The Just War or Just A War A Proposal For Ethical Joint Doctrine of War

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Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2005-09
The just war or just a war a proposal for ethical joint

doctrine of war
Schultz, Sarah J.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/2092
NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA
THESIS
THE JUST WAR OR JUST A WAR? A PROPOSAL FOR

AN ETHICAL JOINT WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE
by
Sarah J. Schultz
September 2005
Thesis Advisor: Karen Guttieri

Second Reader: Edwin Micewski
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September 2005 Master’s Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: The Just War or Just a War? A Proposal for Ethical 5. FUNDING NUMBERS
Joint Doctrine of War
6. AUTHOR(S) Sarah J. Schultz
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING
Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER
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N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
According to joint doctrine, winning the nation’s wars is the primary purpose of the armed forces. It is
the foundation of joint professional military education and training, forming the basis for how the warfighter will
prosecute a war, and is a reflection of the judgments of senior military leadership. The joint and Service
warfighting doctrine of the 1940s and 1950s contained two aspects of war that are not reflected in current joint
doctrine. Combat now spans both war and “not war” in the new “military operation other than war”, and the
process of the military government has been completely replaced by the new “civil administration”. This two-part
redefinition of war has created a new joint doctrine that is confusing, overlapping, compartmentalized, and
incomprehensible, which has in part resulted in the many military failures in the decades since World War II. In
general, the second tenet of the Just War Theory dictates that the weak must be protected throughout the war
effort. International law of occupation states that certain functions and institutions of the defeated nation must be
restored by the occupying power. The military government, such as those found in past wars administered by the
U.S. armed forces, is the vehicle to insure the war is prosecuted justly and done so in a manner that will also win
the peace. This thesis recommends a return to a holistic continuum of war in two phases – formal hostilities and
the post-formal transition to peace – that adheres to international law, incorporates all combat as “formal
hostilities”, is independent of size or scope, and that requires the armed forces to win the peace as they have
successfully done in the past.
14. SUBJECT TERMS Joint Warfighting Doctrine, MOOTW, War, Peace, Just War, Professional 15. NUMBER OF
Military Education, War with Mexico, U.S. Civil War, Japan, Germany, Philippines, Conundrum, PAGES
Civil Affairs, Civil-Military Operations, Post-Conflict Transition to Peace, Stabilization and 113
Reconstruction, Joint Publications, Holistic. 16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION
CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF OF ABSTRACT
REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL
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Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
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THE JUST WAR OR JUST A WAR? A PROPOSAL FOR AN ETHICAL JOINT

WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE
Sarah J. Schultz
Major, United States Air Force
B.S., Bob Jones University, 1990
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES

(CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS)
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

September 2005
Author: Sarah J. Schultz, Major, USAF
Approved by: Karen Guttieri, PhD

Thesis Advisor
Edwin Micewski, PhD

Second Reader
Douglas Porch, PhD

Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs
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ABSTRACT
According to joint doctrine, winning the nation’s wars is the primary purpose of
the armed forces. It is the foundation of joint professional military education and
training, forming the basis for how the warfighter will prosecute a war, and is a reflection
of the judgments of senior military leadership. The joint and Service warfighting
doctrine of the 1940s and 1950s contained two aspects of war that are not reflected in
current joint doctrine. Combat now spans both war and “not war” in the new “military
operation other than war”, and the process of the military government has been
completely replaced by the new “civil administration”. This two-part redefinition of war
has created a new joint doctrine that is confusing, overlapping, compartmentalized, and
incomprehensible, which has in part resulted in the many military failures in the decades
since World War II. In general, the second tenet of the Just War Theory dictates that the
weak must be protected throughout the war effort. International law of occupation states
that certain functions and institutions of the defeated nation must be restored by the
occupying power. The military government, such as those found in past wars
administered by the U.S. armed forces, is the vehicle to insure the war is prosecuted
justly and done so in a manner that will also win the peace. This thesis recommends a
return to a holistic continuum of war in two phases – formal hostilities and the post-
formal transition to peace – that adheres to international law, incorporates all combat as
“formal hostilities”, is independent of size or scope, and that requires the armed forces to
win the peace as they have successfully done in the past.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1
II. THE LANGUAGE OF WAR AND PEACE .............................................................5
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW ................................................................................5
B. THE LANGUAGE OF WAR..........................................................................8
C. THE LANGUAGE OF PEACE......................................................................9
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY................................................................................10
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION..........................................................................10
III. THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE....................................................................................11
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW ..............................................................................11
B. RELEVANCE TO THE WARFIGHTER ...................................................11
C. RELEVANCE TO THE CIVILIAN ............................................................15
IV. A REVIEW OF MILITARY DOCTRINE ..............................................................17
B. U.S. WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE, 1940 – 1969.......................................19
1. Field Manual 27-5, Military Government (U.S. War
Department, July 1940) .....................................................................19
2. Small Wars Manual (U.S. Marine Corps, 1940) .............................19
3. Field Manual (FM) 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare (U.S. War
Department, October 1944)...............................................................21
4. U.S. Army and Navy Manual of Civil Affairs Military
Government (CAMG), FM 27-5 and OPNAV P22-1115
(October 1947)....................................................................................22
5. Review of Field Manual 27-10, Law of Land Warfare (U.S.
Army, July 1956)................................................................................23
6. U.S. Joint Manual of Civil Affairs and Military Government
(CAMG), November 1958 .................................................................23
7. Joint Manual for Civil Affairs, November 1966 (FM 41-5,
OPNAV 09B2P1, AFM 110-7, NAVMC 2500) ................................24
8. Review of Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operation (U.S.
Army, October 1969) .........................................................................25
C. CURRENT U.S. WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE........................................26
1. U.S. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting
(MCDP 1, 1997)..................................................................................28
D. CURRENT U.S. DOCTRINE ON MILITARY OPERATIONS
OTHER THAN WAR....................................................................................30
1. JP 3-07, Military Operations Other Than War (1995)...................30
2. JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operation (2001) .........32
3. JP 3-57.1, Civil Affairs (2003)...........................................................33
4. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability and Support
Operations (SASO) ............................................................................35
5. U.S. Army Field Manual 41-10 (2000) .............................................36
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6. U.S. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 3, Expeditionary
Operations (MCDP 3, 1998)..............................................................38
E. CURRENT BRITISH, CANADIAN AND AUSTRALIAN
WARFIGHTING DOCTRINES ..................................................................39
1. British..................................................................................................39
2. Canadian.............................................................................................40
3. Australian ...........................................................................................40
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY................................................................................41
V. THE UNITED STATES AT WAR: SIX CASES ....................................................43
B. THREE WARS OF THE 19TH CENTURY.................................................45
1. The War with Mexico, 1845 - 1849...................................................45
2. The U.S. Civil War, 1861 - 1865 .......................................................46
3. The Indian Wars of 1800 - 1900........................................................47
C. THREE WARS OF THE 20TH CENTURY.................................................48
1. The Small War: The Philippines, 1899 - 1916.................................48
2. Germany, 1945 - 1956 ........................................................................51
3. Japan, 1945 - 1952..............................................................................52
D. WARS SINCE 1950 .......................................................................................53
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY................................................................................55
VI. AN ETHICAL BASIS FOR A HOLISTIC JOINT WARFIGHTING
DOCTRINE ................................................................................................................57
B. THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR ............................................................58
C. “WAR IS WAR IS WAR”.............................................................................60
1. Applying the Just War Theory .........................................................61
2. International Law on War, Occupation and Human Rights .........63
VII. A PROPOSAL FOR JOINT WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE ...............................67
B. HISTORICAL EXAMPLE: A SUCCESSFUL CIVIL-MILITARY
OPERATION .................................................................................................68
C. THESIS SUMMARY.....................................................................................70
D. RECOMMENDATION TO JOINT DOCTRINE ......................................72
1. Remove the Ambiguity on War and “Not War” in Joint
doctrine by Placing All Combat under the Umbrella of War........73
2. Apply jus in bello to the U.S. Armed Forces in Any War –
Large or Small....................................................................................73
3. Return the Doctrine of Military Governance to the Active
Portfolio and Recommend It – Even If Policymakers Chose
Not to Use It........................................................................................74
4. Develop the Continuum of War as a Corollary to jus in bello
and the Doctrine on the Military Government – The Battle for
Victory and Battle for Peace .............................................................74
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5. Develop Distinctive and Meaningful Terminology to Clearly
Explain War and “Not War” ............................................................74
E. RESTORATION OF TERMS ......................................................................75
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY................................................................................76
APPENDIX. DODD 2000_13, 1994 .....................................................................................79
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................89
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................97
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank the staff of the Dudley Knox Library for their tireless efforts
and helpfulness – especially Greta Marlatt and Daryle Carson for their endless patience.
My heartfelt thanks to MAJOR Kevin Simmers, U.S. Army, for his ready assistance in
gaining access to Army doctrine and publications. My warm appreciation to Professor
Edwin Micewski for his insight and encouragement as my second reader. My sincere
thanks to Professor Karen Guttieri as my advisor for her frankness and motivational
direction that was always on target.
My heartfelt gratitude also to Major Clare Reid, USAF, and Ms. Nancy Sharrock
for their team spirit and for going the extra mile to help someone in desperate need.
Their examples stand as beacons of friendship and camaraderie in my life.
My gratitude to Khing Kantasa for allowing me many worry-free work hours,

knowing the children were well cared for. To my family – my husband, Lt Col Paul
Schultz, USAF; my first daughter, Elizabeth; to my second daughter, Emma; and to my
parents, Russ and Stella Daniels for their time, encouragement, and their much-needed
listening ears as I made this 6-month journey, invaluable to my understanding of war,
peace, doctrine, and my fellow armed service members. Without your time, love and
understanding, I would not have been successful.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Joint doctrine, gaining its authority from Congress and the Department of
Defense, provides the blueprint from which the Services recruit, train, equip, organize
and educate the U.S. armed forces. Currently, joint warfighting doctrine is massive,
unwieldy, disjointed, and founded upon the concept of military operations other than war
instead of war. Very little of joint warfighting doctrine today concerns itself with war.
Current publications are focused on providing the policymaker with a more flexible
response, developed down through the decades following World War II and into the
present. To meet the objectives of the policymaker through the use of force, the return to
a holistic concept of war is required. In doing so, the end result of armed conflict or war
is peace.
As a proposal to the Joint Staff for a change to the fundamentals of U.S. joint
warfighting doctrine, this thesis finds its basis in the Just War Theory’s second tenet – jus
in bello and in international laws of war from the Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949.
Regardless of historical successes at warfighting and nation-building, a gradual
eradication of the military government concept and the parceling out of the components
of war into separate, more flexible doctrines took place over the period after the end of
World War II and the end of the Vietnam War. War as the historic holistic concept that
included all combat and the transition from war to peace was broken apart and redefined
to form what is represented by current joint warfighting doctrine.
According to current (1995) joint doctrine on military operations other than war,
combat can exist outside of the realm of the war, creating a new category of armed
conflict that falls outside the requirements of a just war with its protection of the weak
during the transition to peace. This disconnection of war concepts from its whole has
created another conundrum known as civil affairs and civil-military operations. The
operations presently carried out under the civil affairs construct were once a function of
the military government, which included maintaining security in the region so that a
functional government conducive to the interests of the United States could be built as
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well as a legitimate justice system, adequate medical care, a functioning education system
with schools and the rebuilding the infrastructure and the homes of those destroyed in the
war.
The just prosecution of the war according to international occupation law requires
the protection of the defenseless until the peace is won. A clear result of a properly
orchestrated and legitimate military government is the winning of the hearts and minds of
the people over to a new life conducive to peace. The military government cannot be a
collage of the military, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations and
other U.S. governmental agencies, such as the current civil administration is constructed.
The reason the military occupation and government are required for peace is tied directly
to its authority from the president of the United States, its ability to maintain security
while it rebuilds a nation. As seen in current events in Iraq and Afghanistan, civilian
leadership of the ongoing war effort is failing. Winning the peace is part of the war, and
as demonstrated by U.S. wars in the past, it takes time, legitimacy and huge expenditure
of effort as well as teamwork between civilians in all capacities and the military to win
the war.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis addresses the requirement for the U.S. military to return the concept of
the military government to U.S. joint warfighting doctrine. Since the extraction of this
concept from doctrine and its consequent redefinition in the 1960s, the U.S. military has
failed to accomplish the objectives of its civilian leadership as seen in the results of the
Vietnam War and the majority of the armed conflicts in which the United States engaged
over the course of the 1970s through the present.
Chapter II highlights the significance of joint doctrine to the warfighter, who is

trained and educated based upon that foundation of doctrine. Doctrine is also relevant to
the civilian policymaker who desires success in the use of the military and to the civilian
U.S. citizen who desires to see value to the expenditure of life. The civilian in whose
country the war takes place perhaps has as much at stake as the warfighter, as his life
hangs in the balance between a war that protects the weak while the peace is won and a
war that fails to do so.
Chapter IV provides a review of doctrine from the 1940s forward to the present
and gives a picture of where U.S. joint military doctrine was and where it is now – from
the concept of the military government to the current concept of the civil administration.
As the doctrinal concept of the military government is weakened and as combat is
separated from the concept of war, a correlation between these concepts and the success
of the U.S. armed forces in the field can be made.
Civil affairs have always been a function of these two concepts, but in different
capacities. Military government in today’s doctrine has been shelved as a “last resort”
with the civil administration taking its place, wherein the U.S. military is relegated to an
advisory position and to that of a security force.
Upon establishing the relevance of doctrine and how it has changed over the
course of the past 60 years, Chapter V will review how the United States prosecuted war
in the 1800s and early 1900s demonstrating that, under the direction of a holistic doctrine
of war wherein all combat or armed conflict is war and the military government is the
means to win the peace, success of political objectives is secured. A comparative and in-
1
depth review of the military failures of 1960 through the present will not be accomplished
in this paper, but those failures will be mentioned in reference to concepts in passing.
The Korean War era was the pivotal point in U.S. policy and military history
wherein the removal of the military occupation from joint and Service doctrine was
initiated. The military occupation with its accompanying government was still at that
time considered the bridge to peace in war, was not a separate entity, and consistently led
to peace. With its origins in the 1950s and through the Vietnam War according to the
date the doctrine was published, the convoluted joint doctrine of “not war” with its long
succession of various names has led to defeat and failure in the course of the use of
armed force.
Finally, the philosophical foundation for this thesis is presented in Chapter VI,
which discusses the two tenets of the Just War Theory – jus ad bellum and jus in bello, as
part of the background on why the U.S. military must reestablish the military government
as a natural and expected process of war. Once the U.S. military goes to war, the
application of the second tenet comes into play, and it is this tenet of just action in war
that provides the foundation for the military government. International laws on war –
specifically, the military occupation – in the form of the Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949 bring even more to the discussion in their explicit explanation of what is required of
occupation forces.
In the understanding and application of these two concepts to warfighting, one

can draw only one conclusion. In the prosecution of the Just War, the U.S. military has
the responsibility to ensure the safety of the weak left without protection by the war. The
only means to this end is the military government as seen by the success of the past and
the failures of today. This important part of the war – the winning of the peace – cannot
be left to chance or to others to try to secure. Although the winning of the war and the
peace is always the result of a team built between civilians and the military, the
responsibility for the operation and its success must fall wholly upon the U.S. military
operating under direct authority from the President of the United States.
2
Current joint warfighting doctrine, due to the separation of the whole into its parts
– combat, civil affairs, humanitarian aid – has evolved into a vast conundrum of separate
doctrines, overlapping concepts, and confusing directions. Chapter VII is a proposal for a
fundamental and ethical change to joint warfighting doctrine – a return to a holistic
doctrine prescribing the use of the military occupation and government and a change to
current terms for clear definition of roles and responsibilities.
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II. THE LANGUAGE OF WAR AND PEACE
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
Military doctrine is a moving target. When the United Nations began to take on
collective responses to peace and security challenges in early 1950s, the nature of
military force dramatically changed. Throughout the Cold War context, war and
peacekeeping co-existed. (UK Joint Warfare Publication 3-50, p. iii). Today, the ground
is shifting again with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new international
order.
Generally speaking, military doctrine – derived from the national security strategy
– is the blueprint upon which modern U.S. armed forces are built, wherein they recruit
their personnel, conduct their training, organize for efficiency, and equip for tomorrow’s
mission. (Joint Publication 3 [JP 3], 2001, p. I-6) Service doctrines have long existed.
Joint doctrine, created officially in the aftermath of several military failures in the early
1980s, has unsuccessfully tried to become “an engine of change” in the warfighting
arena. (JP 1, 2000, p. I-9) Joint doctrine has generated some success in its mission to
unify the efforts of the Services by increasing inter-Service communication and
coordination as demonstrated in the recent wars in Iraq. Unfortunately, the warfighting
doctrine of the Joint Chiefs fails to be a doctrine of war – an armed intervention that
results in peace.
Primarily, joint doctrine contains “fundamental principles that guide the

employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common
objective.” (Joint Chiefs of Staff Website; Doctrines, Definitions; accessed 16 September
2005) Assuming that the common objective is to accomplish the goals of current foreign
policy, a mismatch exists between the stated purpose of the armed forces and the actual
written doctrine intended to coordinate that action between the Services for mission
success. If winning the Nation’s wars is the fundamental purpose of the U.S. armed
forces (JP1, 2000, p. v, Executive Summary; italics added), very little attention is given
to explaining and developing the subject in current joint doctrine – even at the capstone
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publication level, and the result is the failure of the ability of the U.S. armed forces to be
successful in the waging of a war, beginning to end.
Doctrine in general is an attempt to codify what the Services are doing in the
present.1 Joint doctrine takes this a step further in inter-Service orchestration for
improved unified action. Joint doctrine provides the blueprint from which the Service
draw their individual warfighting doctrines. In the big picture, ties national security
strategy and national military strategy to the military’s role in facilitating national policy
and security through the preparation of the forces for “team warfare” and also for
operations that most certainly fall outside of war, such as the humanitarian assistance in
the aftermath of a hurricane. (JP1, 2000, Chairman’s Letter)
Doctrine is more than a mere reflection of what the Services are trying to do
today. It reflects the judgment of senior military leadership and contains shadows of
philosophies of senior civilian leadership through its ties to the national security strategy.
But even more importantly, it is the hands-on component of the grand strategy of national
security policy. Depending on the political and international environment in which it is
formed, it can be given a defensive, offensive or deterrent stance in its application of
strategy to how force can and will be applied, but it remains a roadmap of purpose for the
armed forces on how warfighting is to be accomplished. (Posen, pp. 13 – 14)
Perhaps the clearest and most established connection between doctrine and the
field is professional training and education. Doctrine is a key reflection of the beliefs and
judgments of senior military officers, and every chance is taken to teach this belief
system of military strategy implementation to incoming, new and seasoned officers at
each step of a career. Therefore, doctrine is one step ahead of field actions, because it is
what is taught in the schools that precede being sent to the field.
Senior military leadership wants those who are following up in their footsteps to
be adept at leadership along the way. The security of a nation hangs upon the ability of a
professional military to follow orders under pressure and to follow the training they have
1 Doctrine provides an opportunity to put into writing the lessons learned from recent campaigns and
to set them aside for study and application. It is written direction from the Joint Chiefs with significant
input from warfighting sources and relatively recent historical examples of U.S. warfighting, but due to its
size and scope, it takes time to develop and publish, causing its publication to lag from time to time behind
the cutting edge of current military thought. (Odom, p. 23)
6
received. For many senior noncommissioned officers and all commissioned officers, this
is taken a step further in the ingraining of a belief system taught in doctrinal concepts that
upholds the professionalism of the armed forces and leads them in the defense of the
nation. (Odom, pp. 29 – 31)
The Services begin to teach their doctrine in the schools that prepare officer
cadets to enter full-time active duty service. This education and training is continued
throughout the first 10 years of a career. At around the 10-year point, joint doctrine is
taught to officers officially through the joint professional military education program
mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and under the direction of the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
We see then, that doctrine is a moving target. The details of doctrine must be
continuously updated in order for it to remain relevant. Based upon the belief that
doctrine “establishes a framework of common understanding and action that informs the
decision-making process”, doctrine affects more than the Services it serves. (Cassidy, pp.
3 – 4) It is also a codification of what senior military leadership will offer up to the
policymaker in the use of the armed forces in support of national objectives.
The following are the deficiencies of current joint doctrine as it is taught to the
service member and as it is recommended as actionable to the policymaker:
1) Joint doctrine (as well as those Service doctrines founded upon it) is
seriously flawed because it no longer contains a holistic concept of the
continuum of war and peace.
2) Joint warfighting strategy and doctrine of today lost at least one

significant and critical piece of the warfighting concept during the
tumultuous Vietnam years, which will prevent the success of warfighting
efforts until it is returned.
In other words, joint doctrine has lost the concept of the military government over
time, which is the part of the war after formal hostilities are terminated that “seals the
peace”. (Guttieri, 1999, p. 91) If doctrines of the past accurately reflected successful
aspects of warfighting of that day, perhaps the U.S. armed forces should today entertain
retaining those concepts that worked, modifying them to fit the capacities of the armed
forces of today.
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B. THE LANGUAGE OF WAR
The issue in this thesis is one of defining war, because joint doctrine as currently
written has little to do with war. The doctrine carefully steps around the concept and
pursues endless rabbit trails in search of peace through the application of specific armed
forces capabilities, such as security assistance, bombing campaigns, a show of force, or
humanitarian aid delivered in the middle of a civil war. War has gone by many names in
the past, depending on the decade – police action, counterinsurgency, rescue operation,
and low intensity conflict. An ironic doctrinal title for warfare American troops most
commonly experience today is “military operations other than war” (MOOTW).
War, defined by Webster, is “a state of usually open and declared hostile conflict
between states or nations….A state of hostility, conflict, or antagonism.” (Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary; accessed 16 September 2005)2 Current joint warfighting
doctrine states that combat transcends the boundaries of war by the use of the “range of
military operations” of Figure I-1 of JP 3-07. One can deduce from this range and the
accompanying chart that the U.S. armed forces can take part in combat operations
without taking part in a war. (JP 3-07, 1995, p. I-2) However, it seems unlikely that
combat – armed engagement between the U.S. armed forces and an enemy with the intent
to kill or incapacitate – can mean anything other than war.
If a war is to be just, at a minimum the combatant must protect the non-

combatant, during formal hostilities and after. Killing outside the confines of war is
normally referred to as terrorism, which is a systematic use of violence to create fear and
instigate change. (Encyclopedia Britannica Online; accessed 16 September 2005)
Individual citizens may legitimately kill only in self-defense, and individual soldiers may
kill only by direction of their civilian leadership during the prosecution of a war.
Otherwise, the killing becomes something else.
In regaining a full understanding of the parameters of war, the Clausewitzian

loop, defined as “the relationship between policy and force”, provides an excellent
picture of war by demonstrating “a continuum from diplomacy (policy) to war (force)”.
2 But the use of the word “war” is relative. Price wars, a class war and wars against disease or drugs
do not contain combat, but refer instead to a struggle or a fight for something valuable. The Cold War was
defined by brinkmanship and détente – by the imminence or threat of a potential nuclear strike with the
goal of tactical or total destruction depending on the enemy’s advances.
8
The loop, shaped like a circle, is in two parts – policy or force and represents a
progression along the curved line wherein there is a point that policy (diplomacy) turns to
force (war). Logically, the progression from policy to force also includes a process to get
back from force to policy. When still in the loop or circle and not yet back in the policy
arena, a state of force or war is assumed to be the situation with post-conflict military
operations marking the transition from force back to policy. (Guttieri, 1999, pp. 20 – 24)
C. THE LANGUAGE OF PEACE
A doctrine of peacekeeping has developed parallel to the “mature doctrine of
war”. (Joint Warfighting Publication 3-50, United Kingdom, p. iii) This development
highlights a serious deficiency with the mature doctrine of war – it does not contain a
doctrine of peace. Service and joint doctrines earlier in the 20th Century attended to the
challenges of peace as part of the doctrine of war, but did not call this a “doctrine of
peace”.
The doctrine of occupation, martial law or the military government until the
1960s, substituted for a doctrine of peace in American field manuals. The two doctrines
of making war and winning the peace were inseparable in the prosecution of war, and
land warfare officers (until the doctrine was replaced) were taught to win the war by
winning the peace.
In the decades before World War II and at its end, the use of the military
government to tame a foreign land or newly acquired region was a well established
function of the U.S. armed forces in more than one war fought and won by the armed
forces of the United States. It has been a process that has not been without its difficulties,
for even the armed forces themselves have resisted the task since its earliest use.
(Guttieri, 1999, p. 50) Not withstanding, civil affairs and the military concept can trace
their origins to General George Washington. Not only was colonial America at war with
the British, it was at war with itself with the loyalists deeply pitted against the patriots.
General Washington was accomplished at dealing with the civil-military aspect of his job
as the senior leader of the rebel troops, dealing with such situations as troop misconduct,
civilian distress, and the establishment of a military government in Philadelphia.
(Daugherty, pp. 14 – 15, 23 – 24)
9
In the decades since World War II, the practice of using the military government
as the primary method of securing the peace during the drawdown of a war gradually
disappears from doctrine. Whereas in the joint and Service doctrine of the 1940s, one
finds entire volumes dedicated to the concept that were in use up to that time in various
places around the globe, the current JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations
(2001) labels the military government concept as a “last resort” (JP 3-57, 2001, p. I-19).
As a last resort and in light of limited resources and personnel, the possibility of this
means of securing the peace being used is very slight.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The problem inherent in joint warfighting doctrine is two-fold. While it might be
successful in the coordination of effort between the Services, it simply does not contain a
doctrine of war, and therefore, cannot begin to ensure the U.S. armed forces will be
successful in the winning of the Nation’s wars. War is inadequately defined, having been
reduced from its original meaning and parameters in order to make room for more
flexible responses to international crises. In the transition war and the use of force to
diplomacy and peace, joint doctrine proposes no plan of operation to the policymaker nor
directs one to the warfighter. Confusion then reigns in the determination of what is war
and what is not, what is civil and what is not, and who’s in charge and who is not.
(Guttieri, 1999, p. 4) In the end then, no one wins with the greatest loss being those who
died in vain.
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION
The next chapter will discuss the relevance of doctrine as it fits into the role of
foreign policy. Chapter IV will demonstrate the evolution of U.S. military doctrine, from
the time of World War II through the present, showing the progression from the military
governance concept to the current civil affairs approach found in joint doctrine today.
Chapter V takes a journey through the warfighting and nation-building history of the U.S.
armed forces and those results, demonstrating the amazing capabilities of the military,
which were engaged in earlier times without proper training. Chapter VI is a presentation
of the Just War Theory, relevant in the understanding of a holistic versus a piecemeal
approach to war. Chapter VII is the summary of the paper and a proposal for specific
changes to current joint publications on warfare and civil-military operations.
10
III. THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
Military doctrine must first of all make sense to the armed forces who will use it.
One approach to evaluating doctrine is to determine how it is used by the U.S. armed
forces, whether it is implemented as intended. Another approach is to determine whether
it achieves its purpose, because doctrine may be implemented as intended, yet not be
pertinent to what is required to succeed.
The Services use doctrine to train, educate and prepare their forces for
warfighting. As the individual officer “grows up” in the Service, he “learns the ropes” of
his Service first, before pressing on to the joint arena. It is doctrine that underpins the
entire training of the future leadership of the armed forces, and it is joint doctrine that
opens the door for the warfighter to the highest echelon of command opportunities. It is
also joint warfighting doctrine that brings the forces together in unity of effort,
strengthening the war effort and in the end providing the warfighter with what he needs
to get the job done and go home.
B. RELEVANCE TO THE WARFIGHTER
Joint doctrine is important to the warfighter, because the codification and teaching
of doctrine that brought success in war efforts in the past most likely increases the
chances for the success of the warfighter in future efforts. A comparison of two origins
of doctrine – religious and military - clarifies the purpose of doctrinal development and
the effect of doctrine on the organizations it serves.3 Religious and military doctrines
have long been with us. The credibility of a religion is a function of its ability to resist
change or compromise over timeless truths or absolutes, but also in its ability to keep up
with the times in its presentation or application of those timeless truths to a present
reality. (Oxtoby, pp. 199 – 200 and Wuthnow, p. 15) The development of military
doctrine has been much the same.
3 Both Webster’s New International Dictionary (1954) and the Random House Unabridged Dictionary
(1993) define doctrine as that which is taught and both refer to the doctrine of the Church. The newer
dictionary by Random House adds that doctrine is associated usually with a certain body or system of
teachings related to a particular subject and also references governmental doctrine such as the Monroe
Doctrine.
11
For the Christian church or religion, doctrine has been those absolute truths
reflected in the teachings – and some more flexible ones added in over time – that guide
the leadership and their followers in the day-to-day administration of life. (Jurji, pp. 337
– 9) Obviously, disagreements have risen over what that doctrine should be, but all of the
major religions that exist today are identifiable by the primary tenets of the doctrine that
defines the ‘camp’ in which they reside. (Wuthnow, pp. 308 – 310) Military doctrine,
much newer on the scene and far less clearly developed, follows in this example in that it
also has ‘camps’ in which proponents proclaim their doctrine as truth. Historical – but
still debatable – truths exist in the classic writings of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and Clausewitz.
Doctrine is defined by the U.S. Joint Staff as the “fundamental principles by

which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national
objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.” (JP 1-02, 2001, p.
165) This definition implies that what is taught becomes a template for action.
British military doctrine is explicit in its connection between doctrine and

education. The British Military Doctrine (BMD) on a “Design for Military Operations”
(1996) produced by the Chief of the General Staff states that “doctrine is what is taught”.
Britain had a long tradition of unwritten doctrine. First issued above the tactical level in
1989, the BMD describes its role as “a formal expression of military knowledge and
thought that the Army accepts as being relevant at a given time, which covers the nature
of current and future conflicts, the preparation of the Army for such conflicts and the
methods of engaging in them to achieve success.” (BMD, 1996, p. 7)
The American approach to doctrine is that it is authoritative, but emphasizes

general principles for action rather than acting as rules and regulations. It also influences
how the military will think about the use of force (JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed
Forces of the United States, 2000, p. vi; Emerson, p. 3) Military doctrine meets the
warfighter informally in the philosophies of military leadership and formally in the
classroom.
Military doctrine interfaces with military education in the teaching of military,

political and civilian factors taught at different levels in the various schools of the armed
forces. (Micewski, p. 19) Professional military education (PME) is expected of all
12
military members – officer and enlisted, but in the preparation of the armed forces for
war, officers carry the burden of responsibility for the leadership, training, education and
equipping that will bring victory in the field. Officers pass through four levels of PME
versus skills training such as the instruction completed to fly an airplane: pre-
commissioning, basic, intermediate, and senior. At these PME schools, doctrine forms
the core of the instruction and in the earlier years of a career, remains Service-oriented.
The Services treat doctrine differently. The Army, due to the need to coordinate
large numbers, tends to emphasize doctrine and teach it early in an officer’s career. As
the officer progresses in rank and time in service, formal education in joint matters is
required in order to be promoted to the more senior grade of O-5. Each Service handles
PME and joint PME (JPME) a little differently in regards to promotion. The U.S. Navy
in particular has not placed as high a premium on education in general, because education
usually takes the officer off the ship or out of operations for a time. (Osman, Personal
Conversation, 2003)
Much time is invested in professional military education throughout the career of

the officer. At the basic or junior officer level, the focus is on instilling the core values of
the Service, the specific mission of the Service in light of the armed forces, leadership
training, and various team-based exercise scenarios. The mid-level officer with about 10
to 12 years of time in the service is expected to complete Command and Staff College,
either in residence or by correspondence if unable to attend. It is in this curriculum that
an education in jointness is begun formally and in earnest. Senior officers usually attend
or complete PME at least once in the 15 to 20-year point of their careers in the
completion of in-residence or correspondence curriculum of the four Service War
Colleges (Air, Army, Naval, and National).
Service schools up until the 1980s were highly Service-centric with joint
education optional and unregulated. In concert with the changes made to the structure of
the military advisory system at the Joint Chiefs level, joint doctrine and joint education
were institutionalized. Phase I JPME was integrated into the Service schools since the
only existing joint PME school – the National Defense University (NDU) – could not
handle the added volume of students required to be educated by the Act. However, Phase
13
II JPME was reserved for NDU, wherein Congress and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff (CJCS) could retain control
The joint doctrine taught and learned by the officer through professional military
can also be found outside the schoolhouse. The U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine
Center (TRADOC) describes its role as follow: “recruit, train, educate the Army’s
Soldiers; develop leaders; support training in units; develop doctrine; establish standards;
and build the future Army.” TRADOC operates 33 schools and centers at 16 Army
installations with 1,714 courses and 451, 682 seats. (TRADOC Website, n.d.)
The U.S. Navy operates its own Warfare Development Command in Newport,
Rhode Island whose Doctrine Department promotes Navy and Joint Doctrine awareness
and development. Also under the auspices of the Command are: a lessons learned
system, the Navy warfare library, and a maritime battle center specializing in warfare
concept development, doctrine refinement, and warfare innovation. (Navy Warfare
Development Command Website, n.d.)
Finally, the U.S. Air Force has placed all of its training and education operations
under the command of one four-star general – Air Education and Training Command
(AETC). This command oversees the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama, which is host to the Air Force Doctrine Center as well as many of the Air
Force’s top professional education schools. The Air Force teaches Service doctrine in
Service schools for the company grade officer. When the officer reaches field grade, he
must then complete the joint PME prescribed by the Goldwater Nichols Act, directed by
U.S. Code Title X and by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. (AETC Website, n.d.)
As stated in its opening pages, the capstone (defined as the top group of a
hierarchy of doctrine per the DOD definition on the Joint Chiefs’ Website, n.d.) doctrinal
publication of the Joint Chiefs – JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United
States, 2000 “ties joint doctrine to the national security strategy and national military
strategy and describes the military’s role in the development of national policy and
strategy.” (Opening Letter signed by the Chairman, published 14 November 2000) Based
upon this statement, joint doctrine provides the link or bridge between the military and its
civilian leadership. It contains the judgments and beliefs of senior military leadership
14
that are recommended to the policymaker and also that are pressed down through the
chain of command to the Services for the recruiting, training, equipping and education of
the troops.
C. RELEVANCE TO THE CIVILIAN
U.S. joint warfighting doctrine is relevant to U.S. civilians as well. Civilians have
always been a part of the war process, but from three different perspectives. In a
democracy, civilians direct the war to take place in the first place and hold the reins of the
military as it proceeds with the war effort. Secondly, civilians abound in the land in
which the war takes place – usually called non-combatants, unless they themselves take
up arms – wherein the international laws of warfare regarding their protection apply until
the invading or occupying force departs. These laws of war can become difficult to
follow when the conventions of war break down through the use of combat and armed
conflict outside the parameters of war.
Thirdly, civilians such as members of the executive branch departments, the

