NIDS China Security Report 2021

China’s Military Strategy in the New Era

Chapter 3

China’s Military Use of Space

Fukushima Yasuhito
 1. R
 elationship between Space Policy and
National Defense Policy

(1) Long-term Goals of Space Activities and the Military

Since the Xi Jinping administration’s establishment, space activities have been considered a means
for achieving “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” In 2013, President Xi Jinping (General
Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party [CCP]) stated that developing the space program and
turning the country into a space power is the space dream, and that the space dream is part of the
dream to make China stronger.1 China’s Space Activities in 2016 (hereinafter referred to as the “2016
Space White Paper”), a white paper published by the State Council Information Office, mentions
that to explore the vast cosmos, develop the space industry, and build China into a space power is a
dream China has pursued unremittingly.
“Space power [hangtian qiangguo, 航天强国]” is a concept unique to China, has a different
meaning from “major space country [hangtian daguo, 航天大国],” and is not a notion specific to the
military. In 2017, Lei Fanpei, Chairman of the board of China Aerospace Science and Technology
Corporation (CASC), one of the two major state-owned space enterprises, commented that China
is a major space country but has not reached the level of a space power. Chairman Lei noted that by
having more than 200 spacecraft in operation and conducting around 30 annual launches by 2020,
China will surpass the European Union (EU) and approach the level of a world space power.2 He
added that by 2030 China will surpass Russia and join the ranks of global space powers, and that
by 2045 China will partially catch up with the United States and establish itself as a comprehensive
space power. China’s space activities based on these long-term goals are broad-ranging. The activi-
ties focus not only on those oriented primarily toward military purposes but also on raising national
prestige, improving the level of science and technology, and stimulating the economy.
Meanwhile, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) plays a core role in China’s space activities,
making space and military activities inseparable. China’s space activities arose out of Mao Zedong’s
policy on developing “two bombs, one satellite [liangdan yixing, 两弹一星].” “Two bombs” refer to
the nuclear bomb (initially the atomic bomb; later the atomic bomb and hydrogen bomb) and missile
[daodan, 导弹]; “one satellite” means an artificial satellite.3 Pursuant to this policy, the Central
Committee of the CCP headed by Mao Zedong established the Fifth Research Academy under the
Ministry of National Defense (MND) in 1956 to oversee the development of launch vehicles and
missiles.4 In China, the establishment of the Academy is understood as the beginning of its space
programs.5 Besides, the missile and “one satellite” are closely related. In 1970, China successfully
launched its first satellite (Dong Fang Hong 1) using the Long March 1 launch vehicle, which was
based on the Dong Feng 4 intermediate range ballistic missile.6 China’s space program achievements
listed in the 2016 Space White Paper include not only those related to satellites, crewed spaceflight,

44
and lunar probe, but also atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, and missiles. As this makes clear, the
country’s space programs and military activities are intricately linked.
Furthermore, China started using satellites for military purposes shortly after it launched
its first satellite. Specifically, it used recoverable satellites [Fanhui Shi Weixing (FSW), 返回式卫
星] to conduct reconnaissance of other countries. At the end of its mission, the capsule on the FSW
satellite is capable of reentering the atmosphere and is recoverable. Although the maiden launch in
1974 ended in failure, the second attempt in the following year succeeded in launching a satellite and
recovering a film capsule.7 With this, China became the third country in the world to successfully
recover a film capsule (the United States and the Soviet Union first succeeded in 1960 and 1962,
respectively). Until around 1990, the payload of FSW satellites was mainly optical sensors, and areas
of the earth of interest to China were photographed from space.8
The Government of China holds peaceful development as one of the principles of space activ-
ities. The 2016 Space White Paper states that China always abides by the principle of the use of
space for peaceful purposes and opposes the weaponization of and an arms race in space. This is not
intended to deny military use of space. Rather, the same white paper goes on to say that an objective
of space activities is to meet the demands of national security. Indeed, the Chinese media makes
occasional references to the military use of space. For example, according to the CCP’s English
language newspaper, China Daily, when President Xi Jinping visited the Xichang Satellite Launch
Center in 2018, he ordered the center to focus on military training and research, enhance satellite
launch and combat capabilities, and integrate itself with the PLA’s joint operation system.9
That said, in many other countries, militaries are also engaged in the entire spectrum of space
activities and space is utilized for military purposes; China is not an exception. China’s development
of its first satellite launch vehicle based on a ballistic missile is the same as its predecessors, notably,
the United States and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it is the international standard interpretation
that peaceful uses of space include non-aggressive military uses. As such, it is not peculiar that
China uses space for military purposes while advocating its peaceful development.

