem

to agree in uniting under the "National Federation of General

Student Councils," formed in August 1988.

One of the distinctive characteristics of the 1980s1

student movement is that the students allied with

intellectuals, workers, farmers and other religious groups to

form a strong opposing force to the governments. Needless to

say, the major demonstration of June 1987 was a product of

this al 1 ia n c e . However, it was more than one group with

others: It was accompanied with the movement of the so-called

"Into the Workers" (Shim, 1986:36). Student activists

secretly crept into industrial plants to become assembly-line

workers in an effort to organize labor unions. They generally

obtained employment by disguising their educational

backgrounds on the application forms. Their numbers

(including both college graduates and expellees) in 1986 were

"conservatively estimated to be about 1,500." "In 1985, 321

27 For example, the Minmintu was succeeded by the Sogonchu

and the Chamintu by Sochonavon. In addition, various regional
federations were formed: for instance, Chunnam, Chunbuk,
Chunju, Wonkwang, and Woosuk Universities formed a "Honam
Student Federations."
 65

'disguised employees' (former student activists) were fired

by their employers. During the first five months of 1986

alone, 350 student activists-turned-workers were dismissed

from their jobs for having misrepresented themselves by

underreporting their educational backgrounds on application

forms" (Wonmo Dong, 1987:247) Those students were often

accused of being communist labor organizers by the government.

28
As the NACHRK (Oct. 28, 1986) report states about a case of

one labor organization:

The organization is said to have been formed at a

meeting of fifteen persons at the home of an
expelled Seoul National University student, Kim Son-
Tae, last June 14, to discuss organizing workers at
the Kuro Industrial Complex in Seoul. The movement
rapidly spread, according to the prosecutor, so that
by the end of August it included 20 "cells" with 101
organizers, who "planned to organize a Marxist-
Leninist party with the ultimate purpose of bringing
about a socialist revolution." As evidence, the
prosecutor said they had discovered "a thesis on
Leninist methods of organizing labor."29

Over the years, the Korean student movement has become

violent and its slogans much more radicalized? its ideology

nurtures the potential for subversion. Unlike their previous

movement, it has become distinctive in that some students are

far more radical than others. This radicalism has raised

concerns among many people, particularly among the older

28 The North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea

(NACHRK) issued biweekly reports on the situation of human
rights in Korea.

29 it has been illegal to possess and read Marx or other

communist literature in South Korea. However, this censorship
is now more relaxed.
 66

generation. Their ideological cry reveals that their

perception of the world is distinctively different from that

of the preceding generation. This not only segregates the

older generation but also limits the support from the body of

students. Such objectionable^^radicalism landed many students

in jail and many other students were expelled from school.

In late 1986, according to a government report, of the 3,400

South Korean political prisoners, 85 percent were students.

From 1980 to 1987, it is estimated that 124,600 students were

expelled (however, most of them were returned later) from

four-year universities due to involvement in the student

movement (Henderson, 1988:1).

Fearing for his safety one student says, "I didn't go to

the demos because I have to think of my self-interest." "If

you're in a demo, it's good for social conditions - but not

for your future. The government investigates you" (Recitation

from Gittelsohn, July 1, 1987:28). Another student responded:

"I was too scared. If you got arrested you might not be able

to get a job, or you might get sent to the army"30 (Recitation

30 In an attempt to segregate the student activists from

the ordinary student body, the Chun government introduced a
program, so-called the "Greening Project" which had forcibly
conscripted some of identified activists into the army in
order to depoliticize them. According to the government, 465
student activists were subjected to this program between May
1980 and the end of 1983. Among 465 student inductees six
were found dead. The causes were unknown, but, according to
the army report, five of them had committed suicide and one
was killed accidentally. This case was widely used to provoke
agitation on campus. (Wonmo Dong, 1986:239)
 67

from Brant, spring 1988:22) Evidently most of students are

concerned with their self-interest and many of them do not

even want to take an explicit stand.

Contrary to the majority of students, one student leader

at Yonse University, who is considered a moderate, told a New

York Times reporter in an interview that "I am not afraid of

going to jail. As a student leader, it's something I take for

granted." The reporter asked again "Will you have difficult

getting a job?" Said the student, "It would be an honor if

I didn't get a job because of my activities. I will be doing

the same thing I am now, fighting for democracy" (Kristof,

August 2, 1987). Approximately 5-10 percent of the students

are considered to be activists. However, it may be largely

the cultural factor that such minority students can influence

the rest of the majority (4 0-60 percent) of students.

As seen in the above statements, a lot of student

activists have evidently risked their careers for the

movement.31 How could some students be bold enough to risk

their lives? Assuming that human action is rational

reflecting the econo-cultural environment in balancing costs

and benefits, minimizing the former and maximizing the latter,

31 The students who are once blacklisted for joining the

ranks of activism are usually left with little choice other
than to become revolutionaries. As Shim Jea Hoon (1986:36-
41) puts it, "Harsh reprisals aimed at critics, such as
deprivation of jobs or expulsion from universities, have
pushed some oppositionists to becoming fulltime
revolutionaries."
 68

a question must be asked how they can risk their promising

career right at its threshold? What is in their heads? To

answer this question, it is necessary to examine the role of

ideology in depth.
 V. ROLE OF IDEA, IDEOLOGY, AND MYTH

In discussing the role of ideology, I am not intending

to argue that voluntarism (i.e., political consciousness), as

neo-Marxists (Marcuse, 1972) assert, is a determining factor

in revolutionary movement. Nor do I intend to attempt to

resolve the intellectual controversy over this issue as to

whether ideology causes revolution or simply adds to it. What

I am trying to do in this chapter is to observe that ideas do

give focus and direction to the continuing movement, ildeology

is important, as Rhyne (1988:9) points out, "in aiding a

protest group to spell out its ends, to name its enemies, and

(most important of all) to define itself to itself."