Central Intelligence Agency, nongovernmental and international organizations who work
alongside the armed forces in winning the war and the peace have a vested interest in
joint doctrine and in its effect on the success of the forces with which they serve.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Because doctrine prescribes how the armed forces will conduct themselves in the
prosecution of the war, it is vital that these truths adhere to international laws of armed
conflict. The principles that make up the framework upon which joint doctrine is hung
are founded on the general principles of international law, developed over time and
codified in several Hague Conventions. The indigenous population in the land where the
war takes have the most stake in how military forces fight wars and secure the peace,
because they stand to lose the most – not only their lives, but also their property, and their
way of life due to the way the war is prosecuted and the results of the transition to peace.
Since joint doctrine is behind how the invading and occupying armed forces were
trained and educated, then it is that doctrine that will direct how those forces will handle
the most critical part of the war – the transition to peace and diplomacy, wherein these
civilians and their future nation are the most vulnerable. The newly “created” state is very
vulnerable with the inevitable insurgencies and power struggles that will take place. The
15
strong possibility for the wrong government to take power exists if the United States or
some other great power doesn’t take an active part in shaping the process. (Orr, p. 58)
Robert Orr argues that the “most important factor in determining the success or
failure of a post-conflict reconstruction order effort” is a “coherent, legitimate
government”, but who is going to help the defeated nation rebuild this government? U.S.
civilian agencies lack the tools to take over the job of establishing peace in the post-
conflict environment of war. The U.S. military has not been prepared to do post-conflict
reconstruction either, but that appropriate doctrine, organization, and training could
dramatically improve the outcome. (Orr, pp. 9, 14, 15)
The wrong strategic doctrine can imperil state survival. (Posen, pp. 220 – 221)
Doctrine is as the bridge between policy and security. It is the foundation for what the
armed forces are taught at home and for what they practice in the field and is of vital
interest to those who make war and win the peace.
16
IV. A REVIEW OF MILITARY DOCTRINE
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
In his work entitled the Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of
Panama, John Fishel has written that the United States’ mishandling of Operation Just
Cause during the Panama invasion was either due to “being disingenuous” or a “gross
error in judgment”. (Fishel, 1992, p. 29) Another option is that perhaps a lack of a viable
doctrine of war containing direction on how to win the peace can also result in a lack of
planning and overall mission failure. Although the end state desired is by direction of the
National Command Authorities, it is the military commander whose objective is, through
armed force, to create it. (JP 5-00.1, 2000, pp. II-3 – 4) It would behoove the armed
forces commander then to have some clear plan available for recommendation to the
policymaker and for use in the preparation of the forces for war and the arduous journey
to peace. (Flavin, p. 97)
If war is a continuum from diplomacy to force to diplomacy, current U.S. joint

doctrine does not contain a doctrine of war, nor does it contain a doctrine of peace.
Instead, joint warfighting doctrine contains a series of partial doctrines on parts and
pieces of war, which have developed since World War II. (Kober, p. 4) The U.S.
military does not have the doctrine and training to guide a war into peace and the result
seems to be that the military is then understandably hesitant to plan for it.
Joint doctrine gains its authority from its basis upon the concepts put forth in the
Department of Defense’s Directives (DODDs) – short official papers that briefly address
the published DOD perspective on specific issues. The joint doctrine on civil affairs and
civil-military operations, for instance, is based upon DODD 2000.13, Civil Affairs.
(Appendix A)
This chapter will bring the reader through historic joint and Service doctrine on
the subject of the World War II-era conception of the “post-conflict” transition to peace –
the occupation and military government.
Currently, joint doctrine has six series of joint publications (JPs): Personnel
(Series 1), Intelligence (Series 2), Operations (Series 3), Logistics (Series 4), Planning
17
(Series 5), and C4 (Series 6: command, control, communications, and computers).
Within the operational 3-series, warfighting doctrine is contained in a wide diversity of
topics within the 61 publications produced on “different” kinds of operations. The
doctrines on military operations other than war (MOOTW), civil affairs, peacekeeping
and civil-military operations are buried within this operational series.
Joint doctrine writers in the post-Cold War era wrote doctrine for murky
international peacekeeping and unilateral stability operations that rendered a full-scale
war concept obsolete. One fix was to string out the “war” concept and separate it into
distinct segments or phases in order to offer up these parts to policymakers as possible
ways in which to utilize a newly flexible armed force without embroiling the nation in a
“war”. The armed forces of the United States could then be deployed to assist in
surgically segmented sections of war to knock down a government, take out one or
several key targets through raids or air strikes, provide added security, or to demonstrate
a show of force as such found in operations in Cuba, Grenada, Lebanon, Panama,
Somalia, Haiti and Afghanistan.
As will be shown in this doctrinal review, the joint doctrine preparing the U.S.
armed forces for the 21st Century not only broke apart its holistic concept of war, it
released the occupying forces and the nation they represent from responsibility for the
consequences of war. When post-World War II occupations were impending, entire
documents were devoted to transition and post-conflict, for example, U.S. Joint Manual
of Civil Affairs and Military Government, 1958.
In the course of this review, an examination of the historical pathway of joint

doctrine – as well as a few pieces of pivotal historical Service doctrines – from 1940 into
the 1990s is required to set the background for proposing new doctrine for the transition
to peace. Since each nation has its own outlook on war and the role of its armed forces in
the international arena or in warfighting, a comparison of what other western
democracies hold as their current joint doctrine on war will also provide insight on U.S.
joint military doctrine and its relevance to today.
18
B. U.S. WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE, 1940 – 1969
1. Field Manual 27-5, Military Government (U.S. War Department, July
1940)
This 59-page, joint manual produced by the War Department is devoted in its
entirety to the proper administration of a military government due to the inability of the
defeated nation to carry on these functions in the latter half of the war. It describes the
civil affairs staff of the interim government, judicial procedures in the form of a 3-part
military tribunal with jurisdiction over all persons in the occupied territory (FM 27-5,
1940, p. 13), and the three phases of a military government. These three phases are 1)
while the fighting is still going on in the district; 2) when organized resistance has ended
in the occupied district, but the U.S. government and the defeated nation have not yet
come to peace terms; and 3) after the fighting has completely ended wherein a greatly
diminished force occupies until the status of the defeated nation is agreed upon and the
forces are then finally withdrawn. (FM 27-5, 1940, pp. 19 – 20) This FM goes on to
fully define and develop the military government concept, walking the warfighter through
when it is necessary and by what authority.
2. Small Wars Manual (U.S. Marine Corps, 1940)
This manual, originally written in 1940, was reissued in 1987 by the Navy’s
Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations wherein the forwarding letter
from this office offers the manual as:
… an aid to education and training in the historical approach of Marine

Corps units to conducting operations in low-intensity conflicts. In the
1930s, such conflicts were referred to as ‘small wars.’ (1987 Foreword
Letter, USMC Small Wars Manual, 1940)
The foreword goes on to state that “the Small Wars Manual is one of the best
books on military operations in peacekeeping and counterinsurgency operations
published before World War II.” The Navy offers a disclaimer for the information
contained within it by calling it “informational only and not directive in nature.” (1987
Reissue Foreword Letter, USMC Small Wars Manual, 1940)
This manual in its reprinted, scanned format contains 492 pages and discusses at
great length what exactly a “small war” is and how to go about successfully waging one.
The words used to define a “small war” are found in recent definitions of low intensity
19
conflict, counterinsurgency and today’s MOOTW. Three chapters apply to what is
currently labeled as the “post-conflict transition” or civil-military operations. Small Wars
defines “military government” as the “exercise of military jurisdiction by a military
commander, under the direction of the President, with the express or implied sanction of
Congress, superseding as far as may be deemed expedient, the local law.” (USMC
Manual, 1940, p. 424) Many pages discuss the supervision of elections in the post-
conflict transition to peace, and 10 pages are devoted to the all-important tactics of
withdrawal from the theater of engagement.
Small Wars breaks the withdrawal of forces into two phases: “the withdrawal
from active military operations and the final withdrawal.” (USMC Manual, 1940, p. 1)
The first phase “terminates when the local government is in complete control of the
theater of operations.” (USMC Manual, 1940, p. 2) In the application of the First Phase
concept to the war in Iraq, Iraq would still be considered in Phase One. Although the
U.S. armed forces are making an heroic attempt to do so, it seems that no one is truly in
control of the theater of operations, let alone the Iraqi government that is trying to work
without a trained police force and a reliable army. Those security capacities of the Iraqi
government are being trained by U.S. forces, but under wartime conditions – a first in
U.S. history. (British Broadcasting Corporation News Website, “Military Police
‘Training Iraqi Force’,” 24 August 2003)
The final withdrawal or Phase Two according to the 1940 Manual ends when all
U.S. forces have evacuated with all authority and responsibility having been successfully
transferred to the local government. The only exception to this transfer and for troops to
remain would be in the case of a grave emergency. (USMC Manual, 1940, pp. 32– 33)
Two elements of this doctrine would be unfamiliar to those who have observed
recent stability operations. First, the military commander, according to Small Wars,
reports directly to the president of the United States. The Chairman of the Electoral
Commission for the new government is named by the U.S. president, and the Chairman is
usually a flag or general officer.
20
3. Field Manual (FM) 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare (U.S. War
Department, October 1944)
In 1944, the War Department produced a 98-page joint document divided into
twelve chapters that includes a chapter on military occupation and governance of enemy
territory and another on the penalties for violations of the laws of war. The doctrine
familiarizes the World War II-era warfighter with the post-conflict transition and the
prosecution of a Just War.
“So far as the United States forces are concerned, military government and
martial law are exercised by the military commander under the direction of the President,
as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.” (FM 27-10, 1944, p. 3) “In power of
enemy power; treated with humanity; reprisals prohibited. – Prisoners of war are in the
power of the enemy power, but not of the individuals or bodies of troops who capture
them. They must at all times be treated with humanity and protected, particularly against
acts of violence, insults, and public curiosity.” (FM 27-10, 1944, p. 17) This philosophy
on the treatment of prisoners of war was carried over the 1956 version FM 27-10, which
as not yet been superseded. (FM 27-10, 1956, p. 106)
Under the auspices of the military government, the maltreatment of prisoners by

military members (such as those events that took place at Abu Ghraib) is subject to action
by courts martial under the military law concerning misconduct. However, Iraq wasn’t
under a military government, but under interim civilian rule.
According to this field manual, the occupation and military government is a

question of fact. In other words, no other options were considered as alternatives in 1944
for use in winning the peace. The authors of this manual refer to the military occupation
as an “incident of war” and inherent in that effort the “right to exercise control for the
period of the occupation.” This doctrine or teaching makes it clear that sovereignty is not
transferred to the occupying power, but that the occupation is “provisional”. It is based
upon the fact of possession of enemy territory, so that law and order may be maintained
and resistance may be subjugated. (FM 27-10, 1944, p. 75)
“The principal object of the occupant is to provide for the security of the invading
army and to contribute to its support and efficiency and the success of its operations. In
21
restoring public order and safety he will continue in force the ordinary civil and criminal
laws of the occupied territory which do not conflict with this object.” (FM 27-10, 1944,
p. 76) The assumption is that the security of the occupier precedes the security of the
occupied.
In this same section of FM 27-10, it is pointed out that calling the occuping
government “military” or “civilian” is “immaterial” as “its character is the same and the
source of its authority is the same”. The occupying government is characterized by force
and is administered according to the laws of war. (FM 27-10, 1944, p. 76) As stated
earlier, military government is exercised by the military commander under the direction
of the President of the United States – whether or not it called military or civilian.
This is kind of interim government is currently not in use in Afghanistan and Iraq,
wherein the commander of the U.S. armed invasion and occupying forces has not been
used in this fashion. The military government as described in this FM has not been used
in any other armed conflicts in which the United States has engaged since the Korean
War.
4. U.S. Army and Navy Manual of Civil Affairs Military Government
(CAMG), FM 27-5 and OPNAV P22-1115 (October 1947)
As historic joint doctrine, it is important to note how the armed forces thought in
general 60 years ago – what was common to their conception of war and what they were
responsible for in their training in preparation for war. In this little booklet, one finds the
early relationship between military government and civil affairs being developed in
concept.
Military necessity requires in the conduct of operations, as well as in the

fulfillment of obligations imposed upon invading forces under
international law, that such forces institute control of civilian affairs by
military government or otherwise in the occupation or liberated areas.
(FM 27-1/OPNAV P22-1115, 1947, p. 1)
Military government is listed first and is defined as “the supreme authority

exercised by an armed occupying force over the lands, properties, and inhabitants of an
enemy, allied, or domestic territory.” This authority is exercised “whether by force or
agreement and has substituted its authority for that of the sovereign or previous
government.” (FM 27-1/OP NAV P22-1115, 1947, p. 3)
22
“Civil affairs” is defined as “the assumption by the responsible commander of an
armed occupying force of a degree of authority less than the supreme authority assumed
under military government, over enemy, allied, or domestic territory. The indigenous
governments would be recognized by treaty, agreement, or otherwise as having certain
authority independent of the military commander.” (FM 27-10/OP NAV P22-1115,
1947, p. 3)
5. Review of Field Manual 27-10, Law of Land Warfare (U.S. Army,
July 1956)
Some things did change in the years that transpired between the FM 27-10 of
1944 and 1947 and that of 1956. For one, the title changed from the Rules of Land
Warfare to The Law of Land Warfare. But more importantly, the 1956 version tends to
bury “military government” in Chapter Six, which is entitled “Occupation”. The term
and concept is still alive and is still differentiated from “martial law”, which is invoked
upon domestic territory (versus the territory of a former belligerent) and is governed
solely by the domestic laws of the United States (versus the indigenous law of an
occupied nation or international law).
One important aspect of military government and/or martial law that remains
constant over the 12 years since 1944 is that “so far as the United States forces are
concerned, military government and martial law are exercised by the military commander
under the direction of the President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.” (FM
27-10, 1956, p. 10) This concept of the direct authority of the President is critical in
forming the foundation of legitimacy for the interim government. The interim military
government cannot possibly retain its own authority, but must act on behalf of the
president to whom it is fully accountable.
6. U.S. Joint Manual of Civil Affairs and Military Government
(CAMG), November 1958
In this “new” version of the old 1947 CAMG publication, civil affairs (CA) is
now listed ahead of military government in Chapter 1, instead of listing CA as a function
of the commander of the military government in territory that might have enemies. CA is
defined as “the matters concerning the relationship between military forces located in a
friendly country or area and the civil authorities and people of that country or area
usually involving performance by the military forces of certain functions or the exercise
23
of certain authority normally the responsibility of the local government.” In current joint
doctrine, civil affairs is not a “matter” or a relationship. Civil affairs is presently a group
of military members trained and equipped to do civil affairs activities in support of civil-
military operations.
7. Joint Manual for Civil Affairs, November 1966 (FM 41-5, OPNAV
09B2P1, AFM 110-7, NAVMC 2500)
This manual introduces the concept of “military-civil relationships” in its
introductory chapter. The civil affairs operations as part of some sort of military
operation “bring civil attitudes, needs, and goals to the attention of the military
commander, and they convey similar matters to appropriate civilian agencies.” These CA
individuals through their operations offer advice, assistance, recommendations and
essential liaison support between the military and the civilian community, where the hope
is to live “harmoniously”. (Joint Manual, 1966, pp. 3 – 4)
In this same section of the introductory chapter (#1), a couple of sentences

describe what has been labeled by past publications or manuals as “military governance”.
Included, also, may be complete assumption of executive, legislative,

judicial, and administrative functions of an occupied enemy territory
during or immediately subsequent to hostilities. Such matters as location,
agreements in force, national policy, international law, and whether
hostilities are in progress influence the conduct of civil affairs. (Joint
Manual, 1966, p. 4)
The manual then outlines a laundry list of “circumstances” wherein CA

operations may be conducted. The list reads like a condensed list of MOOTW of today –
show of force, counterinsurgency, disaster relief, civil defense assistance, occupation of
enemy or liberated territory, and during wartime activities in the United States. (Joint
Manual, 1966, p. 4) Military government is given an honorable mention, but in a half
page at the end of Chapter One in fine print so as to perhaps not be noticed.
One other item of note in this Manual is the role for the State Department put
forth in this Department of Defense publication in seven (7) guidelines for “nation-
building”.
24
In the field of civil affairs, the Department of State has primary or
collateral interest in determination, among others, of policies concerning –
1) The foreign government with which the U.S. armed force were to deal,
2) the extend of governmental intervention, 3) matters that impact other
foreign relations, 4) the economic level to be maintained, 5) the level of
feeding for civilians, 6) all matters of psychological warfare and
associated programs, and 7) the plans for turning civil affairs activities
over to civilian control after the conclusion of hostilities either generally
or in a given country or area. (Joint Manual, 1966, p. 12)
It is evident that the two Departments were supposed to plan these kinds of
operations together, but with the State Department holding the reins. Perhaps, depending
on the Secretaries in charge of these Departments, this kind of shared arrangement might
bring with it some battles of its own, and hence, a reluctance on the part of the
Department of Defense to secede power to its non-warfighting sister Department. The
overall end result may have been a reluctance to take part in this kind of by either
Department and the beginning of a search for new and more flexible arrangements.
8. Review of Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operation (U.S. Army,
October 1969)
This mid-Vietnam War field manual puts military government and martial law
squarely into the civil affairs camp as a function of the CA concept. Since the military
government and martial law carry a heavy judicial component, this 1969 doctrine
redirects the reporting authority of past doctrine on military government, from the U.S.
president to the appropriate staff judge advocate, and in so doing removes the foundation
for the legitimacy required for such an operation. (FM 41-10, 1969, p. 1-1) The FM goes
on to describe the three aspects of civil affairs which are 1) the concept of CA, 2) the CA
operations to attain political-military objectives, and 3) CA organization “consisting of
the staffs and units particularly designed and trained” to supervise and conduct CA
operations. (FM 41-10, 1969, p. 1-2)
Chapter 12 of this FM is entitled “Military Government”, which discusses the

basic principles of such a situation. These principles are:
• International law requires the occupant, so far as he is able, to maintain an
orderly government in occupied territory.
• No nation may expect to gain a lasting victory from modern warfare
without taking into account the future activities and orientation of the
enemy civil government and population.
25
• An organization must be planned; it cannot be improvised.
• To be effective, military government must act as both the instrument and,
if adequate guidance has not been provided, the creator of foreign policy.
• Military government is not a permanent regime, and from the outset plans
must be made for the transfer of power to civil authority. (FM 41-10,
1969, p. 12-1)
Next in this chapter comes the all-important “rationale for the creation of a
military government”. Here, the unique capabilities of a land force are described as the
providing of control of the enemy’s land and population as well as “enforcing the
surrender terms after victory has been assured.” According to this FM, the U.S. Army
has historically been assigned the responsibilities of military governance through the
replacement of civil authority in the conquered and/or occupied territories until it can be
restored by treaty or inaugurated with U.S. consent and legitimately assume power. (FM
41-10, 1969, p. 12-2)
Probably the most important aspect of this 200-plus page document, which is
acknowledged by its authors, is its discussion of the legal and international foundations
for such governance. It discusses at length its foundation in international law, originating
with The Hague Convention No. IV, with respect to the Law and Customs of War on
Land of 1907 (HR) and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War of 1949 (GC). The FM expects all CA personnel to have a good
working knowledge of international law and conventions and goes on then to discuss the
treatment of the population, respect for existing law, and the protection of cultural
property as the foundational requirements for a lawful military government. (FM 41-10,
1969, p. 12-2)
But in the end, the concept of the military occupation and government as an
effective tool in the transition to peace is rendered powerless through the removal of its
position, reporting directly to the President of the United States.
C. CURRENT U.S. WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE
The fundamental purpose of the Armed Forces is to win the Nation’s
wars. Success in combat in defense of national sovereignty, territorial
integrity, societal values, and national interests is the essential goal and
measure of value of the profession of arms in American society….
26
Joint doctrine — an “engine of change” — serves as an important method
for implementing change as forces train and build effective joint teams. It
facilitates development of a common joint culture from which to integrate
Service cultures and doctrines. (JP 1, 2000: Joint Warfare of the Armed
Forces of the United States of America, pp. I-9 and III-1; Emphasis in the
original)
Perhaps the best way to describe joint warfighting doctrine today is by the single
term “disjointed”. Joint doctrine breaks war down into “levels” and defines war as “large
scale combat operations” versus “military operations other than war” (MOOTW). (JP 1,
2000, pp. xi and III-14) As seen in an earlier review of the USMC Small Wars Manual of
1940, wars came in all sizes with the difference between “small” and “major” wars being
who initiated them – the President in the protection of American lives, property, and
interests abroad or Congress. (USMC Manual, 1940, p. 4) The most notable difference
between JP 1 and USMC Small Wars Manual is that in the Manual, the word “combat” is
fully interchangeable with the word “war”. Small wars are not limited by their size or by
their cost in dollars or lives. (Manual, 1940, p. 23) According to JP 1, combat exists
separately from war and can stand alone in a new, more general category called
“conflict”. (JP 1, 2000, p. I-4)
“Small wars vary in degrees from simple demonstrative operations to military