(2) S
 pace in the Context of the National Defense Policy and PLA Unit
Operations
China’s space activities from their inception have been closely linked to military activities as
described above. However, it was only in the 1990s that the military value of space began to be
recognized more widely in the PLA. Though it has not fought a major war since the 1979 Sino-
Vietnamese War, China has made observations of other countries’ wars to assess the characteristics
of modern warfare and has sought to develop military capabilities needed to win such wars. In
particular, large-scale U.S. operations since the 1990s offered considerable lessons for the PLA. In
1993, the Central Military Commission (CMC) gave a new focus to winning “local wars under high-
tech conditions,” and in 2004, the CMC announced its intention to build up military capabilities to

45
 win “local wars under the conditions of informationization.”
In parallel with this shift in military strategy, the military value of space began to gain greater
appreciation. During the 1991 Gulf War, various satellites were utilized to support the operations
of the U.S. forces and other multinational forces, to the extent that the war was dubbed “the first
space war.” This war is considered to have made the PLA aware of the battleground’s expansion to
outer space.10 In addition, through observations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO)
air strikes against Yugoslavia in 1999, the PLA appears to have developed a deeper understanding
of the role space plays in operations.11 In 2002, Jiang Zemin, Chairman of the CMC, expressed the
view that space will become a new strategic high ground in international military competition.12 In
2004, Hu Jintao, who replaced Jiang Zemin as Chairman of the CMC, made clear that the PLA must
safeguard China’s interests in space as part of the PLA’s “new historic missions.”13 Also in 2004, the
Air Force proposed the “integration of air and space capabilities” to the CMC, and it was formally
approved as an Air Force strategy in 2014.14 In addition, the National Defense White Paper 2015
argued: “The world revolution in military affairs (RMA) is proceeding to a new stage. Long-range,
precise, smart, stealthy and unmanned weapons and equipment are becoming increasingly sophisti-
cated. Outer space and cyber space have become new commanding heights in strategic competition
among all parties. The form of war is accelerating its evolution to informationization.” There is a
growing recognition in the PLA that information dominance is key to winning informatized warfare
and that space is an inalienable component of information dominance.15
Furthermore, the National Defense White Paper 2019 (hereinafter referred to as “NDWP
2019”) expressed anew that war is evolving into informatized warfare, and that intelligentized warfare
has begun to take tangible form. Intelligentized warfare is defined as “integrated warfare waged in
land, sea, air, space, electromagnetic, cyber, and cognitive domains using intelligent weaponry and
equipment and their associated operation methods, underpinned by the Internet of Things (IoT) infor-
mation system.”16 Space continues to be considered an essential domain for executing such warfare.
The strategic guiding thought for military struggle over space is outlined in the 2015 edition of
Science of Military Strategy published by the National Defense University, namely, that deterrence is
the primary means while war is an auxiliary and that the contest for space dominance is at the core
of these struggles.17 Like cyber deterrence, the concept of space deterrence [kongjian weishe, 空间
威懾] in China consists not only of dissuading an enemy’s actions but also compelling an enemy to
take certain actions.18 While the concept of space dominance is similar to space control in the United
States, the former is a broader concept that encompasses providing information support from space
as well as maintaining one’s own space use and denying an adversary’s use of space.19
As regards space dominance, the PLA has recently begun to place emphasis not only on
offense but also defense aspects.20 China’s policy of securing interests in space is not confined to
the military. Article 32 of the National Security Law enacted in 2015 enshrines securing China’s
activities, assets, and other interests in outer space as well as international seabed areas and polar

46
regions. NDWP 2019 expresses the view that outer space security provides strategic assurance for
national and social development and articulates an intention to safeguard space assets.
Ensuring mission assurance to maintain the functions necessary for mission execution is a
major challenge for militaries dependent on space use. The PLA recognizes its importance, albeit
little information has been made public on how it will do this. The Satellite Navigation Research and
Development Center at the National University of Defense Technology directly under the CMC has
reportedly succeeded in developing electromagnetic shields for protecting the BeiDou Navigation
Satellite System (BDS) from radio interference.21 Their development was motivated by the existence
of states that research interference of positioning signals, raising fears that, unless the problem of
radio interference is solved, “weaponry that relies on navigation and positioning, such as China’s
fighters and missiles, will be unable to fully fulfill its role, leading to decreased combat capability.”22
Moreover, the enhanced variant of the CH-4, a long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), can
carry laser-guided munitions on top of satellite-guided munitions, which allows for the execution of
strike missions even when jammed.23 In the future, UAVs may partially substitute communications
satellites. CH-T4 developed by CASC is powered by solar energy and can conduct smooth flights
even at altitudes of 20 kilometers or higher above sea level where air is thin. CH-T4 can also allegedly
remain in flight for many hours without refueling.24 It is expected that the UAV will be able to fly for
several months or longer in the future. CASC plans to have such a drone serve as a “quasi-satellite”
and provide communication relays. According to CASC officials, this type of UAV can also be
used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), early warning, and signal intelligence.25
These efforts have the potential to improve the PLA’s mission assurance.
Furthermore, space-based information support (e.g., reconnaissance, positioning, communi-
cations) is anticipated to make PLA operations more efficient and effective. For example, an article
in the Japanese edition of the People’s Daily Online dated February 6, 2013 introduced an MND
research report stating that 1,465 fighters equipped with the Global Positioning System (GPS) have
combat capability equivalent to 1,714 fighters without GPS, and pointed out that the use of BDS
(Chinese version of GPS) will lead to China’s military cost savings. The same article cites an expert
as saying, “As the construction of BDS proceeds and its coverage expands, BDS will likely double
the combat capability and effectiveness of the Chinese military.”
Space-based information support has gained importance as the PLA broadens its area of
operation. Especially the Navy and Air Force have stepped up activities in open seas as well as in
offshore waters. Satellite communications are indispensable for mobile users, such as vessels and
aircraft, to communicate with certainty with command headquarters and friendly troops that are out
of line-of-sight. Satellite positioning is also essential for accurately knowing one’s position in the
large expanse of sea. In particular, under present circumstances, wide-area operation of long-endur-
ance UAVs is inconceivable without satellite communications and satellite positioning. In the case
of the CH-5 that conducted the first flight in 2015, for example, it has an operable range of up to

