Case Digest 1
Case Digest 1
Case Digest 1
Quisumbing Digest
Manila Electric v. Quisumbing
G.R. No. 127598 February 22, 2000
Facts:
Members of the Private respondent union were dissatisfied with the terms of a CBA with
petitioner. The parties in this case were ordered by the Sec. of Labor to execute a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) wherein. The CBA allowed for the increase in the wages of the
employees concerned. The petitioner argues that if such increase were allowed, it would pass off
such to the consumers.
Issue: W/N matters of salary are part of management prerogative
RULING: Yes. There is no need to consult the Secretary of Labor in cases involving contracting
out for 6 months or more as it is part of management prerogative. However, a line must be drawn
with respect to management prerogatives on business operations per se and those which affect
the rights of the workers. Employers must see to it that that employees are properly informed of
its decisions to attain harmonious labor relations and enlighten the worker as to their rights.
The contracting out business or services is an exercise of business judgment if it is for the
promotion of efficiency and attainment of economy. Management must be motivated by good
faith and contracting out should not be done to circumvent the law. Provided there was no malice
or that it was not done arbitrarily, the courts will not interfere with the exercise of this judgment.
FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was
dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the
ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of
PAL.
In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended vacation
until November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all the excess weight. But
the problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February
1989.
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained
overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain
grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was
directed to report every two weeks for weight checks, which he failed to comply with.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight
check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates, which
he did not report to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for
violation of company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being
discriminated as those similarly situated were not treated the same.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his
ideal weight, “and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him “which spanned a period
covering a total of almost five (5) years,” his services were considered terminated “effective
immediately.”
LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature
of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of
dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance of his duties.
NLRC affirmed.
CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because
he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that the issue of
discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal
for being overweight.
ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.
HELD: YES
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they
constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. The dismissal of the
employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that obesity is a
disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible
for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed,
during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that “[t]he issue
is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it
now.”
Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company
physician, per the advice of PAL.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight
attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his
dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As
the CA correctly puts it, “[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable
to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element
runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action
or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary
although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).”
NOTES:
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense.
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or
national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual
qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because
it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid “provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably
necessary for satisfactory job performance.”
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its
passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly
the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be
viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees.
The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight
safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice
or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it
reflective of his moral character.
Eddie Manuel, Romeo Bana, Rogelio Pagtama, Jr. and Joel Rea vs. N.C. Construction
Supply, Johnny Lim, Anita Sy and National Labor Relations Commission (Second
Division)
G.R. No. 127553, November 28, 1997
FACTS: Petitioners were employed as drivers at. N.C. Construction Supply owned by private
respondents. Another company driver and his helper was found stealing company property
consisting of electrical wire, welding rod, G.I. sheet, steel bar and plywood. The helper identified
petitioners as among the perpetrators of the theft.
The petitioners received separate notices informing them that they were positively identified by
their co-worker and were thus invited to Pasig Police Station for investigation. Petitioners
admitted their guilt and offered to resign in exchange for the withdrawal of any criminal charge
against them. The resignation was accepted by the counsel of the respondents.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed because they were not informed of the
charge against them nor were they given an opportunity to dispute the same.
2. Whether or not the employer observed due process in terminating the employment of the
petitioners.
3. Whether or not the petitioner’s admission is inadmissible as evidence against them as they
were not assisted by counsel during the conduct of investigation at the police station.
RULING:
1. Petitioners were dismissed for a just cause. They were found guilty of stealing company
property and it was proved during an investigation conducted by respondents’ lawyer. An
employer is authorized to terminate the services of an employee for loss of trust and confidence,
provided that the loss of confidence arises from particular proven facts. The law does not require
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee’s misconduct. Substantial evidence is sufficient.
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
2. Employers failed to observe due process in terminating the employment of petitioners. Due
process requires that the employer should furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be
terminated a written notice containing a statement of the cause(s) for termination and afford him
ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of a representative if he
so desires. Specifically, the employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before
termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and (2) the subsequent notice
which informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him.
3. The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a
criminal case under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of
interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of
such investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (3) Section 12 of the Bill of
Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation. In this case, petitioners were not under custodial investigation as
they were not yet accused by the police of committing a crime. The investigation was merely an
administrative investigation conducted by the employer, not a criminal investigation. The
questions were propounded by the employer’s lawyer, not by police officers. The fact that the
investigation was conducted at the police station did not necessarily put petitioners under
custodial investigation as the venue of the investigation was merely incidental. Hence, the
admissions made by petitioners during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify their
dismissal.
NOTES:
An employer has a right to terminate the services of an employee subject to both substantive and
procedural limitations. This means that (1) the dismissal must be for a just or authorized cause
provided in the Labor Code, and (2) the employee must be accorded due process before his
employment is terminated. LORNA DISING PUNZAL
VS
ETSI TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
518 SCRA 66 (2007)
No matter how much the employee dislikes the employer professionally, he cannot afford to be
disrespectful.