intervention in the fullest sense, short of war.” (Manual, 1940, p. 23) In essence, what
the USMC Manual is calling small wars, recent joint publications are now calling
MOOTW. But something is lost in this exchange of terms – namely the use of the word
“war”. In the extraction of combat from war and the spreading of the combat concept
across “operations other than war”, current joint publications change the foundation of
war. If a combat operation is named something other than war, then perhaps all of the
rules of a Just War do not apply, and even if they might apply, they can be modified.
World War II-era Service doctrine taught that any combat – large or small, sustained or
short-term – equated to a war and that winning the peace was integral to the concept of
war. (Manual, p. 28) But with the onslaught of the Cold War, the United Nations and
Vietnam, the traditional doctrine of war, which incorporated a holistic view of the post-
conflict transition to peace, has been replaced with separate doctrines on low-intensity
conflict, MOOTW, civil-military operations, and post-conflict transition.
27
Although stated up front in the capstone publication, JP-1 that winning the
nation’s wars is the primary purpose of the armed forces of the United States (JP-1, 2000,
p. I-9), very little discussion on the critical role of the armed forces in conflict
termination and post-conflict operations is found. Instead one finds a short description of
war as “large scale combat” and its principles according to Clausewitz before it launches
into a lengthy discussion of what the U.S. armed forces have done most of (by joint
doctrine definition) since 1953 – military operations other than war. (JP 3-0, 2001, p. I-
2)
Although war is conspicuously short-changed in both the capstone JP-1 and the
more specific JP 3-0 volumes, an even larger and questionable vacuum is that found on
the subject of “termination and post-conflict operations”, accompanied by an almost total
blackout of the term “military government” in Service doctrine. In JP-1, one finds an
important cycle of policy-formulation and policy-execution, wherein the military advises
the National Command Authorities (NCA), acts only with their authorization, and the
NCA in turn “directs the dimensions of the conflict termination.” (JP-1, p. II-6) In JP 3-
0, one finds all of 38 words dedicated to discussion on the topic as authoritative guidance
to field commanders in the wake of a war. (JP 3-0, p. IV-20)
If the purpose of war is peace, then the lack of developed doctrine on the
transition from war to peace is a strange state of affairs in the warfighting doctrine of
today. Whatever the reasons are for this state of affairs in doctrine, the fact remains that
no clear plan for the U.S. armed forces is captured in joint doctrine, leaving a vacuum of
training and capacity at this critical point in the warfighting process.
1. U.S. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting (MCDP 1,
1997)
In the preface to MCDP 1, war is “timeless and ever-changing”. An important
aspect of war is presented to the warfighter in this publication – that the basic nature of
war is a constant. The weaponry and skills of applying them may change, but the goal is
the same – to make a political point or change at the pain of death. This preface also
recognizes that a new nature of war has surfaced in the decade prior to the publication of
28
this doctrine. The authors are not specific, but this new nature seems to be the military
operation other than war range that is introduced later in the publication. (Preface to
MCDP 1)
The range of military operations is described as those starting on one end of the
spectrum called military operations other than war, wherein military power is restrained
and selective. On the other end is the “large-scale, sustained combat operation such as
global conflict between major powers” or general war. (MCDP, 1997, p. 26) Although
described as a range, nothing holds the middle ground of that range. There is only
MOOTW and war, which is in line with the concepts put forth by joint doctrine. Putting
two and two together, one reads that the new nature of war is that war’s nature is large –
defined only by the size of the armed conflict and not on what the armed forces do in
armed conflict.
Within this 113-page document, there is no mention whatsoever of “military

government”, an old term eradicated in the military’s new conception of the nature of war
– large-scale sustained combat operations, separate and distinct from the post-victory
return to stability and peace. Instead, one finds here long discussions about the nature
and theory of war – the human dimension, the science and art of war, the levels of war,
styles of warfare, and some of the principles of war.
War is further defined as “a violent clash of interests between or among organized

groups characterized by the use of military force.” (MCDP 1, 1997, p. 3) The
publication recognizes that war and peace “rarely exist in practice.” (MCDP 1, 1997, p.
4) The authors go on to state that “war is a social phenomenon…. We thus conclude that
the conduct of war is fundamentally a dynamic process of human competition requiring
both the knowledge of science and the creativity of art but driven ultimately by the power
of human will.” (MCDP 1, 1997, p. 19; Emphasis in the original)
A window of insight opens within this publication when it states that “military
strategy can be thought of as the art of winning wars and securing peace”. (MCDP 1,
1997, p. 28) It is unusual to find the two concepts together in one sentence, yet given the
history of the small wars wherein marines were very experienced and successful at the
29
whole war, the two concepts go hand in hand – even in present day military thinking,
which is so very removed from the small wars of the past.
D. CURRENT U.S. DOCTRINE ON MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER
THAN WAR
In February 2001, the nebulous region of civil-military operations (CMO)
received its own rather large joint publication, JP 3-57, a mind-boggling 195-page
document, which deals extensively with the post-conflict transition to peace. In addition
to the CMO doctrine, a stand-alone joint publication on Civil Affairs (CA) has also been
sanctioned – JP 3-57.1, yet another 155-page document dated April 2003. This doctrine
is subordinate to the CMO doctrine and states that CA are the military component forces
“who are specially trained and suited to perform CMO liaison with the varied civil
agencies and multinational partners in the operational area.” (JP 3-57.1, 2003, p. 9)
1. JP 3-07, Military Operations Other Than War (1995)
Perhaps the single most confusing term in current joint doctrine is what has come
to be known as military operations other than war or MOOTW. Described on column #1
of page I-1 of JP3-07, MOOTW is a range of military operations short of war. (Emphasis
added) Across the page in column #2, MOOTW is said to “focus on deterring war,
resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to
domestic crises.” Then in bold face, the doctrine reads: MOOTW may involve elements of
both combat and noncombat operations in peacetime, conflict, and war situations. (JP 3-
07, 1995, p. I-1, Emphasis in the original) It seems as though the authors of this doctrine
highlighted specific text to emphasize their own confusion. How can an operation be
short of war yet involve combat in war situations? Perhaps the answer lies in not what it
is, but in what it is not.
MOOTW is not only not war, it is also intended not to bind US military forces to
requirements of international law. JP 3-07 conducts a very intricate tap dance, in order to
avoid obligating the U.S. armed forces in the post-conflict transition – the most difficult
and sometimes costly part of the war. If MOOTW remains a nebulous, gray area that is
defined by whoever reads it in as many ways, then no one is exactly sure what it requires
and how it can be applied. It is flexibility at its finest.
30
“War” is a term reserved for large-scale, sustained combat operations. However,
MOOTW operates on a flexible schedule. “Many MOOTW may be conducted on short
notice and last for a relatively short period of time…. On the other hand, some types of
MOOTW may last for an extended period of time to achieve the desired end state.” (JP
3-07, 1995, p. I-7) The first three of the six MOOTW principles are war principles, but
that the last three are MOOTW specific. These specific principles are: restraint,
perseverance and legitimacy. (JP 3-07, 1995, p. II-1) If war is sustained and MOOTW
can be, and if the Just War should also be characterized by restraint, perseverance and
legitimacy, the war and MOOTW are not very different after all.
Interestingly, in Chapter IV, one finds a section which discusses “transition from
wartime operations to MOOTW” and “termination of operations”. The publication gives
the impression that these periods are separate and distinct from the battles of the war and
perhaps not even really related to war at all. These activities follow “significant military
involvement and include: transition to civil authorities, support to truce negotiations, civil
affairs support to reestablish a civil government, psychological operations to foster
continued peaceful relations, and continuing logistic support from engineering and
transportation units. (JP 3-07, 1995, p. IV-12) According to this section, “a
commander’s campaign plan should include a transition from wartime operations to
MOOTW.” “Should” suggests “optional”.
Following the post-conflict activities, the publication moves quickly on to

termination of operations in the space of one page. “As in war, MOOTW operational
planning includes actions to be taken as soon as the operation is complete.” These
“Termination of Operations Actions” may include but are not limited to: transition to
civil authority, marking and clearing minefields, closing financial obligations, pre-
deployment activities, and redeploying forces. (JP 3-07, 1995, pp. IV-12 – 13) The
entire joint doctrine discussion of transition from “wartime operations to MOOTW” and
the “termination of operations” that is authoritative and binding upon the Services takes
approximately two pages. The rest of the entire 70 page document is taken up with the
principles of MOOTW, the range of MOOTW, and the planning for MOOTW, all with
one focus – to create a new category of flexible combat or near-combat that can be used
31
without falling into the total or general war trap with all of its responsibility and
aftermath.
2. JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operation (2001)
“Civil Administration in Hostile or Occupied Territory. In a civil administration
by an occupying power, also called military government, international law contains
provisions as to the authorities of the occupying power and the obligations of the
submitting government.” (JP 3-57, 2001, p. I-18; bold-face in the original)
“The most critical civil-component is governance: who will provide civil

administration of the occupied or liberated area? ….Options for post-conflict governing
authorities may be to return governance to former authorities, to install a new
government, to establish an international organization as an interim governing body, or,
as a last resort, to establish an interim military government until a civilian government
can be formed.” (JP 3-57, p. I-19, bold-face in the original; underlining added)
“The US military contributes to shaping the security environment and addresses

threats to US interests by conducting CMO using a variety of types of units. …Civil-
military operations are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence,
or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian
organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace…. CMO may include
performance by military forces of activities and functions which are normally the
responsibility of local, regional, or national government.” (JP 3-57, p. I-1, bold-face in
the original)
The publication then launches into a detailed discussion on when these activities
might occur (before, during, after or in the absence of “other military actions”), on the
range of individuals who might perform these operations (CA or other military forces or
some combination thereof), and then on the range of military operations (from war to
NEO). The publication mentions that CMO included liaising with multinational and
indigenous forces and government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
and international organizations (IOs). The entire concept is built upon a “Country Team”
foundation that includes many of the above mentioned civilian organizations, creating by
the very nature of the organizations, difficulties in communication and coordination. (p.
32
I-4) Stated very clearly are three CMO objectives: 1) Support national objectives, 2)
enhance military effectiveness, and 3) reduce negative impact of military operations on
civilians. (JP 3-57, p. I-8)
3. JP 3-57.1, Civil Affairs (2003)
Civil affairs in this volume are to be “capable of providing functional expertise in
civilian sector disciplines necessary for CA assessments, civil assistance, civil
administration, and military government”. (JP 3-57.1, 2003, III-4) In DOD Directive
2000.13, Civil Affairs (1994), the military government and civil administration are
interchangeable, which seems to carry over to JP 3-57.1 but with restriction. (DODD
2000.13, 1994)
First, when compared to the military government of 1940s doctrine, the civil
administration of today does not report directly to the president of the United States, but
instead to a designated authority or to the Secretary of Defense. Secondly, in complete
deviation from the old doctrine of war, the civil administration can also act on the
authority of a nation, alliance, coalition of nations or the United Nations. (JP 3-57.1,
2003, p. II-11) This new arrangement of the chain of command (a new nature) answers
perhaps why U.S. military leadership today is reluctant to advise the policymaker in the
use of the civil administration, since the legitimacy of the 1940s concept with its direct
reporting to the president of the United States is lost.
The term “military government” is used only four times in this latest joint civil
affairs manual. This publication references DOD Directive (DODD) 2000.13, Civil
Affairs, many times as its authoritative source, and surprisingly, it lists the military
government as an option under the functions DOD that may be provided in the
administration of “civil affairs”. (DODD 2000.13, 1994, p. 2) The military government
is defined by this directive as the “form of administration by which an occupying power
exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied territory.” (DODD
2000.13, 1994, p. 9)
Although at first, the terms seem to be interchangeable, JP 3-57.1 insists on using

both terms in different locations. However, when one turns to the glossary of terms in the
back of JP 3-57.1, one finds “civil administration” defined, but not the military
33
government. This leads one to believe that the new term for military government is civil
administration, but the publication confuses the issue by using both terms throughout.
The phrase “military operations other than war” is mentioned 11 times in the new
CA manual, but the most pertinent of these states that MOOTW is the Armed Forces’
“inherent secondary purpose in the advancement of national interests.” (JP 3-57.1, 2003,
p. VII-1) War is mentioned 35 times without reference to the winning of the peace, but
the authors are reluctant to go into detail on what exactly war includes. It is mentioned
several times on a scale in conjunction with MOOTW. MOOTW is pictured as a
balancing act between combat operations through the use of combat forces against hostile
forces while CMO assets strengthen the civilian infrastructure. (JP 3.57.1, 2003, p. I-4)
Applying this concept to the real world, the result is a window into what the U.S.
armed forces are doing currently in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The U.S. and coalition
forces have faced continuous combat situations in their efforts to secure the region while
CMO have being executed in the form of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance Coalition directly following the declaration of victory, and followed by the
Provisional Authority in May 2003. On-going through this reconstruction period under
the umbrella of CMO have also been the reconstruction of the Iraqi Police Service,
development of the judiciary system and the prisons, the recreation of the armed forces
and the defense ministry, as well as the intelligence services. Missing from this report,
however, is any mention of the reconstruction of the houses, schools and social
institutions of the people of Iraq. (RAND Study, Establishing Law & Order after
Conflict, 2005, pp. 115 – 116)
Joint doctrine on Civil Affairs does not contain any specific information on a
continuum of war – what constitutes its beginning and its end. It provides very little
insight into the military government, but negates the old use of the term by equating it
with the current civil administration concept. By observing the CA concept and its
accompanying civil administration in action at present in Iraq, the result is that the
military is not in charge of the whole operation, to include the CMO. Instead, the work is
split with the military taking the combat portion and the civil administration run by U.S.
civilians and appointed Iraqi nationals. Although the civil administration does in concept
34
report eventually to the president of the United States, much authority and legitimacy is
lost due to the middle echelons of authority in charge of the whole scenario of combat
with its supporting CMO activities.
4. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability and Support Operations
(SASO)
In this publication – which superseded FM 100-20 (1990), FM 100-23 (1994), FM
90-29 (1994), and FM 100-19 (1993) in 2003, the term Stability Operations and Support
Operations (SASO) seems to be the replacement doctrine for parts of the interim or
transitional “military government”. The confusing and overlapping definitions continue
here in the basic definition of what a SASO might be according to this manual.
Offensive and defensive operations normally dominate military operations

in war, as well as some smaller-scale contingencies. On the other hand,
stability operations and support operations predominate in MOOTW that
may include certain smaller-scale contingencies and peacetime military
engagements. (FM 3-07, 2003, p. 1-1)
In summary, MOOTW includes offensive, defensive, big-war, small-war, war-

time, stability, support, and peace-time operations. Better said, MOOTW is everything
except declared, global war. SASO, however, seem to be predominate in smaller-scale
contingencies versus large-scale ones.
Stability operations’ purpose is to “promote and sustain regional and global

stability.” Support operations’ primary role is to “meet the immediate needs of
designated groups, for a limited time, until civil authorities can accomplish these tasks
without military assistance.” These tasks can be domestic support operations (now under
Homeland Security) and foreign humanitarian assistance. (FM 3-07, 2003, p. 1-2)
SASO remains a nebulous, loosely defined bridge of cooperation between civilians and
the military – eager to make the handoff to someone else as soon as possible. The word or
words “handover” or “hand over” are used nine times in this manual. The word
“transfer” is used seven times in reference to the handover or transfer of a vital piece or
all of the military’s responsibility to someone else – a nonspecific civilian organization
such as an international organization (IO), non-governmental organization (NGO), a non-
specific civil authority, a governmental agency, or perhaps another military group.
35
The manual also identifies the history of SASO as grounded in such operations as
the “stability operations” in the Philippines from 1899 to 1904 and in Haiti from 1915 to
1934. A good description of these long and arduous occupations is completely and
conspicuously absent, considering these were not “stability operations, but full fledged
military occupational governments. Although the bulk of the fighting and subjugation
took place between 1899 and 1904, U.S. soldiers occupied and governed pivotal parts of
the Philippines until the early 1930s. In 1935, the Philippines became a Commonwealth,
but the nation was not granted independence from the United States until 1946, and the
last U.S. military base was not closed until 1991.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippines; accessed 11 September 2005)
There are a plethora of other historic “SASOs” that are not covered here in the
one brief paragraph that mentions the above two occupations, and the two that are
mentioned were far more than “stability operations”. It must be noted that inherent in the
reference to the Philippine and Haitian occupations of the early 20th Century, the U.S.
Army equates stability operations with the military government, but in a lesser form
according to the authoritative joint doctrine’s form of the same – “civil administration”.
With the Army using SASO as their operating term, which is related to, but not exactly
the same as, the joint term of “civil administration”, one begins to see how confusion
might rein in the world of civil affairs.
5. U.S. Army Field Manual 41-10 (2000)
This FM is pivotal in one’s understanding of how military government became
civil affairs. “On 17 August 1955, the CA Military Government Branch became the
USAR [United States Army Reserve] Branch; on 2 October 1959, it became the CA
Branch. The major organizational development of the branch traces back to the
expansion of the War Department during WWII.” (FM 41-10, 2000, p. 3-1) There were
thus three shifts: first, the organizational specialization; second, the doctrinal terms (from
military government to civil affairs); and third, military government went from being an
active duty function to one of the reserve component.
The CA section describes the primary function of all Army CA units as the
support of CMO (civil-military operations). Ironically, the ability to govern is no longer
required. This CA team is more attuned to intelligence, cultural considerations, “civic
36
administration” (a redefined interchangeable term with military government in JP 3-57.1,
but one that means something completely different), and to help minimize civilian
interference with military operations. (FM 41-10, 2000, p. 3-4) Although this doctrine
describes a “government team” construct, its functions are limited to providing “technical
expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance to the supported command…. [The
government team] [C]onducts assessments of government resources and systems and
determines how these may impact CMO.” (FM 41-10, 2000, p. 3-7)
This team provides technical advice and assistance in identifying resources for
many of the same functions over which the occupying military government had authority
in the past, such as that found in the Philippines in 1903 – public administration, public
education, public safety, international law, public health, public transportation and
communications, local economics, dislocated civilians, and engineering.
Currently, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), joint civil-military units

