This case involves a dispute over visitation rights between Viesca and Gilinsky regarding their son Louis Maxwell. Viesca and Gilinsky were in a relationship and Gilinsky executed an affidavit acknowledging paternity of Louis Maxwell. After their relationship ended, Gilinsky filed a petition for visitation rights. The parties later entered into a compromise agreement regarding visitation rights that was approved by the court. However, disputes continued to arise regarding compliance with the agreement. The court ruled that it could not amend the terms of the compromise agreement without the parties' consent, as that would violate the principle that a contract is law between the parties.
This case involves a dispute over visitation rights between Viesca and Gilinsky regarding their son Louis Maxwell. Viesca and Gilinsky were in a relationship and Gilinsky executed an affidavit acknowledging paternity of Louis Maxwell. After their relationship ended, Gilinsky filed a petition for visitation rights. The parties later entered into a compromise agreement regarding visitation rights that was approved by the court. However, disputes continued to arise regarding compliance with the agreement. The court ruled that it could not amend the terms of the compromise agreement without the parties' consent, as that would violate the principle that a contract is law between the parties.
This case involves a dispute over visitation rights between Viesca and Gilinsky regarding their son Louis Maxwell. Viesca and Gilinsky were in a relationship and Gilinsky executed an affidavit acknowledging paternity of Louis Maxwell. After their relationship ended, Gilinsky filed a petition for visitation rights. The parties later entered into a compromise agreement regarding visitation rights that was approved by the court. However, disputes continued to arise regarding compliance with the agreement. The court ruled that it could not amend the terms of the compromise agreement without the parties' consent, as that would violate the principle that a contract is law between the parties.
This case involves a dispute over visitation rights between Viesca and Gilinsky regarding their son Louis Maxwell. Viesca and Gilinsky were in a relationship and Gilinsky executed an affidavit acknowledging paternity of Louis Maxwell. After their relationship ended, Gilinsky filed a petition for visitation rights. The parties later entered into a compromise agreement regarding visitation rights that was approved by the court. However, disputes continued to arise regarding compliance with the agreement. The court ruled that it could not amend the terms of the compromise agreement without the parties' consent, as that would violate the principle that a contract is law between the parties.
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Viesca vs Gilinsky
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent, a Canadian citizen, met at the Makati Shangri-La Hotel where the former worked as a hotel manager. After a few months, a relationship blossomed between the two. On 22 October 2001, their son Louis Maxwell was born. Respondent executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity3 of the child. Subsequently, the Civil Registrar of Makati City issued a Certification granting the change of Louis Maxwell’s surname from “Viesca” to “Gilinsky. Unfortunately, the relationship between petitioner and respondent soured and they parted ways during the early part of 2003.
Respondent filed a Petition praying that he be entitled to the company of Louis Maxwell at any time of any given day; he be entitled to enjoy the company of Louis Maxwell during weekends and on such occasions the child shall be allowed to spend the night with his father; and he be entitled to enjoy a yearly three-week vacation in any destination with his child.
During the pendency of respondent’s petition, the parties arrived at a compromise agreement. Respondent filed an “Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution.” It was alleged in said motion that petitioner had repeatedly refused to abide by the terms of the compromise judgment, particularly the provision allowing Louis Maxwell to spend a night with him at any day of the week.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution insisting that said writ was issued with “indecent haste” violative of her right to due process, and that the writ varied the terms of the Compromise Agreement since it failed to take into consideration the parties’ understanding that in the enjoyment of respondent’s visitorial rights, petitioner “shall have the right to designate any person of suitable age to accompany the child.”
The court ruled to deny the motion to quash the writ of execution filed by [herein petitioner] thru counsel for lack of merit and grant the prayer of the respondent that he be allowed to exercise his visitorial rights over the minor LUIS MAXWELL VIESCA today under the conditions imposed by the petitioner, some of which are contained in the compromise agreement.
petitioner filed an “Ex-Parte Reiterative Motion to Inhibit” claiming that Judge Mariano could no longer handle the case “with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge”23 because of her statement pertaining to petitioner’s failure to abide by the Compromise Judgment. Respondent filed his opposition thereto. Respondent once more filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution, Judge Mariano issued an Order, directing the parties to attend an in-chamber conference on 20 May 2005 relative to respondent’s Motion to Withdraw Support and petitioner’s Ex-Parte Reiterative Motion to Inhibit. Respondent requested that his Very Urgent Motion to Enforce and Enjoy Visitorial Rights be heard notwithstanding the three-day notice rule required under the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as he was about to go on a two-week business trip. The RTC granted the urgent motion. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in amending or altering the terms of the Compromise judgment without the concurrence of both parties.
RULING: YES.
it is settled that neither the courts nor quasi-judicial bodies can impose upon the parties a judgment different from their compromise agreement or against the very terms and conditions of their agreement51 without contravening the universally established principle that a contract is the law between the parties.52 The courts can only approve the agreement of parties. They can not make a contract for them.53
A compromise agreement that has been made and duly approved by the court attains the effect and authority of res judicata, although no execution may be issued unless the agreement receives the approval of the court where the litigation is pending and compliance with the terms of the agreement is decreed.47
In this case, the compromise agreement entered into between the parties fell way short of its objective of finally putting an end to their dispute. The sheer number of incidents which cropped up shortly after the trial court’s approval of the compromise agreement reveals that the compromise judgment failed to bring peace to the parties. Interestingly enough, the only points of disagreement are Clause II(b) of the Compromise Judgment which pertains to the overnight visits of Louis Maxwell with respondent and the last paragraph of the same clause regarding the appointment of the child’s accompanying guardian.