Petitioner Lorna Dising Punzal (Punzal) had been working for respondent ETSI Technologies,
Inc. (ETSI) as Department Secretary. Punzal sent an e-mail message to her officemates
announcing the holding of a Halloween Party that was to be held in the office. Her immediate
superior, respondent Carmelo Remudaro advised her to first secure the approval of the SVP,
respondent Werner Geisert. When Geisert did not approve of the plan, Punzal then sent a second
e-mail to her officemates that states ―Geisert was so unfair . . . para bang palagi siyang
iniisahan sa trabaho. . . Anyway, solohin na lang niya bukas ang office.”
Punzal’s superiors required her to explain her actions which found such as unacceptable. She
was then dismissed from employment due to improper conduct or act of discourtesy or disrespect
and making malicious statements concerning company officer. Punzal filed before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for illegal dismissal against ETSI, Geisert,
and Remudaro.
The complaint was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter. On appeal, the NLRC found that while she
was indeed guilty of misconduct, the penalty of dismissal was disproportionate to her infraction.
The Court of Appeals held that Punzal’s dismissal was in order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid cause to dismiss Punzal
HELD:
A cordial or, at the very least, civil attitude, according due deference to one’s superiors, is still
observed, especially among high-ranking management officers. The Court takes judicial notice
of the Filipino values of pakikisama and paggalang which are not only prevalent among
members of a family and community but within organizations as well, including work sites. An
employee is expected to extend due respect to management, the employer being the “proverbial
hen that lays the golden egg,” so to speak. An aggrieved employee who wants to unburden
himself of his disappointments and frustrations in his job or relations with his immediate superior
would normally approach said superior directly or otherwise ask some other officer possibly to
mediate and discuss the problem with the end in view of settling their differences without
causing ferocious conflicts. No matter how much the employee dislikes the employer
professionally, and even if he is in a confrontational disposition, he cannot afford to be
disrespectful and dare to talk with an unguarded tongue and/or with a bileful pen.
Punzal sent the e-mail message in reaction to Geisert’s decision which he had all the right to
make. That it has been a tradition in ETSI to celebrate occasions such as Christmas, birthdays,
Halloween, and others does not remove Geisert’s prerogative to approve or disapprove plans to
hold such celebrations in office premises and during company time. Given the reasonableness of
Geisert’s decision that provoked Punzal to send the second e-mail message, the observations of
the Court of Appeals that “the message x x x resounds of subversion and undermines the
authority and credibility of management” and that petitioner “displayed a tendency to act without
management’s approval, and even against management’s will” are well taken.
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board Case Digest (GR Nos. 157870,
158633, 161658)
Posted byPingJune 2, 2019Posted inUncategorizedTags:Law Notes
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board
GR Nos. 157870, 158633, 161658
November 3, 2008
Facts:
Petitioners question the constitutionality of Section 36 of RA 9165, a.k.a. the Comprehensive
Drugs Act of 2002. Section 36 requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices,
and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, particularly those who
are charged with offenses punishable by a penalty of not less than 6 years and 1 day of
imprisonment.
On December 23, 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution 6486, which provides the rules on the
mandatory drugs testing of candidates for public office. It requires the COMELEC offices and
employees concerned to submit two separate lists of candidates: one for those who complied
with the mandatory drug testing and the other of those who failed to comply.
It was Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. who opposed such resolution, contending that it was
unconstitutional as it imposes an additional qualification for senators.
Issues:
1. Do Section 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution 6468 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator?
2. Is RA 9165 unconstitutional?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Section 36, validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution provides. The COMELEC resolution
effectively enlarges that qualification requirements for senator, enumerated under Section 3,
Article VI of the Constitution.
2. The provision of RA 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing for students (Section 36[b]) are
constitutional as long as they are random and suspicionless. This is because schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students, and schools have the right to
impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair and non-discriminatory.
The provision requiring mandatory drug testing for officers and employees of public and private
offices (Section 36[d]) are also justifiable. The privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is reduced. A degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld. To the
Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to
override the individual’s privacy interest under the premises.
On the other hand, the Court finds no justification in the mandatory drug testing of those
prosecuted for crimes punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 years and 1 day (Section
36[f]). The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are randomness and suspicionless.
In this case, it cannot be said that the drug testing is random. To impose mandatory drug testing
on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.
In sum, Section 36(c) and (d) are constitutional, but 36(f) is not.
The team proceeded at once to the office and backed up all files in the hard disk of computers at
the PALD and the Legal Services Division. Within the same day, the investigating team finished
the task. It was found that most of the files copied from the computer assigned to and being used
by the petitioner were draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the
CSC and other tribunals. Chairperson David thus issued a Show-Cause Order requiring the
petitioner to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
Petitioner denied that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint. He asserted
that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave, and that
the files in his computer were his personal files and those of his relatives and associates, and that
he is not authorize the activities as they are in violation of his constitutional right to privacy and
protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. Also, the
files/documents copied from his computer without his consent are inadmissible as evidence,
being “fruits of a poisonous tree.”