in place throughout Afghanistan, act primarily as advisors to the provisional government
and the joint forces commanders still working out the many issues involved in the process
of winning the war still in progress. These PRTs act as advisors to indigenous
governmental members on many of the issues mentioned above, but do so without
authority to carry out any of those actions on which they advise.
The success or failure of the programs lies almost completely in the indigenous
government and its infrastructure, whereas the PRTs’ activities are relegated to
“establishing working relationships”, providing security support, developing and
mentoring the Afghanistan army, and “conducting needs assessments”. (U.S. Agency for
International Development [USAID] Website, Afghanistan, Provincial Reconstruction
Teams Article, n.d.)
It must be noted that IOs and NGOs in today’s stabilization and reconstruction
environment, however, do not in general agree with being paired with the U.S. military in
the pursuit of a lasting peace. It was evident in observation of participants in the civil-
military conference held at Naval Postgraduate School in August 2005 that many
members of IOs, such as the Red Cross, are not keen on working side-by-side with the
military. Some suspect the military presence of adding to the difficulty of ending the
37
armed conflict and of increasing the efforts, while reducing the safety, of those NGOs
who are there to rebuild. (Personal observation, Civ-Mil Working Conference, NPS,
August 2005)
The critical piece of authority under the president of the United States has been
completely removed from this manual. “Civil administration” retains some aspects of the
old military government much as it does in the JP 3-57.1 concept of it (FM 41-10, 2000,
p. 1-1), but in the definition found in the glossary, the civil administration is imposed in
hostile territory that the U.S. forces occupy by a “foreign government”. (FM 41-10,
2000, p. Glossary-3) This foreign government is not identified, might perhaps be the
United States, but according to joint doctrine, should only be so as a “last resort”.
6. U.S. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 3, Expeditionary Operations
(MCDP 3, 1998)
This publication contains no references to military governments, nation-building
or small wars. It does use the word “war” 83 times, however, in its discussion of the
World Wars, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Cold War, the Gulf War, military
operations other than war, and the distinction between war and criminal violence.
(USMC DP3, 1998, p. 13). In the discussion of various wars, the publication calls
attention to the difference between MOOTW and major theater wars (USMC DP3, 1998,
p. 89). Therefore, this Service doctrine, which at one time taught so clearly the concept
of the military government, now follows the direction of authoritative joint doctrine and
adds to the confusion of what to do to win the peace.
This doctrine implies that a major regional conflict is equal to the joint doctrine’s
definition of war – direct military conflict with a major power (USMC) and large-scale
sustained combat (joint). However, the USMC doctrine goes on to state that this kind of
an event is unlikely. This discussion leads to the belief that U.S. marines are currently
taught that combat is war, and war is combat – that the two terms are equal and the sum
total of war is combat. This is a huge change from the USMC doctrine of the 1940s that
taught that war was a continuum – a return to peace through a military government.
Military operations other than war are defined by the USMC as a “range of
military operations short of war.” (USMC DP3, 1998, pp. 108 – 109) This definition
implies that the USMC understands MOOTW to be something other than combat. For
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the marine of 1940, war was combat, but also included an occupation. Presently, any
combat going on during a war would be part of a war and not short of war, and therefore,
combat is still part of war and cannot stand alone.
With this example of the use of the word war versus MOOTW, one can begin to
see the difficulty that arises in having a category that spans both definitions – combat.
The following passage uses the term combat in a way that contradicts the earlier USMC
definition of MOOTW:
Military operations other than war may also take place in environments
characterized by widespread random violence or even combat of less than
large scale.
In military operations other than war more than in war, political concerns
tend to restrict the application of military force. Political considerations
may even necessitate military actions or deployments that are not
militarily advantageous. (USMC DP3, 1998, p. 109)
As General Douglas MacArthur learned in Korea, political considerations that are

not necessarily advantageous or aligned with the warfighting commanders’ conception of
the prosecution of the war are always a limiting factor. That limitation does not
distinguish between war and “not war.”
E. CURRENT BRITISH, CANADIAN AND AUSTRALIAN WARFIGHTING
DOCTRINES
1. British
British Military Doctrine (BMD) takes its position on general war from the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) perspective. The forces for general war are not a
large standing army, but are instead generated by a mobilization of reserve forces added
to the standing units. (BMD, 1996, p. 16)
The British take a very different approach to the use of their armed forces versus
how U.S. armed forces. British forces are prescribed to be used in two ways – to NATO
for general war and to civil authorities for emergencies, disasters, and restoration of law
and order when the civil security forces cannot do so. U.S. forces are not subject to
control or use by any external authority and are not to be used to step in for the local
police. (BMD, 1996, pp. 17 – 18)
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“Operations other than war” is a term used in British Military Doctrine.
However, no mention is made of civil administration or military government in the
British Army’s military doctrine. In Army Doctrine Publication, Volume 5, Soldiering
(Feb 2000), however, is found the statement that “soldiers operate in a complex spectrum
which embraces conflict presentation operations, conflict itself, and post-conflict
activities… (p. 1-1) By this statement, it seems the British Army defines war as armed
conflict and recognizes that it is a continuum. However, it does not contain any direction
on who performs what functions during the post-conflict activities.
2. Canadian
Canadian military doctrine is divided into eight areas on the Deputy Chief of
Defense Staff website. These areas are: Personnel Issues, Intelligence, Operations,
Support to Operations, Operational Planning, Joint CIS, Mobilization, and Joint Civil-
Military Cooperation (CIMIC). The primary Canadian Forces Operations doctrine of war
is found in one manual – B-GJ-005-300/FP-000, dated November 2004. This
comprehensive 234-page document is replete with a plethora of doctrine on military
operations, armed conflict, command and control, campaign planning, training, task force
organization, intelligence use, defense against WMD, space operations, civil-military
considerations, electronic warfare, public affairs, psychological operations, health
services, and personnel support. Parts of it are “still to be written” (p. x). Supporting this
mammoth publication are eight subordinate publications that seem to be amplifications of
the primary publication listed above.
3. Australian
Australian military doctrine is found in its individual Service doctrines. It seems
no official joint military doctrine is published. However, in the Army’s doctrine, one
finds a six-chapter volume and 78 pages. This doctrine includes the classic principles of
war, a discussion about the differences between “conflict” and “war”, military strategy,
the Australian national security framework, levels of command, strategic context,
warfighting philosophy (the maneuver approach and centers of gravity), fighting power
(the moral component – purpose, integrity, morale), and measurements of effectiveness
(relevance, sustainability, flexibility, efficiency). The document also contains several
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annexes to include one on a description of military doctrine, on the history of Australian
military strategy, on training, and on the Law of Armed Conflict.
The Australian Air Force’s doctrine is very well articulated in ten chapters and
provides the following definition of doctrine:
Doctrine is prescriptive and authoritative, but not directive. It is not a

statement of national policy or even military strategy; it is nothing more
than a set of beliefs based on historic precedent that forms a framework
for military action. Doctrine is not law and never intended to be used as
such. Doctrine…forms a fundamental component of our military power.
(Australian Aerospace Doctrine, Chap. 1, p. 7)
The Australian aerospace doctrine goes on to state that “doctrine is only effective
if applied correctly by expert practitioners who understand history, theory, culture,
technology, and context” (AAD, Chap. 1, p. 7).
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Current joint warfighting doctrine is massive, unwieldy, compartmentalized and
yet overlapping, confusing, repetitive, incomplete, and exclusive of a discussion of war.
Instead of a well-developed doctrine of war, a segmented plethora of doctrines on
operations other than war have developed. Due to the Congressional mandate that joint
doctrine be authoritative over Service doctrine, the Services are using it as a baseline for
their own. Unfortunately, joint warfighting doctrine has developed away from its
historical roots in a holistic concept of war. Of course, it must be updated to meet the
demands of a rapidly changing world, but certain timeless truths have been lost in time.
Doctrine begins with an understanding of why the mission is to be accomplished

and what that mission should be. Well stated by the Australian Ministry of Defence,
doctrine “is a set of beliefs based upon historic precedent.” Doctrine then becomes the
foundation for all an organization does. It is most likely a reflection of what the
organization is already doing, but it should also look in all directions with a 360-degree
perspective. The overarching doctrine of an organization should also be timeless, laying
out general concepts, beliefs, and principles to be applied more specifically at lower
levels, down to the point of the individual who makes the mission a reality.
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Not surprisingly, United States, British, Canadian, and Australian doctrines on
war are similar in that they are all founded upon the classic Clausewitzian principles of
war and upon an ethical code of conduct. Considering that the primary purpose of armed
forces is to wage and win the nation’s wars, what is surprising is the scant discussion of
the Just War Theory and the international laws of war, timeless truths which provide the
foundation and guidelines for what the warfighter does during war. Nor do the British,
Canadians or Australians discuss any post-war responsibilities of their respective armed
forces or the lack thereof.
The concept of the military governance in order to shape the peace for a defeated
enemy nation and territory was the way of life for the Army and the Marine Corps –
regardless of the size of the war. Combat was most certainly – armed conflict between
pirates, rebels or regulars and the U.S. armed forces. Military operations other than war
didn’t exist, because most of what engaged the U.S. armed forces on the sea and on land
included combat which was part of war. When the war was won, the occupation started.
Insurgencies were put down in the jungles of the Philippines, Haiti, Cuba, South
America, Japan and in Europe.
War is certainly not a one-size-fits-all situation, and as the world has grown in
complexity, so have the ways in which to deal with it. However, to redefine war, to
break it into components, and to take out the parts that are particularly difficult at which
to be successful has created a false environment called “operations other than war”. Akin
to the dark side of the moon, this conundrum can be corrected with huge benefit to all.
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V. THE UNITED STATES AT WAR: SIX CASES
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
The history of the United States shows that in spite of the varying trend of
the foreign policy of succeeding administrations, this Government has
interposed or intervened in the affairs of other states with remarkable
regularity, and it may be anticipated that the same general procedure will
be followed in the future. (U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940,
p. 4)
If the past is any indication of the future, the picture the U.S. Marine Corps had in
1940 of war trends holds more truth today than it did then. John Keegan has said of the
20th Century that it is “mankind’s most bloody and hateful century.” (Keegan, p. 391)
International politics have failed with over 87,000,000 combatants and civilians dead due
to war and another 80,000,000 people killed deliberately by their own governments.
(Brzezinski, pp. 4, 7 – 18) It is safe to assume that war is going to be with mankind well
into the 21st Century, requiring armed forces that are capable and prepared to deal with it.
How the United States in particular is going to deal with it now and later is the question.
Total, general, declared, large-scale war is the rare exception in the warmaking
history of the United States. Only two wars come to mind as such wherein the civilian
leadership of the nation was willing to do whatever it took to win the war and clearly
didn’t seek to mask the intent: the Civil War and World War II. In the first 145 years of
the United States’ existence (1789 – 1934), the U.S. Marines made 180 landings on
foreign soil. (Boot, p. xiv) As stated above in the U.S. Marine Corps manual on small
wars, foreign intervention in the form of “small wars” is the norm for the United States,
and when one is the pointy tip of the spear, one had best be prepared so as to not only
survive, but also to be successful in the expenditure of life.
The fighting of small wars under any name – low intensity conflict, police action,
MOOTW – is not an easy job. These are usually fought in extreme and hostile
environments against an invisible enemy that is vicious, not in uniform, familiar with his
own territory, and bent on confusing the invaders to the point of exhaustion and
demoralization and not necessarily on its opponent’s defeat.
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Contrary to current public and policymaker opinion and background knowledge,
it is interesting to note that historically the “norm” was for the United States to engage its
armed forces in nation-building or what is currently labeled the post-conflict transition to
peace – which is hardly post-conflict. Wars fought prior to the Korean War were
prosecuted to the full extent of the abilities of the military with the purpose of securing
peace through the building of an amenable foreign government or through full annexation
as in the case of what is today the southwestern United States. Whether or not the United
States had any right to have waged these wars is another debate, saved for another time.
But the fact remains that the United States armed forces have a long and quite
distinguished history of nation-building.
This dangerous and difficult arena known today as “post-conflict” is filled with
conflict and was not in the past considered an “operation other than war”. It was the
other half of the war – part and parcel of the package of war – and was the only course of
action by which the peace could be secured. As illustrated in the previous chapter,
doctrine today is founded upon the belief that the peace can be won without the full
engagement and authority of the armed forces, but as one can see in the newspapers
today, this approach is not working at present. (“The Struggle for Iraq,” BBC News
Online, UK Edition, 19 September 2005)
The winning of the peace is perhaps more dangerous than the campaign itself as it
is historically filled with insurrection. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are no different
up to the point of the declared victory. At this point, instead of installing a military
government to guide and ensure the peace in all aspects (security, judicial, educational,
engineering), the United States installed a civilian interim government before the dust
had settled and has repeated the mantra of “Iraqis to rebuild Iraq – it’s their future”. Alan
Larson, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, stated
that in the aftermath of years of misgovernment – even though the military victory was
swift and decisive – the rebuilding of Iraq will take longer. He goes on to explain that
“most of this work will – and rightly should – fall to the citizens of Iraq.” After all, he
says, it is their country. (Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4
June 2003, U.S. Department of State Website)
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But such was not always the case when the United States waged war. Depending
on the war and the ensuing post-conflict situation, the U.S. military conducted an array of
civil-military operations wherein the armed forces were the force of war and peace,
beginning to end and many times over decades.
B. THREE WARS OF THE 19TH CENTURY
The nation-building expertise of the U.S. military begins, as stated earlier, with
the troops of George Washington’s army. Martial law and the formal occupation of New
Orleans by Major General Andrew Jackson were engaged again during the war with
Britain in order to contain the threat of an insurrection. (Daugherty, pp. 36 – 37) Wars in
which U.S. armed forces prosecute in later years, however, provide a clearer picture of
their full engagement in the civil affairs of nation-building through the use of the military
government.
1. The War with Mexico, 1845 - 1849
Said Ulysses S. Grant, the Mexican War was “the most unjust war ever waged by
a stronger republic against a weaker nation….an instance of a republic following the bad
example of European monarchies….” (Grant, p. 54) Historically, no national leadership
of a Western democracy in its right mind wants to accept responsibility for being the
nation to start a war – without socially acceptable provocation. Through the waging and
winning of the War with Mexico, the United States in the words of President Polk
“extended the dominions of peace over additional territories.” (Price, p. 13) Not
withstanding in 1846, the New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, and California territories
along with portions of Colorado and Wyoming had been governed by Mexico –
independent from Spain since 1821 – for 25 years.
As Mexican territories were taken, U.S. commanders remained in place to occupy