47
 250 kilometers via line-of-sight data-
link, but it can be extended to 2,000
kilometers if satellite communica-
tions are utilized.26 For the operation
of anti-ship ballistic missiles which
requires searching for vast areas,
it is expected that maritime recon-
naissance by satellites, together with
over-the-horizon radars and other
systems, will provide targeting infor-
mation.27 If space-based information
support is utilized more actively by
the PLA, its operational dependence on space systems will rise, which will increase the necessity of
ensuring mission assurance for maintaining space use.
The PLA’s emphasis on space is reflected conspicuously in China’s military reforms. The
Strategic Support Force (SSF) was established in late 2015 coinciding with the elevation of the
Second Artillery Force to Rocket Force. The SSF is under the direct command of the CMC. Its
purpose is to provide resources that can secure space security alongside cybersecurity.28 The SSF has
the Space Systems Department, which integrates the space-related missions formerly overseen by
the General Armament Department and the General Staff Department.29 These missions are thought
to include space launch and support; space telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C); space informa-
tion support; space attack; and space defense. Analysts note that the Network Systems Department,
which is also under the SSF, has a unit responsible for electronic countermeasures against satellites.30
Thus, the PLA recognizes the role of space in modern warfare and has taken steps to integrate
space capabilities into unit operations. As already noted, however, the PLA has not experienced
a major war in 40 years. The U.S. forces, in contrast, has integrated space capabilities into unit
operations while drawing lessons from actual warfare, such as the Gulf War, the air strikes against
Yugoslavia, the War in Afghanistan, and the Iraq War. It is difficult to say how effectively the PLA
can provide space-based information support for its units on the ground, at sea, and in the air in
actual warfare.

2. S
 ituation of Space Activities and Their Military
Implications

(1) Operations of Space Systems

As discussed above, China has set a goal to become a comprehensive space power by 2045 and

48
is pursuing a wide range of space development and utili- Table 3.1 Number of Satellites
zation. While China has not disclosed its space budget, it Operated by China (by Purpose)

is estimated at around US$5.8 billion (2018) according to Purpose Number

Euroconsult.31 This is the second largest after the United Earth observation 177
States’ approximately US$40.9 billion and is larger than
Communications 49
Russia’s (approximately US$4.1 billion).
PNT 49
Against this backdrop, the number of China-
operated satellites has grown steadily. According to the Earth science 2

UCS Satellite Database, China is estimated to operate Space science 15

363 satellites as of the end of March 2020. Of the 2,666
32
Technology
71
development
satellites operating worldwide as of the same date, China
Note: “Earth observation” includes “earth
has the second largest number of operating satellites after
observation/technology devel-
the United States’ 1,327. China already operates more opment” and “earth observation/
satellites than Russia (169 satellites). As shown in Table communications” dual-purpose

3.1, China operates an array of satellite types such as those satellites. “Earth observation,”
“earth science,” and “technology
used for earth observation (including weather observation);
development” include satellites
communications; and positioning, navigation, and timing jointly operated with Bra zil,
(PNT). Of these satellites, MND or the PLA is believed to France, Germany, or Italy.

possess or operate the following satellites: 65 earth obser- Source: Compiled by the author, based on
Union of Concerned Scientists,
vation satellites (Gaofen, Ludikancha Weixing, Yaogan); 3
“UCS Satellite Database,” last
communications satellites (Zhongxing); and 49 PNT satel- modified April 1, 2020, https://
lites (BeiDou for BDS). 33 w w w.ucsusa.org/resources/
satellite-database.
As noted earlier, it appears China operated photo
reconnaissance satellites from the mid-1970s, but their
performance was said to be nowhere near that of the United
States and the Soviet Union.34 Then came the 21st century, which saw dramatic advances in China’s
operation of earth observation satellites.
Gaofen is the space segment of the China High-resolution Earth Observation System
(CHEOS) and is thought to be dual use.35 Started in 2010, the CHEOS project aims to build a system
capable of all-weather, 24-hour global earth observations using a combination of satellites, strato-
sphere airships, and aircraft by around 2020.36 Launches of the Gaofen series commenced in 2013.
For example, Gaofen-2 launched in 2014 is an optical satellite with a resolution of under 1 meter.
Gaofen-3 launched in 2016 is a synthetic aperture radar satellite with a resolution of 1 meter. Gaofen-4
launched in 2015 is China’s first optical earth observation satellite placed in the geostationary orbit
(GEO) and has a resolution of 50 meters.37 Earth observation satellites in GEO are globally rare.
Ludikancha Weixing is a series of earth observation satellites launched from 2017.38 They appear to
be reconnaissance satellites with electro-optical sensors. The Yaogan satellites have been launched