The CSC found prima facie case against the petitioner and charged him with Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No.
6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). On 24 July
2007, the CSC issued a Resolution finding petitioner GUILTY of the same merits and meted the
penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all its accessory penalties. This Resolution
was also brought to the CA by herein petitioner.
By a Decision dated 11 October 2007, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition for certiorari
after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents CSC officials. His motion
for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal before the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the search conducted and the copying of petitioner’s files without his
knowledge and consent lawful?
Held:
Yes. The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and
seizures but only of “unreasonable” searches and seizures.
Applying the analysis and principles announced in O’Connor and Simons for warrantless
searches involving public employees for work related reasons to the case at bar, we now address
the following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office
and computer files? (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair reasonable in its inception
and scope?
The petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files for he
failed to prove that he had an actual expectation of privacy either in his office or government-
issued computer which contained his personal files. He did not allege that he had a separate
enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not
open to other employees or visitors. He did not use passwords nor adopted any means to prevent
access by others of his computer files. The CSC also implemented a policy which implies on-the-
spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such
legitimate business purposes.
The search authorized by the respondent CSC Chair was reasonable since it was conducted in
connection with investigation of work-related misconduct. A search by a government employer
of an employee’s office is justified when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will
turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in the
mind of the Commission that the search of Pollo’s computer has successfully passed the test of
reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace. It bears emphasis that the Commission
pursued the search in its capacity as a government employer and that it was undertaken in
connection with an investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances
exempted from the warrant requirement. The nature of the imputation was serious, as it was
grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in the
practice of “lawyering” for parties with pending cases before the Commission would be a highly
repugnant scenario, then such a case would have shattering repercussions. It is settled that a
court or an administrative tribunal must not only be actually impartial but must be seen to be so,
otherwise the general public would not have any trust and confidence in it. Considering the
damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any
possible adverse consequence or fall-out.
Thus, petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail.
His other argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section
3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded
to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under
the aforecited authorities. We likewise find no merit in his contention that O’Connor and
Simons are not relevant because the present case does not involve a criminal offense like child
pornography. As already mentioned, the search of petitioner’s computer was justified there being
reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein would yield incriminating evidence
relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as government employer of such
misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This situation clearly falls under the exception
to the warrantless requirement in administrative searches defined in O’Connor.
Meralco v. NLRC
G.R. No. 78763 July 12,1989, MEDIALDEA, J.
FACTS
Private resondent, Apolinario Signo was dismissed from work by Meralco when it was found out
that he breached the trust of thpe company by making it appear that the residence of one
applicant for an electric service is within the serviceable area of MEralco. The applicant’s
residence was installed with electrical services thru Signo’s maneuver, however, due to the fault
of the Power sales division, the applicant-consumer was not billed for a year.
ISSUE
Whether or not, the dismissal of Signo was a proper penalty for his acts.
RULING
The Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in finding that Dismissal was a drastic
measure considering the length of service of to the Company by Signo, which is 20 years, and
the 2 awards he received for honesty from the employer. He was ordered reinstated, thought
without backwages for he is not at all faultless.
Further, it was held that in carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and its
implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount
consideration. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and
compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states
that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code
including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor"
FACTS:
The SSS failed to act on the demands of SSEA, such as: payment of accrued overtime pay,
conversion of temporary or contractual employees, implementation of the provision of collective
bargaining agreement and etc. Thus, the union of SSEA staged a strike, barricading the entrances
to the SSS Buildings and preventing other employees from work and from SSS to transact
business. Subsequenty, the SSS filed with the RTC of QC a complaint for damages and a writ of
to enjoin the union from striking and to report back to work. However, SSSEA filed a motion to
dismiss the writ with the court. The court denied the motion to dismiss. On appeal, the CA also
denied the motion on the basis that government employees, such as employees of the SSS,
cannot be allowed to strike.
ISSUE:
Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?
HELD:
No. While the constitution and statutes were silent, as to whether or not government employees
had the right to trike (at the time the disputes arose), the Court, nevertheless, held that the
employees of the SSS do not have the right to strike. The Court maintains that Art. IX (B), Sec.
2(5), allowing for the right to self-organization to government employees, do not include with it
the right to strike. A look into the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission with regard to
the provison expressly dictates that the right to strike is not included as an interpretation.
Furthermore, the Court asserts that, unlike private-sector employees, the terms and conditions of
employment of government employees are fixed by law, as imposed by the legislature and the
administrative heads. In fact, right after the instant dispute arose, Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules
and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government Employees to Self-
organization has now expressly ruled out the right of government employees to strike for the
purpose of securing changes. Thus, the SSS employees do not have the right to strike. The
remedy for them as a union is to petition to Congress the betterment of their terms and conditions
of employment