Collective behavior theorists (Smelser, 1963) assert that

there can be street riots and other forms of collective

behaviors, but, without the idea about who it is, where it is

going, who stands to thwart its path, the collective behaviors

end up as random outbursts of unfocused anger. Therefore,

Rhyne argues that the ideology is a pull factor that

facilitates the movement into the following three ways:

69
 70

...(1) It gives focus and direction to any

frustrations or concerns a collectivity may have,
thereby bringing some unity of perception. That is,
it facilitates the process whereby the diverse
concerns and rages of disparate members can be
melded into a limited number of shared feelings and
be made to focus on common ends and common enemies.

... (2) It facilitates the process of clearly

separating the "us" from the "them.” Armed with
moral absolutes and stark dichotomies, a member of
a protest group can give far more unstintingly of
his or her time, and possibly life, and is able to
see the opponent as undeserving of forgiveness or
mercy. Without these processes operating in some
kind of joint, communal way neither the co-ordinated
actions nor the lethal challenges so necessary to
violent conflict would be possible.

...(3) In S o r e l 's illuminating conception, (1950)

it is in the realm of ideas that one can identify
the Mvth without which no great deeds, "heroic
action" as he put it, are possible. To him, the
Mvth makes it possible to link individual goals to
a single task, to translate abstract ideals into a
concrete path of action, and to energize all with
the belief that the world will be transformed if all
will follow the single, common call to action. The
Myth is thus not primarily a summary of beliefs or
a diagnosis of what is wrong with the world; it is
a design meant to convince the believer that great
things will happen if the common action is pursued.
In his time, it was the call to a General Strike
that Sorel saw as the Myth which would unite the
French proletariat in the transformation of their
world. (Rhyne, 1988:10)

In Q.Y. Kim*s view, the real cause of the student

uprising in 1960 was not the motivation of conspiratorial

ideology but primarily by "the disjunction between the content

of education and the criteria of legitimacy" (1983:209). In

other words, the students rose against the Syngman Rhee

government "for its failure to live up to the ideals of

liberal democracy" (Kim, 1983:210). Thus, according to him,

 71

because of this lagging condition, students were angered. So j

!
the uprising was purely spontaneous, i.e., it was not planned ^
i
ahead. For example, the 1960 student uprising initiated with

a small group of students, a network of friends, in Taegu who

mobilized the first student revolt on February 28, 1960. They

rebelled simply against the unfair order of the Commissioner

of Education (of Kyungbuk Province) to keep school open on

Sunday, which was an obvious attempt by a government officer

to keep the students away from the planned opposition party's

Sunday campaign rally for the coming presidential election on

March 15, 1960 (Q.Y. Kim, 1983:36-40).

It is obvious to me that there were no interuniversity

plans and national coordinations at the threshold. No student

group premeditated their protests: i.e., there were no clear

common objectives fueled by subversive ideas. However, that ]

does not mean we must view it as a purely spontaneous event 1

1
as Kim asserts. It is certain that small groups in friendship |

circles and classmates carefully planned to mobilize their

student body. Evidently, these small circle of already

concerned students took pre-existing ideas and made potential

participants not only aware of them but made those ideas

meaningful to them. Those ideas, such as academic freedom,

liberty, and democracy, were extensively utilized in order to

justify the moral cause of their revolt, to spell out their

i
goal, and, more importantly, to provide the picture of a^

wishful state of affairs. As Crane Brinton (1963:49)

suggests, "ideas are always a part of the pre-revolutionary

situation No ideas, no revolution." The students in the

initiation stage formulated their ideas as follows

Our basic liberty is in danger. The freedom to rest

from the week's labor on Sunday — the most
fundamental right of mankind all over the civilized
world — is now to be taken away from us. (Q. Y.
Kim, 1983:41)

It is apparent that they capitalized on these pre­

existing ideas to facilitate their protest movement . J Without

ideas, the revolt follows "in haphazard eruptions of unfocused

anger" (Rhyne, 1988:9). Ideas provide a blueprint for the

continuing movement. Undoubtedly, it has been evident that

the further the Korean student movement goes, the better the

ideology becomes articulated and subversive.

But the most important fact is that students emotionally

embrace some mythical qualities in their cultural legends of

the movement within the country's history. In other words,

they give a noble interpretation on the historical role of

students. They feel that they succeed in acting out of a

nationalistic, patriotic tradition. For example, the first

student revolt at Taegu in 1960 received extensive media

attention because two days later was the day commemorating the

March First Liberation Movement against Japanese colonial

power which occurred in 1919, at which many students were

sacrificed. The 1919 Liberation struggle was symbolically

meaningful in the minds of Koreans, invoking the spirit of

patriotic movement. Thus, regarding the student revolt against

 73

the order to keep school open on Sunday, the media portrayed

this incident as a continuing symbol of the patriotic young

students' struggle for freedom and justice. In a similar way,

the students of Korea University in Seoul, after being

attacked by a gang mobilized by the ruling party during the

demonstration, received extensive media attention propitious

to the student side. This media coverage seemed to give 1

renewed momentum to the Korean student movement in 1960. /

Seen from the process of the April revolution32, there is"!