49
 since 2006.39 They are believed to be reconnaissance satel-
lites and are considered to consist of optical, radar, and
signal intelligence satellites.40 U.S. defense authorities
speculate that Yaogan satellites replicate the U.S. maritime
reconnaissance satellites and are used to keep abreast of
vessel deployments in the Western Pacific.41
Two types of the Zhongxing satellite are used for
military communications.42 One is a satellite series known as
Fenhuo. Fenhuo-1 launched in 2000 provided SHF (C-band)
and UHF communications and is said to be a satellite for the
Qudian, China’s first integrated command, control, commu-
nications, computers and intelligence (C4I) system.43 The
other is a satellite series called Shentong, which began to be
sent into space in 2003, and is said to provide communica-
tions in SHF (Ku-band) to users on the ground.44
Started in 1994, the BDS project has proceeded based
on a three-step development strategy.45 In the first step (BDS-1), two satellites were launched in
2000, and the system began providing pilot services in China. A third satellite was launched in 2003.
In the second step (BDS-2), the launches of 14 satellites were completed in 2012, and the system
began providing services in the Asia-Pacific. In the third step (BDS-3), the system began providing
services worldwide by the end of 2018.46 The BDS-3 consists of 30 satellites, and the launches of all
satellites were completed in 2020.47
It has been announced that BDS has both civil and military signals.48 The PLA likely seeks
to shift from GPS to BDS to use with the satellite positioning system.49 While GPS is a U.S. mili-
tary-operated system, anyone can utilize its civil signals and they are used globally. To prevent an
adversary’s use of GPS, the United States announced that it will jam civil signals in the relevant
region in an emergency.50 For this reason, the PLA needs PNT services which can replace GPS and
ensure stable access even in an emergency. PLA units have already begun using BDS for, for example,
ammunition guidance, vessel and aircraft navigation, and location determination by soldiers.
A BDS feature not available on GPS is a function that notifies users’ location to other users.
This function is reputed for enabling a commander to have real-time information on the movements
of his/her troops and for significantly increasing the combat capabilities of individual soldiers.51
The function was utilized to maintain control over the numerous participants in the military parade,
which celebrated the 70th anniversary of China’s victory in the war against Japan.52 Another feature
of BDS not available on GPS is text messaging. Since short text messages can be sent from BDS
terminals, PLA units are said to be utilizing this function as a complementary way of communica-
tions during exercises.53

50
 In addition, observers repeatedly point to the PLA’s ongoing development of early warning
satellites.54 China is developing a missile defense system, and early warning satellites that can detect
ballistic missile launches quicker than radars on mainland China will play a critical role in estab-
lishing an interception posture. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, China’s nuclear forces
may aspire to secure a launch on warning posture (where China can immediately launch a ballistic
missile upon receiving warning of an adversary’s ballistic missile launch), and if so, early warning
satellites may support this posture in the future.55
It is unclear which satellites China actually uses for military purposes and to what extent.
Military use cannot be determined solely from whether or not a satellite was developed for military
purposes. “Military use” applies not only to satellites that have been developed and launched at the
military’s request but also to other satellites if they are used by the military. Military use of services
provided by satellites possessed and operated by non-military actors (civil satellites and commer-
cial satellites) has become common internationally. As discussed later, China places importance on
military-civil fusion in the space domain. In this light, it needs to be kept in mind that an overall
improvement in space activities could strengthen China’s military capabilities in the space domain.
In 2017, for instance, China announced that for the first time in the world it achieved intercon-
tinental quantum key distribution using the Quantum Science Satellite Mozi, and that through this
satellite China transmitted encrypted data and conducted a video communication.56 China plans to
start operating satellite-based, global quantum-encrypted communications by 2030.57 The PLA’s use of
such capability will make its communications far more secure. It has also been found that, entering the
2010s, China has conducted rendezvous and proximity oper-
ation (RPO) tests repeatedly.58 RPO constitutes the technical
foundation of space-based anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.
Moreover, if satellites can be repaired with RPO capability in
the future, this will translate into increased mission assurance.
In examining the situation of China’s space activi-
ties and their military implications, one needs to consider
capabilities pertaining to space access and space situational
awareness (SSA). China has a range of satellite launch
vehicles and has maintained a high launch frequency. The
flagship Long March series have evolved from the first
generation (e.g., Long March 1, 2) to the second generation
(e.g., Long March 2C, 2D, 2E, 3), the third generation (e.g.,
Long March 2F, 3A, 4), and the fourth generation (e.g., Long
March 5, 6, 7, 11).59 These launch vehicles can be classified
into small (e.g., Long March 6, 11), medium (e.g., Long
March 2, 3A, 4, 7), and large (e.g., Long March 5).60