and hold the ground until diplomacy returned between the two nations. Major General
Zachary Taylor held northern Mexico, wherein he appointed a military governor for
every city or important town that was defeated. Brigadier General Stephen Kearney took
the New Mexico and California territories, pronouncing himself governor of New Mexico
in Santa Fe on 19 September 1846. As the war effort overtook California, General
Kearney arrived in California to find Major John Fremont already installed as the
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governor from the territory’s governmental seat of Monterey, but had to replace him soon
after his arrival due to “conduct prejudicial to the public service”. (Daugherty, p. 54 –
70)
Meanwhile in central Mexico, General Winfield Scott led the campaign to defeat
and subdue a territory far removed from Washington, D.C. His plan was to occupy all
the major towns along his single and therefore vulnerable line of communication.
(Daugherty, p. 84) The lessons-learned from the War with Mexico read like the to-do list
of the present war effort in Iraq. The importance of public health, local revenue, civil
government, and public relations as well as good relations between the occupying troops
and the local populace came to light in 150 years ago (Daugherty, pp. 86 – 93) and are as
important now as they were then. But difference between now and then is that then, the
U.S. armed forces, responsible directly to President Polk, won the peace.
2. The U.S. Civil War, 1861 - 1865
Arguably the most significant war in the history of the United States, the Civil
War took place during a time when the United Nations didn’t exist so as to conduct a
Chapter VI and a Half intervention and raise hopes for an earlier end to the hostilities.
The Civil War was perhaps “the deadliest conflict in American history” (Boot, p. 56).
This war is an example of intra-state conflict and nation-building that was successful
from the perspective of the Union and one wherein the Union army and its leadership, in
coordination with local authorities, played a huge role in stitching the Union back
together.
At the outset of the Civil War, the use of the military government was up for
debate within the Army’s top leadership. Major General George McClellan took a
conservative stance on the use of armed force against the citizens of the South.
(McClellan, p. 488) Other Union generals took the position that all Confederates ought
to be treated like criminals and should lose their rights as citizens. (Daugherty, p. 95)
The crux of the matter was the second tenet of the Just War Theory – jus in bello. Were
the Confederates to be treated like criminals or like the peoples of a defeated nation and
like prisoners of war?
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But beyond the occupation of the South and its successfully restoration to the
Union, another great contribution to the laws that govern war was the Code of War for
the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field, produced largely as a
result of the work of Dr. Franz Lieber. President Lincoln, in an attempt to secure a more
uniform approach to military governance and the proper handling of the South, appointed
a commission to prepare a study on conduct for the Union army. The result was the Code
mentioned above, which formed the foundation for much of what has been written on
Civil Affairs in the 20th Century. (Daugherty, pp. 95, 121)
3. The Indian Wars of 1800 - 1900
Throughout the end of the 1800s, the U.S. military saw many small wars with
nations of Native Americans who occupied the West. Their seemingly uncivilized way
of life was not comprehended by policymakers in Washington, D.C., and this expansion
west was truly an exercise in invasion, occupation, military governance, and nation-
building. Since the nomadic lifestyle of the plains Indians made it difficult to establish
military rule, reservations were set up upon which to group the Indians in an attempt to
curb the violence that haunted the West for more than 50 years.
This period came to be known popularly as the taming of the West. Settlers
moved out from the East and took up residence on the rich farm and ranchlands of the
plains of Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado, the Dakotas, Wyoming and Montana. They
installed fences and hunted the buffalo almost to extinction, thoroughly disrupting the
lifestyle the Native Americans had enjoyed for centuries. As the towns, outlying homes
and wagon trains of the invading Easterners were attacked, the U.S. government saw fit
to send out the cavalry.
U.S. Army forts were built at strategic points along lines of communication
throughout the West, and the soldiers that resided at these forts went to work subduing a
massive insurrection across a vast territory. The West was “won” through small battles,
as there are only a few large battles on record between the horse soldiers and the Indians.
The most famous of those large battles was the infamous Battle of the Little Big Horn,
led by Major General George A. Custer, which resulted in the annihilation of the 7th
Cavalry, and the lesser known Battle of Wounded Knee, which resulted in the nearly
complete extermination of the Sioux warriors and broke the back of the resistance.
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C. THREE WARS OF THE 20TH CENTURY
1. The Small War: The Philippines, 1899 - 1916
Twenty million dollars paid out of the U.S. treasury into Spain’s placed the 7,108
islands and 7 million Filipinos into U.S. hands for “benevolent assimilation”, so called by
President McKinley (Boot, p. 106). The end of the American war with the Spanish in the
Philippines put American troops in Manila, surrounded by 15,000 Filipino guerilla forces
who were prepared to fight and die further for their independence. Back in Washington,
D.C., a debate raged on about the “benevolent assimilation” of this very foreign land.
Two camps existed: those like Grover Cleveland, Andrew Carnegie, Jane Addams, and
Mark Twain were part of the Anti-Imperialist League and those such as Theodore
Roosevelt, Senator Albert J. Beveridge, and Rudyard Kipling made up the “progressive”
group who thought “the U.S. should take up the white man’s burden” and continue with
the assimilation. (Kiester, p. 44)
Ill-prepared yet again for this new war, Congress raised the strength of the regular
army from 28,183 to 56,688. President McKinley then called for 120,000 volunteers
recruited by the states for a one-year enlistment. (Boot, p. 107) The war to subjugate the
Philippines began in earnest on Luzon, since at first there were not enough U.S. troops to
garrison the entire archipelago. The organized resistance army, President General
Aguinaldo’s Army of Liberation, was defeated by U.S. Commanding General Otis’
troops under the direction of Major General Arthur MacArthur and Brigadier General
Loyd Wheaton. “By February 1900, American troops had marched the length and
breadth of Luzon, scattering insurrectos wherever they went, and breaking the back of
Aguinaldo’s army…. But the war did not end. It entered a new and more dangerous
phase.” (Boot, p. 111)
“The Filipinos stubbornly resisted their new colonial masters, and though
successive U.S. generals proclaimed victory at hand, American soldiers kept dying in
ambushes, telegraph lines kept being cut, and Army convoys kept being attacked” (Boot,
p. 99). As hard-line guerilla commanders tortured and killed any remnants of the Spanish
still present and any Americans they could get their hands on, U.S. troops retaliated in
kind with their own ways of eliciting information, punishing insurrectionists, and those
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who were suspect of harboring them. (Boot, pp. 99 – 100) It was “a war of atrocities”
(Kiester, p. 43).
Among civilian U.S. policymakers, disparity over what was going on in the
thoughts and minds of the Filipinos continued to cause difficulties in the field. Judge
William Howard Taft, sent by President McKinley to “supervise the transition from
military to civilian rule in pacified areas”, held the belief that the Filipino guerillas were
merely bandits and that the upper-class with whom he primarily associated and Filipinos
in general welcomed U.S. rule (Boot, p. 114). General MacArthur’s soldiers in the field
fighting the war knew differently and “displayed considerable cruelty in fighting the
Filipinos” (Boot, p. 115).
The War in the Philippines ended on July 4, 1902, when President Roosevelt
declared the Philippine insurgency to be over (Boot, p. 124). A U.S. colony in the
European fashion, the Filipinos were granted greater autonomy than those under
European rule and established their own legislature in 1916, being the first Asian state to
do so. In 1935, they elected their own president under the benevolent rule of the United
States and in 1945 were granted their own independence. (Kiester, p. 44) In the course
of the war for the Philippines, 126,468 Americans served in 2,811 engagements with
4,234 dead and 2,818 wounded. The Filipinos faired not so well with 16,000 dead in
battle, but also 200,000 civilians dead of disease, famine and “the cruelties of both sides”.
(Boot, p. 125)
Perhaps the best commentary on the results of American peace-building efforts

came from Filipinos themselves. President Manuel Quezon went on record in 1935 when
he found it difficult to pull together enough national spirit to gain independence as having
said: “Damn the Americans! Why don’t they tyrannize us more?” (Boot, p. 125) And
more recently, Filipino senator-statesman, Emmanuel Pelaez – former Philippines vice
president and ambassador to the United States – said when asked about English as the
Philippine national language: “English was the means through which we internalized the
idea of constitutional government and democratic rights. How would you translate ‘due
process of law’ into Tagalog?” (Kiester, p. 45)
49
Thanks to the end of the Cold War, the early 1990s saw the drawdown of
American bases in the Philippine islands as the United States no longer felt the need to
occupy and finally withdrew its forces at the request of the democratic, sovereign
Philippine government. After almost 100 years, the Filipinos were independent of
foreign intervention and hold to this day the distinction of being the only democratic
nation – recognized by the West – in the Far East.
The military government with its accompanying civil affairs was in full swing at
the turn of the 20th Century. The 1930s found the U.S. Army training its Civil Affairs
personnel on the details of assisting a supreme commander in the administration of local
government. New doctrine was being written based upon the concepts learned in the
small wars at the turn of the century and their heroes were teaching their trade in the
schools. (West, pp. 7 – 9)
In the international arena, the League of Nations had failed. Imperialism was
spreading like a stain across Asia, threatening the newly established trade with the West,
and Nazi Germany was rebuilding its war machine for revenge and to retake what it
considered its own.
The attempts at creating a new Germany after World War I hadn’t worked. The
efforts of the international community to subdue the nation were ineffective. As the
United States entered World War II, doctrine was on the shelf that provided a blueprint
for peace in the aftermath of war, and the troops were being trained to implement it. The
actual plans were yet to be developed, but were done so as the war unfolded. In the
aftermath of World War II, a massive effort to shape the peace took place through the
coalition occupation of Germany and the U.S. occupation of Japan.
The results were astounding, but in the course of history, these occupations seem
to have fallen out of the history books. The great battles across Europe and in the islands
of the Pacific are widely discussed in history books and in military schools of leadership.
But the occupation and military governance which secured the peace and made these
nations what they are today is a little discussed, but critical piece of the war effort that
went well into the 1950s.
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2. Germany, 1945 - 1956
The purpose of military government in Germany would be to assist the
military commander to impose his will on the enemy, and the first concern
would be to help maintain the striking power of the military forces by
controlling movements of people and by preventing disease and disorder.
(Ziemke, pp. 30 – 31)
At the end of World War II, the method employed by the military governments
was “reasonably clear”:
• Identification and removal of the ruling Nazi elite.
• Identification and destruction (or modification) of the institutions by
which the Nazi elite maintained itself in power.
• Substitution of new or transformed institutions within which a new
leadership could grow and function.
• Encouragement and support of a new leadership to take the place of the
removed Nazi elite. (Gimbel, p. 2)
In March 1945 when the town of Marburg fell, the war was not over, and
Marburg was a “hotbed of Nazism”. The military governments in place around Germany
in early 1945 had little guidance on how to proceed due to conflicts among military
government planners not yet resolved at higher echelons. (Gimbel, p. 32) With little
guidance from higher headquarters, guidance early on came primarily from reading the
Army’s own Field Manuals, Military Government (FM 27-5, July 1940), from the
Handbook for Military Government in Germany (based upon 27-5; originally written and
distributed in 1943, revised and reissued in December 1944) and The Rules of Land
Warfare (FM 27-10, October 1939).
In mid-1946, the governance of Germany was centralized in Berlin under an

active duty U.S. Army commander and carried on with stabilization and reconstruction
efforts with the Army as the executive agent for the military government, which ended in
1949. It should be noted that during the occupation period, Germany was divided up into
four zones of military governance under the United States, France, Great Britain, and the
Soviets, each guided by their own set of military governance schools, training and
published doctrine. The British in their zone used similar procedures for military
occupation and governance in the British publication, whose occupation is outlined in
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such books as Civil Affairs and Military Government Northwest Europe, 1944 – 1946 (by
V.S.F. Donnison, London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1961).
3. Japan, 1945 - 1952
A defeated Japan lay at the feet of the Allied Pacific forces. In mid-August 1945,
Japan’s Emperor Hirohito capitulated on behalf of his empire upon news of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers
(SCAP), entered Japan on August 30, 1945 via Yokohama harbor at 65 years of age and
unarmed to accept Japan’s surrender and to inaugurate his regime. “The United States
was determined to retain for itself a dominant position and a deciding voice in the
military occupation and control of Japan, while offering the United Kingdom, China, and
the Soviet Union an advisory role.” (Moore, p. 87) The Far Eastern Advisory
Commission took shape, allowing other nations such as Australia, New Zealand, the
Netherlands, France and the Philippines to contribute their concerns and interests as well.
The occupation of Japan began on September 2, 1945 and would endure officially
until April 28, 1952. Although both Germany and Japan experience U.S. occupations
and differing levels of military governance, the occupation of Japan was much, much
different than the one prosecuted by the U.S. and Allied forces in Germany. Both nations
had been devastated by the war, but Japan’s devastation was unusually diverse. Not only
had the Land of the Rising Sun lost almost 3 million souls during the war, experienced
the nuclear bomb, and seen the near total destruction of its capitol city through
firebombing, the nation had around 5 million members of its army and some citizens
dispersed throughout much of Asia due to vast empire-building efforts of the previous 45
years. (Dower, pp. 37, 46 – 50)
While the occupation powers in Germany battled insurgents and replaced most of
the government, much of the Japanese government was left intact with only those who
had been in power during the war being removed. Emperor Hirohito was retained due to
General MacArthur’s strong stance that he’d had little to do with the war generation in
the face of the dominating military powers within the Japanese government of the 1930s.
The emperor was considered at that time to be a central figure in the Japanese way of life
and philosophy, and his removal may have destabilized the nation unnecessarily. Since
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he hadn’t represented the primary war efforts to his people, he was thought to be more
valuable to the regeneration efforts as emperor than as martyr. (Moore, pp. 32 – 35)
The goals of the Occupation, outlined “early” and “often”, were (1) to ensure as
far as possible that Japan would never again become a “menace to the peace and security
of the world” and (2) to encourage the establishment in Japan of a peaceful, democratic
government. “The achievement of the first goal obviously entailed the dismantling of
Japanese armed forces, destruction of related industries, and creation of a compliant
ruling class by a massive purge.” (Moore, p. 9) But in consideration of the second goal,
which incorporated the ideal of allowing the Japanese people to establish a government
by their “freely expressed will”, the potential for conflict of interest existed. It was
through this minefield and in the face of considerable opposition from Washington, D.C.
that General MacArthur and his staff would have to wade.
“To rule Japan during the Occupation, MacArthur used two government
structures. His general headquarters (GHQ) in Tokyo, with roughly 5,000 American
personnel, issued orders and policy directives to the Japanese government, which
implemented them.” (Moore, p. 34) Throughout the early months of the Occupation,
much work went into the constitution efforts between the Japanese government and the
Occupation powers. “The work of laying a new constitutional framework for Japan did
not end on November 3, 1946, when the emperor promulgated the ratified draft, or on
May 3, 1947, when it took effect.” (Moore, p. 317)
During the remaining five years of the occupation, more work was done on the
constitution, and elections were reformed. Although the interim government of Japan
held over from the war period was not able to gain much ground during the occupation
due to public opinion, the peace that is Japan’s was most certainly shaped by the forces
that occupied it. Emperor Hirohito lived to see the fall of the Berlin wall, his death
marking the end of an era for two participants in World War II. (Dower, p. 558)
D. WARS SINCE 1950
The Korean War, or as it was called at the time – Conflict, set the stage for the
transition of military doctrine from one of winning the peace to that of winning the
“war”. The naming of the Korean War as “not war” opened the door for combat or
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armed conflict to be accomplished by the U.S. military outside the confines of war.
Combat spans war and “not war” in present joint doctrine of MOOTW. The door was
then wide open for the separation of other aspects of war – such as humanitarian aid in a
war torn region, strikes, raids, interdiction, and civil affairs – to be placed into their own
separate doctrinal categories of military operations.
During the Vietnam War era, the concept of the military government in doctrine
was molded into the civil affairs concept, wherein it lost its legitimacy in its direct
connection to the president and was changed into a collage of efforts by many
organizations and departments other than the U.S. armed forces. As pointed out earlier in
this paper, the military government lost its authority in the new division of labor and
therefore lost its ability to effectively win the peace. Many issues contributed to the loss
of the Vietnam War, with one of those reasons most likely being the lack of a cohesive
plan to win the peace during a war that was “not war”.
The 1980s and 1990s saw many more military failures on foreign soil, such as the
U.S. military presence in Lebanon and the humanitarian aid operations in Somalia. These
military operations represent a time in U.S. military history wherein military doctrines no
longer contained a holistic approach to war. The result was the failure to accomplish the
objectives of the policymaker as well as the deaths of many armed forces members in
military operations other than war.
The Global War on Terrorism presents yet another challenge to the concept of
war at present, due to the borders it crosses in pursuit of its goals. Like the war on drugs,
its parameters are hard to define as a war against a group of individuals bent on doing
harm for a cause – but who are not associated with a specific government with which to
make war. The clear boundaries of war and its associated concepts blur as territory is
removed from the picture. However, the concepts of the Just War Theory and the laws of
war still apply in the prosecution of armed conflict regardless of the circumstances.
In spite of the changing face of war, the concept of war and its foundational
principles remain constant. In the pursuit of terrorists across the globe, the same rules
apply in the territories wherein armed conflict takes place, because the U.S. armed forces
must still justly handle the civilian populace, the indigenous government and the
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rebuilding of war damages in a secure and legitimate environment. Regardless of how
the war changes in references to the enemy and the battlefield, it must still be prosecuted
in a just manner with winning the peace as the chief end of war.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
It takes more than winning the campaign to win the war. The American military
won the wars mentioned in this chapter, but would not have done so had the peace not
been won as well. The military engagements of the U.S. armed forces since the Korean
War are dominated by failure to accomplish the political will of U.S. policymakers. The
difference between the wars fought before 1955 and after is two-fold.
First, the redefining of war as only large-scale and sustained combat operations
has allowed combat actions to stand alone without the other operations that complete the
concept and finish the war. Secondly, the philosophy and doctrine of the military
occupation set in place to secure and win the peace is no longer used, but is a last resort.
For the first 150 years of American military history, it was the only option, but it worked.
The actions of the U.S. occupations in western U.S. territories, the South, the Philippines,
Japan and Germany demonstrate that the U.S. armed forces are up to the job and that it is
successful. How much greater would be the effects of such a transition to peace if only
the U.S. armed forces were allowed to train, organize, equip and prepare for this mission.
55
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VI. AN ETHICAL BASIS FOR A HOLISTIC JOINT
WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
The U.S. has no intention of determining the precise form of Iraq’s new
government. That choice belongs to the Iraqi people. . . . We will remain
in Iraq as long as necessary and not a day more. America has made and
kept this kind of commitment before in the peace that followed a world
war. After defeating the enemies, we did not leave behind occupying
armies, we left constitutions and parliaments. (Quote from President
George W. Bush shortly before the invasion of Iraq – Ferguson, pp. 6 – 7)
Not only are the Iraqi people undertaking the huge job of building a new
government that is legitimate in the eyes of the people, but they are trying to do so while
a full-scale war is being waged around them. Almost daily, news of bombings, death and
destruction come out of Iraq as a violent struggle for power and against the U.S. and
coalition forces goes on and on. On one page, National Public Radio (NPR) reports that a
bomber struck a U.S. convoy in Mosul, tensions are rising in Basra, and a blast in
Baghdad killed at least another 31 on September 15th following the 150 killed the day
before. On the same page, an article discusses the difficulties the current interim
government is having gaining support from the Sunni minority for the new constitution.
(NPR, Iraqi News, Website, n.d.)
Insurrection, death and destruction are part of the aftermath of every war. But
what sets Iraq apart from other wars the United States has waged is that it falls into the
gray territory “somewhere in between” wherein the United States hasn’t totally deserted
the Iraqi people, but it hasn’t taken charge of the situation to ensure the peace through the
use of a military government. The small wars of the 1980s saw the United States forcibly
removing governments and leaving behind the nation to rebuild itself without further
intervention or assistance. Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty in Panama were
defined as liberations, falling short of nation-building due to a moratorium on funds for
restoring the Panamanian infrastructure. (Fishel, 2000, pp. 108, 114)
The Just War Theory and its application to the current wars of the United States
has generated much on the subject. (Maynes, p. 159) Its application of the Just War
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Theory to the “post-conflict” conundrum of civil-military affairs might help clarify why
the military government is the single option open for policymakers that brings the
greatest chance for success.
What follows the end of formal hostilities has been improperly called “post-
conflict termination” or the “post-conflict transition” to peace. As in every war, the end
of formal hostilities or conflict marks the beginning of informal hostilities and conflict.
This part of the war can be more vicious than the formal conflict as seen in current events
in Iraq. Perhaps a better way to conceptualize this dangerous and critical period
following the cessation of formal hostilities is not “post-conflict termination”, but
“conflict resolution”. (Flavin, p. 96)
This chapter is a discussion of how as those who fight the war as well as their
weaponry and battle plans change, the central truths of war and “conflict resolution” do
not. International laws of war have been written to codify those truths, based in part upon
the Just War Theory in existence for millennia to give shape to what war is about and
how it should be waged. The faces of those who wage the war may change, but war itself
is like a rose – unchanging and fully recognizable even by any other name.
B. THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR
Regardless of what one considers war to be down through the millennia of time,
the essence of war remains the same. The war-waging subjects, battlegrounds, weapons,
tactics and procedures might change, but the essence of war does not. Clausewitz
considers combat to be the essential factor in war and danger, exertion, uncertainty, and
chance its characteristic elements, (Clausewitz, p. 127) Due to the nature of war,
theoreticians of war have concerned themselves with the question of whether the task of
military leadership is an art or a science. Possible answers to this question have also
played a role in how the conduct of war has been perceived and has been presented to the
public for support and legitimization.
The general attitude of the populace of the United States has varied greatly over
time, not the least depending on the collective memory about the most recent war at that
time. But regardless of the era and societal conditions, “the soldier, and particularly the
military officer, has to be able to credibly demonstrate the true essence of military duty in
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the context of the modern, tendentiously pacifist societal consciousness that basically
aims at the peaceful and non-violent resolution of conflicts.” (Micewski, p. 19)
Wars are usually fought to destroy one thing and to force a change to something.
War can be started for just reasons, fought under just conditions and ended in just
conclusions – or not. War can be directed, declared, limited, total, general, controlled,
out-of-control, small, medium, large, nuclear or conventional. But whatever adjectives
are used to describe a particular war, Clausewitz was absolutely right on another account:
War is fraught with friction. What has been called the Clausewitzian loop describes a
reciprocal relationship between force and policy. The end of diplomacy and the
beginning of armed force mark the beginning of war. Therefore, the end of force and the
resumption of diplomacy mark the end of it. (Guttieri, p. 20) This picture of war is the
foundation of the discussion of this chapter.
“The focus upon the zone between armed conflict and the restoration of civil
order is a focus upon what is arguably one of the most obscure of all possible gray areas
in international relations. . . . Occupation is ruled by jus in bello, but is situated
somewhere between war and peace.” (Guttieri, pp. 132, 135, 137) In between the
making and the winning of the war is the gray zone concerning the transition to peace.
War proposes two difficulties: 1) for the policymaker, the moral decision to wage it and
2) for the combatant, the process of how best to win it.
For the policymaker, the warfighter can – under the current rules of engagement
and doctrine of the armed forces – be called to perform a multitude of tasks “short of
war” that provide a more flexible response in the international arena of conflict. For the
warfighter, there are only two categories – war and not war. There is no “range of
military operations other than war” – with perhaps one exception of absolute
humanitarian support in the event of a natural disaster. But even a humanitarian mission
can quickly degenerate into a war (Somalia). The warfighter is either in combat, nearly
in combat or not in combat.
The negation of a range of military operations short of war was clearly illustrated
to me by my father – a Korean War veteran – who gave tribute to his fellow Servicemen
when he was awarded the Korean War medal in May 2004, more than 50 years after the
59
end of America’s first “military operation other than war”. For decades, my father said,
the U.S. government and most Americans called the Korean War a “conflict”, concerned
that calling it a war might trigger some sort of adverse reaction from the Soviet Union
and Red China. Regardless of what Washington thought, he said, to those who fought in
it, it was a war. Fifty years later, America has changed her mind and now allows proper
tribute to be paid to those Servicemen and women, who served their nation and fought to
win the Korean War. (Beaumont, p. 25) Even so, their sacrifice paid for the freedom of
many, but not all. Not withstanding, my father said, those who served – and even more
so those who didn’t come home – have earned this medal. Policymakers can call war by
any name they chose, but to the warfighter, all combat is war – small or large.
Only the face of war changes, but not war itself.