Isa/
no evidence that any group or organization plotted to topple d f

the ruling regime and to take over power. In other words,

there was no ideological conspiracy believable to the

protesters before action was provided, except a symbolic

interpretation of the role of students by mass media. The

students simply utilized the pre-existing ideas, justice,

freedom, and democracy to express the justification for their

collective action, and furthermore equipped with "a noble

interpretation of the historical process1' (Oberschall,

32 The way one defines the revolution varies according to

what perspective one has. There is a wide range of controversy
as to whether the event should be called a revolution or not.
Some call it, the April revolution? others, the April 19th
Righteous Uprising; or still others, simply the Sa-il-gu
(April 19th). Q.Y. Kim (1983:8) defines the event simply the
"revolt" "because it had neither strong leadership nor
unifying organization or ideology." It is self-evident that
there was neither a plot by any organization or group to gain
power nor significant transformation of social structures with
class upheaval. However, it brought the collapse of the
ruling regime which seems to form an important part of a
revolutionary movement.
1973:181). However, as we have seen, the Mythic quality

combining the old historical moral traditions and new Western

ideas were utilized by the students in order to facilitate the

movement. The Korea University students issued a leaflet

before their action:

We all know that the tradition of our school is a

glorious one. Our school fought against the Japanese
for our national independence! Such a feat one does
not forget! We must not permit our noble tradition
to be blemished. We cannot sit idly by while such
injustice is perpetrated. (Q.Y. Kim, 1983:39)

Again combining with a set of moral ideas and the noble

interpretation of historical processes, any collectivity can

be mobilized into the mortal conflict, / i t is not the matter

of the cogent ideas or existing historical and cultural facts;

it is rather the translation of them into some kind of

believable plan of action.^/As Sorel (1950:46) pointed out,

men move to action by myths rather than facts.

The mind of man is so constituted that it can not

remain content with the mere observation of facts,
but always attempts to penetrate into the inner
reason of things.

These mythic elements pertaining to the abstract ideas help

men to move to action and, at the same time, the complete

system of ideas in their heads works to diagnose and evaluate

the moral evil and name its enemies, to offer "a counter­

vision in waiting which lights the future," (Rhyne, 1983:16)

and to call to that heroic action which leads from today's

gloomy world to tomorrow's shining Utopian society. As Sorel

(1950:41-2) puts it,

 75

...men who are participating in a great social

movement always picture their coming action as a
battle in which their cause is certain to triumph.

Armed with moral ideas, the Korean students are not hesitant

to judge the reality and convince themselves that they are

going to change the world. According to Sorel, this is so

kind of illusion rather than reality; that is, it is a mytn. \

But the important point to keep in mind is that myth is

neither primarily a set of beliefs nor simply an intellectual

or philosophical diagnosis of ills in the world; it is rather

an emotional phenomenon that calls the believer to action.

In other words, "the myths are", according to Sorel, "not

description of things, but expressions of a determination to

act" (1950:50). It is the unconscious factors complete with

rational ideology that "convince the believer that great

things will happen if the common action is pursued" (Rhyne,

1988:10).

In this respect, we can discover great amounts of mythic

elements out of the 1 9 80 s1 Korean student movement. Because

of the myths, it is possible for the student activists to

dedicate themselves to the political struggle in spite of

their risking promising careers. Without question, the Sa-

il-gu (April 19th) revolution also bore a new myth, and added

to the existing myths.

 Offsprings of the April Revolution! Descendants of
Tonghak Revolution and the March First Movement!
Let us rise up! (from a leaflet issued at Yonse
University, Nov. 18, 1981)

Applying a set of moral values, they also identify who are

villains and who are heroes. Then, the common enemy becomes

apparent:

Chun Doo Hwan has committed too many outrages! He

is worse than a doer or p i g ! ...Chun Doo Hwan has
shown for all to see that he is a genocidal murderer
and he will go down in history for his immorality.
(from the "Declaration of Democratic Students,"
1981: source anonymous)

This clear separation of the evil from the good helps the

movement to bring some unity of perception, that is

"solidarity." These fashions have helped to shape the nature

of the following Korean student movement, and have continued

to inspire the participants in it.

In comparison to the 1960s and 70s, one finds a stark

difference in the 1980s1 student movement. The difference is

conspicuous violence. The students in the 1980s are

apparently far more violent than in the 1960s and 70s. Why?

This question needs to be viewed in terms of ideological

differences. Actually, in most cases, political violence is

initiated by military or police action. Generally

demonstrations turned violent at the moment "when the

authorities intervened to stop an illegal but nonviolent

action" (Zimmermann, ‘1983:126).

33 An abortive peasant revolution in 1893, during the time

of Yi dynasty's disintegration.
 77

However, it seems to me that the students in the 1980s

use violence as a tactical means to draw the media attention J

I
in an attempt to publicize their movement goals. Furthermore,

the violence also results from their morally absolute ideas.

Unlike their forebears in the 1960s and 7 0s, the students in

the 1980s have become an "ideologically cohesive and

tactically effective force" (Dong, 1988:B2). They claim in

their appraisal of the previous movement that "the student

movement up to the late 1970s was a romantic one, simply

protested against the dictatorship under the names of freedom

and democracy" (111 Song Chung, 1985:5) , which means that they

were naively optimistic about political reform within the

system. They declare that the year of 1980 was the end of

romanticism in the student movement. The students view that

the goal of the April student revolution in 1960 has not been

achieved yet: it is still in the process. They believe that

they are successors of the April movement and feel an

obligation to complete it, which implies that they are

determined to make real and violent revolution by their own

will. This means that they now have their own ideology and

are prepared to struggle for it. Thus, the student movement

of the 1980s has become self-consciously theoretical in

ideology better articulated than before and more concrete in

issues. Despite little changes in the structure of thej

movement, this ideological maturation in the 1980s tends to!

reveal a stark difference from the previous student movement.

 78

Student activists in the 1980s, having reinterpreted

Korea*s history, believe that the masses have been exploited

and oppressed under both the Japanese and their authoritarian

Korean successor, and that "the people must be liberated from

an exploitative economic system which is dependent on

comprador-monopolized capital" (Henderson, 1988:17). Students

also believe that Korean business leaders, whom they see as

being supported by massive foreign capital, "maintain a low-

wage policy and an agricultural import policy [low-grain

price] which benefits only themselves" (Henderson, 1988:17).