51
 The Long March 5, first launched in 2016, is a heavy-lift launch vehicle used for the construc-
tion of a Chinese space station. It is China’s largest launch vehicle and has a launch capacity nearly
equivalent to that of the United States’ Delta IV Heavy. Launches of the Long March 5 were
suspended following the failed launch in 2017 but resumed in late 2019.61 By around 2028, China
aims to begin launching the Long March 9 comparable to the Saturn V, which the United States used
for the crewed Apollo lunar probe program.62 The Long March 9 launch vehicle is being considered
for use in crewed exploration of the moon and beyond.
The Long March 11 is the only solid propellant rocket of the Long March series, which are
predominantly liquid-propellant rockets.63 The Long March 11 is designed for rapid satellite launch
in an emergency and can be carried on a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). The Long March 11
reportedly can complete preparation within 24 hours of receiving a launch order and can be launched
daily. In 2015, it was launched successfully for the first time carrying four small satellites.
Other launch vehicles capable of sending small satellites into space at low cost and in a short
time include the Kuaizhou series, which are also solid propellant rockets.64 The 2016 Space White
Paper assesses that successful launches of the Kuaizhou 1 and the Kuaizhou 2 (a satellite carried on
the Kuaizhou 1) have improved China’s emergency response capabilities in space. Kuaizhou 1 can
also lift off from a TEL. Factories capable of producing 20 Kuaizhou launch vehicles a year (the
Kuaizhou 1A and the new Kuaizhou 11) are slated to start operations by the end of 2020.65
Using a variety of launch vehicles, China conducted more launches than any other country
in the world in 2018 for the first time (39 launches, including one failure) and again in 2019 (34
launches, including two failures).66 China’s goal of approaching the level of global space powers by
operating more than 200 spacecraft and carrying out around 30 launches annually, as indicated by
CASC Chairman Lei Fanpei in 2017, was achieved earlier than the 2020 target year.
China has four rocket launch sites. Three (Jiuquan, Taiyuan, Xichang) are located inland, and
the remaining site (Wenchang) is on the coast. Wenchang is a new launch site capable of launching
Long March 5 and has conducted launches since 2016.
China has sought to diversify its launch methods. In 2019, it successfully launched satellites
from a sea-based platform using the Long March 11.67 A sea-based platform has the advantage of
offering flexibility to choose the launch position.68 In addition, studies of the reusable space trans-
portation system between the earth and low-earth orbit are under way. China Aerospace Science
and Industry Corporation (CASIC), a state-owned space enterprise comparable to CASC, is imple-
menting the Tengyun Project and aims to conduct the first flight of a space plane by 2030.69
China thus has a number of methods at its disposal to carry out frequent satellite launches.
Therefore, by global standards, the country has one of the highest abilities to launch additional
satellites in response to changes in the situation. If a satellite breaks down for any reason, China
will likely be able to launch an alternative satellite to reconstitute the satellite constellation relatively
quickly.

52
 The foundation of the space activities elaborated above is SSA. Without SSA capability, it
is not possible for satellite operators to determine where their satellites are flying, whether they
will not collide with other satellites or space debris, and at what timing a rocket can be launched to
avoid collision with satellites and space debris. For this reason, China has been putting efforts into
enhancing SSA. The China National Space Administration, which oversees civil use of space and
international cooperation, established the Space Debris Observation and Data Application Center in
2015.70 The Center’s responsibility includes developing systems that observe space debris and near-
earth objects, performing the actual tracking and observations, addressing emergency situations,
and engaging in international cooperation. According to the 2016 Space White Paper, China has
improved the monitoring of and early warning against space debris, and such activities have been
put into regular operation to ensure the safe operation of spacecraft. The white paper notes that in
the next five years, China will continue to develop the space debris basic database and advance
the development of space debris monitoring facilities, the early warning and emergency response
platform, and the online service system.
NDWP 2019 also sets out the government’s plans to strengthen SSA. SSA serves as the foun-
dation for not only the safe operation of satellites but also achievement of space dominance. SSA
provides information needed for China to conduct targeting when interfering with the space use of
an adversary and is essential for detecting interference with China’s own space use.

(2) Development of Counterspace Capabilities

China not only operates space systems to provide information support for operations on land, sea,
and air, but is also developing capabilities to disrupt other countries’ use of space. The counterspace
capabilities being developed by China can be broadly divided according to target of attack: ASAT
weapons, which attack satellites in orbit; and electronic countermeasure systems, which attack links
connecting satellites and earth stations (control facilities and user terminals).
While it is said that China’s development of dedicated weapons for ASAT can be traced back
to 1970, test launches gathered pace only from the mid-2000s.71 In 2007, China destroyed an old
Chinese weather satellite in low Earth orbit (LEO) using an ASAT weapon. This test is thought to
have used basically a derivative of the DF-21C medium-range ballistic missile (known as SC-19
among the U.S. intelligence community).72 This type is called a direct-ascent ASAT, which is
launched from a platform such as a TEL and reaches the target satellite on a ballistic trajectory. As
a result of this successful test, China became the third nation after the Soviet Union and the United
States to demonstrate destructive anti-satellite capability in orbit.
Although China admitted to performing an ASAT test only once in 2007,73 it has since then
repeatedly carried out SC-19 test launches not involving satellite destruction. It is believed that China
has already completed operational deployment of ASAT weapons targeting LEO satellites (likely
SC-19) and that it is conducting training.74 Analysts note that the SSF is responsible for training units