C. “WAR IS WAR IS WAR”
Essentially, then, the art of war is the art of using the given means in
combat; there is no better term for it than the conduct of war. To be sure
in its wider sense the art of war includes all activities that exist for the
sake of war, such as the creation of the fighting forces, their raising,
armament, equipment, and training. (Clausewitz, p. 127)
According to joint doctrine, war is only those combat operations that are large
scale and sustained. Under that definition, only the U.S. Civil War, the World Wars,
Korea and Vietnam – due to their scale or duration, and the Persian Gulf Wars would be
wars. All the other armed conflicts in which the United States has participated are too
short, too small, or perhaps not grand enough to be considered wars, starting with the
Barbary “Operations” in the Mediterranean at the turn of the 19th Century. But according
to Clausewitz, upon whose principles of war joint doctrine is founded, war has a wider
sense with activities that exist for the sake of it.
It’s easy to identify the large wars, fought between states for independence and
security. The United States has fought a few of those. The small wars of 19th and early
20th Centuries were fought on the same basis as the large ones, however, with full-scale
occupations and rebuilding efforts to guide and secure the peace. Through the course of
the Cold War and international events, we turned our back on the concept of the military
government and have allowed the small wars of today to confound us and make us
wonder what we’re doing and how to do it.
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As learned from the U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual of 1940, the common
thread between wars – small or large, legal or illegal, civil or interstate, urban or rural – is
armed combat. Combat and war are not equals in that the concept of war contains more
than just combat. However, combat or armed conflict by national armed forces cannot
exist outside the umbrella of war.
The threat of attack and armed combat constitutes an imminent or possible war –
such as the Cold War. But does that common thread of armed combat make a small war
a real war? When it comes to gang violence, perhaps it doesn’t. But in the employment
of the national armed forces of a great world power such as the United States, I believe it
does, and in the use of this great, but limited, power, it behooves such a nation to ensure
it does so under full recognition and employment of the Just War concept.
1. Applying the Just War Theory
The modern theory of international law and the Just War Theory reach back
centuries to the philosophical ideas of Plato and Aristotle, but gains momentum in the
writings of Saint Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Hugo Grotius, and Immanuel Kant.
(Christopher, pp. 10, 29, 49, 66, and 190) The Hague Conventions of 1907 have
provided a modern platform, translating the philosophical foundation into international
law governing the conduct of war. The Geneva Conventions of 1929, 1949 and the
Additional Protocols of 1977 have added to that legal platform, wherein 192 states have
signed up to these protocols and conventions, the most recent of these being East Timor
in 2003. (Federal Dept of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland;
http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/e/home.html , accessed on 25 August 2005) If one will go
back farther into history, the laws of war find their origins in Roman and Canon Law.
(van Creveld, pp. 65 – 66, 87)
The Just War Theory proposes two concepts or rules by which to make a war –
just ad bellum and just in bello. In short, the Theory falls into two parts, with a first set
of principles, the Jus ad bellum (Right to war) criteria, concerning the conditions that
make the use of force permissible; and a second set of principles, the Jus in bello (Right
in war) criteria, concerning the rules of how war should be conducted.
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The decision made by the policymaker to go to war must be just as well as the
prosecution of the war by the warfighter must also be just. When one looks at war from
these two lenses – international law of war and the Just War Theory, one can come to
only one conclusion. If war is a continuum from diplomacy to force and back to
diplomacy, then until diplomacy is secured, the war is still going on. If the war is still
going on, then in that jus in bello part of war (its prosecution by the warfighter, the weak
require protection.
Taking this one step further, not only do the weak require protection, but
according to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, much more is required of the occupying
power than just protection of the civilian population. Restoration of the nation to
working order – to include education, medical care, and fair wages to any workers
employed by the occupying power – is also required. (UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights Website, Geneva Conventions Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Entry to Force 21 October 1950, n.d.)
As various presidents take the United States into war – small and large, the
decision to do so (jus ad bellum) is sometimes not very clear at the outset of the fighting.
At the beginning of the Civil War, when the North declared war on the South in 1860,
President Lincoln declared the war to be one of preservation – that a “house that is
divided against itself cannot stand”. Three years into the war, the President issued the
Emancipation Proclamation that gave the civil war a better and more just cause – against
slavery and for all to have some level of rights. The same can be said of the United
States’ involvement in World War II, which began through President Roosevelt’s
lobbying for support of the British and its allies against German imperialism. It was later
discovered that the Nazis were exterminating parts of its population, and the war cause
shifted to the nobler end of ending the reign of a genocidal regime. (Temes, pp. 195 –
196)
As war is redefined as just combat and no longer incorporates the idea of

protecting the weak in the return to diplomacy, two unwanted situations are already seen
to have played out in the more recent wars of the United States. On one side of the coin
in the aftermath of any armed conflict (whether or not it called a war), the protection of
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the weak in the vacuum at the end of formal hostilities left by the would-be occupation
forces is filled by whoever is the strongest and not necessarily by those who have the best
interest of the nation and its people at heart – as seen with the re-establishment of the
warlord system in present day Afghanistan and the on-going destruction in Iraq.
On the other side of the coin, when armed forces are used in combat alone and not
under the rules of engagement in war, the national troops of a nation such as the United
States are reduced to the level of common thugs – one of the root causes of the violations
of international conventions in the Vietnam War. (van Creveld, pp. 92, 207) The
principles of the Just War or the laws of war can be stated as the rules of engagement in
these armed conflicts outside the parameters of war, but upon what basis? The concept of
war is a holistic one – one that comes with all the bits and pieces that make a legitimate
whole. National armed forces are bound to execute the laws of war in full and to abide
by the second tenet of the Just War Theory, or they stand to lose more their legitimacy
and the legitimacy of the nation for whom they fight.
2. International Law on War, Occupation and Human Rights
A shift occurred in the thinking within the international arena governing
warmaking, demonstrated by the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which gave legal
definition to the formal military occupation. The sovereignty of the state was the focus of
international law at that time, but the rights of the individual now take precedence over
the sovereignty of the state. With human rights and the rights of the individual having
risen to the fore, a higher value than that found in the past was assigned to the lives of
those noncombatants present in a war zone, whose existence could no longer be run over
by tanks without international reprisal. (Goodman, pp. 1575, 1579) This has been partly
evidenced in cases brought to trial by individuals versus the nation of Germany following
World War I – the occupying power in Russian Poland during that war as described in the
Yale Law Journal published in February 1918. (Yale Law Journal, 1918, p. 577)
The principles drawn from international law on occupation might be best applied
if tailored to the situation at hand – principles regarding “humanitarian and due process
norms” as well as those guiding “human rights, self-determination, the environment, and
economic development so as to create a legal regime uniquely suitable for the territory in
question.” One of the driving forces behind the military occupation, more aptly called
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the military government, is the protection of human rights. If human rights are not
protected in the aftermath of formal hostilities, the entire war effort collapses like a house
of cards. The occupation rests upon “an enormously complex legal framework” that,
depending on the nation in which the war is waged and under what circumstances, creates
vast possibility for violations. (Scheffer, pp. 843, 847)
Articles of the Hague Regulations require that the occupying power do all in its
power to restore and ensure public order and safety, the education of the children, to
ensure the protection of the rights of the worker, the maintenance of medical and hospital
establishments, and so forth while respecting the laws in force in the country. (UN
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Website, Geneva Conventions
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Entry to Force 21 Oct
1950, n.d.) As seen in military occupations in past U.S. war history, these tasks were
accomplished by the U.S. military. In more recent U.S. occupations such as those in Iraq
and Afghanistan, these tasks are being accomplished by someone else – Afghanistan’s
interim government, the provisional Iraqi authorities in addition to a large assortment of
NGOs, IOs, and U.S. governmental organizations such as USAID in addition to their
“military advisors”.
The problem with assigning or allowing such important tasks to be done by an

organization other than the U.S. military is accountability and legitimacy. NGOs and
international organizations are not responsible to a governing body or individual, such as
the U.S. Congress or president, nor can they be forced to finish the job. The U.S. military
is fully accountable to the president, which forms the legitimate foundation of the
occupation and the boundaries within the occupation would proceed. Therefore, if a
nation such as the United States is going to ensure the success of the war and its
occupation, it would behoove that nation to put the U.S. military in charge of it in order
to maintain legitimacy and accountability as well as the insurance that it will be
completed as directed by the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.
In light of the international trials that government officials faced in the decades of
post-World War II era for violations of international and humanitarian law, leaving this
important part of the war up to chance would not then be an option.
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Reflections on the nature of war and warfare make clear that the definition of war
must be all-inclusive. The focus of the second tenet of the prosecution of a just war (jus
in bello) and the primary point of international law is security – the security (or the
protection) of the weak. During formal hostilities, the weak must be protected, or the
invading forces lose legitimacy. After the formal hostilities end, security becomes even
more difficult as factions struggle for power within the vacuum left by the destroyed
government and infrastructure, and if security is not ensured, legitimacy is lost in the eyes
of the defeated civilian populace. A 2005 RAND study noted what the history of all of
the wars of the United States demonstrate – that the likelihood of criminality and political
violence are increased by war and regime change. (Jones, p. 9)
When combat is separated from the concept of war and used as a tool of foreign
policy by itself, the security of the people on whose land the combat takes place is
compromised. When war is equated to combat alone and the armed forces depart without
ensuring the peace, again the security of the people on whose land the “war” is waged is
compromised.
As established in the Post-Conflict Reconstruction task framework produced by

the U.S. Army and the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2002, security is
the “precondition for achieving successful outcomes in the other pillars”, which are
justice and reconciliation, social and economic well-being, and governance and
participation. (Task Framework, p. 3)
Security is an absolute in transition to peace. There is no peace without security.

(Jones, p. 7) However, joint warfighting doctrine on military operations other than war
does not teach this principle. The current joint publication on military operations other
than war states that legitimacy of action is critical to the success of MOOTW (JP 3-07,
1995, p. II-5).
However, security is established as the third (not the first) principle of MOOTW
whereby warfighters are to be successful in MOOTW and is not the security of the
wartorn people. The security as stated by this publication refers to that of the armed
forces and their operation. Security may be provided to civilians and participating
65
agencies and organizations, but the security of civilians in the war zone are not
mentioned, let alone guaranteed. (JP 3-07, 1995, p. II-4)
In this publication alone, it is evident that a holistic concept of the Just War is not
taught to the warfighter in the U.S. armed forces, because without security, there is no
legitimacy. Without legitimacy, there can be no justice in war. Without a Just War, there
is no peace. The just prosecution of war, prosecuted fully according to the laws of
international warfare, is the legitimate foundation for a just transition to peace – one that
requires security, patience, resources, and time. (Micewski, pp. 209 – 210)
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VII. A PROPOSAL FOR JOINT WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
The military government is a concept that has faded like a sunset on Waikiki
Beach. The U.S. armed forces are left instead with decades of doctrine that has taught
them that winning the battle means winning the war and that a destroyed nation can and
should take care of the ingrained problems that brought it to its knees. All the U.S. armed
forces have to do is show them the way. Although this doctrine works well for getting
the troops home faster, it leaves death, destruction and danger in its wake.
The establishment of peace after formal combat takes time. First, the losing
forces must understand fully that they have lost, and then the rebuilding begins. General
Micewski develops the definitive elements of traditional warfare – victory and time – in
relation to asymmetrical warfare and brings together the efficient end of the war with the
restoration of peace as a function of the aspect of time in light of the Just War Theory.
(Micewski, pp. 209 – 210)
As recent history has shown, when the formal combat has ended, the defeated
people don’t necessarily welcome the victorious army with open arms and victory
parades. Insurgencies, power struggles, looting, and rebuilding every aspect of the
wartorn nation is what characterizes the “post-conflict transition”. This transition period
is far from peaceful; however, “dominance on the battlefield will be squandered if the
United States does not have the tools to win the hearts and minds and secure lasting peace
out of its military engagements.” (Orr, p. 9)
In the confusion and hopelessness that reigns in the reality at the end of formal
hostilities, one real-world example of a successful civil-military operation sheds some
valuable insight into the possibilities of what the civil-military operation should at the
lowest level during formal hostilities. The example spreads to the transition to peace in
the use of the terms – civil and military. Due to their efforts, they won the peace in their
small corner of the war – even though the war was lost in the end.
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During most devastating war in the history of the United States, a small group of
marines made all the difference in lives of the people whose peace and freedom they
were willing to die to secure. Committed to a cause greater than that for which they’d
been sent to fight, this handful of warfighters demonstrated international law, jus in bello,
and the winning of the peace in action.
B. HISTORICAL EXAMPLE: A SUCCESSFUL CIVIL-MILITARY
OPERATION
Inside the “big unit” war fought in Vietnam by Westmoreland’s troops was
another “small war” known as the “pacification struggle”, waged by the Department of
Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Agency for International
Development (USAID), the U.S. Information Agency, and the State Department.
In 1967, the Johnson administration unified all these programs under

CORDS (Civil Operations and Rural Development Support), a joint civil-
military office headed by a pugnacious bureaucrat named Robert Komer.
Many of the pacification programs concentrated on the struggle for “hearts
and minds,” spending millions of dollars to build schools and hospitals,
resettle refugees, improve rice production, electrify rural areas, spread pro-
government propaganda. (Boot, p. 304)
Alongside the more long-term pacification efforts was the marine-initiated