They are convinced that present anomalies of structure in

Korean society have been affected by this process. The

students believe that the true barrier to the democratization

of Korean society is the comprador-bureaucratic capitalism

which was primarily imposed by foreign powers — i.e., neo­

colonial powers. By virtue of the foreign imperialistic

capitalism, Korea has failed to secure her national

sovereignty and establish a self-reliant economy. The result

of an economic system dependent upon the neo-colonial

capitalism is not only anti-democratic but also anti­

reunification of Korea. Under this economic system, according

to the students:

...the ruling coalition (the military, monopoly

capital and bureaucrats) dependent on foreign powers
 79

attempts to construct the permanent Miniuna54

exploitation system and to make the stable self
reproduction. Therefore, the basic structure of the
present Korean society can be understood as the
state monopolistic capitalism dependent on foreign
powers in economic realm and as the anti-democratic,
authoritarian, military fascism in political realm;
to sum up, it can be understood as the twofold

Miniuna is a Korean word, which literally means the

mass of the people ("min" can be interpreted as "people" and
"jung" as the "mass"). However, the concept has strong
historical meaning. The concept was initially used by a
nationalist Buddhist monk during the Japanese colonial period.
The concept was originally meant to describe "mass"; "first,
the people who don't have sovereignty under the colonial
system and under the situation where feudal monarchy withered
away. Second, the people, nevertheless, who are dedicated to
achieve their sovereignty by struggling against the colonial
system." Presently, this concept is widely used in south
Korea. Dr. Han Wan Sang in his book, Miniuna Sociology
(Seoul: ChongRo Books Inc., 1984) argues that the concept of
miniuna differs from the Marxian concept of the proletariate
class. According to him, it is a broader category of people
which is determined not only by the mode of production but
also by the political processes. Thus, it includes all the
alienated ruled who are economically exploited, politically
oppressed, and socially discriminated. It seems to me that
much of his emphasis is put on the overtly subjective
criteria, so that it is still very vaguely and imprecisely
defined. However, the way in which the students have defined
it may be useful to understand their ideological rhetoric.
According to them, Miniuna is the class coalition formed by
labor, peasantry, the urban poor, as well as the urban middle
and lower class. It only excludes the class of comprador
monopoly capitalists, comprador bureaucrats, and the comprador
military group. As they put it:
The concept "Minjung in the Minjung-democracy"
should be grasped as the main revolutionary agent
of the world history, as a historical conception and
as a class coalition. The Korean social structure
is the product of the dependent industrialization
process. As a result, the social conflict does not
take the singular shape of the capitalist-labor
conflict, but the reiterated complex shape of the
conflict between monopoly capital and informal
section, the conflict between monopoly capital and
agricultural section and the like. In this sense,
"Miniuna" is the class coalition at the core of
labor, peasantry, and the urban poor. (What is 3-
Min Ideology? 1985:8)
 80

Miniuna exploitation system. (What's the 3-Min

Ideology? 1985:6)

The following are views of the students on the internal

products of structural process of capitalism in south Korea:

Generally, in the process of the capitalist

formation (the construction of capitalist state -
the creation of capitalist mode of production), the
state distorts the civil society and serves as a
Total Capitalist. In particular, the authoritarian
system constructed by process of the dependent
industrialization, namely the military fascist35
system dependent on foreign powers complements the
weakness of the capital, and at the same time
contrives to exclude the Minjung section (labor,
peasantry, the urban poor, and the urban middle and
lower class) politically. (What's the 3-Min
Ideology? 1985:5)

The students believe that the economic development that

industrialization has brought is actually a deformed one, and

it only benefits a handful of elites in Korean society. Thus,

they must convert their ideological path from "Liberal

Democracy" to "Minjung Democracy." The "Minjung Democracy"

implies a state of complete transformation of political and

social structures with class upheaval from below fminiuno^

into a politically and economically equal society. A strong

abiding hope of students is that if the united miniuna

overthrow the handful who wield evil power, it will lead to

35 The students define "fascism" as "the system which

obliterates democracy, oppresses the people with weapons, and
deprives them of their natural rights (in a political sense),
and which puts the people under the screw in order to preserve
the vested interests of a few privileged groups (in a economic
sense). (from a leaflet of "Declaration on the Current
National Situation," The Democratic Student of Seoul National
University, March 1981)
 81

a future earthly u t op ia . As they perceive the situation:

It is more than twenty years that a dictatorial

regime, enemy of democracy, has stood over people
with the aid of the force of guns and swords, in the
guise of "Liberal Democracy." Until the middle of
the 70's the student movement called for the
recovery of "Liberal Democracy." But the time of
frustration has been too long. During the long time
of set-backs and frustration, the color of liberal
democracy has faded. In the 80s, the students have
with great effort given fresh colors to the tired
and faded democracy. And this democracy has been
called miniuna democracy. (Student* s Reaction to the
Public Prosecutors* Interim Report of the
Investigation of "Sammintu" - committee, 1986:4)

Since the Sammintu student movement organization had

professed three basic goals: liberation of the masses

(minjung), attainment of democracy (mi niu) , and the

reunification of Korea fminiok) , the main rhetoric behind most

of the demonstrations represents democratization (Minju__wha)

and reunification (Tongil). it is the students* belief that

to make Korea a democratic society is to move one step further

to reunifying the nation. As these goals are achieved, the

liberation of miniuna will naturally follow. However, they

discover with reinterpreting history that the dictatorial

regime is not the sole enemy; for them the real enemy is

behind the undemocratic regime, that is, imperial capitalist

power. Therefore, they think that in order to achieve

democracy and unification in Korea, they must struggle against

foreign imperialistic powers. Most of their arguments revolve

around their perception of Japan*s and A m e r ic a’s role in

Korean history, particularly toward the United States. As one

 82

student publication puts it:

We understand clearly that the United States is the

basic enemy who prevented us from achieving
democracy, both through the Kwangju incident and in
the presidential election. Therefore, we see
clearly that democracy can not flourish in this land
until we are freed from the United States. Not a
single soul ventures to assert any more that the
United States is the guardian of world peace or the
motherland of democracy. ...The United States is
precisely the power that acted as the chief
instigator to divide our fatherland, precisely the
power that stage-managed dictatorship in this
country....(Young Pupils Devote Their Hearts to the
Proud Korean Minjung, 1988)

The students tend to believe that no progressive change is

possible until American troops and political influences are

eliminated. In short, the major blame is fixed upon the

foreign imperialistic powers, more precisely on the United

States, for the structural anomalies in Korean society while

the authoritarian Korean successors are nothing but puppets

manipulated by imperialists.