53
 that operate these weapons.75 Furthermore, it is deemed that in 2013, China carried out a test launch
of a new direct-ascent ASAT missile (called DN-2 in media reports).76 According to the analysis of
U.S. defense authorities, its range may cover GEO.77 China also reportedly conducted test launches
of its third direct-ascent ASAT missile (called DN-3 in media reports) in the latter half of the 2010s,78
but some observers note that these missiles may be a mid-course missile defense system.79
In addition to direct-ascent ASATs, a report published by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) in 2019 assesses that China is developing capabilities to inspect and repair satellites in orbit,
some of which are capable of functioning as weapons.80 The report does not go so far as to explain
how China may utilize these capabilities as weapons. In general terms, however, DIA states that the
following methods could be utilized for satellite-to-satellite attacks: kinetic kill vehicles; radiofre-
quency jammers; lasers; chemical sprayers; high-power microwaves; and robotic mechanisms.81
China could deploy a laser weapon targeting sensors on LEO satellites by 2020.82 Also, DIA
notes that, from the mid-to-late 2020s, China may deploy higher power laser weapons that can attack
non-optical satellites.83
As regards electronic countermeasure systems, China is thought to have jamming capabilities
against GPS and satellite communications.84 The PLA’s electronic warfare units carry out routine
training to conduct jamming against GPS signals alongside communications and radar systems.85
On Mischief Reef of the Spratly Islands, China has reportedly deployed mobile jammers targeted
at GPS and other global navigation satellite systems.86 The U.S. forces has revealed that it monitors
jamming against communications satellites while its aircraft carriers sail through the South China
Sea.87 DIA analyzes that China continues to develop jamming capabilities against satellite-borne
synthetic aperture radars.88
Additionally, China may have cyber attack capabilities against space systems. In 2007 and
2008, U.S. civil use earth observation satellites were reportedly under Chinese cyber attacks via
ground stations.89 Furthermore, the PLA is considering attacks against satellite TT&C facilities and
launch sites.90 Such attacks do not require dedicated weapons and can be carried out with ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles, or special forces, for example.
The focus of attention should be on when and how the PLA will utilize its multiple counter-
space capabilities. One cannot discount the possibility that preemptive attacks in the space domain
lie within the purview of the PLA, given that its military strategy emphasizes the preemptive attack
element as part of “active defense.” In that case, the question of which means of interference the PLA
will actually utilize also deserves attention. Will the means be limited to electronic countermeasure
systems against the links? If the PLA were to attack satellites, will it be limited to reversible means,
such as lasers for dazzling sensors on satellites? Or will the PLA employ non-reversible means like
destructive ASATs for preemptive attacks?
In particular, how does the PLA perceive the risk of secondary damage to its satellites caused
by space debris produced by the destruction of satellites? In the case of an armed conflict between

54
China and the United States, will the PLA actually destroy satellites, judging that the United States
loses more than China from the destruction of satellites and its secondary damages? China’s reliance
on space is expected to keep increasing. In this context, the questions of when and how destructive
ASAT weapons should be used will become even more critical issues for the PLA.

(3) Military-Civil Fusion in Space Activities

China regards the development and use of space as a key area of the military-civil fusion strategy.
President Xi Jinping has urged the SSF to focus on integration of military and civilian development.91
Advancement of military-civil fusion in space activities may lead to strengthening China’s use of
space for military purposes.
In China, emerging space enterprises have rapidly boosted their technological capabilities
with government and military support. State-owned enterprises have traditionally developed and
manufactured Chinese satellites and launch vehicles. Specifically, they are the two enterprises under
the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND):
CASC and CASIC. These two trace their origin to the Fifth Research Academy of MND.92
To this day CASC and CASIC remain leading players in the Chinese space industry. However,
there have been noteworthy changes in the last five years. In 2014, the Government of China decided
to open the space sector to private capitals. At a State Council executive meeting in the same year,
Premier Li Keqiang officially encouraged private capital investment in the space industry.93 This
gave impetus to the establishment of numerous emerging space enterprises in China.
Emerging space enterprises that have set themselves apart from traditional space enterprises
have been established globally since the 2000s, led by the United States, and have increased their
presence especially since the 2010s. These enterprises have come to be called “New Space” as
opposed to “Old Space” (e.g., Boeing, Lockheed Martin).94 Representative examples include SpaceX
founded by Elon Musk and Blue Origin established by Jeff Bezos in the early 2000s. In particular,
SpaceX has had significant influence on space business trends, not only driving down prices of satel-
lite launch services but also planning the provision of an internet service enabled by a constellation
of thousands to tens of thousands of satellites.
Emerging space enterprises in China can be dubbed the Chinese version of New Space. As
of the end of 2018, 141 aerospace enterprises have been registered in China, consisting of 36 satel-
lite manufacturing enterprises; 22 launch vehicle manufacturing enterprises; 39 satellite operation
enterprises; and 44 satellite applications enterprises.95
For example, Beijing Commsat Technology Development established in 2015 aims to launch
72 IoT satellites into LEO by 2022.96 Galaxy Space founded in the following year, 2016, has a scheme
to provide high-speed global communications by launching up to 1,000 5G satellites into LEO.97
Galaxy Space launched a technology verification satellite in January 2020.98 Beijing Interstellar
Glory Space Technology (iSpace), also founded in 2016, became the first Chinese private rocket