Combined Action Program (CAP), which was started in 1965 at the suggestion of marine
major general, Lewis Walt – who had trained under Chesty Puller, a veteran of the early
20th Century Nicaraguan “school of nation-building”, otherwise known as civil affairs.
The CAP’s purpose was, as in the early days of the 20th Century, to provide immediate
security to the local villagers of Vietnam from the Viet Cong, who raided constantly for
food, “volunteers”, shelter, and intelligence. Paired with a platoon from the South
Vietnamese Popular Forces (a militia), 12 to 15 U.S. marines worked to give the local
forces a working knowledge of military “know-how”, which when coupled with the
Vietnamese knowledge of local conditions, resulted in amazing strength. (West, pp. 7 –
9)
The Army’s command leadership was skeptical of the ability of the marines to be
successful due to their remote location in the coastal village of Binh Nghia, 300 miles
north of Saigon and 400 miles south of Hanoi. Binh Nghia was a community if seven
hamlets and 5,000 residents that was “virtually run by the Vietcong”. When the U.S.
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marines arrived, they “slept side-by-side with the Vietnamese in a ramshackle fort, ate
the same food, smoked the same cigarettes, drew the same patrol assignments.” (Boot, p.
305)
General Walt had two stipulations for the marine volunteers. First, these had to
be seasoned warfighters, and secondly, only men who could get along with the villagers
could go. When marine units were polled, “the response was enthusiastic.” The results
of the marines’ efforts were astounding, but the easy life they thought they were going to
have in the villages did not materialize. (West, p. 11) Not withstanding, the Vietnamese
Popular Forces gained guerilla warfare skills rapidly, becoming as adept as their enemies
and turned the enemy forces back more than 70 times in the first two months.
Once, when the combined forces let their guard down for only a moment, the
Vietcong almost overtook the camp in a desperate firefight. Five marines lost their lives
with one wounded, and when asked if they wanted to evacuate, the remaining ten chose
to stay on and help train the replacements. The CAP unit gained six new marines, all
volunteers, and continued its mission at Binh Nghia with increasing success. Although
hit several more times by Vietcong regulars and guerillas – even after being ordered to
evacuate before one particularly large assault, the CAP stayed in place and beat the odds
in a war that was largely a failure for most other U.S. troops.
The U.S. marines began departing in October 1967, two years after their arrival.
The remaining Popular Forces had some setbacks, but Binh Nghia remained a stronghold
against the Vietcong, becoming so peaceful by 1970 that it became known as a rest and
relaxation center (R & R center) to a new American district adviser.
No village protected by a Combined Action Platoon was ever repossessed

by the Vietcong,” Brute Krulak wrote, “and 60 percent of the marines
serving in Combined Action units volunteered to stay on with their marine
and Vietnamese companions for an additional six months when they could
have returned to the United States. (Boot, p. 307)
Sir Robert Thompson, the British counterinsurgency expert, said the CAPs were
the best idea he’d seen in Vietnam and that it worked superbly. The Army was reluctant
to put men into CAPs due to the shortage of manpower and to the potential danger of
total loss. But as the war played out, CAPs saw 50 percent fewer combat casualties than
69
did the “big unit” search-and- destroy missions the army did on a day-to-day basis. After
the war in his memoirs, General Westmoreland said that he “simply didn’t have enough
members to put a squad of Americans in every village and hamlet.” (Boot, p. 307)
The point of this story is to help clarify the concept of civil-military operations
that has become convoluted through the redefinition of terms and their consequent
misuse. In past doctrines, civilian meant those indigenous peoples upon whose land the
war was waged. These U.S. marines were civil-military “operators” – who engaged in
hand-to-hand combat and yet were fully immersed in helping guide a village to security
at the same time.
In the conflicted transition to peace through stability and restoration operations,

the concept is the same. The enemy must be defeated, whatever form he takes, and the
people must be protected by the warfighter, regardless of the cost. The only way to do
this is through occupation, wherein the warfighter wins the hearts and minds of the
people, first through security and then through other means. The next and natural step –
had Hanoi conceded to the United States and the South Vietnamese forces – would have
been the establishment of the military government throughout South Vietnam, but
especially in the outlying areas near the northern border such as Binh Nghia. The
warfighters who knew the people and the land would most likely have been successful in
the implementation of the peace due to the foundation already laid.
C. THESIS SUMMARY
First, MOOTW should be redefined to mean only those operations that
completely exclude any form or the threat of combat. Conversely, the concept of war
must be applied according to its age-old definition – armed conflict of any size, to include
the armed conflict that takes place while the peace is being secured. Thirdly, it should be
clear in joint warfighting doctrine that once the decision is made by the policymaker to
go to war, the war must then be conducted under the second tenet of the Just War Theory,
whereby the weak are protected until the peace is won. The natural progression of this
thinking is the incorporation of international laws of war and occupation in order to reach
the primary end of peace.
70
If war is a permanent fixture on the horizon of international affairs, perhaps it is
time for the war-avoiding doctrine of the U.S. armed forces to return to the warfighting
doctrine that has proven true in the past. The recommendations for success at nation-
building made by the 2005 RAND study introduced earlier read like the doctrine on
military government of 1947. (RAND Study, Establishing Law & Order after Conflict,
2005, pp. 115 – 116) No one seems to question what needs to be done during the
transition. The current question is who is going to do it and the lack of trained personnel
to ensure its success is a large part of what seems to be holding up the process.
In respect to U.S. military doctrine, while we’re working really hard to get part of
it right, the other critical half drops off into the ocean. U.S. warfighting doctrine gets the
“big unit” war right just when the guerilla war becomes what U.S. warfighting is all
about – even though guerilla warfighting tactics have been a part of every war. The
concept of nation-building as the transition from war to peace just in time for a Cold War
with the threat of nuclear war and end to empire-building or democracy-cloning. Then,
as the U.S. military begins to improve its guerilla warfare capabilities, the wars in Iraq
provide engagement in major battles fought in large cities through huge urban areas full
of insurrectionists, hauntingly similar to the war fought in Mogadishu in 1993.
All of these kinds of warfare are well represented in U.S. war history. The U.S.
military has a rich history from which to draw its plans for recruiting, organizing, training
and equipping its troops for urban, guerilla, and big-unit wars and the nation-building that
is part of them all. The U.S. military – and the individual warfighter – is capable of
training to do more than one thing at a time and should not turn its back on a viable,
successful doctrine to make room for another more popular one that results in failure.
Military doctrine can be changed as can be seen in the Army’s more recent
approach to general European warfare. One thinker had something good to say of the
current MOOTW doctrine:
Today’s OOTW concept may sound inadequate, vague, and even a little
silly, but it deserves a lot of respect. For the first time, the U.S. Army, and
even the U.S. armed forces in general, have publicly acknowledged that
combat smaller in scale than a World War II or Gulf War crusade deserves
significant official attention. OOTW may not be the best of terms or set of
ideas, but it’s a start, however tentative. (Bolger, p. 38)
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The statement that OOTW is a tentative start is actually true. It brings to the fore
the struggle that the U.S. armed forces have been facing in their battles abroad for the
past 40 years and are currently embroiled in today. It demonstrates the many forms that
war can take and the difficulties of interjecting one’s own forces into the middle of
another’s civil war.
Joint warfighting doctrine should encompass the battle for victory and the battle
for peace. War, large and small, is a continuum of two battles for two goals, not one –
first for surrender and then for stability. Spanning these two battles, there exists only one
war for the hearts and minds of the people. First, the fact of defeat must be established.
Then in order to repair the damage done, a hope secure in tomorrow must also be won.
The first battle is the easy one with clear objectives and hands-on weapons. It is
won through the pitting of warfighter against warfighter with a definitive outcome on the
physical battlefield. The second battle is much more difficult to win and depends wholly
on the people themselves. If they are not won over to a new way of life, the entire war is
lost. As has been successfully done in the past, the armed forces of the invading nation
are not only in the best position to bring about the peace, but they are the only ones who
can ensure it. The invading armed forces are bound by jus in bello and international law
– timeless principles – to stabilize and restore. It is these principles that, at a minimum,
should be taught in joint warfighting doctrine.
D. RECOMMENDATION TO JOINT DOCTRINE
The most critical civil-component is governance: who will provide civil
administration of the occupied or liberated area? ….Options for post-
conflict governing authorities may be to return governance to former
authorities, to install a new government, to establish an international
organization as an interim governing body, or, as a last resort, to establish
an interim military government until a civilian government can be formed.
(JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Operations, p. I-19)
Joint doctrine on CMO says it best above, but it reduces the possibility for success
in naming the interim military government as a last resort. Regardless of the reasons the
policymaker sees this as a last resort, the warfighter should draw upon his own history
and recommend what has worked.
72
1. Remove the Ambiguity on War and “Not War” in Joint doctrine by
Placing All Combat under the Umbrella of War
Combat should not span both war and “not war”. The lesser and nonconventional
combat that has been redefined as existing outside of war – for instance, the kind of
combat that is required to put down the insurgency – has allowed for the removal of the
concept of the military occupation and government (which includes much conflict,
combat and potential combat) from the doctrine of war, incorrectly making the military
government (civil administration) an operation other than war.
The resulting ambiguity is profound in joint doctrine and is amplified in Service

doctrine as the primary land warfare Services (U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps) try to
interpret it. Define all combat and armed conflict as war, to include the fight for the
peace that follows the formal hostilities and takes the warfighter through the insurgencies
that will inevitably take place. Recognize that winning the war means winning the peace,
which most likely will take decades.
2. Apply jus in bello to the U.S. Armed Forces in Any War – Large or
Small
Today, we have a convoluted concept of civil affairs and civil-military operations
since we have separated it from the concept of war. Current doctrine says that the most
critical component of the civil-military operations or the post-conflict transition period is
governance, but the concept of the military government has been virtually eliminated.
Instead, the publication for the U.S. armed forces asks the critical “who” question, but
can’t answer it. The military occupation and governance that was successful in the past is
not now politically or internationally acceptable and has been shelved as a “last resort”.
(JP 3-57, p. I-19)
Now why is enlisting Iraqis in security and governance early so

important? My view is it’s important because it is their country. We are
not in Iraq to engage in nation building. Our mission is to help the Iraqis,
so that they can build their own nation. It’s something that a people have
to do for themselves. It cannot be handed to a people, and I think it’s an
important distinction. The foreign presence in any country is in my view
unnatural…Spoken by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Thursday,
25 September 2003 at the Eisenhower National Security Conference
(www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030925-secdef0712.html)
73
When the armed forces of the United States invaded Iraq in March 2003, they
took apart or disbanded whatever fragile security structure the people might have had.
Regardless of the condition and operating procedures of the government of Iraq in 2003,
the U.S. and coalition forces became the only security the people of Iraq then had. In jus
in bello, the invading forces have “a duty to the innocent, even when it means the risk of
the [soldier’s] own life.” (Christopher, p. 25)
3. Return the Doctrine of Military Governance to the Active Portfolio
and Recommend It – Even If Policymakers Chose Not to Use It
The United States seems not to be too affected by international opinion at this
time, so now is a good time to return the concept of the military “occupation” to the play
book. But this time, instead of renaming war, call occupation by another name –
something more politically acceptable. And then train for it.
4. Develop the Continuum of War as a Corollary to jus in bello and the
Doctrine on the Military Government – The Battle for Victory and
Battle for Peace
The battle for peace should include the military government tailored to the
defeated nation and its region; the rebuilding of the roads, houses, schools, basic
infrastructure and public utilities of the nation; medical care for the population; security
against looting and rioting; a viable justice system – militarily or U.S. civilian
administered; demining and collection of unexploded ordnance; maintenance of prisons
and prisoners per international law; rejoining of the indigenous armed and security
forces. This is the more critical winning of the hearts and minds of the people – over to a
hope for a better future through the good will, hard work and continued sacrifice of the
same forces that brought death and destruction in the months before.
5. Develop Distinctive and Meaningful Terminology to Clearly Explain
War and “Not War”
Much confusion exists today on the use of the words civil, military, affairs,
operations, stability, reconstruction, post-conflict, and so forth. The word “civil” or
“civilian” refers to any non-military individual who takes part in a war effort and in the
currently distinctly separate peace process. Joint doctrine needs to lead the way on what
terms refer to what operations and people. Recommend using historical doctrinal pieces
as the basis for applying these words and terms. Service doctrine needs to follow suit.
74
This conundrum of terms and responsibilities is also due in part to the different
organizations trying to make sense of things from different perspectives. Beside who’s
going to do what during and after the main battles are over and what is classified as
civilian and what is not, a problem exists on who is in charge and the division of labor.
Everybody wants to be in charge, but no one wants to do the dirty work – the story of
mankind. However, the statement of the obvious is that with the restoration of the
military government as part of the process of war, a natural progression occurs, beginning
with clear lines of authority and teamwork.
E. RESTORATION OF TERMS
War is all armed conflict or combat and includes the transition to peace following
the end of formal hostilities or a declaration of victory. The Campaign is the major block
of battles wherein the enemy forces are primarily defeated and wherein the defeated
national leader must capitulate formally and publicly in order to begin the pursuit of
peace in earnest. The Conquest for Peace encompasses any and all operations,
institutions, and agreements that bring the nation back to the international community as
a stable and sovereign whole.
Civil Affairs Department is the department within the U.S. Department of Defense
(DOD) and each Service akin to the Public Affairs Department whose mission is to assist
primarily in the buildup of the military occupation and government or to advise on how
to work with indigenous governments and institutions of foreign nations when assisting
in truly humanitarian operations. These critical personnel form the foundation as a
liaison to the civilian populace of the defeated nation. They also work alongside the
combat warrior as the campaign unfolds, establishing the critical relationship between
those indigenous civilians who can assist the war effort.
Civil-Military Operations are those liaisons undertaken and relationships built

between the U.S. military and the indigenous peoples in various capacities throughout the
entire war, until the troops redeploy home. These liaison officers should include Foreign
Area Officers (FAOs) who are familiar with the region, its culture, and its languages, and
who fall under the Civil Affairs Department of their Service.
75
CMO is not the relationship between the military and the State Department,
NGOs and IOs. CMO, as seen in the Vietnam War example, are a joint, combined and
coalition effort between various agencies in addition to the military. However, the
working relationship between civilians other than the indigenous peoples and the military
should be called something else.
Executive Coordination is specifically that communication required between

officials in the DOD (to include the Combatant Commanders) and officials within the
State Department (DOS) or other executive branch departments, similar to that described
in the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual of 1940, including USAID and the CIA, in
concert with the National Security Council and in the pursuit of national wartime
objectives.
In the event of impending invasion and wars of any size and anywhere, the DOS
should organize and coordinate the participation of any and all non-governmental
(NGOs) and international organizations (IOs) with the DOD and should be the conduit of
all communication between DOD and any outside organizations. It should be recognized
that neither the DOD nor the DOS (or the DOJ or DOE) work for each other, but that
each has a specific and critical duty that is vital to the success of the war. This plan of
communication requires the DOS to be involved from the beginning of the war and
reconstruction plans. The DOS might utilize USAID to organize NGO and IO response
and assistance.
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
“To understand the future, then study the past.” Even as the organizations that
wage war, the conventions to which it is subjected, and the aims for which it is fought
remain products of historical circumstance, war itself is an “unchanging axis around
which revolves the whole of human existence….” (van Creveld, pp. 192, 218) Joint
warfighting doctrine is woefully inadequate in the provision of an effective tool to the
warfighter in the winning of the nation’s wars. In its inadequacy, it fails the policymaker
as well in the conquest for the successful accomplishment of foreign policy objectives.
In fighting the wars of the nation without the inclusion of the post-campaign
transition to peace under military governance and control, the U.S. armed forces are
76
relegated to being the World’s Police Force. Instead of reporting directly to the President
of the United States as his special emissaries and strong hand in a dangerous and
promising new order, the U.S. armed forces are reduced to putting their lives on the line
in the endless mission of special security that is out of control.
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APPENDIX. DODD 2000_13, 1994
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INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
1. Defense Technical Information Center

Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
3. Joint Doctrine Branch, Joint Staff (J7)

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon
Arlington, Virginia
4. Air Force Doctrine Center

Maxwell AFB, Alabama
97

The Just War or Just A War A Proposal For Ethical Joint Doctrine of War

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Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive

Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection

The just war or just a war a proposal for ethical joint

THE JUST WAR OR JUST A WAR? A PROPOSAL FOR

Thesis Advisor: Karen Guttieri

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THE JUST WAR OR JUST A WAR? A PROPOSAL FOR AN ETHICAL JOINT

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Author: Sarah J. Schultz, Major, USAF

Approved by: Karen Guttieri, PhD

Edwin Micewski, PhD

Douglas Porch, PhD

My gratitude to Khing Kantasa for allowing me many worry-free work hours,

Chapter II highlights the significance of joint doctrine to the warfighter, who is

In the understanding and application of these two concepts to warfighting, one

Primarily, joint doctrine contains “fundamental principles that guide the

2) Joint warfighting strategy and doctrine of today lost at least one

If a war is to be just, at a minimum the combatant must protect the non-

In regaining a full understanding of the parameters of war, the Clausewitzian

Doctrine is defined by the U.S. Joint Staff as the “fundamental principles by

British military doctrine is explicit in its connection between doctrine and

The American approach to doctrine is that it is authoritative, but emphasizes

Military doctrine interfaces with military education in the teaching of military,

Much time is invested in professional military education throughout the career of

Thirdly, civilians such as members of the executive branch departments, the

If war is a continuum from diplomacy to force to diplomacy, current U.S. joint

In the course of this review, an examination of the historical pathway of joint

… an aid to education and training in the historical approach of Marine

Under the auspices of the military government, the maltreatment of prisoners by

According to this field manual, the occupation and military government is a

Military necessity requires in the conduct of operations, as well as in the

Military government is listed first and is defined as “the supreme authority

In this same section of the introductory chapter (#1), a couple of sentences

Included, also, may be complete assumption of executive, legislative,

The manual then outlines a laundry list of “circumstances” wherein CA

Chapter 12 of this FM is entitled “Military Government”, which discusses the

“Small wars vary in degrees from simple demonstrative operations to military

Within this 113-page document, there is no mention whatsoever of “military

War is further defined as “a violent clash of interests between or among organized

Following the post-conflict activities, the publication moves quickly on to

“The most critical civil-component is governance: who will provide civil

“The US military contributes to shaping the security environment and addresses

Although at first, the terms seem to be interchangeable, JP 3-57.1 insists on using

Offensive and defensive operations normally dominate military operations

In summary, MOOTW includes offensive, defensive, big-war, small-war, war-

Stability operations’ purpose is to “promote and sustain regional and global

Currently, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), joint civil-military units

As General Douglas MacArthur learned in Korea, political considerations that are

Doctrine is prescriptive and authoritative, but not directive. It is not a

Doctrine begins with an understanding of why the mission is to be accomplished

As Mexican territories were taken, U.S. commanders remained in place to occupy

Perhaps the best commentary on the results of American peace-building efforts

In mid-1946, the governance of Germany was centralized in Berlin under an

Only the face of war changes, but not war itself.

As war is redefined as just combat and no longer incorporates the idea of

The problem with assigning or allowing such important tasks to be done by an