In their zeal for moral purity, the students tend to make~~j

a stark dichotomy: something is either absolutely right or

absolutely wrong. "If one decides that the government is the

purveyor of falsehood, the opposite must be true" (Buruma,

1987:36). The true conscience of the nation is carried only

by the students, and fundamentally irreconcilable with the

spoiled power.

It is impossible for the majority of the people and

the Chun Doo Hwan clique to exist together. The
struggle is reaching the decisive stage, and the
final fight between a tiny fascistic clique and the
democratic majority is at hand. The victory of
people is historically inevitable... ("Emergency
 83

Student Council," Korea University: Sep. 17, 1980)

In morally absolute terms, the enemy for them becomes

distinctive: the foreign imperial powers and its puppets who

act against the will of the miniuna. Having defined their

enemy, their faith convinces them that if they kick out all

imperialistic foreign power, the puppets, in their simplistic

logic, the dictatorial political and comprador-monopolized

regime, will be so volatile that the miniuna will gain self-

reliance? democracy will be in bloom? this will lead to the

peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula, then the

nationalistic Utopian society will come to exist.36

As has been seen, the ideology developed by the radical

Korean students in the 1980s is starkly different from the

conventional ideology of South Korea. In addition, their

paradigmatic perception of the world has also shifted

considerably from the taken-for-granted world views of the

36 It is apparent that the Korean student leaders are

adherents of nationalism as well as Marxism. However, it
should not be understood that radical ideology is the sole
determining factor of revolution. For example, the uprising
in 1960 did not have an ideology such as Marxism. In terms
of nationalism, it seems to me that it helps consolidate
movement solidarity and enhance the alliance among different
groups.
 84
older generation.37 The two paradigms are most likely

competing with each other for political hegemony. With

respect to reality, their ideological cry seems impossible to

achieve by compromise or reconciliation with the present

government because of the similarity between the ideological

stance of students and that of North Korea.

However, the fundamental problem does not lie in their

rational ideological belief. More importantly, the students

— -----------------

translate their ideology into a concrete path of action. They

have an image of transformed better world and believe that

solidarity and the pursuit of common action is the means by

which the transformation of society will be realized. So,

they are called to action. This is what Sorel calls a myth.

An aspect of reality is given to the hopes of immediate

action, believing that through concerted action something real

can be achieved. This illustrates that "revolts are born as

much as out of hope as out of anger" (Rhyne, 1988:class) . All

too often, the Korean student movement is apparently seen with

much more hope as well as anger or frustration.

With respect to faith and determination, astudent who

set fire to the United States Information Service building in

37 The meaning of a generation here does not solely

indicates an age cohort category. It refers to a social group
of varied pool of people who share the same sense of
historical experiences. According to Braungart (1984:350),
generations are not born, but made? thus, "A generation shares
not only age-group membership ....but a sense of social
consciousness and participation in the historical process."
 85
Pusan 1982, said in his final statement in the appellate

c o u r t :38

Democratic society will never be realized until you

and I determine to sacrifice ourselves for it. ...
I hope that my death will be a turning point of
U.S.-Korea relations, and that the U.S. government
will not longer force the Third World countries to
maintain the Cold War system, but will support and
help her friend to build a democratic society and
a unified country. The relationship of both
countries should be based on equal friendship, not
vertical control. (Source and translation from the
"Cry of the People Committee," May 11, 1983)

As a radical student organization puts their determination to

struggle:

We are the noble sons and daughters of the

magnanimous Paedal R a c e , the Korean M i n i u n q . ...As
we assess the present situation, we see that the
fate of our fatherland has fallen permanently into
the grasp of American dominion and aggression. We
can not merely sit idly by and watch. Moreover, we
can no longer sit idly by while the masses groan
once again under the oppression of military
dictatorship. We swear by our burning patriotic
hearts that will stand in the vanguard of the
struggle for national salvation, offering up our
hearts and bodies in all purity. ("Oath of the Young
Student National Salvation Suicide Squad," Feb. 16,
1988)

The Council of the National Student Federation formed in 1988

expresses their hopes on the reunification of Korea:

It has been 44 years since the division of the Korea

peninsula by American neo-colonial power. The
economic and military invasion of American
imperialism has made this land frozen with mass-
production of murderous tear gas and also obligation
for those divided and colonized people to fight
against colonial powers in recovering national
sovereignty and in obtaining full freedom. However,
not having a motherland to defend and to love, what

38 • •
He received death sentence, but it was reduced later
to life imprisonment.
 86

can we do? Therefore, we, the students who are

proud of having struggled for a liberated nation
since the Japanese colonialism, desire to contribute
to the rescue of our nation and reunification of our
people with greater sense of patriotic obligation.
("We should Never be Two," April, 1988:2)

From what I have discussed, it becomes apparent that

radical Korean students utilize abstract ideas and do abide

by cultural myths (such as, "history calls us!") by giving

noble interpretations to history for their movement. Those

radical students are convinced that they are the elect,

destined to carry out the will of miniuna. It is from these

myths that one can espouse to the morally absolute terms,

good-or-evil, as being a believable call to action. Black and

White are easily identified: the ruling regimes are villains;

the activists are heroes. By this they are determined to act

and they believe that "their cause is certain to triumph"

(Sorel, 1950:42). As their movement goes further, their ideas \

i
become consolidated, and their faith becomes deeper in

conviction and greater in hope. By this hope they can bring ,

themselves into mortal conflict. In sum, the essential point

here is that the presence of such ideas makes it easier to

create a more or less organized protest group in line with

their resource base (i.e., organizational structure).