55
 company to successfully launch satellites with an independently developed rocket in July 2019.99
The solid propellant rocket Hyperbola-1 developed by iSpace was launched from Jiuquan Satellite
Launch Center administered by the SSF.100
Private companies are rapidly improving their technological capabilities against the back-
drop of the military-civil fusion strategy pursued by the Chinese government. Technologies are
being transferred to these companies to promote innovation in dual-use technology.101 Following
its successful launch, iSpace expressed its appreciation to CASC, CASIC, SASTIND, and the CMC
Equipment Development Department for their support.102 At the top of its “About Us” webpage,
One Space Technology (One Space) founded in 2015 states that President Xi Jinping elevated mili-
tary-civil fusion to national strategic level in 2015.103 In an interview with the foreign media, One
Space noted that China already has mature space technologies and that the job of private companies
is to apply the military’s aerospace technologies to private-sector launch vehicles.104
In June 2019, SASTIND and the CMC Equipment Development Department jointly created
and released rules on manufacturing, test flights, and launches of commercial rockets.105 The rules
explain the significance of commercial rocket development in the context of increasing China’s
space power and international competitiveness, coupled with potentially lowering the development
costs of the space sector.106 The specific rules include the need for commercial rocket companies
to obtain SASTIND’s prior permission for research and manufacturing and to give prior notice to
relevant departments when actually beginning research and manufacturing.107 The published rules
also contain a provision encouraging companies to make maximum use of national resources for
technology research, manufacturing equipment and facilities, and launch sites.108
In December 2019, the China Commercial Space Alliance was launched by entities including
the China Space Foundation, China Volant Industry (CASIC subsidiary), China Great Wall Industry
Corporation (CASC subsidiary), and Chinese Academy of Sciences Holdings.109 The Alliance plans
to support member organizations through such activities as providing information under the guid-
ance of the China National Space Administration.
The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has forced delays in China’s private-sector
space activities in the first half of 2020 and has slowed fundraising.110 However, as the National
Development and Reform Commission added satellite internet to the list of “new infrastructure
development” in April 2020, investments in this sector have begun to gather pace.111
At present, China’s private space firms are in their early stages, and it appears premature for
the military to use technologies or services that the companies developed. Nonetheless, the Chinese
version of New Space has grown at an extraordinary pace, supported by the government and the
military under the military-civil fusion strategy. The future is expected to herald an era in which the
military adopts the technologies developed by the private sector and uses its services.

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3. International Relations over the Space Domain

(1) Relations with the United States

China sees the United States as the world’s No. 1 space power and as the ultimate goal of Chinese
space programs. As was already discussed, observations of U.S. combat operations in the 1990s and
thereafter made the PLA realize that space plays a key role in modern warfare. Analysts suggest
that the U.S. Strategic Command served as the model for creating the SSF that integrated space and
cyber forces into a single organization.112 Meanwhile, China is wary of U.S. military activities in the
space domain. NDWP 2019 indicates China’s recognition that the United States has improved its
capabilities in the space domain and is undermining global strategic stability.
Likewise, the United States has become strongly cautious about China’s stepped-up activities
in space. In particular, U.S. military space activities since the 2000s cannot be discussed without
mentioning China. China’s destructive ASAT test in 2007 was a major wakeup call to the entire
U.S. forces.113 China’s test firing of a new ASAT weapon in 2013 gave the United States impetus to
conducting the Space Strategic Portfolio Review, and since then, has been preparing itself for a war
in space.114
The Donald Trump administration inaugurated in 2017 labeled China as a strategic compet-
itor and maintains vigilance of the space domain. In a 2018 address, Vice President Mike Pence,
alongside mentioning Russia’s activities, remarked that China was developing ASAT weapons and
that in 2015, China created a separate military organization to oversee and prioritize its warfighting
capabilities in space (likely in reference to the SSF).115 Vice President Pence went on to express the
view that U.S. adversaries have already transformed space into a warfighting domain. Based on this
recognition, in late February 2019, the Trump administration submitted a bill to Congress to create
the Space Force. The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2020, which contains provi-
sions on creating the Space Force, was
passed in late 2019, establishing the
Space Force as the sixth branch of the
armed services following the Army,
Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and
Coast Guard.
In his regular press conference
on February 28, 2020, a spokesperson
for the Chinese MND criticized that
it was the United States which has
been weaponizing space, and that as
The Space Force flag unveiled at the White House (May 15, 2020)
was well known, the United States, in (Photo by: Shealah Craighead, White House)

57
 pursuit of space hegemony, has created the Space Force, spent significant funds on enhancing space
combat readiness, and unilaterally initiated an arms race in space.116 He went on to state that the U.S.
accusation against China was an excuse for the United States to strengthen its military capabilities.
In addition, the PLA Daily dated April 9, 2020 sounded alert over the U.S. Space Force’s deployment
of Counter Communications System Block 10.2, and expressed concern that other countries may
follow the United States in acquiring or preemptively utilizing similar weapons.
Moreover, the moon and surrounding area are beginning to become a new area of competition
between the United States and China. China launched the Chang’e 4 lunar probe in 2018 and became
the first country in the world to successfully soft-land it on the moon’s far side in 2019. To secure
communications with Chang’e 4, the Queqiao relay satellite was placed in orbit around Lagrange
point (EML2).117 With Chinese activities in cislunar space (outer space between the earth and the
moon) starting to become normal, U.S. defense authorities have raised concerns that U.S. satellites
in GEO may suffer surprise attacks from the moon side.118 U.S. defense authorities therefore have
begun examining capabilities to collect information on activities in cislunar space.119
While the United States and China are increasingly wary of each other, there remains room
for expanding cooperation between the two countries. Currently, the U.S. military notifies China if
an artificial object is found approaching a Chinese satellite.120 This is because if a Chinese satellite is
destroyed due to collision with an artificial object and causes space debris, there is risk of secondary
damage to satellites used by the United States. As was noted, China already operates the second
highest number of satellites in the world. Furthermore, the growth of the Chinese version of New
Space is expected to further increase the number of China-operated satellites. China’s safe operation
of satellites is thus a vital issue for the United States. The two countries have a shared interest in
securing stable use of space. From this perspective, future U.S.-China discussions on matters such
as international rule-making, SSA sharing, and space traffic management are worthy of attention.