 VI. CONCLUSION

I have discussed the historical processes of the Korean

student movement that have surfaced in the last three decades.

Instead of identifying the structural and psychological

variables which may underlie the movement, I have concerned

myself with the facilitating factors.

Given the resource mobilization model, the analysis of

this research suggests that the modern education system in

South Korea has increased the student population and has thus

formed a superimposed and segmented collectivity that is

relatively cut off from the larger society. It is within this

collectivity that viable and dense organizational structures,

such as the student government associations, departmental

activities, various "circle" (club) meetings, etc., have made

it easier for the Korean students to engage in collective

action and to endure their movement. Observing the micro

level of the organizational structure, one of Korea's most

segmented, cohesive, organizations is the informal, factional

group which runs through much of Korean life. Such small-

groups on campuses have been an important dynamic factor in

facilitating the mobilization process and in sustaining that

mobilization. It is thus my central argument that with the

87
 88
primary networks that link students by m eans of strong J

emotional ties, the small group cells have been the I

fundamental unit for mobilizing the Korean student movement,

f
j

Furthermore, I have viewed the mobilization process of

the students within the dimension of historical construction. [

This dimension tends to be symbolically meaningful for the

actor. For example, a certain event in history becomes |

legendary and the belief of it is soon built into a belief !

structure to be shared as a part of communal culture. For 1

this reason historical tradition is an important factor in a J

quick and effective mobilization.

The Confucian ideal of moral purity appears to be one of

the abiding cultural themes in the student movement. Also,

the widespread emphasis on equality underlies the movement

groups. Such cultural belief structures, however, experience

what Ogburn (1964:87-95) calls a "cultural la g ” a r ising as a ’

result of the differential rate of change between two parts

of culture in the rapidly changing societal conditions. This

ambiguous coexistence of change and continuity in a culture

overall may be an incipient condition of social movement. As

such, the traditional role of students and the consciousness

of community are necessarily taken into account as important

facilitators of the movement.

These cultural themes are combined with new ideas, and \

become a great facilitator. The resource mobilization model J

tends to ignore the significance of these cultural and__

ideological aspects. deas^ in themselves do not determine

whether there is a movement. However, the way in which the

/.
actor translates them into a concrete path of action becomes
/'
an important facilitating factor to make the movement sustain

its violent confrontation. Ideas give direction to the

movement by bringing unified perceptions? they also make a

dichotomy of the "us” and the "them” ; and they provide hope

that great things will happen if we do take action. With the

presence of the cultural ideas, the Korean students have been

able to create a more or less organized protest movement and

to sustain violent confrontation.

Given the ideology of radical students, it is important

to understand how violence is generated. We find that the

ideology of the students becomes a paradoxical mixture of

moral absolutism and virulent antagonism. As Brinton

(1965:176-2 36) saw it, "reign of terror" and "reign of virtue"

grow out of the revolutionary mind set. Both extreme

characteristics of virtue and violence are often two sides of

the same coin. Thus, extreme moral virtue can at the same

time be extreme violent absolutism.

One might then ask: to what extent is the Korean student

movement to be seen as unique? Are we able to find the

patterns described above other places? The answer is Yes.

There may be unique cultural elements, such as the traditional

role of students and a shared sense of homogeneity in the

Korean student movement. However, at least the two

 90
categories, the degree of organizational structure and the

degree of intensity of ideology, can be the major patterns in

other student movements.

For example, comparing the Korean student movement to the

one in Indonesia reveals a similar political progression and

structural background? however, the Indonesian students seem

to lack a strong cultural homogeneity, that is, a shared sense

of cohesive meaning that gives the collectivity a sufficient

feeling of solidarity. Although the Indonesian students have

various kinds of national and local organizations with a

rapidly growing student population, they have not successfully

mobilized for effective challenge to the political regime

because of their diffused loyalty to various racial,

religious, and political groups (Lyman, 1965-66:282-293). Of

course, we must take into account the role of government in

controlling the movement as an important facilitating factor.

However, it may be attributed to the fact that unlike the

Korean students, the Indonesian students do not have a strong

cultural homogeneity. They seem to lack a nationally shared

strong identity.

On the other hand, the recent development of the Chinese

student movement deserves attention not because it occurs

under the strong state machinery of socialism but because of

its relatively quick communication despite its seemingly less

cohesive organizational structure. It is important to note

that the Chinese students have played a significant role in

 91
other revolutionary events (for instance, the May 4th movement

in 1919) . They seem not only to have a historically patriotic

tradition but also to share a more or less cultural

homogeneity. In the 1986-87 demonstrations, the students

actually intended to support the Communist Party policy of

economic reform. The conservative party members, who were

concerned lest the students ally with laborers and others,

intervened and dismissed the party chief Hu Yaobang, who

initially proposed the liberal reform. The recent death of

Hu Yaobang has clearly demonstrated the potential of students

for an organized opposition movement capable of presenting a

lethal challenge to the Party. This incident implies that the

Chinese student collectivity at any time can move from a

latent to a rigorous political opposition group (even become

a revolutionary force) especially when the Party is perceived

to be weak, confused, and pusillanimous.

Many student movements seem to begin more out of hope '

than anger or frustration. The recent Chinese student

movement is a good example: "Perhaps the march will not bring

democracy today, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, but if

we keep working on it, China has hope," said one participant

in the march, ..."We have to transform China" (Daily Press,

Fri. May 5, 1989) . The moderation of the movement can be

developed into a violent protest, especially when the students

convince themselves that they carry out the will of their

nation. As they convince themselves that "their cause is

 92
certain to triumph” (Sorel, 1950:42), the opponents of their

cause become not just human enemies but moral degenerates?

they become sinners. Then, the movement is likely to become

increasingly violent. Although this type of action is not

rationally calculated, as Weber views it, this emotional

aspect of action can change the course of history.

In sum, it is because of these two major facilitating

factors (organizational structure and cultural ideas), among

others, that the Korean student movement has been easily

mobilized in political opposition for the last thirty years.

They are likely to remain as an important political group for

some time to come. Particularly when the government appears

to be incompetent and is perceived to be illegitimate, the

student group is likely to be a potentially subversive force.

However, if the present democratization continues and the

society becomes more pluralized, as diverse interest groups

become organized, the student movement may become increasingly

divergent in the South Korean political process.

Nevertheless, as long as students retain a resource bases for

potential mobilization, no one can say for sure that the

student movement will disappear.

 APPENDIX I

Chronology of Student Movement in South Korea39

Spring, 1450
Students at National Confucian Academy in Seoul
protest the Great King S ejong’s alleged "soft-on-
Buddhism" policies. [Altogether 96 protest
incidents by students and scholars occur throughout
the Yi dynasty (You Young-ik, 1987:65).]

March 1, 1919 - May 192 0

The Korean independence movement begins against
Japanese colonial rule. Platform of the March First
Declaration of Independence is spread through
schools and churches in nationwide demonstrations.

October 30, 1929 - February, 1930

Students in Kwangju who save a Korean girl from a
group of Japanese students are arrested. This
incident sparks nationwide student demonstrations
lasting four months and involving 54,000 students
and thousands of arrests.

August 15, 1945

Ending of World War II and Liberating from the 36
year Japanese colonial occupation of Korea.
Division of Korea was made by the United States and
the Soviet Union. Beginning of the rightist-leftist
student and intellectual confrontation.

August 11, 1947

A wave of arrests of leftist political forces begins
under the United States Military Government in south
Korea.

39 This section primarily refers to the work of Henderson

in "Student Activism in Korea" (1988:21-24), and of NACHRK's
chronological reports of human rights situation in Korea *88
(1988:23-45) . A large portion are verbatim and come from both
of the above works.

93
 94

April 19, 1960

The student uprising in Seoul protesting the
fraudulent presidential elections of March 15 is met
by martial law troops, resulting in 18 6 deaths and
6,022 injuries. Within a few days demonstrations
have escalated and led to Syngman Rhee's resignation
from the presidency on April 29.

May 16, 1961

Military coup of General Park Chung Hee strikes down
student power, reunification efforts and activism.

Summer, 1961
The Korean Central Intelligence Agency is founded
as a major national instrument of control and
suppression of internal criticism.

March, 1964
Students in Seoul demonstrate protesting the K o r e a 1s
"low posture" in establishing diplomatic ties with
the former colonial power.

January - June, 1965

The involvement in the Vietnam conflict and signing
and ratification of South Korea-Japan normalization
treaty sparks nationwide student protests; all high
schools and universities are closed.

January - April, 1974

Four emergency decrees are issued by President Park
Chung Hee which are extremely suppressive towards
student organizations and demonstrations. Student
activists begin to go underground.

September-October, 1977
Student protests increase in intensity, refusing to
cooperate with the "Student Defence Corps," which
has become the only legally recognized campus
organization.

May, 1978
Park re-elected through indirect electoral process.
This is followed by nationwide student
demonstrations demanding an end to the Yushin
Constitution and restoration of civil rights.

October 16-19, 1979

Students in Pusan lead massive demonstrations
violently denouncing the Yushin system of President
Park.
 95

October 26, 1979

Park Chung Hee is shot dead by the KCIA Director,
Kim Jae Kyu. This brings the so-called "the spring
of 1980", a hopeful state for democracy.

May 15, 1980

Tens of thousands of students demonstrate in Seoul
and other cities demanding that the government adopt
a new democratic constitution and that it lift
martial law.

May 17, 1980

Martial law is extended throughout the country.
Student leaders and opposition politicians are
arrested; the universities are closed and all
political gatherings are prohibited.

May 18-27, 1980

Kwangju uprising lasts for 10 days (refer to page
35-36).

March 18, 1982

The American Cultural Center in Pusan is set afire
by four college students protesting the U.S. policy
and involvement in Kwangju. One student in the
building is killed by the fire.

February, 1983
Large-scale arrests of students for alleged
membership in a "Democratic People's Federation" and
a tightening of campus security.

September 25, 1984

2,500 Seoul National University students gather to
revive their autonomous organization and elect a
president for the Student Association.

May 23, 1985

Seventy-three university students stage a three-day
sit-in at the U.S. Information Service building in
Seoul demanding that the U.S. apologize to the
Korean people for what they call "U.S. involvement
in the Kwangju incident."

November 18, 1985

191 students from 14 universities in Seoul occupy
the training center of the ruling Democratic Justice
Party.

February, 1986
Nineteen students, members of Sammintu committee,
 96
are indicted in connection with the seizure of the
USIS building in May 1985, and draw jail terms
ranging from two to five years.

April 28, 1986

Two students commit suicide by self-immolation
protesting that military training for students is
an imposition of U.S. imperialism.

May 3, 1986
Violent student demonstrations occur in Inchon.

May 20, 1986

Seoul National University student burns himself to
death during a rally on the school campus.

August, 1986
The prosecutor General's Office announces the arrest
of 169 members of two "leftist-leaning" student
groups during the spring semester for allegedly
masterminding violent anti-government
demonstrations.

October 24, 1986

The Seoul District Prosecution announces that its
crackdown on a 101-member student organization that
is attempting to establish a Marxist-Leninist party
identical to that of the North Korean Workers Party
in an effort to ultimately establish a communist
country on the Korean peninsula.

October 31, 1986

Large number of Students are stormed by eight
thousand police on the campus of Konkuk University
where they are protesting against the legitimacy
of the Chun regime, and against the U.S. military
presence in Korea. Students violently resist and
seize five buildings on campus for three days. This
results in the arrests of 1,274 students and 395 of
them are charged under the National Security Law.