(2) Relations with Other Countries

The United States is not the only country wary of China’s increasing military space activities. India
conducted its first destructive ASAT test in 2019. The Ministry of External Affairs of India expresses
the view that the capability achieved through the test will serve as deterrence against threats to
India’s space assets.121 Although the ministry states that the test was not directed at any specific
country, it is believed that the test was carried out with China in mind.122
On the surface, China’s reaction to the test was restrained. Asked about the test at a regular
press conference, an MND spokesperson merely stated that China takes notice of related reports and
hopes all countries can take real actions to protect lasting peace and stability in space.123 However,
with counterspace capabilities becoming more widespread around the world, the PLA will have to
put further efforts into not only offense but also defense aspects of space dominance.
While there are countries that seek to counter China, a number of nations are also eager to

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work with China in space activities and China is enthusiastic about pursuing such cooperation. Its
most important partner is Russia. In 2008, China and Russia proposed the Treaty on the Prevention
of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects
(PPWT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). In 2014, the two countries jointly submitted a new
PPWT draft to CD. Behind the China-Russia PPWT proposal is likely an intention to keep the United
States from deploying missile interception systems into space.124 Furthermore, China is advancing
cooperation with Russia on satellite positioning, as the latter operates the Glonass satellite posi-
tioning system. The political leaders of the two countries have prioritized such cooperation since
2012, and in 2015, China and Russia concluded an agreement on securing BDS-Glonass compatibility
(meaning each other’s signals will not cause interference) and interoperability (meaning each other’s
signals can be used on their respective terminals).125 An article in Global Times (dated September 3,
2019), an English-language newspaper published by the People’s Daily, suggested that synergistic
effects between BDS and Glonass will offset GPS dominance in satellite positioning. In addition, in
2019, President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was providing assistance for China’s creation
of a missile warning system.126 Although the details of the cooperation have not been made public,
the question of whether it will be related to China’s development and future operation of early-
warning satellites deserves attention.127
China also actively works with other countries through the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation
Organization (APSCO). APSCO is an intergovernmental organization founded in 2008 under China’s
leadership and is headquartered in Beijing. Its eight member states are China, Bangladesh, Iran,
Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey. Egypt, Indonesia, and Mexico are associate member,
signatory state, and observer state, respectively. In particular, SSA cooperation may have security
implications among APSCO’s wide-ranging areas of cooperation. In 2011, APSCO initiated a
project known as the Asia-Pacific Ground-Based Space Object Observation System (APOSOS).128
Its main objective is to create a network observing objects in orbit (initially in LEO) using optical
telescopes of member states and provide collision avoidance and early warning services that are
necessary for member states to operate space assets. As shown in Figure 3.1, in 2015, telescopes
were installed in Pakistan and Peru, and the APOSOS Data Centre was established in Beijing. In
2016, a telescope was installed in Iran as well. APSCO plans to install larger-diameter telescopes in
all member states, enable observation of objects as small as 10 centimeters in LEO, and allow for the
tracking of objects in medium Earth orbit and GEO and near-earth objects. As already stated, SSA
is the foundation of all kinds of space activities, and data collected by APOSOS could be utilized as
a basis of PLA space operations.
Moreover, China has established TT&C facilities across the globe and has already begun
operating facilities in Pakistan, Namibia, Kenya, Australia, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Sweden.129
The facility in Kiruna, Sweden is a data reception station for earth observation satellites that China
installed overseas for the first time in 2016.130 With this facility now being operational, it is said that

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 Figure 3.1 APOSOS’ Observation Network

Mongolia
Turkey
China
Iran
Pakistan

Bangladesh Thailand

Peru

Country housing the Data Centre

Countries installed with a telescope
Other APSCO member states

Source: C
 ompiled by the author, based on Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, “Ground-Based Space
Object Observation Network,” accessed July 21, 2020, http://www.apsco.int/html/comp1/content/
APOSOS/2019-03-01/59-261-1.shtml.

China can acquire satellite images of any place on earth within two hours.131
China has a long-term vision to build “a community of common destiny in outer space” and
is asking countries for their cooperation.132 Additionally, China is undertaking a project to construct
a Space Information Corridor that will provide satellite-based communications, earth observation,
and positioning services to the One Belt, One Road members.133 As China moves along the path
toward becoming a comprehensive space power, attention must be paid to whether the country will
develop into a new hub for space cooperation and what implications it will have for national security
in the world.

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