December, 1986
Government prosecutors announce that 3,405 persons
have been arrested in 1986 in connection with
political activities, including campus
demonstrations — the total includes 2,919 students.

January 14, 1987

A Seoul National University student, Park Chong Chul
died after being tortured during interrogation by
the National Police. Park's death sparks major
nationwide student demonstrations and leads to the
 97
resignation of several important cabinet members in
the government posts, including arrests of five
police officers from the Anti-Communist Division of
the National Police Headquarters who were involved
in the torture killing.

June 10, 1987

As the ruling party holds its convention to nominate
Roh Tae Woo as Chun's successor when his term
expired in early 1988, nationwide student
demonstrations break out throughout the country.

June 26, 1987

Grand peace march in Seoul and 37 other major cities
culminates in over two weeks of massive
demonstrations; three days later, Roh Tae Woo
declares direct presidential elections in a
liberalized atmosphere. There is a partial defusing
of confrontation with student activists.

July 9, 1987
At a funeral procession for Lee Han Yol, a Yonse
University student who died after being struck in
the head with a tear gas canister, an estimated
half million march in an anti-government protest.

July 10, 1987

Kim Dae Jung and 2,334 other political offenders
have their civil rights restored with a sweeping
amnesty.

May 15, 1988

University student Cho Song Man commits suicide at
Myongdong Cathedral to protest slow government
progress on the release of political prisoners. The
incident ends the de facto truce between the ruling
and opposition parties and incites the latter to
call for a government response to the issue. The
opposition uses the incident to demand a full
investigation of the Kwangju incident including Chun
Doo H w a n 1s involvement.

May 18, 1988

Eighth anniversary of the Kwangju incident. Violent
student demonstrations occur in Seoul and other
cities. Radical students express strong anti-
American sentiment. A martyr student sets himself
on fire.

June 10, 1988

Radical students clash with riot police at Yonse and
other universities across the country. Students
 98
attempt to march to Panmunjom in the demilitarized
zone in order to meet their north Korean
counterparts for a joint conference to discuss
reunification and North Korea*s demand for co­
hosting the Olympics. Students are turned back by
60,000 riot police in the Roh government's largest
display of force against militants.

August 15, 1988

Students' second attempt to march to Panmunjom is
rebuffed by tens of thousands of riot police; more
than 2,000 students are arrested. Roh Tae Woo
proposes a meeting with North Korean leader Kim II
Sung. Four days later, representatives of the north
and south Korean government meet for negotiations
at Panmunjom for the first time in nearly three
years.

November, 1988
Students clash with riot police throughout the
country, demanding the arrest of former President
Chun Doo Hwan. Chun apologizes his wrongdoings
during his seven-year rule and goes into internal
exile.
 APPENDIX II

METHODOLOGY

This presentation is basically a case study of a student

movement. The intent was not to make arguments for a

generalization to all student movements but to build a

tentative frame of reference.

It was appropriate to employ a qualitative technique for

this fundamentally interpretative approach. Most of the

analyses are dependent upon a wide range of secondary, primary

and near-primary sources as well as statistical data.

Materials are drawn from a variety of sources: books, essays,

newspapers, magazines, leaflets, pamphlets, court documents,

newsletters, publishing letters, and human rights reports.

I also conducted interviews with two Korean graduate students

in America who once were involved in the student movement.

The data collection was a somewhat sporadic collection,

taking bits and pieces from every available source. Given the

limitations of time and the resources available for me, in

reality, I encountered many impediments which hindered the

collection of a very organized, extensive set of data on this

99
 100
particular subject. Thus, I have simply tried to obtain all

the data on the subject that I possibly could. A sizable

portion of the primary evidence upon which my analysis was

based came from archival and other historically relevant data

obtained from organizations in America associated with Korean

studies, politics, and religion. Those organizations are: The

Asia Society, a public education organization in New York; The

Library of Congress (the Korean Section) in Washington, D.C.;

The Asia Watch, a human rights organization in Washington,

D.C.; The North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea

(NACHRK),40 a religious affiliated human rights group in

Washington, D . C . ; and The Korea Information & Resource Center,

a political group in Washington, D.C. Some publications also

have been received from Korea through m a i l . Most of the data

I have collected are written either in English or in Korean.

The following are newspapers and magazines that I have

drawn from:

Newspapers: (English) The Washington Post

The New York Times
The Chronicle of Higher
Education

(Korean) The Miiu Dong-A (Dailv^

The Miiu Chosun (Dailv^
The Peace Weakly
The New Korea Times (Weakly^

40 I would like to express special thanks to a staff

member at NACHRK, Ms. Kim Hwa Young, for her help in accessing
the archival data. A large portion of leaflets and court
documents would have been unavailable without her generous
assistance.
 101

Underground Student Newspapers

The Miniok Miniu Sonun
The Heabanq Sonun

Magazines (English) Far Eastern Economic Review

Time
Newsweek

(Korean) Shin Dong-A (Monthly^

Chosun (Monthly’)
Current (Monthly)

As the data were initially collected in large,

unorganized fragments, I attempted to systematize the

information I had obtained as much as was possible. After

defining the subject matter as eclectic, I organized the messy

data according to historical sequences and coded them by their

categories and properties. The two categories, organizations

and ideology, were my major focus for the information search.

For the 1960's and 70's I analyzed the student movement

primarily from the historical descriptions using the published

literature. For the 1980's I made extensive use of both

published literature and various other primary and secondary

resources.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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North American Coalition for Human Rights in Korea, Biweekly

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 103

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 VITA

Bveona-chul Park

Born in Korea, December 23, 1956. B.A. in English

language and literature, Han Nam University, Taejon, Korea in

1984; B.A. in Sociology, Lynchburg College, Lynchburg,

Virginia in 1987; and M.A. in Sociology, the College of

William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia in 1989.